Chapter XXIV: Appendix (2)

“HIGHNESS,—The undersigned members of the _corps consulaire_ have the honour to transmit to your Highness the subjoined memorandum, by which they take respectfully the liberty of calling your Highness’s attention to the consequences which may be entailed on his country by the authorisation accorded to the firm of Ranking to establish a bank with the power of issuing notes on conditions contrary, as they contend, to their several treaties of commerce and the interests of their subjects, &c.

(Signed) “A. DE BOTMILIAU,

_Chargé d’Affaires de France, &c. &c._”

N.

_Notes about the Khamírs._

Since writing the text I have had access to a source of very valuable and authentic information about the people and country whose name became almost synonymous with the earlier phases of the Tunisian Expedition. Prior to the month of April 1881, the Khamír districts were totally a _terra incognita_ to European travellers: all existing maps were based on the dubious authority of Arab description and native legends, and, as afterwards turned out, had no practical value. The very charts used during the advance were but an illustration of the blind leading the blind, and proved to be wholly fallacious and misguiding. One of the most striking of the vulgar errors existing about the Khamírs relates to the question of population. They have been generally reckoned at about three times their real number, and other neighbouring tribes, such as the Ouchtetas, have been more or less confounded with the Khamírs proper. The only detail not overpainted and exaggerated seems to be the natural difficulties of the country itself. The essential features of Khamír-land are mountains with steep sides and razor-like ridges, dense forests of oak and impenetrable tangle, and an entire absence of roads or paths. Under these circumstances, wholly apart from the Khamírs themselves, the military movements were both arduous and remarkable, especially when we consider that they were to a great extent performed during the fall of torrential rain. One of the few results of the campaign has been a minute survey of the whole province, and a sufficient knowledge of the people who live there.

The Khamírs are grouped into _three_ great tribes, containing many divisions and subdivisions. The following exhaustive table was drawn up by an able officer on the staff, who was one of the first French soldiers to enter, and the last to leave, the Khamír country:—

_Selloul._

Huts or Tents, 208 }
}
Inhabitants, 892 } Nine divisions, one of them having three and
} another two subdivisions.
Guns, 384 }

_Slelma._

Huts or Tents, 620 }
}
Inhabitants, 2751 } Six divisions, two of them having three and
} one two subdivisions.
Guns, 866 }

_Tedmaka._

Huts or tents, 1007 }
}
Inhabitants, 3674 } Six divisions, one having six, three having
} four, and two having three subdivisions.
Guns, 1030 }

Total, Huts or tents, 1835.

Inhabitants, 7317.

Guns, 2270.

It is strange to notice that Commandant Villot, in his brochure, estimates the fighting men alone of these three tribes at 9900! (See _ante_.)

The same officer composed another table, showing the strength of the three columns invading Khamír-land, and the casualties which happened to each of them during their expedition of forty-nine days (24th April-10th June):—

Brigade Brigade Brigade
Caillot. Vincendon. Galland.

Officers, 128 170 149

Men, 3725 4641 4024

(In all 2120 mules and 628 horses.)

Entered hospital, 767 222 311

Wounded in action, 177 14 26

Killed in action, 8 6 3

Transfered to other hospitals 216 103 123
(_evacués_),

The following is a correct summary of the movements of the invading force during the same period:—

“April 26th.—Brigade Ritter at Demanet-Rebah.

Brigade Vincendon at El Aioun.

Brigade Galland at Ain Smain.

The Brigade Ritter ascended the Djebel Addeda as far as Baba Brik in two columns, setting out at 3 A.M. and arriving at 8.30. The column Vincendon advanced into the defile Fedj-Kahla in two divisions, with the 7th Battalion of Chasseurs as advance guard, and reached at 8 A.M. Hadgar Menkoura. General Galland’s brigade skirted the mountain with two cannons. The insurgents cut off the 2d company of the 22d Regiment, and killed five soldiers besides wounding seventeen. Position in the evening:—The Brigade Galland at Hadgar Menkoura, the Brigade Vincendon at Kef Cheraga, and the Brigade Ritter at Baba Brik. Tabarca is occupied by Colonel Delpech.

April 27th.—Ritter attacked with apoplexy, and removed to La Calle. His brigade at El Aioun. No other movement.

April 28th.—General Forgemol advances to Hadgar Menkoura, and brings back the wounded.

April 29th.—No other movement. Raids (_razzias_) executed in several directions.

April 30th.—Position maintained. Brigade Galland makes a reconnaissance towards Babanet, and Sidi Abdallah. It was arranged that if the Khamírs asked terms, the conditions were to be—(1) Surrender of arms, (2) Hostages, (3) Requisition of mules, (4) Work on the roads, (5) Payment of a war indemnity.

May 1st and 2d.—No movement.

May 3d.—The brigades are concentrated at Djebalue. The ambulances are organised with 78 mules, each to convey 2 wounded and 7 litters.

May 4th.—Brigades Ritter and Galland move to Sidi Yusef.

May 5th.—The three brigades are concentrated at El Mana, where General Forgemol arrives.

May 6th and 7th.—Same camp. Torrential rains.

May 8th.—Reconnaissance of the three brigades on the Djebel and Marabout Sidi Abdallah.

May 9th.—Rain.

May 10th.—Three soldiers assassinated.

May 11th.—The Brigade Vincendon, followed by that of General Galland, ascends the Sidi Abdallah mountain. The Brigade Caillot moves to Dar-el- Abidi. Skirmishes all day long. General Forgemol starts for Fernána.

May 12th.—Rain. Dense fog.

May 13th.—The Brigade Vincendon goes to Ain Draham or Drahan. General Caillot makes a reconnaissance on the Kranget El Meridge, sighting the column Logerot. Brigade Galland remains at Sidi Abdallah.

May 14th.—The Brigade Caillot crosses the Kranget El Meridge and arrives at Ben Metir. The column Logerot engaged.

May 15th.—Reconnaissance in the valley of the Oued Lille.

May 16th.—The Brigade Caillot moves to Redir Tebeinia, General Vincendon to El Atatfa, and General Galland to Ain Drahan, occupying also Sidi Abdallah.

May 17th.—Same camps. Rain. Fog.

May 18th.—Reconnaissance towards El Guemaïr. Battalion attacked returning.

May 19th.—Brigade Caillot reaches El Guemaïr (advance guard of _Tirailleurs_ attacked _en route_), and Brigade Vincendon Sattora and Ouldj Souk. The Mecknas incessantly attack the Brigade Caillot.

May 20th and 21st.—No further movements.

May 22d.—Same position.

May 23d.—The Brigade Logerot at Souk el Temis.

May 24th.—Brigade Caillot reaches Faïd el Aïech. General Galland arrives at Glimett from Ain Drahan by way of Guemaïr. General Vincendon attacks the Mecknas.

May 25th.—Logerot advances to Seriou, Caillot to Sidi Kreider, Galland to Khradouma. Vincendon traverses the valley of the Oued Mellah in two columns, and attacks Djebel Abiat. His left is engaged by the enemy, but he reaches Sidi Asker.

May 26th.—A portion of the Brigade Caillot marches without knapsacks on Berzigue. General Vincendon makes a reconnaissance over the sand-hills, and a portion of his troops are attacked, but the enemy were repulsed. Only two soldiers were killed.

May 27th.—Early in the morning, General Forgemol with the 4th Hussars left Khradouma for Berzigue. Caillot makes a reconnaissance against the Mecknas amongst the sand-hills, conjointly with the Brigade Vincendon. General Forgemol decides to attack the Moggods thus:—

General Logerot from the south, Bréart from the east (Mater), and Caillot from the west.

May 28th.—No movement.

May 29th.—Galland advances to Berzigue.

May 30th and 31st.—No movement beyond reconnaissances.

June 1st.—Reconnaissance against the Ouled Yahya, Ouchteta, and Nefza.

June 2d.—Same camps.

June 3d.—Galland moves in the direction of Ben Metir.

June 4th.—Caillot marches towards Cape Négre.

June 5th.—Vincendon at Sidi Asker completes the road to Tabarca.

June 6th.—Caillot arrives at Fedj Recheder-Sekker. Roads ordered to be constructed from Tabarca to Fernána through Ain Drahan, and from El Aioun to Sidi Fatullah by way of Ain Drahan.

June 7th.—Caillot remains at Fedj Recheder Sekker. No other movement of importance. The “Vienne” arrives at Tabarca with 200,000 rations.

June 8th.—The three brigades shift their positions:—Vincendon to Kasr Tautia, Caillot to Dar el Melah, and Galland to El Guemaïr.

June 9th.—No movement of importance.

June 10th.—Galland at El Guemaïr, Caillot and Vincendon at Berzigue.

June 11th.—The Brigade Caillot goes to Lag-Haf. The Brigade Galland at El Guemaïr works on the road from Ain Drahan to Ben Metir. The Brigade Vincendon completes the road from Ain Drahan to Tabarca.

June 12th.—No movement.

June 13th.—The Brigade Caillot goes to Oun el Ouch.

June 14th.—The Brigade Vincendon quits Kasr Tautia for Tabarca and commences embarkation. The Brigade Caillot moves to Ain Drahan.

June 15th.—The transports with the Brigade Vincendon quit Tabarca for Marseilles.

June 16th to 21st.—The portions of the other brigades not destined to garrison Tabarca, Fernána, and Ain Drahan, embarked for France. The staffs of General Forgemol and the other Generals broke up on the termination of the campaign. I reach Tunis by way of Fernána and Souk- el-Arba.”

The following is an exact copy of the report presented to the Bey of Tunis by General Younes El Dziri, Governor of Beja, and the Kahia Allela Jouini “on the subject of the recent events in the Khamír country:”—

“There was a sort of partnership established between some individuals of the Khamír tribes and others belonging to the neighbouring Algerian clan of the Nahads. The object of this association was the sale by the Khamírs of goods stolen by the Nahads, and the subsequent division of the proceeds, and _vice versâ_. On a dispute arising as to a division which the Khamírs had failed to make, a quarrel ensued in which a Khamír lost his life. This business was communicated to the ministry (of the Bey) by the Governor of Beja, who had conferred on the subject with the Commandant of the French troops at Roum-el-Souk. The affair was to all appearances arranged, when, on the 29th March, the French Commandant invited some of the Sheikhs of the Khamírs to meet him at Roum-el-Souk, for the purpose of a further discussion about it. They accordingly repaired thither in company with some Sheikhs of the Tunisian tribe of Beni-Mazens. The Commandant told them to give up, by way of hostage, the “tents” of the chiefs of the Ouled Cedra subdivision (“fraction”) of the Khamírs, and to pay an indemnity of 4702 francs for two Nahad tents, which had been burned during the above-mentioned disturbance, telling them at the same time that if they did not comply with his orders they would be attacked on the following day. The Khamír Sheikhs answered that they could not give the required hostages without the consent of the Bey, and that they were not prepared to pay for the burned tents unless the ‘price of blood’ arising from the death of the Khamír in the same dispute was taken into consideration, and unless both parties were allowed to take an oath, as is usual in cases where no agreement can be come to. The Sheikhs added that this arrangement had been agreed to by both the Commandant and the Governor of Beja, subject to due confirmation by the superior authorities on both sides, and cited as a proof that one of the Khamírs had been detained as a hostage, for the due execution of the compromise. ‘To-day,’ they added, ‘you change the conditions; nevertheless we ask you to give us a delay to prepare what you seek from us and to fix the sum which we ourselves claim.’ The Commandant said that he had no delay to accord them or indemnity to pay them, that their demands were totally devoid of foundation, and that unless they carried out his orders promptly he should attack them the next day. The Khamír Sheikhs then withdrew.

“At the same moment the Commandant enjoined the Nahad people to collect their tribesmen on the frontier, and, in case the Khamírs did not give the satisfaction required, to invade their country and attack them. Persons not obeying the injunction were to be fined 500 francs each, without prejudice to other and more serious penalties. The day after this conference (Wednesday, March 30th), the Nahads came to the frontier, _and attacked upon their own territory_ the Khamírs of the subdivision (_fraction_) of the Bechainas, while engaged in their lawful and peaceful pursuits. The Bechainas defended themselves with the help of their compatriots and killed a Nahad man. The officer in command of the troops at La Calle having heard of the business, at once repaired with a company of soldiers to the scene of the combat. Although the struggle was over, a troop of cows were fired at, and one killed and the others wounded. The owners of the cattle abstained from resistance to avoid a dispute. The officer went away, but returned next day (Thursday), with more Arabs, the Caid Ben Hamada, and soldiers, and renewed the engagement. The Khamírs defended themselves. In the result the French lost 7 killed and 6 wounded; the Khamírs 15 killed and 13 wounded. This is the exact truth concerning the affair.”

O.

_The Modest Gains of a Tunisian Premier._

I have told in the text the story of how the coffee-house drudge, Mustapha Ben Ismael, became Prime Minister of Tunis, and how his French friends first “delighted to honour him,” and then pitilessly but prudently relegated him to the seclusion of private life. It is almost incredible, but nevertheless true, that even now at the time I am writing (April 1882), a strong party is working and intriguing for his speedy restoration to place and power. A glance, therefore, at a list of Mustapha’s more notorious gains during the past ten years will be useful as a warning to those who have rendered themselves responsible before the world for the destinies of the Tunisian Regency, and to the ordinary reader it may perchance be interesting as showing the profits of a lucky favourite at even a petty Oriental court.

Names of Estates. Localities. Notes.

Ain Sciala. Beja. }
}
Sidi Soltan. „ }
}
Elzrelli. „ }
}
Arbir. „ }
} Sold to General Hamida Ben
Sciauatt. Tebourba. } Ayad for 500,000 francs.
}
Nahba. Mater. }
}
Elzriba. „ }
}
Ermil. „ }

Elmebtuh. Bizerta road. }
}
Buarada. Elfahs. }
} Sold to Signor Rivoltella
Borj Elamri. Tunis. } and a syndicate for 975,000
} francs.
Elazib. Bizerta. }
}
Ghiran. „ }

Fritisa and Asciafir. „ }
}
Beny Ata. „ }
} Sold as in the last case for
Beny Meslem. „ } 200,000 francs.
}
Sidi Hassan. „ }

Gafur. Teboursak. Not sold, but worth 600,000
francs.

Elmornaghia. Manouba. Not sold, but worth 200,000
francs.

Seltan. Hamman-el-Lif. Not sold, but worth 300,000
francs.

Village of Grambalia. Not sold, but worth 1,500,000
francs.

Mkada. Bizerta. }
}
Udai. „ } Not sold, but worth 200,000
} francs.
Elzaina. „ }

In addition to all these splendid properties:—

100,000 olive-trees at Menzel.

Two caravanserais in the city of Tunis.

Twenty shops.

Jewels of the value of 3,000,000 francs belonging to Sy Mustapha
Khaznadar, the disgraced favourite, and Sy Ismael Sunni and Sy Rescid,
the strangled ministers.

Furniture worth about 1,500,000 francs, belonging to the same persons.

_N.B._—The greater part of the real estate absorbed by Mustapha were portions of the theoretically inalienable royal domain, belonging to the various princes and princesses of the Hassanite family—_e.g._, the village of Grambalia was the property of the late Muhamed Bey, of whose son Mustapha was appointed guardian. So complete has been the nest- feathering to which the Bey has been exposed on all sides, that the Financial Commission has been lately compelled to reduce his annual Civil List by £15,000 at one blow. The first reform which should occupy the attention of the French authorities is the dilapidation of the public or quasi-public State lands, and the bringing to justice of the persons concerned in it. The list of Mustapha’s “tokens of affection” from his sovereign was compiled by a person for some years in his confidence, after consulting the purchasers of his estates. Mustapha is now thinking of a rainy day; the proceeds of his Tunisian lands are being prudently expended in Parisian house-property. If the French Protectorate is to receive recognition at the hands of Europe, by all means let the Minister Resident be Prime Minister as well _de facto_ as _de jure_. We have had enough of absorptive Grand Viziers.

P.

_Strength and Arrangement of the First Corps Expéditionnaire on the 8th
June 1881._

Staff: 46 officers, 383 men, 171 horses, 198 mules.

Division Delebecque: Staff, 22 officers, 167 men, 143 horses, 57 mules.

Brigade Caillot: 130 officers, 3771 men, 125 horses, 415 mules.

„ Vincendon: 167 officers, 4681 men, 303 horses, 479 mules.

„ Galland: 148 officers, 4092 men, 137 horses, 386 mules.

„ Logerot: 151 officers, 3660 men, 465 horses, 689 mules.

„ Gaume: 65 officers, 868 men, 937 horses, 34 mules.

„ De Brem: 82 officers, 2130 men, 522 horses, 81 mules.

Fourth Brigade (General Bréart): 244 officers, 6669 men, 1247 horses, and 1209 mules.

Kef: 46 officers, 1274 men, 127 horses, 130 mules.

Ghardimaou: 20 officers, 496 men.

Beja: 9 officers, 325 men, 3 horses, 4 mules.

Souk-Erras (Algeria): 2 officers, 120 men, 82 horses, 60 mules.

Tabarca: 60 officers, 1516 men, 95 horses.

Total: 1202 officers, 30,152 men, 4357 horses, and 3742 mules.

Q.

_Troops sent from France to take part in the First Tunisian Expedition._

1st Brigade 202 officers. 4987 men.

2d „ 191 „ 5245 „

3d „ 189 „ 5247 „

Brigade of Reserves 258 „ 6587 „

Detachment at Tabarca 54 „ 1550 „
-----------
Total 23,616 men.

Of these the following were left in Tunis:—

1st Brigade 44 officers. 1112 men.

2d „ 91 „ 2772 „

3d „ 89 „ 2890 „

Brigade of Reserves 80 „ 3477 „

Detachment at Tabarca 34 „ 1109 „
-----------
Total 11,360 men.

The following were sent to Algeria:—

1st Brigade (one battery) 4 officers. 177 men.

2d „ 3 „ 695 „

3d (Company Commissariat) 3 „ 695 „

Reserves (Cavalry and transport service) 27 „ 585 „
---------
Total 2152 men.

A round number of 10,000 were therefore sent back to France on the breaking up of the Corps Expéditionnaire.

R.

_Troops sent to Algeria to take part in the First Tunisian Expedition._

6 Battalions of Zouaves.

5 „ Turcos.

1 „ Infantry.

3 Squadrons of Cavalry.

2 „ of Spahis.

5½ Batteries of Artillery.

5 Companies of Engineers.

4 „ Military Train.

Thus constituting a total force of 8200 men.

At the end of the expedition all the troops were sent back to Algeria, where their presence was necessitated by the affairs of Saïda, with the exception of one squadron of Spahis, one battery of Artillery, and two companies of Engineers, and left the Regency on the following dates:—

June 13.—Embarked 2 battalions of the 1st Tirailleurs for Algiers.

„ „ „ 2 „ „ 2d „ for Oran.

„ 19. „ 1 „ „ 2d Zouaves for Oran.

„ „ „ 1 battery of Artillery for Oran.

July 1. „ ⅓ „ „ for Algiers.

„ „ „ 4 companies of Military Train for Algiers.

„ 4. „ 1 company of Engineers for Algiers.

„ 8. „ 2 battalions of Zouaves for Algiers.

„ „ „ 1 company Engineers for Algiers.

„ 13. „ 1 battery of Artillery for Algiers.

The rest, viz., 4 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 2 batteries, recrossed the frontier into the province of Constantine, with General Forgemol, on the 28th June.

S.

_Troops sent to Tunis to take part in the Second Campaign._

July 9.—Tunis, 4 battalions (71st, 93d, 136th, and 137th) 2000 men.

(Afterwards sent to Sfax.)

„ 13. „ 1 battalion (77th) 450 „

(Afterwards sent to Sfax.)

„ 21. „ 2 battalions (107th and 114th) 1000 „

(Afterwards sent to Gabes.)

„ „ „ 1 battalion (78th) 500 „

(Afterwards sent to Jerba.)

„ „ „ 1 battery (35th) 188 „

(Afterwards divided between Sfax and Gabes.)

„ 24 —Tunis, 2 companies of Military Train (6th brigade) 180 „
& 26.

„ 27.—Tunis, 2 battalions (25th, 55th, 6th brigade) 1030 „

„ 28. „ 1 battalion 135th (6th brigade) 500 „

„ 29. „ 1 company of Engineers 141 „

(Afterwards sent to Sfax, Jerba, and Gabez.)

„ 31.—Bizerta, 2 battalions (65th, 28th Chasseurs, 6th 1000 „
brigade)

„ „ Tunis, 2 batteries (31st, 95th, 6th brigade) 360 „

„ „ „ 1 battalion (125th, 6th brigade) 515 „

Aug. 1. „ 1 battalion (6th, 6th brigade) 500 „

„ 31.—Goletta, 3 battalions (80th, 114th, 118th) 1500 „

Sept. 6.—Susa, 3 battalions (66th, 116th, and 48th) 1500 „

„ 4. „ 1 battery (33d) 185 „

„ 1.—Tunis, 3 battalions (33d, 43d, 110th) 1500 „

„ „ „ workmen and hospital assistants 125 „

„ 11. „ 3 battalions 1500 „

„ 12. „ 2 squadrons (1st Hussars) 360 „

„ „ „ 1 battalion of the 127th 515 „

„ 14. „ 2 battalions (8th and 73d) 1200 „

„ „ „ 2 batteries (31st and 33d) 360 „

„ „ „ 1 squadron (1st Hussars) 125 „

„ „ „ others 150 „

„ 16. „ 1 company of Engineers (3d battalion) 128 „

„ „ „ Telegraphists 44 „

„ „ „ Hussars 85 „

„ „ „ 1 battery (34th) 188 „

„ „ „ ambulance of the 6th brigade 128 „

„ „ „ Topographical service 14 „

„ 20. „ 1 battery (34th) 180 „

„ „ „ convoy of the 6th brigade 234 „

„ 25.—Susa, 2 battalions (10th and 138th) 1040 „

„ „ „ 1 company of Engineers (11th battalion) 124 „

„ 27. „ 1 battalion (23d Chasseurs) 509 „

„ „ „ 1 squadron (6th Hussars) 189 „

„ „ „ ½ battery (32d) 90 „

„ „ „ staff of the 7th brigade 17 „

„ 28.—Manouba, 2 battalions (111th and 61st) 1128 „

„ „ Susa, 1 battalion (62d) 534 „

„ „ „ 2 squadrons (6th Hussars) 307 „

„ „ „ 1 battery (29th) 187 „

„ „ „ staff and other services 118 „

„ 30. „ 1 battalion (46th) 549 „

„ „ „ 1 battery (10th) 188 „

„ „ „ others 9 „

Oct. 3.—Goletta, gendarmerie 99 „

„ „ „ others 25 „

„ 5. „ train and others 127 „

„ „ Susa, ambulance and convoy 300 „

„ 7.—Tunis, Artillery 97 „

„ 9.—Susa, ½ battery of Artillery (32d) 118 „

„ „ „ others 97 „

„ 10.—Tunis, 3 battalions (1st, 84th, 101st) 1694 „

„ „ „ _section de munitions_ 179 „

„ „ „ others 28 „

„ „ Susa, military railway corps 205 „

„ 12.—Tunis, train and gendarmerie 160 „

„ „ Susa, train and telegraph 60 „

„ 17.—Tunis, 3 battalions (87th, 119th, and 128th) 1698 „

„ 19. „ train 90 „

„ 21. „ „ 89 „

„ 24. „ telegraphists 30 „

„ „ Susa, ammunition train 130 „

„ „ „ train 10 „

„ 25.—Tunis, 3 battalions (130th) 1627 „

„ „ „ 1 battery (27th) 184 „
-----------
30,421 men.

T.

_Formation of the Columns employed in the Concentric Movement on
Kairwán._

The troops forming part of the columns Forgemol and Étienne have been enumerated in the text. The following details explain the constitution of the column Saussier, Logerot, and Sabatier, which marched on Kairwán from Tunis and the Manouba:—

_Infantry_— (1.) The battalions of the 65th, 125th, and 135th
Regiments attached to the _corps expéditionnaire_,
which formed the 1st _Regiment de Marche_.

(2.) The 2d _Regiment de Marche_, composed of the
battalions belonging to the 25th and 55th Regiments.

(3.) The 28th battalion of the _Chasseurs à pied_.

_Cavalry_— (1.) 7th Regiment of the _Chasseurs à cheval_.

(2.) One squadron of the 1st Regiment of _chasseurs
d’Afrique_.

(In addition to these, there were one battalion of the 33d Regiment
and one of the 46th Regiment detached from the Brigade Philibert.)

_Artillery_—10th battery of the 9th Regiment (field guns).

3d _section de munitions_ of 36th Regiment of Artillery.

_Engineers_— 3d company of the 3d battalion of the 3d Regiment.

_Transports
(Train des
équipages)_— 5th company and 5 _bis_ company of the 5th squadron.

U.

_Details of the Positions and Strength of the French Army of Occupation
in the Regency of Tunis on April 1_, 1882.

DIVISION DU NORD.

GENERAL JAPY (_now General Guyon Vernier_).

* * * * *

_Commandement des places de Tunis et la Goulette_—GÉNÉRAL LAMBERT, _à
Tunis_.

LA GOULETTE.

4e zouaves (1 bataillon et le depôt).

114 régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

11 régiment de hussards (1 péleton).

Parc d’artillerie No 3.

14e escadron du train (1 détachement).

11/4 génie (1 détachement).

_Services administratifs._

21e section d’ouvriers.

21e id. d’infirmiers.

Dépôt des convalescents.

Ambulance.

TUNIS.

4e zouaves (2 bataillons).

1er de ligne (1 bataillon).

101e id. id.

118e id. id.

11 régiment de hussards (1 péleton).

1er batterie 19me d’artillerie 90 mm.

10e id. 34me id. 80 mm.

14e escadron du train (1 détachement).

15e id. id.

18e id. id.

20e id. id. (3 compagnies).

11/4 génie, portion principale.

Gendarmerie.

21e section d’infirmiers.

* * * * *

_Subdivision de Testour_—GÉNÉRAL D’AUBIGNY, _à Tebourba._

TEBOURBA.

8e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

20e id. id.

11e régiment de hussards (1½ escadrons).

Génie (1 section).

MEDJEZ-EL-BAB.

127e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (1 section montagne).

12/2 génie.

TESTOUR.

84e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

21e section d’ouvriers.

21e „ d’infirmiers.

BORDJ MESSAOUDI.

128e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

LE KEF.

83e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

122e id. id.

128e id. (2 compagnies).

13e chasseurs à cheval (3 péletons).

3e batterie 26e d’artillerie 80 mm.

10e id. 13e id. (1 section montagne).

18/2 génie.

21e section d’ouvriers.

21e id. d’infirmiers.

Ambulance.

AÏN TUNGA.

73e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

11e régiment de hussards (1 péleton).

10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (section montagne).

ELLEZ.

80e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

13e chasseurs à cheval (1 péleton).

10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (section montagne).

* * * * *

_Subdivision d’Aïn Draham_—GÉNÉRAL GUYON VERNIER, _Aïn Draham._

AÏN DRAHAM.

29e bataillon de chasseurs.

18e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

22e id. id.

14e escadron du train, 5e compagnie bis.

13e batterie 16e d’artillerie (montagne).

16/3 genie, à El Aioun (1 section).

21e section d’ouvriers.

21e id. d’infirmiers.

Ambulance.

BÉJA.

57e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

142e id. id.

10me batterie 13e régiment d’artillerie.

14e escadron du train (détachement).

11/4 génie (détachement).

GHARDIMAOU.

96e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

13e régiment de chasseurs à cheval (1 escadron).

18/2 génie (détachement).

TABARKA.

143e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

13e régiment de chasseurs à cheval (1 escadron).

1er batterie 19e d’artillerie (1 section).

8e id. 12e id. id.

14e escadron du train.

15/2 génie à 16e Teboul (détachement).

SOUK-EL-ARBA.

1re compagnie de fusilliers de discipline.

18/2 génie (détachement).

* * * * *

_Subdivision de Tunis_—GÉNÉRAL MAURAND, _à Tunis._

TUNIS.

115e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

HAMMAM-LIF.

88e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

119e id. (3 compagnies).

9e batterie du 27 d’artillerie (montagne).

9e id. id. id.

11/4 génie.

Gendarmerie.

ZAGHOUÁN.

87e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

92e id. id.

11e regiment de hussards (un péleton).

16/3 génie (détachement).

HAMMANET.

1 compagnie franche.

BIZERTE.

38e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

1er batterie 19e d’artillerie (1 section, 80 mm.)

14e escadron du train (1 détachement).

11/4 génie.

21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).

MATEUR.

30e bataillon de chasseurs à pied.

14e escadron du train (détachement).

21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).

MANOUBA.

119e régiment de ligne (1 compagnie).

11e régiment de hussards (½ escadron).

14e escadron du train 5e compagnie pp.

18e id. id.

21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).

Ambulance.

Depôt de remonte.

RÉCAPITULATION.

_Infanterie._

1er régiment de ligne Tunis.

8e id. Tébourba.

18e id. Aïn Draham.

20e id. Tébourba.

22e id. Aïn Draham.

38e id. Bizerte.

57e id. Béja.

73e id. Aïn Tounga.

80e id. Ellez.

83e id. Le Kef.

84e id. Testour.

87e id. Zaghouán.

88e id. Hammam-Lif.

92e id. Zaghouán.

96e id. Ghardimaou.

101e id. Tunis.

114e id. La Goulette.

115e id. Tunis.

118e id. id.

119e id. Hammam-Lif.

122e id. Le Kef.

127e id. Medjez-el-Bab.

128e id. Le Kef.

143e id. Tabarka.

142e id. Béja.

29e bataillon de chasseurs Aïn Draham.

30e id. id. Mateur.

4e zouaves (3 bataillon et depôt) Tunis et La Goulette.

1er compagnie franche Tunis.

1re compagnie de fusilliers de discipline Souk-el-Arba.

_Cavalerie._

13e chasseurs Le Kef, Tabarka, Ghardimaou.

11e hussards Tébourba, La Goulette, Manouba.

id. Tunis, Aïn-Tounga, Zaghouán.

3e Spahis Aïn Draham.

_Artillerie._

12e régiments, 8e batteries Tabarka.

13e id. 10e id. Béja, Kef.

16e id. 13e id. Aïn Draham.

19e id. 1re id. Tunis, Bizerte, Tabarka.

26e id. 3e id. Le Kef.

27e id. 9e id. Hammam-Lif.

31e id. 9e id. id.

33e id. 10e id. Medjez, Aïn Tunga, Ellez.

34e id. 10e id. Tunis.

Parc No. 3 La Goulette.

_Train des Equipages._

14e escadrons, 5e compagnies, pp. Manouba.

14e id. 5e id. bis. Aïn Draham.

18e id. 5e id. pp. Manouba.

20e id. 3e id. Tunis.

_Génie._

11e escadrons, 4e compagnies Tunis, Bizerte.

12e id. 2e id. Medjez-el-Bab.

15e id. 2e id. Tabarka.

16e id. 3e id. Aïn Draham, Tabarka.

18e id. 2e id. Le Kef.

_Troupes d’administration._

21e section, ouvriers Tunis,
La Goulette.

id. infirmiers Manouba.

19e section de secretaires d’etat-major force publique, Tunis.

DIVISION DU SUD.

GÉNÉRAL LOGEROT.

* * * * *

_5e Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL SABATIER.

CAMP DE SOUSSE.

65e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

28e bataillon de chasseurs à pied.

125e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

135e id. id.

6e id. id.

25e id. id.

7me régiment de chasseurs.

10e batterie du 9e d’artillerie (montée).

10e id. du 35e id. (montagne).

6e section de munitions (36e d’artillerie).

Un péleton de génie (3e régt., 3e bon., 3e cie).

Train des équipages (5e cie. pp. et 5e cie. bis)

ENFIDA.

65e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

EL DJEM.

125e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

* * * * *

_6me Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL PHILIBERT.

GAFSA.

27e bataillon de chasseurs.

46e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

61e id. id.

111e id. id.

1er régiment de hussards (1 escadron).

10e batterie du 31e régiment (2 sections montagne).

Génie (1 section, 3e cie., 3e bon., 3e régt.)

Train des équipages (5e cie. pp.)

OUED GILMA.

33e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

43e id. id.

110e id. id.

1er régiment de hussards (escadron).

Détachement de la section de munitions (36e).

Génie (1 section, 3e bon., 3e cie., 3e régt.)

Train des équipages (5e cie. bis détachement).

RAZ-EL-OUED GABÈS.

1 regiment de hussards (1 escadron).

* * * * *

_7me Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL ÉTIENNE.

EL-MELAH.

23e bataillon de chasseurs.

KAIRWAN.

48e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

66e id. id.

62e id. id.

138e id. id.

6e régiment de hussards (2 escadrons).

10e batterie (29e régiment d’artillerie).

9e id. du 10e id.

Génie (2e cie. du 3e bon. du 3e regt).

Train des équipages (5e cie. et 5e cie. bis détachement).

SOUSSE.

19e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

10e batterie du 32e d’artillerie.

Parc No. 2.

3e cie. d’ouvriers mixte du chemins de fer.

Train des équipages (5e cie. détachement).

SIDI-EL-HANI.

6me hussards (½ escadron).

3e section des munitions (36e artillerie).

Train des équipages (détachement de la 5e cie.)

OUED-LAYA.

19e de ligne (2 compagnies).

6e hussards (½ escadron).

* * * * *

_Brigade de la Côte_—GÉNÉRAL JAMAIS.

RAZ-EL-OUED GABÈS.

Un bataillon de zouaves.

14e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).

77e id. id.

107e id. id.

137e id. id.

6e id. id.

25e id. id.

1er hussards (un escadron).

9e batterie du 35e d’artillerie (2 sections montagne).

Génie (2 sections du 4e régt.)

SFAX.

136e regiment de ligne.

55e id.

9e batterie du 13e régiment (montagne).

MEHDIA.

71e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

ILE DE DJERBA.

_Houmt-Souk._

73e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

_Borj-Marsa._

73e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

10e batterie du 13 régiment (13e montagne).

_El-Kantera._

71e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).

9e batterie 35e d’artillerie (une section montagne).

RÉCAPITULATION.

_Infanterie._

6e régiment de ligne Gabès.

14e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.

19e id. Sousse et Oued-Laya.

25e id. Gabès.

46e id. Gafsa.

48e id. Kairwán.

55e id. Sfax.

61e id. Gafsa.

62e id. Kairwán.

65e id. Sousse et Enfida.

66e id. Kairwán.

71e id. (Djerba), Médra-el-Kantara.

77e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.

78e id. (Djerba), Bordj Marsa.

107e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.

111e id. Gafsa.

125e id. Sousse-el-Djem.

135e id. Sousse.

136e id. Sfax.

137e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.

138e id. Kairwán.

4e zouaves (1 bataillon) Gabès.

23e bataillon de chasseurs El-Melah.

27e id. Gafsa.

28e id. Sousse.

_Cavalerie._

7e régiment de chasseurs Sousse.

1er hussards Gafsa, Ras-el-Oued, Gabès.

id. Oueld Gilma.

6e id. Kairwán, Ouled-Laya.

6e id. Sidi-el-Hami.

_Artillerie._

9e régiments, 10e batteries Sousse.

10e id. 9e id. Kairwán.

13e id. 9e id. Sfax.

13e id. 10e id. Bordj-Marsa.

29e id. 10e id. Kairwán.

31e id. 10e id. Gafsa.

32e id. 10e id. Sousse.

35e id. 9e id. Ras-el-Oued, Randam.

35e id. 10e id. Sousse.

Parc No. 2 id.

_Train des equipages._

Escadrons. compagnies.

... 5e 5me bis.

Sousse, Gafsa, Oued-Gilma, Kairwán, Sidi-el-Hami.

_Génie._

Sousse, Gafsa, Oued-Gilma, Kairwán, Raz-el-Oued-Gabès.

V.

_An American Prophecy about Tunis._

Mr. Amos Perry was, from July 1862 till September 1867, United States’ Consul at Tunis. On his return to America he published, in 1869, a book entitled, “Carthage and Tunis—Past and Present.” His note as to “the political future of the country” has been so curiously verified that it may be reproduced with advantage. He writes:—

“Just as I was leaving Tunis, after having endured the heat of the summer of 1867, and breathed a noxious air, that brought cholera and death to thousands around me, I received from an eminent diplomatic source a pointed inquiry, whose definite answer, which was then confidential, implied on my part some insight into the future. Though not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, I embraced my privilege as a Yankee and guessed.

“Since then, I have seen no reason to change my views. As the great ship canal across the isthmus of Suez progresses under French auspices, Tunis, centrally situated on the great highway between the canal and the ocean, acquires a new importance, which the French people and government are not slow to appreciate, and turn to their account. They see on the Tunisian coast better harbours, and a richer soil, than are to be found in their Algerian possessions, and they evidently mean to bring them under their control. Instead of being animated by a chivalrous spirit and a desire to diffuse the blessings of civilisation, they seem disposed to take advantage of the weakness of this government to extend their power and increase their territorial possessions. Despite his graceful air and comely looks, the French eagle is savagely rapacious; and now the British lion, which seeks the gratification of his own appetite, is powerless to restrain the soaring and plunging movements of this keen-eyed bird. The American eagle, distrustful of both the bird and beast that hovered and prowled around his western domains in the season of his exposure, contents himself with simply noting passing events. The inquiry and reply were as follows:—

“WHAT IS TO BE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF TUNIS?

“This question is often put, and gives rise to a variety of speculations and answers. Frenchmen apparently regard Tunis as the supplement of Algeria. Englishmen see here an important source of supplies for Malta, and Italians claim special consideration on account of their language and customs, which have to some extent prevailed here from the Roman period to the present time. Italy has the largest colony here; England has the most pressing need of supplies for Malta; but France has the greatest force at hand to control the country.

“Politically, too, France has the most intimate relations with Tunis. From the beginning of the war against Algiers, the French have been near neighbours of the Bey, and much of the time have been patronised as his special friends. On one occasion they prevented the Ottoman fleet from an organised effort to get control of this government. They have employed the full range of diplomatic arts to introduce and keep up intimate relations between the two countries. The French consul at length acquired a leading, not to say controlling, influence with the Bey. He was consulted, and his aid was regarded as needful to the success of all important enterprises. French subjects were invited to fill places of emolument and trust, and to them were given the most important contracts, such as establishing telegraphic communication between different parts of the regency, making loans to the government almost on their own terms, and introducing water into the city and its environs from the mountains of Zaghuán.

“With French influence thus strongly established and recognised, in the year 1864, a French consul, with little experience in the country, attempted to inaugurate a new line of policy, boldly treating the Bey as a French vassal by interrupting his vessels in his own waters, demanding the dismissal of some of his ministers, and recommending other important changes in the government. Not being able to execute this line of policy without resorting to force (from which measure the consul did not shrink), and giving serious offence to other nations, the French government withdrew this consul, and has since sent other officers who have pursued a more conciliatory course. Still, during their administration, the Bey has been made to feel the arbitrary power of the French government.

“When the Bey was relieved of the presence of the offensive consul, it was regarded as a victory on his part, and was so proclaimed abroad. But I believe France took this step, both because she did not wish to encounter the displeasure of other nations and especially because she was not disposed unnecessarily to have another religious war similar to that waged in Algeria. But her ultimate purposes in regard to this country are scarcely to be questioned. While she watches it with a vigilant eye lest it escape her irritating touch, she sees that gentleness is in general better than harshness. Feeling secure of her plunder, she can afford to await the maturity of plans of slow development.

“If the French were to take forcible possession of the regency, other nations might protest, and Mussulmans might massacre and plunder. The seizure could be made and the country held. Difficulties would, however, naturally arise in regulating many complicated affairs while encountering the hatred of Mussulmans and the ill-will of Europeans. In view of all the facts in this case France decides to await the progress of events. Her experience in Algeria and in Mexico probably serves as a warning. Her legitimate influence as a powerful neighbour of the Bey is great, and she has but to persist in the maintenance of apparently friendly relations, and seize every petty occasion to assert her presumed authority, to secure present advantages and a final triumph.

“I am, then, persuaded that this country will at length come under the acknowledged protection and control of France, if not with the consent and approbation of other nations, probably without violent opposition. Such at least is the manifest tendency of affairs at the present time, notwithstanding a species of statecraft employed to produce a counter result. The malady is too deeply seated to be overcome by empirics in the name of diplomacy. The Gallic eagle, already scenting the prey, prepares to clutch it, despite the lion’s growl and all the shrieks and howls that may be raised as he enjoys his repast.”

W.

_A Foreign Diplomatist’s Note on Tunis._

The following _mémoire_ was sent to Lord De la Warr by a foreign diplomatist last May. It affords very valuable aid to the serious study of the Tunisian Question, if the reader has not already made up his mind, that political conventions and diplomatic assurances are not altogether subservient to the doctrine of expediency:—

“The jesuitical language employed by certain portions of the Russian and Austrian Press on the subject of the aggressive policy of France in the Mediterranean is the more remarkable, and at the same time the more immoral, because it was precisely the diplomatists of Austria and Russia who, at the Congress of Vienna, extorted from the representatives of France a declaration guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Regency of Tunis. It is superfluous to point out now that the present policy of France, who seems to have entirely deserted the path of peace and honour, menaces the great and vital interests of England, commercially in Europe, and politically in the East. Very patent facts oblige British statesmen now-a-days to remember the traditions of George Canning, who by an energetic policy saved the prestige of his country and the interests of modern civilisation; then, as now, menaced by the struggle for supremacy carried on by a restless Power which is trying by all possible means to subject nations and races to the despotism of a so-called universal Republic.

“‘The régime changes,’ says George Canning, speaking of France, ‘but the hereditary character of the French people never alters.’ The French are Chauvinists now as they were under Henry IV., Louis XIV., Charles X., Louis Philippe, and the Napoleons, who, to blind the English, invented as it suited them that now exploded fiction, ‘L’Empire c’est la paix.’ Let us glance for a moment at Protocol XIII. ‘of the Conference held at Vienna, April 26th, 1855.’

“Prince Gortschakoff: ‘A territorial stipulation being once guaranteed, should we not extend it to the most distant points, _as, for instance, in the case of Tunis_, and make a _casus belli_ of all attacks on the outlying portions of the Empire?’

“M. Drouyn de Lhuys: ‘I would point out that France not only promises to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but has engaged to cause the principle to be respected by others; as far as I am concerned, _I see no difficulty in extending to that country (Tunis) the operation of the Treaty_ I am ready to subscribe.’

“The Baron de Bourquenet: ‘I am of entirely the same opinion as M. Drouyn de Lhuys.’

“This Protocol was communicated by Her Majesty’s Government to the Houses of Parliament on the 10th May 1855. It bears the signatures of the Plenipotentiaries of France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the Baron de Bourquenet, as well as those of M. le Comte Buol Schauenstein, Baron Prokesch-Osten, Lord Westmorland, M. de Titoff, Prince Gortschakoff, Aali Pasha, and Aarif Effendi.

“By this international convention it is evident that France actually confirmed the obligations which she had already entered into by her adhesion to the Treaty of London in 1841—obligations which, in the eyes of every honest man in Europe, were solemnly ratified afterwards at Paris and Berlin.

“It results, therefore, that the admission of Sir Charles Dilke, as to the recognition by Europe of the Tunisian Firman of 1871, is actually based on great international engagements; but it merely confirmed a state of things existing _ab antiquo_. Is there any record of a Bey of Tunis _not_ being invested by the Sultan? Did the Sultan obtain from his Tunisian vassal a contingent of 15,000 men during the war of 1854?

“An examination, however, of historical facts abundantly proves that the advance on Tunis is nothing more nor less than an incident in one long- continued and traditional policy of Chauvinistic aggression. Before the dawn of the present century, Citizen Devoize played very effectively at Tunis the rôle of the Roustan of to-day, and let it be noted that M. Devoize’s proceedings were speedily followed by the invasion of Malta, Syria, and Egypt by the French troops. ‘La mission de civilisation’ is no new phrase; it is as old as the time of the First Napoleon. Let us pursue our inquiry into the traditional politics of France. In 1795, M. Devoize, under the veil of coral-fishing, did his best to enable France to annex the Regency, and even then the pretext was an old one, for a quarter of a century before, her consul had endeavoured to purchase Tabarca _and Bizerta_ for the same purpose. France has always coveted Tunis as the political and strategic key of her vast plans for the foundation of a French Carthage.

“Hence Bonaparte’s expedition; hence the revolt of Mehemet Ali, the emissary of France in Egypt, Syria, and South Arabia. Did not France encourage Abdul Jelil to excite a rising in Tripoli? The most eloquent testimony as to the ultimate aims of France on the whole African littoral is afforded by the reports of the British Political Agents at Tunis and Tripoli for the past twenty years; but they appear to have been written only to be treated as a sealed book. The famous letter of M. Sabattier (then Consul-General for France in Egypt) addressed to the Parisian paper _L’Union_ should just now be consulted. Lord Salisbury should have remembered at Berlin that the day after the Treaty of Paris Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, Lord Russell, Mr. Disraeli, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe all said that _now_ the possibility of a further French advance on Tunis was removed for ever. This opinion was also communicated by England to H.E. Nusret Pasha, Ottoman Commissioner to Tunis, then in Paris, and appeared in all the French newspapers of that date.

The memoirs of Captain Carette (_vide_ ‘Bulletin de la Société de la Géographie,” 4ième série, vol. ii. No. 21, 1852), as quoted by M. de la Roquette, affirm that ‘the possession of Tunis would give France _political frontiers_, and enable her to annex a great Oriental empire, at the same time guaranteeing to her supremacy both in Europe and in the Mediterranean, and assuring her a monopoly of African trade.’ Strange to say, the letter of the ill-fated Colonel Flatters, of the 29th January 1881 (reproduced in the St. Petersburg papers two months later), contains the same ideas. This document speaks of positive instructions from the Minister, M. Freycinet, ‘_to form a French party_ at Mourzouk (Fezzan) amongst the Touaregs,’ and adding, ‘_it is absolutely necessary to go to the Soudan_.’

“On the 20th of June 1865, Napoleon III. wrote thus to Marshal MacMahon, Governor of Algeria:—‘When our manner of regenerating a vanquished nation becomes an object of envy to the fifteen millions of Arabs scattered over other parts of Africa and Asia; when our supremacy, established at the foot of Mount Atlas, appears to them an intervention of Providence, _that day_ the glory of France will resound from Tunis to the Euphrates!’

“The Protectorate of France over Tunis will very shortly menace the freedom of trade at the great Saharian Fair of Berbera Zeilah (the Roman _Avalites Emporium_), which lasts six months, and up to the present time affords the most important means of commerce between England and Africa. By this Protectorate she also assures to herself not only a practical monopoly of commerce, but the possession of the Soudan as a recruiting ground, from which no less than four hundred thousand fighting men are obtainable (_vide_ Report of M. Selve, afterwards Solyman Pasha, organiser of Mehemet Ali’s army, and Lieutenant of France under Louis Philippe Egalité).

“It is known that the Soudan furnished 300,000 men towards Louis Philippe’s _levée de boucliers_, but he was ultimately vanquished by the energetic policy of Lord Palmerston and the diplomacy of the Berlin Foreign Office.

“The political manifesto of France in Africa (from which Napoleon’s letter has been quoted) is now very studiously ignored by British opportunist statesmen. Article IV., which is particularly instructive, and is entitled ‘Les Turcos,’ says, ‘_the most useful products which Africa can give to France are her soldiers_.’ The same article speaks of bounties of 300 francs for each enlistment, &c.

“Messrs. Gladstone and Dilke should read carefully a once popular pamphlet in France, entitled ‘La Regénération Militaire Française.’ It was written by General Yusef, and is dedicated to Marshal Bugeaud (the Arab roaster). At page 1 he says: ‘AFRICA BELONGS TO-DAY TO FRANCE,’ and, later on, ‘by the aid of her camels and dromedaries, France _is to go_ into the Soudan, _and_ FROM TUNIS UP TO THE EUPHRATES.’ General Yusef extols the expedition of General Carbuccia, and his plan of alliances with the tribes and with the Kabyles, which is also glorified by the apostle of _chauvinisme par excellence_, M. Thiers, in the second volume of his ‘History of the French Revolution.’

“The fatal error of England is, that she never understood this self- evident fact—that the political aim of France, both before and since her usurpation of Algeria, has been to found the Empire _Carthage Gauloise_, and so dictate the law to England in the East.

“This undoubted truth is shown in bold relief by M. Louis Blanc in his ‘Histoire de dix ans.’ Having described the annexation of Algeria, he speaks of the interviews at Paris between M. de Polignac and the English Ambassador, Lord Stuart. The quotation of one or two astounding passages is sufficient. Irritated by Lord Stuart’s tone, the French diplomatist allowed the following words to escape him: ‘If you require a diplomatic answer, the Resident or the Council will give it to you. As for me, I can only tell you in unofficial language, _we can do without you_.’ In volume ii., chapter iii., p. 82, we read:—‘In consequence of the embarrassments and complications of Europe, the prudent course to be adopted in Paris is to risk all, and the most daring diplomacy in appearance is in reality the wisest. Peace may be secured by either system, only in shaking the Treaties of Europe as exemplified in the Algerian expedition, France would be in a position to impose peace to Europe, whereas by adhering to those treaties she would have been forced to beg for peace. If she imposed it, she could dictate the conditions. If she had to beg for it, she would have had to submit to them.’

“In these words we have an explanation of the secret of the motive for France’s Protectorate over Tunis.

“The foregoing unpalatable truths are what Sir Charles Dilke must learn before he can attempt to baffle the strategy of the Quai d’Orsay. As it is, his more than equivocal answers in Parliament to the pertinent questions of Mr. Montague Guest, Lord Bective, Lord Randolph Churchill, Sir H. D. Wolff, and Mr. Otway, would to all appearances reveal a very decided predilection for a Franco-Arabian Republic.

“The language of the French Press, and the articles in the official Arabic journals published in Paris, remind one strangely of an almost forgotten pamphlet, entitled ‘Les temps sont venus.’ At page 7 we find these words:—

“‘If France had only followed _one_ line and _one_ policy since 1789, she would be now at the head, not only of Europe, but of the whole world, which would follow her footsteps in the glorious path of Peace and Universal ‘Fraternity!’

“George Canning, in a memorable speech delivered in December 1802, fearlessly denounced the French policy in Europe and the East from the time of Louis XIV. He pointed out its characteristic feature—_duplicity_. Duplicity as regards other nations, duplicity towards the House of Savoy, and above all, duplicity against England. He exhorted his countrymen to mistrust the deceitful assurances of France, no matter from what Government they might emanate, and he implored them to save the legitimate prestige of England and of modern civilisation by that energetic resistance which alone could muzzle the supremacy-seeking vagaries of France and her rulers. ‘Providence,’ he said, ‘will do nothing for those who neglect their own interest, nor will Heaven itself help a country (England) which does nothing in its own defence.’”

· · · · · · · · · ·

X.

_The last Episode in the History of Carthage._

On the 16th April Monseigneur Charles Martial Allemand Lavigérie received, in one of the halls of the college he has erected over the site of the temple of Esculapius on the Byrsa hill at Carthage, the first insignia of the Cardinalate from the hands of Count Cechini of the Papal guards. This imposing ceremony was performed in the presence of the French Minister Resident M. Cambon, the chiefs of the French naval and military services, and several of the foreign representatives. For some time past Monseigneur Lavigérie’s influence has been undoubtedly exercised with a view to promote a conciliation of conflicting interests in the Regency. After the investiture the Cardinal delivered the following short allocution:—“I am almost overwhelmed at receiving these honours in this place. The ruins of Carthage which surround us are at once emblems of human greatness and the vanity of earthly magnificence. It was from the spot on which we are now standing came the conquerors of Africa—the islands of the Mediterranean, and the shores of the distant oceans—the great captains, who for a moment caused the fate of Rome itself to tremble in the balance. What names are those of Mago, Hanno, Hamilcar, Hannibal, and Hasdrubal, who upon this very hill saw his father-land in flames and his children slaughtered in the temple, the remains of which at this moment surround us! What names are those of Regulus, Scipio, Marius, Cæsar, Justinian and Belisarius, and in more modern times those of Louis IX. and Charles V.! Each of them left upon this spot the memorials of his deeds and his glory. But what a lesson as to the vanity of man presents itself! Not a trace of these memorials remains, and one must excavate even to know that it was here that Carthage existed!