Chapter XLIV: A Month of Chaos

On the 19th July 1875, the twenty years’ labour of Sir Richard Wood in the Regency of Tunis was crowned with a new and elaborate treaty between the English and Tunisian Governments. The second and third articles of this convention ran as follows:—

ARTICLE II.

Every mark of honour and respect shall at all times be paid, and every privilege and immunity allowed, to Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul- General accredited to His Highness the Bey which is paid or allowed to the representative of any other nation whatsoever; and respect and honour shall be shown to the British Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents, who shall reside in the Regency of Tunis. Their houses and families shall be safe and protected. _No one shall interfere with them, or commit any act of oppression or disrespect towards them, either by word or deed_; and if any one should do so, the Tunisian authorities shall take immediate measures for the punishment of the offender. The British Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents shall, moreover, continue to enjoy, in the most ample sense, all the privileges and immunities which are now or may be hereafter accorded to the Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE III.

The British Agent and Consul-General shall be at liberty to choose his own interpreters, brokers, guards, and servants, either from among the natives or others. His interpreters, brokers, guards, and servants shall be exempt from the conscription, and from payment of any poll-tax, forced contribution, or other similar or corresponding charge. In like manner, the Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents residing at the Tunisian ports, under the orders of the said Agent and Consul-General, shall be at liberty to choose, that is to say, the Consuls, each one interpreter, one broker, two guards, and three servants; the Vice- Consuls and Consular Agents, each _one interpreter, one broker, and one guard, and two servants_, not being in the military service, who shall likewise be exempt from the conscription, from the payment of any poll- tax, forced contribution, or other similar or corresponding charge.

Four days after the Treaty of Kasr-es-Said, M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire (May 16th, 1881) wrote thus to Lord Lyons:—

You wish first of all to place on record that I stated to you that the Conventions existing between Tunis and Foreign Powers would be maintained and respected. _I repeat this assurance to you_ with greater pleasure because, by a special Article of our Treaty with the Bey, the French representative guarantees the execution of all the Conventions of this kind which now exist.

A week later Lord Granville promptly but courteously took note of these assurances in the following guarded language:—

Her Majesty’s Government do not wish to lay too much stress on _inconsistencies of language_ in conversation, or on the various reasons which have been given at Paris and at Tunis for French intervention, first as a protection against the alleged designs of the Sultan for the Bey’s deposition, and secondly for the punishment of the turbulent frontier tribes. But it can hardly be doubted that the Treaty with Tunis goes far beyond any question of the security of the frontier, and amounts practically to a Protectorate, which they understood to have been disclaimed.

Her Majesty’s Government, however, readily acknowledge the assurance repeated by M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire in his note of the 16th instant that all existing Conventions between Tunis and Foreign Powers will be maintained and respected, and this all the more readily because by the 4th Article of the Treaty with the Bey the French Republic guarantees their execution. Commercial and other rights and privileges will therefore remain undisturbed, in so far as they are guaranteed by Treaties, unless new Conventions, freely entered into, shall be substituted for the existing arrangements.

_Her Majesty’s Government take note of this assurance, which they regard as an international engagement binding upon the French Government in the future_.

Diplomacy in kid gloves was, however, no match for the diplomacy of duplicity. The history of the “month of chaos” at Tunis will sufficiently illustrate the practical results of M. Saint-Hilaire’s assurances.

Mr. Cacchia has the honour and misfortune to be British Consular Agent at Hammamet. During Colonel Corréard’s unlucky advance from Hammám el Lif, and after the French troops had finally evacuated the place by sea as “hopelessly infected by typhoid,” the Arabs had avenged their grievances by carrying off all Mr. Cacchia’s flocks and herds, and his repeated protests were not even answered. His troubles were not destined to finish here. Towards the end of November another detachment of French troops was sent to Hammamet. The night of their arrival, a shot was said to have been fired in the direction of the French encampment, but nobody was hurt by it. Mr. Cacchia was then at Tunis making useless protests about his lost camels, sheep, and goats. He had left an Arab guard, who was also his gardener, in charge of his garden, which is situated about a mile from the town. On the morning after the shot had been heard, the French commanding officer imposed a daily fine of 1000 francs on the inhabitants, until such time as the culprit was detected and given up. Up to Sunday the 27th November this contribution was duly paid. On the evening of that day, the Arab _khalifa_ or vice-governor entered Mr. Cacchia’s property, and caused his servant to be seized and bound on a charge of firing at the French camp. The man’s protestations of his innocence, and those of Mr. Cacchia’s representative, were unavailing: he was shot at dawn next morning. His head was then cut off and hung up in the town gate, in sight of the house occupied by Mr. Cacchia’s family. Of course the man’s master made immediate application for redress, and invoked the British Convention of 1875 in support of his demand, but from that day to this four months have passed away and the Tunisian Government has made no sign. The matter has been under the consideration of no less a personage than General Elias Musalli, Commander of the Legion of Honour, Director of the Tunisian Foreign Office. Notwithstanding that he has as yet come to no conclusion on the subject, he makes no secret of his opinion that “although Mr. Cacchia may be right, and the English treaty presents an awkward difficulty, any kind of redress would be detrimental to the prestige of the Protectorate.” So Mr. Cacchia’s protest about his innocent servant’s death must perforce share the same fate as those concerning his camels, his sheep, and his goats.

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While these events were taking place at Hammamet, Colonel Moulin was conducting a column from Kairwán through the Enfida estate, which had been almost forgotten in the excitement of the more striking events of the two expeditions. My readers will remember that in a former chapter we left Mr. Levy in undisturbed possession of the property under a legal order of the Sheikh-el-Islam, who had been encouraged by the presence of the “Thunderer” and “Decoy” to resist the moral pressure gently conveyed to his judicial mind by the appearance of French ironclads in Tunisian waters. The time had now come to attain one of the avowed objects of the war, and place the coveted estate with some show of decency and legal procedure in the hands of M. Saint-Hilaire’s “honest and laborious Marseilles company.” Shortly after the signing of the Kasr-es-Said Treaty, the agents of the French claimants, accompanied by the French interpreter Sumaripa, paid a visit to the Sheikh-el-Islam, to judge of his present intentions. As the old man proved to be refractory, the Société Marseillaise next turned in its dilemma to the now docile Prime Minister Mustapha. The Meliki school of Moslem jurisprudence ignored, or regarded with disfavour, the exercise of pre-emption, and if the case could be transferred to the Meliki judges they would have no difficulty in conscientiously nonsuiting Mr. Levy. It was true that in the British Convention of 1863 the religious courts, and not the Bey himself, were declared to have jurisdiction in disputes relating to real property, and it was unfortunate that the Meliki Court had already declared itself incompetent, but still under existing circumstances these were mere details. Mustapha explained matters to the Bey, who _proprio motu_ issued a decree removing the suit from the Hanafee to the Meliki tribunal. The rest was now comparatively easy, but meanwhile the Arabs had cut matters short by driving every European out of the district. The legal manœuvres at Tunis went on, however, undisturbed by the anarchy which now reigned all over the Regency. On the 20th July the enlightened Meliki _cadís_ published, as an evidence of their impartiality, an _ex parte_ manifesto in the Tunisian Government Gazette, declaring that as Mr. Levy had no right of pre-emption, the Société Marseillaise must be regarded as the legal owner.

Four days later they cited Mr. Levy to appear before them _to support his claim_. Although the Société Marseillaise had for months ignored the authority of the Hanafee Court, Mr. Levy presented himself before the Meliki _cadís_ on the 28th July, and respectfully stated that as he had legally constituted himself a defendant in the Hanafee tribunal, he was unable to acknowledge their jurisdiction. The chief cadi replied that he would report the matter to the Bey, and Mr. Levy took refuge in a protest against the treatment to which he was being subjected. Ten days afterwards the Bey ordered the Meliki _cadís_ to “take no heed of the Englishman Levy’s objections,” and to proceed with the trial. This at once elicited a fresh protest from Mr. Levy, but the Tunisian Government had long since ceased to trouble themselves with the reclamations of the British subjects. Towards the end of August the Meliki _cadís_, without calling any further on Mr. Levy, issued a decree annulling the attachment of rents made originally by the Sheikh-el-Islam in Mr. Levy’s favour, and ordered the tenants and inhabitants to consider the Société Marseillaise henceforward in the light of “the sole and lawful proprietors.” Soon after the taking of Kairwán (October 26th), Mr. Levy resumed his possession, and proceeded to till the land and sow his crops as usual. In spite of the complacency of the Meliki judges, the Société Marseillaise did not even yet feel strong enough to act on the decrees they had obtained, and eject Mr. Levy _vi et armis_. On the 20th November, Mr. Levy’s servants were working as usual; the next day Colonel Moulin’s column came to the Enfida in force on its errand of pacification. Scrupulous care was taken not to interfere with the property of Mr. Levy, but the march over the whole domain, the disarmament of the Arabs, the imposition of a heavy war contribution, and last, but not least, the shelling of the insurgent Caid Bilawar’s fort after breakfast on the 26th November, most efficiently prepared the way for what was to follow. The very next day the agents of the Société Marseillaise and a posse of workmen arrived at the Enfida, bringing with them twenty carts filled with building material. In order to have a reliable witness as to the final steps taken by his “honest and laborious” opponents, and at the same time to prevent, if possible, any collision between their employés and his own, Mr. Levy had induced an English gentleman, Mr. Kane, to remain in his camp at the Enfida. I cannot better tell the story of the last scene in this _cause célèbre_ than by borrowing Mr. Kane’s narrative, which has the merit of never having been impugned or contradicted.

“When I went to the Enfida last month (November),” writes Mr. Kane, “Mr. Levy’s workmen and tenants were in possession of the Enfida, and were carrying on the usual works of cultivation. At that time no person appeared to represent the French company. On the 20th of November a column of the French troops from Kairwán marched over the Enfida, and the Arabs made their submission as required. The day after they left a person arrived there, who said he was the agent of the Société Marseillaise, now called the Société Franco-Africaine. He had several French and Italian subordinates, and the Tunisian Caid and Khalifa began to act under his orders.

“On the 4th December, about eight o’clock in the morning, the French agent sent a servant of the Caid of the Enfida to the ground on which Mr. Levy’s men were working, and ordered them to cease ploughing. They complied with the Caid’s orders and sent a messenger to me. I at once proceeded to the spot and ordered the workmen to continue to plough.

“About ten o’clock the French agent, attended by the Caid’s servant, rode over to the camp where Elnaser (Mr. Levy’s headman) lived, and gave in writing an order to an Arab guard he had sent there in the early morning, to prevent Elnaser and his men from taking any of the straw from the large stack close to the Arab encampment, and also from giving any water to their beasts. He then left for Dar-el-Bey, the house in which he had taken up his abode. Hearing this, I rode over to the encampment of Elnaser, and told Mr. Levy’s people to use the hay and straw as before, and to draw water. The Arab guard hearing this at once left the stacks of hay and straw, and reported what I had done to the French agent. An hour afterwards, the French agent sent an Italian armed with a gun to guard the stacks. The French agent also told Elnaser and his men to leave their camp and _threatened to send for some soldiers from the company stationed at Dar-el-Bey to burn their tents if they did not go away_. This was of course said to frighten Mr. Levy’s Arabs into quitting his service.

“On the 10th December, by order of the French agent, his people commenced to dig a trench at a distance of six yards from the tent in which I lived, and all day long, notwithstanding my remonstrances, they threw earth against the sides of the tents and completely covered up the pickets for fastening the tent to the ground. The trench was evidently dug for the purpose of annoying me and blocking up the entrance of my tent. They continued to dig this trench up to the time when the final act of open violence took place.

“On the evening of the 11th of December I received intelligence that the Caid of the Enfida had enjoined all the Arabs living near Dar-el-Bey to place themselves and their camels and oxen at his disposal on the following morning for the purpose of ploughing up all the grain that had been sown in the Enfida by Mr. Levy’s employés.

“Early next morning Mr. Levy’s headman Elnaser arrived at my tent with the news that the Khalifa’s (Hadj Mufta) brother had arrived at his camp, accompanied by about forty Arabs, and had commenced the work of destruction, but that he had desisted when opposed by the Maltese in Mr. Levy’s service.

“Accordingly I rode over to the Arab camp and found everything as described. I saw that the Khalifa’s brother had ranged about twenty ploughshares drawn by camels and oxen on the edge of the cultivated ground in a line ready at any given signal to commence turning up the ground.

“_In about half-an-hour’s time a courier from the French agent arrived with orders to plough up Mr. Levy’s land at once, and by force if necessary_. Upon this the Arab in charge ordered his men to advance, and notwithstanding that the Maltese resisted by holding the camels’ heads, the Arabs forced the camels and oxen into the cultivated ground, and Mr. Levy’s employés, in order to avoid being run over and attacked, were forced to retire. I then at once ordered the Maltese and Arabs working for Mr. Levy to abandon the Enfida and return to Tunis, being compelled to leave Mr. Levy’s oxen, camels, crops, and tents in the hands of our assailants.”

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The statement of Mr. Kane was corroborated by a dozen other declarations made by his Arab and Maltese servants. He at once presented a formal protest, but from that day to this, he has, like Mr. Cacchia, been waiting for a reply. Whatever may be the merits of his case, there can be no doubt that the manner in which M. Saint-Hilaire’s “honest and laborious” friends took the administration of justice into their own hands involved half-a-dozen violations of the treaty-right of Englishmen in the Regency of Tunis, and still further compromised the consoling assurances so liberally showered on Lord Granville. Eight months before to a day, M. Jules Ferry, in the French Chamber, had indignantly repelled the insinuation of M. Lenglé “that the Enfida affair was at the bottom of the expedition to Tunis, just as the Jecker affair had been at the bottom of the expedition to Mexico under the Empire.” “Je répète,” exclaimed the President of the _Cabinet des Naifs_, with virtuous indignation, “qu’entre cette opération militaire et l’affaire d’Enfida _il n’y a aucune relation directe ou indirecte_; que l’affaire de l’Enfida, comme le rappelait tout à l’heure, M. le Président, a donné lieu à un débat international, et que ce débat étant ouvert entre la France et ce grand et loyal pays de l’Angleterre, _il n’y a lieu de faire intervenir entre ces deux grandes nations que les règles de la justice et les considérations de l’équité pour arriver à une solution_.”

It was a strange coincidence that while Mr. Levy’s servants were retreating to Tunis to escape from the ploughs and camels of their militant adversaries, the authors of the expedition were undergoing a hardly less disagreeable ordeal before the Tribunal de la Seine. Retributive justice overtook M. Roustan in the very moment of victory.

The month of December 1881 was signalised by both political and military chaos. The absence of M. Roustan at Paris necessarily brought all business to a dead lock. Mustapha returned to Tunis soon after the Resident’s departure, in order to avoid the awkward contingency of his being called as a witness by M. Rochefort, and at once set an intrigue on foot to secure his return to power. Taib Bey and his party were equally active in the prosecution of their designs to supplant both Mustapha and his master. Meanwhile torrential rains set in with unprecedented violence, and greatly helped Ali Ben Hlifa to hold his own against General Logerot. The hospitals at Susa and Jerba were inundated; the ambulance sheds at Manouba were destroyed, and several patients died in consequence; the tents at Carthage shared the same fate; a mud wall fell on the sleeping soldiers near Oued Zerga and killed five of them; and several of the smaller columns were knee-deep in slush, and literally unable to either advance or retreat. Then came the excitement of the Rochefort case, the practical condemnation of M. Roustan, and an official announcement of M. Roustan’s departure, to be contradicted a week later by an equally official announcement of his return.

Affairs showed no signs of mending in the south. A war contribution of £250,000 was decreed against the inhabitants of Sfax, to their own ruin and that of their already half-beggared European creditors. No sooner had General Logerot’s column commenced its march northward, than the “pacified” Beni Zid tribe once more rose in revolt, and an eight days’ reconnaissance in force became necessary to bring them to reason. The Matmata mountain, the stronghold of the Beni Zid, was surrounded, and greatly to the surprise of the French, the courageous but infatuated Arabs were the first to begin the attack. For six hours they maintained a hopeless resistance, and only submitted after losing twenty-seven men, besides having a much greater number _hors de combat_. The Beni Zid now ceased their hostilities, but the Ouerdna and Ouerghama tribes prepared to resist any invasion of their territory. After the engagement at Matmata, another fight took place near the village of Zeraon, which was subsequently bombarded. General Logerot then passed, amidst a continued fall of rain, through the defile of Djebel Ben Aïssa, but the Ouerghama named Ali Ben Hlifa Pasha Bey, and placed 5000 horsemen at his disposal. The fruitlessness of the great concentric movement on Kairwán was becoming more and more apparent: a successful _razzia_ of cattle was executed within sight of Kairwán itself (December 20th), the tribes near Gabes were threatened with attack, and it was even considered necessary to hold the chief of the Beni Zid as a hostage for their good behaviour. General Logerot now prepared to attack the Ouerghama, but unexpectedly their _sheikhs_ made a pretence of submission, and the troops gladly enough returned to Gabes (December 23d). On Christmas day General Logerot set out for Sfax, leaving only half a battalion of soldiers on the shore at Gabes, and a small garrison at Ras-el-Oued. The reality of this peacemaking was doubted at the time, and has since turned out to be entirely deceptive.

On the last day of 1881 M. Roustan returned to Tunis. A crowd of Algerian protegés hastened to Goletta to meet the conqueror, but all honest Frenchmen, and notably the military authorities, held aloof from so curious a demonstration. In this manner, the first year of the Protectorate closed with a very melancholy prospect for the future of this once peaceful country. The Bey’s power over his subjects was now reduced to the merest shadow; his administration had fallen into a state of hopeless confusion, while his available army was reduced to a corps of titular generals and colonels, who did nothing but wear magnificent uniforms, and draw their pay when they could get it. The collection of taxes had proved inadequate for the payment of the interest due on the national debt, and the wholesale desertion of their usual camping- grounds by the Bedouin Arabs was an ominous portent of coming famine and the pestilence which usually follows in its wake. The notables of Sfax were still offering in vain an interest of twelve per cent. for a loan to pay their share of the war indemnity, the indiscriminate levy of which elsewhere had hopelessly ruined a large proportion of the Tunisian tribesmen. Suspicions were afloat that the peace in the south would be of short duration, and the heavy rains had augmented the natural difficulties which met the French troops at every turn, and increased the mortality in the military hospitals. While all unity of feeling amongst the European residents was at an end, the French colony, split up into Taibists and Roustanites, presented notoriously the spectacle of a house divided against itself. To add to those troubles, the inopportune return of M. Roustan, in defiance of public opinion, now placed any attempt at a new departure beyond the range of possibilities. The very streets of the town seemed to share in the general chaos; they had become an impassable quagmire. Genuine trade was now at a standstill, and had been superseded by a brisk traffic in absinthe and vermouth. The _Café du Cercle_, frequented by generals and staff- officers, and the _Café du Kroumír_, the rendezvous of the honest _troupiers_, were doing a roaring business, but Ali Ben Saleh and Muhamed Ben Abdallah no longer came into Tunis to purchase their Manchester cloth and Nottingham calico. They had exchanged their cattle for guns and gunpowder, and were waiting on the frontier with Ali Ben Hlifa, for the long-expected advance of the Sultan and Caliph. This was the state of Tunisia when 1881 dropped into the years of history.

While these pages have been passing through the press the Enfida case has ended. The Société Marseillaise has at last purchased Mr. Levy’s adjacent property, and at the same time his contingent right to the Enfida estate. Ten days later (June 11th) Mr. Levy died.