Chapter XXIV

_England in 1859; Relations with France; First Visit to Biarritz;
Napoleon III; Letters from Gladstone, Mérimée, Fould and
Ellice._

The formation of a new and extensive kingdom, as might have been expected, was a question of too deep moment not to exercise an important, though indirect influence on England’s relations with States nearer and more powerful than Italy. It is purposed in the present chapter to deal with events more immediately affecting this country rather than Italian politics. England, in 1859, did not occupy her former high and stable position amongst the nations of Europe. Her late struggle with Russia had taught her a lesson which had not been neglected; she had gained strength it is true, but not in such a degree as to render altogether unwarrantable the disparaging taunts in which certain foreign Statesmen indulged at her expense. ‘Of a truth,’ says the prince of comic writers, ‘wise folk learn a good many things from their enemies’ (Aristophanes, The Birds 1, 387), and well do the words apply to England, who then learnt wisdom from her foes. Bitter experiences in the Crimea taught us the miserable insufficiency of our military system, and already action had commenced for future improvement. Regarding, not unreasonably, with some feeling of alarm the threatening aspect of Continental affairs, we had at last opened our eyes to the knowledge that the dispersion of the troops retained in the country over all parts of the United Kingdom (and of these, many, in the sister isle, employed on what may be considered as little better than police duty) was not the policy most adapted to secure home defence, or to maintain that army in the fittest condition for service abroad. It was in the year 1859 that the Volunteer force of Great Britain, which, with the exception of one solitary battalion, had been extinct since the beginning of the century, was revived, or, to speak more accurately, sprang up into a fresh existence: indeed, in the succeeding year the movement acquired strength so rapidly as to appear before the nation as an army, imperfect naturally and undeveloped, but giving such promises of efficiency as have since been so fully and amply ratified.

It is not our intention to enter on the subject of reforms in the regular army which ensued, nor is there any necessity to detail all the circumstances which led England to turn her attention to her own safety, and in the interests of this to set her house in order. The causes for apprehension may have been exaggerated, but that they were altogether without foundation is incredible. It is indisputable that after the cession of Nice and Savoy to the Emperor of the French, disquieting rumours as to his further intentions were afloat. His next project, it was said, was the annexation of Geneva, and among other means of aggrandisement which he contemplated, one was an advance of the French frontier to the Ebro, in exchange for which Spain was to receive aid and support in the subjugation of Portugal. These designs of the Emperor were not only freely discussed in society, but set forth in pamphlets apparently stamped with Imperial authority. Lord Palmerston watched with much misgiving the great additional military and naval preparations on the part of France, and to him they were a source of grave anxiety; nor must these rumours, magnified and distorted as they may have been, be regarded by us with contempt, when it is known that such keen observers, and acute politicians, as the Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, and Panizzi himself, viewed them with perturbed reflections.

In this year (1860), Panizzi, for the first time, had been invited by His Majesty Napoleon III. to spend his holidays at Biarritz, in company with his old friend Prosper Mérimée. Correspondence of much importance is here adduced, and is given in full, as bearing upon the suspicions and presages of evil already referred to. The first letter in order is from the pen of Panizzi to Mérimée, and from it may be gathered all that is needful of the dreaded omens which threatened to disturb the peaceful relations existing between England and France, whose alliance involved the peace of the whole civilized world, whilst its rupture would throw broadcast the seeds of dissension and of war. The letters themselves indicate the close relations between the two correspondents, and their intimacy, will be reverted to hereafter:—

“British Museum,
Sept. 30 (Sunday), 1860.

“My dear Mérimée,

... I have been so fortunate as to have an opportunity of
at once communicating to a very influential personage the chief
points of the conversation I had the honour of holding with the
Emperor respecting the want of cordiality, not to say coolness,
now unhappily prevailing between France and England, my object
being humbly to contribute, as far as might be in my power, to the
growth of better feelings. I have dwelt on the earnestness with
which His Majesty had expressed himself with respect to the
English alliance, and on the warmth with which he had spoken of
his affection for this nation. I did not fail to repeat what His
Majesty had said of his consciousness of never having done a
single act which could be construed as injurious or even
unfriendly to England; of his feeling that he had most
scrupulously fulfilled his duties as an ally; of his having
nothing so much at heart as to be on the most intimate terms with
this country, feeling confident that that would be for the
advantage of both France and England, whilst it gave him,
personally, heartfelt satisfaction.

What I said was extremely well received, and the same wish was
expressed as that which had been expressed by His Majesty, that
the two countries should always act cordially together; that His
Majesty would find England most desirous to cultivate an alliance
so eminently advantageous to both nations, provided that could be
done without sacrifice to England’s honour and interests, and that
on this side of the channel they were not aware of ever having
given France any just cause of complaint. But that many things
created the impression that France, not satisfied with the eminent
position in which she was placed, was striving to extend her
influence and possession beyond what was just and fair towards her
neighbours. In support of this impression a great many facts were
alleged. It was stated that Savoy and Nice were annexed not only
against the most explicit professions to the contrary, but on
pretence that would justify any other annexation of territories
that France might covet. I was, moreover, told that France,
knowing how injurious it might be to English interests to alter
the territorial arrangements on the coast of Barbary with
reference to Gibraltar, had nevertheless encouraged an unjust
attack on the part of Spain or Morocco; that France was favourable
to the fall and partition of the Turkish Empire, well-knowing that
England would oppose this consummation with all her might; that
agents were traced to Belgium and other parts, endeavouring to
create a party in those populations favourable to the annexation
of territories now belonging to other States, to France; that
agents had even been found at work in Ireland, that the number of
pamphlets published in France directed to prepare the world for
extensive territorial alterations in favour of an enlargement of
the French Empire, and the belief that many of such pamphlets were
published with the approbation, if not at the instigation of the
French Government, rendered them apparently an indication of the
intentions of that Government. It is only necessary, in
conclusion, to advert to the great, constant, and progressive
armaments of France, both by land and by sea. As to the latter,
Englishmen are convinced they cannot be directed to any other end
but eventually to offensive warfare, especially against England.
France, they say, cannot want for any defensive purpose so large a
navy as she has, to which she is steadily adding; and it is
obviously for aggressive purposes that she drills her sailors and
troops to embark and disembark with rapidity and precision, and
that she builds vessels intended for the transport and landing of
large bodies of soldiers. It depends on France, I was told, to be
on the very best and most intimate terms with this country, that
is, by not acting in a manner which excites well-grounded
suspicions of her intentions. There is every disposition on the
part of England to meet her more than half way, but if the acts of
the Imperial Government are not calculated to inspire confidence,
it will be impossible for England not to be on her guard, and
prepare herself for any contingencies. As to the accusation that
England encourages other powers to coalesce to attack France, I am
told it is utterly unfounded. It is positively denied, moreover,
that there is any intention of forming any coalition, or even of
coming to an understanding for the purpose of injuring France. It
is, however, admitted that nations who watch the conduct of France
are uneasy for their own security, and that they will probably
come to some understanding should it ever come to pass that France
becomes aggressive.

In conclusion, I was told, the peace of the world as well as the
happiness of mankind, is in the hands of France. If she will not
attempt to injure others, no one will think of injuring her; and
so far as England is concerned, if France will be satisfied with
what is fair and honourable, she may rely on the sincere desire of
this country of being on the best terms with her, and of her
acting accordingly.

You are at liberty to show this letter to the Minister, and even
to place it in his hands should he wish to show it to his august
master, who ought to know exactly by what feelings and motives
political men are moved in this country towards France.

A good understanding with England must be of some value to France.
She has raised the storm; she must do her best to allay it if she
have at heart the English alliance.

I hope you will be authorised to answer this letter in a manner
that will prepare the way to a lasting return of cordiality on
both sides.

Yours, &c., &c.,
A. PANIZZI.”

M. Mérimée’s reply partakes much of the style of the special pleader. Whilst he strongly disclaims his belief in the Emperor’s bad faith, as suggested by Panizzi, his defence of Louis Napoleon seems hardly inconsistent with the truth of certain of the allegations. He himself appears to have considered his criticism of English policy the strongest point in his letter:—

“Paris, Samedi 6 Octobre, 1860.

“Mon cher Panizzi, ...

En attendant, vous saurez que je ne suis revenu de voyage
que hier soir, où j’ai trouvé votre lettre. Je l’ai portée ce
matin chez Son Excellence. Je vois que les dispositions de Lord
Palmerston sont telles que je me les représentais, c’est-à-dire le
contraire de bienveillantes, mais je ne me doutais pas qu’il _dit_
la moitié des choses extraordinaires qu’il vous a dites. Dans
l’exposé de ses griefs il y a une bonne partie de faussetés
complètes auxquelles il n’y a qu’un démenti formel à donner. Puis
il y a des niaiseries que je ne me serais jamais attendu à
entendre dans la bouche d’un homme d’Etat ou soit-disant tel. Par
exemple, cette bonne bêtise que la France médite une invasion en
Angleterre, parce que dans des ports de mer on exerce les soldats
à embarquer et débarquer promptement. Il me semble que, lorsque
dans l’espace de deux ans on a eu cent cinquante mille hommes à
débarquer en Italie, douze mille à débarquer en Chine, six mille à
débarquer en Syrie; quand, de plus, la plus importante de nos
colonies, l’Algérie a une armée de cinquante mille hommes qui ne
communique avec la France que par mer, il me semble, dis-je, qu’il
n’est pas inutile d’apprendre aux soldats à entrer dans un
vaisseau et à en sortir. Quant aux armements, vous pouvez dire
hardiment qu’il ne s’en fait point. On donne des congés de
semestre dans tous les régiments, et, à mon avis, _on a tort_,
attendu l’état des choses en Italie. Les armements maritimes sont
aussi faux que les préparatifs de l’armée de terre. Si vous voulez
lire la brochure que je vous ai portée, vous verrez la vérité sur
tout cela. Le pauvre Louis-Philippe avait laissé dépérir la
flotte. De plus on est dans une époque de rénovation et il est
nécessaire de transformer les bâtiments à voiles. Je conçois que
l’Angleterre veuille avoir le monopole de la mer, et qu’elle y
tienne, mais elle l’aura toujours, attendu qu’elle dispose d’un
bien plus grand nombre de marins que toute autre puissance. Nous
avons eu des escadres d’élite qui, sous les ordres d’un chef
excellent comme l’Amiral Lalande, auraient peut-être battu une
escadre Anglaise, mais si, en gagnant une bataille, nous perdions
mille matelots et les Anglais dix mille, nous ne pourrions réparer
notre perte, tandis qu’en un mois l’Angleterre trouverait dix
mille autres matelots aussi bons. Il me paraît par trop bouffon de
la part de Lord Palmerston de dire que l’Angleterre ne cherche pas
et ne cherchera pas à former une coalition contre la France, et
d’ajouter aussitôt que les puissances inquiètes _will probably
come to some understanding_! Une autre assertion non moins
extravagante, c’est de nous accuser d’avoir encouragé l’Espagne a
faire la guerre au Maroc. J’étais en Espagne au moment où cette
guerre s’est faite, et s’il y a à Madrid un ministre anglais avec
des yeux et des oreilles, il aurait pu dire que la guerre a été
faite par l’explosion du sentiment national, et que les lettres de
Lord John Russell ont eu pour résultat d’exalter ce sentiment et
d’exciter à la haine contre l’Angleterre. Il n’est pas moins
étrange de prétendre que la France qui a aidé l’Angleterre à
retarder la destruction de l’empire Ottoman, pousse maintenant à
sa ruine. Vos ministres sont comme les malades qui ne veulent pas
que leur médecin leur dise que leur état est grave. Ressusciter ou
même faire vivre longtemps la Turquie est impossible, et il serait
insensé de se quereller sur les remèdes à lui donner, lorsqu’il
faudrait au contraire s’entendre sur la manière de l’enterrer. Que
la France ait de l’ambition, je ne le nie pas. C’est une idée ou
plutôt un préjugé national, qu’elle s’est amoindrie en perdant une
partie des conquêtes de la révolution. Je crois que l’Empereur ne
partage pas ce préjugé, mais, en tout cas, dans l’hypothèse qu’il
l’aurait, vous ne le supposez pas assez dépourvu de bon sens pour
risquer d’avoir toute l’Europe sur les bras, sur la chance d’ôter
cent cinquante mille âmes à la Bavière et autant à la Prusse? Ce
que la France gagnerait en étendue, elle le perdrait en
homogénéité, et, tout considéré, elle s’affaiblirait au lieu de
prendre des forces. Ce qui me frappe surtout dans la politique
anglaise de notre temps, c’est sa petitesse. Elle n’agit ni pour
des idées grandes, ni même pour des intérêts. Elle n’a que des
jalousies et se borne à prendre le contrepied des puissances qui
excitent ses sentiments de jalousie. Le résultat est de diminuer
son importance en Europe et de la réduire au rôle de puissance de
second ordre. En ménageant la chèvre et le chou comme elle a fait,
en observant la neutralité peu impartiale entre l’Autriche et la
France, elle n’a obtenu l’amitié ni de l’une ni de l’autre. Y
a-t-il quelque chose de plus misérable que sa politique à Naples
et en Vénétie? Comment M. de Rechberg peut-il avoir la moindre
confiance en des gens qui encouragent Garibaldi et Kossuth et qui
ne veulent pas l’affranchissement de la Vénétie? Tout se fait en
Angleterre en vue de conserver des portefeuilles. On fait toutes
les fautes possibles pour conserver une trentaine de voix
douteuses. On ne s’inquiète que du présent et on ne songe pas à
l’avenir. Il est certain qu’il y a dans ce moment en Europe un
malaise général qui amènera une catastrophe et une grande
modification de la carte. Des hommes vraiment politiques, voyant
le mal, chercheraient le remède. Vos ministres ne pensent pas à la
guérison du malade. Ils veulent conserver la maladie. Cela est
digne de vieillards qui n’ont que quelques années devant eux, mais
je doute que les grands ministres du commencement de ce siècle
eussent pensé et agi de la sorte.

Je viens d’un pays où l’on est très dévot et où la catastrophe de
Lamoricière a fait une grande sensation. J’ai vu des gens fort
piteux et fort découragés, mais nullement dangereux. Je vois que
Garibaldi se soumet et va reprendre sa charrue. Il fait bien. Son
affaire est de se battre, et il n’entend rien à organiser. Il
parait que le gâchis est grand en Sicile et à Naples, et qu’il est
parvenu à faire regretter le gouvernement déchu. Cependant il
parait que tous les gens sensés sont unanimes pour croire que
l’annexion est le seul moyen de rétablir un peu d’ordre pour le
moment. Je trouve qu’il y a de l’habileté dans les ménagements de
M. de Cavour pour Garibaldi, mais j’aurais voulu le voir un peu
plus énergique au sujet de Mazzini. Je crains que les reproches de
Lord Palmerston, qui, entre nous, me semblent dénoter peu de bonne
foi, ne produisent pas un très bon effet sur l’Empereur. M. Fould,
que je n’ai pas rencontré ce matin, en sera, je pense, très
irrité. Je lui ai laissé un mot en le priant de ne faire aucun
usage de cette lettre avant d’en avoir causé avec moi. Vous
pouvez, quand vous en trouverez l’occasion, assurer hautement que
s’il y a eu en Irlande quelques menées contraires au Gouvernement
Anglais, elles sont l’œuvre de nos Catholiques et que le
Gouvernement de l’Empereur n’y est pour rien absolument.

Adieu, mon cher Panizzi, portez-vous bien et ne m’oubliez pas
auprès de nos amis.... J’espère encore que le pape s’en ira un de
ces jours.

Tout à vous.

P. MERIMEE.”

We next offer Mr. Gladstone’s opinion of England’s relations with France, and would draw attention to the sense of security pervading his expressions in a letter to Panizzi. How these sentiments were modified at a later date will be shown further on:—

“11 Downing Street,
Whitehall,
October 16th, 1860.

“My dear Panizzi,

I return all; but I have not, I think, completely
deciphered M. Mérimée’s important letter. If there is a flavour of
bitterness in it, I cannot deny that it may be in some degree due
to us. Instead of saying anything akin to what is complained of, I
will merely point to topics of consolation, such as follow. In my
opinion, under the present Ministry, no coalition will be formed
against France. The English nation is really Italian in feeling;
and in proportion as France is the same will there be a broader
and firmer ground for concord and co-operation. The foolish alarms
which have been unhappily prevalent in this country are abating by
degrees. They implied a most extravagant compliment to France, and
a compliment that I for one grudged her not a little. Lastly, the
Commercial Treaty, if the work be completed by the French
Government in the spirit of courage, sagacity, and good faith with
which it has been begun, will, by processes all the more safe
because they are quiet and gradual, lay the most solid foundations
of active goodwill between the two countries. How much I desire
that goodwill I can hardly tell you. France and England are the
two really great Powers of Europe; and two such forces, if they
move in severance from one another, cannot but disturb the
political system. The case of Savoy and Nice was, as I think, an
unhappy one; but if on the one side it may be said that it was
exceptional, and if on the other calm reflection must admit that
it has been made too much of, then every day that passes over our
heads will have its healing power. On the whole, unless we have
new faults and follies, we ought to do well in this all important
matter.

Yours most sincerely,
W. E. GLADSTONE.”

“I shall look anxiously for your next. In answer to a question
which you reported about me, you might have said with truth that I
am now denounced as one of the most dangerous and revolutionary
characters in England.”

Panizzi’s letter of September 30, above-quoted, was forwarded by Mérimée to M. Achille Fould, and in due course he replied, commenting on it. As the correspondence would be incomplete without this, it is inserted, but the contents scarcely call for any special remarks on our part.

(For “Ferdinand,” _infra_, read “François.”)

“4 Novembre, 1860.

“Mon cher collègue,

En vérité notre ami Panizzi, ou ses honorable
interlocuteurs ont une singulière idée du caractère de l’Empereur.
S’il fallait attacher de l’importance aux propos que vous transmet
M. Panizzi, Machiavel ne serait qu’un enfant naïf auprès de
Napoleon III. Pendant que nous faisons des efforts pour calmer
l’irritation de l’Espagne, et arrêter son zèle pour la cause de
Rome, c’est l’Empereur qu’on accuse d’avoir sous mains provoqué le
rappel de la Légation Espagnole de Turin, et je le sais de la
meilleure source, rien n’est plus faux que cette dernière
supposition. Ce qui est vrai, c’est que nous avons essayé d’agir
dans un sens tout à fait opposé à celui allégué. Voilà pour
l’affaire d’Espagne.

Quant à l’envoi de notre flotte à Gaeta je conviens qu’il y a une
sorte de contradiction dans notre conduite; mais elle est bien
plus apparente que réelle. Les explications diplomatiques ont déjà
été données sur ce point. L’envoi de la flotte a été purement une
affaire de sentiment et d’humanité. Si cette mesure manque de
logique elle ne peut pas être taxée de parjure. La meilleure
preuve de notre sincérité, c’est que nous avons immédiatement
désillusionné le Roi de Naples, à qui la présence de nos vaisseaux
avait donné des espérances mal fondées, en lui refusant de faire
avancer un corps de troupes à Terracina, comme il nous le
demandait. Je crois savoir que Ferdinand (François) II., s’apprête
à profiter de notre flotte pour quitter Gaeta. On ne pourrait
vraiment pas reprocher à l’Empereur de s’être laissé toucher par
le malheur de ce jeune souverain et la situation de la famille
dont il est entouré.

Quant à la question d’alliance entre la France et l’Angleterre
pour régler le sort de l’Italie je ne sais que vous dire. Cela me
parait pour le moment prématuré.

Mille bonnes amitiés,
ACHILLE FOULD.”

Now follows the exposition of Mr. Gladstone’s modified views, set forth in two letters. From these we gather that, on further observation, he had come to regard the conduct of the Emperor of the French, both in Italy and elsewhere, as somewhat more than equivocal, and as calculated to engender strife, and threaten the existing peaceful relations of the two countries:—

“Nov. 26, 1860.

“My dear Panizzi,

You know, and therefore I need not describe, the spirit in
which I received your recent communications respecting certain
conversations which you held in Paris, and in which I have looked
upon the acts of your interlocutor. But since I saw you his
conduct has really become so equivocal that I do not see how it is
possible for one who pursues it to expect that he should retain
confidence, much less that he should remove mistrust.

The seizure of Terracina is defended, if at all, by a plea which
seems little short of ridiculous—I mean strategic necessity for
the defence of Rome.

But there is a construction for the act alike obvious and
rational—namely this, that disturbance is to be prolonged in
Southern Italy, under the notion that the establishment there of a
nation and a kingdom is an evil, and that every chance is to be
kept open of averting it.

It seems intended to facilitate the escape of the soldiers of King
Francis into the mountain districts of the Regno, and to make
those districts the focus of resistance to Victor Emmanuel.

This construction is supported by the incomprehensible conduct of
France with respect to Gaeta.

If Victor Emmanuel could be conceived anxious to get hold of
Francis and his family, then we could also conceive the duty or
the policy of baffling him; but it is impossible that the French
Government can entertain such an idea.

To keep open Gaeta on the side of the sea is to prolong suffering
and bloodshed for the present—fear and insecurity for the future.
Such a policy, if it be a policy, appears inhuman. I admit that,
notwithstanding the unhappy affair of Savoy, and especially of
Nice, the great acts done by France for Italy last year have
rendered to that country an inestimable service. I do not enter
into any comparative question as between the path pursued by
France and that taken by England. I assume no right to be her
judge. I merely write in the interest of peace, and of a fervent
desire that there should be constant and cordial goodwill between
France and England. Whatever susceptibility my countrymen may have
shown, a consistent course on the part of the French Emperor with
regard to Italy would have been acknowledged by them. They were
utterly thrown abroad by the terms of Villafranca; but they,
perhaps, did not then make sufficient allowance for difficulties,
and they were pleased to see that Zurich was an amendment upon the
prior proceeding. But what is it possible to say or think or urge
when the Sardinian force is only permitted to conduct one-half a
siege, and when (as I am told) the French have either secured the
passage, or themselves actually carried provisions into Gaeta?

Before these unhappy proceedings, the English mind was getting
rapidly clear of its prepossessions. The publication of the
Treaty, in which the Emperor has behaved so admirably, will do an
infinity of good—or will, at any rate, lay the ground for it—and
this will grow as the terms of it are better understood. Why is an
opportunity to be made for the light-minded and the evil-minded to
point to other ambiguities or conduct on questions in which it is
of such vast importance that France and England should have a
common feeling?

Believe me,
Sincerely yours,
W. E. GLADSTONE.”

“11, Downing Street,
Whitehall,
Nov. 27, 1860.

“My dear Panizzi,

I return the letter you sent me. It was, I think, quite
capable of a good construction on Nov. 4, when it was written; and
the writer tells us he had then learned that Ferdinand, evidently
meaning Francis, was about to use the French Fleet as a means of
escape. By this time he must have pretty well unlearned that piece
of knowledge, and the character of the act, I think, stands out
such as I described it yesterday. I impute no Machiavelism, or ism
of any other kind. What I have been saying to every one all this
year has been, _Give the Emperor’s acts a fair construction_; but
a fair construction of _these_ acts unhappily lends to them a
rather foul aspect. I entirely withhold even now my belief from
any such notions as those which you describe in your last page,
and I do not take these false strokes of policy as indications of
a plot extending far beyond them. They may be due to uncertainty,
and to apprehensions of the future Italy; such as are, however,
quite unworthy of a country so able and so certain to hold its own
as France. But they are alike deductions from the glory it has
won, evils in themselves, menaces to the general peace, and
sources of mistrust _here_, such that as far as they go make it
impossible to deny that the feeling is legitimate.

As to my interest in Italy, I wish it could be one-tenth part as
useful as it is true. She has been to me for the last eighteen
months a principal cause, not only of joy and satisfaction, but
even of the desire for political existence.

Yours sincerely,
W. E. GLADSTONE.”

The substance of these two letters was forthwith communicated as follows by Panizzi to Mérimée:—

“B. M., 29th November, 1860.

“... Shortly after my return I informed Mr. Gladstone of my having
had the honour of conversing with His Majesty, and told Mr.
Gladstone of the great interest with which the Emperor spoke of
him. This gentleman was much pleased with what I told him, but was
of opinion that certain actions had been unjustly judged, and felt
confident of the loyalty of the Emperor; and, notwithstanding the
conduct of General Goyon at Viterbo, and of Admiral Barbier de
Tinan at Gaeta, he still adheres to his former opinions.

“But yesterday Mr. Gladstone sent me a long letter, in which he
tells me how he deplores the conduct of the Imperial Government at
Gaeta, at Viterbo, at Terracina, and, in fact, everywhere; and
which almost confirms what he has constantly tried to make people
disbelieve. He is much mortified. I answered him, but from a
second letter received this morning, I feel I cannot conceal the
sudden change in Mr. Gladstone’s convictions. And if so firm a
partisan of the Emperor has changed, think what the effect must be
on those who have always suspected the Emperor.

“As His Majesty placed so much confidence, and justly so, in the
sentiments of Mr. Gladstone, I have thought it right to inform him
(H.M.) of this change and its cause, and this I do entirely at my
own risk, hoping that something will be done, in order to restore
to His Majesty the confidence of those who, here, are his real
friends. As for myself, I am at your disposal.”

The following letter to Count Cavour, the only one in our possession, will serve to show Panizzi’s opinions of the real intent of the policy of Louis Napoleon towards Italy—an opinion not, in our own judgment, destitute of considerable support from facts:—

“British Museum,
7th of December,
1860.

“My dear and distinguished Friend,

You are already aware that I wrote to let the Emperor know
of the bad impression which his conduct was producing here, and
that Mr. Gladstone, who had always defended him, was beginning to
feel it impossible to trust in him, especially after what he did
at Gaeta.

The Emperor has read my letter, and has given me to understand, in
answer, that his feelings are the same as they were two years ago:
that he still wishes to promote the independence of the Italian
nation, and ever so many fine things of that sort, which amount to
nothing. But there is in the answer a passage of considerable
importance, which I copy:—'The Emperor replied to me that all that
has been done was done in concert with the King’s Government, and
that it would be wrong to hold him alone responsible for what has
happened. The King is quite aware of the Emperor’s ideas on all
that has taken place; and he knows, moreover, what the Emperor
ardently desires above all.’ I know not what to think of this.
Neither the King nor his Government can have approved either the
conduct of Guyon or that of Barbier de Tinan, of which I specially
complained. How is all this going on? I don’t know, and cannot
stomach it.

My rejoinder was that if the matter stood as thus reported to me,
I could not but confess that the King’s Government was involved in
the responsibility, but that I was unable to comprehend why such a
King should be patronized as he of Gaeta, sprung of a generation
of ruthless tyrants; that we should never have expected to see the
wings of the Imperial eagle extended over the lawless people of
Naples, red with human blood, and that we were completely at sea.
I said too, that the most influential persons here believed the
Emperor was favourable to a certain measure of Italian
independence, but not to Italian unity; and to this is attributed
the protection accorded to the King of Gaeta; that it was held for
certain too that H.M. would go to war next spring, but not for the
unity of Italy.

I ought perhaps to have said more, but did not wish to go beyond
certain limits. There are some here who think that the Emperor has
an understanding with you over there to go to war next spring, but
I do not know what good it would do us to have Francis at Gaeta.
In short we understand nothing at all.

Yours, &c., &c.,
A. PANIZZI.”

“P.S.—Please tell Hudson what I am writing. I have let Palmerston
and Gladstone read the answer which I got from Paris: they have
both formed the same opinion of it.”

What schemes and intentions the Emperor may have secretly entertained at this period (if, indeed, such a creature of circumstances can be supposed to have been capable of possessing fixed intentions beyond the exigencies of the hour) will probably remain hidden from human ken until records now in obscure recesses shall come out into the light of publicity. That ambitious ideas floated through his brain, and that, if it had been possible to carry out his projects, he would have hesitated but little about the means of executing them, there is little doubt; but that, for some reason, he did not see the way to their fulfilment seems equally certain. Happily—and probably owing to the firm attitude of England—the cloud passed over, and no rupture occurred between the two great powers. In a little more than two years after the date of the letter last quoted, Panizzi received from the Emperor a second invitation to Biarritz. What led to this invitation we find him thus explaining to his friend Ellice:—

“Paris, 52, Rue de Lille,
“Monday, Aug. 11th, 1862.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
“... It is perfectly true that Her Majesty, on hearing from
Mérimée himself that I was to pass through Paris, did me the
honour of inviting me to dine at St. Cloud last Wednesday, which
of course I did. I am not, however, so conceited as to suppose
that Her Majesty, who knows me very little, asked me in
consequence of that slight knowledge of me; no doubt she asked me
out of kindness to Mérimée. We had a most agreeable party on that
day. The Empress was kind, more than I can express, both at dinner
and after, when the ladies and gentlemen who had dined,
accompanied by several carriages (she driving her mother) went to
see a new contrivance to run carriages on a railway (of which I
understood nothing). We returned to St. Cloud about 11 o’clock by
bye-lanes without any escort whatever, and in the most private
manner. The Emperor, who was to arrive on that day, not having
come, the Empress most gracefully said that Mérimée and I must
wait for him, and dine again yesterday, which we did. He was
uncommonly gracious and friendly; owing to a mistake, we arrived
long before the dinner hour; we walked in the garden, Her Majesty,
and Mérimée, as well as myself, till dinner time; then, after
dinner, he called me to a private room and we had a long
conversation, during which he encouraged me to speak out, and I
did so. The conclusion was an invitation to Biarritz. I was most
struck with the Prince Imperial. He is a handsome, intelligent,
charming boy; he speaks English just as well as you do....”

This chapter may close with part of a letter from Panizzi to Mr. Gladstone, wherein he appears to give the result of his visit to Biarritz, and of his conversations with the Emperor Napoleon. Much of the provocation stated by the writer to have been given to His Majesty it is difficult to deny; but those who have studied the subject, or retain any memory of the circumstances of the time, will agree that the conduct of the Emperor himself was the chief source of all those accusations, true or false, which were brought against him.

“British Museum,
November 3rd, 1862.

“... As to the conduct of Napoleon respecting Italy, of course
you know I am completely with you; but I must say that some of
our friends have acted as if they wished to furnish him with a
pretext for behaving as he has hitherto done. He has been told
that no confidence can be placed in his word (if even true he
cannot like to be told), he has been _bullied_ and threatened,
those who have treated him with insolence and have grossly
insulted him, not only as Emperor, but as if he were the vilest
of mortals, have been made most of by some public men in England
(I will tell you what I allude to when we meet), all this has
greatly, and not unnaturally, vexed him, and indisposed him to
listen to the advice of statesmen whom he no longer considered
as his friends. One of the very few Frenchmen who looks upon the
English alliance as the best for France, as well as for the good
of Europe generally, and who has long been doing his utmost to
smooth difficulties and soften asperities has often said to
me:—‘On se croit réciproquement plus mauvais qu’on n’est en
réalité, il n’y a pas moyen de s’entendre.’ I have found by
experience the perfect truth of this.”

Here we abandon this subject: leaving at the same time material for much thought as to the instability of all human events, either private or public, and as to the uncertainty of individual character. How inconspicuous may be the turning-point upon which hangs the good or evil of the future, and with what jealous care the actions of the powerful and ambitious should be watched; how a thought or a word may lead to the misery and destruction of thousands; and how soon all that was fair, prosperous, and peaceful may be turned into hideous bloodshed, dissension, and misery! Like the Cæsars of old, the Napoleonic dynasty was ever craving for increased dominion; and although we, who live in these later days, have seen the last hopes of Imperial power in France seemingly extinguished, as we look back to the time when such haughty spirits had to be kept in check, we cannot but feel a certain amount of gratitude that such contingencies are unlikely ever again to inspire us with apprehension from so formidable a quarter.

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