Skip to content

Chapter XX: Part II: A Historical Argument (5)

Text size

That devolution to a local authority, or to local authorities, is the proper remedy for evils affecting Great Britain and Ireland, has been, for various reasons, admitted by responsible statesmen during the last fifty years. As long ago as 1865 the late Lord Salisbury, then Lord Robert Cecil, enquiring why “a people with so wonderful a soil, with such enormous resources (as the Irish) lagged so far behind the English in the race?” and examining critically all the usual reasons assigned, came to the conclusion that the cause was not to be found in any of them, but was to be sought for in the system of government. “I am afraid,” he said, “that the one thing which has been peculiar to Ireland has been the Government of England.” About the same time Lord Beaconsfield went so far as to indicate his desire for a federal arrangement. In a conversation with the American Ambassador in London in the early ’seventies he stated that: “If he had to deal with the situation he would propose to place Ireland in a similar position that New York held in the Federal Government.” In 1879 Mr. Gladstone advocated devolution, and devolution on federal lines, for the relief of Parliament.

“I desire,” he said, “I may almost say I intensely desire, to see
Parliament relieved of some portion of its duties.... We have got
an over-weighted Parliament; and if Ireland, or any other portion
of the country, is desirous and able so to arrange its affairs
that by taking the local part, or some local part, of its
transactions off the hands of Parliament, it can liberate and
strengthen Parliament for Imperial concerns, I say I will not only
accord a reluctant assent, but I will give a zealous support to
any such scheme.”

After indicating that the only limit he knew to the extension of local government was the limit imposed by the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, he went on to say:

“I will consent to give to Ireland no principle, nothing that is
not upon equal terms offered to Scotland and to the different
parts of the United Kingdom. But I say that the man who shall
devise a machinery by which some portion of the excessive and
impossible task now laid upon the House of Commons shall be
shifted to the more free, and therefore more efficient, hands of
secondary and local authorities, will confer a blessing upon his
country that will entitle him to be reckoned among the prominent
benefactors of the land.”

In 1885 Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Devonshire and Mr. Chamberlain all spoke in favour of devolution. The “Radical programme,” published with a preface by Mr. Chamberlain, before the General Election of that year, advocated the creation, in addition to County Councils and District Councils, of elected National Councils for Ireland, Scotland, and (if desired by the Welsh) Wales, to take over part of the duties of the central administration, and also to deal with private Bills, but apparently not with other matters of legislation. The appointment of a Secretary for Scotland had not then been decided upon, but the subject was under discussion, and the writer doubtless expected that greater attention to Scotch legislation would be secured by that means. In the course of his argument he said:

“Before dealing, as we presently shall at some length, with the
case of Ireland, it seems well to say a few words on another
object of the first importance, which can be accomplished only in
connection with some such extension of the principles of local
government as we are now considering. Recent experience has made
it perfectly clear that Parliamentary Government is being exposed
to a strain for which it may prove unequal. The overwhelming work
thrown upon the Imperial Legislature is too much for its
machinery.... The Imperial evil is not less than the domestic.
What, for instance, can be more deplorable than the systematic
neglect at Westminster of Colonial and Indian topics of the
highest moment? It is obvious that no mere extension of local
government upon the ordinary and restricted lines will relieve the
Parliamentary congestion which has long since become a national
calamity.”

The late Duke of Devonshire expressed, for so cautious a man, pretty strong views on the imperfections of “Castle Government” and on the advantages of devolution. Speaking in Belfast on November 5th, 1885, he defended the Irish Government against accusations which he considered unjust, but added:

“At the same time, I am perfectly willing to admit that it is very
possible and even probable, that the Irish Government as now
constituted is not the best fitted in all respects to discharge,
still less to undertake new and more important duties. I would not
shrink from a great and bold reconstruction of Irish
government....”

He explained that, in his opinion, considerable power ought to be left in the hands of the executive, but added:

“I would endeavour so to frame those powers as to make them
capable of relaxation, perhaps ultimately of relinquishment, in
response to any proof we may receive from the Irish people of
their fitness for self-government, their fitness for the
assumption of those responsibilities.”

Later in the same year, Mr. Gladstone, in his address to the electors of Midlothian, used the word “devolution” as, I believe, for the first time in connection with the Parliamentary problem due to the over-pressure of work. He said:

“It has gratified me to find abundant proof that the country was,
and is, fully alive to the vital importance of devolution.... The
task of the House of Commons in our time has habitually exceeded
what had ever been imposed upon a legislative body in the whole
history of the world.... I desire to point out the three cardinal
points of the question. First, the congestion of business, now
notorious and inveterate, degrades the House of Commons by placing
it at the mercy of those among its members who seek for notoriety
by obstructing business, instead of pursuing the more honourable
road to reputation by useful service, or of those who, with more
semblance of warrant, seek to cripple the action of the House of
Commons in order to force the acceptance of their own political
projects. Secondly, it disappoints, irritates, and injures the
country by the suspension of useful legislation. And lastly, and
perhaps worst of all, it defeats the fundamental rule of our
Parliamentary system—that the majority shall prevail.... This
country will not, in the full sense, be a self-governing country
until the machinery of the House of Commons is amended, and its
procedure reformed.”

It is possible that Mr. Gladstone had in his mind reform of procedure of the nature of devolution to bodies within the House of Commons such as Grand Committees; but in view of his former utterances it is probable that he foresaw the necessity for devolution on a larger scale.

Mr. Chamberlain continued, even during the Home Rule controversy, faithful in his advocacy of devolution. In a manifesto to his supporters, issued on July 11th, 1886, he appealed to the moderate opinion in Great Britain for a “delegation not a surrender of power,” on the part of the Imperial Parliament. He outlined his political aims in the following succinct statement:

The objects to be kept in view are:

(1) To relieve the Imperial Parliament by devolution of Irish
local business, and to set it free for other and more important
work.

(2) To secure the free representation of Irish opinion in all
matters of purely Irish concern.

(3) To offer to Irishmen a fair field for legitimate local
ambition and patriotism, and to bring back the attention of the
Irish people, now diverted to a barren conflict in the Imperial
Parliament, to the practical consideration of their own wants and
necessities.

And, lastly, by removing all unnecessary interference with Irish
Government on the part of Great Britain, to diminish the causes of
irritation and the opportunity of collision.

Mr. Chamberlain was acutely aware of the intimate connection between political and agrarian reform, and outlined a general constructive policy which was adopted up to a point later on by the Unionist party under the inspiration of Mr. George Wyndham:

“It is clear,” said Mr. Chamberlain, “that suggested land reform
must precede the political change; and until the long-standing
quarrel between land-owners and land-occupiers has been
compounded, it will not be safe to trust the latter with full
control over the property of the former.... But, assuming that the
social war which now exists in Ireland were terminated by a
reasonable settlement, there are strong reasons for desiring, on
the one hand, to relieve the Imperial Parliament of some of the
constantly increasing burden of its local work, and, on the other
hand, to open up to Irishmen in their own country a larger field
of local ambition, together with greater liberty of action and
greater personal responsibility.”

The Duke of Devonshire also expressed himself in favour of devolution, provided that “the powers which may be conferred on local bodies should be delegated—not surrendered—by Parliament”; that “the subjects to be delegated should be clearly defined; and the right of Parliament to control and revise the action of legislative or administrative authorities should be quite clearly reserved”; but he urged that “the administration of justice ought to remain in the hands of an authority which is responsible to Parliament.”

As recently as April, 1893, in the course of an article in _The Nineteenth Century_ Mr. Chamberlain stated that “every Liberal Unionist will readily agree” with a desire “to give to Ireland the management of such of its affairs as can be handed over to an Irish Assembly without any risk or danger to this country, and, I hope that I may add, without the loss of honour that would be involved if the property and the liberties of all Her Majesty’s subjects were not fully safeguarded.” It is evident that the Liberal Unionist seceders drew a sharp distinction between separation and devolution. They objected to Mr. Gladstone’s Bills because rightly or wrongly they were convinced that they involved separation; but while opposing them on that ground they held fast to their belief in the efficacy of devolution.

After 1893 devolution was little heard of, but about ten years later the theory was revived in the movement with which I became associated. This modern suggestion of devolution was an offspring of the Conference on the land question which was held during the winter of 1902. That Conference produced a profound impression not only on the individuals composing it, but also, with a few exceptions of a retrogressive or perverted type, upon the classes represented, and consequently upon the whole community. The land had been for generations, and for centuries, the cause of bitter strife. The parties represented—indeed some of the individuals representing them had come straight out of the firing line to confer upon a question bristling with difficulties and overlain with passion and prejudice. The Landlords’ Convention not unnaturally laughed to scorn the idea of a settlement or even of amicable discussion; but they were wrong—prejudice and passion were put aside and the difficulties were overcome.

The Land Conference—an inspiration of the inarticulate moderate opinion existing in Ireland—proved that frank and honest discussion between Irishmen holding opposing views could be productive of good results, and it naturally occurred to many of those interested that the tolerance, good feeling and good sense displayed in settling so vexed a question might be utilised to find a solution for other problems, social, economic and political, presenting difficulties of a less formidable character.

On March 3rd, 1903, five members of the Land Conference Committee issued a circular stating that it was “now becoming evident that only in a reasonable system of devolution of legislative powers is to be found the solution of the problem that demands such urgent consideration. In no other way can Parliament be relieved from the ever-increasing strain of public business or the legitimate aspirations of Ireland for some definite form of self-government be met.”

The idea was a good one, but somewhat premature. The Land Conference Committee having been appointed for a definite purpose—the settlement of the land question, which had not then been fulfilled, had no authority to deal with any other matter. All men’s minds were still occupied with the consideration of the land purchase problem, and obviously the moment was not suitable for a further step forward. The matter was therefore allowed to drop; but in the summer of 1904, the way for the new—but yet old—policy seemed open. The Land Conference had fulfilled its purpose. The Committee was about to dissolve, and it occurred to some of us that a meeting should be held in Dublin with a view to inaugurating a general policy for the betterment of Ireland. In preparation for the meeting I sketched out roughly what I thought our objects should be, and among them was a larger control for Ireland over her local affairs. The Committee met on August 25th, and two resolutions were passed, one dissolving the Committee and another forming the Irish Reform Association. We then set to work to consider a programme, and on August 26th we adopted the following as setting forth the objects of the Association:

“Believing, as we do, that the prosperity of the people of
Ireland, the development of the resources of the country, and the
satisfactory settlement of the land and other questions, depend
upon the pursuance of a policy of conciliation and goodwill and of
reform, we desire to do everything in our power to promote a union
of all moderate and progressive opinion, irrespective of creed or
class; to discourage sectarian strife and class animosities from
whatever source arising; to co-operate in re-creating and
promoting industrial enterprises; and to advocate all practical
measures of reform.

“While firmly maintaining that the parliamentary union between
Great Britain and Ireland is essential to the political stability
of the Empire, and to the prosperity of the two islands, we
believe that such union is compatible with the devolution to
Ireland of a larger measure of local government than she now
possesses.

“We consider that this devolution, while avoiding matters of
Imperial concern, and subjects of common interest to the Kingdom
as a whole, would be beneficial to Ireland, and would relieve the
Imperial Parliament of a mass of business with which it cannot now
deal satisfactorily, and which occupies its time to the detriment
of much more important concerns. In particular, we consider the
present system of financial administration to be wasteful and
inappreciative of the needs of the country.

“We think it possible to devise a system of Irish finance whereby
the expenditure could be conducted in a more efficient and
economic manner, and whereby the sources of revenue might be
expanded. We believe that a remedy for the present unsatisfactory
system can be found in such a decentralisation or localisation of
Irish finance as will secure to its administration the application
of local knowledge, interest and ability, without in any way
sacrificing the ultimate control over the estimates presented, or
in respect of the audit of money expended, at present possessed by
the Imperial Parliament. All moneys derived from administrative
reform, together with whatever proportion of the general revenue
is allocated to Irish purposes, should be administered subject to
the above conditions.

“We think that the time has come to extend to Ireland the system
of Private Bill Legislation which has been so successfully worked
in Scotland, with such modifications as Scotch experience may
suggest, as may be necessary to meet the requirements of this
country.

“We are of opinion that a settlement of the question of higher
education is urgently needed, and that the whole system of
education in this country requires remodelling and co-ordinating.

“We desire to do all in our power to further the policy of land
purchase in the spirit of, and on the general lines laid down in,
the Land Conference Report.

“We consider that suitable provision for the housing of the
labouring classes is of the utmost importance, and we shall be
prepared to co-operate in any practical proposals having the
betterment of this class in view.

“Among many other problems already existing, or which may arise in
the future, the above-mentioned appear to us to comprise those
most deserving of immediate attention, and which afford the most
reasonable prospect of attaining practical results; towards their
solution we earnestly invite the co-operation of all Irishmen who
have the highest interests of their country at heart.”

The programme was, as will be seen, socially and economically a comprehensive one; but, so far as political reform was concerned, limited to the devolution of administrative functions and reform of Private Bill procedure.

Shortly afterwards we explained our views more in detail, and made a further suggestion in recommending a delegation, not only of administrative, but also of legislative functions to the Irish body. On this point, and after giving our reasons for desiring a Private Bill Procedure Act for Ireland, we said:

“... But the disabilities under which Ireland labours are not
confined to Private Bill procedure. The problems that affect her
well-being, the peculiarities of her position and requirements are
such that similarity of treatment does not always involve equal
justice ... under existing circumstances the special needs of
Ireland do not, and cannot receive, adequate attention. Sufficient
relief cannot, in our opinion, be afforded by mere amendment in
the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. Some delegation of
authority is necessary. We believe that power to deal with much of
the business relating to Irish affairs which Parliament is at
present unable to cope with, might, with perfect safety and with
advantage both to Ireland and Parliament, be delegated to an Irish
body to be constituted for the purpose.... Parliament should take
power to refer to the Statutory Body not only business connected
with Private Bill Legislation, but also such other matters as in
its wisdom it may deem suitable for reference, under prescribed
conditions. The experience gained by this method of _ad hoc_
reference would materially assist Parliament in the ultimate
grouping into distinct classes of matters to be referred to the
Statutory Body.”

The document is far too long to quote in full. We dealt critically with the Irish problem as it presented itself to us then, and concluded with a recommendation which, if it had been acted upon, would by now have borne fruit in the shape of information of great value, to the public.

“... We do not consider it now opportune,” we said, “to make more
definite proposals on the points herein raised. We are prepared to
inquire fully into them if the Association so desire, but we
submit that inquiry can be best conducted by means of a Royal
Commission, and that the proper function of this Association is to
place its opinions and propositions before such a Commission. We
therefore recommend the Association to use its best endeavours to
secure the appointment of a Commission, and to instruct this or
some other Committee to prepare a detailed report for its
consideration, with a view to placing the same in evidence before
the Commission....”

In preparing this second programme we had the invaluable assistance of Sir Antony MacDonnell (now Lord MacDonnell of Swynford) who occupied the position of Under-Secretary, but on somewhat peculiar terms. Our proposals, which are to be found in full in “The Outlook in Ireland,” published for me by Mr. John Murray in 1907, may be considered as cramped and limited in character, but the circumstances in which we found ourselves must be considered. We had to deal with existing conditions. A Unionist administration was in power. Home Rule was in abeyance, by many looked upon as dead and decently buried out of sight for ever. But the Chief Secretary and Under-Secretary were pledged to a policy of administrative and economic reform, and the latter was known to be in favour of some modification of the terms of the legislative union.

It is not necessary to re-open the controversy as to the connivance of the Unionist party, or any of its members, with the early work of myself and others.(158) No ministerial or official comment was made on our first programme published on August 31st, 1904. Mr. Wyndham was away at the time and in his absence I consulted with the Permanent Under-Secretary for Ireland, a proceeding which I felt sure, would meet with the Chief Secretary’s approval. The Unionist Lord-Lieutenant, the Earl of Dudley, was also cognisant of the movement. The second programme was published on September 26th of that year, and on the following day a letter from Mr. Wyndham commenting upon it appeared in _The Times_. After criticising our proposals he said “without reserve or qualification that the Unionist Government is opposed to the multiplication of legislative bodies within the United Kingdom,” and declared that such of our “aspirations” as were “unimpeachable” were “prejudiced and not enhanced when they are confused with any plan, however tentative, for the multiplication of legislative assemblies within the limits of the United Kingdom.” Mr. George Wyndham, in order not to embarrass his party, resigned his office, but Lord Dudley remained Lord-Lieutenant after Mr. Walter Long had become Chief Secretary. In some later correspondence, published in the spring of 1906, with Sir Edward Carson, Lord Dudley after relinquishing his office stated:

“(1) That though I fully explained to the late Prime Minister the
nature of my connection with what you describe as Sir A.
MacDonnell’s Home Rule scheme, he never conveyed to me any
intimation that he or the Government disapproved, strongly or
otherwise, of my conduct, though, of course, I can well believe
that you and a few other Ministers disapproved not only of the
devolution proposals, but also of any attempt at governing Ireland
in sympathy with Irish ideas.

“(2) That I was never asked for and never gave any assurance that
it was no longer my intention to act in a manner at variance with
my position as a Unionist Lord-Lieutenant. It was not my opinion
then, nor is it now, that I ever so acted, and I do not consider
that my knowledge of the devolution proposal, still less my
conviction that Ireland should be governed according to Irish
ideas, is inconsistent with the position which I occupied.”

Devolution held the field when a Liberal administration came into power in 1906 and found expression in the Councils Bill. That Bill practically gave to an Irish body control over the great spending departments. It embodied devolution on a large scale, but entirely confined to administration. The Liberal party had passed a self-denying ordinance in respect to Home Rule while still in opposition. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, speaking at Stirling on November 23rd, 1905, said it was “his desire to see the effective management of Irish affairs in the hands of a representative Irish authority”; but he advised Irish Nationalists thankfully to take “an instalment of representative control” ... “or any administrative improvement” ... “provided it was consistent, and led up to their larger policy.” We have it on the authority of Mr. T. P. O’Connor that this declaration “was all that the Irish Nationalist party could have expected at that moment, and it enabled them to give their full support at the elections to the Liberal party”; and, in alluding to the private breakfast-table conference between himself, a friend and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, he informs us that “the exchange of views was brief, for there was complete agreement as to both policy and tactics.” Mr. Redmond also, speaking at Motherwell a couple of days after the Stirling speech, announced his readiness to accept any concession “which would shorten and smooth the way to Home Rule.”

Notwithstanding these plain declarations Mr. Redmond, having accepted the Councils Bill in the House of Commons, moved its rejection at the National Convention and endeavoured to justify his action at the expense of devolutionists by protesting “that the responsibility for this Bill largely rests upon those who first encouraged this idea of devolution”—a protest in which Mr. T. P. O’Connor joined him. The truth is that in their Councils Bill the Government went in principle as far as they could under the circumstances. The idea that they, or the Irish Reform Association in general, and I myself in particular, were actuated by a desire to shelve Home Rule by substituting a measure of administrative reform, is pre-eminently absurd. The tactics pursued by the Nationalist party towards the Irish Reform Association and the Government were most unwise. The Association would, had it received the support it deserved, have certainly organised and rendered articulate a body of moderate opinion strong enough to neutralise any immoderate demonstration against the principle of Home Rule on religious, racial, or social grounds. Had the Councils Bill been amended and accepted by Ireland, and, as is probable, had it been passed into law, Ireland would have had an opportunity, which she would have availed herself of, of proving her aptitude to manage her own affairs, and she would be now in a position of inestimable advantage to her. But neither I nor the Reform Association considered the Bill as satisfying Ireland’s reasonable demands. We looked upon it as valuable in itself _pro tanto_ and as the honest effort of a Government with self-imposed limits to do justice to Ireland. The Association having considered the matter, passed and published a series of resolutions which space forbids me from quoting in full. To summarise, we criticised the limited transfer of departmental authority, and considered the financial proposals of the Bill insufficient. We regretted “that the Bill entirely excludes consideration of any powers of a legislative character.” But, as we thought the Bill constituted an advance towards necessary reforms and was capable of amendment in Committee, we expressed our regret at its summary rejection by the National Convention.

Such is the story of the devolution movement in its modern expression. Devolution is an elastic though not a vague term. As I have already said, it is incompatible with repeal of the Union. It predicates a union of some sort—connection with a superior delegating authority, but under that union and subject to that authority its powers of expansion are unlimited. If I may be allowed to quote from myself, an evil habit, I thus defined my position in 1907. I then declared it was:

“... my ambition to see:—

“(1) Cordial, honest co-operation among Irishmen for their
country’s good. A true, living sense of Irish nationality is
necessary. Ireland united can accomplish anything in reason.

“(2) The exercise of moderation and common-sense on the part of
Irishmen.

“(3) The creation of friendly, fraternal relations between Great
Britain and Ireland on both sides—‘let the dead bury their dead.’

“(4) Recognition by Ireland of: (_a_) Her Imperial mission, her
share in the larger nationality covered by the Flag, and her
consequent duties and responsibilities; and (_b_) of the political
necessities of Great Britain.

“(5) Recognition by Great Britain of: (_a_) Irish nationality; and
(_b_) of the economic and social requirements of Ireland, and of
her just claim for exceptional treatment.”

and I concluded by saying:

“... My political creed is clear and simple. One Parliament is my
centre; its ultimate effective supremacy is my circumference; but,
emanating from that centre, and within that circumscribing limit,
I desire to see the largest possible freedom of action and
self-governing power delegated to Ireland.”

That was the opinion I then held and, in its general principles, that is the opinion I hold now. I have endeavoured to obtain such a measure of devolution as was at the time practical of attainment. My ideal is devolution on federal lines—that is to say, devolution of a character as nearly analogous as circumstances permit, to such an arrangement as would be come to between co-ordinate legislatures federating for their mutual advantages.

It has been necessary to recall the public declarations of statesmen of the Victorian period in order to get a true conception of the devolution movement in proper perspective. Among English statesmen of the front rank we find Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, the Duke of Devonshire, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Gladstone all admitting the great fact that both for British and for Irish purposes, some scheme of devolution was necessary. It would be easy to multiply instances and to give quotations in profusion, but I have said enough to show that for the last half century statesmen have, for various reasons, advocated devolution. Upon some the necessity has been impressed by deliberate obstruction in the House of Commons, others have been actuated by a desire to relieve congestion and to restore dignity and efficiency to the Commons House of Parliament. Upon others again the conviction has been forced that, under the system created by the Act of Union, Ireland cannot be well governed or contented; and a few have foreseen that both for domestic and Imperial purposes reconstruction on federal lines is desirable. Yet, in spite of this remarkable expression of opinion, nothing has been done, though the necessity for action has become more and more urgent with every passing year, and though many of the objections felt in former days can no longer be entertained. The doubts felt by the Duke of Devonshire as to the fitness of the Irish people to exercise self-governing power have been dispelled by experience of the working of the Act of 1898. The settlement of the land question rightly deemed by Mr. Chamberlain an essential preliminary to, or accompaniment of, political reform, has been half accomplished under the Act of 1903, and can be fully accomplished by reverting to the principles of that Act.

Many attempts have been made to reform procedure within the House of Commons and all of them have proved inadequate. Owing to an actual increase of business, and to the growing complexity of domestic affairs, Parliament is over-burdened with work to a far greater extent to-day than it was in the seventies and eighties. Since those days the idea of union on federal lines in the Mother Country, as not only desirable in her interest, but as also indicating the path to some larger form of union, has become prevalent. It has become more and more evident that some scheme of devolution is necessary to enable the Parliamentary machine to deal with the great industrial questions that perplex us, and to give adequate consideration to the problems of Imperial policy which press for consideration. Under these circumstances it is indeed extraordinary that this great question has not been settled in the only way by which, in my humble opinion, it can be settled satisfactorily and permanently, namely, by consent of both the great parties in the State; and it is passing strange to see the leaders of one of the great parties, despite the opinions of their predecessors in title, taking up an irreconcilable attitude towards devolution of any kind. It would be most interesting, but impossible, within the scope of this article to consider how far contemporaneous events in Ireland, faulty tactics on the part of Irish politicians, and the exigencies of party political warfare are respectively chargeable with this lamentable legislative default. The fact is the question has never been considered on its merits. The party system is probably the principal offender, but impatience on the part of the Irish people, vagueness in the demands put forward by their leaders, inconvenient alliances, vacillating counsels, a short-sighted policy, and mistaken tactics are much to blame.

It is a curious circumstance in the historical development of this policy, that Devolutionists in going forward have come back to the standpoint of the greatest leader the Tory party ever had. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1844, Mr. Disraeli is reported in _Hansard_ as saying:

“I always thought that the greatest cause of misery in Ireland was
identity of institutions with England. It has become a great
historical aphorism that Ireland is to be the great difficulty of
the Minister. Now this is an opinion in which I never shared. I
never believed that Ireland would be a great difficulty, because I
felt certain that a Minister of great ability and of great power
would, when he found himself at the head of a great majority,
settle that question. What, then, is the duty of the English
Minister? To effect by his policy all those changes which a
revolution would do by force. That is the Irish question in its
integrity. It is quite evident that to effect this we must have an
Executive in Ireland which shall bear a much nearer relation to
the leading parties and characters of the country than it does at
present.”

These principles Mr. Disraeli declared to be “Tory principles, the national principles of the democracy of England.” When a quarter of a century later, and holding a most responsible position, he was challenged in the House of Commons as to this statement of his views, he still declared that: “in my historical conscience the sentiment of that speech was right.”

Comments

Log in to leave a comment.

The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some ArgumentsChapter XX: Part II: A Historical Argument (5)

0%22 min left in chapter