Chapter XXIV: Section 5: dealing with the provinces almost recall the centralising (1)

tendencies of France, such as for instance, the provision that the Governor-General in Council is to appoint the administrator, or Chief Executive Officer, of the province, in whose name all executive acts relating to provincial affairs shall be done—an official who presents a certain resemblance to the French Prefect.

The powers reserved to the Executive Committee of the Provincial Council, presided over by the Administrator, comprise:

Taxation within the province;

The borrowing of money on its sole credit;

Education, other than higher education;

Agriculture;

Hospitals, charitable, municipal and other local institutions;

Local works and undertakings within the province, other than
railways and harbours and bridges connecting two provinces;

The imposition of fines, penalties, or imprisonment for enforcing
provincial laws and generally all matters which, in the opinion of
the Governor-General in Council, are of a merely local or private
nature in the province.

Taking the Canadian Constitution as the most workable model, let us consider in the light of that instrument what powers it would be reasonable to hand over to an Irish Legislature. There are two ways of proceeding in framing any such Constitution. One is to grant general powers with specific limitations, the course followed by Mr. Gladstone in his two Home Rule Bills. The second is to specify the powers to be given to the subordinate Legislature, outside of which it cannot act. Good reasons may be advanced for both methods; but in view of the difficulty of accurately foreseeing all the needs and necessities to be provided for by a new legislative body and the great risk of overlooking important matters, the inclusion of which later on might encounter very serious obstacles, the method of giving general powers with exceptions and restrictions specified in the Act seems the more workmanlike of the two.

If the latter course be adopted, following the precedent created in the Bills of 1886 and 1893, the new Legislature will acquire general powers to make the necessary laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland. The powers thus granted in general terms will of course be very extensive, comprising, as they must, the liberty of raising taxes, borrowing money, and dealing with education, public worship, property and civil rights, land, factory and company laws, the administration of justice, licensing, etc., etc.

In connection with taxation the important question arises whether the power should be granted to any unit of a federal state to impose Customs Duties. In the models we have referred to no local legislature is entitled to deal with Customs or Tariffs. Indeed all three Constitutions expressly provide that there shall be free trade within the limits of the federation. It is inconceivable that a British Parliament should ever grant, or that the Irish representatives should ever ask for, powers which would enable Ireland to set up a radically different fiscal system to that adopted by the rest of the United Kingdom. Thus the precedents established by the Constitutions of the different Dominions would undoubtedly have to be followed. There is a further question to consider, namely, how and to what extent it will be possible to reconcile any conflict that may arise between the powers exercised by the central and local legislatures in collecting taxes. For instance is the income tax to be retained as a purely Imperial tax, or is the Irish Parliament to have power to levy, either in substitution for it or in addition to it, an income tax of its own? The same question arises with regard to excise duties. As no income tax is imposed in any of the three self-governing Dominions referred to, their constitutions throw no light on this point. Nor does the Constitution of the German Empire, as there the income tax is a state and not an Imperial tax. A solution of this problem might be possible on two lines. One by allowing the Irish Government to impose its own income tax, paying a fixed contingent to the British Treasury. The second method would be to allow the Irish Parliament to make additions to the British tax, in the way that German municipalities are allowed to make additions to the State income tax. Something of this kind seems contemplated under the Government Bill.

In the Dominions licenses for the sale of alcoholic liquors, excise duties, and land taxes are all imposed by the States. They might also be very well made State, that is to say Irish, taxes in Ireland. The future financial relations between Ireland and Great Britain, however, are dealt with in another chapter.

In considering what subjects would naturally be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the future Irish Legislature, as of other subsequent British local legislatures, it will be well to see which of these exclusions are common to the Canadian and Australian Constitutions. These are: trade and commerce, indirect taxation, borrowing money, postal, telegraphic, and telephonic services, naval and military defence, lighthouses, etc., quarantine, fisheries, census and statistics, currency, coinage and legal tender, banking, other than State banking, weights and measures, bills of exchange and promissory notes, bankruptcy and insolvency, copyrights patents and trade marks, naturalization and aliens, marriage and divorce. There are also a few differences in the matter of exclusions between the two Dominions. For instance, Canada’s list of reservations for the Central Parliament begins with “The Public Debt and Property,” for which there is no exactly corresponding heading in the Australian Constitution. This Canadian list also includes navigation and shipping, savings banks, the criminal law and penitentiaries. On the other hand the subjects reserved for the Central Parliament in Australia, comprise, _inter alia_, bounties, insurance, other than State insurance, trading or financial corporations, invalid and old-age pensions, immigration and emigration, “external affairs,” control of railways for military and naval transport purposes, railway construction and extension, industrial conciliation and arbitration, etc.

The essential exclusions from the jurisdiction of State Legislatures are, of course, national defence, treaty making powers, laws affecting foreign trade and shipping, lighthouses, coinage and legal tender, trade marks, patents and copyrights to which might very well be added factory legislation, company legislation and the laws affecting negotiable instruments. It would seem a pity to break up the legislation on subjects that are less of local than of general interest, thus adding to their legal difficulties by diversity of legislation. As regards factory laws the question of the position under international conventions of an Irish Legislature demands specially careful consideration. There are, at present, two international conventions relating to factory laws, namely, those concerning the prohibition of white phosphorus in match manufacturing, and night work by women in industrial occupations. It is likely that they will shortly be followed by others regulating the hours of work of women and young persons and prohibiting night work by boys under eighteen. It is desirable that the advantages of such conventions should be retained for the Irish industrial worker.

The justification of most of the exclusions just enumerated is sufficiently obvious and their enforcement in most of the Dominion Constitutions show that by common consent they have been accepted as reasonable, as for instance those dealing with national defence, treaty-making, peace and war, and the rights and privileges of the Crown.

There remains, perhaps the most important point of all, namely the control or power of restriction to be exercised by the Imperial Parliament over the legislation of the new Irish Legislature by means of a veto. The Canadian Constitution confers upon the Dominion Government the same powers of disallowance of Acts of the provincial legislatures as belonged to the Imperial Government prior to 1867. According to Sir John Bourinot (“Parliamentary Procedure”), the Minister of Justice in 1868, laid down certain principles of procedure which have been generally followed up to the present time. On receipt of the Acts passed in any province they are immediately referred to the Minister of Justice who reports upon them. If the Minister considers an Act free from objection and his report is approved by the Governor-General in Council, such approval is forthwith communicated to the Provincial Government. The Minister of Justice makes separate reports on those Acts which he may consider: (1) as being altogether illegal or unconstitutional; (2) as illegal or unconstitutional in part; (3) as, in case of concurrent legislation, clashing with the legislation of the general Parliament; (4) as affecting the interests of the Dominion generally. It has also been the practice (adds Sir John Bourinot) in the case of measures only partially defective, not to disallow the Act in the first instance, but, if the general interest permits such a course, to give the local government an opportunity of considering the objections to such legislation and of remedying the defects thereof. In his book “How Canada is Governed,” Sir John Bourinot makes some pertinent remarks upon the method of dealing with such cases:

“The Governor in Council can within one year from its receipt
disallow an Act of a provincial legislature, and consequently
prevent it becoming law.... As a rule it is the wiser policy to
obtain an opinion from the Courts in all cases of doubt ... rather
than use a political power which is regarded with suspicion by the
provinces. The law allows such reference to the Supreme Court in
Canada.”

In Australia, where the powers of the States were established long before the Commonwealth came into existence, there is no direct power of veto, but in 1903 and subsequently, Acts were passed by the Commonwealth Parliament giving the High Court jurisdiction in matters arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. Thus, in the words of Mr. W. Harrison Moore, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Melbourne, in his “Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia,” “the Commonwealth Government and the State Governments are in their relations independent and not hierarchical. There is no such general supervision of the State in the exercise of the powers belonging to it as is enjoyed by the Dominion Government over the Provinces of Canada.... The observance by the Commonwealth Government and the States of the limits set to their powers is secured by the action of the courts whose judicial duties may involve the determination of the validity of the authority under which acts are done, whether that authority is the Crown, a subordinate legislature, or any whatsoever save the Imperial Parliament.”

If the Canadian example be followed the Imperial Parliament will retain powers of control of such a far reaching character over Irish legislation, as ought to dispel the fears of timid souls who are reluctant to entrust the Irish people with the task of working out their own destiny. The Canadian veto has not been a dead letter, but has exercised its restraining influence, both actively and passively, over the Provincial Legislatures, which have naturally been averse to allowing matters to come to a crisis necessitating its use. Further, to follow precedent, the interpretation of the powers to be granted by the new Irish Constitution should rest in the last resort in an appeal to the Privy Council.

With both these safeguards inserted in the Home Rule Bill much of the objection commonly felt against the creation of an Irish Parliament, an objection largely due to loose thinking, should disappear. It may be argued that both in Canada and Australia disputes do occasionally occur between the State Legislatures and the Central Parliaments as to their respective rights. That is one of the inevitable disadvantages of a federal regime, but, as a very distinguished Canadian statesman once said to the writer, the counterbalancing advantages of a de-centralized system far outweigh all such drawbacks. No student of current politics can be blind to the fundamental fact that the amalgamating of the Parliaments of Scotland, Ireland and England into one legislature, without at the same time unifying the legislation of those countries, has produced a state of congestion and overwork which cannot be permanently tolerated. In existing circumstances neither matters affecting the whole Empire nor local legislative needs can secure a sufficient expenditure either of energy or time to do them justice. By partially reversing the process of unification through a devolution of powers to local legislatures we should be following a precedent that has proved successful in other parts of the Empire and in foreign countries while at the same time putting our action into harmony with the true process of evolution.

XVI.—Contemporary Ireland And The Religious Question

(I) A Catholic View. BY MONSIGNOR O’RIORDAN

It is as characteristic of those who have fallen in fortune to talk of their wealth as it is of the consumptive to talk of their health. It is natural. If they were conscious of having the reality they would not feel the need of convincing others that they had it. For a like reason those speak most of virtues and gifts who have them least. One rightly suspects the spirit of those who keep insisting that all are intolerant who think and act on other principles and in other ways than theirs. The word tolerance has met the fate of other words which denote excellent things; it has come to be misused. “Tolerance,” like “religion,” “liberty,” etc., has become a shibboleth, and like these it has been run to death.

When we speak of tolerance we necessarily refer to evil of some sort. In the matter of truth or untruth we are said to tolerate what is untrue, or what we think to be untrue. In the matter of right or wrong, we are said to tolerate what is wrong, or what we think to be wrong. If one says that he is tolerant of that in another which he himself believes to be true or right, he speaks as one who does not understand what he says. It is the same as saying that he is tolerant of his own convictions; in fact, that he tolerates himself. One is said to be tolerant of that in another which he thinks to be erroneous or wrong. Now, every principle which a man holds is a law to him. He may be mistaken; his principles may be false; but whilst he holds them as his principles he cannot under pain of inconsistency disown them in word or deed. No man has proprietary rights in principles. One has no right to compromise them. One may not barter them away, may not make them the basis of a policy of give and take. To do so would be to treat them not as principles but as mere opinions. Principles are things to stand on, not things to play with as with pawns on a chessboard. He who, whilst he professes some principle of belief or conduct in religious or civil life, is ready to agree with his neighbour in the opposite shows little regard for truth and little sense of duty. He who for the sake of some convenience is prepared to play with his principles has practically no principles at all. Such is one who professes universal toleration, although no person would be more pained at being thought an unprincipled man. It is a logical necessity for everyone to be intolerant of principles opposed to his own. In matters of mere _opinion_ one may be, and ought to be, tolerant of the opinions of others, since in face of those opinions he cannot claim an objective certainty for his own. Let us illustrate this. A rationalist who denies the existence of any higher than natural causes cannot admit any event to be miraculous. He may ascribe it to some hypothetical natural cause, or he may have no cause to assign; but he cannot on principle assign a supernatural cause, for the simple reason that he ignores anything above the natural forces which come within the sphere of experience. Thus the rationalist who claims tolerance as his characteristic virtue is intolerant of any doctrine which supposes the supernatural. He must be so, or he lets the ground go from under his feet. Again, the Protestant on his principle of private judgment must be intolerant of any doctrine which supposes an infallible authority on earth claiming a divine commission to teach us the meaning of divinely Revealed Truths. A Catholic who believes in a Church of divine institution, one, visible, infallible, cannot be tolerant of a doctrine which makes different Churches belong by equal right to Christianity, each whilst conflicting with the others claiming Christ for its Founder. For the same reason a Catholic cannot be tolerant of a theory which holds all religions to be equally useful; that is, equally useless. He cannot be tolerant of any theory which involves a denial of Catholic doctrine, since he acknowledges an infallible authority as the source of the Catholic doctrine which he holds. I am now and here neither asserting nor denying any theory or any doctrine, Catholic or non-Catholic. I am only setting forth the inconsistency implied in the toleration of principles opposed to one’s own, whatever those principles be. Is it then irreclaimable prejudice, or indifference to the obligation of principle, that makes some persons throw up their arms and raise a cry of horror when they hear that some Catholic has been excommunicated for having denied or questioned some Article of Catholic faith? What is taken as a matter of course and of common justice in every society and in every club in the country, namely that one who is false to his society and unfaithful to its rules deserves expulsion, is stigmatised as intolerance and moral tyranny in the Catholic Church. There are certain rules in every association which a member may not break under pain of expulsion. But a man may say what he likes, write what he likes, do as he likes; may deny every doctrine, despise every principle, and may nevertheless have, according to some, a right to remain a member of the Catholic Church out of which only Romish intolerance would drive him.

Everyone then, whatever be his religious, philosophical, political, or social principles, must be intolerant of principles which are opposed to his own. Tolerance, however, claims a place in matters of opinion. But must not one think another’s opinions false if they are opposed to his own? Certainly; but, being only opinions, one has no right to claim a monopoly of certainty for one’s own as against those of others. Opinions have no claim to the privilege of principles. And what is true in theory of opinions holds in practice in matters of principle. One cannot, it is true, be tolerant of principles opposed to his own; but others must not suffer at his hands because they own principles which are not his. Everyone must have credit for honesty, since one cannot fathom the depths of another’s conscience. The Catholic Church, not to speak of its individual members, disowns such a pretension as that; _Ecclesia non judicat de internis_ is a maxim in Catholic theology. Thus, Catholic teaching, whilst it binds Catholics to be intolerant of principles and doctrines which it condemns, obliges them also to be tolerant of those who hold those principles and doctrines for the sake of the sincerity which it presumes in those who hold them. If we compare this tolerance, imposed as a duty by Catholic teaching, with the unlimited tolerance professed by some who assert the autonomy of individual reason, we shall find a contrast between, for instance, the noble tolerance of St. Francis de Sales and the bigotry of Voltaire. They were fellow countrymen. Each had great natural gifts, mental acquirements, and uncommon literary power. St. Francis lived a century before Voltaire, and, therefore, nearer to what would now be called those traditions of bigotry from which Voltaire helped so much to set us free. Yet the latter let his pen splutter on all who dared to differ from him; the former in all his controversies dressed his arguments with honey instead of vinegar. That charity which disposes one to see good faith and honesty of purpose in persons in spite of their errors, is the only true source whence the spirit of toleration must flow into civil society. Toleration coming from any other source can give no guarantee of permanence; for it begins with expediency, and ends with it. But the toleration which separates a man’s sincerity from his possible errors, and which in civil life ignores the latter for the sake of the former, is founded on principle, and is above expediency or the changing combination of human affairs.

The sincerity of a man who professes tolerance of principles which he believes to be false is to be suspected; he should be taken as one who is practically indifferent to truth or error. One can rely on the fidelity of him who professes tolerance of others, in spite of some personal views of theirs which he abhors, because of the sincerity with which, as he presumes, they entertain those views. But if they should so obtrude those views into public life as to affect the rights of him who repudiates them, it becomes another matter. That would be an aggression on the civil rights of others; and no person should let himself be made a victim in the name of toleration.

Now, it is a significant fact that Catholic Maryland, before American Independence came, was the one State in America in which no person had to suffer civil disabilities for conscience sake. Members of Protestant sects who had to fly from the intolerance of more powerful Protestant sects in New England States always found toleration and a home there. Bancroft, the Protestant historian of the United States, writes of Maryland:

“Its history is the history of benevolence, gratitude, and
toleration. The Catholics who were oppressed by the laws of
England were sure to find a peaceful asylum in the quiet harbours
of the Chesapeake, and there, too, Protestants were sheltered from
Protestant intolerance.”

It is an equally significant fact that later on the non-Catholics of Maryland, in the day of their power, placed grievous disabilities on the children of those Catholics who had given their exiled fathers a refuge in their hour of need.

I will now consider how far those principles which I have set forth have found application in Ireland. I know no country where tolerance and intolerance are more talked of than there. It is sometimes good to talk tolerance, but it is always better to practise it. The word is not heard so much from Irish Catholics. Their relation to it is that they are constantly engaged in defending themselves from charges of intolerance poured out upon them from the vantage ground of ascendency. I doubt whether it is worth while to assure our accusers that those charges are not deserved. Those who call us intolerant in spite of our conduct will discard our assurance in spite of our word. He who is in the habit of calling his neighbour intolerant is not likely to trust him as truthful. There are in every race and class individuals of an intolerant spirit. It has always been so, and will always be so. Those exceptions will remain in spite of the highest principles of a religion, a race, or a class. The spirit of intolerance will be found in individuals within a class, as well as between classes; and in actual life society subdivides itself down to the units. Religion has been for the past few centuries the great cleavage line along which the spirit of intolerance is supposed to play in the distribution of privileges and power in civil life in Ireland. How are we to determine on which side tolerance and intolerance lie? Not certainly by witnesses on either side giving testimony in their own favour. We had better let facts speak then; or, if we accept the evidence of persons, we should hear what they have to say only of those of the other side.

The Synod of Kilkenny met in May, 1642. It was held by the Catholic Bishops of Ireland in connection with the Kilkenny Confederation. That Confederation was National and Catholic; part of its purpose was to support King Charles against those who sought to dethrone him. He did not personally deserve much sympathy from the Irish Catholics; nevertheless, who were the Loyalists then? Ireland was in a state of war, and the rebels were not the Catholics. Now the 18th Decree of the Synod of Kilkenny is as follows:

“Wee ordaine and decree that all and every such as from the
beginning of this present warre have invaded the possessions or
goods, as well moveable as unmoveable, spirituall or temporal, of
any Catholic whether Irish or English, _or also of any Irish
Protestant_ being not adversaries of this cause, and doe detaine
any such goods, shall be excommunicated, as by this present Decree
wee doe excommunicate them, if admonished they do not amend, &c.”

That Decree speaks for itself; it protects Protestants equally with Catholics. The “Lawes and Orders of Warre,” issued by Castlehaven the following year, and the conduct of the Confederates throughout, show the same spirit of toleration which is expressed in the Decree of the Bishops.

Another test of tolerance came with the restored power of Irish Catholics half a century later. How did they use their opportunity? Lecky knew it as well as anyone of his time; he was moreover out of sympathy with the religious and national ideals of the Irish Catholics. Now Lecky, referring to deeds of violence which took place in Ireland, writes (“History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century,” Vol. I., pp. 408, 409):

“Whoever will examine these episodes with impartiality may easily
convince himself that their connection with religion has, in most
cases, been superficial. Religious cries have been sometimes
raised, religious enthusiasm has been often appealed to in the
agony of the struggle; but the real causes have been conflicts of
races and classes, the struggle of a nationality against
annihilation, the invasion of property in land, or the pressure of
extreme poverty. Amongst the Catholics, at least, religious
intolerance has not been a prevailing vice, and those who have
studied closely the history and character of the Irish people can
hardly fail to be struck with the deep respect for sincere
religion in every form which they have commonly evinced.... In
spite of the fearful calamities that followed the Reformation, it
is a memorable fact that not a single Protestant suffered for his
religion in Ireland during all the period of the Marian
persecution in England. The treatment of Bedell during the
outbreak of 1641, and the Act establishing liberty of conscience
passed by the Irish Parliament of 1689 in the full flush of the
brief Catholic ascendency under James II., exhibit very remarkably
this aspect of the Irish character.”

Referring to that Catholic Parliament of Ireland, he says (Vol. I., p. 117):

“The members of the House of Commons were almost all new men,
completely inexperienced in public business, and animated by the
resentment of bitter wrongs. Many of them were sons of some of the
3,000 proprietors who, without trial and without compensation, had
been deprived by the Act of Settlement of the estates of their
ancestors. To all of them the confiscations of Ulster, the fraud
of Strafford, the long train of calamities were recent and vivid
events. Old men were still living who might have remembered them
all, and there was probably scarcely a man in the Irish Parliament
of 1689 who had not been deeply injured by them in his fortunes or
his family. It will hardly appear surprising to candid men that a
Parliament so constituted, and called together amidst the
excitement of a civil war, should have displayed much violence,
much disregard for vested interests. Its measures, indeed, were
not all criminal. By one Act, which was far in advance of the age,
it established perfect religious liberty in Ireland, &c.”

From that time till our own the Catholics of Ireland have had little opportunity of showing whether they were tolerant or otherwise. During the long and dreary meantime the problem before them was not what sort of civil life they should live, but whether or how they could manage to live at all.

So late as 1759, Lord Chancellor Bowes, in giving judgment in a famous trial in Dublin, declared that “The law did not suppose a papist to exist in Ireland.” I have no desire to recall the story of how toleration fared in Ireland down to recent times. It is not necessary, and it is a disagreeable recollection. He would be very bold or very credulous who would think of doubting or denying what that history has been. I take up “Thom’s Almanac” of half a century ago, and I find that so late as that time the public offices were occupied almost exclusively by non-Catholics, from the Lord-Lieutenancy down to the Clerkship of Petty Sessions; and I think that it was so down to the office of the rural process-server. How did it come to pass that Catholics were kept outside, and that non-Catholics got within? Surely not that Catholics willingly yielded all public positions to their neighbours! The arrangement was therefore made by the other side. And what was the reason of that monopoly? Surely not that no Catholic was capable of any civil position except that of paying rates and taxes to the Crown and rent to the landlord. The exclusion was clearly the political penalty which Catholicism had to pay for its principles; the monopoly was the political premium which was awarded to those of the other side.

The Catholics of Ireland have been gradually working their way towards civil equality. But every step has been disputed. Every claim for civil equality made by those who formed the vast majority of the population and who bore the burden of civil duties was met with a charge of intolerance, and with a protest against intruding religion into the affairs of civil life. That is to say, those who had already secured for themselves political and social privileges through religious exclusiveness raised the cry of religious exclusiveness against the vast majority of the population for claiming their just share of civil rights as they bore their share of civil duties. Catholics had either to remain resigned to their condition, or to protest against their faith being made a bar between them and civil justice. In doing so they have not sought to intrude religion into purely civil affairs; they rather have sought to extrude religious intolerance which, having taken up its abode, slammed the door in their face. Thus when Catholics claimed their civil rights it was called religious exclusiveness; when their neighbours were privileged by religious exclusiveness it was called civil rights.

(II) Catholic Tolerance in Practice.

Just a century ago Wm. Parnell, an Irish Protestant who knew Irish Catholics and their history well, wrote that “The Irish Roman Catholics are the only sect that ever resumed power without exercising vengeance.” Let us see if he was a true prophet as well as a true historian. When he wrote his “Historical Apology of the Irish Catholics” they were helpless, and almost hopeless. During the past eighty years they have been gradually regaining instalments of their civil rights. Their numerical strength could, in nearly every corner of the country, use those rights which they already have as an instrument wherewith to avenge the past. Have they, in fact, used their power thus?

For the sake of saving space I pass over Government and other such nominations. A better test of tolerance and intolerance is to be found in the statistics of public appointments to responsible positions which are elective. We get in that way a better key to the popular feeling.

Now, in recent centuries, and till 1842, Dublin was not allowed to have a Catholic Lord Mayor. It elected O’Connell at its first opportunity. And were the Protestant citizens ostracized henceforth? Since then it has had 23 Protestant Mayors and 38 Protestant Sheriffs. At present, its City Marshal, its City Surveyor and his assistant, Superintendent Electrical Engineer and four assistants, Drainage Engineer and two assistants, Superintendent Medical Officer of Health, Veterinary Inspector, Collector of Market Dues, and several other important offices are entrusted to non-Catholics. And the Catholics form the vast majority of the population.

In Belfast, the non-Catholics are about twice the number of the Catholics. The Corporation has never had a Catholic Mayor. Until a few years ago, when the City wards were re-distributed by order of Parliament, there was no Catholic Member of the Corporation. There are about 440 salaried officials, of whom about 10 are Catholics; and that these hold no office of importance may be seen at once in the fact that their combined salaries do not amount to more than £800 a year; whilst the Corporation pays in salaries about £70,000 a year. The anomaly is felt; and the apology made for it is that the Catholics hold offices quite in proportion to the rates they pay. It is implied that the Catholics are poor and pay little rates. The apology is not more creditable than the anomaly it is made to explain. It appears to be the custom in Belfast for the landlords to pay rates for the houses rented from them; the tenants thus pay rates in their rents. That practice nullifies the apology.

I pass now to the Counties. Co. Cork has a population of 403,000; of which 365,000 are Catholics, and 38,000 are non-Catholics. Of the salaried officials in the County, 151 are Catholics and 40 are non-Catholics.

Co. Tipperary has a population of 160,500; of which 151,000 are Catholics, and 9,500 are non-Catholics. There are 60 salaried officials, of whom 43 are Catholics and 17 are non-Catholics.

Co. Kerry has a population of 165,000; of which 160,000 are Catholics, and 5,000 are non-Catholics. There are 112 salaried officials, of whom 93 are Catholics and 19 are non-Catholics.

Co. Clare has a population of 112,000; of which 110,000 are Catholics, and 2,000 are Protestants. There are 68 salaried officials, of whom 62 are Catholics and 6 are Protestants.

So much for the South; let us pass to the North.

Co. Antrim has a population of 196,000; of which 40,000 are Catholics and 156,000 are non-Catholics. There are 65 salaried officials, of whom 5 are Catholics, and 60 are non-Catholics.

Co. Armagh has a population of 124,000; of which 56,000 are Catholics, and 68,000 are non-Catholics. There are 50 salaried officials, of whom 3 are Catholics and 47 are non-Catholics.

Co. Tyrone has a population of 150,000; of which 82,000 are Catholics, and 68,000 are non-Catholics. There are 52 salaried officials, of whom 5 are Catholics, and 47 are non-Catholics.

Co. Fermanagh has a population of 65,000; of which 36,000 are Catholics and 29,000 are non-Catholics. There are 75 salaried officials, of whom 17 are Catholics and 58 are non-Catholics. It will be observed also that in those counties supposed to be Protestant, the Catholic population of Tyrone, Armagh, and Fermanagh is 174,000, whilst the Protestant population is only 165,000. In Co. Antrim only, the Protestants are in a vast majority. And in Ballymoney, Antrim, Portrush, and some other towns of that county, there is not 1 Catholic in any elective body. On the other hand, I find that in Clonmel, Co. Tipperary, where the Protestants are to the Catholics in the proportion of 1:9 of the population, they are in the proportion of 1:4 in the Borough Council. In Kinsale, Co. Cork, where the Protestants bear an extremely small proportion to the Catholics, they are as 1:4 in the Borough Council.

Nine years ago, through much trouble and correspondence, I made an inquiry into the provision made in Irish workhouses for the religious interests of their Protestant paupers. I made an analysis of the results, some of which I quote here from the 18th Chapter of “Catholicity and Progress in Ireland” (pp. 346-350).

“In 1882 there were 163 workhouses in Ireland; but some have
disappeared, or have been amalgamated since then. At present there
are 48 of these in which there is _usually no Protestant_ inmate.
The Protestant Minister—

In 7 of these receives no salary.
In 1, a salary of £4 a year for attending to nobody.
In 5, £5, ditto
In 2, £6
In 17, £10
In 2, £12
In 4, £15
In 5, £20
In 4, £25
In 1, £30

There are 25 workhouses with only _one_ Protestant pauper in each, and the Protestant chaplains receive in each £21 a year on an average. There are 12 workhouses with only _two_ Protestant paupers in each on an average: there is a Protestant chaplain for each; they receive on an average £21 a year. There are 12 workhouses with only _three_ Protestant paupers in each on an average. Each has a Protestant chaplain: they receive on an average £30 a year. There are 5 workhouses with only _four_ Protestant paupers in each on an average: their Protestant chaplains receive an average salary of £20 a year. There are 5 workhouses with only _five_ Protestant paupers in each on an average: their Protestant chaplains receive an average salary of £33 a year. There are 7 workhouses with only _six_ Protestant paupers in each on an average: their Protestant chaplains receive salaries of £25 a year on an average. There is 1 workhouse with _seven_ Protestant paupers on an average: the Protestant chaplain receives £30 a year. There are 2 workhouses with _eight_ Protestant paupers in each on an average: in 1 of these the Protestant chaplain gets £25 a year, in the other £30. In all those workhouses I have named there are 194 Protestant paupers on an average; and the Protestant chaplains receive a combined salary of £2,000 a year for attending them. Now nearly all the Guardians of those workhouses are Catholics; those who pay the poor rates are nearly all Catholics.

I do not write these facts in complaint: rather with pride. I give them as evidence of the sort of religious “intolerance” which is practised by Irish Catholics on those few Protestant paupers; who indeed are so few that their having to be in a workhouse at all is not creditable to the wealthy Protestants of Ireland. The money spent in the vain attempt to proselytize a certain degraded remnant of the Catholic poor, if spent on those few Protestant paupers, would make workhouse life unnecessary for them.

(III) The Papal Decrees.

A great noise has been made about the _Ne temere_ Decree, and the recent _Motu proprio_. They have been used to illustrate a phase of Catholic “intolerance” which is supposed to constitute a constant danger to society. I hope to make plain that those who have raised the cry have been shouting into space, and that, moreover, they have been throwing stones out of glass houses. Those laws have been made for Catholics only; Catholics only are bound by them; therefore only they have a right to protest if there be any cause of complaint. Or are we to understand that Catholics are not free to have their own religious rules and usages without the approval of outsiders? It will be answered: Certainly, but this _Ne temere_ Decree might affect Protestants also. How? Well, it ordains that unless Catholics get married before an authorised priest the marriage is null; they are not married. Hence, if a Catholic and a Protestant attempt to get married before a parson or a registrar, as the law of the land allows, there is no marriage in the eyes of the Catholic Church, and the Catholic party is bound in conscience to disown it. That is what has been said; but it is not correct. What the Catholic party would be bound in conscience to do in such a case is to set things right by making it a valid marriage. But what if the parties will not comply with the _Ne temere_ law? Then they go their own way, and the Catholic Church has no more to say to them. But if the Catholic party, getting conscience-stricken, should determine to disown it as a marriage, will not the Protestant party be the sole sufferer? Not at all; because the Protestant party can appeal to the law of the land for conjugal rights, since in the eyes of the law the marriage is valid; and an attempt by the Catholic party to contract marriage with anyone else would be punished as bigamy. On the other hand, if the Protestant party should for any reason determine to disown it as a marriage, the Catholic party cannot in conscience appeal to the law of the land for conjugal rights; because according to the Catholic conscience there are no conjugal rights, since there is no marriage. It should be observed that, also in the case of two Catholics, there is no marriage if they attempt to get married before any other priest than the authorized priest. The _Ne temere_ Decree was meant for Catholics only. It was not at all meant for Protestants, and it can only affect a Protestant through a Catholic. Now, the Catholic Church does not wish a Protestant to marry a Catholic. Quite otherwise. In fact, Catholics are forbidden to marry Protestants without a special permission, which is not given without good cause assigned. But if any Protestants should desire to marry Catholics, they know the conditions they have to fulfil. If they object to those conditions they are quite free to seek some other partner less tied by religious conditions than a Catholic is. If a Protestant say, “I like this Catholic, but I don’t like these conditions,” the Catholic reply is simple and straight: “If you want the Catholic you must take the conditions too; it is intolerant conceit for you to expect that the Catholic Church should shape its discipline to make it fit in with some possible affections which might some time or other possess you.”

The result of all the noise made about this _Ne temere_ Decree has been just what those who have made the noise little thought of, and least of all desired; namely, it has left them without a shadow of excuse, or even the semblance of a grievance. Their cry has become their nemesis. It has so promulgated the Decree that they, no more than Catholics, can plead ignorance of it, or of the consequence of not observing it. Hence what they in future do in regard to it, they will do with their eyes open; and if they count the cost they have only themselves to blame.

But if these remarks I have made help to silence the _Ne temere_ cry, another like grievance is not far to seek. It is remarkable that, whilst there are several Catholic marriage laws the import of which is exactly the same as that of the _Ne temere_ Decree, we never hear a word said about them. Here is one: A Protestant has a sister-in-law who is a Catholic. His wife dies. His Catholic sister-in-law marries him without the necessary dispensation. That marriage is null in the eyes of the Catholic Church. But it is valid before the law of the land since the Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act was passed. That Protestant and his deceased wife’s Catholic sister are precisely in the same predicament in which a Protestant and a Catholic are who attempt marriage in defiance of the _Ne temere_ Decree. There are other similar instances amongst the Catholic marriage laws. There have been for centuries. The _Ne temere_ Decree itself is but a slightly modified form of one three centuries old. Thus, if the _Ne temere_ cry is serious, the party who raised it have been standing at the mouth of a volcano for generations, and have escaped unhurt. Why then have those other Catholic marriage laws been left in place, whilst the _Ne temere_ Decree has raised a storm? The only difference one can see is that the _Ne temere_ Decree happened to appear on the eve of some parliamentary elections, and the consciences of some scrupulous persons were suddenly awakened to the danger it brought.

_Tu quoque_ is not a logical reply; but at the tail of an argument it does not come amiss. Well, then, in England the law recognises no other marriages than those contracted before the parson or the registrar. Let a Protestant and a Catholic therefore get married before a priest, without the presence or knowledge of the parson or the registrar, it is a valid marriage in the eyes of the Catholic Church and binds the conscience of the Catholic party; but it is no marriage in the eyes of the law. So far the case is the exact converse of the _Ne temere_ Decree. But it goes farther; for it holds not only in the case of a Protestant and Catholic but also in the case of two Catholics. The law of the land will not recognise a marriage contracted by two Catholics in their own church and before their own priest, unless the registrar or the parson be present. On the contrary, the _Ne temere_ Decree does not in any sense touch the case of two Protestants. Now, Catholics think, and justly so, that a priest is quite as qualified a witness for the marriage of Catholics as the parson is for the marriage of Protestants, or as the registrar is for the marriage of either. The Catholics have in this a real grievance; and they feel it; yet their consciences have not been so wounded nor their hearts so broken as to think of exhibiting them bleeding before their country upon election hustings. Political consciences show strange phenomena.

What is decreed by the _Motu proprio_ has been in force since the Constitution _Apostolicae Sedis_ was published in 1869. Yet during those forty-two years nobody seems to have been hurt by it; and nobody seems to have been concerned except Catholics till lately. The _Motu proprio_ obliges Catholics, under threat of excommunication not to bring ecclesiastics before lay tribunals without the permission of their bishop. It binds ecclesiastics equally with lay Catholics. It does not, and cannot, touch non-Catholics in any sense; a very plain proof of which is that it threatens with excommunication those to whom it applies. That censure of excommunication should convince anyone that the _Motu proprio_ cannot possibly apply to non-Catholics. They are not within the Church; and how could those be put outside it who have not been within it? It applies to Catholics only, whether lay or cleric. But not to all Catholics. The Holy Office issued a Decree in 1870 in which it declared that “the excommunication does not affect subordinates, even though they be judges.” A Catholic functionary acting in his official capacity does not come under the Decree. It will at once then be seen how unfair are the following words spoken by Mr. Campbell, who represents the Dublin University in Parliament. Speaking at a meeting in Dublin on January 4th, 1912, he said of two Irish Catholic Judges: “They might be called upon any day in the exercise of their duty to their Sovereign to put the law in force against a Catholic priest. If they did so, _ipso facto_ they incurred excommunication.” He thus explained the meaning of the _Motu proprio_ for his audience, in face of the following words which he also read for his audience. The excommunication is against “those who compel, whether directly or indirectly, lay judges to summon ecclesiastical persons before lay tribunals.” Thus the excommunication is against _those who compel_ the judges; so that Mr. Campbell’s interpretation implies that _the judges_ are one and the same with _those who compel them_. Catholics, then, and Catholics only (clerics as well as lay) are forbidden to bring ecclesiastics before lay tribunals, without the permission of their bishop; which permission, the Holy Office decrees, “the bishop shall never refuse, in case he fails to reconcile the parties.” If a Catholic (lay or ecclesiastic) thinks that an ecclesiastic, for instance, owes him a debt, and the ecclesiastic denies it and refuses to pay, the Catholic (priest or layman) who makes the claim is bound by the _Motu proprio_ to have recourse to the bishop first, in order to have the matter arranged amicably. If the bishop fails to settle it, he is not left free to give or refuse his consent to have the case brought before the Civil Court. The Holy Office decrees that “he shall never refuse.” Even in those times and countries when and where Ecclesiastical Courts existed to try the civil cases of clerics, the purpose of the _Privilegium Fori_ was not to grant ecclesiastics any immunity from the civil law of their country, but to provide that in their civil cases they should be tried by an Ecclesiastical Court. The privilege was not as to the law of the land, but as to the court that was to try them according to that law.

What the _Motu proprio_ orders is just what Catholic instinct moves every Catholic worthy of the name to do. In Ireland and everywhere, Catholics, and many Protestants also, if they think they have a cause of complaint against a priest, for debt or otherwise, make known their case first to his bishop. If the bishop fails to compose the question, then they bring the case before the lay tribunals; permission to do which, as the Holy Office lays down, the bishop “shall never refuse.”

I have explained the meaning and scope of this _Motu proprio_ as though it applied to Ireland. But according to the evidence of Cardinal Cullen, the highest authority on Canon Law who has lived in these countries for a century, the Caput _Cogentes_ of the _Apostolicae Sedis_ does not hold in Ireland; and that being so, the _Motu proprio_ does not apply to Ireland, for it is a confirmation of the Caput _Cogentes_.

What this awful _Motu proprio_ orders, then, is just what fraternal charity, a sense of the fitness of things, even common sense, would suggest. So befitting does the procedure ordered by the _Motu proprio_ appear to a writer in the January number of _The Review of Reviews_ that he says, “it might very well be extended to all Christian men, whether lay or clerical”; and he suggests that the civil authorities in England would do wisely to take a leaf out of the book of Pius X.

As a matter of fact, something parallel to it exists in every society. There is not an association of any kind in England, Ireland, or elsewhere, which has not some rules which bind its members under pain of expulsion. In Chapter VII. of his “Middle Ages,” Hallam writes:

“The spiritual Courts in England, whose jurisdiction is so
multifarious, and in general so little of a religious nature, had,
till lately, no means of compelling an appearance much less of
enforcing a sentence, but by excommunication.”

He writes in a note:

“By a recent Statute, the 33 Geo. III., c. 127, the writ, _de
excommunicato capiendo_, as a process in contempt was abolished in
England, but retained in Ireland.”

Both in England and in Ireland there are, of course, rules for expulsion, or excommunication, in every union, society, and club in the country. But a rule more like the _Motu proprio_ than any that I know of, is in the constitutions of the Dublin University which Mr. Campbell represents in Parliament. According to Letters Patent 13 Charles I.:

“All domestic differences shall be examined, and if possible
decided within the College.... He who brings another into Court,
without the consent of the Provost and the majority of the Senior
Fellows, shall be expelled from the College.”

It is in every particular like the _Motu proprio_ of which Mr. Campbell spoke, in a Catholic city and country, as “an arrogant and insolent decree” which “aims a deadly blow at the sanctity and security of property.” I do not believe that he was conscious of the offensiveness of his words. But such has been the fruit and habit of Protestant privilege in Ireland. Some, even men of position and education like Mr. Campbell, remain as if unconscious that the “old order changes.” They fail to fit themselves into the change which a century has made; and “If in the green wood they do these things, what shall be done in the dry?” Catholics, whilst they have their own thoughts about the constitutions and rules of other Religious Bodies than theirs, do not meddle with or question them. The _Ne temere_ Decree and the _Motu proprio_ are, as I have explained, for the discipline of us Catholics exclusively. We do not seek for them the approval of outsiders. But we cannot help thinking that the diatribes to which we have been subjected in connection with those two Pontifical Acts have been inspired rather by political and social jealousy than by a spirit of toleration or love of fair play. I hope that most non-Catholics who read what I have written will be disposed to agree with me.

(IV) Some Protestant Views.

(1) A Church Of Ireland View. BY CANON COURTENAY MOORE, M.A.

It is under a deep sense of both privilege and responsibility that I contribute this article—of privilege because I feel very sensibly the honour done me in asking me to write it—and of responsibility because of the service it may or may not prove to be. A word about myself may be pardoned and may not be inappropriate.