Chapter VIII: Section 92: in each province the legislature may exclusively make laws as (1)

to “the solemnisation of marriage in the province,” which would appear to extend to all matters affecting the form and ceremony; a division of powers certain to produce sooner or later conflicts. Recently the _Ne temere_ decree was promulgated in Canada. The effect upon Roman Catholics has been considered in what is known as the Hebert case, the chief facts of which were these: Eugene Hebert and Emma Clouatre, both Roman Catholics, were married by a Protestant clergyman. The marriage was declared null and void by Archbishop Bruchesi. His decision was confirmed by Judge Laurendeau. But on appeal it was reversed by Judge Charbonneau, who held that any officer qualified by the State to marry persons could marry persons of any religious faith; that the _Ne temere_ decree had no legal validity and was binding only upon the consciences of Roman Catholics.

To quote a report of Judge Charbonneau’s judgment:

“I do not think that the Roman congregation ever intended the _Ne
temere_ Decree to have a civil effect. It applies to Roman
Catholics only. As for the Archbishop’s nullification, it has the
same legal effect, but not more than the decree upon which it is
based. It simply declares that no Catholic marriage ceremony was
performed.”—(_Globe_, Toronto, February 23rd, 1912.)

So far as I know, there has been no appeal to the Judicial Committee, and I take it that Judge Charbonneau’s decision is binding in Canada.(92)

In the Constitution of the Australian Dominion is a provision similar to that quoted above from the Constitution of the United States. (Section 116):

“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious
test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public
trust under the constitution.”

This enactment, so far as I am aware, has not been the subject of interpretation. Religious equality in Australia has virtually no history.

IV. SAFEGUARDS FOR IRELAND

I come to the position of things in Ireland. It may be well at the outset to make clear two points. The first is the present legal status of the Roman Catholic Church in that country. It is the same as that of any other voluntary association; its position theoretically no better and no worse. It possesses autonomy; it enjoys freedom as to doctrine and worship; its constitution is not interfered with; it regulates clerical education; it nominates its bishops; it administers its property in its own way.

It may thus enjoy immense power, especially if there be no true national system of primary education; it may well be doubted whether it possesses as much power in any other country as in Ireland. But like other voluntary religious associations the Catholic Church is not wholly withdrawn from the supervision and control of the Law Courts. A series of decisions of our highest courts with reference to Churches in Ireland and Scotland, and the colonies, have laid down certain principles equally applicable to the Roman Catholic Church and to all other religious bodies; in particular, these principles: that the State can exercise control over all religious bodies possessing property when it is proved to be contravening its rules to the injury of members. In the case of societies resting upon a consensual basis, Courts of Justice are bound when due complaint is made that a member of the society has been injured as to his rights in any matter of a mixed spiritual and temporal character, to inquire into the laws or rules of the Society.(93) Further the authority of a Church cannot be legally used for purposes inimical to the State or contrary to any statute. It may make rules for its own members; it cannot enforce them against others; they are invalid against them if contrary to the terms of any statute. It may, for example, declare that it will not regard a marriage with a deceased wife’s sister as valid; it may refuse to recognise as members those who so marry. But such rules will not legally invalidate a union which a statute has legalised. Probably this has not always been fully borne in mind by those who have denounced the promulgation of the decree _Ne temere_ in Ireland. Resolutions have been passed against it here and in Ireland. Many Nonconformist bodies have protested against the promulgation of the decree in British Dominions. The decree is, I think, objectionable for several reasons, and not least because it discourages mixed marriages, an effect which seems to me deplorable, for nothing is better calculated to put an end to uncharitableness and hatred than the frequency of such unions. But while such a decree may do harm, it will have no direct effect except as between the members of the Catholic Church _in foro conscientiæ_. The Irish marriage law, which with a few exceptions is the same as the English, is binding on all Catholics and Protestants. Lord Llandaff who speaks at once as a lawyer and as a Catholic, puts this point clearly:

“The invalidity was that of the sacramental and not of the legal
marriage, and what the Church said to one of her subjects in such
circumstances was: ‘You are married; you are a husband; but you
may not receive the sacrament, and therefore you are in a state of
sin, and in that sense your marriage in void, according to your
conscience, though not according to the law.’ ”(94)

A movement of retrogression the promulgation of the decree may have been; but every religious body must be free to lay down rules as to its membership. To quote the letter of the Archbishop of Canterbury of November 8th, 1911, on this subject: “Any branch of the Church of Christ must clearly have the power of defining the conditions of membership.”(95) It is but fair to remember that the decree _Ne temere_ is part of a settled policy. The Church of Rome has often shown its disapproval of mixed marriages which Benedict XIV. declared “abominable.”(96) It is but fair also to take note of the plea that this decree is the latest attempt to secure uniformity in regard to marriage law; attempts which have been pursued since the _Tametsi_ decrees of the Council of Trent. Before the reform in the marriage law then effected there was much confusion and looseness. All that was required for a valid marriage was that the contracting parties should express to each other their mutual consent by words _de præsenti_; a state of things which favoured fraud and led to uncertainty. The Tridentine change must appear to most lawyers to have been a great reform; marriage was to be solemnised in the presence of the parish priest of one of the parties and of two witnesses. But this ecclesiastical law is not even now in force in several countries. It was promulgated in most Catholic countries; it was never promulgated in purely Protestant countries, or in all countries with a mixed population. It applied to marriages between two Catholics but not necessarily to mixed or to Protestant marriages. It might be in force in one part of a country and not in another. Thus the _Tametsi_ decree was in force in the greater part of the province of Armagh since the time of Elizabeth. Not until 1827 was it promulgated in the province of Dublin. Now we are told that it was to secure still further uniformity that the decree _Ne temere_ was published. It requires all persons baptized in the Catholic Church, and those who have been converted to it from heresy or schism, to marry in the presence of the parish priest or ordinary of the place in which the marriage is to be celebrated, otherwise the Church will regard it as null. If neither of the contracting parties is a Catholic the Church recognises the marriage as valid wherever it is celebrated.(97) How far other motives may have operated I cannot say; it is only fair to bear in mind that the decree is defended as a fresh effort to introduce certainty and definiteness as to a fundamental institution.

I may here refer to the fears expressed as to the effects of the decree, _Motu Proprio, Quantavis Diligentia_ of October 9th, 1911; a decree which, it is said, might conceivably place every sincere Roman Catholic in antagonism with his duties to the State. The principle of that decree seems to me highly objectionable; it is an impossible attempt to revive the past; a form of the greatest of all heresies, disbelief in spiritual forces unsupported by privilege. But here, too, it is well to understand the case made by defenders of that decree, and before deploring its effects in Ireland to be certain that, in the view of the Catholic Church, it is in force there. When the Church was all powerful, there existed a _privilegium fori_ according to which no layman could bring a cleric before a lay tribunal; a privilege based upon the words of St. Paul to the Corinthians who resorted to the Pagan Courts. By various Concordats the Papacy had agreed to abrogate this right wholly or partly. In some countries the privilege had become extinct. In October 1869, was issued the bull of Pius IX., _Apostolicæ Sedis Moderationi convenit_ which appeared to revive the _privilegium fori_. This, however, is denied by Roman Catholic theologians; according to them where no such Concordat exists, a custom has grown up that breaches of ecclesiastical immunity are to be overlooked; in any case it operates only as to canonical offences.(98) Whether that interpretation is correct or not, I need not enquire. But obviously such a rule has no legal efficacy; and it would be a strong measure to deny the Church the right to give to its adherents such monitions—for its commands are no more—as it thinks fit.

V. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS

In the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 were elaborate provisions designed to secure equality of treatment. Thus the Irish Legislature was prohibited from making any law.

Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; imposing any disability or
conferring any privilege on account of religious belief;
abrogating or derogating from the right to establish any place of
denominational education or any denominational institution or
charity; prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend
a school receiving public money without attending the religious
instruction at that school; or impairing without either the leave
of Her Majesty in Council first obtained on an address presented
by the legislative body of Ireland, or the consent of the
Corporation interested, the rights, property or privileges of any
existing corporation, incorporated by Royal Charter or local or
general Act of Parliament.

(Summary of Clause 4 in Bills of 1886 and 1893.)

Two comments may be made upon these provisions. They were so minute as to be at once a source of frequent irritation and certain to give rise to frequent conflicts with the Irish Legislature and as to be calculated to encourage litigation. Further, they did not specifically deal with the subject of marriage, an omission which, in view of the decree _Ne temere_, seems objectionable. They are replaced by a general clause to the following effect:

“In the exercise of their power to make laws under this Act the
Irish Parliament shall not make a law so as either directly or
indirectly to establish or endow any religion, or prohibit the
free exercise thereof, or give a preference, privilege or
advantage, or impose any disability or disadvantage, on account of
religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status, or make
any religious belief or religious ceremony a condition of the
validity of any marriage.”

How far these provisions will be eluded probably no one can say with certainty. It is difficult enough to ascertain the present situation in Ireland without attempting to predict with confidence the future. Statements diametrically opposite are vouched for by persons of equal experience and opportunity of knowledge. “Facts” in that country are so elusive. What is true in the south is fiction in the north, and _vice versa_. It may be admitted that machinery designed to protect minorities counts for less than the spirit actuating those who work it. The greatest security no doubt for religious liberty would be the presence of a general spirit of mutual forbearance; militant bigotry could not permanently exist alongside the prevalence of the spirit of charity; and Ulster, as well as other parts of Ireland, might make its contribution thereto. Some new forces there are working for toleration, I believe that they are increasing. Among them are these: the action of democratic institutions in which persons of all creeds take part; the prosperity of the country bringing in its train to all parts of the country new ideas and hopes and interests; the performance by Catholics and Protestants of common civic duties; the constant stream, strongly charged with secular elements, flowing between Ireland and the United States; the silent influence of literature and newspapers permeated by a spirit which no priesthood can exorcise; the frequency of mixed marriages as proved by the action of the Catholic Church against them; the existence of urgent political and social questions as to which men are not divided according to their religious beliefs. These are so many manifestations of the modern spirit, from the operation of which Ireland no more than any other part of the western world can escape. They may prove stronger than legal safeguards.

I shall not attempt to measure the relative strength of these influences, but I should be inclined to rate highest the ultimate effect of democracy, and of a Parliament in which must be a Protestant minority powerful by their talents, their wealth and their energy. Democracy has everywhere its own problems, as engrossing for it as any in which the Church is interested. It will solve them in its own way, which may not be always the Church’s. “Nothing,” says Mr. Bryce with reference to America, “excites more general disapproval than any attempt by an ecclesiastical organisation to interfere in politics.” Under democratic institutions there may be the same results in Ireland. The remodelling of primary education will probably be one of the first struggles in which an Irish Parliament will be engaged. The fight will be in the open, which is a clear gain. The Church may for a time succeed in retaining its present hold over the schools. It is quite as likely that it will lose ground, and that the first Irish Minister of Education will be the first to incur ecclesiastical censure. There is much evidence of the growth of a widespread toleration extending it may be hoped, to the northeast corner of Ulster:

“Since the Local Government Act of 1898,” writes Mr. Annan Bryce,
“it has not been found that the priest interferes unless in the
rare cases where there is a question of personal morality, and
then not always with success.”

The opinions of three Lord-Lieutenants upon this point cannot be ignored.

Lord Aberdeen:

“After years of continuous residence in Ireland, watching affairs
and meeting people of every class and creed, I am profoundly
impressed with the baselessness of alarm about the consequences of
Home Rule.

“On Home Rule for Ireland, I repeat and emphasise the opinion of
my former telegrams, especially regarding apprehension of
religious intolerance.”

The late Lord Spencer:

“I have had some experience of Ireland, and yet I do not know any
specific instance where there has been the exercise of religious
intolerance on the part of the Roman Catholics against their
Protestant countrymen.”

The Marquis of Crewe:

“In 1886 and 1893 the animosity between classes, largely agrarian
in its origin, was far stronger than at present, and the line of
cleavage roughly followed that of religious difference. But even
in those days, as I well remember, it was evident that the
possibilities of intolerance in a self-governed Ireland were
deliberately and grossly exaggerated, with a party motive. Now,
when the various classes know each other better, and there is less
occasion for friction, the attempt to excite religious discord
will utterly fail, as I firmly believe.”

The safeguards provided by the measure deal specifically with the subjects as to which fears of religious inequality exist: establishment and endowment, education and marriage; as compared with them, the provisions in the Canadian and Australian Acts are very imperfect. They guard, in explicit terms, against the dangers to religious liberty and equality in a way in which probably no other Constitution does.

A necessary supplement to any Legislature with limited jurisdiction is a Court of Appeal. Under the proposed constitution, the Irish Courts will be free to determine the constitutional character of any measures passed by the Irish Parliament; and from their decisions an appeal will lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which will decide questions similar to those determined by it with reference to the Canadian and Australian constitutions, and by the Supreme Court of the United States reviewing the constitutional character of State legislation. It may be surmised that the Court will be faithful to the principles which it has laid down in dealing with the powers of the Parliaments of the Dominions. It has not hesitated to interfere in Canada with ecclesiastical sentences or censure which it believed invalid (see _e.g._, _Brown_ v. _Curé de Montreal_). It will, we may assume, do likewise in Ireland.

To conclude: He who believes in political freedom will believe also that religious oppression cannot long co-exist with it. Never, so far as I know, has ecclesiastical tyranny been enduring under democratic institutions; and I see no reason why the result should be different in the new Ireland which the Land Acts and the Local Government Act have created. Full and free political life is the best, perhaps the only, solvent of intolerance.

V.—Financial Relations(99) BY LORD WELBY

“The Channel forbids Union, the Ocean forbids separation. I demand
the continued severance of the Parliament with a view to the
continued everlasting unity of the Empire.”

Terse words in which a great statesman summed up the relation of Ireland to England. The Home Rule Bill will give the sanction of law to Grattan’s aphorism. It bids Ireland manage her own affairs, freeing her in her own house from official bondage to an unsympathetic consort. If the Act of Enfranchisement is drawn in a trustful and large spirit, it will, we may feel assured, end the feud of centuries, and create unity where the Act of Union has created enmity.

The policy of Home Rule is wise in itself, and worthy the statesmanship of a nation always bold in the hour of need, and, as experience of its working is gained, it will commend itself more and more to the commonsense of a practical people, but the immediate success of the first Home Rule Act will depend greatly on the skill and wisdom with which the details of a complicated measure are devised, facing fairly the financial evils consequent on Tory obstinacy, and avoiding, in reasonable degree, offence to popular prejudice and existing interests.

The provisions which will adjust the financial relations between the two nations are not among the least difficult of those details, and Parliament must solve the puzzling problem without delay. It must begin by temporarily giving local government in Ireland a fair start at the cost of the British tax-payer.

Let us, in the first place, clear the ground from some doubtful arguments which, used as premises, will probably lead the unwary to false conclusions. A plea is often put forward that England is a rich country and Ireland a poor country, and it is argued that identical taxation therefore wrongs Ireland. But England is not a rich country, in the broad sense. It is a country in which there is vast accumulation of wealth, but in which, also, there is a great mass of poverty—poverty probably exceeding the poverty of Ireland, and, therefore, identical taxation if it wrongs the poor of Ireland, wrongs still more the poor of England. Critics arguing from this false premise contend that the extension of the Income-tax to Ireland was a wrong, that is to say, the wealthy man living in Ireland, where living is relatively cheap, ought not to contribute to the national expenditure on the same principle as the wealthy man living in England, where living is relatively dear; or, to put the argument in another form, it is sound finance to take Income-tax from a man in England, struggling on a few hundreds a year. It is unsound finance to take Income-tax from, say, the profits earned in Ireland by the Guinness firm. Nationalists, misled by the plea of Ireland’s poverty, have relied on this argument, and Conservatives also have used it chiefly to discredit Mr. Gladstone, who extended the Income-tax to Ireland; but the argument is false in itself, and cannot be made the basis of sound financial legislation. As a matter of fact, taxes on articles of general consumption, on the necessaries of life, fall heavily on the poor, and the argument of over-taxation applies in great degree to the poor in the great towns of England, and to the poor in Ireland. If, then, the poor of Ireland are to be relieved, the poor of England must be relieved also, and identical taxation would still be the result. The statesman must find a truer gauge by which to measure the relative capacity of the two countries to bear taxation.

Again, during the long discussion on financial relations, much time has been wasted in criticising that provision of the Act of Union, which fixed the respective contributions of Great Britain and Ireland to the common purposes of the Empire at the proportion of fifteen and two. That proportion, in fact, was not exacted, and it may be put aside as theoretical.

A summary of recent financial history in Ireland will enable the reader to understand the circumstances in which Parliament takes up the problem of Home Rule. Towards the close of the eighteenth century the condition of Ireland was bad. England, selfish to the last degree in her commercial policy, treated Ireland as little better than a conquered country, and ruined her commercially and industrially by restrictions on her trade. Protestants and Catholics joined in patriotic resistance, and wrung at last freedom of trade in 1779, and an independent Parliament in 1782. Thenceforward for a time the financial administration of Ireland was regulated in accord with Irish interest. The country prospered financially under the new order. Large sums were spent in promoting agriculture and manufactures, and in grants for public works, and the country’s finance was restored to order. During the years of peace, 1782 to 1793, Ireland contributed on the average £584,000 to military—that is to the common expenses of the Empire. The military expenditure of Great Britain in the peace years, 1786 to 1792, averaged £5,142,000. Ireland was then a most important factor in the State, for the population was to that of England in the proportion of nearly one to two.

Pitt desired to establish reciprocity between the two countries and at the same time to obtain from Ireland a contribution on a fixed principle for the Navy, wise proposals worthy of the Minister; but the two Parliaments could not agree. That of England bowed to the pernicious claims of ascendancy and to the supposed interests of the commercial classes. Pitt was defeated. The French Revolution and a war lasting nearly twenty-two years followed, and in the midst of the war broke out the Rebellion of 1798. If the charge of the Irish debt at the outbreak of the war and the average civil expenditure of Ireland between 1793 and the Union is deducted from the average income of Ireland, the surplus constituted Ireland’s real contribution to the common expenditure and it averaged about £900,000 a year. The year 1800 marks a great change of policy. Pitt put an end to the independent Parliament of Ireland and passed the Act of Union, bad in itself, and worse by the means which made it law. It sought to make the two countries one for all purposes of revenue, and that object was kept steadily in view.

From 1800 to 1817 the United Parliament imposed taxes on both England and Ireland, but the Irish Treasury collected the Irish Revenue, defrayed the local expenditure of Ireland as sanctioned by the United Parliament and remitted the surplus in aid of the war expenditure. The greater part of the burthen fell upon Great Britain, but Ireland’s share drained greatly her resources. Her revenue which had produced £1,837,000 in 1793, reached £7,305,000 in 1817, an increase of 300 per cent., while her contributions during the years of war to the common expenditure calculated on the principle adopted in the preceding paragraph amounted to about £3,000,000. During the same period Great Britain contributed to the war out of revenue about £43,000,000 on the annual average.

In 1817 the Irish Treasury was abolished, the exchequers of the two countries were united, the British and Irish Revenues were paid alike into the one exchequer. The Irish local expenditure was defrayed from that exchequer under the check of the English Treasury, and the United Parliament imposed and repealed Irish taxes. From 1817 for many years Ireland fared badly. Her representatives in Parliament served her ill. Tories, Whigs, and independent members failed alike in making England understand Irish needs, and the British Parliament neglected Irish interests. The years between 1817 and 1842 mark the first period of Irish financial history dating from the war. It was a period of stagnation. Both countries required time to recover from the calamity incident to war; but the recovery would have been more rapid, even under heavy taxation, had not progress been retarded by the unwise legislation of protection, which fettered enterprise and restricted commerce. This evil, however, injured Great Britain more than Ireland. In 1824 the separate Customs Departments of the two countries were abolished. The trade between Great Britain and Ireland was treated as coasting, and from that time no official record has been kept of goods exported from and imported into both countries.

In 1817 the taxes levied in England were similar to, but not identical with, those levied in Great Britain. Ireland was exempt from many taxes levied here, and in some cases, such as spirits, she paid a lower rate of duty. A period of profound peace enabled the government to remit taxation; but those remissions were chiefly made in deference to British interests, and in making them Irish interests were little considered. The truth of this statement is illustrated by the Revenue Returns. The estimated “_true_”(100) Revenue of Great Britain fell from £51,500,000 in 1820 to £46,250,000 in 1840, although population, and with it consumption, had increased. The “_true_” Revenue of Ireland in the same period rose from £5,250,000 to £5,500,000. But it must be added that many of the taxes remitted were taxes _not levied in Ireland_. In respect to them Great Britain had to a certain extent a claim to prior consideration.

The second period of financial history extended from 1842 to 1869, a period of rapid recovery and of great prosperity in Great Britain, but not so in Ireland. Famine fell upon her in 1846, and thinned her population, followed by emigration, which showed how poverty pressed upon the poor, while the Fenian movement of 1866 showed how widespread was the spirit of unrest. A highly cultivated Liberal statesman was Lord-Lieutenant during several years of the period. An interesting diary which he kept leaves the impression that the leading statesmen of the day were not reading the signs of the times, or gauging the gravity of a growing movement. This was hardly the period to choose for increasing the taxation of Ireland, nevertheless in 1853 Mr. Gladstone extended the Income-tax to Ireland, counterbalancing it in part by the remission of loans granted to Ireland during the famine—a very insufficient compensation. But the Income-tax did not touch the poor, and as I have pointed out there was no reason why the wealthy and comparatively well-to-do classes in Ireland should not contribute to the public expenditure like their brethren in Great Britain. This plea, however, does not extend to the spirit duties which during 1853 Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli raised to the level of the spirit duties in Great Britain. That tax undoubtedly was paid in great measure by the poorer classes.

In one direction there was improvement. In 1842 Sir Robert Peel acceded to power, and inaugurated at once the policy of liberating trade which has conferred such benefits on Great Britain, and in a minor degree on Ireland. The era of prosperity which followed the adoption of the Free Trade policy increased greatly the consuming power of the people, and enabled Mr. Gladstone to largely reduce duties on the principal articles of food consumed by the poorer classes. For example, he and his successors reduced the tea duties from 2s. 2d. to 6d. and abolished the sugar duties. This was undoubtedly the true method of remedying the evil which underlies the plea that identical taxation wronged Ireland. I have shown that that evil was caused not by identical taxation, but by heavy taxes on food, which oppressed alike the poor of Ireland, and the more numerous poor of Great Britain. The policy adopted met the local grievance, by modifying if not removing the general grievance, and this remedy of the general grievance was only rendered possible by the growing prosperity of Great Britain. The poor of Ireland had therefore their full share of the benefit caused by the prosperity of Great Britain. The historian must give full weight to this consideration when he criticises the increase of the Irish spirit duty. There can be little doubt as to the verdict of history, if the choice lies between cheap whisky and dear food on the one side, and cheap food and dear whisky on the other. Between 1860 and 1900 the Customs and Excise duties which were reduced exceeded the like duties increased by some £22,000,000 a year, and Ireland had her share in the reduction.

In 1864 a Committee of the House of Commons inquired into the taxation of Ireland, but it led to no useful result. In other directions the monotony of neglect continued. The Government and Parliament paid little or no attention to Irish needs. Ireland was the Cinderella of the three kingdoms, and fared accordingly.

The third period ranged from 1869 to 1896. It might be termed the Home Rule period, for it includes the two Home Rule Bills of Mr. Gladstone, but it includes also other great measures relating to Ireland. Indeed, during the whole period of seventeen years Ireland engrossed, to a great degree, the attention of Parliament. The change was very remarkable. Up to 1869 England was indifferent to, or bored by, Ireland. She was stupid. She did not trouble herself to learn Irish wants, and she could not understand the spirit of Irish nationality. The Devon Commission, a Conservative Commission, appointed by a Conservative Minister, Sir Robert Peel, reported that 2,500,000 people in Ireland were on the verge of starvation, and gave warning of the evils, the perils, inherent in the Irish land system. England took no notice of either warning. The famine answered the first in cruel fashion. The second was pigeon-holed. Wise in her own Home administration, wise of late years in her Colonial administration, she knew no remedy for Ireland but force, and force is no remedy. She accepted, almost as matters of ordinary administration, Coercion Acts which marked with a black stigma most years of the century, unable to see that that fact alone was a disgrace to her statesmen, her Parliament, and her people.

Early in the Home Rule days I heard a great English statesman say: “The first duty of a Government is to bring the people into agreement with the law; till it does that it fails in its first duty, and England has hitherto failed to bring Ireland into agreement with the law”—a truth well and forcibly expressed.

In 1869 a man of great power and eloquence, wide views, and firm resolve became Prime Minister. He realised the habitual injustice of England to Ireland, and he saw the perils impending. By his strength of will he forced an unwilling country and an indifferent Parliament to devote its serious attention to Irish questions. He disestablished the Church. He was defeated on Irish education, but he laid the foundation of a land settlement by conferring on the tenants, in spite of strenuous opposition from the Tories, the rights of fair rents, fixity of tenure, and free sale, and his measures were marked by an earnest desire to deal liberally with Ireland to the utmost extent consistent with equity to the British tax-payer. Finally, when Ireland sent to Westminster more than four-fifths of her representatives pledged to Home Rule, he accepted this expression of the national will, and became a convert to the principle of Home Rule. I deal later in detail with his two Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893, which were defeated, and I need only here deal with finance of the third period, apart from the provision of the Home Rule Bills.

Before Mr. Gladstone was converted to Home Rule, Home Rule finance attracted little attention. That eminent statistician, Sir Robert Giffen, made, indeed, in 1885, a singular suggestion to the _Statist_ newspaper, viz., that the Irish landlords should be bought out at the cost of the Imperial Exchequer, and that the rent charge, which would then be payable by the purchasing tenant, should be given to an Irish authority, in lieu of payments from the Exchequer, for the internal administration of Ireland.

Again, Sir Robert wrote an article in the _Nineteenth Century Review_, March, 1886, a few weeks before the introduction of the first Home Rule Bill, to show how unimportant, from a financial point of view, Ireland had become to us, and to suggest the expediency of devising some form of Government under which the special needs and circumstances of that country would receive more and better attention than they did under the existing arrangements. His figures might be, in some instances, doubtful, perhaps even incorrect, but it can hardly be denied that he made good his point. Sir Robert was, we see, greatly in advance, not only of the ordinary Briton, but of financial experts generally, both as regards the land question and also that of the Government of Ireland.

Perhaps the most able thinker and writer on economic questions in the second half of the nineteenth century was the late Mr. Bagehot, and, in proof of the general indifference to Irish questions in England, it is notable that his collected works, ranging over a wide field in politics and literature, contain no paper on the government or condition of Ireland. Yet he had witnessed O’Connell, the famine, the depopulation of Ireland, the Committee on Irish Taxation, and the Fenian outbreak in 1866.

In 1890 Mr. Goschen, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the Conservative Government, moved for a Committee of the House of Commons to consider the financial relations of England, Scotland, and Ireland. The Committee was instructed to inquire into the equity of their financial relations in regard to the resources and population of the three kingdoms. It had hitherto been much discussed whether Ireland could be regarded as a separate financial entity from the rest of the kingdom. The Irish Taxation Committee of 1864, of which Sir Stafford Northcote and Mr. Lowe were prominent members, had refused to admit the principle of such separate entity, and that had been generally the Conservative contention. But, in the reference to the Committee of 1890, the Conservative Government accepted the principle. The Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 were, of course, based upon it. Thus, 1890 marks an important advance in the discussion, and thenceforward, by consent of both parties, the separate “entity” was established.

After the rejection of the second Home Rule Bill the Liberal Government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the financial relations of the two countries and their relative taxable capacity. The Report of this Commission deserves attention, because it was exhaustive in its inquiries, because the information it laid before the public has since that time been generally used in discussion, and because many of the recommendations made were far-reaching and suggestive. There was, as might be expected, great difference of opinion. The Conservative members and the Nationalist members made their several Reports. Attention, however, may be directed to one of the Reports, because it received the concurrence of the Nationalist members and of three English members—one of whom was a very high, if not the highest, financial authority in the City of London, the two others retired Civil Servants who had been at the head of two great Departments of the State. Their conclusions were as follows:

“(1) That Great Britain and Ireland must, for the purpose of this
inquiry, be considered as separate entities.

“(2) That the Act of Union imposed upon Ireland a burthen which,
as events showed, she was unable to bear.

“(3) That the increase of taxation laid upon Ireland between 1853
and 1860 was not justified by the then existing circumstances.

“(4) That identity of rates of taxation does not necessarily
involve equality of burthen.

“(5) That whilst the actual tax revenue of Ireland is about
one-eleventh of that of Great Britain, the relative taxable
capacity of Ireland is very much smaller, and is not estimated by
any of us as exceeding one-twentieth.”

The three English members above mentioned presented a separate Report, recording at length their views on the questions referred to the Commission. I call attention to it, because reference is frequently made to it in the Report of Sir Henry Primrose’s Committee, recently appointed to advise the Government upon the new Home Rule Bill.

They pointed out that the whole taxation of Ireland increased from £2,900,000 in 1820, to over £6,600,000 in 1893, and that by far the larger part of this increase was derived from taxes on articles of consumption which fell most heavily on the poor; that the increase resulted only temporarily in an increase in the contribution to common expenditure which rose from £3,691,000 in 1820 to £5,396,000 in 1860, to fall to £1,966,000 in 1893, for the greater part of the increase had been absorbed in increase of Irish civil expenditure. This local expenditure amounted in Ireland to 19s. 7d. per head, while in Great Britain it only amounted to 11s. 9d. If the cost of administering Ireland had been reduced to the like cost in Great Britain, a saving of nearly £2,000,000 would have been realised.

They thought that the expenditure in Ireland was conducted on a scale totally unsuitable to that country, that the industrial taxation, borne in Ireland mainly by the consumers of dutiable articles, was heavier than the masses of the Irish people ought to bear, that Irish taxation ought not to exceed one twentieth part of taxation of the United Kingdom, but they doubted whether Great Britain would consent to alter her whole system of taxation to meet the evil to Ireland. They objected totally to seeking a remedy in increased grants and doles, and they suggested that Ireland should levy her own taxes and provide for her own expenditure.

Lastly, in answer to the objection that Ireland might impose new Customs duties, they held that to be unlikely, since Ireland rather than Great Britain would suffer by such a policy, because the market of Great Britain is of greater importance to Ireland than that of Ireland to Great Britain.

The Royal Commission reported in 1896. The question of the financial relations remained then in practical abeyance till 1907. In that year the Government of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman proposed to establish an Irish Council under the Lord-Lieutenant entrusted with the control and direction of certain administrative Departments. A sum was to be charged on the Consolidated Fund to enable the Council to meet the expenditure of the transferred Departments. This sum was fixed for the first five years at £4,164,000. This was simply a measure to decentralise administration, and to admit Irishmen to a share in Irish administration. It did not, however, obtain support in Ireland, and in consequence it was not pressed.

We come now to the last stages in the story of Irish finance. The Government of Mr. Asquith decided to introduce the Third Home Rule Bill in the session of 1912, and in 1911 they appointed a Departmental Committee under Sir Henry Primrose to advise them. The able report of that Committee has been laid before Parliament, and it brings our information on the financial relations up to the latest date:

They state the “true” Irish Revenue in 1895-6 to have been £8,034,000.

They estimate “true” Revenue 1910-11 at 10,300,000.

Increase £2,266,000.

The “true” local expenditure in Ireland, 1895-6, £5,938,000.

The “true” local expenditure 1910-11, 11,344,000.

£5,406,000.

Thus whereas Ireland in 1895-6 made a contribution of £2,066,000 to Imperial Expenditure, in 1910-11, not only did she make no contribution to Imperial Expenditure, but the British taxpayer was called on to contribute more than £1,000,000 towards Irish local expenditure. But Irish local expenditure is increasing under the heads of old-age pensions, land purchase, and expenses of the Government which will be established in Ireland under Home Rule. The Committee in consequence estimate:

The Irish local expenditure in 1913-14 at £12,400,000.

The Irish Revenue at 10,350,000.

Deficit £2,050,000.

for which provision must be made in the forthcoming measure.

In order to meet the existing deficit, the Committee suggest that the British Exchequer should take over liability for all old-age pensions which had been actually granted at the date when the Home Rule Bill comes into operation. They estimate that liability at £3,000,000 a year, gradually, of course, diminishing. If necessary, the liability in whole or part of the Irish Constabulary Pensions (£400,000) might also be transferred to the British Exchequer. They advise that the obligation of Ireland to contribute to the Imperial expenditure should be affirmed, but that a settlement of the amount of the contribution should remain in abeyance; and lastly, that the guarantee of the Imperial Exchequer in respect of the Land Stock should remain, but that means should be taken to secure regular payment of the sum due from Ireland to the National Debt Commissioners.

I shall contrast later the recommendations of the Committee with the actual provisions of the Home Rule Bill.

I will now compare the finance of the three Home Rule Bills which have been submitted to Parliament, those of 1886, 1893 and 1912.

THE BILL OF 1886

Mr. Gladstone made it an essential condition of his plan that there should be an equitable distribution of Imperial charges and that Ireland should pay her fair proportion to the common expenses of the Empire. In 1885 that contribution was represented by the surplus of Irish Revenue remaining after deduction of the expenditure in Ireland on Irish services. He calculated in 1886 that the surplus above described provided a contribution by Ireland to Imperial expenditure equivalent to £2 where Great Britain contributed £23. This proportion contrasts with Mr. Pitt’s arrangement in 1800 that Ireland should pay £2 where Great Britain paid £15. Mr. Gladstone proposed in future that where Great Britain paid £28, Ireland should pay £2, a concession of moment to Ireland, and he supported it on the following ground: he measured the taxable capacity of the two countries by (1) the Income-tax returns (2) the death duty returns, and (3) the valuation of property. Income-tax gave a proportion of £38 to £2, but he held Income-tax an imperfect test, because it was paid in Ireland on a lower valuation than in Great Britain and because many Irishmen receive dividends on securities which pay Income-tax in England. He thought that £34 to £2 would be nearer the true proportion. He held the death duties to be a better test and they showed a proportion of £26 to £2, while the valuation, lower in Ireland than in Great Britain, gave a proportion of £24 to £2. Arguing from these premises, he held that his proposed contribution of £2 to £28 was an equitable and even a generous arrangement, justified by the necessity of starting the Irish Legislative body with a balance to its credit.

A table is given showing how the contribution was appropriated.

The amount to be contributed by Ireland to Imperial expenditure being thus ascertained, the more difficult part of the problem remained, viz., how to provide the fund out of which the contribution would be payable and how to secure its payment. The plan which commended itself to him as insuring the fiscal unity of the three kingdoms, and giving absolute security to the British Exchequer, left the imposition and collection of Customs and Excise duties with the Imperial Government, and under Imperial control. This plan was to be carried into effect in the following manner. The Customs and Excise were to be levied under Acts of the Imperial Parliament, and were not to be subject to the control of the Irish Legislature. The Irish Legislature with that exception could impose taxes on Ireland. Under the Land Purchase Bill, which was to be introduced concurrently with the Home Rule Bill, a Receiver-General was to be appointed, into whose hands the Customs and Excise Duties and other taxes were to be paid, including taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament. The Imperial Receiver-General, having thus in hand all Imperial and local taxes levied in Ireland, would in the first instance pay out of them the Imperial charges. Apart from the Imperial charges there were other charges, strictly Irish, such as Judges’ salaries, pensions, the salaries of existing civil servants, for the security of which the Bill provided. The Bill bound the Irish Parliament to impose taxes sufficient to meet such charges, and ordered them to be paid by the Receiver-General. The Receiver-General was to keep an Imperial and an Irish account. The Irish charges would of course be paid from the latter account. He was to carry the Customs and Excise Duties in the first instance to the Imperial account, and the local taxes to the Irish account, transferring to the Irish account the surplus of Custom and Excise, after payment of the Imperial contribution. He was subsequently to pay the balance remaining on the Irish account to the Irish Exchequer.

An Imperial Court of Exchequer was established in Ireland to watch over the observance of the Act, and all Revenue acts were to be tried and defaults punished in that Court. The Bill further enabled the Irish Parliament to take over the Irish Post Office, if it should so desire, though it was Mr. Gladstone’s opinion that it would be for the convenience of both countries if the Post Office were to remain under the control of the Postmaster-General.

The Imperial contribution payable by Ireland was not to be increased for thirty years, though it might be reduced if the Imperial charge for Army, Navy and Imperial Civil expenditure for any year should be less than fifteen times the contribution paid by Ireland. In that case one-fifteenth of the diminution could be deducted from the Imperial contribution.

Existing Civil Servants were retained in their offices at existing salaries. If the Irish Government were to desire their retirement, they would be retired on pensions. On the other hand, if at the end of two years the officers themselves desired to retire, they could do so, receiving pensions on the usual abolition of office scale.

Supposing the Home Rule Bill to have become law the account of Irish finance would have stood thus:

RECEIPTS.

Imperial taxes:
Customs £1,880,000
Excise £4,300,000
Total £6,180,000

Local taxes:
Stamps £600,000
Income-tax 6d. £550,000
Total £1,150,000

Non-tax revenue:
Post Office £1,020,000

Total: £8,350,000

EXPENDITURE.
Contributions to Imperial expenditure on basis of one-fifteenth of
Imperial expenditure:
Debt charges £1,466,000
Army and Navy £1,666,000
Civil charges £110,000
Total £3,242,000

Sinking Fund on one-fifteenth of capital of debt £360,000
Constabulary(101) £1,000,000
Local Irish Civil charges £2,510,000
Collection of revenue:
Imperial taxes £170,000
Local taxes £60,000
Non-tax revenue £604,000
Total £834,000
Surplus £404,000
Total £8,350,000

When it is said that in 1885-1886 Ireland was paying to Imperial expenditure in the proportion of £2 to £23, that proportion was calculated on the whole gross Imperial expenditure, whereas Mr. Gladstone calculated the proportion of £2 to £28 on a military expenditure materially cut down, for he excluded from it charges which ought strictly to be called war charges, a modification very favourable to Ireland and reducing considerably her true contribution.

He made another concession of great importance. He proposed to credit Ireland with the entire receipts levied in Ireland, but that was not a true test of the amount of taxation paid by Ireland. There are goods which pay duty in Great Britain, but which are consumed in Ireland, so conversely there are goods which pay duty in Ireland but are consumed in Great Britain. For instance, spirits, porter, and tobacco are largely exported duty paid from Ireland and are consumed in Great Britain, and Mr. Gladstone calculated that the excess of duties so paid in Ireland on goods consumed in Great Britain amounted to no less a sum than, £1,400,000 a year. That is of course British Revenue, and in striking a true account between the two countries it should be credited to Great Britain, not to Ireland. The Home Rule Bill, however, gave it to Ireland, a direct grant of £1,400,000(102) from Great Britain to Ireland, and if that amount be subtracted from the contribution of £2 to £28, it leaves the proportion £2 to £52 instead of £2 to £23.

If we strike a balance between the contributions to be paid by Ireland to Great Britain under the Home Rule Bill, and the grants to be paid to Ireland, we shall arrive at the following result:

Contribution from Ireland to Great Britain £3,602,000 Grants from Great Britain to Ireland: Duties paid in Ireland on goods consumed in Great Britain £1,400,000 Grant toward the Constabulary £500,000 Total: £1,900,000

Net contribution from Ireland to Imperial purposes (or nearly in the proportion of 2 to 60) £1,702,000

If the Imperial contribution _actually_ paid by Ireland in 1885 be equated on like principle, the proportion stated above at 2 to 23 will be similarly reduced.

The Bill was defeated in the House of Commons, and therefore its provisions did not undergo the test of scrutiny in Committee.

The provisions of this Bill illustrate the difficulties which attend the financial severance of the Irish from the British Government. High authorities thought at the time that Mr. Gladstone, in 1886, should have proceeded in the first instance by way of Resolutions establishing the principles upon which the Bill would be subsequently founded, and there is much to be said for that view. The main principles of the measure would have been established in the first instance after free and full discussion, and the details would have been adapted later to the principles then laid down. Mr. Gladstone himself, in his reply upon the Second Reading (June 7th, 1886,) indicated a course somewhat similar in its result. He said:

“If an interval is granted us, and the circumstances of the
present session require the withdrawal of the Bill, and it is to
be re-introduced with amendment at an early date in the autumn, it
is our duty to amend the Bill with every real amendment and
improvement, and with whatever is calculated to make it more
effective and more acceptable for the attainment of its end.”

It must be remembered that there had been no sufficient time for the collection of the data on which an effective measure could be founded, and the collection of those data was a task of great difficulty, for the Departments did not possess them. The Government came into power in February, and the Bill was introduced on April 6th; thus there was no real opportunity for testing the value of the data collected in that short interval, or for gauging beforehand objections both to the principles and details of the scheme adopted, and experience proved that some of the objections were valid, though probably not insurmountable.

The scheme was based on two principles which would be especially liable to criticism:

(1) For thirty years Ireland was to contribute to Imperial charges as they then existed a fixed annual sum.

(2) The Customs and Excise duties as _collected_ in Ireland (_i.e._, not the “true” revenue) were to be credited to the Irish Government.

The first of these principles would have been closely scrutinised in Committee, but probably in the main it could have held its ground. In the first place, it reduced considerably the Imperial contribution, consisting hitherto of the balance of revenue after payment of Irish charges. As Mr. Gladstone pointed out, the amount of military expenditure, on which the proportion of 2 to 28 was calculated, was considerably reduced, and Great Britain had to pay the difference, and so far the change was favourable to Ireland. In the second place, Irish expenditure was increasing, and under the existing system the balance of Irish revenue, constituting the Irish Imperial contribution, was, as the sequel lamentably proved, diminishing, and, a result not foreseen at the time, the wasteful and unsound finance which financial partnership entailed upon Ireland ere long extinguished it. The grant of autonomy was an effective check on this continued waste, otherwise the contribution of a fixed quota would soon have reduced the Irish Government to insolvency.