Chapter VII: Conclusion (1)

Such was the outline of the state of these islands in 1822. Severe and frequent as the censures are which are passed in the foregoing pages, the writer is not conscious that they are in any instance unjust or exaggerated, or that praise has been withheld wherever it might be due. The unprejudiced, honourable, and well-informed, will, he hopes, think so, the opinion of others is indifferent to him: they will perhaps too believe, that his object has neither been to flatter nor to wound, but, if a sketch like this had originally any object, a hope that when their true state was better known these islands might be better appreciated--perhaps better governed; that a cruelly-abused class of men (the natives) might one day find their condition ameliorated; and lastly, that when this fair and rich portion of the earth shall be visited by men of science, a few general remarks on their state at any given period, however ill drawn up, might be of some use. Who indeed can but reflect with pain, that while the torch of science has blazed in the western hemisphere, from Greenland to the Antarctic, bearing with it light, and life, and hope, and blessings, few are even aware how very much it has yet to illumine in the East!

Finis

REFORMS NEEDED IN FILIPINAS

Opinion regarding the causes which antagonize the security and
progress of the Filipinas Islands

Most Excellent Sir:

The Filipinas Islands, on account of their great extent, their advantageous location in the center of the commercial world of Asia, their considerable population, and the fertility of their soil--which is capable of yielding all the products which are grown between the two tropics--require from his Majesty's paternal government a carefully planned system of measures which shall strengthen their peace and internal security, and at the same time advance their agriculture, industry, and commerce to that high degree to which they have been destined by Providence.

As I am charged by order of the king our sovereign to furnish information regarding the measures which can contribute to objects so important, it will be my plan to point out (but with that circumspection which is so necessary in matters of colonial policy and administration) the causes which today are antagonizing both the internal and external security of those islands and their successful administration--civil, economic, and commercial--proposing in regard to each one of these the correctives which have been impressed upon me by my experience as consulting attorney [asesor] and judge in all the public affairs of justice, army and navy, the government, revenues, and commerce; and my own observations under popular revolutions, changes in the system of government, and other vicissitudes and critical positions in which that colony has been seen during the long period of my residence therein.

OF THE CAUSES WHICH ANTAGONIZE THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE FILIPINAS ISLANDS, AND OF CORRECTIVES FOR THEM

Of the present composition of the divisions of the army

The army of the Filipinas Islands, in view of the class of men of whom it now consists, offers very little (if any) moral confidence for their resisting the force of the revolutions which may be formed in the very bosom of the islands. It is officered, in great part, by Spaniards of the country, and by some Americans and mestizos; and the disposition, tendencies, and education of the latter class are (with very rare exceptions) absolutely different from those of the other and European officers; consequently, there exists between the two classes, from the outset, a certain insuperable disunion of feeling, between not only individuals but the two classes. The officer who is a native of the country has all the lax characteristics which the climate induces. He lives in exclusive intercourse with his neighbors, and separated from the Europeans. He likes the military career solely for the conveniences connected with his office; he is incapable of a noble emulation, and limits himself in the service to the outside and very inexact fulfilment of the necessary obligations of his position; and when the cause of the legitimate government exacts on his part sacrifices incompatible with his own interests or those of his neighbors, he disowns and absolutely abandons his duties. For these reasons the officers born in that country have never come to merit the confidence of their chiefs; and if from the rank of cadets they have been promoted to that of captain, it has been more from the peremptory necessity of completing the military corps and protecting the service than on account of their fitness, military spirit, or appreciation of the confidence and honor which the king bestows on them. Such sentiments they can never possess until they undergo a rigid training moral and political, in the colleges of España. This mental divergence, and the natural contrariety of their temperaments, so mischievous in the ordinary service of military bodies, are much more lamentable in the crisis of a revolution. The officers of the country, being nearer to the Indian soldiers in their customs and language, make common cause with the latter, and seduce and lead them into their own faction, with a marvelous readiness; this I have repeatedly seen in the mutinies of military bodies which have occurred in the Americas, and especially in that of the troops in the kingdom of Guadalajara in the year '21, and in that at Manila in the year '23.

The army of Filipinas also contains a considerable number of Indian sergeants and corporals, and this is another of the causes from which have already arisen, and always will arise, seditions in the corps. Whoever has observed the natural disposition of the Filipino Indian will recognize two things: First, that he always imitates and obeys only that which is directly commanded, explained, and taught to him; and, second, that while he is kept in his simple condition of laborer, artisan, or soldier he is entirely void of ambition. The Indian soldier serves very contentedly during the eight years of his term, and returns to his own land without aspiring to anything; but when he is placed in command, of any degree whatever, he is filled with pride, and vehemently desires to be at the head [serlo todo], without changing, for all that, his station as an Indian. [The writer states that even these non-commissioned officers were formerly always Spaniards; [141]] the appointment of Indians to these posts has been only in these last years, in which a system of commerce which entirely separated those islands from their center of government has rendered impossible the despatch of reënforcements, so necessary to those islands. From that very time may be noted much laxity in the military service and discipline; and I have witnessed the insurrections and disorders which never were known in former days. In the popular uprisings in the suburbs of Manila, at the end of 1820, [142] the detachments commanded by Indian corporals who were sent out to pacify the villages took such part in the lawlessness that they even attacked houses, and it was by their gunshots that many foreigners were butchered. In the military insurrection of June 3, 1823, parties of troops commanded by only one officer (a Philippine Spaniard), without any previous plan or any combination, and simply by appearing before the barracks of their regiment and offering to make captains of the Indian sergeants, immediately persuaded them to revolt; and, directing the soldiers at their own pleasure, they committed the lamentable and horrible acts of that day, which ought to be kept well in mind. [This should be a warning against allowing the Indians any place of command, especially as they have more influence with the common soldiers than do the superior officers; and all military posts of command should be filled with competent and trained Spaniards. The writer urges the following measures of reform: (1) that a sufficient number of Spanish officers to fill all the posts of sergeant and corporal, and a surplus number to fill vacancies as they occur, shall be sent to Filipinas annually; (2) the class of cadets should be suppressed, who "have always been (with a few exceptions) very unsatisfactory officers; for, belonging to very poor and obscure families, and receiving no kind of education, in a country which so depraves and corrupts a youth, they demoralize the soldiers, and cause the military career to be held there in slight esteem;" (3) in future, no other officers except the heads of corps should be sent there from the Peninsula, so as to make room for promoting the lower officers, and to avoid demoralizing the young Spaniards; (4) that the Indian and mestizo sergeants or corporals who, after fulfilling their twelve years of all service, have to be replaced by Spaniards, shall be given places in the custom-house or revenue service, or in the monopoly shops, so as to recompense them for losing their posts.] In this manner the Indian soldier--who is docile, and always imitates the desires and opinions of his immediate superiors--will receive more disinterested treatment than he has hitherto had; he will make common cause with his leaders, in critical cases of popular revolutions; and the army will remain loyal and incorrupt in its opinions, always ready for its duty, and united in action and interests.

Of the enlargement of the army of the islands

The colonies are governed and maintained more by opinion, justice and example than by force of arms. When opinion in them becomes corrupted up to the point of forming great conspiracies, the offensive action of the army produces no other effect than to hasten the ruin of the legitimate government. [In the Filipinas Islands, the persuasions and example of the ministers of religion, and the measures taken by the civil authorities, have been usually sufficient to put down an uprising; but it is not well to rely too much on military force in such cases, since such action causes rankling resentment and unites the discontented in the common effort to throw off the yoke. It is impossible, in such a climate, to employ only Spaniards in the army, since they cannot endure it, and the expense of such an army would also be too great a burden on the royal treasury.] The army of Filipinas, then, ought not to have a greater force than is sufficient to defend and maintain, in any event, a post or locality that is impregnable, which can serve as a protection and defense to the government, its interests and employees, and the families of Spanish blood. A center of strength, ordered and disciplined, of this sort (the locality of which I will mention later), will be inaccessible not only to three millions of inhabitants who now people the islands, but to thirty millions who might inhabit them; and this idea alone in the mind of the Filipino Indian is the most efficacious for disconcerting, in its origin or progress, any plan for conspiring or taking by surprise. [In such a point of vantage, the government can use measures of policy,] which in revolutions are more effective than arms for reëstablishing order, without leaving in the minds of the people, as war does, deep feelings of resentment at being repressed; and the partial revolutions in the provinces will be always broken--as thus far have been those of Ilocos, Cebú, Bataan, and others--by the zeal and sagacity of the European religious and coöperation of the civil employees of the king. In such a crisis, the principle is, to disunite sagaciously the opinions and feelings of the people; and repression by force only unites them. [If the military forces, the forts, and the navy be augmented, the only results will be to demoralize the army, make unnecessary display of the government's power, teach the Indians the art of war (which as few of them as possible ought to know), and impose unendurable burdens on the treasury. Plans of this sort ought to be postponed until the country can bear such burdens. The present permanent veteran force of the islands seems to Bernaldez sufficient for the above purpose;] it consists of four battalions of infantry, each containing approximately one thousand men; of a cavalry corps, recently increased to three squadrons; and a brigade of artillery, with a force of four hundred forty-four men, including a light-armed company. The following may also be regarded as permanent troops: a company, called the Pampanga, annexed to the service of the engineer corps; and three brigades called the "pirate marines" [marina corsaria], who have been in service twenty years. [The system of rewards is costly and useless. The soldier receives enough pay to live comfortably, in a country where living is so cheap; "it is equivalent for an Indian, and even for a Spaniard, to three times the same amount in Europa." The rewards given to the soldiers ought to be reduced in such measure as the circumstances of the colony demand, "taking for a basis the fact that with four hard dollars a month any inferior employee can maintain himself and all his family comfortably in the provinces, and that all beyond that is extravagance." The Pampanga company has no organization; it ought to be placed on a military basis, with European officers, and ranked as a company of pioneers, when it would be very useful in the service. The militia troops of the islands have been neglected, although they are (especially the pirate marines) so important in checking the Moro pirates. The commanders are "men of no force, arbitrarily chosen by the governor there, from the class of merchants and private citizens of Manila, who possess only honorary titles, without any military instruction or love for the military career." The militia forces do not cost the government much, but they are of very little use. Bernaldez thinks that the pirate marines ought to be regarded as a part of the regular army, with the same pay, and with European officers. The cavalry corps of Luzon is untrained, and would be of little use in an invasion of the country; it ought to be replaced by light and irregular cavalry, and supplemented by a small body of veterans. Two squadrons in the corps of dragoons of Luzon would be sufficient to preserve order in Manila, and the third ought to be abolished as unnecessary.]

Of the artillery and its dependent branches

[The artillery corps is in better condition than any other part of the military force of the islands; it is under better discipline, and has always been under European officers. The Indians are in great terror of the cannon. When in the tumult of 1820 Folgueras ordered three pieces to be planted at various points outside the walls, the natives implored him to take the cannon away, as the inhabitants were so terrified that they did not dare to cross the streets; and in the disturbances of 1809 in Ilocos, "only one four-libra cannon, fired by a revenue-clerk, the ball from which hit a church-tower, was sufficient to curb and disconcert more than 10,000 insurgents." To this corps might be added (but as footmen) the company which should be disbanded in the cavalry, since in so rough and broken a country as Luzon horsemen are of little use. The artillery in Manila is of wretched quality: almost all of it was cast there, at various periods, and by unskilled founders; not only the guns but their carriages are irregular, clumsy, unreliable, and are difficult to manage; and for these very reasons the foundry there has been abolished, but since that time no cannon save a small siege battery has been sent thither from Europe. The artillery cast in Manila is sufficiently good to provide for the defense of the provinces against the Moros; but measures should be taken to provide for the better defense of that city. The working of iron and the making of artillery are almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese of Manila, [143] and the Indians therefore are unskilled in this industry; some skilled masters should be sent over from Spain to teach them and oversee the manufacture of iron. The country abounds in rich mines of iron, but these have been barely scratched and then abandoned; only some common utensils are made there, and other iron articles are sold to the people at high prices by foreigners, who carry great sums of money out of the country. "The iron of Manila has been examined in the artillery workshops, and has been found to be very soft and fibrous." Attempts have been made by the Spanish government to utilize the mines and introduce machinery into their operation; but the officials entrusted with these enterprises have been ineffective, caring only to draw their salaries. Bernaldez urges the encouragement of private capital to undertake these works, with concessions, privileges, and protection which shall be adequate to enlist their energies; this would lead to the development of the natural riches of the islands, the population would be increased by skilled artisans and mechanics, and the great increase thus obtained in wealth of the country would likewise bring incalculable benefits to the royal treasury--not only in revenues from the increased commerce and manufactures, but in the great saving in the expenses of furnishing the army with weapons, made in the country at so much less cost than before. In the arsenal reform is needed; all its workmen except the gunsmiths should be replaced gradually by Indians, who are so skilful and work for less wages than the Spaniards; and the gunsmiths should have a regular military organization. Better provision should also be made for a supply of gunpowder. At the beginning of the century, a powder factory was erected, which cost eighty thousand hard dollars, although it was made of only bamboo and nipa; with this a large supply of powder was made, but its quality was poor, on account of the impurities in the saltpetre, which they had to obtain from India. There has been talk of building another factory (the former one being apparently no longer in existence); it is likely to be as costly an enterprise, because the lack of a strong current in the rivers "has rendered impracticable the installation of hydraulic machinery." The Spanish government ought to take measures to provide the large amount of powder needed for the use of the forts, army, navy, and revenue service. Bernaldez advises that this be done by making contracts (with either Spaniards or foreigners), by which they can secure powder of better quality and at lower prices; and besides this they ought to send immediately to the islands a scientist (whose salary ought to be paid from the funds of the Economic Society and the consulate of commerce)--"whose mission shall be not only to establish in the capital a chair of mineralogy (which is so necessary for exploring the hitherto unknown interior of the islands), but himself to make researches in the provinces of the archipelago for places where the saltpetre can be found--which he will find, without fail." Then gunpowder can be made in the islands, and they will be independent in the means for their defense.]

Of the forts of Manila and Cavite

No location like that of Manila could have been selected by the conquistadors of the island of Luzon for fortifying themselves and founding the capital of an infant colony. [Its position is described, with mention of its earlier fortifications; but these were only suitable for the defense of its inhabitants against piratical attacks. Its present condition is a dangerous one, for its fortifications are unable to withstand a siege by European troops; it has no bomb-proof magazine, and hostile batteries across the Pasig River could easily reduce the city to ashes. Manila is not suitable for a military center, and the efforts of the government ought to be bent toward the fortification of Cavite, which would render that place a first-class fortress; its advantages for this are enumerated in detail, and the measures which should be taken to render it impregnable.] The feeble fortifications of Manila and its citadel may be preserved for the present, in order to shelter the government and the property of the Spaniards from a sedition; but in case of war and the landing of an enemy let them be abandoned and destroyed, in order to proceed for safety to the impregnable point of Cavite. In this manner will be laid the foundation for the perpetual security of the [Spanish] government in those islands, and for their preservation against all enemies, whether within or without.

Of the piracies of the Moros

Longer tolerance of the piratical raids by the Moros is another cause which in time must compromise our secure possession of the islands, through the plundering of their maritime villages and the captivity of their inhabitants, and the stoppage of the commerce and the coasting trade. Much more is this true because some ports of the islands, which are in the possession of those pirates, are already frequented by foreign vessels, which provide the pirates with military supplies and firearms; and it is to be feared that later the foreigners will furnish them with plans, vessels, leaders, and other aids, like those which they have furnished to the disaffected peoples in the Americas, to wage steady war on the Spanish government. [The Spanish colony has carried on defensive warfare with the Moros ever since the conquest, but has gained no permanent advantage therein, while the enemy have increased in numbers and strength, inflicting ravages on the southern provinces that are "continually greater and more scandalous." The Spaniards have spent enormous sums in forts, vessels, and other defenses; but with little effect, on account of the immense extent of the coasts of Filipinas and the great number of uninhabited places where the pirates can hide themselves from pursuit.] Their vessels, called pancos, are of extraordinary swiftness. The Moros make these of planks lashed together with rattans, without nails or any [other] ligature. Their masts are three bamboos, their rigging a few pieces of rattan or the bark of trees, their sails are certain petates, or mats, which they call saguran; and their provisions are reduced to the flour made from a tree, called yoro [i.e., sago] and dried shellfish. Nearly all their pancos have two banks of oars, and two men for each oar. And with this slight though warlike equipment, with their harpoons, javelins, campilans, and arrows (in handling which weapons they are very dextrous), and with their swarming crews--composed of their slaves, who row under the lash; and of a multitude of pirates, who thus make their living, and traffic in their booty--they attack, among many, with the odds on their side, surround, and jump aboard, any Christian vessel which cannot defend itself on account of a small crew or the inaccurate firing of its cannon. [If they are caught in some bay by the Spanish who pursue them, they abandon their pancos, hide in the mountains, where they find enough to live on, and, as soon as the Spaniards depart, the pirates easily construct new boats and resume their raids. The pirate marine with the forts, troops, and cannon supported by the Spaniards make a heavy burden of expense on the treasury and on the people; and the amount thus spent in half a dozen years is enough to equip a strong naval expedition which could humble the insolence of the pirates. In view of this, and of the importance of Joló--which is the headquarters of the Moro pirates and of their government, and the general market for the Christian slaves and property which they carry away--Bernaldez advocates the immediate conquest of that island, and its repopulation from the more thickly settled parts of the northern islands. This can easily be done. Thousands of families whose members have been enslaved, especially in Bohol, are ready to join such an expedition, if leaders and provisions are supplied to them; and there are a multitude of skilled inter-island pilots--mestizos who are efficient and rich--who would act as leaders for the sake of their own profit and reward in such an enterprise. For ships they could use the government armed vessels, and the multitude of boats which ply among the islands; and sufficient rewards could be furnished to the soldiers in the distribution of the conquered lands and of the plunder which they would obtain. By this plan, the Moro piracies could be suppressed, and the islands thus gain peace from those fierce enemies.]

Of the large Indian villages

Although the laws of the Indias endeavor to establish firmly the peace and good government, both temporal and spiritual, of the villages by placing limits to their extent and the number of their residents, the inattention of the governors of Filipinas in regard to this so important subject, on the one hand, and on the other the interested motives of the parish curas and the ministers of the doctrinas, have given rise to the abuse of the villages of excessive size which are now found established in Filipinas. These, as they cannot be properly governed by their respective local authorities, maintain within themselves a source of internal civil discord, and from time to time they have broken out in disturbances which have placed the islands in a very critical situation.

If the reports of their population be examined, it will be found that in a great number of villages it does not fall below 10,000, 11,000, or 12,000 souls; and it is impossible that so many can be well directed spiritually by the one parish cura alone which each village has, or in secular matters by only one gobernadorcillo or alcalde. In this class of towns the most notable are the following: Tondo, with 13,424 souls; Binondoc, 22,570; Tambobo, 21,378; Pasig, 14,465; Malolos, 19,655; Vigan, 17,320; Pavay, 14,840; Lavag [Laoag], 25,242; Bacarra, 13,064; Balayan, 18,631; Taal, 23,526; Banan, 17,438; Batangas, 19,566; Cabatuan, 17,359; Xaro, 14,911. In these populations which do not conform to the rule there has always been recognized more or less instability, for the class of the plebeians, or caylianes, is immense, and out of proportion to that of the timauas, or nobles; and likewise because the unarmed authority of a gobernadorcillo must necessarily be vacillating, at the mercy of that great mass of people, who are easily set in motion by a seditious person, a few drunkards, or the superstitious tale of some old man.

The successive revolts of various towns in the province of Ilocos in the years 1810, 1812, and 1816 had no other source. The cause of this last uprising was decided by me, in my official character as fiscal of the royal Audiencia of Manila. In my reply I explained the origin of those repeated insurrections, analyzed the degree of perverseness which progressively in each of them had been revealed in the purpose of the conspirators, and deduced the necessity of dividing the province of Ilocos into two, to the end that its large towns should each have a ruler closer at hand who might keep them in check. The Audiencia made a report, with my opinion as fiscal thereon to the king our sovereign; and, his Majesty having deigned to command that immediately the said province should be divided into two, it has been maintained on that footing, up to the present time, in the greatest order and tranquillity.

[Even more surprising is the neglect of the governors to enforce the law that no houses shall be erected close to the castles and fortresses.] Within cannon-shot of the walls of Manila, and even no farther away than the breadth of the river, one hundred thousand souls--Indians, mestizos, and Chinese--have been allowed to establish themselves; a people of foreign origin, in great part, without passports, classification, settled occupation, or any other requisite of a well-ordered social condition, and whose formidable number is threatening Manila with an inevitable blow. The sudden movements of that great mob of people, ignorant and swayed by blind passion, reached the point of approaching close to the defenses of the city, in the year of 1820, even before this was known to the government and the military council (which for this object had been called together, and of which I was a member)--notwithstanding that the object of their revenge was in the outer suburbs, and that their aim was not, at least for the time, directed against the city. [These facts ought to make the authorities of the colony realize that no other considerations ought to interfere with their prime obligation, which is to preserve peace and order in the towns and maintain the military posts in security. Bernaldez recommends that new regulations be formed regarding the settlements of the islands; that no town be allowed to contain over five thousand souls and one thousand houses (except the capitals of the provinces, which might have ten thousand souls and two thousand houses); that the large towns be divided into villages on the above basis, which should be kept separate from one another; and that in the suburbs of Manila there should be more rigorous police control of the people. The Indians there should be classified by occupations, to each being appointed a chief or leader who should be responsible for the conduct of those in his class; the use of all dangerous weapons should be forbidden; passports should be required for all persons coming from the provinces; and vigilant watch should be kept over the occupations and mode of life of every family.]

Of the titles to landed property belonging to the Indians and the villages

The lack of clear and exact laws for properly authenticating the documents regarding the ownership of the lands of the Indians, and the uncertain and unlimited possession which the villages have of lands under the pretext, of their being communal, have been and always will be in Filipinas the origin of a multitude of ruinous lawsuits and contentions--sometimes those of Indians and villages among themselves, sometimes between these and the Spanish and mestizo proprietors. The Indians, as a rule, have no title of ownership in the lands which they possess, and if any one has such it is a private document, signed by other Indians--who with the greatest readiness deny, change, and forge their signatures--or it will be simply a writing signed by the alcalde-mayor, a copy of which, if it remains in the court, will disappear or be mutilated, with equal readiness, by the Indian clerks of the alcalde, in whose charge the archives are--if indeed these are not entirely destroyed in the frequent fires which occur in the villages. The most common method which the Indians of the villages have for proving their territorial property is by tradition, and the depositions of witnesses; and with that powerful weapon they undertake and maintain the most contentious lawsuits, aided by the fiscals of the Audiencia--who often forget that their office of defenders of the Indians is bona fide, and for the sake and protection of the natives in the tribunals to which the laws commend them. But any person who may have exercised the duties of magistrate for any time in Filipinas will know that in the decisions of judges there is nothing more discredited than the evidence presented by Indian and mestizo witnesses, who are not restrained from perjury by either an intimate acquaintance with the obligations of religion or by sentiments of conscience, honor, and reputation. It is very common to see, in court cases, that witnesses of that sort will swear, and then contradict their own testimony, according as the witnesses [are affected by] either their own interests or the influence of the litigant who presents them.

These causes, besides rendering the lawsuits of this kind eternal, have very frequently produced scandalous disobedience of the villagers to the enactments of the Audiencia of the islands, and uprisings of armed men in order to prevent effectually even the judicial possession of the crown lands which had been sold, with all the formalities of the laws, by the government there; and, finally, they withhold the Spanish families and persons of wealth from purchasing rural establishments in order to undertake on a large scale the cultivation of the products of the country, which is perhaps the only means of promoting the agriculture of the islands.

It is therefore expedient, in order to cut short these noisy controversies, which have so mischievous consequences for the internal peace of the communities in the islands, that his Majesty be pleased to command that the government there shall oblige all the villages and private land-owners in them to have authenticated before the respective alcaldes-mayor of the provinces the documents for their ownership, both private and communal. Strict obligation should be imposed on them to surround their lands with trees--achiote, [144] mulberry, cotton, cinnamon, cacao--under penalty of losing their title to the land. The documents should be registered in the tribunals of the respective alcaldes, who at the end of every year should send to the capital the original books of record, in order that these may be kept there securely in the archives, for which provision shall be made by the government, not admitting in the courts or declaring lawful any other titles of ownership to lands than those which are supported by those necessary conditions.

Of the ecclesiastical orders which are conferred on Indians and mestizos

The irregular procedure of the reverend archbishops and bishops of the islands in conferring ecclesiastical orders on the Indians and mestizos there, will be in that colony, as it has already been in America, one of the causes which most incite revolutions. The Indians receive through the priesthood a standing which they cannot worthily sustain, because they never lay aside the affections, passions, and usages of Indians. Educated by the religious, they afterward come to be their decided enemies; they divide with the religious the opinions of the villagers, who finally, even though they know the deficient morals of the native priests, always respect the sacred functions which these exercise. The least political evil which the latter occasion is [through] their neglect of their obligations as parish priests, the irregularity of their mode of life, and their carelessness in everything pertaining to divine worship. The inhabitants of the villages administered by Indian curas are very different from those of the religious from Europa, whose people are distinguished by their simplicity, docility, and religious training. He who knows the active and leading part played by this class of persons in accomplishing the independence of America will not be surprised that in the establishment of the constitution in Filipinas Indian curas have almost all been the directors of the elections in their villages, the electors, and the deputies in Cortes and for the province--in all these functions distinguishing themselves by their officiousness, and their pretensions against the legitimate government of the islands.

This class of persons, dominating the consciences of the ignorant and unfortunate, can easily drag them into error. As simple farmers and artisans, they would have been useful to their families and to the government; but mistakenly raised to the dignity of priests, other interests now move them, and they form a commonwealth apart in the safe retreat of the provinces. A consideration of justice wrongly understood by the prelates of the islands, and a vehement desire in the Indian or mestizo heads of families to ennoble these by placing their sons in the priesthood, have caused there an excessive ordination of Indians--which I cannot avoid characterizing as such, since, besides the many clerics who are actually administering villages, there is a considerable surplus of others who are scattered through the provinces. These evils were foreseen in the laws of the Indias (ley iv, tit. vii, lib. i), which cautions and exhorts the reverend prelates of the Indias not to ordain so many clerics as they were doing; but this has not sufficed, and it is necessary that the government, recognizing the unfortunate experience that it has already had with this abuse, should take the most efficacious measures for the purpose of limiting the authority of the prelates in Filipinas, in conferring ecclesiastical orders on Indians and mestizos, strictly to the number of clerics which the religious orders of those islands agree upon and propose as necessary to have for their coadjutors, and for Indian villages not now occupied, or which in the future the religious shall fail to occupy--ordering the governor of Filipinas to secure, by mild and discreet means, that the vacant curacies of clerics be conferred on European religious.

Of the European religious in Filipinas

The lack of European religious in the Filipinas Islands for filling at least four-fifths of their curacies is incompatible with the permanent preservation of that colony. It can be safely asserted that the government of his Majesty has in this class of ministers the most powerful force for maintaining that possession in attachment to his sovereignty. Their virtuous and unworldly mode of life; their absolute disinterestedness in regard to temporal matters, which is a marvelous contrast to the greed and ambition of the European trader, the mestizo, and the Chinese; their extraordinary sacrifices in living apart from the society of their equals for nineteen, twenty, and [even] thirty years in those almost uninhabited islands, which are unprovided with the sort of nourishment suitable to their estate; their discretion and patience in correcting and teaching the Indians; their resignation in all kinds of adversity: everything, in short, contributes to make the inhabitants of that land regard them as supernatural beings, and in the light of this conception the fathers exercise over the Indians a moral force more powerful than even that of the government. The Indians live in entire moral separation from the Spaniards; they have their own laws of tradition, their own opinions and customs, entirely unknown to any one who is ignorant of their language or has not continual intercourse with them. The European religious are the only persons in the confidence of the government who by favor of these circumstances, and with a practical and intimate knowledge of the nature and inclinations of the natives there, can find a way into their hearts, incline their wills to what is right, enlighten them, and keep them peaceful and submissive; and without this larger armies would be of no avail.

[The religious are the only persons who understand the condition of their respective villages, and the alcaldes-mayor are usually indolent and inefficient, relying on native interpreters, and caring little for aught save their own profit; they depend on the religious in all cases of difficulty, and the higher authorities are jealous of this superiority of the religious. The government ought to maintain as many religious as possible in the islands, and give them as much political authority as is consistent with their ministry; five hundred of them should be sent there, and the alcaldes-mayor should be obliged to consult every month with their respective curas on the best means of promoting the interests of the people, and the central government can then act on reports of these conferences.]

On the settlement of banished and vagabond foreigners in the islands

[The entrance of these persons causes trouble among the people of the islands: the Indians are easily influenced by white men, especially those who teach them to live in more freedom and insubordination to authority; foreigners of this sort are almost always of lax morals and dangerous political opinions, which are even more dangerous to "the Spaniards of the country, who, although more enlightened than the Indians, are more susceptible to such corruption." The foreigner thus residing in the islands, "usually from the dregs of other nations," makes light of all the institutions there, and tries to set the people against the mother country; and three times recently has occurred] the scandal, unheard-of in that colony, of foreigners who, abusing the innocence of the country, have, being already married in their own country, again married Philippine Spanish girls, leaving them abandoned and dishonored. Others, who feigned to be learned physicians and agriculturists, have deceived and defrauded proprietors in the islands. Others have clandestinely introduced impious, revolutionary, and obscene books printed in the Spanish language, but pirated in France, with which they have caused atrocious injury in the morals of families there. In fine, the settlement of foreigners in the islands would not be expedient, even for the sake of the advantages which their industry and arts would produce there; for works carried on always with foreign capital, on the account of foreigners, and by the agency of foreigners, would leave to the country very little benefit as compared to that from labor employed there by Spanish capital, and on the account and for the benefit of Spaniards. If we desire to preserve intact in Filipinas the religious ideas and the pure morals of our ancestors, and due submission to the government of his Majesty, it is necessary to keep the people away from every point of contact with foreigners. In China, Japan, and other nations, the revolutionary spirit has not been able to penetrate, because the laws of those kingdoms keep the gates closed to all strangers. In a colony still in its infancy in customs and enlightenment--which, like a school of education, needs to have for models men of sound morals--it has been very absurd to allow to remain and become citizens therein men who have served a term of exile, and polisones [145] or vagabonds, sometimes followed by officers of justice from the Peninsula; and that the Indian people should see (as so many times I have seen) that this sort of men succeeded in obtaining positions as corporals, revenue officials, and even militia captains, solely from the circumstance of their being white men. It is necessary always to remove from the colonies this sort of people, who on account of their principles and their inclinations must be enemies of order and of government, permitting therein the settlement only of respectable Spanish artisans and merchants, whose upright conduct may serve as an example to that neophyte people, while at the same time they make fortunes for themselves. But even this point needs careful study, and in regard to it I will present the following reflections.

Of the residence of European Spaniards in Filipinas

By a necessary and inevitable effect of certain causes, physical and moral, which would take too long to explain here, the Spanish race in the colonies--or the descendants of Europeans, and mestizos of these, born and reared there--have from their birth political sentiments which are entirely opposite to those of their ancestors and other Europeans. They regard the Indian as an entirely passive being, the European as a foreigner, and the land as exclusively their own. The educational institutions which thus far have been founded in the colonies, with the object of uniting their inhabitants, by means of enlightening them, under the same principles of religion, morals, and politics, have not been able to uproot those ideas; on the other hand, recent events in the Americas have proved that the men who had most education and acquaintance with the sciences were the party leaders [corifeos] of revolution and independence. It ought to be regarded as an incontestable truth that as soon as the Spanish race in Filipinas reaches a greater number than that of the Europeans, and with this increase acquires a certain degree of moral force, a war for independence will be declared; and according to this idea the educational institutions, when there is not sincerity in the minds of the persons and in the laws that aim at encouraging this class of population in the colonies, have a tendency hostile to the preservation of the royal government in them. This class of Spanish families is, for another reason, very unfortunate in Filipinas, and may be regarded as condemned to perpetual slothfulness and misery. They cannot devote themselves to agriculture, because in that burning climate only the Indian resists labor so hard; nor to handicrafts, because the wages which the Indian and the Sangley mestizo alike earn, which is sufficient to meet their simple needs, is insufficient to pay for another sort of food and clothing for the Spaniards. For these same reasons, they cannot occupy themselves in the coasting trade; nor, finally, in the commerce of the islands on a large scale, for lack of sufficient capital, since by inheritance is divided among all the sons the wealth which their European parents left to them; and the practice of law is there a career to which resort is very unfortunate. All these causes, added to the lassitude which the climate inspires, maintain that class of people in such a condition of idleness and poverty, especially the women, that it has been necessary to establish in the capital alone six seminaries and beaterios in which to shelter and educate Spanish girls; and that in the ordinance regarding the Acapulco galleon his Majesty should grant to the Spanish widows of merchants the special favor of a pension or widow's usufruct on the boletas of that vessel, their only means of making a living.

[Bernaldez declares that these European Spaniards, "there abandoned, as it were, to the mercy of charity, or to vices," are not only useless but dangerous to the country; that among them revolutions are born; that it is for the best interests of España to retain her population at home, and, while furnishing means for Spaniards to enrich themselves in the colonies or their trade, to attract to the mother country all possible wealth and capital, not allowing her children to remain abroad after acquiring wealth; and, finally, "to remove from the colonies all cause of insurrection, than which there is none greater and more terrible than the propagation [therein] of the Spanish race." Moreover, the Europeans settled in the colonies "have too much influence, through their exclusive wealth and connections, for weakening governmental action there; and care nothing for any political changes except as they can find therein opportunity for speculations" (on which he instances the action of European Spaniards in Mexico in Iturbide's short reign, and in other events of the revolution there). "The Filipinas Islands need, to maintain them in tranquillity, nothing more than a stable system of administration, civil and spiritual, by means of religious, and an army trained and commanded by competent European leaders, officers, sergeants, and corporals, with the necessary number of civil officials." The creole inhabitants should be diminished as much as possible, all Spaniards being required to return with their families to their own country; and "aid given to destitute widows and orphans of Spaniards who die in Filipinas would be better employed in paying for their removal to Europa." This matter should be considered in the residencia of every governor. Convicts and exiles should no longer be sent to the islands. No foreigner should be allowed to marry there except on condition of leaving the country with his wife. No European adventurer or idler should be allowed to remain in the islands unless he proffer sufficient security for his good conduct and occupation; he may then remain not longer than ten years; otherwise, he should be at once sent back whence he came. Every ship should carry back to España as many Spaniards as it brought to the islands; and European Spaniards should not be allowed to remain in Filipinas more than ten years, after which they should be compelled to return with their families to España.]

Of the residencias

[It is highly desirable that public officials should undergo strict residencia, and that regulations be made for these, which are adapted to the special needs of Filipinas. This is especially true of the alcaldes-mayor, who, as they have permission to trade, are more tempted to evade or infringe the laws; and many persons are appointed to that office who "lack all the qualifications necessary for obtaining any public office whatever." Unfortunately, since the royal decree of August 24, 1799, no alcalde has been or can be subject to residencia, and they consequently enjoy absolute impunity in their transgressions; for that decree does not allow a sufficient time for complaints to be made in a country like Filipinas, where intercourse between the provinces and the capital is so uncertain, interrupted, and difficult, on account of the vicissitudes of weather and climate, the lack of roads and postal facilities, and the great distance of many provinces from Manila. "This impunity has most serious results, very detrimental to the peace and quiet of the islands; for such has been the class of persons whom necessity has compelled to appoint as alcaldes-mayor that not only have they used their authority to possess themselves of the property of the Indians--seizing the boats of traders, which injured the natives in their traffic--and defrauded the Indians with unjust exactions; but they have humiliated the religious, stolen moneys from the king, outraged young girls, burned houses, and, in short, have thrown the provinces into a condition of effervescence and of conspiracy against the government which sent to the natives such a ruler." Bernaldez urges the government to take such measures that the residencia of the alcaldes may be made effective and just.]

Of the selection of all classes of employees for the Filipinas Islands

[On this point, the writer urges greater care and more sense of responsibility. All government officials, of every grade, should be of good morals, old enough to have stability of character, sufficiently competent and experienced to understand their duties, and such as will set a good example to the natives.] The imprudence of one man alone has often been sufficient to incite a sedition in the minds of various parties or castes in those islands; and in any case it is very dangerous to entrust positions of command to persons who are not endowed with well-proved ability and discretion. I cannot attribute the laxity which in recent times is evident in all branches of the administration and government of those islands to any other cause than the injudicious selection of many of their employees. The military corps, whose former captains and subalterns had been mainly sergeants sent from the Peninsula, were kept in the best order and discipline until, in the year '23, those officers were added to them who accompanied General Martinez--of some of whom, according to the documents which were executed for my court, their appointment to the Indias, with their scandalous conduct, looks like a proof that in España there was neither religion, morality, nor subordination. [Bernaldez urges that certain qualifications be required for office in Filipinas; the governors should be members of learned bodies, and excel in discretion and ability, and in the art of governing, and of promoting the welfare of a country, rather than in the military art. The intendants should be "enlightened economists, capable of creating and promoting the great wealth of which that virgin country is capable." The officials of the Audiencia should be at least thirty-five years old, with ten years of service, and experienced in legal practice; and other employees should be trustworthy, experienced, and not mere youths. "The Filipinas Islands, like every colony, are the country of the corruption of youth, and where it is necessary to work with men whose characters are already formed."]

Of the use of weapons in Filipinas

[The writer protests against the carelessness which, contrary to the laws of the Indias, has allowed the natives to possess and carry weapons--even including campilans and sabers, pistols and guns. These arms have, through culpable negligence of the government officials, been imported in the foreign ships and sold publicly; and, possessing them, the natives are a constant source of danger to the whites. He recommends that the governor of Filipinas be commanded to disarm the natives, using mild and politic methods, and allow them no implements or tools save those required in their labor; to stop the importation of arms into the islands; to compel all coasting vessels to deposit with the authorities, during their stay in the harbor, the arms which they carry for defense against the pirates; to see that no weapons be allowed in the villages save those needed by the local guards; and to stop all clandestine manufacture and sale of gunpowder.]

Of the despatch of assistance to the Filipinas Islands

[This section is devoted to the evils resulting from the remoteness of the islands, and the neglect of providing them with facilities for communication with España; it is necessary, if the government desires to keep the islands; to remedy this deficiency at once, for their material prosperity, the administration of justice, their safety from enemies, their loyalty to the crown--all are at great risk under present conditions. "The establishment of postal service in vessels of the royal armada would be a most burdensome expense to the treasury of España and to that of Filipinas. Unfortunately, previous to the royal decree of 1820 in regard to the commerce of Filipinas, in the long period of forty years only twenty trading ships have gone to those islands, leaving them without assistance or communication during the long space of three, four, five, or [even] seven years." However, this can be remedied, and without expense, by suitable measures for the promotion of commerce between the islands and España, "an attempt at which has been made in these last six years, during which time more expeditions direct to Filipinas have been effected than in the preceding forty years--that is, sixteen from Cadiz, three from Santander, Coruña, and San Sebastian, and five whose return is now expected."]

OF THE CAUSES WHICH OPERATE IN THE BACKWARD CONDITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION, BOTH CIVIL AND ECONOMIC, OF THE FILIPINAS ISLANDS; AND THEIR CORRECTIVE

[Of the failure of governors and intendants to make reports]