Chapter XXIII (2)

Your No. 229 of the 9th ultimo, inclosing printed copies of
a report from the _Straits Times_ of the same day ... with a
view to its communication to the Press, has been received and
considered. By Department's telegram of the 17th of June you were
instructed to avoid unauthorized negotiations with the Philippine
insurgents. The reasons for this instruction were conveyed to you
in my No. 78 of the 16th of June, by which the President's views
on the subject of your relations with General Aguinaldo were
fully expressed. The extract now communicated by you from the
_Straits Times_ of the 9th of June, has occasioned a feeling of
disquietude and a doubt as to whether some of your acts may not
have borne a significance and produced an impression which this
Government would be compelled to regret. The address presented
to you by the 25 or 30 Filipinos who gathered about the consulate
discloses an understanding on their part that the object of Admiral
Dewey was to support the cause of General Aguinaldo, and that the
ultimate object of our action is to secure the independence of
the Philippines "under the protection of the United States." Your
address does not repel this implication, and it moreover represents
that General Aguinaldo was "sought out by you," whereas it had
been the understanding of the Department that you received him
only upon the request of a British subject ... who formerly lived
in the Philippines. Your further reference to General Aguinaldo
as "the man for the occasion" and to your "bringing about" the
"arrangement" between "General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which
has resulted so happily" also represents the matter in a light
which causes apprehension lest your action may have laid the
ground of future misunderstandings and complications. For these
reasons the Department has not caused the article to be given to
the Press, lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to views,
the expression of which it had not authorized.

Respectfully yours,

_William R. Day_.

During the first few weeks following the Cavite naval battle nothing remarkable occurred between the belligerents. The British Consul and Vice-Consul were indefatigable in the services they rendered as intermediaries between Admiral Dewey and General Augusti. The American fleet was well supplied with coal from British vessels. The Manila-Dagupan Railway was in working order, and bringing supplies into the city. The Spanish authorities issued a decree regulating the price of meat and other commodities. American vessels made occasional trips outside the Bay, and brought in captive sailing-vessels. Neutral passenger-steamers were allowed to take away refugees other than Spanish subjects. The rebels outside Manila were very active in the work of burning and pillaging churches and other property. Streams of smoke were daily seen rising from the valleys. In the outskirts of the city, skirmishes between Spanish troops and rebels were of frequent occurrence. The Spaniards still managed to preserve routes of communication with the country districts, although, little by little, the rebels were closing in upon them. Aguinaldo and his subordinate leaders were making strenuous efforts effectually to cut off all supplies to the city, with the view of co-operating with the Americans to starve the Spaniards into capitulation. The hospitals in the capital were crowded with wounded soldiers, brought in at great risk from the rural districts. Spanish soldiers sauntered about the city and Binondo--sad spectacles of emaciation in which body and soul were only kept together by small doles of rice and dried fish. The volunteers who had enlisted on the conditions of pay, food, and clothing, raised an unheeded cry of protest, and threatened revolt, whilst the officers whiled away the time in the cafes with resigned indifference. The Archbishop issued his Pastoral Letter, in which he told the natives that if the foreigners obtained possession of the Islands there would be an end to all they most dearly cherished. Their altars would be desecrated; the churches would become temples of heresy; Christian morality would be banished, and vice would become rampant. He reminded them (with the proviso "circumstances permitting") that he had appointed June 17 as the day on which the consecration of these Islands to the "Heart of Jesus" would be solemnly confirmed.

To draw the remnant of loyalty to his side, the Gov.-General instituted a reformed "Consulting Assembly" composed of 15 half-castes and natives, under the nominal presidency of Pedro A. Paterno, the mediator in the Biac-na-bato negotiations. Senor Paterno, whose sympathy for Spain was still unalienated, issued a _Manifiesto_ of which the following is a translation (published in _El Comercio_ of Manila on June 2, 1898):--

_Filipinos: Beloved Brethren_.

I love our country as none other does. I want it to be great,
free, and happy, and to shape its own destinies according to
its desires and aspirations. Therefore, I respect all the vital
forces in it at the cost of my life and my fortune. A long time
ago I risked my existence for the rights and liberties of the
Philippine people, who were sorely agitated, by bringing the
majority together, and directing the salvation of their interests
based on liberty and justice. My ideas are neither strange nor new;
they are the _result of study and political experience,_ and not
recently conceived under the existing circumstances. I desire,
with all the vehemence of my soul, to see my country strong and
great--its honour and dignity respected and in the enjoyment
of the greatest happiness. But however great our efforts may be
we need an ally. Let us imitate the example of the Great Powers;
they cannot exist alone, however strong and great they may be. They
need help, and the union of strength increases their power. Russia
seeks France; Germany seeks Italy and Austria. Unhappy is the Power
that isolates itself! And what better ally can we have than Spain,
a nation with which we are united for nearly four centuries in
religion, laws, morals, and customs, understanding full well her
virtues and her defects? The evil days of Spanish colonization are
over, and by dint of experience and the sacrifice of blood Spain
has understood that we are already of age, and require reforms
in our territory such as the formation of Philippine Militia,
which gives us the force of arms, and the Consulting Assembly,
which gives us the power of speech, participation in the higher
public employments, and the ability to control the peaceful
development and progress of society. Spain is at war with the
United States; we neither know that nation nor its language. The
Americans will endeavour by all imaginable means to induce us to
help them against Spain. And then, alas! they, the all-powerful,
will absorb us and reward our treachery to Spain by betraying
us, making us slaves and imposing upon us all the evils of a new
colonization. On the other hand, by helping Spain, if we die, we
do so in the fulfilment of our duty; if we live, we shall obtain
the triumph of our aspirations without the dangers and risks of
a civil war. We shall not die! No! Under the flag which shields
us and our garrisons, fighting with faith, decision, and ardour,
as a country does which yearns to be free and great, the enemy
will disappear like the wave which washes the seashore. Let us
hope to obtain from Spain all the good that the American stranger
can offer to us. Let us help our old ally, our old friend Spain,
and realize, with her, more quickly our aspirations. These are
they:--With the greatest decentralization possible consistent with
national unity, the organization and attributions of public powers
must be based on three principles:--(1) Spanish sovereignty. (2)
Local representation. (3) Colonial Government responsibility. Three
institutions correspond to these three principles, viz.: (1)
The institution of the General Government of the Philippines. (2)
The Insular Deputation or Philippine Assembly. (3) The Governative
Council. In this way the rights of the Government and those of
the Colony are harmonized. Let us shun the policy of suspicion
and doubt. With these firm and solid guarantees let us establish
civil and political liberty. The Assembly, representing the will of
the people, deliberates and resolves as one would treat one's own
affairs in private life, and thus constitutes the legislative power
of the Archipelago. Its resolution will be put into practice with
all fidelity by the executive power in its character of responsible
government. There are only Spaniards in the Archipelago; we are all
Filipinos and all European Spaniards. Such is _the programme of
the party who want home rule for the Philippines--ever Spanish!_
Thus shall we see the destinies of this country guided under the
orange and red flag. Thus will my beloved country be governed,
without detriment to the integrity of Spain. Finally, under Spain
our future is clear, and with all certainty we shall be free and
rule. Under the Americans our future is cloudy; we shall certainly
be sold and lose our unity; some provinces will become English,
others German, others French, others Russian or Chinese. Let us
struggle, therefore, side by side with Spain, we who love the
Philippines united and free. Long live Spain!

_Pedro Alejandro Paterno_.
_Manila_, _31st of May_, 1898.

This _Manifiesto_ was replied to a week later by the rebel party, who published a Refutation, of which the following is a translation:--

_Refutation_ of the _Manifiesto_ of Senor Paterno.

"Actions speak louder than words."

A better phrase, or idea, could not be found with which to reply
to the _Manifiesto_ of Don Pedro A. Paterno, published in _El
Comercio_ of the 2nd instant, than the epigraph which heads
these lines.

Senor Paterno begins by saying that he loves his country as
none other does; he wants it to be great, free, and happy,
and to shape its own destinies according to its own desires and
aspirations. _Would to God such beautiful language represented
the truth_, for it is just what we wish and what we have, long
ago, been aiming at, at the risk of our lives and property,
as proved by our actions and our arguments, especially since
the middle of the glorious year of 1896, the period in which we
commenced the conquest, by force of arms, of our most cherished
liberties. May Senor Paterno forgive us if we cite a little of
the history of this movement, so that he may see that neither
are we ungrateful, nor are we acting with precipitation, but as
a logical and undeniable consequence of the vile conduct and bad
faith of the Spanish Government.

For over 300 years the country slumbered in ignorance of all that
referred to its rights and political liberties. It was resigned to
the Spanish governmental system of spoliation, and no one thought
of reforms. But when the Revolution of September, 1868, broke
out in Spain and overthrew the throne of Isabella II., the first
revolutionary leaders, inspired by ideas of humanity and justice,
caused an Assembly of Reformists to be established here, one of
the members of which, if we remember rightly, was Don Maximo Molo
Paterno, father of Don Pedro. The Assembly agreed to and proposed
good and appropriate reforms, amongst which was that relating
to the incumbencies which were monopolized by the friars. What
did the Spanish Government do with these reforms? What did the
friars do? Ah! though it may appear cruel to Senor Paterno,
historical facts oblige us to remind him that the Government,
in agreement with the friars, engineered the military rising
of the City of Cavite in January, 1872, and at the instigation
of its authors and accomplices, sentenced the secular priests
Father Jose Burgos, Father Jacinto Zamora, Father Mariano Gomez,
parish priests of Manila, Santa Cruz (suburb), and Bacoor (Cavite)
respectively, to be garotted. Moreover, another secular priest,
Father Agustin, the Philippine lawyers and landed proprietors, Don
Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, Don Antonio Regidor, Don Pedro Carrillo,
Don Jose Basa, and others, amongst whom was Don Maximo Molo
Paterno, the father of Don Pedro, were banished to the Ladrone
Islands. This virtuous grand old man (Don Maximo Paterno) did
indeed (and we proclaim it with pride) make sacrifices of health
and fortune for the advancement of the liberties of his native
country. From the year 1872 the Spanish Government carried on a
persistent persecution of all the Philippine reformers by unjust
imprisonment and banishment. In 1888 the authorities went so far
as to prosecute 700 representative men of the suburbs of Manila,
simply for having presented a petition of rights and aspirations
to the Gov.-General Don Emilio Terrero. There is not a single
insalubrious island or gloomy corner in the country which has not
been the forced home of some banished Filipino. No one was sure
of his personal liberty; none were safe in their homes, and if
three or four Filipinos met together for an innocent purpose,
they were spied, arrested, and banished. Calumny has brought
about enough banishments to Fernando Po, Chafarinas Islands,
Ceuta, and other African and Spanish places to demonstrate the
bad faith, cruelty, and injustice of the Spanish Government with
respect to the Philippine people. This virile, intelligent people
received the supreme decree of reforms with joy and enthusiasm,
sharing the feelings of those who felt in their souls the flame
of liberty. This people worked, through legitimate channels, to
advance its ideal, inspired by the purest loyalty to Spain. How
did the Spanish Government fulfil, on its part, the decree
spontaneously issued in 1868? By prosecuting and banishing the
reformists, and employing a system of terror to damp the courage
of the Filipinos. Vain, ridiculous fallacy!--for it ought to
have known better after three centuries of rule of that country
of intelligence, birthplace of Rizal, Luna, Rosario and other
living examples of Philippine energy. The Filipinos, lovers
of their liberty and independence, had no other recourse open
to them than an appeal to arms, to bring force against force,
terror against terror, death for death, resolute and sworn to
practise the system of fire and blood, until they should attain
for the whole Philippine Archipelago absolute freedom from the
ignominious sovereignty of Spain. Now let us continue our comments
on the _Manifiesto_.

Senor Paterno says that a long time ago he risked his existence
for the rights and liberties of the Philippine people, even at
the cost of his health and his fortune. We, however, do not see
how he put into practice such magnificent ideas, for what we do
know is that Senor Paterno passed his younger days in Madrid,
where, by dint of lavish expenditure, he was very well treated
by the foremost men in Spanish politics, without gaining from
Spain anything whereby the Philippine people were made free and
happy during that long period of his brilliant existence. On
the contrary, the very epoch of the persecutions narrated above
coincided with the period of Don Pedro A. Paterno's brilliant
position and easy life in Madrid, where, because he published a
collection of poems under the title of "Sampaguitas," he became
distinguished by the nickname of _Sampaguitero_. We know, also,
that Senor Paterno came back to this, his native soil, appointed
director of a Philippine Library and Museum not yet established,
without salary, but with the decoration of the Grand Cross of
Isabella the Catholic. This was no gain to us, no distinction to
him, seeing that the same decoration was given to the Chinaman
Palanca and two others, without their leaving their homes to
obtain them.

How are we then to understand those generous sacrifices of health
and fortune for the cause of Philippine liberty? Perhaps he
refers to the recently created Philippine Militia and Consulting
Assembly. Well, admitting for argument sake, that with such
Militia and Consulting Assembly the liberty and happiness of the
Philippines were assured (a doubtful hypothesis, Senor Paterno),
this happiness is not due to Senor Paterno's efforts, but simply
to the circumstances. Spain is at war with North America, and
now offers us this sugar-plum to draw us to her side to defend
her against invasion.

We ask you again, Senor Paterno, where are those sacrifices?

We do not see them, although we seek them with the light of
impartiality, for, as the splendour of justice shines on our flag,
we should not fail to do this even for our greatest enemies,
amongst whom we do not count you.

Do you allude to the Peace of Biac-na-bato? If so, we ask, what
have you done with that peace to which we subscribed in good
faith, and which you and General Primo de Rivera together have
stupidly and scandalously torn into shreds? You have, indeed,
bungled the amnesty when many of the banished are, up to now,
suffering the miseries of their sad and unjust fate.

You have put off the promised reforms which, even yet, have
not come.

You have delayed the payment of the P400,000 for the second and
third instalments of the agreed sum.

You have not delivered into the hands of our chief, Don Emilio
Aguinaldo, the money as agreed upon.

Ah! You thought that when we had surrendered to you our arms and
our garrisoned strongholds--when our forces were dispersed and we
were absent--you could turn back to the Government of iniquity
without reflecting that Divine Providence could permit, in the
hour of great injustice, her emissary Don Emilio Aguinaldo to
return resolved to chastise energetically the immoral and impotent
Spanish Government.

Then comes Senor Paterno, telling us that however great our efforts
may be in the cause of liberty, we cannot live without an ally,
and that we can find no better alliance than the sovereignty of
Spain. Frankly, we must say that this is inconceivably incompatible
with Senor Paterno's clear intelligence. How do you understand an
alliance with sovereignty? How can you imagine a people great,
free and happy under the sovereignty of Spain? Senor Paterno
cites, as examples, the alliances between Russia and France,
Germany and Italy and Austria, but, so far, we do not know that
Russia is the sovereign power of the French, nor the Germans that
of the Italians and Austrians. Senor Paterno further says that by
helping Spain in the war with the United States, if we die, we do
so in the fulfilment of our duty; if we live, we shall obtain the
triumph of our aspirations without the dangers and risks of a civil
war. Know, Senor Paterno, and let all know, that in less than six
days' operations in several provinces we have already taken 1,500
prisoners, amongst whom is the Brigadier-General Garcia Pena,
one Colonel, several Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors and officers,
besides the Governor of the Province of Bulacan, his wife and all
the civil service staff of that province. We also have about 500
Philippine volunteers as prisoners, of whom 10 have died and 40
are wounded, whilst among the European prisoners there is only one
wounded. This goes to prove that the Europeans were too cowardly
to defend the sovereignty of Spain in these Islands, therefore we
do not understand the appeal you make to the Filipinos to defend
Spain as a duty, when the Spaniards themselves are heedless of
that which ought to be a more rigorous and strict obligation
with them, seeing that they defend their own possession which
brings them so much lucre and profit. This does not say much for
the duty when the favoured ones themselves forget it and trample
upon it. To die to-day for cowardly Spain! This implies not only
want of dignity and delicate feeling, but also gross stupidity in
weaving a sovereignty of frightened Spaniards over the heads of
brave Filipinos. It is astonishing that in the face of such an
eloquent example of impotence there should still be a Filipino
who defends the sovereignty of Spain.

Remember, Senor Paterno, that we make war without the help of any
one, not even the North Americans; but no! we have the help of God,
who is the eternal ally of the great and just causes such as that
which we defend against Spain--our own beloved _independence_!!!

Senor Paterno concludes by explaining his political and
administrative principles on the basis of Spanish sovereignty, but,
as we have charged that sovereignty with cowardice and immorality,
we dismiss this detail.

To conclude, we will draw the attention of Senor Paterno to two
things, viz.:

1. That he _commits an injustice in imputing to the North Americans
the intention of taking possession of these Islands_ as soon as we
have conquered the Spaniards, for, besides having no grounds on
which to make such an allegation against a nation distinguished
for its humanity like the Federal Republic, there is the fact
that _its own constitution prohibits the absorption of territory
outside America, _in accordance with that principle laid down
by the immortal Monroe, of America for the Americans. There is,
moreover, the historical antecedent that the independence of
South America, once under Spanish dominion, is largely due to
the protection of the United States; and

2. That Senor Paterno should reflect on the fact that the Spaniards
would never have allowed him to publish his _Manifiesto_ had it not
been for the existence and attitude of our Dictator, Don Emilio
Aguinaldo. This ought to serve Senor Paterno as further proof of
the cowardice of the Spaniards, who, notwithstanding all that has
been shown, insist on creating discord by provoking civil war:
on their heads will fall the responsibilities of the moment and
of the historical past.

_Cavite_, _9th of June_, 1898.

_The Revolutionists_.

The feeling against Don Pedro A. Paterno in the rebel camp was very strong for the time being, because of his supposed complicity in the alleged Biac-na-bato fraud.

The rebels stopped all the traffic on the Tondo-Malabon steam tramway line, and shortly afterwards the Manila-Dagupan railway trains had temporarily to cease running.

On June 10, 1898, General Monet received, through a Chinaman, a message from the Gov.-General to hasten to Manila with all the force he could bring. Monet had been so long in the northern provinces unsuccessfully trying to hold them against the rebels that his fate was, for a time, despaired of in the capital. Hemmed in on all sides by the enemy, concentration of all his detachments for general retreat was impossible. The forces spread over Tarlac, North Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija had to be left to their fate; their junction was quite impracticable, for, surrounded everywhere by the enemy, each group was then only just able to defend itself, and subsequently most of them fell prisoners. With only 600 fighting men, escorting 80 wounded, General Monet set out on his terrible southward march amidst recurring scenes of woe and despair. At every few miles between San Fernando and Macabebe his progress was hampered by an ever-increasing terror-stricken, weeping crowd of European women and children who besought him not to let them fall into the hands of a revengeful enemy. In the course of his march at most another hundred fighting men, a few of whom were natives, were able to join the retreating column. Their ammunition was scarce; they had no artillery waggons; every _carromata_ (gig) of the districts traversed had been seized by the enemy. Near San Fernando his passage was disputed, but he entered the town, nevertheless, and evacuated it immediately after, having secured only 12 carts for the transport of the sick and the wounded and what little remained of the war-material. The greatest difficulty was how to feed the swelling mob of refugees. At 6 a.m. on June 14 a start was made for Santo Tomas, but they were so fiercely attacked on the road that, for the moment, annihilation seemed inevitable. Concentrated between Apalit, Santo Tomas, Bacolor, and Mexico the rebel forces were estimated at 9,000 well-armed men, between whom Monet's column had to pass or die. The sobs of the children, the lamentations of the women, the invocation of the saints by the helpless were drowned in the united yelling of half-starved troopers in their almost superhuman struggle for existence. Fortunately the best order possible, under such distressing circumstances, was maintained by the splendid officers supporting Monet. They were men personally known to many of us years before. Lieut.-Colonel Dujiols commanded the vanguard; the rearguard was under Major Roberto White; the refugee families were in charge of Lieut.-Colonel Oyarzabal, all under the superior orders of Colonel Perez Escotado. At length they cut their way through to Apalit, where the railway station served them as a stronghold, which they were able to defend whilst food was served out and some attention could be bestowed on the sick and wounded. On leaving Apalit a group of rebels approached the column with a white flag saying they were friendly Macabebes, but when they were close enough they opened fire. Nearly the whole town turned out against the fugitives, and Monet had to hasten the march by deploying his troops to keep the road clear. Understanding well that Monet was acting only on the defensive to cover his retreat, the rebels sent him an audacious message offering to spare the lives of his people if he would surrender their arms. The general's reply was in the negative, adding that if he once reached Santo Tomas not a stick or stone of it would he leave to mark its site. This defiant answer nonplussed the rebels, who had private interests to consider. To save their property they sent another message to General Monet, assuring him that he would not be further molested; and to guarantee their promise they sent him the son of a headman as hostage, whose life they said he could take if they broke their word. That night was, therefore, passed, without attack, at Mandaling, around which outposts were established and trenches occupied. The following day the retreating column and the refugees reached Macabebe safely, [197] but what became of their leader at this crisis we must leave to future historians to explain. Some nine months afterwards the acts of two generals were inquired into by a court of honour in Spain; one of them was disgraced, [198] and the other, who was accused of having abandoned his whole party to escape alone in disguise, was acquitted.

General Augusti's wife and family were chivalrously escorted from Macabebe, where they were quite safe, by a loyal Philippine volunteer named Blanco (the son of a planter in Pampanga), who was afterwards promoted to effective rank of colonel in Spain. They were conducted from the Hagonoy marshes to the Bay of Manila and found generous protection from the Americans, who allowed them to quit the Islands. The Spanish garrisons in the whole of La Laguna and Pampanga had surrendered to the rebels, who were in practical possession of two-thirds of Luzon Island. General Augusti was personally inclined to capitulate, but was dissuaded from doing so by his officers.

Several American generals arrived with reinforcements, more were _en route_, and about the middle of July the Commander-in-Chief, Maj.-General Wesley Merritt, reached the Islands and remained there until the end of the following month, that is to say, for about 10 or 12 days after the Spanish surrender and the American military occupation of Manila were accomplished facts. On the way out from San Francisco to Manila some American ships called at the Ladrone Islands and brought the Spanish garrison of about 40 men prisoners. The surrender of the capital had been again demanded and refused, for the Spaniards were far from being starved out, and the American commander had strictly forbidden Aguinaldo to make an attack on the city. Aguinaldo, however, had been wonderfully active elsewhere. In several engagements the Spaniards were completely routed, and in one encounter the rebel party took over 350 prisoners, including 28 officers; in another, 250 prisoners and four guns; and 150 Spaniards who fled to Cavite Viejo church were quietly starved into surrender. Amongst the prisoners were several provincial governors, one of whom attempted to commit suicide. At Bacoor a hotly-contested battle was fought which lasted about nine hours. The Spaniards were surprised very early one morning, and by the afternoon they were forced to retreat along the Cavite-Manila road to Las Pinas. The Spanish loss amounted approximately to 250 troops wounded, 300 dead, and 35 officers wounded or dead. The rebels are said to have lost more than double this number, but whatever may have been the sacrifice, the victory was theirs. The Spaniards would probably have come better out of this combat but for the fact that a native regiment, hitherto loyal, suddenly murdered their officers and went over to the rebels. The Spaniards undoubtedly suffered much from unexpected mutinies of native auxiliaries and volunteers at critical moments, whilst in no case did rebels pass over to the Spanish side. [199] They were not long left in possession of Las Pinas, where a subsequent attack in overwhelming numbers drove the survivors still nearer to the capital.

Long before the capitulation of Manila the rebels were as well armed as they could wish from three sources,--that is to say, the Americans, the Spanish arms seized in warfare, and consignments from China. They also made good use of their field-pieces, and ever and anon the booming of cannon was heard in the streets of Manila. The Spaniards, hard pressed on all sides, seemed determined to make their last stand in the old citadel. The British banks shipped away their specie to China, and the British community, whose members were never united as to the course they should adopt for general safety, was much relieved when several steamers were allowed, by the mutual consent of Admiral Dewey and General Augusti, to lie in the bay to take foreigners on board in case of bombardment. Emilio Aguinaldo, on his return to the Islands, had declared himself Dictator. The Dictatorial Government administered the provinces as they were conquered from the Spaniards, collected taxes, and enacted laws. In a month's time the management of these rural districts had so far assumed shape that Aguinaldo convened deputies therefrom and summoned a Congress on June 18. He changed the name of Dictatorial to Revolutionary Government, and on June 23 proclaimed the Constitution of that provisional government, of which the statutes are as follows:--

_(Translation)_

_Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy_,

President of the Philippine Revolutionary Government and
Commander-in-Chief of its army

This Government, desirous of demonstrating to the Philippine
people that one of its objects is to abolish with a firm hand
the inveterate vices of Spanish administration, substituting
a more simple and expeditious system of public administration
for that superfluity of civil service and ponderous, tardy and
ostentatious official routine, I hereby declare as follows, viz:--

CHAPTER I