Chapter XVII: Section III (3)

From hence it is manifest, that whatever is caused by soul, is also caused by intellect, but whatever is caused by intellect, is not also caused by soul. For intellect energizes prior to soul; and whatever the soul confers on secondary natures, intellect also confers in a more ample manner. And when soul no longer energizes, intellect illuminates with its gifts, natures to which soul does not communicate its essence. For that which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of intellect, and the formation of intellect. Besides, this likewise follows that whatever is caused by intellect is also caused by the good, but not the contrary. For the privations of forms emanate from the good: since all things flow from this. But intellect since it is form, is not the fabricator of privation.

PROPOSITION LVIII.

Every thing produced from many causes, is more compounded, than that
which is produced from a few.

For if every cause confers something on that which proceeds from it, many causes will confer many gifts, but fewer causes will bestow fewer gifts. Of participants, therefore, some will consist from many, but others from a few of the things which each participates; the former indeed on account of their progression from many causes, but the latter on account of their progression from a few. But the former proceeding from many causes are more composite: and things proceeding from a few, are more simple than those which proceed from many causes. Hence every thing produced from many causes, is more compounded; but that which proceeds from a few is more simple. For the more compounded participates of that which the more simple participates, but the contrary to this, is not true.

PROPOSITION LIX.

Every thing essentially simple, is either more excellent, or worse than
composite natures.

For if the _highest_ of beings are produced from things fewer and more simple, but such as are in the _middle_, from a many, these will be composite. And with respect to the _extremes_, some are more simple, according to that which is more excellent, but others according to that which is worse. But that the highest beings are produced from fewer causes, is evident from their being superior, and originating prior to inferiors, and extending themselves over beings, beyond the progressions of subordinate natures, on account of their diminution of power. For on this account the last of beings[113], is most simple, as well as the first, because it proceeds from the first alone. But one kind of simplicity subsists according to a nature more excellent, but another kind, according to that which is more base than every compound; and there will be the same proportion in all things.

PROPOSITION LX.

Every thing which is the cause of a multitude of effects, is
more excellent than that which is allotted a power productive of
a few; when the few are parts of the many.

For if this is the cause of a few, but that of a many, and the few are parts of the many, that which forms the one, will also form the rest, if fabricative of a many. It is, therefore, more powerful and comprehensive of a greater multitude. For as production is to production, so is one producing cause to another, according to a mutual relation. But that which is capable of accomplishing more, possesses a greater, and more universal power. And this is nearer to the cause of all: but that which is nearer is a greater good: since the cause of all, is the good itself. Hence that which is the cause of many effects, is essentially more excellent than that which produces but a few.

PROPOSITION LXI.

Every power when impartible is greater, but when divided
becomes less.

For if it is divided, it passes into multitude. And if this is the case, it becomes more distant from unity; and on this account is diminished in power; since it departs from unity by which it is contained, and acquires imperfection. Since the good of every thing subsists through the benefit of union.

PROPOSITION LXII.

Every multitude which is near to unity, is less in quantity than things
farther distant, but is greater in power.

For that which is near is more similar to unity. But unity is constitutive of all things without multiplication. The cause, therefore, of many effects, is more similar to unity. Since the cause of all is the most uniform and impartible of all things; if the cause of all is _one_. As, therefore, that which is less multiplied is more allied to the one; so that which is productive of a multitude of effects, is more allied to the cause of all. But a nature of this kind is more powerful.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident, that there are more corporeal natures than souls; more souls than intellects; and more intellects than divine unities. And in all other natures there is the same proportion.

PROPOSITION LXIII.

Every imparticipable produces two-fold orders of things
participated; one in things which sometimes participate; but the
other in such as participate always, and in a connate manner.

For that which is always participated, is more similar to an imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence that which is always participable, will subsist prior to that which is sometimes participated. Because it is participated indeed, differing from that which is posterior to itself, but because it is always more allied, it is also more similar to an imparticipable. Nor are there alone things, which are sometimes participated: for prior to these are the natures which are always participated; through which they are conjoined with imparticipables according to a certain well ordered progression. Nor are there alone natures which are always participated: for these, since they possess an unextinguishable power (on account of their perpetuity), bear other natures in their essence, viz. the natures which are sometimes participated. And as far as to these diminution and subjection extends.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is manifest, that of the unions, which illustrate beings from the one, some are always participated, but others sometimes: and that intellectual participations are in the same manner two-fold; and likewise the animations of souls, and of other forms. For beauty, and similitude, and station, and identity, are imparticipable, but they are participated, through things which always participate, and by things which sometimes participate in a secondary manner, according to the same order.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

Every principal unity produces a two-fold number; one indeed
of self-perfect substances; but the other of illuminations,
possessing their subsistence in others.

For if its progression takes place by subjection, and through things proper to fabricative causes; and if perfect natures proceed orderly from the perfect, and things imperfect through these as mediums: hence some will be self-perfect substances, but others imperfect; and these last will become the forms of participants. For since they are imperfect, they will be indigent of subjects to their existence. But the perfect natures will make themselves their own participants: for since they are perfect, they will replenish and establish themselves. But they will require nothing of inferior natures, to their proper subsistence. Self-perfect substances, therefore, on account of their distinction into multitude, are diminished from their principal unity; but on account of their self-perfect essence, they are in a certain respect assimilated to it. But imperfect substances because they reside in others, are remote from that which is self-subsistent; and because they are imperfect, they are distant from that which perfects all things. But progressions are accomplished by things similar, as far as to things perfectly dissimilar. Hence every principal unity produces a two-fold number.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident, that with respect to unities, some are self-perfect proceeding from _the one_: but that others are illuminations of unities and intellect. And again, that some of these are self-perfect essences, but others nothing more than resemblances of souls which are animated. And hence, neither is every unity a god, but this is peculiar to a self-perfect unity alone. Nor is every intellectual property an intellect, but that which is essential alone. Nor is every illustration of soul, a soul: but there are likewise images of souls.

PROPOSITION LXV.

Every thing which subsists in any manner whatever, either
subsists according to cause, in a primary manner (or
possessing the form of a principle ἀρχοειδῶς) or according to
hyparxis[114], or according to participation, after the manner
of an image (ἐικονικῶς.)

For either the thing produced is beheld in its producing cause, as in a pre-existent cause: (because every cause previously assumes in itself, the thing caused, being that primarily, which its effect is secondarily) or the producer, is beheld in the thing produced. For since that which is produced participates of its producing cause, it exhibits in itself, in a secondary manner, that which its producer is primarily. Or every thing is to be considered in its own order, and is not to be contemplated either in its cause, or in the thing caused. For the one so far as it exists, subsists after a more excellent mode; but the other, so far as it is, in a subordinate manner. But it is requisite that this last also, should be such as it is. And every thing subsists in its own order, according to hyparxis.

PROPOSITION LXVI.

All beings are to one another either wholes, or parts, and are either
_the same_, or _different_.

For either one comprehends, but the remainder are comprehended; or they neither comprehend, nor are comprehended. And they either suffer that which is the same, as participating one; or they are distinguished from one another. But if they comprehend they are wholes: and if they are comprehended they are parts. But if many things participate one, they are the same according to one. But if they are many only; so far as many they are different from each other.

PROPOSITION LXVII.

Every totality is either prior to parts, or composed from parts, or
contained in a part.

For we either contemplate the form of every thing in its cause, and affirm that the whole which subsists in its cause is prior to parts; or we contemplate the form of a thing in the parts which participate of that form. And this in a two-fold respect. For the form is either collectively in all the parts; and this is a whole composed from parts, any one of which when absent diminishes the whole itself. Or it is in each of the parts; so that every part according to participation becomes a whole, i.e. a partial whole. But the whole composed from parts subsists on account of essence. But that which is prior to parts according to cause: and that which subsists in a part, according to participation. For this is a whole according to ultimate subjection, so far as it imitates the whole consisting from parts; since it is not any part indifferently, but that which is capable of being assimilated to a whole, whose parts also are wholes.

PROPOSITION LXVIII.

Every whole contained in a part, is a part of that whole which is
composed from parts.

For if it is a part, it is a part of some whole: and is either a part of that whole which abides in itself, according to which it is called a whole in a part. But on this hypothesis the whole would be a part of itself, and a part would be equal to the whole, and each would be the same. Or it will be a part of some other whole; and if of some other, it is either only a part of that other, in such a manner as again to differ in no respect from the whole. Or it will be a part together with some other whole. For the parts of every whole, are more than one; and this will be a whole composed from many parts. And thus the whole contained in a part, is a part of that whole which is composed from parts.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

Every whole composed from parts, participates of that totality which is
prior to parts.

For if it is composed from parts, it becomes passive to a whole. For the parts since, they are made one, suffer a whole, on account of their union: and this is a whole subsisting in parts which are not wholes. But that which is imparticipable has an existence prior to every thing participated. An imparticipable totality, therefore, exists prior to a participated totality. And hence there is a certain species of totality, prior to that whole, which is composed from parts. And this is not a passive whole, but is an essential totality; from which the totality resulting from parts proceeds. Since likewise that whole which is composed from parts, subsists in many places, and in various ways, in many other things composed from parts. But it is requisite that there should be an essential monad or unity of all totalities. For each of these wholes is not sincere, because indigent of the parts from which it is composed, and which are themselves different from wholes. Nor if this whole was generated in any thing particular, could it be the cause that all others are wholes. The cause, therefore, by which all things are wholes, is prior to parts. For if this also was composed from parts, it would be a _certain whole_, and not that which is _simply whole_. And this again would subsist from another whole: and this must either be the case in infinitum, or there must be a first whole; a whole not composed from parts, but that which is a perfect totality.

PROPOSITION LXX.

That which is more universal subsists in principal causes, and
prior to particulars illuminates participants; and leaves that
which participates as second in order from principal causes.

For a more universal cause begins its energy in secondary natures, prior to that which is posterior to a more universal cause: and it is present not only when that which is posterior is present, but even when the energy of that which is posterior is no more; and it energises in a more causal manner, and this not only in different subjects, but also in each of the things which sometimes participate. Thus for example it is requisite, that being should be first, afterwards animal, and then man. And the species man no longer exists, when deserted by the rational power: but animal, breathing and sentient, will still subsist. And again, though life is taken away, being remains: for when man ceases to live, being is present. And the same reasoning may be adopted in all things. But a cause which is more efficacious, and which is on this account more causal, energises first in a more causal nature: for it suffers the same from a cause more powerful, and prior to itself; and it co-energises with that which is secondary when in energy. For every thing which generates that which is secondary, congenerates also that which is more causal: and when that which is secondary deserts the more causal nature, that which generates the secondary nature is present. For the communication of a more powerful cause, when it is more efficacious, leaves that which participates it, the last of all. For through the communication of that which is second, it strengthens its own illumination.

PROPOSITION LXXI.

All things which abide in principal causes, and which possess
a more universal and superior order in effects, according to
the illuminations proceeding from them, become in a certain
respect the subjects of the communications of particulars.
And the illustrations emanating from superior, receive the
progressions of secondary natures. And thus some participations
antecede others, and representations, or resemblances (ἐμφάσεις)
supernally coalesce one after another in the same subject:
things more universal energizing first, but particulars
posterior to the energy of universals, bestowing their
communications on their participants.

For if things which partake more of cause, energize prior to things secondary, on account of their exuberance of power, and are present with, and illuminate things endued with a more imperfect aptitude: but if things more subordinate, and which are second in order, receive their communications from these; it is evident that the illustrations of superior natures pre-occupy that which participates of both, and establish the communications of subordinate natures. But these illustrations use the resemblances emanating from superior natures, as supports and foundations, and operate in a participant prepared by superior natures.

PROPOSITION LXXII.

All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject,
proceed from more perfect and universal causes.

For the causes of many effects are more powerful and universal, and nearer to _the one_, than the causes of a few effects. But things producing the subjects of others, are the causes of many effects, because they likewise produce aptitudes, before forms are present. And hence these are more universal and perfect in the order of causes.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from _the one_, is essentially destitute of form. And why body is effectually destitute of soul, although it participates of being. For matter which is the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of all[115]: but body which is the subject of animation, subsists from that which is more universal than soul, because it participates of being in a certain respect.

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of
being: but every being is not a whole.

For either _being_ and _whole_ is the same; or the one is prior, and the other posterior. But a part also, so far as a part, is a certain being (for that which is a whole consists from partial beings), yet is not an essential whole. And hence _being_ and _whole_ is not the same: for on this hypothesis, a part would be a _non-entity_. But if the part is a _non-entity_, neither can the whole be _being_. For every whole is a whole of parts, either considered as existing prior to the parts[116], or as inherent in the parts. But the part being a non-entity, it is impossible that the whole can exist. But if the whole is prior to being, every being will be immediately a whole; and so a part, will not be a part, which is impossible. For if a whole is a whole, and is a whole of parts; the part also existing as a part, will be a part of the whole. It remains therefore that every _whole_ is _being_, but not every _being a whole_.

COROLLARY.

For hence it is evident that the first being is above totality, since being is present to a multitude of things: for it affords essence to parts, so far as parts. But totality is present to fewer natures. For the cause of a multitude of effects is more excellent: but that of a few is subordinate, as is demonstrated.

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

Every form is a certain whole.

For it is composed from a multitude of things, each of which replenishes the form. But every whole is not a form. For that which is particular, and an indivisible, is indeed a whole, so far as it is an indivisible; but is not a form: For every whole consists from parts. But form or species, is that which may be divided into many particular forms. Hence _whole_, and _form_ differ from each other: and the former is inherent in more natures than the latter. That which is _whole_, therefore, is above the _forms_ of beings.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident that _whole_ possesses a middle order between being, and forms: and hence it follows that being is prior to forms, and that forms, are beings; and yet every being is not a form. From hence likewise in effects, privations are after a certain manner beings, yet they are not forms[117]. But on account of the unifying power of being, they likewise receive a certain debile representation of being.

PROPOSITION LXXV.

Every thing which is called a cause properly, is exempt from its
effect.

For if it subsisted in its effect, it must either replenish its effect, or be indigent of it in a certain respect, in order to its being; and thus be more imperfect than its effect. But that which abides in its effect, is more an assistant-cause than cause itself: because it is either a part of that which is made, or an instrument of that which makes. For the part subsisting in that which is made, is more imperfect than the whole: and the instrument which supplies the measures of fabrication to the efficient, is not able to separate itself. Every thing, therefore, which is properly a cause, if it is more perfect, than that which proceeds from it, affords likewise a measure to generation, and is exempt from instruments, and elements, and from every thing which is simply called an assisting cause.

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

Every thing which is produced from an immoveable cause,
possesses an immutable hyparxis: but every thing which emanates
from a moveable cause, possesses a mutable hyparxis.

For if every thing which fabricates is entirely immovable, it produces that which is second from itself, not by motion, but by being. But if this be the case, that which emanates from it, concurs with its essence. And if this be the case, as long as it exists, it will produce. But it always is, and therefore will always produce that which is posterior to itself. Hence too that which is posterior always emanates from thence, and always is; conjoining its own _progressive ever_, with the _ever_ according to energy, of an immoveable cause. If, therefore, the cause is moved, that also which is produced by it will be essentially mutable. For that which derives its essence through motion, when the motion is changed, changes its being. For if that which is produced from motion abides immutable, it will be more excellent than its producing cause: but this is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable; and will consequently be changed, and moved according to essence, imitating the motion by which it is produced.

PROPOSITION LXXVII.

Every being in _capacity_, emanates from that which is
_energy_; and that which is in capacity proceeds into
energy. But that which is in a certain respect in capacity,
so far as it is in capacity, emanates from that which is in
a certain respect in energy. And that which is all things in
capacity proceeds from that which is all things in energy.

For that which is in capacity is not adapted to produce itself into energy because it is imperfect. For if that which is imperfect should become the cause of perfection to itself, and this in energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which it produces. Hence that which is in capacity, so far as in capacity, will not be to itself, the cause of subsisting in energy. For on this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it will be to itself the cause of the perfect: since every thing in capacity, so far as in capacity, is imperfect. But every thing which is in energy, so far as in energy, is perfect. If then that which is in capacity becomes in energy, it will inherit perfection from something else. And this again, will be either in capacity; (but then again, the imperfect will be generative of the perfect), or it will be in energy. And either something else, or this which is in capacity, will rise into energy. But if something else in energy operates, acting according to its propriety, it will produce into energy, that which is in capacity, in another. Nor will this again be in energy; unless it rises into energy from capacity. It remains, therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity must be changed into energy.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

All power or capacity is either perfect, or imperfect.

For that which produces energy is a perfect power: for it makes other things perfect through its energies. But that which is perfective of others, is greater, because it is more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of something pre-existing in energy, according to which it is something in capacity, is imperfect: for it is indigent of the perfect abiding in another, that it may become prefect through its participation. And hence such a power is essentially imperfect. Hence too the power which subsists in energy is perfect, because prolific of energy. But the power which subsists in capacity is imperfect; deriving its perfection from power in energy.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.

For it is requisite that it should be adapted to generation, and that it should possess an imperfect power. It is likewise requisite that the agent being in energy, such as that which is generated is in capacity, should previously assume a perfect power. For every energy proceeds from inherent power. For if the agent does not possess power, how can it energise, and operate in another? But if that which is generated, does not possess power according to aptitude, how can it be fabricated? For that which produces, produces every thing, in that which possesses a passive power; but not in every thing; nor in that which is not naturally passive to the energies of the producing cause.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

Every body is naturally adapted to passivity: but every thing
incorporeal is naturally adapted to fabricate. And the former
is essentially inefficacious, but the latter is impassive. Yet
that which is incorporeal becomes passive through its communion
with body: just in the same manner, as bodies are enabled to
fabricate, through the participation of incorporeals.

For body, as body is divisible alone, and through this becomes passive; being every way partible, and this every way in infinitum. But that which is incorporeal, because it is simple, is impassive. For neither can that which is impartible be divided, nor can that which is incomposite be altered. Hence nothing will be fabricative, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal: since body so far as body, does not operate, because it is alone exposed to division and passivity; while on the contrary every agent possesses an active power. Hence it will not fabricate so far as body, but according to a power of operating, which it contains. But body is essentially inefficacious, and impotent: and hence when it fabricates, it fabricates by a participation of power. But incorporeals likewise participate of passions, when they abide in bodies; because in this case they are divided in conjunction with bodies, and enjoy their partible nature, though at the same time, they are impartible according to their proper essence.

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is
present by a certain inseparable power, which it inserts in its
participant.

For if it is separable from its participant, and does not abide in it, as that which possesses a subsistence in itself, a certain medium is requisite, which may connect the one with the other, and which is more similar to that which is participated, and to that which participates. For if this medium is separable, how can it be participated by the participant? Since neither the participant contains the medium nor any thing proceeding from this medium. A power, therefore, and illumination emanating from this medium, into its participant, conjoins both. One thing, therefore, is that through which participation subsists, but the second is that which is participated, and the third is the participant.

PROPOSITION LXXXII.

Every thing incorporeal, because converted to itself, when it is
participated by others, is participated in a separable manner.

For if in an inseparable manner, its energy will not be separable from its participant, any more than its essence. But if this be the case, it will not be converted to itself. For if it is converted it will be separable and different from its participant. If, therefore, it is capable of being converted to itself, it is participated in a separable manner, when it is participated by others.

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

Every thing endued with a self-gnostic power, is entirely converted to
itself.

For that which is converted to itself, in energy, manifestly knows itself: for that which knows is one and the same with that which is known; and the knowledge of itself reverts to itself, as that which is known. And as this knowledge belongs to that which knows, it is a certain energy: but it is an energy of itself to itself, because it possesses a power of knowing itself. But that this also subsists in essence if in energy has been demonstrated. For every thing which is converted to itself in energy, contains also an essence verging to itself.

PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

Every thing which always _is_, possesses an infinite power.

For if its essence is never-failing, its power also, according to which it is what it is, and is able ta be, must he infinite. For if the power according to which it subsists was finite, it would some time or other fail. But if it should fail, the being also of that which possesses this power must fail; nor would it be any longer an eternal being. It is requisite, therefore, that the power belonging to, and containing that which always is, should be essentially infinite.

PROPOSITION LXXXV.

Every thing which is always _in generation_ (ἀεὶ γινόμενον),
possesses an infinite power of _being generated_ (του yίνεσθαι).

For if it is always in the act of becoming to be, it contains a never-failing power of generation. For, if its power was finite, it would cease in a infinite time. But if its power of being generated ceases, that also which is in generation will cease; viz. that which is in generation according to this power will cease; nor will it any longer be always in generation[118]. But it is always in generation, according to the hypothesis: and consequently it possesses an infinite power of being generated.

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

Every _true being_ is infinite, not according to multitude, nor
according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

For every infinite is either in multitude, or in magnitude, or in power. But true being is indeed infinite, as possessing an inextinguishable life, a never-failing essence, and an undiminished energy. Nor is it infinite on account of magnitude; since that which is true being, is without magnitude, and self-subsistent. For every self-subsistent being, is impartible, and simple. Nor is it infinite, on account of multitude, for it is most uniform, on account of its vicinity, and alliance to the one. But the one is infinite according to power: and hence through this, true being will be impartible and infinite. And indeed by how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more will it be infinite. For power when distributed into parts, becomes debile, and finite. And powers entirely partible, are entirely finite. Far such as are last, and most distant from the one, are after a certain manner finite: but first powers are on account of their impartibility infinite. For partition dissipates and dissolves the power of every thing. But impartibility, from its binding and collective nature, contains in itself, that which is never-failing and undiminished. But infinite according to magnitude and multitude, is entirely a privation, and desertion of impartibility. For that which is finite proximately approaches to that which is impartible; while that which is infinite is most distant from an impartible nature, because it on all sides departs from the one. Hence that which is infinite according to power, does not belong to the infinite, either of multitude, or magnitude: since infinite power is co-existent with impartibility. But infinite, either in multitude or magnitude is most distant from an impartible nature. If, therefore, true being was infinite, either in magnitude, or multitude, it would not be endued with infinite power. But it is endued with infinite power, and is, therefore, not infinite, either according to magnitude, or multitude.

PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

Every thing eternal, is _being_; but not every being is
_eternal_.

For in generated natures the participation of being, is after a certain manner inherent, so far as they are not that, which is in no respect being. But if that which is in generation, is not that which _is in no respect being_ (οὐδαμῶς ὀν,) it is being, _in a certain respect_ (ἔστι πῶς ὀν.) But that which is eternal, or eternity itself, is _in no respect_ inherent in generated natures; and is particularly separated from things which do not participate of eternity, according to the whole of time. But every thing eternal always is; for it participates of eternity itself, which confers perpetual being, on the natures by which it is participated. _Being_, therefore, is participated by more natures than _eternity_: and hence _being_ is above _eternity_. For things which participate eternity, participate also of being; but not all that participate of being, participate also of eternity.

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Every true being, is either prior to eternity, or abides in eternity,
or participates of eternity.

But that it is above, or prior to eternity, is demonstrated in the preceding proposition. And it likewise abides in eternity: for eternity possesses perpetuity together with being. And this is also true of that which participates of eternity: for every thing eternal, is called eternal from its participation of perpetuity and being. For this according to participation possesses both perpetuity and being. But _eternity_ possesses perpetuity the first of all; but _being_, through participation[119]. And being itself, is the first being.

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Every _primary being_ (πρώτως ὅν) consists of _bound_, and
_infinite_.

For if it is endued with infinite power, it is evident that it is infinite, and through this subsists from _infinite_. But if it is impartible and uniform, through this it participates of _bound_. For that which participates of the one, is bounded. But that which is impartible, is at the same time endued with infinite power. Every true being, therefore, consists from _bound_ and _infinite_.

PROPOSITION XC.

_First bound_, and _first infinity_, have a self-subsistence prior
to all things which consist from _bound_ and _infinite_.

For if beings which subsist from themselves, subsist prior to certain beings, because common to all, and primary causes, and this not to some in particular, but simply to all; it is requisite that there should be a first bound, and a first infinity prior to that which consists from both. For in that which is mixed, _bound_ participates of _infinity_, and _infinity_ of _bound_. But the first of each, is no other than that which it is. It is requisite, therefore, that that which is _primarily infinite_ should not possess the form of _bound_, and that that which is _primarily bound_, should not possess the form _of infinite_. And hence these subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.

PROPOSITION XCI.

Every power is either bounded, or infinite. But every terminated
power subsists from infinite power: and infinite power from
_first infinity_.

For powers which have a partial existence; or subsist sometimes, are bounded; because they have fallen from the infinity of perpetual being. But the powers of eternal beings, are infinite, because they never desert their own hyparxis.

PROPOSITION XCII.

Every multitude of infinite powers, depends on one first
infinity, which is not as a participated power, and which does
not subsist in things endued with power, but is essential; not
existing as the power of any participant, but as the cause of
all beings.

For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself: for it likewise possesses bound. But the first power is infinity: for infinite powers, are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity itself, therefore, will be before all powers; through which being also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity. For _that which is first_, is not infinity: for that is the measure of all things, because it is the good; and the one. Nor is _being_ infinity: for this is infinite, but not infinity (or infinite itself.) Hence between that which is first, and being itself, infinity subsists, as the cause of all things endued with infinite power, and of all the infinity in beings.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

Every infinite subsisting in beings, is neither infinite with respect
to superior natures; nor is it infinite to itself.

For that by which every thing is infinite, by this also it is without circumscription. But every thing in natures superior to beings, is bounded in itself, and in all things prior to itself. It remains, therefore, that the infinite belonging to inferior natures, belongs to them alone, above which it is expanded in such a manner, that it is incomprehensible by them all. For however they may extend themselves towards this infinite, yet it possesses something entirely exempt from their nature. And though all things enter into this infinite, yet it possesses something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures. And again, though it expands its powers, yet it contains something on account of its union, invincible, convolved, and surpassing their involutions. Likewise containing and bounding itself, it will not be infinite to itself; and much less will it be infinite with respect to superior natures, because it possesses a portion of the infinity which they contain. For the powers of more universal natures are more infinite[120], because they are more universal, and are placed nearer to the first infinity.

PROPOSITION XCLV.

Every eternity is a certain infinity, but every infinity is not an
eternity.

For many infinites possess _the infinite_, not on account of their perpetuity; as is evident in the infinity according to multitude, and according to magnitude, and in the infinity of matter; and whatever else may be infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or on account of the indefinite nature of its essence. But that eternity is an infinity, is evident: for that which never fails is infinite: and this because it possesses a never-failing subsistence. Infinity, therefore, is prior to eternity. For that which constitutes a greater multitude, and is more universal, is a more causal nature. _First infinity_, therefore, is above eternity, and _infinity itself_, is prior to eternity.

PROPOSITION XCV.

Every power which possesses more of the nature of the one
than of multitude, is more infinite than the power which is
multiplied.

For if the first infinity is the nearest to the one, hence of the powers which are more allied to the one, that which is less distant from the one, is more infinite. For when multiplied it loses its uniform nature; in which when it abides, it will possess a superiority among other natures, being contained by impartibility. For among partible natures, collected powers are multiplied, but such as are divided, are debilitated.

PROPOSITION XCVI.

The power of every finite body, when infinite is incorporeal.

For if this power is corporeal, since in this case it would be an infinite body, infinite would reside in that which is finite. But if this power is a finite body, it will not be an infinite power, on account of body, but on account of something else. For if through body it is finite, but through power infinite; it will not be power, on account of body. Hence the infinite power, which resides in a finite body is incorporeal.

PROPOSITION XCVII.

Every principal cause in every series, communicates its property
to all that series: and the series is that by remission, or
subjection, which this cause is after a primary manner.

For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all kindred natures, are co-ordinated to this cause, it is manifest, that it confers on all one idea, through which they are allotted an order under the same series. For either all things participate of similitude with this principal cause, without a cause; or the sameness which is in all, proceeds from this principal cause. But that this should be the case, without a cause, is impossible: for that which is without a cause is fortuitous. But among things in which there is order, and a connection with each other, and which always abide in the same state, chance can never take place. From this principal cause, therefore, the whole series receives the property of its subsistence. And if from this cause, it is evident that it receives this property with remission, and a descent accommodated to secondary natures. For either this property subsists in a similar manner, in that which is principal, and in things secondary, and the former presides, but the latter are allotted a subsistence posterior to the principal; or it subsists in a dissimilar manner. And if this is the case, it is manifest that identity in multitude proceeds from one, and not the contrary; and that the property which primarily pre-exists in one, is secondarily in multitude, and is exempt from the series.

PROPOSITION XCVIII.

Every separate cause, is at once, every where, and no where.

For by the communication of its power, it is every where. For this is a cause, which replenishes things naturally adapted to participate of its nature, and is the leader of all secondary natures, and is present to all the prolific progressions of illustrations. But, on account of an essence unmingled with things in place, and through its excellent purity, it is no where. For if it is separate from effects, it is placed above all things. In like manner it resides in none of the natures subordinate to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not indeed be hindered from being a cause, and it would be in all participants: but it would not be in a separate manner prior to all. But if it was no where, without being every where, it would not indeed be restrained from being prior to all things, and it would not be any one of subordinate natures, but it would not be in all things; as causes are naturally in things caused, through their abundant communications. On account of its being a cause, therefore, it is in all things which are able to participate its nature: and from its being separate in itself, it is prior to all the natures which it replenishes; and is at once every where and no where. And indeed it is not according to a part every where, and according to a part no where: for thus it would suffer a divulsion and separation from itself: since one part of itself would be every where in all things, and another part would be no where, and prior to all things. But it is total, every where and no where, after the same manner. For things which are able to participate of this cause, abide in the _whole_, and find the _whole_ present with their nature; while this whole is exempt from its participants. For its participant does not establish this whole in itself, but participates of it as much as it is able to receive. Nor in communicating does it contract itself, through the participations of a multitude of things: for it is separate. Nor do the participants participate in a defective manner: for that which communicates is every where.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

Every imparticipable, so far as it is an imparticipable, does
not subsist from another cause, but is the principle and cause
of all participated natures. And in consequence of this every
principle in every series is without generation.

For if it is imparticipable, it is allotted a principality in its own proper series, and does not proceed from others: for it would not be the first, if it received that property on account of which it is imparticipable, from any other. But if it is worse than others and proceeds from them, it is not allotted a progression, so far as it is imparticipable, but so far as it is a participant. For in this case it participates of the natures from which it proceeds, and the things which it participates, have not a primary subsistence. But that which is imparticipable has a primary subsistence. And hence so far as it is imparticipable it does not flow from a cause[121]. For if it proceeded from a cause, it would be a participant, and not an imparticipable. But so far as it is an imparticipable, it is the cause of participants, and not that which participates of others.

PROPOSITION C.

Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause
and principle. But all imparticipables depend on one first
principle of all.

For if every series suffers a certain sameness, there is something in every ruling nature, which is the cause of identity. For as all beings proceed from _the one_, so likewise every series emanates from _one_. But all imparticipable unities are reduced to the one itself because all of them analogous to the one. So far, therefore, as they suffer a certain sameness, through their analogy to the one, so far they are reduced to the one itself. And so far as they all proceed from _the one_, none of them is a principle, but they flow from _the one_, as from a principle. But so far as each of them is imparticipable, so far each of them is a principle. Because, therefore, they are principles of certain things, they depend on the principle of all: for that is the principle of all, of which all participate. But the first is alone participated by all things; while some things only participate of the rest. And hence _the one_ is that which is simply the first. But others are firsts with relation to a certain order, but are not simply firsts.

PROPOSITION CI.

The leader of all things participating of intellect, is an
imparticipable intellect: of all things participating life, an
imparticipable life: and of all things participating being, an
imparticipable being. But of these, being is prior to life, and
life is prior to intellect.

For since in every order of beings, imparticipables are prior to participants, it is requisite that there should be an intellect prior to intellectuals, life prior to things vital, and being prior to beings. But since that which is the cause of more effects precedes that which is the cause of a fewer; hence among these being will be the first: for it is present to all things, to which life and intellect is present. For every thing vital and intellectual participates of being; but the contrary is not a necessary consequence: since all beings are not endued with life, and intellect. But the second in order is life: for all things to which intellect is present, participate also of life; but the contrary is not true. For many things are endued with life, but are destitute of cognition. But the third is intellect. For every thing which is endued in any respect with cognition, both lives, and possesses being. If, therefore, being is the cause of more effects; but life of fewer; and intellect of still fewer: hence _being_ is the first in order, _life_ the second, and _intellect_ the third.

PROPOSITION CII.

All beings, in whatever manner they may possess being, consist
from _bound_ and _infinite_, through the first being. But all
vital natures, are self-motive, through the first life. And all
gnostic natures, participate of cognition, through the first
intellect.

For if that which is in every series imparticipable, communicates its peculiar property, to all things under the same series; it is evident that being first communicates to all things _bound_ together with _infinite_; since it is primarily mixed from these. And life imparts the motion resident in its nature: for life is the first progression and motion, from the stable subsistence of being. And lastly, intellect imparts cognition: for the summit of all cognition, is in intellect; and intellect is the first gnostic nature.

PROPOSITION CIII.

All things are in all, but subsist peculiarly in each.

For in being there is both life and intellect; and in life, being and intellection; and in intellect, being and life. But in intellect all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being, according to true beings. For since every thing subsists, either, according to cause, or according to essence, or according to participation: and since in the first the rest subsist according to cause; and in the second, the first subsists through participation, and the third through cause: and in the third, natures prior to its own, subsist through participation; hence in _being_, _life_ and _intellect_ preside. But since every thing receives its characteristic, according to hyparxis, and not according to cause (for cause pertains to other things, or to effects); nor yet according to participation (for it receives externally that which it participates): hence in being there is _true_[122] life and _true_ intelligence, essential life and essential intellect. And in life, there is being according to participation; but intelligence according to cause. But both of these, are vitally inherent in life: for its hyparxis is according to life. And in intellect there is both life and essence, through participation: but both these subsist intellectually. For the being and life of intellect is knowledge.

PROPOSITION CIV.

Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence, and
energy eternal.

For if it is primarily allotted the perpetuity of eternity, it does not partly participate of this, and partly not; but it entirely participates of perpetuity. For either participating according to energy, it does not participate according to essence: but this is impossible, since in this case, energy would be more excellent than essence. Or participating according to essence, it does not participate according to energy. And thus that which is primarily eternal, will be the same with that, which primarily participates of time[123]. And time will primarily measure the essence of some things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time, will be the measure of nothing; since that which is primarily eternal, will not be contained by eternity according to energy[124]. Every thing, therefore, primarily eternal, has both its essence and energy eternal.

PROPOSITION CV.

Every thing immortal is eternal, but every thing eternal is not
immortal.

For if that is immortal which always participates of life, and that which always participates of life, participates also of being, and that which is always vital is perpetual; hence every thing immortal is eternal. For that is _immortal_ which does not receive death, and perpetually _lives_: but that is _eternal_ which cannot receive non-being, and which always _is_. But if there are many beings more excellent and worse than life, but which are not susceptive of immortality, though they are perpetual beings; it follows that every thing eternal is not immortal. But that many perpetual beings; are not immortal is evident. For there are certain beings, destitute indeed of life; yet perpetual and incorruptible[125]: since as being is to life, so is that which is eternal to that which is immortal. For that life which cannot be taken away, is _immortality itself_. And being which cannot be destroyed, is _eternity itself_. But being is more comprehensive than life: and hence that which is eternal is more comprehensive than that which is immortal[126].

PROPOSITION CVI.

The medium of every thing entirely eternal, both according to
essence, and according to energy, and of that which has its
essence in time; is that which is in a certain respect eternal,
but which in a certain respect is measured by time.

For that which has its essence comprehended by time is entirely temporal: for this in a most primary manner, is allotted a temporal energy. But that which according to all things is temporal, is perfectly dissimilar to that which is according to all things eternal. But all progressions subsist through similars. There is, therefore, some medium between these. Hence either that is the medium which is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy; or the contrary. But this is impossible: for energy on this latter hypothesis would be more excellent than essence. It remains, therefore, that the former hypothesis must be the medium.

PROPOSITION CVII.

Every thing which is in a certain respect eternal, but in a
certain respect temporal, is at the same time _being_ and
_generation_.

For every thing eternal, is being, and that which is measured by time is generation. And hence, if the same thing participates both of time and eternity, yet not according to the same, or after the same manner; this same thing will be, both being and generation, yet will not be both according to one of these alone[127].

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident that generation, since it has a temporal energy, depends on that which partly participates of being, and partly of generation; and which at once participates of eternity and time. But this is related to that which is eternal according to all things. But that which is eternal according to all things is related to eternity itself: and eternity itself is related to _being_, which is prior to eternity.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every thing which is particular in each order, is capable of
participating in a two-fold manner, that unity which is placed
in a proximate superior disposition; either by its own proper
totality, or through that which it contains, of a partial
nature, and which is allied to something particular, according
to an analogy to the whole series.