Chapter XVIII: Section III (4)

For if all things are converted through similitude, the particular nature which subsists in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which in a superior order is monadic, and total; and is as that which is particular to that which is universal, and as different orders are to each other. But this particular nature is similar to a _whole_ of the same series, on account of a communion of peculiarity; and to that superior proximately co-ordinated property, through an analogous subsistence. It is, therefore, evident that through these mediums a conversion from one to the other is effected, as through similars, to that which is similar[128]. For _particular_, is similar to that which is _particular_, but that which is of the same series is peculiar. And the universal, or whole which is placed above the series, is dissimilar according to each of these.

PROPOSITION CIX.

Every particular intellect participates of that unity, which is
above intellect, and is the first; both through that which is
_universal_, and through a _particular_ unity, co-ordinated to
its nature. And every particular soul, participates of universal
intellect; both through _universal_ soul, and a _particular_
intellect. And every particular nature of body, participates
of universal soul, both through _universal_ nature, and a
_particular_ soul.

For every thing particular (by the preceding proposition) participates of that unity placed in an order above it; either by its own proper universality; or by that particular nature which it contains, and which is co-ordinated to something particular.

PROPOSITION CX.

Of all things placed in order, according to every series,
such as are first, and are conjoined with their unity, may
participate of those which are proximately established in a
superior order, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect,
and remote from their proper principle, are not naturally
adapted to participate of their superiors.

For because some things are allied to their superiors being allotted in their proper order, a more excellent and divine nature; but others are more distant, because they are allotted a secondary and ministerial, but not a primary and principal progression in every series: hence some things are naturally conjoined with those of a superior order; but others are not conjoined with a superior order. For all things are not of equal dignity, though they belong to the same distribution. For there is not one reason, of all things: but all things proceed from one, and return to one, from their own proper unity. And hence they are not allotted the same power. But some are able to receive continually the participations of their superiors. But others of a dissimilar nature, are deprived of such a power, through their far distant progressions from their principles.

PROPOSITION CXI.

Of every intellectual series, some are divine intellects
receiving the participations of the gods; but others are
intellects alone. And of every animastic series (i.e. a series
composed of souls) some are intellectual souls, depending on
their proper intellects; but others are souls alone. And of
every corporeal nature, some have supernally-presiding souls,
but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.

For in every series the whole genus is not naturally adapted to depend on that which is prior to itself; but this belongs to that more perfect nature which the genus contains, and which is sufficient to coalesce with superior natures. Hence every intellect is not connected with a god; but this belongs to the highest and most uniform intellects, (i.e. to intellects which participate most of unity). For these are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of participable intellect; but this belongs to such as are most intellectual. Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of that soul which is participated; but such only as are more perfect and rational. And the mode of demonstration is the same in all.

PROPOSITION CXII.

First natures in every order, possess the form of things prior to
themselves.

For the highest genera in every order, are conjoined with their superiors by similitude, and through a continuation of the progression of universals. Hence such as superior natures are primarily, such is the form which things first in every order are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of superiors. And through the peculiarity of their subsistence, they appear such as natures prior to themselves.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

Every divine number is _unical_ (ἑνιαῖος), i.e. possesses the form
of unity.

For if a divine number has the one itself, as its preceding cause, in the same manner as an intellectual number has intellect, and an animastic number (ψυχικὸς, or number possessing the form of soul) soul as its preceding cause, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause; it is evident that a divine number also, is uniform. Since _the one itself_, is _the deity_: and this because _the good itself_ is the same with _the one_. For the _good itself_, and _the deity_ are the same: since that above which there is nothing, and which all things desire, is _the deity_. And that from which all things proceed, and to which all things tend, is _the good_. If, therefore, there is a multitude of gods, it is an uniform multitude. But that there is a multitude is evident: since every principal cause is the leader of a proper multitude[129]; and to this multitude it is similar and allied.

PROPOSITION CXIV.

Every god is a self-perfect unity: and every self-perfect unity
is a god.

For if there is a two-fold number of unities, as we have previously demonstrated, and some of these are self-perfect, but others illuminations emanating from the self-perfect unities; and if a divine number is allied, and of a similar nature to the good; hence the gods are self-perfect unities. And on the contrary every self-perfect unity is a god. For as unity is most excellently allied to the one itself, and that which is self-perfect to the good, and through both the one, and the good, participates of a divine property; so likewise that which is self-perfect is a god.

COROLLARY.

But if a god was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity; or a self-perfect hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be placed in another order, on account of a mutation of his property.

PROPOSITION CXV.

Every god is super-essential, supervital, and super-intellectual.

For if every god is a self-perfect unity, but each of these (viz. essence, life, and intellect) is not a unity, but united; it is evident that every god, is above essence, life, and intellect. For if these differ from each other, but all are in all, every one of these being _all things_ will not be _one_ alone. Besides, if the first deity is super-essential, but every god, so far as a god is of the first series[130]; hence every god will be super-essential. But that the first deity is super-essential is evident: for _essence_ is not the same with _unity_; nor is _to be_, and _to be united_ one and the same. But if _essence_, is not the same with _unity_, that which is first will either be both of these, and so will not be _one_ alone, but something besides _one_, and will participate of _the one_, without being _the one itself_; or it will be either of these. But if indeed it is essence, it will be indigent of the one. But it is impossible that _the good_, and _the first_ should be indigent. It will, therefore, be _the one_ alone; and will consequently be super-essential. But if every thing subsisting in a primary manner, confers the property of its primary subsistence on the whole series; hence every divine number is super-essential. For every principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, the first god is super-essential, all the gods, will be super-essential: for by this means they will be perfectly similar. But if they were essences they would be produced from the first essence, as the unities of essences.

PROPOSITION CXVI.

Every deity, except _the one_, is participable.

For that _the one_ is imparticipable, is evident; since if he participated any thing, and thus became dependant on some other nature, he would no longer be the cause of all things; both of such as are prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that other unities are participants we shall now demonstrate as follows: For if there is another imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from _the one_? For it either subsists in the same manner as that: but how in this case, is the one second, and the other first? Or it does not subsist in the same manner. And so _that_ will be the one itself, but _this_ will be both _one_, and _non-one_. But this non-one, if it is no hypostasis (or subsistence) will be one alone. But if it is some other hypostasis besides the one, _the one_ will be participated by non-one: and that will be a self-perfect one, by which it is conjoined. Hence this again, will be the deity. But that which subsists as non-one, will subsist in the participation of the one. Every unity, therefore, which subsists after _the one_ is participable, and every god is participable.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

Every god is the measure of beings.

For if every god possesses the form of one (ἑνιαῖος), he defines and measures all the multitudes of beings. For since all multitudes, are naturally indefinite, they are bounded by _the one_. But that which is one, measuring and bounding whatever it supervenes, is willing to lead into bound, by its terminating power, whatever is indefinite. For that which is one becomes uniform through participation: but that which is indefinite recedes from the one, through its interminable and infinite nature. And by how much the less it is uniform, by so much the more is it indefinite and immense. And hence every multitude of beings, is measured by the divine unities.

PROPOSITION CXVIII.

Every thing which is in the gods, according to their idioms (or
properties), pre-exists in their natures. And the property of
the gods, is uniform and super-essential. And hence all things
are contained in the gods, uniformly, and super-essentially.

For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, either through cause, or through hyparxis, or through participation, but the first of all numbers is the divine number; hence nothing will be inherent in the gods according to participation. But all things will reside in them, either through hyparxis, or through cause. But likewise, whatever the gods, as the authors of all things previously receive, they previously receive in a manner convenient, and apposite to their union. For every thing which presides over secondary natures according to cause, naturally contains the cause of inferiors. All things, therefore, are in the gods uniformly, and super-essentially.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

Every god subsists according to a super-essential goodness, and is good
neither through habit, nor through essence.

For both habit and essence are allotted an order secondary and remote from the gods: but these have a super-essential subsistence. For if the first one, is also the good, and so far as the one is the good itself, and so far as the good the one itself; hence every series of gods, is both uniform, and beneficent (ἀγαθοειδὴς), on account of one property alone, and not through more than one. But every god, so far as a unity is also a goodness, and so far as a goodness is also a unity; and on account of progression from the first is also beneficent and uniform. For the first cause of all, is both the one itself, and the good; and consequently all the gods are unities and goodnesses. As therefore _the one_ of the gods is super-essential, so likewise _the good_, which they contain, is super-essential, and is nothing else than _one_. For every god is not first of all something different from good, and afterwards _good_; but is good alone. Nor is first of all something besides _one_, and afterwards _one_; but is _one_ alone.

CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

PROPOSITION CXX.

Every god contains in his hyparxis a providence of the universe; and
primary providence resides in the gods.

For all things posterior to the gods, provide through the communion of the gods: but providence is connate with the gods. For if to communicate good to things provided for, is the peculiar employment of a providential property, but all the gods are goodnesses; hence they will either communicate themselves to nothing, and so there will be no good in secondary natures (for whence can that which subsists by participation emanate, but from natures which are primarily endued with properties); or if they communicate, they will communicate good, and through this communication provide for the universe. Providence, therefore, primarily subsists in the gods. For where can an energy prior to intellect abide, but in super-essential natures? And hence providence as the name indicates, is an energy prior to intellect. The gods, therefore, on account of their being, and because they are goodnesses, provide for all things[131]; and fill all things with that goodness which is prior to intellect.

PROPOSITION CXXI.

Every thing divine has for its hyparxis goodness itself,
and possesses an uniform power, and a knowledge occult, and
incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

For if it provides for the universe, it contains a power comprehensive of the things for which it provides; and by this invincible and indiscribable power, it fills all things with itself; and subjects every thing to its own nature. For every principal and ruling cause, rules through its abundance of power, and contains according to nature. There is, therefore, a primary power in the gods, which does not govern some things, and not others, but it equally assumes in itself in a primary manner, the powers of all beings: and this is neither an essential power, nor much more unessential, but it is connate to the hyparxis of the gods, and is super-essential. But likewise the boundaries of all cognitions, pre-exist uniformly in the gods. For all other cognitions subsist, on account of divine cognition, which is abstracted from the universality of things. And this cognition is neither intellectual, nor much less does it belong to the cognitions posterior to intellect; but according to its divine property, it is constituted above intellect. If then this knowledge is divine, it is an occult and uniform cognition. But if the power is divine, it is uncircumscribed by all things, and, in a similar manner, comprehensive of all things. But if the goodness is divine, it gives bound to the hyparxis of the gods. For if all things are contained in the gods, and among these knowledge, power, and goodness; and if their hyparxis is characterized with that which is best, the subsistence also of the gods will take place according to the best: and this is no other than goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXII.

Every thing divine both provides for secondary natures, and is
separated from the things for which it provides; providence
neither remitting its unmixed and uniform excellence, nor a
separate union obscuring providence.

For the gods abiding in their uniform nature, and hyparxis, fill all things with their power. And every thing which is able to participate, enjoys the goods, which it is capable of receiving according to the measure of its proper subsistence; the gods in the mean time, through being itself, or rather through a nature prior to being, pouring their illuminations on every thing which exists. For since they are no other than goodnesses, they abundantly confer good upon all things, through being itself; not making a distribution according to a reasoning energy, but because these receive according to their dignity, and those confer according to their hyparxis. Hence, in their providential operations, they receive no impediment from the natures for which they provide: for they benefit all things through their very being itself. But every thing which operates essentially, operates without habitude or respect: for respect, is an addition to being itself: and is on this account contrary to nature. Nor again, because they are separate, do they take away their providential care; for thus they would remove (which it is unlawful to say) their peculiar hyparxis whose property is goodness. For the communication of good extends to every thing capable of its participation: and that which is greatest, is not that which is endued with a form of good, but that which is beneficent. This beneficent nature, therefore, either no being will possess, or the gods will possess it prior to beings. For to goods subsisting through communication, it is impossible that a greater good should be present, but a less good only, to such goods as are first.

PROPOSITION CXXIII.

Every thing divine, on account of its super-essential union,
is ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is
comprehensible, and knowable by its participants. And hence
_that which is first_, is alone entirely unknown, because
it is imparticipable.

For all knowledge subsisting through reason, belongs to _beings_, and in _beings_ possesses the apprehension of its truth: for it is conversant with _conceptions_, and subsists in intellections. But the gods are above all beings. Hence that which is divine, is neither to be apprehended by opinion, nor by a rational energy, nor by intellection. For every being, is either sensible, and on that account the object of opinion, or true being, and on that account intelligible. Or it subsists between these, and is at the same time _being_, and _generable_, and is on this account the subject of a rational energy. If, therefore, the gods are super-essential[132], and prior to beings, there can neither be any opinion of their natures, nor science, nor cogitation, nor intellection. But they are known by dependant natures in a manner correspondent to their properties: and this by a necessary consequence. For the diversities of participants are divided together with the properties of the things participated. Nor does every thing participate every thing: for neither is there a composition of things perfectly dissimilar, nor does any thing participate fortuitously of another: but a kindred nature is conjoined with every thing kindred, and derives its progression from that to which it is allied.

PROPOSITION CXXIV.

Every god knows partible natures, in an impartible manner,
things subsisting in time without time, things not necessary,
necessarily, things mutable, immutably; and universally, all
things, in a manner more excellent than the order of the things
known.

For if every thing which is present with the gods is present, according to their _characteristic_; it is evident that the knowledge of the gods will not subsist according to the nature of things inferior, but according to the singular excellence which the gods contain. Their knowledge, therefore, of multiplied, and passive natures, will be uniform and without passion. Likewise if that which is the object of cognition, is partible, divine knowledge will be impartible. If the subjects are mutable, the gnostic energy of the gods will be immutable: if contingent, divine knowledge will be necessary; and if indefinite, definite. For that which is divine does not receive knowledge into itself from subordinate natures, that so cognition may correspond to the object of knowledge; but inferiors receive their indefinite subsistence, about the terminated nature of the gods, are changed about their immutability, receive with passivity that which is impassive, and temporally, that which subsists without time. For it is possible that subordinate, may be surpassed by more excellent natures: but it is not lawful for the gods to receive in themselves any thing from natures inferior to their own.

PROPOSITION CXXV.

Every god proceeds through all secondary natures, in the
order from which he begins to indicate himself. Always indeed
multiplying and dividing his communications, yet preserving the
characteristic of his own proper subsistence.

For since progressions are produced through remission, things first, every where multiply into the decrements of secondary natures. But proceeding according to a similitude to their producing causes, they receive the same ordination; so that the whole, is in a certain respect the same and different, and that which proceeds, with that which abides. For on account of its remission, it appears different, but on account of its coherence with the whole, it does not depart from identity. But such as _that_ is among first natures, such is the subsistence of _this_ among things secondary, and such is its preservation of the indissoluble communion of the series. Every god, therefore, appears in a manner adapted to the orders in which he exhibits his presence: but he proceeds from thence even to the last of things, through the generative power of primary natures. But he always multiplies the progression from one into multitude: but preserves identity, in the progression, on account of the similitude of the progressions to the governing and first operative cause of every series.

PROPOSITION CXXVI.

Of every deity, he is the more universal, who is nearer to the one: but
he is more particular, who is more distant.

For he who is the cause of more effects, is nearer to the cause of all, but he who produces fewer effects, is more distant. And he who is the author of many is more universal, but he who produces fewer effects, is more particular. And each of these is a unity. But the one is greater, and the other less according to power. And the more particular goods are generated from such as are more universal, without the latter receiving any division, (for they are unities) of alteration (for they are immoveable) or being multiplied according to habitude (for they are unmixt). But they generate from themselves through an abundance of power, secondary progressions, diminished from such as are first.

PROPOSITION CXXVII.

Every thing divine is primarily, and especially simple, and through
this is most sufficient.

For that it is simple, is evident from its unity: for the whole is eminently uniform. But a nature of this kind, is most eminently simple. But that it is likewise most sufficient, may be learnt by any one who considers, that a composite, is indigent; though not of things external to its nature, yet of those from which it is composed. But that which is most simple, and uniform, and one, is the same with _the good_, in which good establishing itself, it becomes most sufficient. But every thing divine, is of this kind. And hence it is neither indigent of externals, because it is goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, because it is uniform.

PROPOSITION CXXVIII.

Every god, who is participated by natures nearer to his own, is
_immediately_ participated: but when he is participated by
far distant natures, this is effected through _mediums_
more or less numerous.

For the former, since they are by their alliance uniform, are on this account enabled to participate the divine unities. But such as through their diminution, and extension into multitude become far distant, are indigent of other things more united, that they may participate such as are no longer united, but are essential unities. For multitude united, subsists between essential unity, and divided multitude. And thus united multitude is able to coalesce with unity, through _union_; but is at the same time allied to divided multitude, through _the manifest appearance of multitude_.

PROPOSITION CXXIX.

Every divine body is divine, through a divine soul. But every
soul, is divine, through a divine intellect. And every intellect
is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And
_unity_ indeed, is a god from itself (αὐτόθεν θεὸς) but
intellect, is most divine: and soul is divine, but body deiform,
or endued with a divine form.

For if every number of gods is above intellect, but participations are effected through kindred and similar natures, an impartible essence will first of all participate the super-essential unities. But in the second place things conjoined with generation. And in the third place, generation itself. And each particular will participate through its proximate superior; the peculiarity of the gods proceeding even to the extremities of things in participants, through mediums allied to their natures. For unity confers on the first intellect, its own illustrious power among divine concerns, and causes this intellect to be like itself, according to an uniform multitude. But through intellect it is present also to soul, adapting and inflaming its conjunction with intellect, when this intellect is participable. And by the resounding echo[133] as it were of soul, it imparts its idiom or peculiarity to body, if it is a body participating in any respect of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated, and intellectual, but also divine. For it receives life and motion from soul, but indissoluble permanency from intellect, and divine union from participated unity. For each of these communicates its subsistence to subsequent natures.

PROPOSITION CXXX.

In every divine order, things first, are more exempt from the
natures proximately placed under them, than these last are from
thing subsequent: and secondary natures are more dependant on
their proximate superiors, than following natures are dependant
on these.

For by how much the more uniform, and universal any thing is, by so much the more it is allotted an excellence greater than subsequent natures: and by how much the more it is diminished according to power, by so much the more is its alliance encreased with things posterior to its nature. And sublimer natures are indeed more united with their more principal causes: but inferiors are less united. For it is the property of a greater power to be more exempt from its inferiors, and to be more united with more excellent natures. And on the contrary to recede more, and to be passive together with these, implies a diminution of power. And this indeed happens to secondary natures in every order, but not to such as are first.

PROPOSITION CXXXI.

Every god begins his own proper energy from himself.

For he first exhibits in himself the peculiarity of his presence in secondary natures, because he likewise communicates himself to others, according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is defect, nor plenitude alone, peculiar to the gods: since every thing deficient is imperfect; and it is impossible that the imperfect, can cause any thing to be perfect. But that which is full, is alone sufficient, and is not yet prepared for communication. It is requisite, therefore, that the nature which fills, and extends its beneficence to others, should be above measure full. Hence, if that which is divine, fills all things through itself, with the goods which it contains in itself, every thing divine is beyond measure full. And if this be the case, it will primarily possess in itself, the property which it confers on others. For thus it will extend to others the communications of overflowing goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXXII.

All the orders of the gods, are bound in union, by a medium.

For all the progressions of beings, are effected through similars; and much more is it necessary that the orders of the gods, should possess an indissoluble continuity, because they subsist uniformly, and are terminated according to one principal cause of their subsistence. Their remissions, therefore, take place in an united manner, and through that similitude alone which is found among beings, of things secondary to such as are first: and this because the subsistence of the gods, much more consists in union, than the subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound together by proper mediums; so that first natures do not immediately proceed into progressions entirely different, but through genera common to each, and of which they are the immediate causes. For these genera combine the extremes into one union, being subjected to some, through an alliance of nature, but proximately separated from others: and they preserve the well-ordered progeny of divine causes.

PROPOSITION CXXXIII.

Every god is a beneficent unity, or a goodness unific
(ἑνοποιὸς); and each possesses this hyparxis, so far as a god.
But the first god is simply _good_, and simply _one_. And every
god posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain
unity.

For a divine property or idiom distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of the gods: so that every god confers goodness on all things, according to a certain characteristic of goodness; such as that of _perfecting_, or _containing_, or _defending_. For each of these is a certain good, but not every good. But that which is first primarily establishes a uniform cause. And this is no other than the good, constitutive as it were of all goodness. For all the hyparxes of the gods are not together equal to _the one_; so great is the super-eminence of _the first_, with respect to the multitude of the gods.

PROPOSITION CXXXIV.

Every divine intellect, _understands_ as _intellect_, but
_provides_ as _a god_.

For to possess a knowledge of beings, and a perfection in intellectual conceptions, is the property of intellect. But it is the province of a god to exercise a providential care, and to fill all things with good. But this communication, and replenishing, subsists through a union of the things replenished, with natures prior to their own. And intellect imitating this, becomes in its intellections the same with intelligibles. So far, therefore, as a divine intellect provides, it is a god; because providence is an energy prior to intellect. Hence, as a god, it communicates itself to all things; but as intellect, it is not present to all things. For a divine unity, extends beyond the progressions of an intellectual property. And this will be evident by considering, that natures void of intelligence, desire to provide, and to participate something of good: and this because all things do not desire intellect, even among such as are capable of its participation; but all things desire good, and hasten to acquire its possession.

PROPOSITION CXXXV.

Every divine unity is immediately participated by some being;
and every thing which is deified, is extended to one divine
unity; and the number of the participating genera of beings is
the same as that of the participated unities.

For neither two, or more unities, are participated by one being[134]. For how is it possible, that when the properties, which the unities contain, are changed, that which is connate to each, can remain without alteration; since conjunction subsists through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divisible manner by many beings: for many beings are unconjoined with unity; both considered as beings, with respect to that which is prior to beings, and as multitude to unity. But it is requisite that the participant, should be partly similar to that which it participates, and partly different and dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates, is something belonging to beings, but unity is super-essential, and the two are on this account dissimilars; it _is_ requisite that _that_ which participates should be one, that by this means it may become similar to the participated one; though the latter is one, because it is a unity, but the former is one, because it is passive to the communications of one, and is united through its participation.

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Every god having a more universal subsistence, and being placed
nearer to _the first_, is participated by a more universal
genus of beings. But every god who is more particular and
remote, is participated by a more particular genus of beings.
And as being is to being, so is unity to divine unity.

For if the number of unities, is the same with that of beings, and on the other hand one unity is participated by one being; it is evident that the order of beings proceeds according to the order of unities, assimilated to an order prior to that of beings. And more universal beings coalesce with more universal unities, but more particular beings, with more particular unities. For if this be not the case, dissimilars will again be joined with dissimilars, and distribution will not subsist according to dignity of nature: but both these cases are impossible; since the one itself, and a proper measure, through the divine unities illuminates and supervenes all other natures. Much more, therefore, will there be an order of participation in the divine unities; similars depending on similars according to the power which they contain.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

Every unity, together with _the one_ constitutes being
participating of its nature.

For _the one_, as it is hypostatic, (ὑποϛατικὸς) or constitutive of all things, so likewise it is the cause of participated unities, and of beings depending on unities. But the unity belonging to every being, produces the property, which shines forth to view in that particular being. And _the one_, indeed, is the cause of _simple being_; but _unity_ is the cause of alliance, because it is connate to _the one_. Hence unity, is that which of itself defines the being, which is its participant, and _essentially_ exhibits in it a _super-essential_ characteristic. For universally, from that which is primary, that which is secondary obtains its subsistence. If, therefore, there is any super-essential property of deity, it must belong to being, which participates it essentially.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

Of all things which participate of a divine property, and which are
deified, the first and highest is _being itself_.

For if being is above intellect and life, as we have demonstrated, and is the most abundant cause after the one; hence _being_ will be the highest after _the one_. For it is more uniform than intellect and life, and is on this account more venerable. But there is no other prior to this, except _the one_: for what besides _the one_, can be prior to uniform multitude? But _being itself_ is uniform multitude; because it consists from _bound_ and _infinite_. And universally, super-essential being[135] is prior to essence. For in the illuminations which are imparted to secondary natures, _the one_ alone extends beyond _being_. But _being_ subsists immediately after _the one_. For that which is _being_ in capacity, and is not as yet _being_ in energy, is nevertheless according to its nature one. And the being, which subsists after _the one_, is being in energy. Among the principles of being, therefore, _non-being_[136] subsists immediately above being, as something more excellent, and no other than the _one itself_.

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

All the participants of the divine unities originate from _being_,
and end in a _corporeal nature_.

For being is the first of participants, but body the last: for we say that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all genera are attributed to the gods, whether they are bodies, souls, or intellects; as in every order, things analogous to the gods, contain and preserve secondary natures, and every number is a whole, containing all things in itself according to that whole which is contained in a part, and possessing before all things a divine characteristic. The divine genus, therefore, subsists both _corporeally_, and _animastically_ (or according to the nature of soul ψυχικῶς) and _intellectually_: and it is evident that all these are divine through participation. For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. The participants, therefore, of the divine unities, originate from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

PROPOSITION CXL.

All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and
proceeding through proper mediums, extend to the extremity of
things, and to places situated about the earth.

For nothing intercepts these powers, and restrains their universal presence; because they are in no respect indigent of places and intervals, on account of their invincible excellence in all things, and a presence every where pure and unmixed. Nor is that which is adapted to the participation of these powers, prohibited from participation: but as soon as any thing is prepared for their communications, they are immediately present, neither then approaching, nor being prior to this absent, but always possessing themselves in the same uniform manner. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the participation of these divine powers, they are present to this; and fill all things with themselves. And indeed they are more present to superior natures, but they are present to such as are middle according to the order of these, and to last natures, in an ultimate respect. They supernally, therefore, extend themselves to the extremities of things: and on this account last natures contain the images of such as are first; and _all things sympathise with all_[137]. For secondary pre-exist in first natures; and first natures manifestly appear in such as are second. For every thing subsists in a three-fold manner; either through _cause_, or through _hyparxis_, or through _participation_.

PROPOSITION CXLI.

Every providence of the gods, is partly exempt from the natures for
which it provides, and is partly co-ordinated with them.

For one kind of providence is entirely extended above the things which are illuminated, according to its subsistence, and the characteristic of its order. But another kind provides for subjects of the same co-ordination with itself; these subjects themselves imitating the providential energy of the gods, who are separated from the concerns for which they provide; and desiring to fill secondary natures with the goods, they are capable of receiving.

PROPOSITION CXLII.

The gods are present to all things after the same manner,
but all things are not after the same manner present to the
gods. For every thing participates of their presence according
to its order and capacity. And this is accomplished by some
things uniformly, and by others variously; by some things
eternally, and by others according to time; and by some things
incorporeally, and by others in a corporeal manner.

For it is necessary that the different participation of these, should either proceed from the participant, or from the thing participated. But every thing divine always possesses the same order: and with respect to all things, is without restraint, and without mixture. It remains, therefore, that mutation must subsist through the participant; and that in these that which is not perpetually the same must abide; and that these are differently present to the gods. Hence the gods are present to all things, in the same uniform manner, though all things are not equally present to them, But particulars are present according to their ability; and they enjoy the divinities, agreeable to the manner in which they are present to their illuminations. For the participation of these is according to the measure of their presence.

PROPOSITION CXLIII.

All inferior natures fail before the presence of the
gods, though a participant among these may be adapted to
participation. Indeed every thing foreign departs from divine
light, but all things are at once illuminated by the gods.

For divine natures always possess a more comprehensive capacity, and are more powerful than their progressions. But the inaptitude of the participants, is the cause of the privation of divine light: for it obscures divine light by its debility[138]. But this obscured light, appears to receive another domination, not according to its own power, but according to the impotency of the participant, which seems to fail and die away, before the illumination of a divine form.

PROPOSITION CXLIV.

All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their progressions as the orders of the gods.

For the gods produce beings together with themselves, nor is any thing able to subsist, and to receive measure, and order beyond the influence of the gods. For all things are perfected, disposed, and measured through the power of the gods. Hence the gods have a subsistence prior to the last genera of beings; who also dispose these, and impart to them life, formation, and perfection; who convert them to _the good_, and who are in like manner prior to middle, and primary natures. And all things are bound, and stably rooted in the gods, and through this derive the continuance, and preservation of their being. But when any thing apostatizes, or recedes from the gods, and becomes on this account solitary and destitute, it entirely departs into non-entity, and perishes: because perfectly deprived of those natures, by which it was contained.

PROPOSITION CXLV.

The characteristic of every divine order, pervades through all
secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate
genera of beings.

For if the distributions of beings, extend as far as the orders of the gods, there must be in every genus of beings, a supernally-illuminated property of the divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate cause, that characteristic, or property, by which it is allotted its peculiar subsistence. I say, for example, if any deity possesses a cathartic, or purgative power, there will also be a purgation in souls and in animals, in plants and in stones. And in the same manner with respect to a defensive, converting, perfective, and vivifying power. And a stone indeed participates of a purgative virtue, but in a corporeal manner only. But a plant participates it more clearly according to life. An animal possesses this form, according to the motion of appetite: but a rational soul, in a rational manner; and intellect, intellectually. But the gods possess this super-essentially, and uniformly. And the whole series is endued with this power, from one divine cause: and there is the same mode of reasoning in the rest. For all things depend on the gods. And different natures are illuminated by different gods; the divine series, descending even to the extremity of things. And some things are connected with the gods immediately, but others through more or fewer mediums; _while all things in the mean time are full of gods_. And whatever any being naturally possesses it possesses from the gods.

PROPOSITION CXLVI.

The extremities of all the divine progressions, are assimilated
to their principles; preserving a circle without beginning and
end, through a conversion to their principles.

For if every progression returns to the principle from which it proceeds, much more must total orders, proceeding from their summit, be converted to it again. But the conversion of the extreme to its principle, forms one whole, finite, and verging to itself; and exhibiting through its inclination uniformity in multitude.

PROPOSITION CXLVII.

The summits of all the divine orders, are assimilated to the extremes
of their superiors.

For if it is requisite that there should be a coherence, and continuity in a divine progression, and that every order should be connected by proper mediums; it is necessary that the summits of secondary orders, should be conjoined with the extremes of such as are first. But conjunction subsists through similitude: and hence there will be a similitude of the principles of an inferior order, to the extremes of one superior.

PROPOSITION CXLVIII.

Every divine order is united to itself in a triple respect; by the
summit which it contains; and by its middle, and end.

For its _summit_ possessing a most united power, transmits this power into a total union, and unites every thing supernally flowing into itself. But its _middle_ extending to each extreme, connects every thing about itself: transfusing the gifts of primary natures, but extending the powers of such as are last; and inserting in all things a communion and connection with each other. For by this means one co-ordination is produced from replenishing and replenished natures, mutually verging to the middle, as to a certain centre. But the _end_ returning again to the beginning, and reducing to this the progressive powers, affords similitude and a mutual inclination to the whole order. And thus the whole order is one, through the unifying power of its primary parts; through the coherence subsisting in its middle; and through the conversion of the extreme, to the principle of the progressions.

PROPOSITION CXLIX.

Every multitude of divine unities, is bounded according to number.

For if it is proximate to the one, it is not infinite; since that which is infinite is not connate to the one, but foreign from its nature. For if multitude essentially recedes from _the one_, it is evident that infinite multitude is perfectly destitute of the one: and hence it is likewise impotent and inefficacious. The multitude of the gods, therefore, is not infinite: and consequently, it is uniform and bounded, and more bounded than any other multitude, because it is more allied to the one. If, therefore, multitude was the principle of things, it would be requisite that every thing nearer to, should be a greater multitude than that which is more distant from the principle: for that which is nearer is more similar. But since that which is first is _the one itself_, the multitude conjoined with it must be less multitude than that which is more remote from _the one_. But infinite is not a less multitude, but multitude in the, most eminent degree.

PROPOSITION CL.

Every thing progressive in the divine orders, is not naturally
adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor
do secondary natures entirely receive all the powers of natures
prior to themselves: but these possess some powers abstracted
from inferiors; and incomprehensible by things posterior to
themselves.

For if there is a difference in the characteristics of the gods, those of the inferior must pre-exist in the superior gods: but the characteristics of the superior, as being more universal, do not reside in the inferior divinities. But the more excellent characteristics impart some powers to their productions, but eminently pre-occupy others in themselves. For it has been demonstrated that those are more universal, which are nearer to the one, but more particular, which are more distant. But if the more universal possess powers comprehensive of the more particular characteristics; hence those which possess a secondary, and more particular order, will not contain the power of such as are more universal. Hence in the superior, there is something incomprehensible, and uncircumscribed by the inferior properties. For every thing divine is truly infinite; nor does it exhibit itself to itself; nor to things of a much prior superiority to itself: but to all such as are posterior to its nature. But infinity resides in these last, according to capacity. And infinite is incomprehensible by those to whom it is infinite. Hence inferiors do no not participate of all the powers, which more excellent natures pre-occupy in themselves. For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things secondary, from their more particular subsistence, will neither possess the whole of superior natures, nor will they contain the properties which they possess, in the same manner, as their superiors; on account of that infinity through which superior excel subordinate natures.

PROPOSITION CLI.

Every thing paternal[139] in the gods has a primary subsistence,
and pre-exists in the order of _the good_, according to all
the divine distributions.

For that which is paternal, produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and universal powers, and essences, according to one ineffable excellence. And on this account it is denominated _paternal_, indicating the uniform and beneficent power of _the one_, and the hypostatical, or procreative cause of secondary natures. And in every order of the gods, that which is paternal, obtains the principality, producing and adorning all things from itself; because it is established analogous to _the good_. And with respect to these divine fathers, some are more universal, but others more particular; just as the orders of the gods differ in the proportion of cause, according to more universal, and more particular. As many therefore as are the universal progressions of the gods, so many also, are the differences of fathers. For if in every order there is something analogous to the good, it is requisite that _the paternal_ should reside in all, and that each order should proceed from a paternal union.

PROPOSITION CLII.

Every thing generative in the gods proceeds according to the
infinity of a divine power, multiplying itself, penetrating
through all things; and eminently demonstrating a never failing
energy, in the progressions of secondary natures.

For what else but the infinite power of the gods, through which all divine natures are filled with prolific good, can multiply progressions, and produce them into offspring from their occult comprehension in causes? For that which is universally full, produces other things from itself, through its overflowing power. Hence a dominion of power, is the characteristic of generative deity: and this absolute dominion multiplies the powers of generated natures, causes them to be prolific, and excites them to the generation and production of others. For if every thing imparts its primary characteristic to others, every thing prolific must insert in natures posterior to itself, a prolific progression, and form a figurative representation of that infinity, which is the first progeny of the universe; from which every generative power proceeds, and which eminently scatters as from a fountain, the perennial progressions of divine natures.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

Every thing perfect in the gods, is the cause of divine perfection.

For as with respect to hypostases, or subsistences, some belong to beings, and others are super-essential; so likewise of perfections, some belong to the gods themselves according to hyparxis, but others to secondary beings posterior to the gods. And the former indeed are self-perfect, and first-artificers, because in these good is contained in a primary manner: but the latter possess perfection through participation. On this account, therefore, the perfection of the gods is different from the perfection of things deified. But that which is primarily perfect in the gods, is not only the cause of perfection to things deified, but to the gods themselves. For if every thing perfect is converted to its domestic principle, the cause of every divine conversion, is the perfective genus of the gods.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

Every thing in the gods endued with a protecting power,
preserves every thing in its proper order; uniformly separating
secondary natures, and establishing them in such as are first.

For if the preservation of every order, preserves measure in an immutable manner, and contains all the protected natures, in their proper perfection, divine protection will insert in all things an eminence above their inferiors, and will permanently establish in itself every thing, without mixture. It will likewise be the cause of immaculate purity, to protected natures, and will establish them in their superiors. For every thing adhering to primary natures is perfect; but at the same time it abides in itself, and is extended above inferior natures.

PROPOSITION CLV.

Every thing vivific in the divine genera, is a generative cause; but
every prolific order is not also vivific.

For a generative power is more universal than that which is vivific, and is nearer to the principle of all. For generation manifests a cause producing beings into multitude: but vivifying (ζωογονία) represents deity the supplier of universal life. If, therefore, the former multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter the progressions of life; it will be as _being_ is to _life_, so is the _generative_ order to the _vivific_ series. And hence the generative order will be more universal, and the cause of more effects, and on this account nearer to the principle of all.

PROPOSITION CLVI.

Every cause of purity, is contained in the protecting order. But the
protecting is not the same with the purifying genus.

For purity inserts an unmixed nature in every thing inferior to the gods, and an unpolluted power, in the providence of secondary natures. But protection likewise produces this, comprehending all things in itself, and firmly establishing them in their superiors. Hence the protecting is more universal than the purgative genus. For it is simply the property of protection, to preserve the order of every thing, both with respect to itself, and to things prior and posterior to its nature. But it is the property of purity to separate things more excellent from such as are more base[140]: and the former of these are primarily contained in the gods. For it is requisite that there should be one antecedent cause of that which is contained in all things. And universally the uniform measures of every thing good, are first received from the gods; and there is no good in secondary natures, which does not pre-exist in the gods according to cause. For what other origin, or cause, can this possess? In the gods, therefore, purity is likewise a primary good, together with protection, and every thing of this kind.

PROPOSITION CLVII.

Every paternal cause supplies every thing with being, and
constitutes the hyparxes of beings. But every demiurgic, or
fabricative cause of forms, precedes composite natures, together
with their order, and division according to number: and is of
the same order with a paternal cause, in the more particular
genera of things.

For each of these belongs to the order of bound, because both _hyparxis_, and _number_, and _form_, are all of them endued with the form of bound: and hence through this they are co-ordinate to one another. But that which is _a demiurgic cause_, deduces fabrication into multitude. And that which is _uniform_, supplies the progressions of beings. And the former indeed is the artificer of forms, but the latter produces essence. In whatever respect, therefore, _form_ and _being_[141] differ from each other, in the same respect that which is _demiurgic_ differs from that which is _paternal_[142]. But form itself, is a certain one. A paternal cause, therefore, is both more universal and causal, and is superior to the demiurgic genus; in the same manner as being itself is more universal than form.

PROPOSITION CLVIII.

Every reductorial cause (τὸ ἀναγωγὸν) in the gods differs both from a
cathartic or purifying cause, and from convertive genera.