Chapter XXIV: Appendix (4)

Nor indeed is it to be thought, that eternity happens extrinsically to the first essence; but we should consider it, as dwelling in this essence, as emanating from, and abiding together with it. For it is beheld as profoundly resident in its essence; because from perceiving every thing else which we affirm to abide there, as perfectly intimate, we say that all things emanate from essence, and abide together with essence. For it is requisite that first natures should abide with, and reside in first beings, and in these have the whole of their essence, because the beautiful dwells in these, and emanates from them: and this also may be asserted of truth. And partly indeed the whole itself, is as it were in a part, but partly, as parts in the whole: as if this true nature was a whole, not congregated from parts, but itself generating parts, that on this account it may be truly all. Besides, truth which flourishes there, is not a certain consonance towards another, but is peculiar to every thing of which it is the truth. Indeed it is requisite that this total truth, if total, should not only be total, so far as it is all things, but should likewise so possess the whole, that nothing may be wanting to itself. And if this is the case, no affection of futurity can possibly belong to this being: for if the circulation of time can add any thing to its essence, it must be defective till such an accession takes place. Besides, nothing contrary to nature can happen to this true being; for it suffers nothing. So that since nothing is generated in it, its being is independent of all temporal connections; and hence it is neither _about to be_, nor _will be_, nor _was made_, nor is _made_. If indeed the affections of futurity are taken away from generated natures, because they are conversant with perpetual acquisition, they cease to exist. But to things of a nature essentially different, the addition of any future circumstance of being causes them to fall from the stable seat of essence. So that it is manifest from hence, that being itself could not reside in these natures, if they were composed from the past, and future processions of time. Since essence in generated natures appears to be nothing more than a certain procession from _real being_, from the beginning of generation, till it arrives at the extremity of time, when it ceases any longer to exist. And that which is called the being of these, subsists in such a manner that by diminishing any part of this extension, life is likewise diminished: for in this manner it is necessary that every thing which participates of futurity should exist. Hence it continually hastens, by a natural desire, to what is future, without desiring to repose; since it continually draws fresh supplies of being to itself, while it performs one thing after another, and is moved in a certain orb of progression, by its desire of essence. And thus we have discovered the existence of temporal beings, and the cause of their motion to eternal duration, through the assistance of futurity. But to such things as are first, and to beings truly blessed, the desire of futurity is unknown; for they are already total; and whatever of life they ought to possess, they now totally possess: so that they seek after nothing, because nothing which is requisite to the full energy and perfection of their essence is future, and consequently nothing happens to them connected with futurity. The absolute and total essence, therefore, of a being which is not separated into parts, but is total in all its parts, and in no one circumstance of being deficient, and to which nothing of non-entity can possibly happen (for it is not only requisite that all beings should be present with that which is universal; and total, but that everything appertaining to non-entity, should be always excluded) is eternity: for that is called eternal which always is.”

And shortly after this, he adds: “Hence eternity is something especially venerable, and is the same with a god, as inherent intelligence affirms. But intelligence likewise dictates that eternity is the same with that god, whom we denominate being and life. And it may with the greatest propriety be said, that eternity is a deity shining and unfolding himself in intelligible light, such as he is in his essence: in an essence, I say, perfectly unchangeable, and the same, and thus firmly abiding in an unceasing energy of life. Nor ought any one to wonder that we speak of eternity, as composed from many. For every thing which abides in the intelligible world, is called many, on account of its infinite power; since infinite there receives its denomination, because it never falls off from the consummate intellectual plenitude of its nature. And indeed it is particularly called after this manner, because its loses nothing of its own: and if any one should describe eternity after this manner, as life already infinite because universal, and because it never deserts the integrity of its nature; (since it cannot be diminished by the past, nor increased, by the future, because it is a perfect whole) he who thus describes eternity, will approach very near to its true definition. For what is afterwards added, that it is a perfect whole, and loses nothing of its integrity, is only a certain exposition of the definition which affirms it to be infinite life. But because a nature of this kind, thus all-beautiful and eternal, abides about the _one itself_, emanating and in no respect departing from it, but ever abiding about and in it, and living with it, in indissoluble union; hence it is said by Plato, not rashly, but in a manner truly beautiful, and profound, _that eternity abides in one_: so that he not only reduces that which eternity contains into one; but the life of being in like manner reduces itself, about _the one itself_. This then is what we investigate, and that is eternity, which thus abides. For that which is the energy of life abiding from itself, and residing in the depths of unity, without any deception, either in essence or life, is without all controversy eternity. Since truly _to be_, is never _not to be_, and to possess no diversity of being. But when in discoursing on eternity, we use the term _ever_; also when we say, it is not sometimes _being_, and sometimes _non-being_, we must consider these appellations as adopted only for the purpose of explanation; because the term _ever_ is not perhaps principally assumed, but is employed, in order to shew, an incorruptible, and never-failing nature.

But here it is proper to enquire, whether we affirm all this concerning eternity, by means of a power foreign from its nature, and as of a foreign concern? But how is this possible? For how can intelligence take place in the soul, unless by an intimate union of intellect, with the object of its intellection? And after what manner can this profound union subsist, by an intelligence of such things as are foreign from our intellectual nature? It is therefore requisite, that we should be partakers of eternity; or we could not thus define its nature, and exhibit the properties which it contains.”

[112] The nature of _time itself_, which every thing in generation participates, has been a subject of much subtle and profound speculation to the Pythagoric, Platonic, and Peripatetic philosophers. According to Archytas the Pythagorean (as we are informed by Simplicius, on Aristotle’s Categories) “time is a generative number, proceeding from the motion of the mundane soul, as from unity.” But others of the ancients considered it as a certain extension of soul about intellect. Others confessed, that time was the period of soul and intellect. According to the determination of others, it is a natural extension about intellect. And others described time, by circulations in a circular nature; all which the Pythagoric sect comprehends. Time, therefore, according to Archytas and the most ancient philosophers, is a self-moving motion, and the number of temporal unity: for as eternity abides in _one_, so time is moved in _number_. According to Plato, “time is a certain image flowing in number, of eternity abiding in one.” But according to Aristotle, “it is the number, or measure of motion according to prior, and posterior.” But the opinion of Plotinus respecting time, is perhaps the most profound of all: and though the preceding definitions when attentively considered contain an abundance of intellectual truth, yet the doctrine of Plotinus on this subject _rekindles_ a greater light in our intellectual conceptions. In his book then on eternity and time, which we have cited in the preceding proposition, after many admirable doubts concerning the nature of time, he enters on its definition, as follows:

“But it is requisite to recal ourselves again to that nature which we have said resides in eternity: a nature immutable and total, and a life infinite and indeclinable, and abiding in, and about the one. But time was not as yet, or at least was not among these true beings, but was about to follow, by a certain reason and nature of a posterior energy. Supernal natures therefore acting quietly among themselves, if any one desires to know how time first fell, he will not perhaps improperly call upon the Muses, who then were not, for the important explanation. Perhaps also he will opportunely invoke them, since the Muses then existed, according to true conceptions of their nature. And perhaps such a one will find time already generated, such as it now is, and manifests itself to our intellectual view. But he will speak concerning it after the following manner:

“Before priority originated, and was indigent of that which is posterior, time not yet existing according to procession, reposed together with priority in being itself, with a tranquil and intellectual energy. But at length time desiring a nature engaged in a multiplicity of affairs, and anxious to govern itself, and become independent, and always chusing to possess more of that which is present, began to be agitated, and at the same time commenced a flowing duration, subsisting in continual succession, and a transition into different periods of existence. And by conceiving that from this motion, a certain longitude of procession is effected, we establish time, as an image of eternity. For since it is a certain restless power of the mundane soul, desirous of transferring what it there beholds, into another, it cannot sustain that a collected whole should be at once present with its nature: but as the spermatic reason, unfolding itself from a certain quiet seed, acts according to an abundant discursive energy; dispersing in the mean time that which is called abundant, by a certain division, and instead of the one which abides in itself, unfolding and consuming a non-abiding one, and thus proceeding into a more debile extension: so likewise the nature of the mundane soul fabricating the sensible world in imitation of that which is superior, and agitated with a motion, not such as the intelligible world contains, but rather similar to the motion which is there; with a motion I say affecting to represent its image, it renders itself in the first place temporal, as a substitute for eternity. But afterwards it endeavours to become subservient to time, because it compels the world to reside in time, comprehending all its transitions in its forming nature. For the world is moved in this nature; since there is no other place for the universe than the mundane soul; and in the time of this soul, it is agitated without end. For this soul applying one energy after another in succession, generates that which is consequent, together with its energy, and at the same time proceeds with a cogitation posterior to this energy, and which before this had no existence, because cogitation was not yet in energy. Its present life too, is now not entirely similar to the preceding life: and hence together with this energy, another life succeeds; and in consequence of this another time is produced. Time, therefore, is allotted a distance and protraction of life; and a perpetual prorogation of life, possesses a perpetual time. If any one, therefore, should say that time is an energy of the mundane soul, perpetually proceeding in a certain transitory motion, from one life to another, he will perhaps appear to assert something correspondent to the truth. For if eternity is life abiding in station, and in a habit similar and the same, and already infinite; and if it is requisite that time should be the image of eternity, in the same manner as this universe is the image of the intelligible world, certainly instead of the life which flourishes there, another life must reside in a certain power of the mundane soul, equivocal with respect to intelligible life; and instead of intellectual motion, it is requisite that there should be a motion of some part of the soul. Likewise instead of identity, and a similar and abiding habit, that which does not abide in the same, but always pursues a different energy must succeed. And again instead of a property indistant, and one, a resemblance of one possessing unity in a continued succession. Besides instead of that which is infinite and total, that which perpetually propagates itself in infinite succession. Lastly, instead of that which is a collected whole, that which sustains parts, and is always about to be total and perfect. For thus it will imitate that which is total, collected, and infinite, if it wishes its essence to consist in a continual pursuit of being; and thus resembles the being of eternity itself. But it is requisite not to receive time external to soul, in the same manner as eternity is not external to being itself. Nor again, must we conceive that time exists as an appendage, or any thing posterior, in the same manner as conceptions of this kind, are not proper to eternity: but we must contemplate it as beheld seated in the recesses of soul, with which it exists in conjunction, just as eternity subsists in being itself.”

[113] By the last of beings, he means matter, which on account of its formless nature may be considered as nothing more than the shadow of being; or something if possible still more privative and simple.

[114] By ὕπαρξις, _hyparxis_, in these Elements is meant that _characteristic_ or _summit_ of any nature, through which it subsists: and in the gods is the same with the _unity_ and _deity_ of their natures. And it is likewise necessary to inform the reader, that by ὑπόϛτασις, _hypostasis_, or subsistence, is meant any individual nature whether essential, or super-essential, considered as something distinct and different from _accident_.

[115] By matter proceeding from the cause of all, nothing more is meant than that it depends entirely on the first cause for its shadowy and unreal subsistence: for as the emanations of causes are extended in proportion to their eminence; hence the precessions of the one extend beyond those of every other cause, and even leave faint traces of their illuminations in the dark receptacle of matter.

[116] This follows from Prop. 69. For every whole prior to parts, may be said to be a whole of parts, because every whole formed from parts, participates of that totality which is prior to parts.

[117] Thus matter possesses a certain obscure image of being, but does not preserve the most debile impression of form. For as the gradations of being are more extended than those of form, and as matter is the last of things; thence matter may be said to retain the footstep of _being_ in its dark receptacle, whilst the processions of form are reflected like echoes from its rebounding seat.

[118] The proposition ends here in the Greek, though very erroneously; and its conclusion forms the beginning of the next proposition. It is strange that Portus would not have detected, this egregious mistake, which the alteration of a single letter, would have enabled him to rectify. Thus if after αλλὰ μεν’ ἀεὶ ὐπόκειται γινόμενον. ἄπειρον ἄρα ἔχει την’ του yίνεσθαι δυναμιν, which is the conclusion of the proposition; παν’ τὸ ὅντως ὅν, &c. is retained, instead of ἐαν τὸ ὄντως ὄν, and is made the beginning of the next proposition, the whole will be correct and plain. Such mistakes, are dreadful instances of the danger attending the understanding from the study of words alone.

[119] To a reader not skilled in the Platonic philosophy, it will doubtless appear strange, that _being_ should be prior to _eternity_, and yet each participate of one another. This apparent paradox may be easily solved, by considering that the mode of participation is different in each. For _being_ participates of eternity, as establishing, illuminating, replenishing, and deifying eternity: but _eternity_ participates of being, as depending upon, established and deifyed by being. So that when a superior, participates of an inferior nature, the participation consists in the energy of the former on the latter: but when an inferior participates of a superior nature, the participation consists in its receiving the communications of the superior nature.

[120] The reader must not be surprised to find that among infinites, some are more infinite than others. For as among beings some are truer than others, and possess more of real being in proportion as they approach nearer to being itself; at the same time that they are all in a certain respect beings: so infinites possess more of infinity, as they approach nearer to the infinite itself. Thus for instance eternity possesses infinity more truly than time, though time also is infinite; because the infinity of eternity, is a stable indivisible life, but the infinity of time consists in an unceasing progression, or as it were an unwearied pursuit of infinity, which it can alone obtain in an extended and partible manner. And this difference among infinites extends even to matter itself, which is the most degraded and abject of all infinites, because it is infinite only in the most dormant capacity.

[121] Thus for instance the first being, or being _itself_, does not flow from any being as its cause, because it is without any participation of being: and though it proceeds from a superior cause, i.e. the _one itself_, yet it does not proceed from this cause, on account of its being an imparticipable, but on account of its being subordinate to _the one_, and consequently a participant of the one. And this is likewise true in every other imparticipable.

[122] Ὄντως in the original, which means indeed literally, _truly_. But the philosophical reader will please to observe that as it is an adverb derived from the participle ὤν, or _being_; its full meaning is _truly according to being_. So that by _true life_, we must understand _life according to the truth of being_; and so of the rest.

[123] For if that which is primarily eternal, is eternal according to essence, but not according to energy, it will be the same with the world, which is the first participant of time. For the world is essentially eternal, because though its parts are subject to change, yet considered as a whole, it is perpetually the same. But then it is not eternal in _energy_, but in _capacity_ alone. For it subsists in a perpetual capacity of existence; and its flowing essence is perpetually composed from the past, present, and future circulations of time.

[124] In the original it is κατ’ ὐσιαν, but it should doubtless be read, according to our translation κατ’ ἐνέργειαν.

[125] Thus for instance the qualities which subsist about bodies are incorporeal, and consequently eternal and incorruptible; but yet they are not immortal, because they are destitute of life.

[126] In the Greek θανατου is erroneously printed, instead of αθανατου, which the reader will evidently perceive must be the true reading. But though this is sufficiently obvious to those who understand the proposition; yet Portus, who seldom attends to the meaning, has, from not rectifying this mistake, given the most ridiculous translation of this concluding sentence, that can possibly be imagined. The original is: τὸ δὲ ὄν τῆς ζωῆς περιληπτικώτερον, καὶ του θανάτου, (lege αθανατου) ἅρα τὸ ἀΐδιον. The translation of Portus: “Illud vero, quod est, vitam, et mortem magis complectitur, _vel, ipsum vero ens, plura complectitur, et latius patet, quam vita et mors_. Ergo ipsum eternum _est illud, quod non recipit ipsum non esse, et quod semper est_;” i.e. “But that which is, comprehends in a greater degree, life and death; or being itself comprehends more, and is of greater extent than life and death. Therefore, eternity itself, is that which does not receive non-being, and which always is.”

[127] That is neither according to time alone, nor eternity alone: but from the participation of both.

[128] Instead of ὡς δι’ ὁμοιῶν ἀνόμοιον, read ὡς δι’ ὁμοιῶν εἰς ὅμοιον. And read with astonishment the version of Portus; who not perceiving the error of the text, has made nonsense of the passage, as usual.

[129] To such as understand these Elements, this argument for the existence of a multitude of gods, is perfectly demonstrative and clear. Indeed as every production of nature possesses the power of generating its similar, it is much more necessary that the first cause of all should generate a multitude the most similar to himself, that can possibly be conceived. For every being produces that which is similar prior to the dissimilar; as indeed a contrary mode of proceeding would be absurd and impossible. The immediate or first productions therefore of the first god, must be a multitude of gods: or otherwise his first progeny would not be perfectly similar to himself. Nor does this doctrine, is any respect derogate from the dignity of the supreme god, as the ignorant suppose; but on the contrary tends to exalt his majesty, and evince the ineffable beneficence and perfection of his nature. For though it establishes a multitude of gods, yet it teaches that they are dependant on the first, who is perfectly incomprehensible, and without participation. So that it leads us to consider the subordinate deities, as so many lesser luminaries shining before the presence of the sun of good, and encircling with awful grandeur his ineffable radiance, and occult retreats. And that this doctrine fully displays his superlative goodness, is sufficiently manifest; since by a contrary assertion we must ascribe imperfection to the fountain of excellence, and leave deity impotent and barren. Indeed this opinion is so natural and reasonable, that, excepting the Jews, it was embraced by every nation of the ancient world. Nor ought we to wonder that the Jews were an exception to the universal consent of mankind, in this important particular. For with respect to the origin of this despicable, _though chosen people_, it was scarcely known to the Heathens; “the greater part of whom,” as Dr. Burnest justly observes (De Origin. Rer. cap. 7.) “supposed them to be natives of Egypt, sprung from the same root, or considered them as a vile, and inconsiderable people.” And as to their learning we may remark with the same author, “that they never excelled in philosophical, or mathematical knowledge; and never gave the world a famous example of the strength of human wit; from whence arose that bitter reproach of Apollonius, _That the Jews were the most trifling of all the barbarians, and that they were the only people who had never found out any thing useful for life_.” The example of the Jews, therefore, ought to be so far from deciding against Polytheism, that when their character is impartially estimated, it will strengthen the evidence of its reasonableness and truth.

[130] Though the first cause of _the one itself_, confers on every thing a proper symbol of his ineffable nature; yet this occult unity, or impression is not divine in things subject to generation and decay, but in true essences alone, in the number of which rational souls must be ranked. Such of these, however, as are of a partial nature, and on this account are not the immediate progeny of _the first one_, do not contain a unity which can be called a god; because they are connected with motion, and are in a certain respect composite essences. But where there is a most true essence, as in separate intellects, and celestial souls, the unity of each is a god. And indeed on account of these unities, which are as it were expressive characters of the first unity, the essences of the gods contain all things, and extend their providential care to every part of the universe, with unbounded beneficence, and immaculate power. But these divine unities are perpetually united to the first one, like rays to light, and lines to a centre. They likewise subsist in the most perfect union with each other. For since union in other natures is effected through the power of unity, these divine unities must be much more closely united, through their subsisting much nearer to the first and most perfect one. Every divine unity, therefore, though it is neither essence, nor obnoxious to essential multitude, yet abides in essence; or is rather the summit, and as it were blossom of essence. And as every thing is established in its proper species through form, and as we derive our being through soul; so every god is a deity, from the secret unity which he contains. Hence these divine unities subsist in the intelligible world, and in the essences of the gods, like so many splendid lamps in diaphanous spheres, mingling their rays with an ineffable union, energy, and consent. And situated in most admirable order, in the vestibule of the good, they occultly signify divine silence, and solitary beauty; and perspicuously announce to posterior natures the awful sanctuary of their incomprehensible cause.

[131] We may farther infer the necessity of providence in the gods, from considering that as they are the producing causes of all things, so all things abide, and are radically established in their natures. For where can any thing subsist, which is not contained in their unknown and all-pervading comprehensions? But if this be the case, since all things are in reality the offspring of the gods, they must continually be the objects of their providential exertions. For as goodness is the characteristic of these divine natures, it is impossible that they should abandon their progeny, or cease to impart their beneficent, unenvying, and all-powerful communications. Nor must we think that these providential exertions are laborious to the gods; since, as Proclus well observes, (Theol. Plat. p. 41.) that which is according to nature, is not laborious to any thing. “For neither (says he) is it laborious for fire to give warmth, nor for snow to refrigerate, nor for bodies themselves to energize according to their peculiar powers. Nor prior to bodies, is it laborious to natures themselves to nourish, or generate, or increase: for these are the operations of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it laborious to souls to exert their peculiar energies: for many of their energies are attended with delight, many are the result of their essence; and many motions are produced by their presence alone.” Hence if the communication of good naturally belongs to the gods, providence also is natural to these divinities, which they exert in a tranquil, unpolluted, and incorporeal manner.

Should it be enquired in what manner providence operates, the following beautiful passage from Proclus on the Parmenides, as cited by Ficinus, in his commentary on that dialogue, will give us abundant satisfaction: “Let us conceive (says he) a ship agitated by the winds and waves, and let us suppose, that the imagination of some one is so powerful, that while he imagines the sea, the sea immediately flows; that while he imagines the ship, the ship is constructed; and that the winds and waves, arise agreeable to his imagination, and as the consequences of its vehement energy. Now it is evident, that such a one would not be compelled, in surveying these particulars, to employ a confused and distracted vision; but both his knowledge and operation, would equally subsist in a uniform manner. And such is the simplicity of divine intelligence, with respect to the intuition and fabrication of inferior concerns.”

[132] The reader must remember that the gods are alone super-essential, through their _unities_, which are the characteristics of their natures: for as irrationality is the essential signature of a brute, and rationality of a man; so a divine unity, is the invariable characteristic of a god.

[133] By this ἀπήχημα, or _resounding echo of soul_, we must understand that vital quality, by which the soul is united to the body; and which is nothing more than the extreme image and shadow of the soul. The necessity of such a connecting quality, will easily appear, from considering that an _incorporeal_ nature, like that of soul, cannot be connected with _body_, without a vital medium. In consequence of this we may consider with Plotinus, (Ennead. IV. lib. 4.) the animated body as resembling illuminated and heated air; and the pains and pleasures of the body, will be conversant with this shadow of the soul.

[134] This must be understood of immediate participation; and on this hypothesis, it is certainly true, that neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For since there is an order among the unities, and some are more universal than others, two cannot be immediately participated by one being, without an alteration taking place in the subsistence of each. This is evident from the cxxxii. Proposition, in which it is proved _that all the orders of the gods are bound in union by a medium_: and consequently since all the unions are connected by proper mediums, it is impossible that any two can be immediately participated.

[135] For as being itself, is no other than the highest order of the gods and the most uniform multitude, and as the characteristic of every god is a divine unity; hence the characteristic of being itself, will be the, unity proceeding from bound. But as all the divine unities are super-essential; hence _being itself_ according to its characteristic will be super-essential.

[136] For as matter is deservedly called _non-being_, because it is _worse_ than all things; in like manner this appellation is proper to the first cause, as he is _better_ than all things.

[137] He who understands this divine sentence, _that all things sympathise with all_, will see that the _magic_ cultivated by the ancient philosophers, is founded in a theory no less sublime than rational and true. Such a one will contemplate the universe as one great animal, all whose parts are in union and consent with each other; so that nothing is foreign and detached; nothing strictly speaking void of sympathy and life. For through various parts of the world, when considered as separated from the whole, are destitute of _peculiar_ life; yet they possess some degree of animation however inconsiderable, when considered with relation to the universe. Life indeed may be compared to a perpetual and universal sound; and the soul of the world resembles a lyre, or some other musical instrument, from which we way suppose this sound to be emitted. But from the unbounded diffusion as it were of the mundane soul, every thing participates of this harmonical sound, in greater or less perfection, according to the dignity of its nature. So that while life every where resounds, the most abject of beings may be said to retain a faint echo of the melody produced from the mundane lyre. It was doubtless from profoundly considering this sympathy between the mundane soul, and the parts of the world, that the ancient philosophers were enabled to procure the presence of divinity, and perform effects, beyond the comprehension of the _vulgar_. And that this was the opinion of Plotinus, the following passage evinces: “It appears to me that the ancient wise men, who wished to procure the presence of the gods, by fabricating statues and performing sacred rites, directed their intellectual eye to the nature of the universe, and perceived that the nature of soul was every where easy to be attracted, when a proper subject was at hand, easily passive to its influence. But every thing adapted to imitation, is readily passive; and is like a mirror able to seize a certain form, and reflect it to the view.” Ennead iv. lib. 3.

[138] For as this divine light operates according to the debilitated nature of the subject into which it is received (and there is no other way in which it can operate), it necessarily appears to receive a dominion foreign from its own. Hence it appears both obscure and impotent, though in reality neither: for these are the imperfections of the subject which it actuates and illumines.

[139] According to the Chaldaic theology, which is the same with the Platonic, the intelligible order, subsisting immediately after _the one_, consists of three triads; the summit of each being called _father_, the middle, _power_, and the third _intellect_. This is profoundly and beautifully explained by Proclus in Theol. Plat. lib. 3. to which I refer the reader desirous of copious information, on this sublime and interesting subject. I only add that Plato in the Timæus, ascribes these appellations to the demiurgus of the universe: and this sufficiently proves that words of this kind are not the invention of the latter Platonists, according to the ignorant assertion of Hyde, in the preface to his book, “On the Religion of the Persians;” a work of an alluring title, but of insignificant execution.

[140] In consequence of this the cause of protection must be superior to the cause of purgation, or purity. For since protection preserves things in their proper order, but purity separates things excellent from such as are base, and the latter is preparatory to the former; hence protection must be superior in the order of causes to purgation.

[141] That _being_ and _form_ differ from each other is evident from the 73d and 74th proposition of these Elements, in which it is demonstrated that _being_ is superior to _form_; because being is above that which is total; and that which is total is above form.

[142] He who understands this will see the propriety of the appellation _fabricator_, and _father_, given by Plato in the Timæus to the artificer of the world; and why _fabricator_ is placed before _father_; concerning which consult Proclus on Plato’s Theology, lib. v. cap. 16.

[143] This must be understood, not as if the first intellect understood nothing but itself; but that it understands no other intellect besides itself. For the divine unities, and the first one, are the objects of its continual speculation: and in this exalted employment its life and felicity invariably and eternally consists.

[144] This last sentence of the proposition, is in the original: καὶ νοητὸν εϛὶ. τοῦτο, τὸ μέν, ὅ ἐϛι, τὸ δέ, ἀφ’ οὗ ἐϛίν. And this Portus renders with his usual unskilfulness: et est mente-perceptum. Hoc autem partim quidem, _est illud_, quod est, partim vero, _est illud_, a quo est. That is, “and it is intelligible. But this is partly that which it is, but partly is that from which it is.” The wrong pointing after εϛὶ, which instead of period should be a comma, and τοῦτο being erroneously printed for τούτῳ were the causes of Portus’ mistake: and this he would have rectified, had be understood the proposition.

[145] Thus for instance intellect in _being itself_, which comprehends the highest order of intelligibles, is νοῦς νοητός, or an _intelligible intellect_; because it is the object of intelligence to all subordinate natures, and because its vision is transcendently simple and occult. But every intellect is indeed the same with the intelligible in its own nature, but is subordinate to _intelligible itself_.

[146] Intellect in energy, or in the act of understanding is the same with the object of its intellection. For the object of its perception, must be resident in its essence, or it would perceive externally like sense; and thus would not behold the thing itself, but only its image. But if that which is intelligible is seated in the essence of intellect, it will in no respect differ from intellect: for it will be essential to its nature, and will consequently be intellectual, as well as intelligible.

[147] By an intellection _according to one_ (καθέν) we must understand a various intelligence subsisting indivisibly, and without mutation. Just as when by one and the same energy of vision, we survey the various parts of the same countenance though distant from each other. And an intellection of this kind belongs to all intellects subordinate to the first: for the intelligence of this is perfectly simple, and comprehends all things in one.

[148] That part of his proposition, within the crotchets is in one place very defective in the Greek, which may be corrected as follows: Instead of reading οἱ δὲ μἑτ’ εκεἰνους, δια πλειόνων, ελασσω. κατὰ τὴν δυ['ν]αμιν οὗν ελλαμψιν ἐκἔινοι δὶ ἑλασσόνων πλέιονα παραγούσιν, ὁλικοίτερα εν αυτὅις ἕιδη: read after πλειωων:----ελασσω, κατὰ τὴν δυναμιν ἅλλειψιν. ει ουν εκεινοι δε and the rest as above.

[149] The reader must observe that this is to be understood of immediate participation.

[150] Instead of ἡ γαρ θεοτης συνεξαπτει τῳ νῳ. κ. τ. λ. as in the original, the sense requires that we should read: ὃ γαρ εὕς συνεξαπτει τῳ θεοτητει. κ. τ. λ.

[151] For inferiors are comprehended in superiors, and particulars in universals; so that he who knows universals, knows particulars also; though the reverse of this is not true. The soul, therefore, by possessing a natural capacity of knowing herself, and things superior to her own nature, will from the illuminations attending her knowledge of the latter, know herself in a much more eminent and perspicuous manner.

[152] Thus for instance the body of the world, or of any particular animal, is vital from its receiving the echo of soul; but as it does not at the same time, essentially possess _life_, (or else it would be soul) it is composed from life, and non-life. For it is nothing more than body, or non-life, united with the last image of soul, or a debile life.

[153] This truly divine sentence, is derived from the most profound theory; and can alone be understood by those who have deeply studied the six books of Proclus on Plato’s Theology. I shall, therefore, only observe for the sake of the _intellectual reader_, that as _essence_, _life_, and _intellect_ subsist in occult union, in the first being, which comprehends the highest order of the gods; and as _intelligence_ is the medium between that which is _intelligible_, and _intellect_; it is evident that life itself is intelligence.

[154] Because eternity subsists in life, and is no other than infinite life, as is copiously proved from Plotinus, in the note to Proposition LII.

[155] For that which is properly eternal, is perfectly stable, and is never subject to mutation.

[156] In Proposition CLXXXIV. And from hence it appears, that by particular souls in this Proposition, are meant such as are capable of being changed from the possession of intellect, into its privation.

[157] The reader must observe that these vehicles or divine bodies, the first participants of their correspondent souls, are no other than those vehicles, so beautifully described by Synesius, and inserted in the preceding history of Theology.

[158] For a demonstration of the truth of this sentence, see the note to page 59, vol. I. of this work.

[159] Instead of ὣστε καὶ ἡ μεῥικὴ ψυχὴ, καὶ το αἴτιον. κ. τ. λ.--I read, ῶστε τὸ αἴτιον της μεῤικὴς ψυχὴς, καὶ ἄρα. κ. τ. λ.

[160] χειρόνων is erroneously printed in the Greek, instead of χειτᾶνων.

[161] That part of this proposition, within the crotchets, is neither in the Greek which is here defective, nor in the translation of Patricius, but is added from my own conjecture; whether or not with propriety, the reader must determine.

Transcriber’s Notes:

1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been corrected silently.

2. Where appropriate, the original spelling has been retained.

3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have been retained as in the original.

4. Italics are shown as _xxx_.