Chapter VI: Part 6

{294} But why do I rebuke him for this, when he has made other lying charges against me, which are more outrageous by far? For when a man charges me--I call Heaven and Earth to witness!--with philippizing, what will he not say? By Heracles and all the gods, if one had to inquire truthfully, setting aside all calumny and all expression of animosity, who are in reality the men upon whose heads all would naturally and justly lay the blame for what has taken place, you would find that it was those in each city who resemble Aeschines, not those who resemble me. {295} For they, when Philip's power was weak and quite insignificant--when we repeatedly warned and exhorted you and showed you what was best--they, to satisfy their own avarice, sacrificed the interests of the community, each group deceiving and corrupting their own fellow citizens, until they brought them into bondage. Thus the Thessalians were treated by Daochus, Cineas, and Thrasydaeus; the Arcadians by Cercidas, Hieronymus and Eucampidas; the Argives by Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnaseas; the Eleans by Euxitheus, Cleotimus and Aristaechmus; the Messenians by the sons of the godforsaken Philiadas--Neon and Thrasylochus; the Sicymians by Aristratus and Epichares; the Corinthians by Deinarchus and Demaretus; the Megareans by Ptoeodorus, Helixus and Perillus; the Thebans by Timolaus, Theogeiton, and Anemoetas; the Euboeans by Hipparchus and Sosistratus. {296} Daylight will fail me before the list of the traitors is complete. All these, men of Athens, are men who pursue the same designs in their own cities, as my opponents pursue among you--abominable men, flatterers, evil spirits, who have hacked the limbs each of his own fatherland, and like boon companions have pledged away their freedom, first to Philip and now to Alexander; men whose measure of happiness is their belly, and their lowest instincts; while as for freedom, and the refusal to acknowledge any man as lord--the standard and rule of good to the Hellenes of old--they have flung it to the ground.

{297} Of this shameful and notorious conspiracy and wickedness--or rather (to speak with all earnestness, men of Athens), of this treason against the freedom of the Hellenes--Athens has been guiltless in the eyes of all men, in consequence of my statesmanship, as I have been guiltless in your eyes. And do you then ask me for what merits I count myself worthy to receive honour? I tell you that at a time when every politician in Hellas had been corrupted--beginning with yourself--[firstly by Philip, and now by Alexander], {298} no opportunity that offered, no generous language, no grand promises, no hopes, no fears, nor any other motive, tempted or induced me to betray one jot of what I believed to be the rights and interests of the city; nor, of all the counsel that I have given to my fellow countrymen, up to this day, has any ever been given (as it has by you) with the scales of the mind inclining to the side of gain, but all out of an upright, honest, uncorrupted soul. I have taken the lead in greater affairs than any man of my own time, and my administration has been sound and honest throughout all. {299} That is why I count myself worthy of honour. But as for the fortifications and entrenchments, for which you ridiculed me, I judge them to be deserving, indeed, of gratitude and commendation--assuredly they are so--but I set them far below my own political services. Not with stones, nor with bricks, did I fortify this city. Not such are the works upon which I pride myself most. But would you inquire honestly wherein my fortifications consist? You will find them in munitions of war, in cities, in countries, in harbours, in ships, in horses, and in men ready to defend my fellow countrymen. {300} These are the defences I have set to protect Attica, so far as by human calculation it could be done; and with these I have fortified our whole territory--not the circuit of the Peiraeus or of the city alone. Nor in fact, did _I _prove inferior to Philip in calculations--far from it!--or in preparations for war; but the generals of the confederacy,[n] and their forces, proved inferior to him in fortune. Where are the proofs of these things? They are clear and manifest. I bid you consider them.

{301} What was the duty of a loyal citizen--one who was acting with all forethought and zeal and uprightness for his country's good? Was it not to make Euboea the bulwark of Attica on the side of the sea, and Boeotia on that of the mainland, and on that of the regions towards the Peloponnese, our neighbours[n] in that direction? Was it not to provide for the corn-trade, and to ensure that it should pass along a continuously friendly coast all the way to the Peiraeus? {302} Was it not to preserve the places which were ours--Proconnesus, the Chersonese, Tenedos--by dispatching expeditions to aid them, and proposing and moving resolutions accordingly; and to secure the friendship and alliance of the rest--Byzantium, Tenedos, Euboea? Was it not to take away the greatest of the resources which the enemy possessed, and to add what was lacking to those of the city? {303} All this has been accomplished by my decrees and by the measures which I have taken; and all these measures, men of Athens, will be found by any one who will examine them without jealousy, to have been correctly planned, and executed with entire honesty: the opportunity for each step was not, you will find, neglected or left unrecognized or thrown away by me, and nothing was left undone, which it was within the power and the reasoning capacity of a single man to effect. But if the might of some Divine Power, or the inferiority of our generals, or the wickedness of those who were betraying your cities, or all these things together, continuously injured our whole cause, until they effected its overthrow, how is Demosthenes at fault? {304} Had there been in each of the cities of Hellas one man, such as I was, as I stood at my own post in your midst--nay, if all Thessaly and all Arcadia had each had but one man animated by the same spirit as myself--not one Hellenic people, either beyond or on this side of Thermopylae, would have experienced the evils which they now suffer. {305} All would have been dwelling in liberty and independence, free from all fears, secure and prosperous, each in their own land, rendering thanks for all these great blessings to you and the rest of the Athenian people, through me. But that you may know that in my anxiety to avoid jealousy, I am using language which is far from adequate to the actual facts, (_to the clerk_) read me this; and take and recite the list of the expeditions sent out in accordance with my decrees.

[_The list of expeditions is read]_

{306} These measures, and others like them, Aeschines, were the measures which it was the duty of a loyal and gallant citizen to take. If they were successful, it was certain that we should be indisputably the strongest power, and that with justice as well as in fact: and now that they have resulted otherwise, we are left with at least an honourable name. No man casts reproach either upon the city, or upon the choice which she made: they do but upbraid Fortune, who decided the issue thus. {307} It was not, God knows, a citizen's duty to abandon his country's interests, to sell his services to her opponents, and cherish the opportunities of the enemy instead of those of his country. Nor was it, on the one hand, to show his malice against the man who had faced the task of proposing and moving measures worthy of the city, and persisting in that intention; while, on the other hand, he remembered and kept his eyes fixed upon any private annoyance which another had caused him: nor was it to maintain a wicked and festering inactivity, as you so often do. {308} Assuredly there is an inactivity that is honest and brings good to the State--the inactivity which you,[n] the majority of the citizens, observe in all sincerity. But that is not the inactivity of Aeschines. Far from it! He, on the contrary, retires just when he chooses, from public life (and he often chooses to do so), that he may watch for the moment when you will be sated with the continual speeches of the same adviser, or when fortune has thrown some obstacle in your path, or some other disagreeable event has happened (for in the life of man many things are possible); and then, when such an opportunity comes, suddenly, like a gale of wind, out of his retirement he comes forth an orator, with his voice in training, and his phrases and his sentences collected; and these he strings together lucidly, without pausing for breath, though they bring with them no profit, no accession of anything good, but only calamity to one or another of his fellow citizens, and shame to all alike. {309} Surely, Aeschines, if all this practice and study sprang from an honest heart, resolved to pursue the interests of your country, the fruits of it should have been noble and honourable and profitable to all--alliances of cities, supplies of funds, opening of ports,[n] enactment of beneficial laws, acts of opposition to our proved enemies. {310} It was for all such services that men looked in bygone days; and the past has offered, to any loyal and gallant citizen, abundant opportunities of displaying them: but nowhere in the ranks of such men will you ever be found to have stood--not first, nor second, nor third, nor fourth, nor fifth, nor sixth, nor in any position whatsoever; at least, not in any matters whereby your country stood to gain. {311} For what alliance has the city gained by negotiations of yours? What assistance, what fresh access of goodwill or fame? What diplomatic or administrative action of yours has brought new dignity to the city? What department of our home affairs, or our relations with Hellenic and foreign states, over which you have presided, has shown any improvement? Where are your ships? Where are your munitions of war? Where are your dockyards? Where are the walls that you have repaired? Where are your cavalry? Where in the world _is_ your sphere of usefulness? What pecuniary assistance have you ever given, as a good and generous fellow citizen,[n] either to rich or poor? {312} 'But, my good sir, 'you say, 'if I have done none of these things, I have at least given my loyalty and goodwill.' Where? When? Why, even at a time when all who ever opened their lips upon the platform contributed voluntarily to save the city, till, last of all, Aristonicus gave what he had collected to enable him to regain his civil rights--even then, most iniquitous of men! you never came forward or made any contribution whatever: and assuredly it was not from poverty, when you had inherited more than five talents out of the estate of your father-in-law Philo, and had received two talents subscribed by the leaders of the Naval Boards,[n] for your damaging attack upon my Naval Law.[n] {313} But I will say no more about this, lest by passing from subject to subject I should break away from the matter in hand. It is at least plain that your failure to contribute was not due to your poverty, but to your anxiety to do nothing in opposition to those whose interest is the guide of your whole public life. On what occasions, then, do your spirit and your brilliancy show themselves? When something must be done to injure your fellow countrymen--then your voice is most glorious, your memory most perfect; then you are a prince of actors, a Theocrines[n] on the tragic stage!

{314} Again, you have recalled the gallant men of old, and you do well to do so. Yet it is not just, men of Athens, to take advantage of the good feeling which you may be relied upon to entertain towards the dead, in order to examine me before you by their standard, and compare me, who am still living amongst you, with them. {315} Who in all the world does not know that against the living there is always more or less of secret jealousy, while none, not even their enemies, hate the dead any more? And am I, in spite of this law of nature, to be judged and examined to-day by the standard of those who were before me? By no means! It would be neither just nor fair, Aeschines. But let me be compared with yourself, or with any of those who have adopted the same policy as yourself, and are still alive. {316} And consider this also. Which of these alternatives is the more honourable? Which is better for the city?--that the good services done by men of former times--tremendous, nay even beyond all description though they may be--should be made an excuse for exposing to ingratitude and contumely those that are rendered to the present generation? or that all who act in loyalty should have a share in the honours and the kindness which our fellow citizens dispense? {317} Aye, and (if I must say this after all) the policy and the principles which I have adopted will be found, if rightly viewed, to resemble and to have the same aims as those of the men who in that age received praise; while yours resemble those of the dishonest assailants of such persons in those days. For in their time also there were obviously persons who disparaged the living and praised the men of old, acting in the same malicious way as yourself. {318} Do you say then, that I am in no way like them? But are you like them, Aeschines? or your brother? or any other orator of the present day? For my part, I should say, 'None.' Nay, my good sir--to use no other epithet--compare the living with the living, their contemporaries, as men do in every other matter, whether they are comparing poets or choruses or competitors in the games. {319} Because Philammon was not so powerful as Glaucus of Carystus[n] and some other athletes of former times, he did not leave Olympia uncrowned: but because he fought better than all who entered against him, he was crowned and proclaimed victor. Do you likewise examine me beside the orators of the day--beside yourself, beside any one in the world that you choose. {320} I fear no man's rivalry. For, while the city was still free to choose the best course, and all alike could compete with one another in loyalty to their country, I was found the best adviser of them all. It was by my laws, by my decrees, by my diplomacy, that all was effected. Not one of your party appeared anywhere, unless some insult was to be offered to your fellow countrymen. But when there happened, what I would had never happened--when it was not statesmen that were called to the front, but those who would do the bidding of a master, those who were anxious to earn wages by injuring their country, and to flatter a stranger--then, along with every member of your party, you were found at your post, the grand and resplendent owner of a stud;[n] while I was weak, I confess, yet more loyal to my fellow countrymen than you. {321} Two characteristics, men of Athens, a citizen of a respectable character (for this is perhaps the least invidious phrase that I can apply to myself) must be able to show: when he enjoys authority, he must maintain to the end the policy whose aims are noble action and the pre-eminence of his country: and at all times and in every phase of fortune he must remain loyal. For this depends upon his own nature; while his power and his influence are determined by external causes. And in me, you will find, this loyalty has persisted unalloyed. For mark this. {322} Not when my surrender was demanded, not when I was called to account before the Amphictyons, not in face either of threats or of promises, not when these accursed men were hounded on against me like wild beasts, have I ever been false to my loyalty towards you. For from the very first, I chose the straight and honest path in public life: I chose to foster the honour, the supremacy, the good name of my country, to seek to enhance them, and to stand or fall with them. {323} I do not walk through the market, cheerful and exultant over the success of strangers, holding out my hand and giving the good tidings to any whom I expect to report my conduct yonder, but shuddering, groaning, bowing myself to the earth, when I hear of the city's good fortune, as do these impious men, who make a mock of the city --not remembering that in so doing they are mocking themselves--while they direct their gaze abroad, and, whenever another has gained success through the failure of the Hellenes, belaud that state of things, and declare that we must see that it endures for all time.

{324} Never, O all ye gods, may any of you consent to their desire! If it can be, may you implant even in these men a better mind and heart. But if they are verily beyond all cure, then bring them and them alone to utter and early destruction, by land and sea. And to us who remain, grant the speediest release from the fears that hang over us, and safety that naught can shake!

FOOTNOTES

[1] Some writers suppose that it was at the meeting in the spring of 339. The evidence is not conclusive, but appears to point to the date given here.

NOTES

ON THE NAVAL BOARDS

§ 1. _who praise your forefathers_. The advocates of war with Persia had doubtless appealed to the memory of Marathon and Salamis, and the old position of Athens as the champion of Greece against Persia.

§ 10, 11. The argument is this: 'If a war with Persia needed a special kind of force, we could not prepare for it without being detected: but as all wars need the same kind of force, our preparations need rouse no suspicion in Persia particularly.'

_acknowledged foes_: i.e. probably Thebes, or the revolted allies of Athens, with whom a disadvantageous peace had, perhaps, just been made. It is not, however, impossible that Philip also is in the orator's mind; for though at the time he was probably engaged in war with the Illyrians and Paeonians, his quarrel with Athens in regard to Amphipolis had not been settled. The Olynthians may also be thought of. (See Introd. to Phil. I and Olynthiacs.)

§ 12. _rhapsodies_. The rhapsodes who went about Greece reciting Homer and other poets had lost the distinction they once enjoyed, and 'rhapsody' became a synonym for idle declamation.

§ 14. _a bold speech_: i.e. a demand for instant war, helped out by rhetorical praises of the men of old.

§ 16. _unmarried heiresses and orphans_. These would be incapable of discharging the duties of the trierarchy, though their estates were liable for the war-tax. Partners were probably exempted, when none of them possessed so large a share in the common property as would render him liable for trierarchy.

_property outside Attica_. According to the terms made by Athens with her allies when the 'Second Delian League' was formed in 378, Athens undertook that no Athenian should hold property in an allied State. But this condition had been broken, and the multiplication of Athenian estates [Greek: _kl_erhouchiai_] in allied territories had been one of the causes of the war with the allies.

_unable to contribute_: e. g. owing to no longer possessing the estate which he had when the assessment was made.

§ 17. _to associate, &c_. The sections which contained a very rich man were to have poor men included in it, so that the total wealth of every section might be the same, and the distribution of the burden between the sections fair.

§ 18. _the first hundred, &c_. Demosthenes thinks of the fleet as composed, according to need, of 100, 200, or 300 vessels, and treats each hundred as a separate squadron, to be separately divided among the Boards.

_by lot_. In this and other clauses of his proposal, Demosthenes stipulates for the use of the lot ([Greek: _sunkl_er_osai_], [Greek: epikl_erosai]) to avoid all unfair selection. It is only in the distribution of duties among the smaller sections within each Board that assignment by arrangement ([Greek: _apodounai_], a word suggesting distribution according to fitness or convenience) is to be allowed.

§ 19. _taxable capital_ ([Greek: _tim_ema_]). The war-tax and the trierarchic burdens were assessed on a valuation of the contributor's property. Upon this valuation of his taxable capital he paid the percentage required. (The old view that he was taxed not upon his capital, as valued, but upon a fraction of it varying with his wealth, rests upon an interpretation of passages in the Speeches against Aphobus, which is open to grave question.) The total amount of the single valuations was the 'estimated taxable capital of the country' ([Greek: _tim_ema t_es ch_oras_]). This, in the case of the trierarchy, would be the aggregate amount of the valuations of the 1,200 wealthiest men, viz. 6,000 talents. (Of course the capital taxable for the war-tax would be considerably larger. Even at a time when the prosperity of Attica was much lower, in 378-377 B.C., it was nearly 6,000 talents, according to Polybius, ii. 62. 6.)

§ 20. A tabular statement will make this plain:--

_Persons _Total capital taxable
_Ships_. responsible_. for each ship_.

100 12 60 tal.
200 6 30 "
300 4 20 "

The percentage payable on the taxable capital was of course higher, the larger the number of ships required. Each ship appears to have cost on the average a talent to equip. The percentages in the three cases contained in the table would therefore be 1-2/3, 3-1/3, and 5, respectively. (Compare § 27.)

§ 21. _fittings ... in arrear_. Apparently former trierarchs had not always given back the fittings of their vessels, which had either been provided at the expense of the State, or lent to the trierarchs by the State.

§ 23. _wards_ ([Greek: _trittyes_]). The trittys or ward was one-third of a tribe.

§ 25. _you see ... city_. The Assembly met on the Pnyx, whence there was a view of the Acropolis and of the greater part of the ancient city.

_prophets_. The Athenian populace seems always to have been liable to the influence of soothsayers, who professed to utter oracles from the gods, particularly when war was threatening. This was so (e. g.) at the time of the Peloponnesian War (Thucyd. ii. 8, v. 26), and the soothsayer is delightfully caricatured by Aristophanes in the _Birds_ and elsewhere.

§ 29. _two hundred ships ... one hundred were Athenian_. In the Speech on the Crown, § 238, Demosthenes gives the numbers as 300 and 200. Perhaps a transcriber at an early stage in the history of the text accidentally wrote HH (the symbol for 200) instead of HHH, in the case of the first number, and a later scribe then 'corrected' the second number into H instead of HH. The numbers given by Herodotus are 378 and 180, and, for the Persian ships, 1,207.

§ 31. _against Egypt_, which was now in rebellion against Artaxerxes. Orontas, Satrap of Mysia, was more or less constantly in revolt during this period.

§ 32. _even more certainly_ [Greek: _palai_]: lit. 'long ago'. The transition from temporal to logical priority is paralleled in certain uses of other temporal adverbs, e.g. [Greek: _euthys_] (Aristotle, _Poet_. v), and [Greek: _schol_e_] (of which, as Weil notes, [Greek: _palai_] is the exact opposite).

§ 34. _sins against Hellas_. This refers to the support given to the Persian invaders by Thebes in the Persian Wars (Herod. viii. 34).

FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS

§ 4. _Plataeae_ (which had been overthrown by the enemies of Athens in the course of the Peloponnesian War, but rebuilt, with the aid of Sparta, in 378) was destroyed by Thebes in 373-372. About the same time Thebes destroyed Thespiae, which, like Plataeae, was well-disposed towards Athens; and in 370 the Thebans massacred the male population of Orchomenus, and sold the women and children into slavery.

§ 11. _Oropus_ had sometimes belonged to Thebes and sometimes to Athens. In 366 it was taken from Athens by Themison, tyrant of Eretria (exactly opposite Oropus, on the coast of Euboea), and placed in the hands of Thebes until the ownership should be decided. Thebes retained it until it was restored to Athens by Philip in 338.

§ 12. _when all the Peloponnesians, &c_. The reference seems to be to the year 370, shortly after the battle of Leuctra, when the Peloponnesian States sought the protection of Athens against Sparta, and, being refused, became allies of Thebes (Diodorus xv. 62). In 369 Athens made an alliance with Sparta.

§ 14. _saved the Spartans_. See last note. Athens also assisted the Spartans at Mantineia in 362.

_the Thebans_. In 378 and the following years Athens assisted Thebes against the Spartans under Agesilaus and Cleombrotus.

_the Euboeans_. In 358 or 357 Euboea succeeded in obtaining freedom from the domination of Thebes by the aid of Athenian troops under Timotheus.

§ 16. _Triphylia_, a district between Elis and Messenia, was the subject of a long-standing dispute between the Eleans and the Arcadians, and seems to have been in the hands of the latter since (about) 368.

_Tricaranum_, a fortress in the territory of Phlius, had been seized by the Argives in 369, and used as a centre from which incursions were made into Phliasian territory.

§ 20. _allies of Thebes_: in order to preserve the balance of power between Thebes and Sparta.

§ 21. _the Theban confederacy_. The reference is particularly to the Arcadian allies of Thebes, but the wider expression perhaps suggests a general policy of a more ambitious kind.

§ 22. _you, I think, know_. He refers to the older members of the Assembly, who would remember the tyrannical conduct of Sparta during the period of her supremacy (the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.).

§ 27. _pillars_. The terms of an alliance were usually recorded upon pillars erected by each State on some site fixed by agreement or custom.

§ 28. _in the war_: i.e. the 'Sacred War', against the Phocians.

FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS

§ 3. _now it will be seen_: i.e. if you come to a right decision, and help the Rhodians.

§ 5. _the Egyptians_. See Speech on Naval Boards, § 31 n.

§ 6. _to advise you_: i.e. in the Speech on the Naval Boards (see especially §§ 10, 11 of that Speech).

§ 9. _Ariobarzanes_, Satrap of the Hellespont, joined in the general revolt of the princes of Asia Minor against Persia in 362, at first secretly (as though making war against other satraps) but afterwards openly. Timotheus was sent to help him, on the understanding that he must not break the Peace of Antalcidas (378 B.C.), according to which the Greek cities in Asia were to belong to the king, but the rest were to be independent (except that Athens was to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros). When Ariobarzanes broke out in open revolt, Timotheus could not help him without breaking the first provision; but the Persian occupation tion of Samos was itself a violation of the second, and he was therefore justified in relieving the town.

§ 11. _while he is in her neighbourhood_. Artaxerxes almost certainly went in person to Egypt about this time. (That he went before 346 is proved by Isocrates, _Philippus_, § 101; and he was no doubt expected to go, even before he went.) The alternative rendering, 'since he is still to be a neighbouring power to herself,' is less good, since he would be this, whether he conquered Egypt or not.

§ 14. _Rhodians who are now in possession_: i.e. the oligarchs, who held the town with the help of Caria.

_some of their fellow-citizens_: i.e. some of the democratic party.

§ 15. _official patron_ ([Greek: _proxenos_]). The 'official patron' of another State in Athens was necessarily an Athenian, and so differed from the modern consul, whom he otherwise resembled in many ways (cf. Phillipson, _International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome_, vol. i, pp. 147-56).

§ 17. _publicly provided_: i.e. in treaties between the States.

§ 22. _when our democracy_, &c.: i.e. in 404, when, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, the tyranny of the Thirty was established, and a very large number of democratic citizens were driven into exile. The Argives refused the Spartan demand for the surrender of some of these to the Thirty (Diodorus xiv. 6).

§ 23. _one who is a barbarian-aye, and a woman_ ([Greek: _barbaron anthr_opon kai tauta gynaika_]). This has been taken to refer (1) to Artaxerxes and Artemisia. But [Greek: _kai tauta_] cannot be simply [Greek: _pros tont_o_], and [Greek: _kai tauta gynaika_] must refer to the same person as [Greek: _barbaron anthr_opon_]; (2) to Artaxerxes alone, the words [Greek: _kai tauta gynaika_] being a gratuitous insult such as it was customary for Athenians to level at any Persian; (3) to Artemisia alone, [Greek: anthr_opos] being feminine here as often. It is not possible to decide certainly between (2) and (3). Artemisia is more prominent in the speech than the king, but it is the king who is referred to in the next sentence.

§ 24. _rendered Athens weak_. The success of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War was rendered possible, to a great extent, by the supply of funds from Persia. In 401 Cyrus made his famous expedition against Artaxerxes II, and Clearchus (with other generals) commanded the Greek troops which assisted him. The death of Cyrus in the battle of Cunaxa in 401 put an end to his rebellion.

§ 25. _rights of the rest of the world_. Weil suggests that it may have been argued that to intervene in Rhodian affairs would be to break the treaty made with the allies in 355 (about), at the end of the Social War, whereby their independence was guaranteed.

§ 26. _Chalcedon_ was on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, and therefore by the Peace of Antalcidas belonged to the king (see n. on § 9). By the same treaty, Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis, ought to have been independent. The Byzantines, who had obtained their independence of Athens in the Social War, were extending their influence greatly at this time.

§ 27. _the treaty_: again the Peace of Antalcidas.

_even if there actually are such advisers_: or, 'even if any one actually asserts the existence of such persons.'

§ 29. _two treaties_. The first must be the Peace of Callias (444 B.C.), the terms of which are given in the Speech on the Embassy, § 273. The second was the Peace of Antalcidas.

§ 30. _the knowledge of what is right_. The parallel passage in § 1 seems to confirm this rendering, rather than the alternative, 'the intention to do what is right.'

§ 33. _oligarchical_. This expression is partly directed at those who, in opposing the exiled democrats, supported the oligarchs of Rhodes; and it may be partly explained by the fact that the policy of Eubulus, who wished to avoid all interferences which might lead to war, was particularly satisfactory to the wealthier classes in Athens. But it was a common practice to accuse an opponent of anti-democratic sentiments, and of trying to get the better of the people by illegitimate means (cf. Speech on Embassy, § 314, &c.).

§ 35. Cf. Speech on Naval Boards, § 41.

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

§ 3. _the war with Sparta_. Probably the Boeotian War (378-371 B.C.), when Athens supported Thebes against Sparta.

_in defence of the right_. The attempt of the Spartans to conquer Boeotia was a violation of the Peace of Antalcidas (see n. on Speech for Rhodians, § 6). But Demosthenes' expression may be quite general in its meaning.

§ 4. _tribes_. Probably refers especially to the Thracians (see Introd. to the Speech). The Paeonian and Illyrian chieftains also made alliance with Athens in 356.

§ 17. _to Euboea_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § 14 n.

_to Haliartus_: in 395, when Athens sent a force to aid the Thebans against the Spartans under Lysander. (For other allusions see Introd. to the Speech.)

§ 19. _paper-armies_ ([Greek: epistolimaious ... dynameis]): lit. 'armies existing in dispatches.'

§ 24. _Athens once maintained_, &c. The reference is to the Corinthian war of 394-387 B.C. The Athenian general Iphicrates organized a mercenary force of peltasts in support of Corinth, and did great damage to Sparta; he was succeeded in the command by Chabrias. Nothing more is certainly known of Polystratus than is told us here, though he may be referred to in the Speech against Leptines, § 84, as receiving honours from Athens.

_to Artabazus_. In 356 Chares was sent to oppose the revolted allies of Athens, but being short of funds, assisted Artabazus in his rebellion against Persia, and was richly rewarded. (See Introd. to Speech on Naval Boards.)

§ 25. _spectators of these mysteries of generalship_ ([Greek: epoptai t_on ] [Greek: *_strat_egoumen_on_]). The word [Greek: _epopt_es_] is chiefly used of spectators of the mysteries, and is here applied sarcastically to the citizens whom Demosthenes desires to see what has hitherto been a hidden thing from them--the conduct of their generals.

§ 26. _ten captains and generals, &c_. There was one general ([Greek: _strat_egos_]) and one captain ([Greek: _taxiarchos_]) of infantry, and one general of cavalry ([Greek: _phylarchos_]), for each of the ten tribes. There were two regular masters of the horse ([Greek: _hipparchoi_]), and a third appointed for the special command of the Athenian troops in Lemnos. The generals ([Greek: _strat_egoi_]) had various civil duties, among them the organization of the military processions at the Panathenaea and other great festivals.

§ 27. _Menelaus_. Either a Macedonian chieftain, who had assisted the Athenian commander Timotheus against Poteidaea in 364, and probably received Athenian citizenship; or else Philip's half-brother Menelaus. But there is no evidence that the latter ever served in the Athenian forces, and probably the former is meant.

§ 31. _Etesian winds_. These blow strongly from the north over the Aegean from July to September.

§ 33. _the whole force in its entirety_. So with Butcher's punctuation. But it is perhaps better to place a comma after [Greek: _dynamin_], and translate, 'after making ready ... soldiers, ships, cavalry--the entire force complete--you bind them,' &c.

§ 34. See Introd. to the Speech. Geraestus was the southernmost most point of Euboea. The 'sacred trireme', the Paralus, when conveying the Athenian deputation to the Festival of Delos, put in on its way at Marathon, where there was an altar of the Delian Apollo, to offer sacrifice.

§ 35. The festival of the Panathenaea was managed by the Athlothetae, who were appointed by lot, and consequently could not be specially qualified; whereas the stewards ([Greek: _epimel_etai_]) who assisted the Archon in the management of the Dionysia, were at this time elected, presumably on the ground of their fitness.

_an amount of trouble_ ([Greek: _ochlon_]). Possibly 'a larger crowd'. But there is no point in mentioning the crowd; the point lies in the pains taken; and Thucyd. vi. 24 ([Greek: _upo tou ochl_odous t_es parhaskeu_es_]) confirms the rendering given.

§ 36. The choregus paid the expenses of a chorus at the Dionysiac (and certain other) festivals. The gymnasiarchs, or stewards of the games, managed the games and torch-races which formed part of the Panathenaea and many other festivals. The offices were imposed by law upon men who possessed a certain estate, but any one who felt that another could bear the burden better might challenge him either to perform the duty or to exchange property with him. (See Appendix to Goodwin's edition of Demosthenes' Speech against Meidias.)

_independent freedmen_: lit. 'dwellers apart,' i.e. freedmen who no longer lived with the master whose slaves they had been.

§ 43. _empty ships_. If these are the ships referred to in Olynth. III, Section 4, the date of the First Philippic must be later than October 351 B.C.

§ 46. _promises_. The 'promises of Chares' became almost proverbial.

§ 47. _examination_, or 'audit'. A general, like every other responsible official, had to report his proceedings, at the end of his term of office, to a Board of Auditors, and might be prosecuted before a jury by any one who was dissatisfied with his report.

§ 48. _negotiating with Sparta, &c_. As a matter of fact, Philip had evidently come to an understanding with Thebes by this time; but he may have caused some such rumours to be spread, in order to get rid of any possible opposition from Sparta. The 'breaking-up of the free states' probably refers to the desire of Sparta to destroy Megalopolis, which was in alliance with Thebes.

_sent ambassadors to the king_. Arrian, ii. 14, mentions a letter of Darius to Alexander, recalling how Philip had been in friendship and alliance with Artaxerxes Ochus. It is possible, therefore, that the rumour to which Demosthenes alludes had some foundation.

THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC

(_Note_.--Most of the allusions in the Olynthiacs are explained by the Introduction to the First Philippic.)

§ 4. _power over everything, open or secret_. The translation generally approved, 'power to publish or conceal his designs,' is hardly possible. The [Greek: kai] in the phrase [Greek: rh_eta kai aporr_eta] (or [Greek: arr_eta]) cannot be taken disjunctively here, when it is always conjunctive in this phrase elsewhere, the whole phrase being virtually equivalent to 'everything whatever'.

§ 5. _how he treated_, &c. The scholiast says that Philip killed the traitors at Amphipolis first, saying that if they had not been faithful to their own countrymen, they were not likely to be faithful to himself; and that the traitors at Pydna, finding that they were not likely to be spared, took sanctuary, and having been persuaded to surrender themselves on promise of their lives, were executed nevertheless. Neither story is confirmed by other evidence.

§ 8. _in aid of the Euboeans_: in 358 or 357. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § 14 n.

§ 13. _Magnesia_. There seems to have been a town of the same name as the district.

_attacked the Olynthians_. This refers to the short invasion of 351 (see vol. i, p. 70), not to that which is the subject of the Olynthiacs.

_Arybbas_ was King of the Molossi, and uncle of Philip's wife, Olympias. Nothing is known of this expedition against him. He was deposed by Philip in 343. (See vol. ii, p. 3.)

§ 17. _these towns_: the towns of the Chalcidic peninsula, over which Olynthus had acquired influence. This sentence shows that Olynthus itself had not yet been attacked.

§ 26. _But, my good Sir_, &c. This must be the objection of an imaginary opponent. It can hardly be taken (as seems to be intended by Butcher) as Demosthenes' reply to the question, 'Or some other power?' ('But, my good Sir, the other power will not want to help him.') There is, however, much to be said for Sandys's punctuation, [Greek: _ean m_e bo_eth_es_eth umeis _e allos tis_], 'unless you or some other power go to their aid.' After the death of Onomarchus in 352, the Phocians were incapable of withstanding invasion without help.

THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC

§ 14. _Timotheus, &c_. In 364 an Athenian force under Timotheus invaded the territory of the Olynthian League, and took Torone, Poteidaea, and other towns, with the help of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia.

_ruling dynasty_: i.e. the dynasty of Lycophron and Peitholaus at Pherae. (See Introd. to First Philippic.)

§ 28. _this war_: i.e. the war with Philip generally. The reference is supposed to be to the conduct of Chares in 356 (cf. Phil. I, Section 24 ii.), though in fact it was against the revolted allies, not against Philip, that he had been sent. Sigeum was a favourite resort of Chares, and it is conjectured that he may have obtained possession of Lampsacus and Sigeum (both on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont) in 356. The explanation of the conduct of the generals is to be found in the fact that in Asia Minor they could freely appropriate prizes of war and plunder, since under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens could claim nothing in Asia for her own.

§ 29. _taxes by Boards_. Each of the Boards constituted in 378-377 for the collection of the war-tax (see vol. i, p. 31) had a leader or chairman ([Greek: __hegem_on_]), one of the 300 richest men in Athens, whose duty it was to advance the sums required by the State, recovering them afterwards from the other members of the Boards. Probably the Three Hundred were divided equally among the 100 Boards, a leader, a 'second', and a 'third' (Speech on Crown, § 103) being assigned to each. The 'general' here perhaps corresponds to the 'second'.

THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

§ 4. _two or three years ago_ (lit. 'this is the third or fourth year since). It was in November 352 B.C. If the present Speech was delivered before November 349, not quite three years would have elapsed. (The Greek words, [Greek: triton _he tetarton etos touti], must, on the analogy of the Speech against Meidias, § 13, against Stephanus, II. § 13, and against Aphobus, I. § 24, &c., mean 'two or three', not 'three or four years ago'). The vagueness of the expression is more likely to be due to the date of the Third Olynthiac being not far short of three years from that of the siege of Heraeon Teichos, than to the double-dating (on the one hand by actual lapse of time, and on the other by archon-years--from July to July--or by military campaigning seasons) which most commentators assume to be intended here, but which seems to me over-subtle and unlike Demosthenes.

_that year_: i.e. the archonship of Aristodemus, which ran from July 352 B.C. to July 351.

§ 5. _the mysteries_. These were celebrated from the 14th to the 27th of Boedromion (late in September).

_Charidemus_, of Oreus in Euboea, was a mercenary leader who had served many masters at different times--Athens, Olynthus, Cotys, and Cersobleptes--and had played most of them false at some time or other. But he was given the citizenship in 357 for the part which he had taken in effecting the cession of the Chersonese to Athens, and was a favourite with the people. He was sent on the occasion here referred to with ten ships, for which he was to find mercenary soldiers.

§ 6. _with might ... power_. A quotation, probably from the text of the treaty of alliance between Athens and Olynthus.

§ 8. _funds of the Phocians are exhausted_. The Phocian leader Phalaecus had been using the temple-treasures of Delphi, but they were now exhausted.

§ 10. _a Legislative Commission_: i.e. a Special Commission on the model of the regular Commission which was appointed annually from the jurors for the year (if the Assembly so decreed), and before which those who wished to make or to oppose changes in the laws appeared, the proceedings taking the form of a prosecution and defence of the laws in question. The Assembly itself did not legislate, though it passed decrees, which had to be consistent with the existing laws. As regards legislation, it merely decided whether in any given year alterations in the laws should or should not be allowed.

§ 11. _malingerers_. The scholiast says that the choregi were persuaded to choose persons as members of their choruses, in order to enable them to escape military service, choreutae being legally exempted. Other exemptions also existed.

§ 12. _persons who proposed them_. This can only refer to Eubulus and his party.

§ 20. _Corinthians and Megareans_. From the pseudo-Demosthenic Speech on the Constitution ([Greek: _pe_ri suntaxe_os_]) and from Philochorus (quoted in the Scholia of Didymus upon that Speech) it appears that the Athenians had in 350 invaded Megara, under the general Ephialtes, and forced the Megareans to agree to a delimitation of certain land sacred to the two goddesses of Eleusis, which the Megareans had violated, perhaps for some years past (see Speech against Aristocrates, § 212). A scholiast also refers to the omission by Corinth to invite the Athenians to the Isthmian games, in consequence of which the Athenians sent an armed force to attend the games. Probably this was also a recent occurrence, and due to an understanding between Corinth and Megara.

§ 21. _my own namesake_: i.e. Demosthenes, who was a distinguished general during the Peloponnesian War, and perished in the Sicilian expedition.

§ 24. _for forty-five years_: i.e. between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, 476-431 B.C.

_the king_: i.e. Perdiccas II, who, however, took the side of Sparta shortly after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He died in 413. (The date of the beginning of his reign is unknown, but he did not become sole king of the whole of Macedonia until 436.)

§ 27. _Spartans had been ruined_: sc. by the battles of Leuctra (in 371) and Mantineia (in 362).

_Thebans had their hands full_, owing to the war with the Phocians, from 356 onwards.

§ 28. _in the war_, when Athens joined Thebes against Sparta (in 378). 'The allies' are those members of the Second Delian League (formed in 378) who had been lost in the Social War which ended in or about 355, when Athens was at peace with Thebes and Sparta. (See Introduction, vol. i, p. 9.)

§ 31. _procession at the Boedromia_. The Boedromia was a festival held in September in honour of Apollo and Artemis Agrotera, Probably a procession was not a regular part of the festival at this time. The importance which the populace attached to such processions is illustrated by the Speech against Timocrates, § 161.

§ 34. _is it then paid service, &c_.: almost, 'do you then suggest that we should _earn_ our money?'

§ 35. _adding or subtracting_: sc. from the sums dispensed by the State to the citizens.

_somebody's mercenaries_. The reference is probably to the successes of Charidemus when first sent (see Introd. to Olynthiacs).

ON THE PEACE

§ 5. _disturbances in Euboea_. Plutarchus of Eretria applied for Athenian aid against Callias of Chalcis, who was attacking him with the aid of Macedonian troops. Demosthenes was strongly opposed to granting the request, but it was supported by Eubulus and Meidias, and a force was sent under Phocion, probably early in 348 (though the chronology has been much debated, and some place the expedition in 350 or 349). Owing to the premature action or the treachery of Plutarchus at Tamynae (where the Athenian army was attacked), Phocion had some difficulty in winning a victory. Plutarchus afterwards seized a number of Athenian soldiers, and Athens had actually to ransom them. Phocion's successor, Molossus, was unsuccessful. When peace was made in the summer of 348, the Euboeans became for the most part independent of Athens, and were regarded with ill-feeling by Athens for some years. There is no proof that the proposers of the expedition were bribed, as Demosthenes alleges.

§ 6. _Neoptolemus_. See Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 315.

§ 8. _public service_: i.e. as trierarch or choregus or gymnasiarch, &c. See n. on Phil. I. § 36.

§ 10. _there were some_ : i.e. Aeschines and his colleagues. (See Introd.)

_Thespiae and Plataeae_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, Section 4 n.

§ 14. _self-styled Amphictyons_. The Amphictyonic Council represented the ancient Amphictyonic League of Hellenic tribes (now differing widely in importance, but equally represented on the Council), and was supreme in all matters affecting the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. (See n. on Speech on Crown, § 148.) The Council summoned by Philip was open to criticism (1) because only certain members of it were present, of whom the Thebans and Thessalians were the chief, (2) because Philip had been given the vote of the dispossessed Phocians.

§ 15. _however stupid, &c_. It had been conventional for over a century to apply this adjective to the Boeotians, and therefore to the Thebans. For a more favourable view, see W. Rhys Roberts, _Ancient Boeotians_, chap. i.

§ 16. _Oropus_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § ii n.

§ 18. _Argives, &c_. See Speech for Megalopolitans throughout (with Introd.).

_those whom they have exiled_: especially the refugees from Orchomenus and Coroneia. See vol. i, p. 124.

_Phocian fugitives_. The Amphictyonic Council had recently declared that these had been guilty of sacrilege, and might be seized wherever they might be.

§ 20. _all that they themselves had toiled for_: i.e. the conquest of the Phocians in the Sacred War.

§ 22. _some persons_: i.e. Aeschines and others who tried to excuse Philip's treatment of the Phocians to the Athenian people.

§ 23. _admission ... Delphi_. The Phocians had formerly contrived their exclusion from the Amphictyonic meeting and from the temple and oracle of Delphi. The Council now restored them, and excluded the Phocians.

§ 24. _refuse to submit_: reading [Greek: (_oud) otioun upomeinai_.] The insertion of [Greek: _oude_] (after Cobet) seems necessary, [Greek: _otioun upomeinai_] alone would mean 'face any risk', but this would be contradicted by the next clause. To translate, 'who think that we should face any risk, but do not see that the risk would be one of war,' is to narrow the meaning of [Greek: _otioun_] unduly.

§ 25. _Treaty of Peace_: i.e. the Peace of Philocrates.

_Cardians_. The Athenians claimed Cardia (the key of the Chersonese on the Thracian side) as an ally, though in fact it was expressly excluded from the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes in 357, and had made alliance with Philip in 352.

_prince of Caria_. See Speech for Rhodians (with Introd.).

_drive our vessels to shore_: a regular form of ancient piracy (see Speech on Chersonese, § 28). The Byzantines drove the Athenian corn-ships into their own harbour. The victims were relieved of their money or their corn.

_shadow at Delphi_: i.e. the empty privilege (as Demosthenes here chooses to represent it) of membership of the Amphictyonic League and Council, now claimed by Philip.

THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

§ 1. _sympathetic_: i.e. towards other Greek states, desirous of securing independence.

§ 2. _Alexander_, &c. Alexander of Macedon was sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer Athens alliance with Persia on favourable terms. Demosthenes has confused the order of events, and speaks as if this message was brought before the battle of Salamis. The Athenians left the city twice, before the battle of Salamis and before that of Plataeae; it was after Salamis that Alexander was sent (Herod. viii. 140, &c.).

§ 14. _fortify Elateia_. This would be a menace to Thebes (cf. Speech on the Crown, §§ 174, 175). Elateia commands the road from Thermopylae to Thebes.

§ 19. _well-balanced_ ([Greek: _s_ophronousi_]), or 'free from passion', i.e. not liable to be carried away by ambition or cupidity as the Thebans were. This is different from mere 'good sense' ([Greek: _syphronein, noun echea_]). For Theban 'stupidity', see Speech on Peace, § 15 (and n.).