Chapter XXI: Summary and Conclusions (2)

With a total area of 2,948,000 square miles, a population of less than four and a half million, and a coast line of 11,300 miles, the continent of Australia is peculiarly open to attack, and the possibilities of invasion, or of attempts at invasion, have not only been much discussed there of late years, but they have given rise to schemes of land defence in which the building of strategical railways and the adapting of existing lines to strategical purposes form important factors.

Under present conditions Western Australia and the Northern Territory are isolated from the remaining States of the Commonwealth so far as regards rail communication, and are at the mercy of any invader who might be able to land a force there unchallenged by the British Fleet.

Since the autumn of 1912, however, there has been under construction a railway which, starting from Kalgoorlie, the eastern terminus of the Western Australian system, will proceed in a direct line for 1,063 miles to Port Augusta, on the South Australian system, thus establishing through rail connection between Perth (Western Australia) and the farthest limit of the Queensland railway system, a total distance, that is, of about 4,000 miles. When this, the first of Australia's proposed trans-continental lines, is completed, it will be possible to send troops from the Central or the Eastern States to Western Australia, not only by rail, but by a railway laid so far inland that they will be safe from attack from the sea. There would thus be a reasonable certainty of the troops arriving at their destination; whereas if they had to go by water there might be the risk of the vessels in which they were making the journey being captured by the enemy. While, therefore, the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line is expected to serve other than purely strategical purposes, it is, in effect, the latter which claim first consideration.

Referring to the Northern Territory, in an article contributed by him to _The Empire Review_ for May, 1910, Mr. F. A. W. Gisborne, an authority on Australian questions, wrote:--

This vast region embraces 523,620 square miles of land,
and lies close to Asia, the most populous of the continents.
At present it contains, exclusive of the aborigines, barely
one thousand white people and about twice as many Chinese. It
lacks railway communication with the settled parts of Australia,
and is completely isolated from them. Its magnificent harbour,
accessible to the largest vessels afloat, and constituting
the natural gateway to tropical Australia, lies, save for
the British Fleet, absolutely defenceless. Behind it extend
millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled, and
never likely to be cultivated by white hands. Practically no
industry flourishes in a region which could support myriads of
agriculturists and operatives.

That some of the peoples of crowded Asia may, sooner or later, seek a settlement for their surplus millions on what, for them, would be so desirable a land as the Northern Territory, with its magnificent opportunities for those capable of working in a tropical climate, is a contingency that has been fully realised in Australia, and the questions have arisen (1) as to whether the presence of a thousand whites in a region half a million square miles in extent constitutes such "effective occupation" thereof as gives them a right to its exclusive possession; and (2) whether it would be possible either to prevent Asiatics from invading the Northern Territory, if they sought so to do, or to eject them therefrom if they did.

The latter question raises in an especially interesting form the problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power and rail-power.

Sea-power would, assuredly, have to be relied upon for safeguarding the Northern Territory against invasion, since it would be impossible for the Commonwealth Government to station troops at every prospective landing point along 1,200 miles of a tropical coast-line in sufficient force to keep off any invader who might appear there at some unexpected moment. For the checking, therefore, of such invasion, dependence would have to be placed on the power of the British Fleet (1) to stop the invader, (2) to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing, or (3) to carry war into the invader's own country.

Nor, if any large Asiatic settlement--as distinct from an "invasion" in the ordinary acceptation of that term--did take place in the Northern Territory under conditions that might not call for the intervention of the British Fleet, is it certain that the ejection of the settlers could be ensured with the help even of a trans-continental line of railway. Here the question is not that of the carrying power of a single line of railway. The examples offered by the War of Secession, the South African War and the Russo-Japanese War have well established the great advantages that even single lines, extending for great distances, can confer in the effecting of military transport. The considerations that would arise in Australia are, rather, (1) the fact that troops arriving at Pine Creek or Port Darwin from the south might have to make some very long and very trying marches across the 523,000 square miles comprising the Northern Territory before they reached the settlement of the Asiatics whom they were to eject, while they would be dependent for their supplies on a far-distant railway base; and (2) the doubt as to whether Australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to undertake such an expedition, having regard to the defence requirements of her south-eastern States, the integrity of which would count as of more vital importance than an Asiatic settlement in her Far North. So there are those who think that if such a settlement were eventually effected in the Northern Territory, under conditions not constituting a _casus belli_, Australia would simply have to accept the situation, and reconcile herself to it as best she could.

All these things may seem to reflect on the precise value, from the rail-power point of view, of that direct communication which, more especially for strategical reasons, Australia has hoped eventually to obtain between north and south as well as between west and east. It is, nevertheless, desirable to see what has already been done in this direction.

The construction of a north-to-south trans-continental line, passing through the very centre of the Australian mainland, and linking up the Northern Territory with the southern and eastern States, has been under discussion for a period of about forty years. Progress seemed to be assured by the Acceptance Act of 1910, under which the Government of the Commonwealth, in taking over the Northern Territory from South Australia, agreed to build a trans-continental line connecting Oodnadatta, the northern terminus of the South Australian railway system, and 688 miles from Adelaide, with Pine Creek, the southern terminus of the Northern Territory system, and 145 miles distant from Port Darwin. This connecting link would have a length of 1,063 miles,--the same, by a singular coincidence, as that of the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line.

Since this "bargain" between the South Australia and the Commonwealth Governments was made, there have been many advocates of an alternative, or, otherwise, a supplementary route which, instead of going direct from South Australia to the Northern Territory, (passing through the central Australian desert,) would link up--on their west--with the railway systems of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, connections with the new line being made by these States where necessary. This "eastern deviation route" would, it is argued, offer a greater strategical advantage, as compared with the other route, because if troops had to be despatched to the north, they could more readily be supplied from Melbourne and Sydney--which, between them, contain over one-fourth of the entire population of Australia--than from Adelaide; while to send troops from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria to South Australia in order that they might start on their journey to the Northern Territory from Oodnadatta, would involve a material delay under, possibly, urgent conditions. Thus it is estimated that if the eastern route were adopted, troops and travellers from Brisbane to Port Darwin would only travel about 2,234 miles as against 3,691 miles via Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and the central Australian route from Oodnadatta.

How these rival claims and contentions will be eventually settled remains to be seen; but there has now been added to them a project for the building of other avowedly strategical lines, establishing a more direct connection between the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta trans-continental line, when it is finished, and the capitals of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland respectively, facilitating the mutual defence of the eastern, southern and western States in a time of crisis. This further scheme is, however, designed only to supplement the trans-continental lines already mentioned.

As regards the eastern States and the "central" State of South Australia, the question of an Asiatic invasion may be assumed not to arise. It has, however, long been regarded as possible that if Great Britain were at war with some non-Asiatic Power able to challenge her supremacy on the seas, the enemy might make an attack, not on the admittedly vulnerable Northern Territory--which he would not want either as a colony for Europeans or as a "jumping-off" place from which to conquer the remainder of Australia--but on some point along the coast-line of nearly 2,000 miles which, stretching from Rockhampton, in Queensland, to Adelaide, in South Australia, comprises (with a Hinterland of some 200 miles) the most populous, the most wealthy and (for non-Asiatics) the most desirable section of the whole Australian continent.

It is true that Germany--the Power which claims first attention from this point of view--has shown far greater desire to convert Africa into a German Empire than she has to effect the annexation of Australia. Yet that she has recognized the weakness of the Australian situation is suggested by the fact that, in dealing with the defensive power of the Commonwealth, Dr. Rohrbach, one of the exponents of German World-Policy, and author of "Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern," among other works, has declared that Australia could not resist if her four chief towns, all of them near the coast, were occupied by an invader.[87]

Which of these four towns, or which particular point along the said 2,000 miles of coast-line, an invader would select for his main attack--apart from feints elsewhere--must needs be uncertain; but this very fact only adds to the imperative importance of those responsible for the defence of Australia being able to move troops freely, and within the shortest possible period, either from one State to another or from any place to another within one and the same State, as the defence conditions might require.

When we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use of existing lines of railway in Australia for strategical purposes, we find that the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this branch of the subject is contained in the following extract from the "Memorandum" which Lord Kitchener wrote in 1910, as the result of an investigation made by him, at the request of the Commonwealth Government, into the "Defence of Australia":--

Railway construction has, while developing the country,
resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an
enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country.
Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and
the want of systematic interior connection makes the present
lines running inland of little use for defence, although
possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have
temporary command of the sea.

The "different gauges" undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious shortcomings of the existing railways in Australia in regard to those military movements with which we are here alone concerned.

Strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require, not only that troops shall be readily conveyed, when necessary, from one part of a country or one part of a continent to another, but that a mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a mobilisation of railway rolling stock. Locomotives, carriages and trucks on lines which are not themselves likely to be wanted for military transport should be available for use on the lines that will be so wanted, in order that all the rolling stock of all the railways in all parts of the country or of the States concerned can, at a time of possibly the gravest emergency, be concentrated or employed on whatever lines, or in whatever direction, additional transport facilities may be needed.

The importance of this principle was first recognised by von Moltke; but when the railways of Australia were originally planned, each State took a more or less parochial view of its own requirements, its own geographical conditions, or its own resources, and adopted the gauge which accorded best therewith, regardless of any future need for a co-ordinated system of rail-transport serving the requirements of the Australian continent as a whole.

So we find that the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge has been adopted in Queensland, South Australia (with a further 600 miles of 5 ft. 3 in. gauge), Western Australia, and the Northern Territory; the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge (the standard gauge in Great Britain and, also, of over 65 per cent. of the world's railway mileage,) in New South Wales; and the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge in Victoria. This means, in most cases, that when the frontier of a State is reached, passengers, mails, baggage and merchandise must change or be transferred from the trains on the one system to those of the other.

Assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway (which is being built with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge) were now available for use, a traveller by it from Perth, Western Australia, through South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland would require, on account of the differences in gauge, to change trains at least five times. This may be regarded as an extreme case; but the evils of the existing conditions are presented to us in a concrete form by an estimate which the Defence Department of the Commonwealth recently made as to the time it would take to move a force of 30,000 mounted troops from Melbourne to Brisbane. It was shown that, with the present break of gauge, this operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days; whereas if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would suffice. Thus the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty days in effecting transfers at the frontier. In this time much might happen if the enemy had obtained temporary control of the sea. Under these conditions, in fact, he would be able to move his own forces by sea for the still longer distance from Adelaide to Brisbane in five days. Brisbane might thus be captured by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were still changing trains at the State boundaries.

It may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time there were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in the United States; that in 1885 the American railway companies resolved upon establishing uniformity as a means of overcoming the great inconveniences due to these conditions; and that in 1886, after adequate preparation, the conversion of practically the entire system of railways in the United States to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge was effected in two days. Strategically, therefore, the United States Federal Government could now, not only send troops by rail from any one part of their vast territory to another, but utilise almost the whole of the available rolling stock for military purposes.[88]

Unification of gauge forms, however, a serious proposition for Australia on account of the prodigious outlay which, owing to the short-sighted policy of the past, it would now involve.[89]

The estimated cost of converting all the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge in New South Wales and all the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory to the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge of Victoria is no less than £51,659,000. To convert all the 3 ft. 6 in. and 5 ft. 3 in. railways to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the New South Wales lines would cost £37,164,000. To convert to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge all the trunk lines connecting the capitals--and this without shortening the present circuitous routes or modifying the heavy grades--would alone cost about £12,000,000.

In addition to this still undecided "battle of the gauges" there are in Australia other disadvantages, from a strategical standpoint, in the existing railway system, included therein being (1) an undue preponderance of single over double track, so that any exceptional amount of traffic causes a congestion which is likely only to be aggravated by new lines constructed, or extensions made, before the carrying capacity of the trunk lines has been increased; and (2) the building of lines which either lead nowhere or have been expressly stopped short of the boundaries of a State in order to retain, for the railways of that State, traffic from outlying districts which would pass, by a much shorter journey, to the port of a neighbouring State if, by means of through railway connexion, the residents in the districts concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical advantage in respect to their nearness to such port.

In addition to the efforts she has already made, or is proposing to make, to effect such improvement both in her railway system and in her military transport facilities as may be practicable, Australia has sought to provide for that effective organisation without which, as experience elsewhere has fully shown, great and even disastrous confusion may arise at a critical moment owing to conflicts of authority and other troubles or difficulties in the working of such railways as may be utilised for military movements.

The action taken in this direction is based on a further recommendation made by Lord Kitchener, who, in the course of his Memorandum to the Commonwealth Government in 1910 said (paragraph 85):--

Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of
the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed
and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions of
war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can
only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military
authorities are in the closest touch, and work in absolute
harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War
Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the United Kingdom,
composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State,
under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General of the Citizen
Forces, and with an officer of the Headquarters Staff as
secretary.

A War Railway Council for the Commonwealth was duly constituted in 1911. The Council, which forms an adjunct of the Commonwealth Defence Department, consists of the Quartermaster-General, (president,) the senior officer of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps also created for the railway system alike of the Commonwealth and of each State (such senior officer being the Chief or the Deputy Commissioner of Railways); the Consulting Military Engineer of the Commonwealth, and two representatives of the naval and military forces, with a military officer as secretary. The duties of the Council in time of peace are, generally, to furnish advice to the Minister of Defence on railway matters, and, particularly (_a_) to determine the method of supplying information to, and obtaining it from, the different railway departments; (_b_) to suggest regulations and instructions for carrying out movement of troops; (_c_) to suggest the method of organising railway staff officers in time of war to act as intermediaries between the various railway authorities and the troops; (_d_) to consider the question of extra sidings, loading platforms, etc.; and proposals for unification of gauges; and (_e_) to suggest the organisation and system of training of railway troops. In time of war the Council further advises the Minister of defence on questions of mobilisation. The organisation for military rail-transport in the several States follows on the lines of the system already adopted in the United Kingdom, as laid down in the Field Service Regulations.

FOOTNOTES:

[83] Altogether there have been twenty-six invasions of India, dating back to about 2,000 years B.C., and of this number no fewer than twenty-one have ended in conquest.

[84] It has been stated that the number of camels employed during the expeditions of 1878-80 for transport purposes, in default of better rail communication, was so great as almost to exhaust the supply of the frontier provinces of Sind and Punjab, while from 30,000 to 40,000 of them died owing to the excessive toils and trials of the work they were required to perform, the financial loss resulting therefrom to the Treasury being estimated at £200,000.

[85] "Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers," Vol xi, 1885.

[86] "Life and Times of General Sir James Browne, R.E., K.C.B., K.C.S.I." by General J. J. McLeod Innes, London, 1905.

[87] See "The Origins of the War"; by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D. Cambridge, 1914.

[88] In the _New York Sun_ of June 18, 1911, there was published an article which had for its heading, "If Troops had to be Rushed, the Railroads in this Country could move 250,000 Men a Day."

[89] The mileage of lines open, under construction, or authorised, in the three gauges, is as follows:--5 ft. 3 in. gauge, 4,979 miles; 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge, 6,160 miles; 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, 11,727 miles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list of books, pamphlets and articles bearing on the evolution and the development of rail-power down to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914--this alone being the purpose and the scope of the present work--was originally based on selections from a "List of References on the Use of Railroads in War" prepared by the Bureau of Railway Economics, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., and including items from all the leading libraries of the United States (Library of Congress; the libraries of the principal Universities, Colleges and learned or technical societies; State libraries, public libraries, private railway-libraries, and the library of the Bureau itself), together with various foreign libraries, such as those of the Minister of Public Works in Berlin, the International Railway Congress at Berne, and others besides.

Much valuable help has been derived from the American list; but a large number of its references, and especially those relating to the World-War itself, have not here been reproduced, while so many additions have been gathered in from other sources among which might be mentioned the published catalogue of the War Office Library; the libraries of the British Museum, the Royal Colonial Institute, and the Patent Office; the _Journal_ of the Royal United Service Institution, the publications of the Royal Engineers' Institute, and official or other publications in Great Britain, France, etc., that the Bibliography here presented may, perhaps, be regarded as practically a new compilation, supplementing the excellent purpose which the list of the American Bureau of Railway Economics will undoubtedly serve.

EARLIEST REFERENCES (1833-50).

HARKORT, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. Die Eisenbahn von Minden nach
Köln. Hagen, 1833.

[The earliest published work in which the importance and
the possibilities of railways from a military standpoint were
advocated.]

Ueber die militärische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen. Berlin,
1836.

Darlegung der technischen und Verkehrs-Verhältnisse der
Eisenbahnen, nebst darauf gegründeter Erörterung über die
militärische Benutzung derselben. Berlin, 1841.

"Pz." (CARL EDUARD POENITZ). Die Eisenbahn als militärische
Operationslinien betrachtet und durch Beispiele erläutet. Nebst
Entwurf zu einem militärischen Eisenbahnsystem für Deutschland.
Adorf [Saxony], 1842.

---- II. Aufl. Adorf, 1853.

Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, considérés comme lignes
d'opérations militaires. Traduit de l'allemand par L. A. Unger.
Paris, 1844.

[A French translation of the above-mentioned work by
Poenitz, with an introduction by the translator and a map of
Germany and Austria showing railways existing in 1842 and the
"system" projected by the German writer.]

Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den
inländischen und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen
für militärische Zwecke; nach den beim grossen Generalstabe
vorhandenen Materialen zusammengestellt. Berlin, 1848-50.

HOFFMANN, C. Amtlich erlassene Vorschriften über Anlage und
Betrieb der Eisenbahnen in Preussen. Berlin, 1849.

WARS AND EXPEDITIONS

CRIMEAN WAR (1854-55)

HAMLEY, GEN. SIR EDWARD. The War in the Crimea. London, 1891.

LUARD, R.E., CAPT. C. E. Field Railways and their general
application in war. _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution_, Vol. XVII, 1873.

[Refers to military railway built for use in the Crimea.]

ITALIAN WAR (1859)

BARTHOLONY, F. Notice sur les Transports par les Chemins
de Fer français vers le théâtre de la guerre d'Italie. 71 pp.
Paris, 1859.

MILLAR, R.A., MAJOR, Topographical Staff. The Italian
Campaign of 1859. _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution_, Vol. V, pp. 269-308. London, 1861.

[Introductory reference to use of railways.]

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Abhandlung über die Thätigkeit der amerikanischen
Feldeisenbahn-Abtheilungen der Nordstaaten; bei den Directionen
der Staatseisenbahnen. Durch das Königl. Ministerium in
Circulation gesetzt. Berlin.

BACON, E. L. How railroads helped save the Union.
_Railroadman's Magazine_, July, 1909.

HAUPT, HERMAN. Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, Chief
of the Bureau of United States Military Railroads in the Civil
War. 321 pp. Illustrations. Milwaukee, Wis., 1901.

HENDERSON, LIEUT.-COL. G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the
American Civil War. Second edition. Two vols. London, 1899.

PORTER, W. E. Keeping the Baltimore and Ohio in Repair in
War Time was a Task for Hercules. _Book of the Royal Blue_,
June, 1907.

United States Military Railroads. Report of Brev.-Brig.-Gen.
D. C. McCallum, Director and General Manager, from 1861 to 1866.
Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st Session. House. Serial
number, 1251. Washington, 1866.

VIGO-ROUISSILLON, F. P. Puissance Militaire des États-Unis
d'Amérique, d'après la Guerre de la Sécession, 1861-65. IIIe
Partie; chap. viii, Transports généraux. Paris, 1866.

AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1866)

COOKE, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. A. C. C. Short Sketch of the
Campaign in Austria of 1866. 70 pp. Map. London, 1867.

WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in
1886. Papers of the Corps of the Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol.
XVI. Woolwich, 1868.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION (1867-68)

WILLANS, R.E., LIEUT. The Abyssinian Railway. Papers on
Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal
Engineers. N.S. Vol. XVIII. Woolwich, 1870.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870-71)

BUDDE, LIEUT. H. Die Französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege
1870-71 und ihre seitherige Entwicklung in militärischer
Hinsicht. Mit zwei Karten und zehn Skizzen im Texte. 99 pp.
Berlin, 1877.

[Gives maps of the French railway system in 1870 and 1877
respectively.]

---- Die französischen Eisenbahnen im deutschen
Kriegsbetriebe, 1870-71. 487 pp. Berlin, 1904.

ERNOUF, LE BARON. Histoire des Chemins de Fer français
pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne. Paris, 1874.

JACQMIN, F., Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées. Les
Chemins de Fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71. 351 pp. Paris, 1872.

---- 2e edition. 363 pp. 1874.

MÜLLER-BRESLAU, F. Die Tätigkeit unserer
Feldeisenbahn-Abteilung im Kriege 1870-71. Berlin, 1896.

Railway Organisation in the late War. _Edinburgh Review_,
January, 1872.

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-78)

LESSAR, P. De la construction des Chemins de Fer en temps de
guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la campagne
1877-78. Traduit du russe par L. Avril. 142 pp. 10 Planches.
Paris, 1879.

SALE, R.E., CAPT. M. T. The Construction of Military
Railways during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. _Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. XXIV. 1880.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN (1882-99)

History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers. Vol. II. By
Maj.-Gen. Whitworth Porter, R.E. The War in Egypt, 1882-85, pp.
64-87. London, 1889.

---- Vol. III. By Col. Sir Chas. M. Watson. The Sudan
Campaigns, 1885-99, pp. 53-76. Royal Engineers' Institute,
Chatham, 1915.

Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared
in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition.
London, 1908.

NATHAN, R.E., LIEUT. M. The Sudan Military Railway.
Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional
Papers, Vol. XI. 1885.

WALLACE, R.E., MAJ. W. A. J. Railway Operations in Egypt
during August and September, 1882. Professional Papers of the
Corps of Royal Engineers, Chatham. Occasional Papers, Vol. IX.

PHILIPPINE WAR (1898)

COLSON, L. W. Railroading in the Philippine War. _Baltimore
and Ohio Employés' Magazine_, Feb., 1913.

Soldiers Running a Railroad. _Railroad Telegrapher_, Sept.,
1899.

[Tells how the 20th Kansas Regiment ran four miles of the
Manila and Dagupan Railroad during the Philippine insurrection.]

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR (1899-1902)

Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War,
1899-1902. Two vols. Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1905.

Vol. I.--Organisation, Military Control, Working and Repair
of Cape and Natal Government Railways; Management, Engineering
and other Departments of Imperial Military Railways; Railway
Pioneer Regiment; Organisation, Equipment and Use of Armoured
Trains; Army Labour Depôts.

Vol. II.--61 Photographs and 93 Drawings.

GIROUARD, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. E. P. C., Director of Railways,
South African Field Force. History of the Railways during the
War in South Africa, 1899-1902. 149 pp. Maps. London, 1903.

HARRISON, C. W. FRANCIS. Natal: an Illustrated Official
Railway Guide and Handbook. Published by Authority. London, 1903.

[Gives a statement, on pp. 287-290, as to services rendered
by Natal Government Railways during South African War.]

History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled by
the Direction of His Majesty's Government. Vol. IV, Appendix 10,
Notes on the Military Railway System in South Africa. London,
1910.

Netherlands South African Railway Company and the
Transvaal War. Account by the Secretary, Th. Steinnetz, dated
Pretoria, April, 1900. _De Ingenieur_, July 14 and 21, 1900.
English translation in _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution_, Jan., 1902.

_The Times_. History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902.
Vol. VI, Part II, chap. iii, The Railway Work in the War, pp.
297-331. London, 1909.

WATSON, COL. SIR CHAS. M. History of the Corps of the Royal
Engineers. Vol. III, chap. iv, The South African War, 1899-1902.
Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1915.

Working of Railways: Duties of Staff Officers. Pamphlet.
Published by authority. Pretoria, 1900.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-5)

KUROPATKIN, GENERAL A. N. The Russian Army and the Japanese
War. Translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay. Two vols. Maps,
Illustrations. London, 1909.

MÉTIN, ALBERT. Le Transsibérien et la Guerre. _Revue
Économique Internationale_, Oct., 1904.

Official History of the Russo-Japanese War. Prepared by the
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. London,
1910.

"P., A." Construction et Exploitation de Chemins de Fer
à Traction animale sur le Théâtre de la Guerre de 1904-5 en
Mandchourie. _Revue du Génie Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909.
Paris.

Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached
to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field. Vol. III.
General Report (dated March, 1905) by Col. W. H. H. Waters: