Chapter XIV: A.d. February--September, 1645 (2)
The immense disproportion between the numbers of the slain on the side of the Covenanters and that of the prisoners taken by Montrose evidently shows that very little quarter had been given, the cause of which is said to have been the murder of James Gordon, younger of Rhiny, who was killed by a party from the garrison of Spynie, and by some of the inhabitants of Elgin, at Struders, near Forres, where he had been left in consequence of a severe wound he had received in a skirmish during Hurry’s first retreat to Inverness.[300] But Montrose revenged himself still farther by advancing to Elgin and burning the houses of all those who had been concerned in the murder, at the same time sending out a party[301] to treat in a similar way the town of Garmouth, belonging to the laird of Innes.
While these proceedings were going on, Montrose sent his whole baggage, booty, and warlike stores across the Spey, which he himself crossed upon the 14th of May, proceeding to Birkenbog, the seat of “a great Covenanter,” where he took up his head quarters. He quartered his men in the neighbourhood, and, during a short stay at Birkenbog, he sent out different parties of his troops to scour the country, and take vengeance on the Covenanters.
When General Baillie first heard of the defeat of his colleague, Hurry, at Auldearn, he was lying at Cromar, with his army. He had, in the beginning of May, after Montrose’s departure to the north, entered Athole, which he had wasted with fire and sword, and had made an attempt upon the strong castle of Blair, in which many of the prisoners taken at the battle of Inverlochy were confined; but, not succeeding in his enterprise, he had, after collecting an immense booty, marched through Athole, and, passing by Kirriemuir and Fettercairn, encamped on the Birse on the 10th of May. His force at this time amounted to about 2,000 foot and 120 troopers. On the following day he had marched to Cromar, where he encamped between the Kirks of Coull and Tarlan till he should be joined by Lord Balcarras’s horse regiment. In a short time he was joined, not only by Balcarras’s regiment, but by two foot regiments. The ministers endeavoured to induce the country people also to join Baillie, by “thundering out of pulpits,” but “they lay still,” says Spalding, “and would not follow him.”[302]
As soon as Baillie heard of the defeat of Hurry, he raised his camp at Cromar, upon the 19th of May, and hastened north. He arrived at the wood of Cochlarachie, within two miles of Strathbogie, before Montrose was aware of his approach. Here he was joined by Hurry, who, with some horse from Inverness, had passed themselves off as belonging to Lord Gordon’s party, and had thus been permitted to go through Montrose’s lines without opposition.
It was on the 19th of May, when lying at Birkenbog, that Montrose received the intelligence of Baillie’s arrival in the neighbourhood of Strathbogie. Although Montrose’s men had not yet wholly recovered from the fatigues of their late extraordinary march and subsequent labours, and although their numbers had been reduced since the battle of Auldearn, by the departure of some of the Highlanders with the booty they had acquired, they felt no disinclination to engage the enemy, but, on the contrary, were desirous of coming to immediate action. But Montrose, although he had the utmost confidence in the often tried courage of his troops, judged it more expedient to avoid an engagement at present, and to retire, in the meantime, into his fastnesses to recruit his exhausted strength, than risk another battle with a fresh force, greatly superior to his own. In order to deceive the enemy as to his intentions, he advanced, the same day, upon Strathbogie, and, within view of their camp, began to make intrenchments, and raise fortifications, as if preparing to defend himself. But as soon as the darkness of the night prevented Baillie from discovering his motions, Montrose marched rapidly up the south side of the Spey with his foot, leaving his horse behind him, with instructions to follow him as soon as daylight began to appear.
Baillie had passed the night in the confident expectation of a battle next day, but was surprised to learn the following morning that not a vestige of Montrose’s army was to be seen. Montrose had taken the route to Balveny, which having been ascertained by Baillie, he immediately prepared to follow. He, accordingly, crossed the Spey, and after a rapid march, almost overtook the retiring foe in Glenlivet; but Montrose, having outdistanced his pursuers by several miles before night came on, got the start of them so completely, that they were quite at a loss next morning to ascertain the route he had taken, and could only guess at it by observing the traces of his footsteps on the grass and the heather over which he had passed. Following, therefore, the course thus pointed out, Baillie came again in sight of Montrose; but he found that he had taken up a position, which, whilst it almost defied approach from its rocky and woody situation, commanded the entrance into Badenoch, from which country Montrose could, without molestation, draw supplies of both men and provisions. To attack Montrose in his stronghold was out of the question; but, in the hope of withdrawing him from it, Baillie encamped his army hard by. Montrose lay quite secure in his well-chosen position, from which he sent out parties who, skirmishing by day, and beating up the quarters of the enemy during the night, so harassed and frightened them, that they were obliged to retreat to Inverness, after a stay of a few days, a measure which was rendered still more necessary from the want of provisions and of provender for the horses. Leaving Inverness, Baillie crossed the Spey, and proceeded to Aberdeenshire, arriving on the 3d of June at Newton, in the Garioch, “where he encamped, destroying the country, and cutting the green growing crops to the very clod.”[303]
Having got quit of the presence of Baillie’s army, Montrose resolved to make a descent into Angus, and attack the Earl of Crawford, who lay at the castle of Newtyle with an army of reserve to support Baillie, and to prevent Montrose from crossing the Forth, and carrying the war into the south. This nobleman, who stood next to Argyle, as head of the Covenanters, had often complained to the Estates against Argyle, whose rival he was, for his inactivity and pusillanimity; and having insinuated that he would have acted a very different part had the command of such an army as Argyle had, been intrusted to him, he had the address to obtain the command of the army now under him, which had been newly raised; but the earl was without military experience, and quite unfit to cope with Montrose.
Proceeding through Badenoch, Montrose crossed the Grampians, and arrived by rapid marches on the banks of the river Airly, within seven miles of Crawford’s camp, but was prevented from giving battle by the desertion of the Gordons and their friends, who almost all returned to their country.
He now formed the resolution to attack Baillie himself, but before he could venture on such a bold step, he saw that there was an absolute necessity of making some additions to his force. With this view he sent Sir Nathaniel Gordon, an influential cavalier, into the north before him, to raise the Gordons and the other royalists; and, on his march north through Glenshee and the Braes of Mar, Montrose despatched Macdonald into the remoter Highlands with a party to bring him, as speedily as possible, all the forces he could. Judging that the influence and authority of Lord Gordon might greatly assist Sir Nathaniel, he sent him after him, and Montrose himself encamped in the country of Cromar, waiting for the expected reinforcements.
In the meantime, Baillie lay in camp on Dee-side, in the lower part of Mar, where he was joined by Crawford; but he showed no disposition to attack Montrose, who, from the inferiority, in point of number, of his forces, retired to the old castle of Kargarf. Crawford did not, however, remain long with Baillie; but, exchanging a thousand of his raw recruits for a similar number of Baillie’s veterans, he returned with these, and the remainder of his army, through the Mearns into Angus, as if he intended some mighty exploit; he, thereafter, entered Athole, and in imitation of Argyle, plundered and burnt the country.
Raising his camp, Baillie marched towards Strathbogie to lay siege to the Marquis of Huntly’s castle, the Bog of Gight, now Gordon castle; but although Montrose had not yet received any reinforcements, he resolved to follow Baillie and prevent him from putting his design into execution. But Montrose had marched scarcely three miles when he was observed by Baillie’s scouts, and at the same time ascertained that Baillie had taken up a strong position on a rising ground above Keith, about two miles off. Next morning Montrose, not considering it advisable to attack Baillie in the strong position he occupied, sent a trumpeter to him offering to engage him on open ground, but Baillie answered the hostile message by saying, that he would not receive orders for fighting from his enemy.[304]
In this situation of matters, Montrose had recourse to stratagem to draw Baillie from his stronghold. By retiring across the river Don, the covenanting general was led to believe that Montrose intended to march to the south, and he was, therefore, advised by a committee of the Estates which always accompanied him, and in whose hands he appears to have been a mere passive instrument, to pursue Montrose. As soon as Montrose’s scouts brought intelligence that Baillie was advancing, he set off by break of day to the village of Alford on the river Don, where he intended to await the enemy. When Baillie was informed of this movement, he imagined that Montrose was in full retreat before him, a supposition which encouraged him so to hasten his march, that he came up with Montrose at noon at the distance of a few miles from Alford. Montrose, thereupon, drew up his army in order of battle on an advantageous rising ground and waited for the enemy; but instead of attacking him, Baillie made a detour to the left with the intention of getting into Montrose’s rear and cutting off his retreat. Montrose then continued his march to Alford, where he passed the night.
On the following morning, the 2d of July, the two armies were only the distance of about four miles from each other. Montrose drew up his troops on a little hill behind the village of Alford. In his rear was a marsh full of ditches and pits, which would protect him from the inroads of Baillie’s cavalry should they attempt to assail in that quarter, and in his front stood a steep hill, which prevented the enemy from observing his motions. He gave the command of the right wing to Lord Gordon and Sir Nathaniel; the left he committed to Viscount Aboyne and Sir William Rollock; and the main body was put under the charge of Angus Macvichalaster, chief of the Macdonells of Glengarry, Drummond younger of Balloch, and Quarter-master George Graham, a skilful officer. To Napier his nephew, Montrose intrusted a body of reserve, which was concealed behind the hill.
Scarcely had Montrose completed his arrangements, when he received intelligence that the enemy had crossed the Don, and was moving in the direction of Alford. This was a fatal step on the part of Baillie, who, it is said, was forced into battle by the rashness of Lord Balcarras, “one of the bravest men of the kingdom,”[305] who unnecessarily placed himself and his regiment in a position of such danger that they could not be rescued without exposing the whole of the covenanting army.[306]
When Baillie arrived in the valley adjoining the hill on which Montrose had taken up his position, both armies remained motionless for some time, viewing each other, as if unwilling to begin the combat. Owing to the commanding position which Montrose occupied, the Covenanters could not expect to gain any advantage by attacking him even with superior forces; but now, for the first time, the number of the respective armies was about equal, and Montrose had this advantage over his adversary, that while Baillie’s army consisted in part of the raw and undisciplined levies which the Earl of Crawford had exchanged for some of his veteran troops, the greater part of Montrose’s men had been long accustomed to service. These circumstances determined Baillie not to attempt the ascent of the hill, but to remain in the valley, where, in the event of a descent by Montrose, his superiority in cavalry would give him the advantage.
This state of inaction was, however, soon put an end to by Lord Gordon, who observing a party of Baillie’s troops driving away before them a large quantity of cattle which they had collected in Strathbogie and the Enzie, and being desirous of recovering the property of his countrymen, selected a body of horse, with which he attempted a rescue. The assailed party was protected by some dykes and enclosures, from behind which they fired a volley upon the Gordons, which did considerable execution amongst them. Such a cool and determined reception, attended with a result so disastrous and unexpected, might have been attended by dangerous consequences, had not Montrose, on observing the party of Lord Gordon giving indications as if undetermined how to act, resolved immediately to commence a general attack upon the enemy with his whole army. But as Baillie’s foot had intrenched themselves amongst the dykes and fences which covered the ground at the bottom of the hill, and could not be attacked in that position with success, Montrose immediately ordered the horse, who were engaged with the enemy, to retreat to their former position, in the expectation that Baillie’s troops would leave their ground and follow them. And in this hope he was not disappointed, for the Covenanters thinking that this movement of the horse was merely the prelude to a retreat, advanced from their secure position, and followed the supposed fugitives with their whole horse and foot in regular order.
Both armies now came to close quarters, and fought face to face and man to man with great obstinacy for some time, without either party receding from the ground they occupied. At length Sir Nathaniel Gordon, growing impatient at such a protracted resistance, resolved to cut his way through the enemy’s left wing, consisting of Lord Balcarras’s regiment of horse; and calling to the light musketeers who lined his horse, he ordered them to throw aside their muskets, which were now unnecessary, and to attack the enemy’s horse with their drawn swords. This order was immediately obeyed, and in a short time they cut a passage through the ranks of the enemy, whom they hewed down with great slaughter. When the horse which composed Baillie’s right wing, and which had been kept in check by Lord Aboyne, perceived that their left had given way, they also retreated.[307] An attempt was made by the covenanting general to rally his left wing by bringing up the right, after it had retired, to its support, but they were so alarmed at the spectacle or _mêlée_ which they had just witnessed on the left, where their comrades had been cut down by the broad swords of Montrose’s musketeers, that they could not be induced to take the place of their retiring friends.
Thus abandoned by the horse, Baillie’s foot were attacked on all sides by Montrose’s forces. They fought with uncommon bravery, and although they were cut down in great numbers, the survivors exhibited a perseverance and determination to resist to the last extremity. An accident now occurred, which, whilst it threw a melancholy gloom over the fortunes of the day, and the spirits of Montrose’s men served to hasten the work of carnage and death. This was the fall of Lord Gordon, who having incautiously rushed in amongst the thickest of the enemy, was unfortunately shot dead, it is said,[308] when in the act of pulling Baillie, the covenanting general, from his horse, having, it is said, in a moment of exultation, promised to his men, to drag Baillie out of the ranks and present him before them. The Gordons, on perceiving their young chief fall, set no bounds to their fury, and falling upon the enemy with renewed vigour, hewed them down without mercy; yet these brave men still showed no disposition to flee, and it was not until the appearance of the reserve under the Master of Napier, which had hitherto been kept out of view of the enemy at the back of the hill, that their courage began to fail them. When this body began to descend the hill, accompanied by what appeared to them a fresh reinforcement of cavalry, but which consisted merely of the camp or livery boys, who had mounted the sumpter-horses to make a display for the purpose of alarming the enemy, the entire remaining body of the covenanting foot fled with precipitation. A hot pursuit took place, and so great was the slaughter that very few of them escaped. The covenanting general and his principal officers were saved by the fleetness of their horses, and the Marquis of Argyle, who had accompanied Baillie as a member of the committee, and who was closely pursued by Glengarry and some of his Highlanders, made a narrow escape by repeatedly changing horses.
Thus ended one of the best contested battles which Montrose had yet fought, yet strange as the fact may appear, his loss was, as usual, extremely trifling, Lord Gordon being the only person of importance slain. A considerable number of Montrose’s men, however, were wounded, particularly the Gordons, who, for a long time, sustained the attacks of Balcarras’s horse, amongst whom were Sir Nathaniel, and Gordon, younger of Gicht.[309] The loss on the side of the Covenanters was immense; by far the greater part of their foot, and a considerable number of their cavalry having been slain. Some prisoners were taken from them, but their number was small, owing to their obstinacy in refusing quarter. These were sent to Strathbogie under an escort.
The brilliant victory was, however, clouded by the death of Lord Gordon, “a very hopeful young gentleman, able of mind and body, about the age of twenty-eight years.”[310] Wishart gives an affecting description of the feelings of Montrose’s army when this amiable young nobleman was killed. “There was,” he says, “a general lamentation for the loss of the Lord Gordon, whose death seemed to eclipse all the glory of the victory. As the report spread among the soldiers, every one appeared to be struck dumb with the melancholy news, and a universal silence prevailed for some time through the army. However, their grief soon burst through all restraint, venting itself in the voice of lamentation and sorrow. When the first transports were over, the soldiers exclaimed against heaven and earth for bereaving the king, the kingdom, and themselves, of such an excellent young nobleman; and, unmindful of the victory or of the plunder, they thronged about the body of their dead captain, some weeping over his wounds and kissing his lifeless limbs; while others praised his comely appearance even in death, and extolled his noble mind, which was enriched with every valuable qualification that could adorn his high birth or ample fortune: they even cursed the victory bought at so dear a rate. Nothing could have supported the army under this immense sorrow but the presence of Montrose, whose safety gave them joy, and not a little revived their drooping spirits. In the meantime he could not command his grief, but mourned bitterly over the melancholy fate of his only and dearest friend, grievously complaining, that one who was the honour of his nation, the ornament of the Scots nobility, and the boldest asserter of the royal authority in the north, had fallen in the flower of his youth.”[311]
The victories of Montrose in Scotland were more than counterbalanced by those of the parliamentary forces in England. Under different circumstances, the success at Alford might have been attended with consequences the most important to the royal cause; but the defeat of the king on the 14th of June, at Naseby, had raised the hopes of the Covenanters, and prepared their minds to receive the tidings of Baillie’s defeat with coolness and moderation.
Upon the day on which the battle of Alford was fought, the parliament had adjourned to Stirling from Edinburgh, on account of a destructive pestilence which had reached the capital from Newcastle, by way of Kelso. Thither General Baillie, Lord Balcarras, and the committee of Estates, which had accompanied the covenanting army, repaired, to lay a statement of the late disaster before the parliament, and to receive instructions as to their future conduct. With the exception of Baillie, they were well received. Balcarras, who had particularly distinguished himself in the battle at the head of his horse, received a vote of thanks, and a similar acknowledgment was, after some hesitation, awarded to Baillie, notwithstanding some attempts made to prejudice the parliament against him. But the fact was, they could not dispense in the present emergency with an officer of the military talents of Baillie, who, instead of shrinking from responsibility for the loss of the battle of Alford, offered to stand trial before a court martial, and to justify his conduct on that occasion. To have withheld, therefore, the usual token of approbation from him, while bestowing it upon an inferior officer, would have been to fix a stigma upon him which he was not disposed to brook consistently with the retention of the command of the army; and as the parliament resolved to renew his commission, by appointing him to the command of the army then being concentrated at Perth, they afterwards professed their unqualified satisfaction with him.
After the battle of Alford the army of Montrose was considerably diminished, in consequence of the Highlanders, according to custom, taking leave of absence, and returning home with the spoil they had taken from the enemy. This singular, though ordinary practice, contributed more to paralyze the exertions of Montrose, and to prevent him from following up his successes, than any event which occurred in the whole course of his campaigns, and it may appear strange that Montrose did not attempt to put an end to it; but the tenure by which he held the services of these hardy mountaineers being that they should be allowed their wonted privileges, any attempt to deviate from their established customs would have been an immediate signal for desertion.
As it would have been imprudent in Montrose, with forces thus impaired, to have followed the fugitives, who would receive fresh succours from the south, he, after allowing his men some time to refresh themselves, marched to Aberdeen, where he celebrated the funeral obsequies of his valued friend, Lord Gordon, with becoming dignity.
The district of Buchan in Aberdeenshire, which, from its outlying situation, had hitherto escaped assessment for the supply of the hostile armies, was at this time subjected to the surveillance of Montrose, who despatched a party from Aberdeen into that country to collect all the horses they could find for the use of his army, and also to obtain recruits. About the same time the Marquis of Huntly, who had been living in Strathnaver for some time, having heard of the death of his eldest son, Lord Gordon, meditated a return to his own country, intending to throw the influence of his name and authority into the royal scale. But as he might be exposed to danger in passing through countries which were hostile to the royal cause, it was arranged between Montrose and Viscount Aboyne, who had just been created an earl, that the latter should proceed to Strathnaver, with a force of 2,000 men to escort his father south. This expedition was, however, abandoned, in consequence of intelligence having been brought to Montrose that the Covenanters were assembling in great strength at Perth.
The parliament which, as we have seen, had left Edinburgh, and gone to Stirling on account of the pestilence, had been obliged, in consequence of its appearance in Stirling, to adjourn to Perth, where it was to meet on the 24th of July; but before leaving Stirling, they ordered a levy of 10,000 foot to be raised in the counties to the south of the Tay; and to insure due obedience to this mandate, all noblemen, gentlemen, and heritors, were required to attend at Perth on or before that day, well mounted, and to bring with them such forces as they could raise, under a heavy penalty.[312]
On leaving Aberdeen, Montrose took up his quarters at Crabston, situated a few miles from Aberdeen, between the rivers Don and Dee, where he remained for some time in the expectation of being joined by reinforcements from the Highlands under Major-general Macdonald, who had been absent about two months from the army in quest of recruits. As, however, these expected succours did not arrive within the time expected, Montrose, impatient of delay, crossed the Dee, and marching over the Grampians, descended into the Mearns, and pitched his camp at Fordoun in Kincardineshire.
Proceeding on his march through Angus and Blairgowrie to Dunkeld, Montrose had the good fortune to be successively joined by his cousin, Patrick Graham of Inchbrakie, at the head of the brave Athole Highlanders, and by Macdonald, his major-general, who brought with him the chief of the Macleans, and about 700 of that clan, all animated by a strong feeling of animosity against Argyle and his partisans. He was also joined by John Muidartach, the celebrated captain of the Clanranald, at the head of 500 of his men; by the Macgregors and Macnabs, headed by their respective chieftains; by the Clandonald, under the command of the uncles of Glengarry and other officers, Glengarry himself, “who,” says Bishop Wishart, “deserves a singular commendation for his bravery and steady loyalty to the king, and his peculiar attachment to Montrose,”[313] having never left Montrose since he joined him at the time of his expedition into Argyle. Besides all these, the Stewarts of Appin, some of the Farquharsons of Braemar, and small parties of inferior clans from Badenoch, rallied round the standard of Montrose.
Having obtained these reinforcements, Montrose now formed the design of marching upon Perth, and breaking up the parliament which had there assembled, and thereafter of proceeding to the south, and dissipating the levies which were being raised beyond the Tay. But the want of cavalry, in which he was constantly deficient, formed a bar to this plan, and Montrose was, therefore, obliged to defer his project till he should be joined by the Earls of Aboyne and Airly, whom he expected soon with a considerable body of horse. In the meantime, Montrose crossed the Tay at Dunkeld, and encamped at Amulree. The covenanting army, with the exception of the garrison of Perth, was then lying on the south side of the Earn, and a body of 400 horse was posted near the town, for the protection of the Estates or parliament.
This movement, on the part of Montrose, created some alarm in the minds of the Covenanters, which was greatly increased by a report from their horse, stationed in the neighbourhood of the town, who, seeing some of his scouts approach it, had fancied that he was going to storm it. While this panic was at its height, Montrose, who had no intention of attacking the town, raised his camp, and took up a position in the wood of Methven, about five miles from Perth. During this movement, the town was thrown into a state of the greatest consternation, from an apprehension that Montrose was about to attack it, and the nobility and the other members of the parliament were earnestly solicited to secure their safety by a speedy flight, but the Estates remained firm, and could not be persuaded to abandon their posts. In order, if possible, still farther to increase the panic in the town, Montrose advanced almost to the very gates of Perth with his horse the following day, which, although not exceeding 100, were made to appear formidable by the addition of the baggage-horses, on which some musketeers were mounted. This act of bold defiance magnified the fears of those who were in the town, and made them imagine that Montrose was well provided in cavalry. The covenanting troops, therefore, were afraid to venture beyond the gates; and Montrose having thus easily accomplished his object, was encouraged, still farther, to cross the Earn at Dupplin, when he openly reconnoitred the enemy’s army on the south of that river, and surveyed the Strath with great deliberation and coolness, without interruption.
Both armies remained in their positions for several days without attempting any thing, each waiting for reinforcements. During all this time, the enemy had been deceived respecting the strength of Montrose’s horse, but having learned his weakness in that respect, and the deception which he had practised so successfully upon them, and being joined by three regiments from Fife, they resolved to offer him battle. Montrose, however, from his great inferiority of numbers, particularly in horse, was not in a condition to accept the challenge, and wisely declined it. Accordingly, when he saw the enemy advancing towards him, he prepared to retreat among the neighbouring mountains; but to deceive the enemy, and to enable him to carry off his baggage, he drew out his army as if he intended to fight, placing his horse in front, and securing the passes into the mountains with guards. While making these dispositions, he sent off his baggage towards the hills under an escort; and when he thought the baggage out of danger, gave orders to his army to march off in close rank; and to cover its retreat and protect it from the cavalry of the enemy, he placed his horse, lined as usual with the best musketeers, in the rear.
As soon as Baillie, the covenanting general, perceived that Montrose was in full retreat, he despatched General Hurry with the cavalry in pursuit of him; but from a most unaccountable delay on Hurry’s part in crossing the Pow--so slow, indeed, had his movements been, that Baillie’s foot overtook him at the fords of the Almond--Montrose had almost reached the passes of the mountains before he was overtaken. Chagrined at his easy escape, and determined to perform some striking exploit before Montrose should retire into his fastnesses, a body of 300 of the best mounted covenanting cavalry set off at full gallop after him, and attacked him with great fury, using at the same time the most insulting and abusive language. To put an end to this annoyance, Montrose selected twenty expert Highlanders, and requested them to bring down some of the assailants. Accordingly these marksmen advanced in a crouching attitude, concealing their guns, and having approached within musket-shot, took deliberate aim, and soon brought down the more advanced of the party. This unexpected disaster made the assailants more cautious in their advances, and caused them to resolve upon an immediate retreat; but the marksmen were so elated with their success that they actually pursued them down into the plain, “and resolutely attacked the whole party, who, putting spurs to their horses, fled with the utmost precipitation, like so many deer before the hunters.”[314] In this retreat Montrose did not lose a single man.
After giving over this fruitless pursuit, the enemy returned to Montrose’s camp at Methven, where, according to Wishart, they committed a most barbarous act in revenge of their late affront, by butchering some of the wives of the Highlanders and Irish who had been left behind. Montrose took up his quarters at Little Dunkeld, both because he was there perfectly secure from the attacks of the enemy’s cavalry, and because it was a convenient station to wait for the reinforcements of horse which he daily expected from the north under the Earls of Airly and Aboyne. Although both armies lay close together for several days, nothing was attempted on either side. The covenanting general had become quite disgusted with the service in consequence of the jealousies and suspicions which it was too evident the committee entertained of him. His disgust was increased by the sudden return to their country of the Fife men, who preferred their domestic comforts to the vicissitudes of war, but who unfortunately were, as we shall soon see, to be sacrificed at its shrine.
At length the Earl of Aboyne, accompanied by Sir Nathaniel Gordon, arrived at Little Dunkeld, but with a force much inferior in numbers to what was expected. They only brought 200 horse and 120 musketeers, which last were mounted upon carriage horses. The smallness of their number was compensated, however, in a great measure by their steadiness and bravery. The Earl of Airly and his son, Sir David Ogilvie, joined Montrose at the same time, along with a troop of 80 horse, consisting chiefly of gentlemen of the name of Ogilvie, among whom was Alexander Ogilvie, son of Sir John Ogilvie of Innerquharity, a young man who had already distinguished himself in the field.
Never, at any former period of his eventful career, did the probabilities of ultimate success on the side of Montrose appear greater than now. His army, ardent and devoted to the royal cause, now amounted to nearly 5,000 foot and about 500 horse, the greater part of which consisted of brave and experienced warriors whom he had often led to victory. A considerable portion of his army was composed of some of the most valiant of the Highland clans, led by their respective chiefs, among whom stood conspicuous the renowned captain of clan Ranald, in himself a host. The clans were animated by a feeling of the most unbounded attachment to what they considered the cause of their chiefs, and by a deadly spirit of revenge for the cruelties which the Covenanters under Argyle had exercised in the Highlands. The Macleans and the Athole Highlanders in particular, longed for an opportunity of retaliating upon the covenanting partisans of Argyle the injuries which they had repeatedly received at his hands, and thereby wiping out the stain which, as they conceived, had been cast upon them. But fortunate as Montrose now was in having such an army at his disposal, the chances in his favour were greatly enhanced by the circumstance, that whereas in his former campaigns he had to watch the movements of different armies, and to fight them in detail, he was now enabled, from having annihilated or dispersed the whole armies formerly opposed to him, to concentrate his strength and to direct all his energies to one point. The only bar which now stood in the way of the entire subjugation of Scotland to the authority of the king, was the army of Baillie, and the defeat or destruction of this body now became the immediate object of Montrose. His resolution to attack the enemy was hastened by the receipt of information that the Fife regiments had left Baillie’s camp and returned home, and that the general himself was so dissatisfied with the conduct of the covenanting committee, who thwarted all his plans and usurped his authority, that he was about to resign the command of the army.
Montrose, therefore, without loss of time, raised his camp, and descending into the Lowlands, arrived at Logie Almond, where he halted his foot. Thence he went out with his cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy, and came in full view of them before sunset. They made no attempt to molest him, and testified their dread of this unexpected visit by retiring within their lines. Early next morning Montrose again rode out to make his observations, but was surprised to learn that the enemy had abandoned their camp at Methven during the night, and had retired across the Earn, and taken up a position at Kilgraston, near Bridge-of-Earn. Montrose immediately put his army in motion towards the Earn, which he crossed by the bridge of Nether Gask, about eight miles above Kilgraston. He then proceeded forward as far as the Kirk of Dron, by which movement he for the first time succeeded in throwing open to the operations of his army the whole of the country south of the Tay, from which the enemy had hitherto carefully excluded him. The enemy, alarmed at Montrose’s approach, made every preparation for defending themselves by strengthening the position in which they were intrenched, and which, from the narrowness of the passes and the nature of the ground, was well adapted for sustaining an attack.
Montrose was most anxious to bring the enemy to an engagement before they should be joined by a large levy then raising in Fife; but they were too advantageously posted to be attacked with much certainty of success. As he could not by any means induce them to leave their ground, he marched to Kinross for the double purpose of putting an end to the Fife levies and of withdrawing the enemy from their position, so as to afford him an opportunity of attacking them under more favourable circumstances. This movement had the effect of drawing Baillie from his stronghold, who cautiously followed Montrose at a respectful distance. In the course of his march, Baillie was again joined by the three Fife regiments. On arriving at Kinross in the evening, Montrose learned from an advanced party he had sent out to collect information through the country, under the command of Colonel Nathaniel Gordon, and Sir William Rollock, that the people of Fife were in arms, a piece of intelligence which made him resolve immediately to retrace his steps, judging it imprudent to risk a battle in such a hostile district. Although the men of Fife were stern Covenanters, and were ready to fight for the Covenant on their own soil, yet living for the most part in towns, and following out the sober pursuits of a quiet and domestic life, they had no relish for war, and disliked the service of the camp. Hence the speedy return of the Fife regiments from the camp at Methven, to their own country, and hence another reason which induced Montrose to leave their unfriendly soil, viz., that they would probably again abandon Baillie, should he attempt to follow Montrose in his progress west.
Accordingly, after remaining a night at Kinross, Montrose, the following morning, marched towards Alloa, in the neighbourhood of which he arrived in the evening, and passed the night in the wood of Tullybody. The Irish plundered the town of Alloa, and the adjoining lordship, which belonged to the Earl of Mar; but notwithstanding this unprovoked outrage, the earl and Lord Erskine gave Montrose, the Earl of Airly, and the principal officers of the army, an elegant entertainment in the castle of Alloa. Montrose, however, did not delay the march of his army while partaking of the hospitality of the Earl of Mar, but immediately despatched Macdonald west to Stirling with the foot, retaining only the horse to serve him as a body-guard. In this route the Macleans laid waste the parishes of Muckhart and Dollar, of which the Marquis of Argyle was the superior, and burnt Castle Campbell, the principal residence of the Argyle family in the lowlands, in requital of similar acts done by the marquis and his followers in the country of the Macleans.[315]
As the pestilence was still raging in the town of Stirling, Montrose avoided it altogether, lest his army might catch the infection. He halted within three miles of the town, where his army passed the night, and being apprised next morning, by one of Baillie’s scouts who had been taken prisoner, that Baillie was close at hand with the whole of his army, Montrose marched quickly up to the fords of Frew, about eight miles above Stirling bridge, and there crossed the Forth. Pursuing his march the following morning in the direction of Glasgow, he made a short halt about six miles from Stirling, to ascertain the enemy’s movements, and being informed that Baillie had not yet crossed the Forth, he marched to Kilsyth, where he encamped. During the day, Baillie passed the Forth by Stirling bridge, and marching forwards, came within view of Montrose’s army, and encamped that evening within three miles of Kilsyth.[316]
The covenanting army had, in its progress westward, followed exactly the tract of Montrose through the vale of the Devon. The Marquis of Argyle availing himself of this circumstance, caused the house of Menstrie, the seat of the Earl of Stirling, the king’s secretary, and that of Airthrie, belonging to Sir John Graham of Braco, to be burnt. He, moreover, sent an insolent message to the Earl of Mar, notifying to him, that, on the return of the army from the pursuit of Montrose, he, the earl, might calculate on having his castle also burnt, for the hospitality he had shown Montrose.[317]
The conjecture of Montrose, that the Fife regiments would not cross the Forth, was not altogether without foundation. In fact, when they arrived near Stirling, they positively refused to advance further, and excused themselves by alleging, that they were raised on the express condition that they should not be called upon to serve out of their own shire, and that, having already advanced beyond its limits, they would on no account cross the Forth. But their obstinacy was overcome by the all-powerful influence of the ministers, who, in addition to the usual scriptural appeals, “told them jolly tales that Lanark, Glencairn, and Eglinton, were lifting an army to join them, and therefore entreated that they would, for only one day more, go out,” until that army approached, when they should be discharged.[318]
While the Fife regiments were thus persuaded to expose themselves to the unforeseen destruction which unfortunately awaited them, an incident occurred on the opposite bank of the Forth, which betokened ill for the future prospects of the covenanting army. This will be best explained by stating the matter in General Baillie’s own words. “A little above the park (the king’s park at Stirling), I halted until the Fife regiments were brought up, hearing that the rebels were marching towards Kilsyth. After the upcoming of these regiments, the Marquis of Argyle, Earl of Crawford, and Lord Burleigh, and, if I mistake not, the Earl of Tulliebardine, the Lords Elcho and Balcarras, with some others, came up. My lord marquis asked me what next was to be done. I answered, the direction should come from his lordship and those of the committee. My lord demanded what reason was for this? I answered, I found myself so slighted in every thing belonging to a commander-in-chief, that, for the short time I was to stay with them, I would absolutely submit to their direction and follow it. The marquis desired me to explain myself, which I did in these particulars, sufficiently known to my lord marquis and the other lords and gentlemen then present. I told his lordship, (1.) Prisoners of all sorts were exchanged without my knowledge; the traffickers therein received passes from others, and, sometimes passing within two miles of me, did neither acquaint me with their business, nor, at their return, where, or in what posture they had left the enemy: (2.) While I was present, others did sometimes undertake the command of the army: (3.) Without either my order or knowledge, fire was raised, and that destroyed which might have been a recompense to some good deserver, for which I would not be answerable to the public. All which things considered, I should in any thing freely give my own opinion, but follow the judgment of the committee, and the rather because that was the last day of my undertaking.”[319] It is here necessary to state, by way of explanation, that Baillie had, in consequence of the previous conduct of the committee, resigned his commission, and had only been induced, at the earnest solicitation of the parliament, to continue his services for a definite period, which, it appears, was just on the point of expiring.
The differences between Baillie and the committee being patched up, the covenanting army proceeded on the 14th of August in the direction of Denny, and having crossed the Carron at Hollandbush, encamped, as we have stated, about 3 miles from Kilsyth.
Before the arrival of Baillie, Montrose had received information which made him resolve to hazard a battle immediately. The intelligence he had obtained was to the effect, that the Earls of Cassilis, Eglinton, and Glencairn, and other heads of the Covenanters, were actively engaged in levying forces in the west of Scotland, and that the Earl of Lanark had already raised a body of 1,000 foot and 500 horse in Clydesdale, among the vassals and dependents of the Hamilton family, and that this force was within 12 miles of Kilsyth.
Having taken his resolution, Montrose made the necessary arrangements for receiving the enemy, by placing his men in the best position which the nature of the ground afforded. In front of his position were several cottages and gardens, of which he took possession. Baillie, seeing the advantageous position chosen by Montrose, would have willingly delayed battle till either the expected reinforcements from the west should arrive, or till Montrose should be induced to become the assailant; but his plans were over-ruled by Argyle and the other members of the committee, who insisted that he should immediately attack Montrose. Accordingly, early in the morning he put his army in motion from Hollandbush, and advanced near Auchinclogh, about two miles to the east of Kilsyth, where he halted. As the ground between him and Montrose was full of quagmires, which effectually prevented Montrose from attacking him in front, he proposed to take up a defensive position without advancing farther, and await an attack. But here again the committee interposed, and when he was in the very act of arranging the stations of his army, they advised him to take a position on a hill on his right, which they considered more suitable. It was in vain that Baillie remonstrated against what he justly considered an imprudent advice--the committee were inexorable in their resolution, and Baillie had no alternative but to obey. In justice, however, to Lord Balcarras, it must be mentioned that he disapproved of the views of the committee.
When Montrose saw the covenanting army approach from Hollandbush, he was exceedingly delighted, as, from the excellent state of his army, the courageous bearing of his men, and the advantage of his position, he calculated upon obtaining a decisive victory, which might enable him to advance into England and retrieve the affairs of his sovereign in that kingdom. But while Montrose was thus joyfully anticipating a victory which, he flattered himself, would be crowned with results the most favourable to the royal cause, an incident occurred which might have proved fatal to his hopes, had he not, with that wonderful self-possession and consummate prudence for which he was so distinguished, turned that very incident to his own advantage. Among the covenanting cavalry was a regiment of cuirassiers, the appearance of whose armour, glittering in the sun, struck such terror into Montrose’s horse, that they hesitated about engaging with such formidable antagonists, and, while riding along the line to encourage his men and give the necessary directions, Montrose heard his cavalry muttering among themselves and complaining that they were now for the first time to fight with men clad in iron, whose bodies would be quite impenetrable to their swords. When the terror of a foe has once taken hold of the mind, it can only be sufficiently eradicated by supplanting it with a feeling of contempt for the object of its dread, and no man was better fitted by nature than Montrose for inspiring such a feeling into the minds of his troops. Accordingly, scarcely had the murmurings of his cavalry broken upon his ears, when he rode up to the head of his cavalry, and (pointing to the cuirassiers) thus addressed his men:--“Gentlemen, these are the same men you beat at Alford, that ran away from you at Auldearn, Tippermuir, &c.; they are such cowardly rascals that their officers could not bring them to look you in the face till they had clad them in armour; to show our contempt of them we’ll fight them in our shirts.”[320] No sooner had these words been uttered, when, to add to the impression they could not fail to produce, Montrose threw off his coat and waistcoat, and, drawing his sword with the air of a hero, stood before his men, at once an object of their wonder and a model for their imitation. The effect was instantaneous. The example thus set by Montrose was immediately followed by the whole army, every man stripping himself to his shirt, and the cavalry, partaking in the general enthusiasm, assured themselves of victory. As the day was uncommonly hot and oppressive, the troops found great relief by disburdening themselves of their clothes, and the infantry were, in consequence, enabled to display greater agility in combat. The extraordinary appearance of Montrose’s men after they had parted with their clothes, excited the astonishment of the Covenanters, and as they could only attribute such a singular preparation for battle to a fixed determination on the part of the royalists to conquer or to die, fearful doubts arose in their minds as to the probable result of the contest in which they were just about to engage.
In moving to take up the new position which had been assigned to it by the committee, the utmost disorder prevailed among the covenanting army, which the general was unable to correct. Indeed, so unruly had the troops become, that some regiments, instead of taking the stations assigned to them by the commander, took up, at the suggestion of Argyle, quite different ground, while others, in utter disregard of Baillie’s instructions, actually selected positions for themselves. Thus, at the moment the battle was about to begin, Baillie found all his plans completely overruled, and as he now saw how utterly impossible it would be for him to carry any of his contemplated arrangements into effect, he was necessitated to engage Montrose under the most unfavourable circumstances.
The covenanting general, however, might have so accommodated himself in the unexpected dilemma in which he had been placed as to have prevented the disastrous result which followed, had not his horse regiments, from an impression that Montrose had begun a retreat, rashly commenced the action before all the infantry had come up, by attempting to carry the cottages and gardens in which the advanced guard of Montrose was placed. Although they made a violent charge, they were as warmly received by Montrose’s musketeers, who, being protected by the dikes and enclosures, kept up such a galling fire upon their assailants as to oblige them to retreat with precipitation and some loss.
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The Scottish Highlands, Highland Clans and Highland Regiments, Volume 1 (of 2)Chapter XIV: A.d. February--September, 1645 (2)
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