Chapter XXVI: A.d. 1715-1716 (2)

The Chevalier returned to Scone in the evening, and notwithstanding the ominous symptoms of the day, proceeded to form a council preparatory to exercising the functions of royalty. From Scone he soon issued no less than six proclamations; one for a general thanksgiving for his safe arrival; another enjoining the ministers to pray for him in the churches; a third, establishing the currency of foreign coin; a fourth, ordering a meeting of the convention of estates; a fifth, commanding all fencible men from sixteen to sixty to repair to his standard; and a sixth, fixing the 23d of January for his coronation at Scone. These assumptions of sovereign authority were, however, of a very evanescent character, as they had scarcely been issued when the Chevalier and his principal friends resolved to abandon the contest as hopeless. Indeed, from the reduced state of the army, and its deficiency in arms and ammunition, a determination had been come to by his party, a month before he landed, to retire from Perth as soon as Argyle should march against it; but being ignorant of that resolution, and believing that the insurgents intended to defend Perth, Argyle delayed his advance till he should be joined by large reinforcements from England and Holland.

Though continued in the command of the army, Argyle, for some reason or other, was not a favourite at court. Of his fidelity there could be no suspicion, and his conduct had lately shown that he wanted neither zeal nor ability to perform the task which had been assigned him. It has been conjectured that the leniency which he was disposed to show towards his unfortunate countrymen was the cause of that hidden displeasure which ended in the dismissal of himself and of his brother, the Earl of Islay, from all their employments. The rejection of an application which he made to the government for extended powers to treat with the insurgents after the battle of Sheriffmuir, goes far to support the supposition. But whatever were his views, he appeared to be in no hurry to pursue the insurgents, probably from an idea that they would disperse of their own accord. By the arrival of a body of 6,000 Dutch auxiliaries, and other reinforcements from England, Argyle found himself, early in January, at the head of upwards of 10,000 men, besides a large train of artillery. Desirous of expelling the insurgents from Fife before advancing north, a detachment of Dutch and Scotch troops crossed the Frith of Forth by the duke’s orders, and under cover of some men-of-war, landed at Burntisland, of which they took possession. On receiving this intelligence the insurgents immediately abandoned all the towns on the north side of the Frith, a circumstance which was attended with serious consequences to their friends at Perth, who were in consequence entirely cut off from their supplies of coals, at an unusually inclement season.

About the end of January, Argyle was in full condition to march north, but the snow, which had fallen to a great depth, appeared to him to offer a formidable obstruction to the march of an army unaccustomed to a winter’s campaign; and which, from the insurgents having burnt and destroyed the villages on the road, would have to bivouac two or three nights in the open air, exposed to all the rigours of a northern winter. For these reasons Argyle urged, at a council of war, which was held at Stirling, a postponement of the march; but General Cadogan,[736] who had been sent down to Scotland to hasten the duke’s motions, insisting upon an immediate advance, and having openly accused Argyle of a want of zeal, his Grace made preparations for marching, and to facilitate the transport of his cannon and waggons, issued orders for assembling some thousands of the country people to clear away the snow.

Although the Jacobite leaders had come to the resolution of abandoning Perth as soon as the Duke of Argyle should advance upon it, they nevertheless gave indications as if they really meant to hold out. Pursuant to an order of a council, which was held on the 16th of January, the most strenuous exertions were made to fortify the town, and both officers and men vied with one another in hastening the completion of the works. What the motives of the leaders may have been in thus practising a deception upon the army it is impossible to conceive; perhaps the distant hope of being joined by the more remote clans, the chance of some fortunate, though unlooked for, occurrence in the chapter of accidents, or an idea that their men could not be otherwise kept together, may have been the inducing causes of these defensive preparations; but whatever their motives were, the apparent determination shown by the leading men to meet the enemy, had the most beneficial effect upon the army, which evinced a strong desire to engage. In this wish they thought they were to be gratified sooner than they expected, by the arrival of some country people at Perth who brought intelligence that Argyle was advancing with all his cavalry, and 4,000 foot mounted on horses. This news was, however, premature, and had originated in the appearance of a reconnoitring party of 200 dragoons, which Argyle had sent forward on the road to Perth, on the 21st of January, and which the fears of the people had magnified into an army.

All doubts, however, were removed in a few days, by the receipt of authentic intelligence at Perth, that Argyle having completed his arrangements, was to leave Stirling for Perth on the 29th of January, with his whole army. The councillors of the Chevalier were dismayed at this intelligence, but it had quite an opposite effect upon the mass of the army. Nothing was to be heard in the Jacobite camp but the voice of joy and rejoicing, and congratulations, on the expected happy result of an encounter with the enemy, were exchanged on all sides--between the officers and gentlemen volunteers, and the common soldiers and clansmen. While the former were pledging each other in their cups and drinking to “the good day,” so near at hand, as they thought, which was to crown the Chevalier’s arms with victory, the latter, amid the din of the warlike bagpipe, were to be seen giving each other a cordial shake of the hand as if fully assured of success.

Whilst these congratulatory exhibitions were going on, the councillors of the Chevalier were deliberating upon the course they should pursue; but although they sat during the whole night they could come to no decided resolution. When the irresolution of the council became generally known, the men could not restrain their indignation, and a general opinion began to prevail among them that they had been betrayed. Impressed with this feeling, they became mutinous, and carried their insubordination so far as to insult the officers, whom they supposed had betrayed them, in the streets, and to load them with reproachful epithets. The gentlemen volunteers also participated in the same sentiments; and one of them from the higher parts of Aberdeenshire was heard to declare before a group of malcontents assembled in the streets, that the clans should take the person of the Chevalier out of the hands of the weak councillors who surrounded him, adding that he would find 10,000 gentlemen in Scotland who would hazard their lives for him, if he was equally ready as a prince to risk his own life in vindicating his right to the crown. A friend of the Earl of Mar, after remonstrating with this party, asked what they wished their officers to do.--“Do,” replied a Highlander, “what did you call us to take arms for? Was it to run away? What did the king come hither for? Was it to see his people butchered by hangmen, and not strike a stroke for their lives? Let us die like men and not like dogs.”[737]

Amid the confusion and perplexity occasioned by such a state of things, Mar convened another meeting of the council on the evening of the 29th, at which a resolution to retreat was entered into chiefly at Mar’s suggestion. His reasons for advising an abandonment of the enterprise for the present, were, 1st, the failure of the Duke of Ormond’s attempt to invade England; 2dly, the great accession of force which Argyle had received from abroad; and, lastly, the reduced state of the Jacobite forces, which did not exceed 4,000 men, and of whom only about 2,500 were properly armed.[738] Besides these there were, according to the Master of Sinclair, other reasons of a private nature which influenced Mar to give the advice he did, the chief of which, says the above-named authority, was that the Earl of Seaforth, the Marquis of Huntly, and other Jacobites who were in treaty with the government, had basely resolved to deliver up the Chevalier to the Duke of Argyle, that they might procure better terms for themselves than they could otherwise expect. This odious charge, which is not corroborated by any other writer, must be looked upon as highly improbable.

Before communicating to the army the resolution to retreat, a general meeting of all the officers was held at Scone on the following day, when they were informed of the determination of the previous evening, and of the reasons which had led to it. It was then secretly resolved that the Chevalier and his principal officers should take shipping at Montrose for France, and that the army should be disbanded as soon as it reached the Highlands, or as soon as circumstances permitted; but to save appearances with the men, it was given out, that as Perth was untenable, it became necessary to retire to a stronger position, where they could not only defend themselves, but keep up a more secure and direct communication with their friends in the north. At this time there were three ships lying in the Tay off Dundee, which had lately arrived with supplies from France; and to secure these for the conveyance of the Chevalier and his followers, a French officer and clergyman were despatched to Dundee with orders to send them down the coast to Montrose, there to wait his arrival.[739]

On the return of the officers to the camp, they promulgated the order to retreat to their men, and, as might have been anticipated, it was received with scorn and contempt. Among the Jacobite inhabitants of the town who had shown themselves very zealous in the cause of the Chevalier, the intelligence caused nothing but dismay, as from the prominent and decided part they had taken, they had incurred the penalties of treason against the government. The morning of the 31st of January was fixed upon for the retreat, but a body of about 800 Highlanders, disliking the aspect of affairs, and displeased with the conduct of the principal officers, quitted Perth the preceding night for the Highlands by way of Dunkeld. Preparatory to his departure, the Chevalier went from Scone to Perth in the evening, and took up his residence in the house of Hay the provost, a stanch Jacobite, where he supped and passed the night. At ten o’clock next morning the rebels began their march across the Tay, which was covered with ice of extraordinary thickness. About noon the whole army had passed, and was on the march to Dundee along the Carse of Gowrie.

Meanwhile, the Duke of Argyle was advancing upon Perth as fast as the nature of the difficulties he had to contend with would admit of. He had left Stirling on the 29th of January, and marched to Dunblane. Next day he advanced as far as Auchterarder, which had been entirely burnt by the rebels. Here they passed the night upon the snow without “any other covering than the fine canopy of heaven.”[740] On the following day a detachment of 200 dragoons and 400 foot, which had been sent forward to protect the country people who were engaged in clearing away the snow, took possession of the castle of Tullibardine, the garrison of which had capitulated. The Duke of Argyle had resolved to take up his quarters for the night in this fortress; but receiving intelligence that the rebels had retired from Perth that morning, he ordered a party of 400 dragoons and 1,000 foot to hasten forward to take possession of that town. The duke, at the head of the dragoons, arrived at Perth about two o’clock in the morning of the 1st of February; but the foot, who were greatly fatigued, did not come up till ten o’clock. The remainder of the duke’s army reached Perth that evening.

The distance from Stirling to Perth is only 34 miles, yet such was the obstruction that Argyle’s army met with from the snow, that their march occupied three entire days. The difficulties of the march and the privations which his men had suffered by resting two nights on the snow, exposed to all the severities of the weather, had so exhausted his men, that it was not till the day after his arrival at Perth that the duke could muster a force sufficiently strong to pursue the enemy.

On the 2d of February Argyle left Perth at the head of six squadrons of dragoons, three battalions of foot, and 800 Highlanders. He stopped at Errol that night, and entered Dundee next day. Having learned that the Chevalier had left Dundee the preceding day on his way to Montrose, the duke sent forward a detachment towards Arbroath, and being joined by the remainder of his army on the 4th of February, he despatched on the same day three battalions of foot, 500 of his own Highlanders, and 50 dragoons, towards Arbroath, and another detachment of 300 foot, and 50 dragoons, in the direction of Brechin; but their march was retarded for some time by the snow. On the 5th the duke followed with the remainder of the army; and while he himself, at the head of the cavalry, took the high road to Brechin, General Cadogan with the infantry marched in the direction of Arbroath.

During the retreat to Montrose, suspicions began to be entertained in the Chevalier’s army, that it was his intention to embark for France, notwithstanding the assurances of the principal officers to the contrary. The unusual route along the sea-coast gave credence to the rumour; but when they approached Montrose, and saw some French vessels lying at anchor off the shore, their suspicions were confirmed, and the men began to manifest symptoms of discontent. The insurgent army arrived at Montrose on the 3d of February, where it was intended they should pass the night; but the Chevalier’s advisers, alarmed at the murmurings of the troops, ordered them to march the same night towards Aberdeen, where it was given out they meant to make a stand till succours should arrive from abroad. This assurance had the desired effect upon the troops, who accordingly began their march in the expectation that the Chevalier would follow them. To prevent suspicion, his horses were ordered to be brought before the door of the house where he lodged at the hour appointed for the march, and his guards were ordered to mount, and to hold themselves in readiness to accompany him.

Meanwhile the Chevalier was busily employed in making the necessary preparations for his approaching departure. To relieve his memory from the imputation of having voluntarily abandoned the brave men who had taken up arms in his cause, it is due to him to state that he had been all along opposed to such a step, and it was not until he had been repeatedly and earnestly urged by his friends that he could be prevailed upon to give his consent to retire beyond seas. He said he was ready to suffer every hardship, and expose himself to every danger, rather than abandon those who had risked their all in his service; but being assured by his friends, that the course they advised might be ultimately beneficial to both, he reluctantly yielded to their entreaties. His principal motive for acceding to their wishes was the consideration that, if relieved from his presence, the government might be disposed to give better terms to his followers than they would be otherwise disposed to grant.[741]

Before his departure he ordered a commission to be drawn up, by which he appointed General Gordon commander-in-chief, with all necessary powers, and particularly with authority to treat with the enemy. He wrote, at the same time, a paper containing his reasons for leaving the kingdom, and along with which he delivered to the general all the money in his possession, (excepting a small sum which he reserved for defraying the expenses of himself and suite,) with instructions, after paying the army, to apply the residue in indemnifying the inhabitants of the villages[742] which had been burned, for the losses sustained by them. At the same time the Chevalier put the following letter to the Duke of Argyle, which he dictated to a secretary, into the hands of General Gordon, respecting the appropriation of the money so left. It is an interesting document, and exhibits the humanity of the prince in a favourable point of view:--

“FOR THE DUKE OF ARGYLE.

“_Montrose, 4th February, 1716._

“It was the view of delivering this my ancient kingdom from the
hardship it lay under, and restoring it to its former happiness
and independency, that brought me into this country; and all
hopes of effectuating that at this time being taken from me, I
have been reduced much against my inclination, but by a cruel
necessity, to leave the kingdom with as many of my faithful
subjects as were desirous to follow me, or I able to carry
with me, that so at least I might secure them from the utter
destruction that threatens them, since that was the only way left
me to show them the regard I had for, and the sense I had of
their unparalleled loyalty.

“Among the manifold mortifications I have had in this unfortunate
expedition, that of being forced to burn several villages, &c.,
as the only expedient left me for the publick security, was not
the smallest. It was indeed forced upon me by the violence with
which my rebellious subjects acted against me, and what they, as
the first authors of it, must be answerable for, not I: however,
as I cannot think of leaving this country without making some
provision to repair that loss, I have, therefore, consigned to
the magistrates of ---- the sum of ----, desiring and requiring
of you, if not as an obedient subject, at least as a lover of
your country, to take care that it be employed to the designed
use, that I may at least have the satisfaction of having been
the destruction and ruin of none, at a time I came to free all.
Whether you have yet received my letter,[743] or what effect it
hath had upon you, I am as yet ignorant of; but what will become
of these unhappy nations is but too plaine. I have neglected
nothing to render them a free and prosperous people; and I fear
they will find yet more than I the smart of preferring a foreign
yoak to that obedience they owe me; and what must those who have
so obstinately resisted both my right and my clemency have to
answer for? But however things turn, or Providence is pleased
to dispose of me, I shall never abandon my just right, nor the
pursuits of it, but with my life; and beseech God so to turn at
last the hearts of my subjects, as that they may enjoy peace and
happiness by submitting to what their interest and duty equally
require of them. As for your own particular, you might, if you
had pleased, joined interest and greatness in your own person;
but, though you have refused to do that, I must earnestly request
of you to do at least all in your power to save your country from
utter ruin, and to be just at least to them, since you are it not
to me.

“[744]I thought to write this in my own hand, but had not time.

“JAMES R.”

This letter was accompanied by a note of the following letter to General Gordon, written in the Chevalier’s own hand:--

“General Gordon is hereby empowered, as soon as he has no
other further occasion for the money left in his hands for the
subsistence of the troops, to forward, if he thinks fitt, the
enclosed letter to the duke of Argil, and to fill up the blanks
of my letter with the name of the town where he shall leave the
money, and the summ he shall leave.

“JAMES R.”

It was not until the eve of his departure, that James thought of selecting the persons he wished to accompany him in his flight, but the near approach of the enemy, of whose motions he had just received intelligence, and the murmurings and jealousies of his troops compelling him to hasten his departure, he was narrowed in his choice, as some of the friends, whose presence he desired, were at some distance from Montrose. The first individual he pitched upon was Mar; but the earl begged that he might be left behind with the army. The Chevalier, however, insisted that he should go; and on representing to him that reasons almost equally strong existed for Mar’s departure as for his own, that his friends would make better terms with the government without him than with him, and that his services could be of no use in Scotland under existing circumstances, he gave his consent.

Matters being adjusted, the Chevalier left his lodgings privately about nine o’clock on the evening of the 4th of February, accompanied only by one of his domestics, and having met Mar at his lodgings, they both proceeded by a private way to the beach, where a boat was lying in readiness to receive them, which carried them on board a small French vessel that lay at a little distance from the shore. The boat was immediately sent back, and returned in about a quarter of an hour with the Earl of Melfort, Lord Drummond, and the remainder of the Chevalier’s suite. Being favoured with a fresh breeze from the west-south-west, the vessel stood directly out to sea, and after a voyage of five days, arrived in safety at Waldam, near Gravelines in French Flanders.

The insurgents, under General Gordon, marched to Aberdeen, which they entered on the morning of the 6th of February. Here he communicated to his men the paper of instructions he had received from the Chevalier, which, he informed them, he had been ordered not to open till their arrival at Aberdeen. In this writing the prince complained of the disappointments he had met with, particularly from abroad, and informed the army of the necessity he was under, for his own preservation, to leave the country. He thanked them for having entered so cheerfully into his service, and imputed the failure of the enterprise to the apathy of others, who had not seconded their efforts as they had promised to do. He advised them to consult their own safety by keeping together in a body under General Gordon till he should order them to disperse, and concluded by encouraging them to hope for better times. After reading this document, the General notified to his men that their pay would cease after that day.

General Cadogan arrived at Montrose on the afternoon of the 5th of February with three regiments of foot, and 600 of Argyle’s Highlanders, and the duke reached Brechin with the dragoons the same night. The whole royalist forces continued their march the following day towards Aberdeen, but they could not overtake the insurgents, who were nearly two days’ march in advance. The latter left Aberdeen on the 7th, and the Duke of Argyle entered it the following day at the head of 400 dragoons. The main body of the insurgents, chiefly foot, marched in the direction of Old Meldrum, but a party of about 200 horse, among whom were many officers and gentlemen-volunteers, took the route to Peterhead, where some vessels were lying to carry them to France. The Duke of Argyle, without waiting for the coming up of the rest of his army, immediately sent 200 dragoons, and a party of foot under Major-General Evans, to cut off the retreat of the latter, but he did not overtake them. Upwards of 100 of the gentlemen composing this party escaped to France.

Meanwhile the insurgents continued their march westwards into Moray, and after marching through Strathspey, retired into Badenoch, where they quietly dispersed. During their retreat, however, many, whose houses lay contiguous to their route, gradually withdrew from the ranks, so that before their arrival in Badenoch a considerable reduction had taken place in their numbers. Though closely pursued by Argyle’s troops, the insurgents did not lose 100 men during the whole retreat, so well and orderly was it conducted by the Jacobite commander.

After the dispersion of the insurgents, about 160 officers and gentlemen-volunteers who had followed the army into the Highlands, hearing that two French frigates, destined to receive on board such of the adherents of the Chevalier as might be inclined to retire abroad, had arrived off the Orkney coast, sallied from the hills on horseback, and crossing the low country of Moray embarked in boats at Burgh-head, and landed in Caithness. From Caithness they proceeded to the Orkney islands, where they had the good fortune to reach the French ships, which carried them to Gottenburg. Among this party were Lord Duffus, who, being a seaman, entered into the naval service of the King of Sweden, Sir George Sinclair, Sir David Threipland of Fingask, and General Eckline. Most of these refugees entered into the Swedish army then about to invade Norway.

Thus ended an enterprise badly contrived, and conducted throughout with little judgment or energy. Yet notwithstanding the disadvantages under which it was attempted, it might have succeeded, if the efforts of the Scottish Jacobites had been seconded by the Jacobites of England; but the latter, though decidedly hostile to the House of Brunswick, were not inclined to risk their lives and fortunes in a doubtful contest, in support of the pretensions of a prince known to them only by name, and to whose religion many of them felt a deep-rooted repugnance.

FOOTNOTES:

[722] Burton’s _Scotland_ (1689-1748), vol. ii. p. 151.

[723] Burton’s _Scotland_, vol. ii. pp. 188, 189.

[724] Rae, p. 294. _Life of Argyle_, p. 187.

[725] It must be remembered that these dates are according to the Old Style of reckoning, and that to make them accord with the New Style, eleven days must be added: thus, the 10th of November O. S. is the same as the 21st N. S.

[726] MS. referred to in Lord John Russell’s _History of Europe_, p. 345. Jacobite Official Account of the battle, printed at Perth, 1715.

[727] “The muir is a hill, but a very gentle one; and it has the peculiarity of being a regular curve, presenting in all parts a segment of a sphere, or rather an oblate spheroid. There are no rapid declivities and no plains. Hence, in every part of the hill, there is a close sky line, caused by the immediate curve, and where there is so much of the curve, as will reach a perpendicular of some eight feet between two bodies of men, they cannot see each other.”--Burton’s _Scotland_ (1689-1748), vol. ii. p. 193.

[728]
“There’s some say that we wan, and some say that they wan,
And some say that nane wan at a’ man;
But one thing I’m sure, that at Sherramuir
A battle there was that I saw, man.
And we ran, and they ran, and they ran, and we ran,
But Florence[729] ran fastest of a’ man.”

_The Battle of Sheriffmuir_ in Hogg’s _Jacobite Relics_.

[729] Marquis of Huntly’s horse.

[730] Colonel Harrison’s account.

[731]
“Rob Roy there stood watch on a hill, for to catch
The booty, for ought that I saw, man;
For he ne’er advanc’d from the place he was stanc’d,
Till no more was to do there at a’ man.”

_Battle of Sheriffmuir._

“A short time previous to the Earl of Mar’s rising, their (the Macgregors’) depredations in the Lennox, and on the lower banks of Lochlomond, had been carried to such an extremity, that the military force of the west country was raised against them, and all the warriors of the clan seem to have been driven from their country, and to have retreated to the north, even as far as the mountains of Loch-Arkaig and Glengarry. Accordingly we find Rob Roy there in September and October 1715.

“From thence he came down with the rest of the clans, and joined general Gordon in Strathfillan. He was with the clans before Inverary, and was active in making some reprisals both by carrying off cattle on the banks of Loch-Fyne, and capturing ships that lay at anchor in the loch.

“He marched with the clans to Ardoch, and was present at the battle of Sheriffmuir, but kept a shy distance, thereby weakening that wing of the army to which the Macgregors were placed as a corps-de-reserve, on what principle it is not easy to determine, if it was not, as the bard suggests, to watch who gained the day, and then assist them in disposing of the booty.

“Before the friends of the Stuarts, however, could be properly brought to a head, Rob performed a very signal service to many of them by an act worthy of his character, and exactly in his own way. At the great hunting of Brae Mar, it has been mentioned what a number of noblemen and chiefs signed the bond of faith and mutual support. By the negligence of a chieftain to whose charge this important and dangerous document was committed, it fell into the hands of Captain Campbell, then at Fort William; and when it became known that a man of such determined Whig principles held this bond, those who signed it were seriously alarmed, and various plans were suggested for recovering it. Rob Roy Macgregor, who was at this clan meeting, had also affixed his name; but on his own account he was indifferent, as he regarded neither king nor government. He was, however, urged by several chiefs, particularly his patron, to exert himself, and if possible to recover the bond. With this view he went to Fort William in disguise, not with his usual number of attendants, and getting access to Captain Campbell, who was a near relation of his own, he discovered that, out of revenge for the contemptuous manner in which the chieftains now treated the captain, he had put the bond into the possession of the governor of the garrison, who was resolved to forward it to the privy council; and Rob, learning by accident the day on which it was to be sent, took his leave, and went home. The despatch which contained the bond was made up by Governor Hill, and sent from Fort William, escorted by an ensign’s command, which in those countries always accompanied the messages of government. On the third day’s march, Rob and 50 of his men met this party in Glendochart, and ordering them to halt, demanded their despatches. The officer refused; but Rob told him, that he would either have their lives and the despatches together, or the despatches alone. The ferocious looks and appearance of Rob and his men bespoke no irresolution. The packet was given up; and Rob, having taken out the bond he wanted, begged the officer would excuse the delay he had occasioned, and wishing him a good journey, left the military to proceed unmolested. By this manœuvre many chieftains kept on their heads, and the forfeiture of many estates was prevented.

“The following notices are from Mr. Moir’s MSS.

“One of the causes of the repulse of part of Mar’s forces was the part which Rob Roy acted; this Rob Roy, or Red Robert, was uncle to the laird of Macgregor, and commanded that clan in his nephew’s absence; but on the day of battle he kept his men together at some distance, without allowing them to engage, though they showed all the willingness imaginable; and waited only an opportunity to plunder, which was it seems the chief design of his coming there. This clan are a hardy rough people, but noted for pilfering, as they lie upon the border of the Highlands, and this Rob Roy had exercised their talents that way, pretty much in a kind of thieving war he carried on against the Duke of Montrose, who had cheated him of a small feudal estate.

“The conduct of this gentleman (who was wont, as occasion served, to assume the name of Campbell, his own being prohibited by act of parliament) was the more surprising, as he had ever been remarked for courage and activity. When desired by one of his own officers to go and assist his friends, he remarked, ‘If they cannot do it without me, they cannot do it with me.’ It is more than probable, however, that his interference would have decided the day in favour of his own party. He continued in arms for some years, and committed great depredations in the shires of Dumbarton and Lennox, particularly on the Duke of Montrose’s lands, defeating several detachments sent to reduce him.”--_Jacobite Relics_, vol. ii. pp. 248-251.

[732] _Journal of Mar’s proceedings_, printed at Paris.

[733] “The coincidence in time, of this achievement, with the reduction of Preston, and the battle of Sheriffmuir, is remarkable, and was much dwelt on at the time. But perhaps the day of the capture of Inverness not being exactly known--though it was certainly about the middle of November--it is not unlikely that the coincidence may have created a tendency to assign it to the 13th.”--Burton’s _Scotland_ (1689-1747), vol. ii. p. 189 (note).

[734] _Annals of 2d year of George I._, p. 189.

[735] _A true account of the proceedings at Perth_, by a Rebel.

[736] This officer appears to have been very suspicious of Argyle’s motives, and did not hesitate to communicate his opinion to his superiors. In a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, he says: “Argyle grows so intolerably uneasy, that it is almost impossible to live with him any longer; he is enraged at the success of the expedition, though he and his creatures attribute to themselves the honour of it. When I brought him the news of the rebels having ran from Perth, he seemed thunderstruck; and was so visibly concerned, that even the foreign officers that were in the room took notice of it.... Since the rebels quitting Perth, he (Argyle) has sent 500 or 600 of his Argyleshire men, who go before the army a day’s march, to take possession of the towns the enemy have abandoned, and to plunder and destroy the country, which enrages our soldiers, who are forbid under pain of death to take the value of a farthing, though out of the rebels’ houses. Not one of these Argyle-men appeared whilst the rebels were in Perth, and when they might have been of some use.”--Cox’s _Marlborough_, vol. iii. p. 612.

[737] _True Account of the Proceedings at Perth_, by a Rebel.

[738] Mar’s _Journal_.

[739] _True Account of the Proceedings at Perth._

[740] _Annals of George I._, vol. ii. p. 222.

[741] Mar’s _Journal_.

[742] Dunning, Auchterarder, Blackford, Crieff, Muthil.

[743] It is presumed this is the letter alluded to in a conversation between Lockhart of Carnwath and Captain Dougall Campbell, who is represented by him as “a person of great worth and loyalty, and a bosome friend of Argyle’s.” “Being with me (says Lockhart) at my country house, he (Campbell) asked me if I heard Argyle blam’d for having received and given no answer to a letter writt to him by the king whilst he was at Perth. I told him I had, but could not agree with those who censured him, for I had such an abhorrence of breach of trust, that had I been the duke’s adviser, it should have been to doe as he did; for tho there was nothing I so much desired as to see him engaged in the king’s cause, I wisht it done in a way consistent with his honour. Captain Campbell smiled and told me, he was to acquaint me of a secret which he must previously have my solemn word I would communicate to none, which he had given when it was revealed to him, having however obtained liberty afterwards to speak of it to me. After giving him the assurance he demanded, he told me that the letter was not delivered to the duke, for in his late Highland progress, he saw it and another to Lord Isla in the hands of the person to whose care they were committed, (but who that person was he would not tell me), who receiving them unseal’d, did not, after perusal, think it for the king’s service to deliver them, that to the duke being writt in a style by no means to be approved of; ‘and, indeed,’ added Campbell, ‘when I read them, I was entirely of the same mind, and could not but think that Mar or some other person, with a view of rather widening than healing the breaches, had prevail’d with the king to write after that manner.’ The letter to Isla was writt as to a man of business, insisting on the unhappy state of Scotland, and that nothing but a dissolution of the union by the king’s restoration, could prevent the utter ruin of that country. That to the duke did invite him to return to his loyalty and duty, threatening him, if he neglected, with revenge and the utter extirpation of his family, for what he and his predecessors had done in this and the last century. I doe not pretend to narrate the precise words of this letter, nor did Campbell mention them as such to me; however, I have narrated what he said was the aim and purport of the letter.”--_Lockhart Papers_, vol. ii. pp. 14, 15.

[744] What follows is in the Chevalier’s own handwriting. The original document is in the Fingask family; of course, it had never been delivered to the duke.