Chapter XXIV: Section 6: of the act of 1850 provides that "the person or persons

to whom such service or labour may be due, or his, her, or their
agent or attorney ... may pursue and reclaim such fugitive
person, either by procuring a warrant ... or by seizing and
arresting such fugitive, where the same can be done without
process, and by taking, or causing such person to be taken,
forthwith before such court, judge or commissioner, whose duty
it shall be to hear and determine the case ... in a summary
manner; and upon satisfactory proof ... to make out and deliver
to such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, a certificate
... with authority ... to use such reasonable force ... as may
be necessary ... to take and remove such fugitive person back
to the State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as
aforesaid."

It is not to be supposed, of course, that the law of 1850 was found to be intrinsically less objectionable to abolitionists than the measure it was intended to supplement. On the contrary, it soon proved to be decidedly more objectionable. The features of the first Slave Act that were obnoxious to the Northern people, and had been subjected to examination in the courts, were retained in the second act, where they were associated with a number of new features of such a character that they soon brought the new law into the greatest contempt. While, therefore, the records of the trials of the chief cases arising under the later law are found to contain arguments borrowed from the contentions made in the cases already discussed, it is interesting to note that they afford proof that new arguments were also brought to bear against the act of 1850. As with the first Fugitive Slave Law, so also with its successor, fault was found on account of the absence of any provision for jury trial;[788] the authority of a claimant or his agent to arrest without legal process;[789] the opposition alleged to exist between the law and the Ordinance of 1787;[790] and the power said to be improperly exercised by Congress in legislating upon the subject of fugitive slaves.[791] It is unnecessary to introduce here a study of these points as they presented themselves in the various cases arising, for a discussion of them would lead to no principles of importance other than those discovered in the cases already examined.[792]

[788] Sims' case, tried before the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, March term, 1851. See 7 _Cushing's Reports_, 310.

Miller _vs._ McQuerry, tried before the Circuit Court of the
United States, in Ohio, 1853. See 5 _McLean's Reports_, 481-484.

_Ex parte_ Simeon Bushnell, etc., tried before the Supreme Court
of Ohio, May, 1859. See 9 _Ohio State Reports_, 170.

[789] Norris _vs._ Newton et al., tried before the Circuit Court
of the United States, in Indiana, May term, 1850. See 5 _McLean's
Reports_, 98.

_Ex parte_ Simeon Bushnell, etc. See 9 _Ohio State Reports_, 174.

United States _vs._ Buck, tried before the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1860. See
8 _American Law Register_, 543.

[790] Booth's case, tried before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
June term, 1854. See 3 _Wisconsin Reports_, 3.

_Ex parte_ Simeon Bushnell, and _ex parte_ Charles Langston,
tried before the Supreme Court of Ohio, May, 1859. See 9 _Ohio
State Reports_, 111, 114-117, 124, 186.

[791] Sims' case. See 7 _Cushing's Reports_, 290. Booth's case.
See 3 _Wisconsin Reports_.

[792] For the text of the Slave Laws, see Appendix A, pp. 359-366.

In some of the cases that were tried under the act of 1850, however, new questions appeared; and in some, where the questions were perhaps without novelty, the circumstances were such that the cases cannot well be passed over in silence.

If, as was freely declared by the abolitionists, it was possible for free negroes to be abducted from the Northern states under the form of procedure laid down by the act of 1793, there can be little reason to doubt that the same thing was equally possible under the procedure established by the act of 1850. Certain it is that the anti-slavery people were not dubious on this point, but they had scarcely had time to formulate their criticisms of the new law when the first case under it of which there is any record demonstrated the ease with which this legislation could be taken advantage of in the commission of a foul injustice. The case occurred September 26, only eight days after the passage of the act. A free negro, James Hamlet, then living in New York, was arrested as the slave of Mary Brown, of Baltimore. The hearing took place before a United States commissioner and the negro's removal followed at once. The community in which Hamlet was living was greatly incensed when the facts concerning his disappearance became known, and the sum of money necessary for his redemption was quickly contributed. Before a fortnight had elapsed he was brought back from slavery.[793]

[793] Marion G. McDougall, _Fugitive Slaves_, pp. 43 and 44, with
the references there given; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave
Power_, Vol. II, pp. 304, 305. See Appendix B, p. 372.

The summary manner in which this case was disposed of had prevented a defence being made in behalf of the supposed fugitive. In the next case, however, that of Thomas Sims, which was tried before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1851, the negro was represented by competent counsel, who brought forward objections against the second Fugitive Slave Law. Almost the first of these was directed against the power of the special officers, the commissioners, created by the new law. It was insisted that the authority with which these officers were invested was distinctly judicial in character, despite the constitutional provision limiting the exercise of the judicial power of the United States to organized courts of justice, composed of judges, holding their offices during good behavior, and receiving fixed salaries for their services.[794] The same argument seems to have been adduced in Scott's case, tried before the District Court of the United States in Massachusetts in 1851; in the case of Miller _vs._ McQuerry, tried before the Circuit Court of the United States in Ohio in 1853;[795] in Booth's case, argued in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1854;[796] in the case known as _ex parte_ Robinson, adjudicated by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio at its April term, 1855;[797] and in the case _ex parte_ Simeon Bushnell, argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1859.[798] The court met this argument by a direct answer in four of the cases mentioned, namely, those of Sims, Scott, Booth and _ex parte_ Robinson. In the first, Sims' case, Chief Justice Shaw pointed out that under the Slave Law of 1793 the jurisdiction over fugitive slave cases had been conferred on justices of the peace and magistrates of cities and towns corporate, as well as on judges of the United States circuit and district courts, and that evidently, therefore, the power bestowed had not been deemed judicial in the sense in which it was urged that the functions of the commissioners were judicial. At the same time the judge admitted that the "argument from the limitation of judicial power would be entitled to very grave consideration" if it were without the support of early construction, judicial precedent and the acquiescence of the general and state governments. In the trial of James Scott, on the charge of aiding in the rescue of Shadrach (May or June, 1851), Judge Sprague, of the United States District Court, held that the legal force of the certificate issued by a commissioner lay merely in the authority it conveyed to remove the person designated from one state to another, and that the disposition made of the person removed depended solely upon the laws of the state to which he was taken. The facts set down in the certificate were not, therefore, to be considered as matters judicially established, but as facts only in the opinion of the commissioner. In Booth's case, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin contained a reference to the legality of the power of the commissioners and sustained the objection to their authority on the ground of unconstitutionality.[799] In _ex parte_ Robinson, Judge McLean admitted that the inquiry made by the commissioner was "somewhat in the nature of judicial power," but that the same remark applied to all the officers of the accounting departments of the government, as, for example, the examiners in the Patent Office. He also remarked that the Supreme Court had always treated the acts of the commissioners, in the cases that had come before it, as possessed of authority under the law.[800]

[794] _7 Cushing's Reports_, 287. The constitutional requirement
will be found in Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of
the United States.

[795] 5 _McLean's Reports_, 481.

[796] 3 _Wisconsin Reports_, 39.

[797] 6 _McLean's Reports_, 359.

[798] 9 _Ohio State Reports_, 176.

[799] 3 _Wisconsin Reports_, 64.

[800] 6 _McLean's Reports_, 359, 360.

The uncertainty as to the precise character of the commissioners' power displayed in the different views of the courts before which the question was brought marks the observations of the commissioners themselves in regard to their authority. Examples will be found in Sims' and Burns' cases. In the former, Mr. George T. Curtis declared that claims for fugitive slaves came within the judicial power of the federal government, and that, consequently, the mode and means of the application of this power to the cases arising were properly to be determined by Congress. In the latter, Mr. Edward G. Loring asserted that his action was not judicial at all, but only ministerial.

An additional ground of objection to the commissioners was found in the provision made in the law of 1850 for their remuneration. When one of these officers issued a certificate authorizing the removal of a runaway to the state whence he had escaped, he was legally entitled to a fee of ten dollars; when, however, he withheld the warrant he could receive but five dollars. Abolitionists took much offence at this arrangement, and sometimes scornfully denominated the special appointees under the law the "ten-dollar commissioners," and insisted that the difference between the fees was in the nature of a bribe held out to the officers to induce them to decide in favor of the claimant. Considering the prevalence of this feeling outside of the courts, it is not surprising that objections to the section of the act regulating the fees of commissioners should have been taken within the court-room.[801] Such objection was raised in McQuerry's case, and was answered by Judge McLean. This answer is probably the only one judicially declared, and is worth quoting: "In regard to the five dollars, in addition, paid to the commissioner, where the fugitive is remanded to the claimant," the judge explained, "in all fairness it cannot be considered as a bribe, or as so intended by Congress; but as a compensation to the commissioner for making a statement of the case, which includes the facts proved, and to which the certificate is annexed. In cases where the witnesses are numerous and the investigation takes up several days, five dollars would scarcely be a compensation for the statement required. Where the fugitive is discharged, no statement is necessary."[802]

[801] Hurd, _Law of Freedom and Bondage_, Vol. II, p. 747.

[802] 5 _McLean's Reports_, 481.

The fees paid to commissioners were, as indicated in the remarks just quoted, by way of remuneration for services rendered in inquiries relative to the rights of ownership of negroes alleged to have escaped from the South. These inquiries, together with similar inquiries that arose under the act of 1793, constitute a group by themselves. Another group is made up of the cases growing out of the prosecution under the two acts of persons charged with harboring fugitive slaves, or aiding in their rescue. The secrecy observed by abolitionists in giving assistance to escaping bondmen shows that the evils threatening, if a discovery occurred, were constantly kept in mind. After the passage of the second act, public denunciation of the measure was indulged in freely, and open resistance to its provisions, whether these should be considered constitutional or not, was recommended in some quarters. Such remonstrances seem to have early disturbed the judicial repose of the courts, for, six months after the new Fugitive Slave Bill had become a law, Justice Nelson found occasion in the course of a charge to the grand jury of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to deliver a speech on sectional issues in which he gave an exposition of the new law, "so that those, if any there be, who have made up their minds to disobey it, may be fully apprised of the consequences."[803] The severer penalties of the law of 1850 had no deterrent effect upon those who were determined to resist its enforcement. The fervor displayed in harboring runaways increased rather than diminished throughout the free states, and the spirit of resistance thus fostered broke out in daring and sometimes successful attempts at rescue. Through the activity of slave-owners in seeking the recovery of their lost property, and the support afforded them by the government in the strict enforcement of the new law, a number of offenders were brought to trial and subjected to punishments inflicted under its provisions.

[803] 1 _Blatchford's Circuit Court Reports_, 636.

Among the prosecutions arising under the two congressional acts the following cases are offered as typical. The number has been limited by choosing in general from among such as came before supreme courts of the states, or before circuit and district courts of the United States.

One of the earliest cases of which we have record was brought before the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on writ of error, in 1822. The action was for the penalty under the law of 1793 for obstructing the plaintiff, a citizen of Maryland, in seizing his escaped slave in Philadelphia for the purpose of taking him before a magistrate there to prove property. The trial in the United States District Court had terminated in a verdict of $500 for the slave-owner. Judge Washington, of the Circuit Court, decided, however, that there was an error in the judgment of the lower court, that the judgment must be reversed with costs, and the cause remitted to the District Court in order that a new trial might be had. This case is known in the law books as the case of Hill _vs._ Low.[804]

[804] _Washington's Circuit Court Reports_, 327-331.

Occasionally an attempt at rescue ended in the arrest and imprisonment of the slave-catchers, as well as the release of the captured negro. When a party of rescuers went to such a length as here indicated it laid itself liable to an action for damages on the ground of false imprisonment, as well as to prosecution for the penalty under the Fugitive Slave Law. This is illustrated in the case of Johnson _vs._ Tomkins, a case belonging to the year 1833.[805] It was the outgrowth of the attempt of a master to reclaim his slave from the premises of a Quaker, John Kenderdine, of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Before the slave-owner could return to New Jersey, the state of his domicile, he and his party were overtaken, and after violent handling in which the master was injured, they were taken into custody, and were forthwith prosecuted. The trial ended in the acquittal of the company from New Jersey, whose seizure of the negro was found to be justifiable. Then followed the prosecution of some of the Pennsylvania party for trespass and false imprisonment, before the Circuit Court of the United States. The fact that the defendants were all Quakers was noted by the judge, who found it "hard to imagine" the motives by which these persons, "members of a society distinguished for their obedience and submission to the laws" were actuated. The question of damages was left exclusively to the jury. The verdict rendered was for $4,000, and the court gave judgment on the verdict.[806]

[805] _Baldwins Circuit Court Reports_, 571-605.

[806] _Washington's Circuit Court Reports_, 327-331.

The law of 1793 provided a double penalty for those guilty of transgressing its provisions: first, the forfeiture of a sum of $500 to be recovered for the benefit of the claimant by action of debt; secondly, the payment of such damages as might be awarded by the court in an action brought by the slave-owner on account of the injuries sustained through the loss, or even the temporary absence, of his property. In the famous case of Jones _vs._ Van Zandt, which was pending before the United States courts, in Ohio and at Washington, for five years, from 1842 to 1847, the defendant was compelled to pay both penalties. In April, 1842, Mr. Van Zandt, an anti-slavery Kentuckian, who had settled at Springdale, a few miles north of Cincinnati, Ohio, was caught in the act of conveying a company of nine fugitives in his market-wagon at daybreak one morning, and, notwithstanding the efforts of the slave-catchers, one of the negroes escaped. The trial was held before the United States Circuit Court at its July term, 1843. The jury gave a verdict for the claimant of $1,200 in damages on two counts.[807] Besides the suit for damages, an action was brought against Van Zandt for the penalty of $500. In this action, as in the other, the verdict was for Jones, the plaintiff. The matter did not end here, however, and was carried on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges to the Supreme Court of the United States. The decision of this court was also adverse to Van Zandt, and final judgment was entered against him for both amounts. This settlement was reached at the January term in 1847.[808]

[807] _McLean's Reports_, 612.

[808] _Howard's Reports_, 215-232; see also Schuckers, _Life and
Public Services of S. P. Chase_, 53-66; Warden, _Private Life and
Public Services of S. P. Chase_, 296-298.

The successful rescue of a large company of slaves was likely to make the adventure a very expensive one for the responsible persons that took part in it. Such was the experience of the defendants in the case of Giltner _vs._ Gorham and others, determined in 1847. Six slaves, the chattels of Mr. Giltner, a citizen of Carroll County, Kentucky, were discovered and arrested in Marshall, Michigan, by the agents of the claimant, but through the intervention of the defendants were set at liberty. Action was brought to recover the value of the negroes, who were estimated to be worth $2,752. In the first trial the jury failed to agree. At the succeeding term of court, however, a verdict for the value of the slaves was found for the plaintiff.[809]

[809] _McLean's Reports_, 402-426.

The value of four negroes was involved in the case of Norris _vs._ Newton and others. These negroes were found in September, 1849, after two years' absence from Kentucky, living in Cass County, Michigan. Here they had taken refuge among abolitionists and people of their own color. They were at once seized by their pursuers and conveyed across the line into Indiana, but had not been taken far when their progress was stopped by an excited crowd with a sheriff at its head. The officer had a writ of habeas corpus, and the temper of the crowd would admit of no delay in securing a hearing for the fugitives. The court-house at South Bend, whither the captives were now taken, was at once crowded with spectators, and the streets around it filled with the overflow. The negroes were released by the decision of the judge, but were rearrested and placed in jail for safe-keeping. On the following day warrants were sworn out against several members of the Kentucky party, charging them with riot and other breaches of the peace, and civil process was begun against Mr. Norris, the owner of the slaves, claiming large damages in their behalf. Meanwhile companies of colored people, some of whom had firearms and others clubs, came tramping into the village from Cass County and the intermediate country. Fortunately a demonstration by these incensed bands was somehow avoided. Two days later the fugitives were released from custody on a second writ of habeas corpus, and, attended by a great bodyguard of colored persons, were triumphantly carried away in a wagon. The slave-owner, the charges against whom were dropped, had declined to attend the last hearing accorded his slaves, declaring that his rights had been violated, and that he would claim compensation under the law. Suit was accordingly brought in the Circuit Court of the United States in 1850, and the sum of $2,850 was awarded as damages to the plaintiff.[810]

[810] 5 _McLean's Reports_, 92-106.

Another case in which large damages were at stake was that of Oliver _vs._ Weakley and others, tried in the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, in October term, 1853. It was alleged and proved that Mr. Weakley, one of the defendants, had given shelter in his barn to several slaves of the plaintiff, who was a citizen of Maryland. The jury failed to agree on the first trial. A second trial was therefore held, and this time a verdict was reached; one of the defendants was found guilty, and damages to the amount of $2,800 were assessed upon him; the other defendants were declared "not guilty."[811]

[811] 2 _Wallace Jr.'s Reports_, 324-326.

The dismissal without proper authority of seven fugitives from the custody of their captors at Sandusky, Ohio, by Mr. Rush R. Sloane, a lawyer of that city, led to the institution of two suits against him by Mr. L. F. Weimer, the claimant of three of the slaves. The suits were tried before the District Court of the United States at Columbus, Ohio, in 1854, and a verdict for $3,000 and costs was returned in favor of the slaveholder. The costs amounted to $330.30, and the defendant had also to pay $1,000 in attorneys' fees. Some friends of Mr. Sloane in Sandusky formed a committee and collected $393, an amount sufficient to pay the court and marshal's costs, but the judgment and the other expenses were borne by the defendant individually.[812]

[812] 6 _McLean's Reports_, 259-273. Mr. Sloane's account of the
case will be found in _The Firelands Pioneer_ for July, 1888,
pp. 46-49. A copy of the certificate of the clerk of court there
given is here reproduced:--

"Louis F. Weimer _vs._ Rush R. Sloane. United States District of
Ohio, in debt.

OCTOBER TERM, 1854.

Judgment for Plaintiff for $3000 and costs.

Received July 8th, 1856, of Rush R. Sloane, the above Defendant,
a receipt of Louis F. Weimer, the above Plaintiff, bearing date
Dec. 14th, 1854, for $3000, acknowledging full satisfaction of
the above judgment, except the costs; also a receipt of L. F.
Weimer, Sr., per Joseph Doniphan, attorney, for $85, the amount
of Plaintiff's witness fees in said case; also certificates of
Defendant's witnesses in above case for $162; also $20 in money,
the attorney's docket fees attached, which, with the clerk and
marshal's fees heretofore paid, is in full of the costs in said
case.

(Signed) WILLIAM MINER, _Clerk_."

The burden of the penalty, of which, as we have just seen, a small fraction was assumed by sympathizers with the offender in the case of Mr. Sloane, was altogether removed by friendly contributors in the case of another citizen of Sandusky. Two negroes from Kentucky, who were being cared for at the house of Mr. F. D. Parish, were protected from arrest by their benefactor in February, 1845. As Parish was a fearless agent of the Underground Road, the fugitives were not seen afterwards in northern Ohio. The result was that Parish was required to undergo three trials, and in the last, in 1849, the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio fined him $500, the estimated value of the slaves at the time. This sum, together with the costs and expenses, amounting to as much more, was paid by friends of Mr. Parish, who made up the necessary amount by subscriptions of one dollar each.[813]

[813] For the first trial (1845), see 3 _McLean's Reports_, 631;
_s. c. 5 Western Law Journal_, 25; 7 _Federal Cases_, 1100; for
the second trial (1847), see 10 _Law Reporter_, 395; _s. c._ 5
_Western Law Journal_, 206; 7 _Federal Cases_, 1093; for the
third trial (1849), see 5 _McLean's Reports_, 64; _s. c._ 7
_Western Law Journal_, 222; 7 _Federal Cases_, 1095. See also
_The Firelands Pioneer_, July, 1888, pp. 41, 42.

It will have been noticed that the Van Zandt and Parish cases were in litigation for about five years each. A famous Illinois case, that of Dr. Richard Eells, occupied the attention of the courts and of the public more or less during an entire decade. The incidents that gave rise to this case occurred in Adams County, Illinois, in 1842. In that year Mr. Eells was indicted for secreting a slave owing service to Chauncey Durkee, of Missouri, and was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $400 and the costs of the prosecution. The case was taken on writ of error first to the Supreme Court of the state, and after the death of Mr. Eells to the Supreme Court of the United States. In both instances the judgment of the original tribunal was confirmed. The decision of the federal court was reached at its December term for 1852.[814]

[814] 5 _Illinois Reports_, 498-518; 14 _Howard's Reports_, 13,
14.

It was sometimes made clear in the courts that the defendants in cases arising under the Fugitive Slave laws were persons in the habit of evading the requirements of these laws. This is true of the case of Ray _vs._ Donnell and Hamilton, which was tried before the United States Circuit Court in Indiana, at the May term, 1849. A slave woman, Caroline, and her four children fled from Kemble County, Kentucky, and found shelter in a barn near Clarksburg, Indiana. Here they were discovered by Woodson Clark, a farmer living in the neighborhood, who took measures immediately to inform their master, while the slaves were removed to a fodder-house for safe-keeping. In some way Messrs. Donnell and Hamilton learned of the capture of the negroes by Mr. Clark, and secured a writ of habeas corpus in their behalf; but, if the testimony of Mr. Clark's son, supported by certain circumstantial evidence, is to be credited, the blacks were released from custody by the personal efforts of the defendants, and not by legal process. Considerable evidence conflicting with that just mentioned appears to have had little weight with the jury, for it gave a verdict for the claimant and assessed his damages at $1,500.[815]

[815] 4 _McLean's Reports_, 504-515.

In the trial of Mitchell, an abolitionist of the town of Indiana, Pennsylvania, in 1853, for harboring two fugitives, some of the evidence was intended to show that he was connected with a "regularly organized association," the business of which was "to entice negroes from their owners, and to aid them in escaping to the North." The slaves he was charged with harboring had been given employment on his farm in the country, where, as it was thought, they would be secure. After remaining about four months they were apprised of danger and escaped. Justice Grier charged the jury to "let no morbid sympathy, no false respect for pretended 'rights of conscience,' prevent it from judging the defendant justly." A verdict of $500 was found for the plaintiff.[816]

[816] 2 _Wallace Jr.'s Reports_, 313, 317-323.

Penalties for hindering the arrest of a fugitive slave were imposed in two other noted cases, which deserve mention here, although they are considered at length in another connection. One of these was Booth's case, with which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the District and Supreme Courts of the United States dealt between the years 1855 and 1858. The sentence pronounced against Mr. Booth included imprisonment for one month and a fine of $1,000 and costs--$1,451 in all.[817] The other case was what is commonly known as the Oberlin-Wellington case, tried in the United States District Court at Cleveland, Ohio, in 1858 and 1859. Only two out of the thirty-seven men indicted were convicted, and the sentences imposed were comparatively light. Mr. Bushnell was sentenced to pay a fine of $600 and costs and to be imprisoned in the county jail for sixty days, while the sentence of the colored man, Langston, was a fine of $100 and costs and imprisonment for twenty days.

[817] 21 _Howard's Reports_, 510; _The Fugitive Slave Law in
Wisconsin, with Reference to Nullification Sentiment_, by Vroman
Mason, p. 134.

In all of the cases thus far considered the charges upon which the transgressors of the Fugitive Slave laws were prosecuted were, in general terms, harboring and concealing runaways, obstructing their arrest, or aiding in their rescue. There was, however, one case in which the crime alleged in the indictment was much more serious, being nothing less than treason against the United States. This was the famous Christiana case, marked not only by the nature of the indictment, but by the organized resistance to arrest made by the slaves and their friends, and by the violent death of one of the attacking party. The frequent abduction of negroes from the neighborhood of Christiana, in southeastern Pennsylvania, seems to have given occasion for the formation, about 1851, of a league for self-protection among the many colored persons living in that region.[818] The leading spirit in this association was William Parker, a fugitive slave whose house was a refuge for other runaways. On September 10, Parker and his neighbors received word from the Vigilance Committee of Philadelphia that Gorsuch, a slaveholder of Maryland, had procured warrants for the arrest of two of his slaves, known to be staying at Parker's house. When, therefore, Gorsuch with his son and some friends appeared upon the scene about daybreak on the morning of the 11th, and, having broken into the house, demanded the fugitives, the negroes lost little time in sounding a horn from one of the upper-story windows to summon their friends. From fifty to one hundred men, armed with guns, clubs and corn-cutters, soon came up. Castner Hanway and Elijah Lewis, two Quakers, who had been drawn to the place by the disturbance, declined to join the marshal's posse and help arrest the slaves; but they advised the negroes against resisting the law, and warned Gorsuch and his party to depart if they would prevent bloodshed. Neither side would yield, and a fight was soon in progress. In the course of the conflict the slave-owner was killed, his son severely wounded, and the fugitives managed to escape.

[818] Smedley, _Underground Railroad_, pp. 107, 108; 2 _Wallace
Jr.'s Reports_, 159.

The excitement caused by this affair extended throughout the country. The President of the United States placed a company of forty-five marines at the disposal of the United States marshal, and these proceeded under orders to the place of the riot. A large number of police and special constables made search far and wide for those concerned in the rescue. Their efforts were rewarded with the arrest of thirty-five negroes and three Quakers, among the latter Hanway and Lewis, who gave themselves up. The prisoners were taken to Philadelphia and indicted by the grand jury for treason. Hanway was tried before the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in November and December, 1851. In the trial it was shown by the defence that Mr. Hanway was a native of a Southern state, had lived long in the South, and, during his three years' residence in Pennsylvania, had kept aloof from anti-slavery organizations and meetings; his presence at the riot was proved to be accidental. Under these circumstances the charge of Justice Grier to the jury was a demonstration of the unsoundness of the indictment: the judge asked the jury to observe that a conspiracy to be classed as an act of treason must have been for the purpose of effecting something of a public nature; and that the efforts of a band of fugitive slaves in opposition to the capture of any of their number, even though they were directed by friends and went the full length of committing murder upon their pursuers, was altogether for a private object, and could not be called "levying war" against the nation. It did not take the jury long to decide the case. After an absence of twenty minutes the verdict "not guilty" was returned. One of the negroes was also tried, but not convicted. Afterward a bill was brought against Hanway and Lewis for riot and murder, but the grand jury ignored it, and further prosecution was dropped.[819]

[819] Still's _Underground Railroad Records_, pp. 348-368;
Smedley, _Underground Railroad_, pp. 107-130; 2 _Wallace Jr.'s
Reports_, pp. 134-206; M. G. McDougall, _Fugitive Slaves_, pp.
50, 51; Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, Vol. II, pp.
328, 329.

One cannot examine the records of the various cases that have been passed in review in the preceding pages of this chapter without being struck in many instances by the character of the men that served as counsel for fugitive slaves and their friends. It not infrequently happens that one comes upon the name of a man whose principles, ability and eloquence won for him in later years positions of distinction and influence at the bar and in public life. In the Christiana case, for example, Thaddeus Stevens was a prominent figure; in the Van Zandt case Salmon P. Chase and William H. Seward presented the arguments against the Fugitive Slave Law before the United States Supreme Court;[820] Mr. Chase also appeared in Eells' case, and in the case known as _ex parte_ Robinson, besides others of less judicial importance. Rutherford B. Hayes took part in a number of fugitive slave cases in Cincinnati, Ohio. A letter written by the ex-President in 1892 says: "As a young lawyer, from the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law until the war, I was engaged in slave cases for the fugitives, having an understanding with Levi Coffin and other directors and officers of the U. R. R. that my services would be freely given."[821] John Jolliffe, another lawyer of Cincinnati, less known than the anti-slavery advocates already mentioned, was sometimes associated with Chase and Hayes in pleading the cause of fugitives.[822] The Western Reserve was not without its members of the bar that were ready to display their legal talent in a movement well grounded in the popular mind of eastern Ohio. An illustration is afforded by the trial of the Oberlin-Wellington rescuers, when four eminent attorneys of Cleveland offered their services for the defence, declining at the same time to accept a fee. The event shows that the political aspirations of these men were not injured by their procedure, for Mr. Albert G. Riddle, who spoke first for the defence, was elected to Congress from the Cleveland district the following year, and Mr. Rufus P. Spalding, one of his associates, was similarly honored by the same district in 1862.[823] In November, 1852, the legal firm of William H. West and James Walker, of Bellefontaine, Ohio, attempted to release from custody several negroes belonging to the Piatt family of Kentucky, before their claimants could arrive to prove property. The attempt was successful, and, by prearrangement, the fugitives were taken into a carriage and driven rapidly to a neighboring station of the Underground Railroad. The funds to pay the sheriff, the court expenses and the livery hire were borne in part by Messrs. West and Walker.[824]

[820] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, Vol. I, p. 477.

[821] Letter of Mr. Hayes, Fremont, O., Aug. 4, 1892.

[822] _Reminiscences of Levi Coffin_, pp. 548, 549.

[823] Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol. II, p. 364.
The others representing the rescuers were Franklin T. Backus
and Seneca O. Griswold. See J. R. Shipherd's _History of the
Oberlin-Wellington Rescue_, p. 14.

[824] Conversation with Judge William H. West, Bellefontaine, O.,
Aug. 11, 1894.

OF SANDUSKY, OHIO,

fined $3000 and costs for assisting runaways to Canada.]

who befriended fugitives in southeastern Pennsylvania, and appeared for them in court.]

OF MECHANICSBURG, OHIO,

a station-keeper, in a centre receiving fugitives from several converging routes.]

who, as a young lawyer in Cincinnati, Ohio, served as counsel in fugitive slave cases.]

Among the names of the legal opponents of fugitive slave legislation in Massachusetts, that of Josiah Quincy, who gained distinction in public life and as President of Harvard College, is first to be noted. Mr. Quincy was counsel for the alleged runaway in one of the earliest cases arising under the act of 1793.[825] In some of the well-known cases that were tried under the later act Richard H. Dana, Robert Rantoul, Jr., Ellis Gray Loring, Samuel E. Sewell and Charles G. Davis appeared for the defence. Sims' case was conducted by Robert Rantoul, Jr., and Mr. Sewell; Shadrach's by Messrs. Davis, Sewell and Loring; and Burns' case by Mr. Dana and others.[826]

[825] M. G. McDougall, _Fugitive Slaves_, p. 35.

[826] _Ibid._, pp. 44, 46, 47.

Instances gathered from other Northern states seem to indicate that information of arrests under the Fugitive Slave acts almost invariably called out some volunteer to use his legal knowledge and skill in behalf of the accused, and that in many centres there were not lacking men of professional standing ready to give their best efforts under circumstances that promised, in general, little but defeat. Owen Lovejoy, of Princeton, Illinois, was arrested on one occasion for aiding fugitive slaves, and was defended by James H. Collins, a well-known attorney of Chicago. Returning from the trial of Lovejoy, Mr. Collins learned of the arrest of Deacon Cushing, of Will County, on a similar charge, and together with John M. Wilson he immediately volunteered to conduct the new case.[827] At the hearing of Jim Gray, a runaway from Missouri, held before Judge Caton of the State Supreme Court at Ottawa, Illinois, Judge E. S. Leland, B. C. Cook, O. C. Gray and J. O. Glover appeared voluntarily as counsel for the negro.[828] As a result of the hearing it was decided by the court that the arrest was illegal, since it had been made under the state law; the negro was, therefore, discharged from the arrest, but could not be released by the judge from the custody of the United States marshal. However, the bondman was rescued, and thus escaped. Eight men were indicted on account of this affair, prominent among whom were John Hossack and Dr. Joseph Stout, of Ottawa. Mr. Hossack, who was tried first, had an array of six of the leading lawyers of Chicago to present his side of the case; they were the Hons. Isaac N. Arnold, Joseph Knox, B. C. Cook, J. V. Eustace, E. Leland and E. C. Larnard. Mr. Stout had three of these men to represent him, namely, Messrs. Eustace, Larnard and Arnold.[829] Early in March, 1860, two citizens of Tabor, Iowa, Edward Sheldon and Newton Woodford, were captured while conducting four runaways from the Indian Territory to a station of the Underground Railroad. At the trial they were ably defended by James Vincent, Lewis Mason and his brother, and were acquitted. It may be added that the trial closed at nine o'clock in the evening, and before daybreak the negroes had been rescued and sent forward on their way to Canada.[830]

[827] G. H. Woodruff, _History of Will County, Illinois_, p. 264.

[828] The _Ottawa Republican_, Nov. 9, 1891. The hearing occurred
Oct. 20, 1859.

[829] The _Pontiac_ (Ill.) _Sentinel_, 1891-1892.

[830] The _Tabor_ (Ia.) _Beacon_, 1890-1891, Chap. XXI of
a series of articles by the Rev. John Todd, on "The Early
Settlement and Growth of Western Iowa."

In Philadelphia there were several lawyers that could always be depended on to resist the claims of the slave-owner to his recaptured property in the courts. William Still mentions two of these, namely, David Paul Brown and William S. Pierce, as "well-known veterans" ready to defend the slave "wherever and whenever called upon to do so."[831] Robert Purvis relates an incident of David Paul Brown that will be recognized as characteristic of the spirit in which the class of advocates to which he belonged rendered their services for the slave. A case growing out of the capture of a negro by his pursuers occupied the attention of Mr. Purvis for a season in 1836, and he desired to engage Mr. Brown for the defence; he accordingly presented the matter to the distinguished attorney, offering him a fee of fifty dollars in advance. Mr. Brown promptly undertook the case, but refused the money, saying: "I shall not now, nor have I ever, accepted fee or reward, other than the approval of my own conscience, and I respectfully decline receiving your money."[832]

[831] _Underground Railroad Records_, p. 367.

[832] Smedley, _Underground Railroad_, p. 359.

In what was, so far as known, the last case under the Slave Law of 1850, Mr. John Dean, a prominent lawyer of Washington, D.C., displayed noteworthy zeal in the interest of his client, a supposed fugitive. The affair occurred in June, 1862, and came within the cognizance of the United States courts. Mr. Dean, who had just obtained the discharge of the colored man from arrest, interfered to prevent his seizure a second time as the slave of a Virginian. The claimant, aided by other persons, sought to detain the black until a civil officer should arrive to take him into custody, but the attorney's surprising play at fisticuffs defeated the efforts of the assailing party and the black got away. He soon enlisted in one of the colored regiments then forming in Washington, and it is to be surmised that all question concerning his status was put to rest by this step. Mr. Dean was indicted for aiding in the escape of a fugitive slave, and although the affair is said to have caused great excitement in the Capital, especially in the two Houses of Congress, it never reached a legal decision, but lapsed through the progress of events that led rapidly to the Emancipation Proclamation and the repeal of the Fugitive Slave laws.[833]

[833] This case is given by Mr. Noah Brooks, in his _Washington
in Lincoln's Time_, 1895, pp. 197, 198.

In the crisis that was reached with the beginning of the new decade, the question of the rendition of fugitives from service was by no means lost sight of. As in 1850, so in 1860 a measure for the more effective protection of slave property appears to have been a necessary condition in any plan of compromise that was to gain Southern support. President Buchanan sought to meet the situation by proposing, in his message of December 4, 1860, the adoption of "explanatory" amendments to the Constitution recognizing the master's right of recovery and the validity of the Fugitive Slave Law; he also recommended a declaration against the so-called personal liberty laws of the states as unconstitutional, and therefore void. This produced, within three months, in the House, a crop of more than twenty resolutions relative to fugitive slaves; the deliberations of that body issued at length, March 1, 1861, in the passage of a bill to make more effective the law of 1850. The new measure provided for an appeal to the Circuit Court of the United States, where cases were to be tried by jury. But in the Senate this bill never got beyond the first reading.

That the people of the Northern states would have acquiesced in a new law for the surrender of runaway negroes was certainly not to be expected. Both the law of 1793 and that of 1850 had been systematically evaded as well as frequently denounced, and now memorials were being sent to Congress praying for the repeal of the despised legislation.[834] A bill for this purpose was introduced into the House by Mr. Blake, of Ohio, in 1860, but was smothered by the attempt to amend the existing law. A similar measure was introduced into the Senate in December, 1861, by Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, who prefaced its presentation by declaring that the Fugitive Slave Law "has had its day. As a party act it has done its work. It probably has done as much mischief as any other one act that was ever passed by the national legislature. It has embittered against each other two great sections of the country."[835] The bill was referred to a committee, where it was kept for some time, and at length was reported adversely in February, 1863.

[834] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power_, Vol. III, p.
395.

[835] _Congressional Globe_, Thirty-seventh Congress, First
Session, 1356.

In the meantime slavery was subjected to a series of destructive attacks in Congress, despite the views of some, who held that the institution was under constitutional protection. The passions and exigencies of the War, together with the humane motives from which the anti-slavery movement had sprung, did not leave these assaults without justification. In August, 1861, a law was enacted providing for the emancipation of negroes employed in military service against the government; in April, 1862, slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia; in May, army officers were forbidden to restore fugitives to their owners; in June slavery was prohibited in the territories; and in July an act was passed granting freedom to fugitives from disloyal masters that could find refuge with the Union forces.

In the train of these measures, and in September of the same year in which most of them were enacted, President Lincoln issued his proclamation of warning to the South declaring that all persons held as slaves in the states continuing in rebellion on the 1st of January, 1863, should be "thenceforth and forever free." When the warning was carried into effect on the first day of the new year by the famous Proclamation of Emancipation, ownership of slave property in the border states was not abolished. The loyalty of these states was their protection against interference. As the Fugitive Slave Law was not yet repealed opportunity was still afforded to civil officers to enforce its provisions both north and south of Mason and Dixon's line. North of the line there was, however, no disposition to enforce the law. South of it wandering negroes were sometimes arrested by the civil authorities for the purpose of being returned to their masters. The following advertisement, printed two months and a half after the final proclamation went into effect, illustrates the method pursued in dealing with supposed fugitives:--

"There was committed to the jail in Warren County, Kentucky, as
runaway slave, on the 29th September, 1862, a negro man calling
himself Jo Miner. He says he is free, but has nothing to show to
establish the fact. He is about thirty-five years of age, very
dark copper color, about five feet eight inches high, and will
weigh one hundred and fifty pounds. The owner can come forward,
prove property, and pay charges, or he will be dealt with as the
law requires.

R. J. POTTER, J. W. C.

March 16, 1863. 1 m."[836]

[836] _Liberator_, May 1, 1863. Extract from the _Frankfort
Commonwealth_, quoted by M. G. McDougall, _Fugitive Slaves_, p.
80.

Although the proposition to repeal the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 had been made in Congress in 1860, and repeated in 1861 and 1862, no definite and conclusive action was taken until 1864. During the session of 1863-1864 five bills were introduced into the House looking toward the repeal of the law. In the discussion of the subject the probable effect of revocation upon the border states was frequently dwelt upon, and it was urged by many members that the loyal slave states would consider repeal as "insult and outrage." Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, was one of those that took this view. He therefore demanded that the law "be permitted to remain on the statute-book," urging, "If you say it will be a dead letter, so much less excuse have you for repealing it, and so much more certainly is the insult and wrong to Kentucky gratuitous." In reply to this and other arguments the need of enlisting negro soldiers was pressed on the attention of the House, and it was said by Mr. Hubbard, of Connecticut, "You cannot draft black men into the field while your marshals are chasing women and children in the woods of Ohio with a view to render them back into bondage. The moral sense of the nation, ay, of the world, would revolt at it."[837] The conclusion that slavery was already doomed to utter destruction could not be avoided. The House therefore decided to throw away the empty guarantee of the institution, and June 13 the vote on the bill for repeal was taken. It resulted in the measure being carried by a vote of 82 to 57. When the bill from the House came before the Senate the question of repeal was already under consideration, and, indeed, had been for three months and a half. Nevertheless, the House measure was at once referred to committee and was reported back June 15. It was then discussed by the Senate for several days and voted on on June 23, the result being a vote of 27 in favor of repeal to 12 against it. Two days later President Lincoln affixed his signature to the bill, and the Fugitive Slave laws were thereby annulled June 25, 1864. The constitutional provision for the recovery of runaways, which had been judicially declared in the decision of Prigg's case to be self-executing was not cancelled until December 18, 1865, when the Secretary of State proclaimed the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution by the requisite number of states.

[837] _Congressional Globe_, Thirty-eighth Congress, First
Session, 2913. See also M. G. McDougall, _Fugitive Slaves_, p.
85.