Chapter X: Part 10

It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.

By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general a clamour without failing equally in our duty to both.

To what, my lords, is the untimely end of so many kings and emperours to be imputed, but to the cowardice or treachery of their counsellors, of those to whom they trusted that intercourse, which is always to be preserved between a monarch and his people? Were kings honestly informed of the opinions and dispositions of their subjects, they would never, or, at least rarely, persist in such measures, as, by exasperating the people, tend necessarily to endanger themselves.

It is the happiness of a British monarch, that he has a standing and hereditary council, composed of men who do not owe their advancement to the smiles of caprice, or the intrigues of a court; who are, therefore, neither under the influence of a false gratitude, nor of a servile dependence, and who may convey to the throne the sentiments of the people, without danger, and without fear. But, my lords, if we are either too negligent, or too timorous to do our duty, how is the condition of our sovereign more safe, or more happy than that of an emperour of Turkey, who is often ignorant of any complaints made against the administration, till he hears the people thundering at the gates of his palace.

Let us, therefore, my lords, whatever may be our opinion of the conduct of the minister, inform his majesty of the discontent of his subjects, since, whether it is just or not, the danger is the same, and whenever any danger threatens the king, we ought either to enable him to oppose, or caution him to avoid it.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, I cannot but observe in this debate an ambition of popularity, in my opinion not very consistent with the freedom of debate, and the dignity of this assembly, which ought to be influenced by no other motive than the force of reason and truth.

It has been a common method of eluding the efficacy of arguments, to charge the opponent with blind adherence to interest, or corrupt compliance with the directions of a court; nor has it been less frequent to prevent inquiries into publick measures, by representing them as the clamours of faction, the murmurs of disobedience, and the prelude to rebellion.

So necessary, my lords, has it been always thought to be uninfluenced in our examinations by dependence or interest, that the most irrefragable reasons have lost the power of conviction, by the condition and characters of those by whom they were produced; and so much is it expected from innocence and justice to despise all foreign assistance, and to stand the test of inquiry without asking the support of power, that every man has been concluded guilty that has fled for shelter to the throne.

And surely, my lords, if that man's suffrage is of little weight, who appears determined to subscribe to the dictates of a minister, no greater credit can be assigned to another, who professes himself only the echo of the clamours of the populace. If it be a proof of a weak cause, and consciousness of misconduct, to apply to the crown for security and protection, it may be accounted an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of arguments, when the people is called in to second them, and they are only to expect success from the violence of multitudes.

That all government is instituted for the happiness of the people, that their interest ought to be the chief care of the legislature, that their complaints ought patiently to be heard, and their grievances speedily redressed, are truths well known, generally acknowledged, and, I hope, always predominant in the mind of every lord in this assembly. But, that the people cannot err, that the voice of fame is to be regarded as an oracle, and every murmur of discontent to be pacified by a change of measures, I have never before heard, or heard it only to disregard it.

True tenderness for the people, my lords, is to consult their advantage, to protect their liberty, and to preserve their virtue; and perhaps examples may be found sufficient to inform us that all these effects are often to be produced by means not generally agreeable to the publick.

It is possible, my lords, for a very small part of the people to form just ideas of the motives of transactions and the tendency of laws. All negotiations with foreign powers are necessarily complicated with many different interests, and varied by innumerable circumstances, influenced by sudden exigencies, and defeated by unavoidable accidents. Laws have respect to remote consequences, and involve a multitude of relations which it requires long study to discover. And how difficult it is to judge of political conduct, or legislative proceedings, may be easily discovered by observing how often the most skilful statesmen are mistaken, and how frequently the laws require to be amended.

If then, my lords, the people judge for themselves on these subjects, they must necessarily determine without knowledge of the questions, and their decisions are then of small authority. If they receive, implicitly, the dictates of others, and blindly adopt the opinions of those who have gained their favour and esteem, their applauses and complaints are, with respect to themselves, empty sounds, which they utter as the organs of their leaders. Nor are the desires of the people gratified when their petitions are granted; nor their grievances overlooked when their murmurs are neglected.

As it is no reproach to the people that they cannot be the proper judges of the conduct of the government, so neither are they to be censured when they complain of injuries not real, and tremble at the apprehension of severities unintended. Unjust complaints, my lords, and unreasonable apprehensions, are to be imputed to those who court their regard only to deceive them, and exalt themselves to reputation by rescuing them from grievances that were never felt, and averting dangers that were never near.

He only who makes the happiness of the people his endeavour, loves them with a true affection and a rational tenderness, and he certainly consults their happiness who contributes to still all groundless clamours, and appease all useless apprehensions, who employs his care, not only to preserve their quiet and their liberty, but to secure them from the fear of losing it, who not only promotes the means of happiness, but enables them to enjoy it.

Thus, it appears, my lords, that it is possible to be a friend, at the same time, to the people and the administration, and that no man can more deserve their confidence and applause, than he that dissipates their unreasonable terrours, and contributes to reconcile them to a good government.

That most of the clamours against the present government arise from calumnies and misrepresentations, is apparent from the sanction of the senate, which has been given to all the measures that are charged as crimes upon the administration.

That the army is supported by the consent of the senate, that the senate has approved the convention, and that our taxes are all imposed and continued by the senate, cannot be denied. What then is demanded by those that censure the conduct of publick affairs, but that their opinion should be considered as an overbalance to the wisdom of the senate, that no man should be allowed to speak but as they dictate, nor to vote but as they shall influence them by their rhetorick or example?

To repeat the particular topicks of accusation, and recapitulate the arguments which have been produced to confute it, would be a tedious and unnecessary labour; unnecessary, because it is well known that they once had the power of convincing this house, and that nothing has since happened to lessen their force, and because many of them now have been already repeated by the noble lords that have opposed the motion.

To search far backward for past errors, and to take advantage of later discoveries in censuring the conduct of any minister, is in a high degree disingenuous and cruel; it is an art which may be easily practised, of perplexing any question, by connecting distant facts, and entangling one period of time with another.

The only candid method of inquiry is to recur back to the state of affairs, as it then appeared, to consider what was openly declared, and what was kept impenetrably secret, what was discoverable by human sagacity, and what was beyond the reach of the most piercing politician.

With regard to the Hanover treaty, it is not, my lords, requisite that we should engage ourselves in a very minute examination; for it was not only not transacted by the right honourable gentleman whose behaviour is the subject of this debate, but cannot be proved to have been known by him till it was formally ratified. If he afterwards approved it either in the council or the senate, he cannot justly, how destructive or ridiculous soever that treaty may be thought, be charged with more than his share of the guilt, the bare guilt of a single vote.

But there is one accusation yet more malicious, an accusation not only of crimes which this gentleman did not commit, but which have not yet been committed, an accusation formed by prying into futurity, and exaggerating misfortunes which are yet to come, and which may probably be prevented. Well may any man, my lords, think himself in danger, when he hears himself charged not with high crimes and misdemeanours, not with accumulative treason, but with misconduct of publick affairs, past, present, and future.

The only charge against this gentleman, which seems to relate more to him than to any other man engaged in the administration, is the continuance of the harbour of Dunkirk, which, says the noble duke, he must be acquainted with as commissioner of the treasury; but if the title of first commissioner be denied, if his authority be but the same with that of his associates, whence comes it, my lords, that he is more particularly accused than they? Why is his guilt supposed greater if his power is only equal?

But, my lords, I believe it will appear, that no guilt has been contracted on this account, and that Dunkirk was always intended, even by those that demanded the demolition of it, to continue a harbour for small trading vessels, and that if larger ever arrived from thence, they lay at a distance from the shore, and were loaded by small vessels from the town.

With regard to other affairs, my lords, they were all transacted by the council, not by his direction, but with his concurrence; and how it is consistent with justice to single him out for censure, I must desire the noble lords to show who approve the motion.

If the people, my lords, have been, by misrepresentations industriously propagated, exasperated against him, if the general voice of the nation condemns him, we ought more cautiously to examine his conduct, lest we should add strength to prejudice too powerful already, and instead of reforming the errours, and regulating the heat of the people, inflame their discontent and propagate sedition.

The utmost claim of the people is to be admitted as accusers, and sometimes as evidence, but they have no right to sit as judges, and to make us the executioners of their sentence; and as this gentleman has yet been only condemned by those who have not the opportunities of examining his conduct, nor the right of judging him, I cannot agree to give him up to punishment.

Lord HALIFAX spoke next, in substance as follows:--My lords, though I do not conceive the people infallible, yet I believe that in questions like this they are seldom in the wrong, for this is a question not of argument but of fact; of fact discoverable, not by long deductions and accurate ratiocinations, but by the common powers of seeing and feeling.

That it is difficult to know the motives of negotiations, and the effects of laws, and that it requires long study and intense meditation to discover remote consequences, is indubitably true. And, with regard to the people in general, it cannot be denied, that neither their education qualifies them, nor their employments allow them to be much versed in such inquiries.

But, my lords, to refer effects to their proper causes, and to observe, when consequences break forth, from whence they proceed, is no such arduous task. The people of the lowest class may easily feel that they are more miserable this year than the last, and may inquire and discover the reason of the aggravation of their misery; they may know that the army is increased, or our trade diminished; that the taxes are heavier, and penal laws become more grievous.

Nor is it less easy for them to discover that these calamities are not brought upon them by the immediate hand of heaven, or the irresistible force of natural causes; that their towns are not ruined by an invasion, nor their trade confined by a pestilence; they may then easily collect, that they are only unhappy by the misconduct of their governours; they may assign their infelicity to that cause, as the only remaining cause that is adequate to the effect.

If it be granted, my lords, that they may be mistaken in their reasoning, it must be owned, that they are not mistaken without probabilities on their side: it is probable that the ministry must injure the publick interest when it decays without any other visible cause; it is still more probable, when it appears that among those whose station enables them to enter into national inquiries, every man imputes his calamities to the minister, who is not visibly dependent on his favour. It becomes more probable, yet, when it appears that it is the great business of the minister to multiply dependencies, to list accomplices, and to corrupt his judges.

At least, my lords, if it be granted, which, surely, cannot be denied, that the people may be sensible of their own miseries, it is their part to declare their sufferings, and to apply to this house for relief, and it is our business to discover the authors of them, and bring them to punishment.

That the people are very loud and importunate in their complaints, is daily evident; nor is it less apparent, that their complaints are just; if, therefore, their miseries must have an author, let the defenders of this gentleman point out the man whom they may more properly accuse.

But, my lords, nothing is more evident, than that the crimes and the criminal are equally known, that there is one man predominant in his majesty's councils, and that it has long been the practice of that man at once to oppress and ridicule the people, to plunder them, and set them at defiance.

Nothing is more known than that this man pretends to a superiour knowledge, and exerts a superiour power in the management of the publick revenues, and that they have been so ill managed for many years, that the expenses of peace have been almost equal to those of a most vigorous and extensive war.

Nothing is more probable, than that most of the foreign negotiations are conducted by his direction, nor more certain, than that they have generally tended only to make us contemptible.

That the excise was projected in his own head, that it was recommended by him upon his own conviction, and pressed upon the legislature by his influence, cannot be questioned; and if this were his only crime, if this were the only scheme of oppression that ever he planned out, it is such a declaration of war upon the publick liberty, such an attack of our natural and constitutional rights, as was never, perhaps, pardoned by any nation.

Nor is it less notorious, that the late infamous convention was transacted by one of his own dependents, that he palliated or concealed the losses of our merchants, that he opposed the declaration of war, and has since obstructed its operations.

On this occasion, my lords, it may be useful to remark the apparent partiality of this gentleman's vindicators, who declare, that measures are not to be censured as imprudent, only because they are unsuccessful, and yet when other instances of his conduct fall under our examination, think it a sufficient defence to exclaim against the unreasonableness of judging before the event.

To deny that, in the conduct both of civil and military affairs, he has obtained, I know not by what means, an authority superiour to that of any other man, an authority irresistible, uncontroulable, and regal, is to oppose not only common fame, but daily experience. If as commissioner of the treasury he has no more power than any of his associates, whence is it, that to oppose or censure him, to doubt of his infallibility, to suspect his integrity, or to obstruct his influence, is a crime punished with no lighter penalty than forfeiture of employment, as appears, my lords, from the late dismission of a gentleman, against whom nothing can be alleged but an obstinate independence and open disregard of this arbitrary minister.

But happy would it be, my lords, for this nation, if he endeavoured not to extend his authority beyond the treasury or the court; if he would content himself with tyrannising over those whose acceptance of salaries and preferments has already subjected them to his command, without attempting to influence elections, or to direct the members of the other house.

How much the influence of the crown has operated upon all publick councils since the advancement of this gentleman, how zealously it has been supported, and how industriously extended, is unnecessary to explain, since what is seen or felt by almost every man in the kingdom cannot reasonably be supposed unknown to your lordships.

Nothing can be more contrary to the true notion of the British constitution, than to imagine, that by such measures his majesty's real interest is advanced. The true interest, my lords, of every monarch, is to please the people, and the only way of pleasing Britons, is to preserve their liberties, their reputation, and their commerce. Every attempt to extend the power of the crown beyond the limits prescribed by our laws, must in effect make it weaker, by diverting the only source of its strength, the affection of his subjects.

It is, therefore, my opinion, my lords, that we ought to agree to this motion, as a standing memorial not only of our regard for the nation, but of our adherence to our sovereign; that his councils may be no longer influenced by that man whose pernicious advice, and unjustifiable conduct, has added new hopes and new strength to his enemies, impoverished and exasperated his subjects, inflamed the discontent of the seditious, and almost alienated the affection of the loyal.

The bishop of SALISBURY spoke next, to the following purport:--My lords, after all the exaggerations of the errours, and all the representations of the malconduct of the right honourable gentleman; after the most affecting rhetorick, and the most acute inquiries, nothing has appeared of weight sufficient to prevail with me to agree to the present motion; a motion, if not of an unprecedented, yet of a very extraordinary kind, which may extend in its consequences to futurity, and be, perhaps, more dangerous to innocence than guilt.

I cannot yet discover any proof sufficient to convict him of having usurped the authority of _first_ minister, or any other power than that accidental influence which every man has, whose address or services have procured him the favour of his sovereign.

The usurpation, my lords, of regal power must be made evident by somewhat more than general assertions, must appear from some publick act like that of one of the prelates left regent of the kingdom by Richard the first, who, as soon as the king was gone too far to return, in the first elevations of his heart, began his new authority by imprisoning his colleague.

To charge this gentleman with the dismission of any of his colleagues, can, after the strongest aggravations, rise no higher than to an accusation of having advised his majesty to dismiss him, and even that, my lords, stands, at present, unsupported by evidence; nor could it, however uncontestably proved, discover either wickedness or weakness, or show any other authority than every man would exercise, if he were able to attain it.

If he had discharged this gentleman by his own authority, if he had transacted singly any great affair to the disadvantage of the publick, if he had imposed either upon the king or the senate by false representations, if he had set the laws at defiance, and openly trampled on our constitution, and if by these practices he had exalted himself above the reach of a legal prosecution, it had been worthy of the dignity of this house, to have overleaped the common boundaries of custom, to have neglected the standing rules of procedure, and to have brought so contemptuous and powerful an offender to a level with the rest of his fellow-subjects by expeditious and vigorous methods, to have repressed his arrogance, broken his power, and overwhelmed him at once by the resistless weight of an unanimous censure.

But, my lords, we have in the present case no provocations from crimes either openly avowed, or evidently proved; and certainly no incitement from necessity to exert the power of the house in any extraordinary method of prosecution. We may punish whenever we can convict, and convict whenever we can obtain evidence; let us not, therefore, condemn any man unheard, nor punish any man uncondemned.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, in substance as follows:--My lords, it is easy to charge the most blameless and gentle procedure with injustice and severity, but it is not easy to support such an accusation without confounding measures widely different, and disguising the nature of things with fallacious misrepresentations.

Nothing is more evident than that neither condemnation nor punishment is intended by the motion before us, which is only to remove from power a man who has no other claim to it than the will of his master, and who, as he had not been injured by never obtaining it, cannot justly complain that it is taken from him.

The motion, my lords, is so far from inflicting punishment, that it confers rewards, it leaves him in the possession of immense wealth, however accumulated, and enables him to leave that office in security, from which most of his predecessors have been precipitated by national resentment, or senatorial prosecution.

There is no censure, my lords, made of his conduct, no charge of weakness, or suspicion of dishonesty, nor can any thing be equitably inferred from it, than that in the opinion of this house his majesty may probably be served by some other person, more to the satisfaction of the British nation.

Though it is not just to punish any man without examination, or to censure his conduct merely because it has been unpleasing or unsuccessful; though it is not reasonable that any man should forfeit what he possesses in his own right, without a crime, yet it is just to withdraw favours only to confer them on another more deserving; it is just in any man to withhold his own, only to preserve his right, or obviate an injurious prescription, and it is, therefore, just to advise such a conduct whenever it appears necessary to those who have the right of offering advice.

To advise his majesty, my lords, is not only our right but our duty; we are not only justifiable in practising, but criminal in neglecting it. That we should declare our apprehensions of any impending danger, and our disapprobation of publick misconduct, is expected both by our sovereign and the people, and let us not, by omitting such warnings, lull the nation and our sovereign into a dangerous security, and, from tenderness to one man, prolong or increase the miseries of our country, and endanger or destroy the honour of our sovereign.

Lord HERVEY spoke next, in effect as follows:--My lords, this is surely a day destined by the noble lords who defend the motion, for the support of paradoxical assertions, for the exercise of their penetration, and ostentation of their rhetorick; they have attempted to maintain the certainty of common fame in opposition to daily observation; the existence of a sole minister in contradiction to the strongest evidence; and having by these gradations arrived at the highest degree of controversial temerity, are endeavouring to make it appear that the publick censure of the house of lords is no punishment.

If we take the liberty, my lords, of using known words in a new sense, in a meaning reserved to ourselves only, it will, indeed, be difficult to confute, as it will be impossible to understand us; but if punishment be now to be understood as implying the same idea which has hitherto been conveyed by it, it will not be easy to show that a man thus publickly censured is not severely punished, and, if his crimes are not clearly proved, punished in opposition to law, to reason, and to justice.

It has been hitherto imagined, my lords, that no punishment is heavier than that of infamy; and shame has, by generous minds, been avoided at the hazard of every other misery. That such a censure as is proposed by the motion, must irreparably destroy the reputation of the person against whom it is directed, that it must confirm the reports of his enemies, impair the esteem of his friends, mark him out to all Europe as unworthy of his sovereign's favour, and represent him to latest posterity as an enemy to his country, is indisputably certain.

These, my lords, are the evident consequences of the address moved for by the noble lord; and, if such consequences are not penal, it will be no longer in our power to enforce our laws by sanctions of terrour.

To condemn a man unheard, is an open and flagrant violation of the first law of justice, but it is still a wider deviation from it to punish a man unaccused; no crime has been charged upon this gentleman proportioned to the penalty proposed by the motion, and the charge that has been produced is destitute of proof.

Let us, therefore, my lords, reverence the great laws of reason and justice, let us preserve our high character and prerogative of judges, without descending to the low province of accusers and executioners; let us so far regard our reputation, our liberty, and our posterity, as to reject the motion.

[Several other lords spoke in this debate, which lasted eleven hours; at length the question was put, and, on a division, carried in the negative. Content, 59. Not content, 108.]

After the determination of the foregoing question, the duke of MARLBOROUGH rose up, and spoke as follows:--My lords, though your patience must undoubtedly be wearied by the unusual length of this day's debate, a debate protracted, in my opinion, not by the difficulty of the question, but by the obstinacy of prejudice, the ardour of passion, and the desire of victory; yet, I doubt not but the regard which this assembly has always paid to the safety and happiness of the state, will incline you to support the fatigue of attention a little longer, and to hear with your usual impartiality another motion.

The proposition which I am about to lay down, my lords, is not such as can admit of controversy; it is such a standing principle as was always acknowledged, even by those who have deviated from it. Such a known truth as never was denied, though it appears sometimes to have been forgotten.

But, my lords, as it never can be forgotten, without injury to particular persons, and danger to the state in general, it cannot be too frequently recollected, or too firmly established; it ought not only to be tacitly admitted, but publickly declared, since no man's fortune, liberty, or life, can be safe, where his judges shall think themselves at liberty to act upon any other principle. I therefore move, "That any attempt to inflict any kind of punishment on any person without allowing him an opportunity to make his defence, or without any proof of any crime or misdemeanour committed by him, is contrary to natural justice, the fundamental laws of this realm, and the ancient established usage of the senate, and is a high infringement of the liberties of the subject."

He was seconded by the duke of DEVONSHIRE:--My lords, though the motion made by the noble duke is of such a kind, that no opposition can be expected or feared, yet I rise up to second it, lest it should be imagined that what cannot be rejected is yet unwillingly admitted.

That where this maxim is not allowed and adhered to, rights and liberties are empty sounds, is uncontestably evident; if this principle be forsaken, guilt and innocence are equally secure, all caution is vain, and all testimony useless. Caprice will, in our courts, supply the place of reason, and all evidence must give way to malice, or to favour.

I hope, therefore, my lords, that your regard to justice, to truth, and to your own safety, will influence you to confirm this great and self-evident principle by a standing resolution, that may not only restrain oppression in the present age, but direct the judiciary proceedings of our successors.

Lord LOVEL rose next, and spoke as follows:--My lords, liberty and justice must always support each other, they can never long flourish apart; every temporary expedient that can be contrived to preserve or enlarge liberty by means arbitrary and oppressive, forms a precedent which may, in time, be made use of to violate or destroy it. Liberty is in effect suspended whenever injustice is practised; for what is liberty, my lords, but the power of doing right without fear, without control, and without danger.

But, my lords, if any man may be condemned unheard, if judgment may precede evidence, what safety or what confidence can integrity afford? It is in vain that any man means well, and acts prudently; it is even in vain that he can prove the justice and prudence of his conduct.

By liberty, my lords, can never be meant the privilege of doing wrong without being accountable, because liberty is always spoken of as happiness, or one of the means to happiness, and happiness and virtue cannot be separated. The great use of liberty must, therefore, be to preserve justice from violation; justice, the great publick virtue, by which a kind of equality is diffused over the whole society, by which wealth is restrained from oppression, and inferiority preserved from servitude.

Liberty, general liberty, must imply general justice; for wherever any part of a state can be unjust with impunity, the rest are slaves. That to condemn any man unheard is oppressive and unjust, is beyond controversy demonstrable, and that no such power is claimed by your lordships will, I hope, appear from your resolutions.

Lord GOWER spoke next:--My lords, to the principle laid down by those noble lords, I have no objection, and concur with them in hoping that all our proceedings will contribute to establish it; but why it should be confirmed by a formal resolution, why the house should solemnly declare their assent to a maxim which it would be madness to deny, it is beyond my penetration to discover.

Though the noble lord's position cannot be controverted, yet his motion, if it is designed to imply any censure of the proceedings of this day, may reasonably be rejected, and that some censure is intended we may conjecture, because no other reason can be given why it was not made at some other time.

Lord HALIFAX then rose:--My lords, that a censure is intended, will, I suppose, not be denied, and that such a censure is unjust must doubtless be the opinion of all those who are supposed to have incurred it, and it will, therefore, not be wondered that the motion is opposed by them, as indecent and calumnious: late as it is, my lords, I will not, for my part, suffer such an indignity without opposition, and shall think my conscience and my honour require, that I should not be overborne by perseverance or by numbers, but that I should, if I cannot convince the noble lords by argument, of the impropriety of the motion, record my reasons against it, which may, perhaps, be more candidly received by posterity.

Lord TALBOT spoke to this effect:--My lords, it is not without indignation that I hear a motion so injurious to my own honour, and to that of the noble lords who have concurred with me in the last debate, nor without contempt that I observed the motion confounded with the positions contained in it; the low subtilty of such conduct is no less to be despised than the malice to be abhorred.

Fifty-nine lords are here branded as strangers, or enemies to the first principle of judicial equity, for doing what will entitle them to the general applause of every man in the kingdom that has the full possession of his understanding, or the free use of his senses; of every man that can distinguish truth, or feel oppression.

They have endeavoured to rescue their country from the rapine of pensioners and the tyranny of an army, from perpetual taxes, and useless expenses; they have attempted to expose the errours of arrogant ignorance, and to depress the power of greatness, founded on corruption, and swelling beyond legal restraints.

That for such attempts they are vilified and reproached, is not to be observed without indignation and astonishment; astonishment which nothing could abate but the recollection of the situation of those lords who have united to promote so unjust a censure.

Let us, my lords, consider the circumstances of the three noble lords by whom this motion has been made and supported, let us take a view of their conduct, and consider the visible motives to which it may be ascribed, their places, their dependence--

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, in substance as follows:--My lords, I rise thus abruptly to preserve that order and decency which is essential to publick councils, and particularly suitable to the dignity of this assembly, which can only become a scene of tumult and confusion by such methods of debate, and lose that respect which it has hitherto preserved, not only by the justice of its determinations, but by the solemn grandeur of its procedure.

The motion, my lords, is allowed to contain nothing but what every man avows in speculation, and observes, or ought to observe, in publick transactions, and yet those that offer and support it are represented as abettors of oppression, and instruments of tyranny.

It is surely wonderful, my lords, that those who are solicitous for the preservation of their own honour, and so diligent to obviate the most remote reflection that may glance upon it, should not remember, that the same delicacy may raise in others the same resentment, when their reputation is openly attacked; and that while they are asserting the right of the minority to an exemption from censure, they shall not allow the greater number at least an equal claim to the same privilege.

Lord TALBOT then resumed:--My lords, whether any thing has escaped from me that deserves such severe animadversions, your lordships must decide. For what I might intend to say, since by the interruption of that noble lord I was hindered from proceeding, I hope I shall not be accountable.

Not that I acknowledge myself to have asserted any thing either contrary to law, or to the privileges of the house, or inconsistent with the character of an independent lord, a character which I shall always endeavour to preserve, and which I will not forfeit for the smiles of a court, the dignity of high employment, or the affluence of a pension.

Nor, my lords, whenever the necessities of my country require that I should speak my sentiments with freedom, will I be awed into silence and submission, but will set any power at defiance that shall dare to restrain me.

I pretend not, my lords, to be always in the right, I claim no other merit than that of meaning well; and when I am convinced, after proper examination, that I am engaged on the side of truth, I will trample on that insolence that shall command me to suppress my sentiments.

When I reflect, my lords, on the distresses of my country, when I observe the security and arrogance of those whom I consider as the authors of the publick miseries, I cannot always contain my resentment; I may, perhaps, sometimes start out into unbecoming transports, and speak in terms not very ceremonious of such abandoned, such detestable-- But as this is, perhaps, not the language of the house, I shall endeavour to repress it, and hope that the bounds of decency have never been so far transgressed by me that I should be exposed to the censure of your lordships.

Lord ABINGDON next rose, and said:--My lords, the present motion is undoubtedly just, but by no means necessary, or particularly adapted to the present time. It contains a general principle, uncontested, and established; a principle which this assembly has never denied, and from which I know not that it has ever departed.

As there is, therefore, no particular necessity of confirming it by a new resolution, and as the present time seems less proper than any other, I cannot but declare my opinion, that to resume it at some other time will be more prudent, than to give the lords, who think their conduct censured, any occasion of resentment or discontent.

Lord CARTERET spoke to the following effect:--My lords, the maxim laid down in the present motion, is in itself incontestable, and so far from any inconsistency with the former, that as there was no reason for making, there is, in my opinion, none for opposing it; as it may at any time be made, it may at any time be properly passed. And I hope that our unanimity on this occasion will show that truth, however unseasonably advanced, will, in this house, be always received.

But, lest the noble lords who have opposed the motion, should think their honour engaged in continuing the opposition, I take the liberty, my lords, to move that the previous question may be put.

[Other lords spoke on each side; at last the previous question was put by the president, who demanded, "Is it your lordships' pleasure, that the question be now put? Those lords who are for it, say, Content: those who are against it, say, Not content." There was, accordingly, a cry of both; after which the president declared, "the contents have it;" and some lords replying, "the non-contents have it," his lordship said, "the non-contents must go below the bar:" which is the manner of dividing the house. Those who remained being told in their seats, and those who went out being told at coming in again, there were Content, 81; Not content, 54: so that the resolution moved for, passed without a division.]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 24, 1740-1.

[DEBATE ON CLEANSING THE CITY OF WESTMINSTER.]

Lord TYRCONNEL made a motion for bringing in a bill for the better cleansing and paving the streets of Westminster, and the liberties thereof; in support of which motion he spoke to the following purpose:--

Sir, though the grievance which I am about to lay before the house is not of the most formidable or dangerous kind, yet as it is such as grows every day greater, and such as every day endangers the lives of thousands, I hope it will not be thought useless or improper to propose it to the consideration of this assembly, to offer my thoughts on the methods by which it may be most easily removed, and to endeavour to incite others to the same considerations.

It is impossible, sir, to come to this assembly, or to return from it without observations on the present condition of the streets of Westminster; observations forced upon every man, however inattentive, or however engrossed by reflections of a different kind.

The warmest zeal for publick happiness, the most anxious vigilance against general dangers, must, I believe, sometimes give way to objects of immediate, though of less importance, nor will the most publick-spirited senators deny, that they have often been in the streets alarmed with obstructions, or shocked with nuisances.

The filth, sir, of some parts of the town, and the inequality and ruggedness of others, cannot but in the eyes of foreigners disgrace our nation, and incline them to imagine us a people, not only without delicacy, but without government, a herd of barbarians, or a colony of hottentots.

The most disgusting part of the character given by travellers, of the most savage nations, is their neglect of cleanliness, of which, perhaps, no part of the world affords more proofs, than the streets of the British capital; a city famous for wealth, and commerce, and plenty, and for every other kind of civility and politeness, but which abounds with such heaps of filth, as a savage would look on with amazement.

If that be allowed which is generally believed, that putrefaction and stench are the causes of pestilential distempers, the removal of this grievance may be pressed from motives of far greater weight than those of delicacy and pleasure; and I might solicit the timely care of this assembly for the preservation of inuumerable multitudes, and intreat those, who are watching against slight misfortunes, to unite their endeavours with mine, to avert the greatest and most dreadful of calamities.

Not to dwell, sir, upon dangers, which may, perhaps, be thought only imaginary, I hope that it will be at least considered, how much the present neglect of the pavement is detrimental to every carriage, whether of trade, or pleasure, or convenience, and that those who have allowed so much of their attention to petitions, relating to the roads of the kingdom, the repair of some of which is almost every session thought of importance sufficient to produce debates in this house, will not think the streets of the capital alone unworthy of their regard.

That the present neglect of cleansing and paving the streets is such as ought not to be borne, that the passenger is every where either surprised and endangered by unexpected chasms, or offended or obstructed by mountains of filth, is well known to every one that has passed a single day in this great city; and that this grievance is without remedy is a sufficient proof that no magistrate has, at present power to remove it; for every man's private regard to his own ease and safety, would incite him to exert his authority on this occasion.

I humbly propose, therefore, that a bill may be brought into the house, to enable his majesty's justices of peace for the liberties of Westminster, to inspect the publick ways of this city, and punish the neglect of cleansing and paving them; or that a new officer be appointed, and vested with full authority for the same purpose.

Mr. SANDYS spoke next, to this effect:--Sir, I believe the grievance, so much complained of by the right honourable member, is not difficult to be removed without a new act of the legislature, being, perhaps, more properly to be imputed to the negligence of the justices, than a defect of their authority; for they have already sufficient power to regulate this disorder: and I may be allowed to hope, sir, that they do not want leisure to observe it, for their number is so great, that if we suppose them to be wholly engaged by the common business of their office, a foreigner would have occasion of reproaching us with defects more important than want of delicacy, and might justly censure us as a people corrupt beyond the common rate of human wickedness, a nation divided only into two classes, magistrates and criminals.

But they, in reality, abound so much among us, that most of them are only nominal magistrates, vested with authority which they never exert, or exert to bad purposes, and which it were well if they were obliged to employ in the real service of their country, by superintending the paviers and the scavengers.

For this reason it is unnecessary to erect a new officer, as an inspector of our streets, since every office that is not necessary is pernicious. Were the consequences of this grievance such as they have been represented, I should, perhaps, willingly erect a new office, though I should not be surprised to hear the wisest man declare rather for a pestilence than an increase of officers.

As I neither think the grievance insupportable, nor the methods proposed for removing it necessary or proper, I declare myself against the motion.

Lord GAGE spoke in the following manner:--Sir, as the grievance cannot be denied to be real, and the motion, therefore, may reasonably be imagined to have been made without any other intention than of benefiting the publick by an useful law, I cannot discover any sufficient reason for a rejection so peremptory and contemptuous.

That every man is disgusted, and almost every man daily endangered in our streets, has not been denied; nor will any man, I suppose, question what, if he has not yet experienced it, he may, perhaps, be fully convinced of, in his next visit or excursion.

Those evils, which every man feels, though slight, are worthy of the attention of the legislature; and that danger that threatens multitudes, though distant, ought to be averted: for a small disorder, like a small expense, when it extends to multitudes, becomes a national affair.

But though this motion may, perhaps, be liable to some objections, there is, certainly, no such absurdity to be found in it, as may justify us in rejecting it without examination; to reject a motion when it is first offered, is a proof of prejudice, next to that of rejecting it unheard; it is to determine a question, before it is discussed, or can be fully understood.

Mr. SANDYS replied, in substance as follows:--Sir, I cannot but differ very widely in opinion from the right honourable member that spoke last, with regard to the propriety of opposing a motion when it is first made; a practice, which I can by no means think inconsistent with either decency or prudence, and which would, perhaps, be of use to the publick, if it was more frequent.

When any motion is made, it is subjected to the consideration of this assembly, and every member is at full liberty to examine and discuss it. If it appears to deserve farther attention, it may be admitted, but if the subject be either improper or unseasonable, or the measures proposed injudicious or dangerous, it is then to be rejected; and if it is at last to be rejected, it is apparent that no time ought to be thrown away upon it.

The hours, and days, and weeks, that have been improfitably spent upon bills which after all our endeavours could not be passed; the delays of real benefits to the publick, which have been produced by long pursuits of shadowy advantages, have inclined me to a more expeditious method of proceeding, and determined me speedily to reject what I cannot hope to amend.

[The question being put, passed in the negative, 142 against 109.]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 27, 1740-1.

DEBATE ON THE SECOND READING OF A BILL TO PREVENT INCONVENIENCIES ARISING FROM INSURANCE OF SHIPS.

The bill being read, sir John BARNARD spoke thus:--Sir, there cannot be brought before this house any questions more difficult in themselves, more entangled with a multiplicity of relations, or more perplexed with an endless diversity of circumstances, than those which relate to commercial affairs; affairs on which the most experienced often disagree, and on which the most sagacious may deceive themselves with erroneous conjectures.

There are no questions, sir, which require so much personal knowledge of the subject to which they relate, nor is there any subject with which so few gentlemen in this house have had opportunities of being acquainted. There are no questions, sir, which their variety of relations to different persons exposes to be so easily misrepresented without detection, nor any in which the opposition of particular interests so much incites a false representation. In all these cases, deceit is easy, and there is a strong temptation to deceive.

Nor are these questions, sir, always perplexed by intentional fraud, or false assertions, of which they that utter them are themselves conscious.

Those who deceive us, do not always suppress any truth of which they are convinced, nor set facts before us in any other light, than that in which themselves behold them; they for the most part err with an honest intention, and propagate no mistakes but those which they have themselves admitted.

Of this kind, sir, are, doubtless, the measures proposed in the bill before us, which those by whom they are promoted may easily think to be of benefit to the publick, but which, I believe, will appear the result of imperfect views, and partial consideration.

The great and fundamental errour, sir, of the patrons of this bill, seems to be an opinion that the practice of insuring is not known to other nations, nor can be carried on in any other place; and from this principle they deduce consequences, which, if they were inevitably certain, might easily influence us to an immediate approbation of the bill, as necessary to secure our commerce, and distress our enemies.

They conclude, sir, with sufficient justness, that very few merchants would hazard their fortunes in long voyages or distant commerce, or expose themselves to the dangers of war, without the security which insurances afford them; and having persuaded themselves that such security is to be obtained from no other nation, they imagine that we might, by prohibiting it, confine all the foreign vessels in their ports, and destroy, by one resolution, the trade of both our rivals and our enemies.

That our East India company may desire the ratification of this bill, I cannot deny, because they might, perhaps, receive from it some temporary advantage by the short inconveniencies which those whom they consider as the enemies of their commerce would feel from it. They may desire it, because the experiment, if it fails, as it must, cannot injure them; and if it succeeds, may produce great advantages to them: they may wish it, because they will feel the immediate benefit, and the detriment will fall upon others.

I shall not inquire whether our merchants are inclined to look with malevolence on all those who cultivate the same branches of commerce with themselves, though they have neither the violation of natural rights, nor the infringement of national treaties, to complain of. I should be unwilling to suspect a British merchant, whose acquaintance with the constitution of his own country ought to show him the value of liberty, who ought to be above narrow schemes, by the knowledge which his profession enables him to gain, of a desire to encroach upon the rights of others, or to engross the general benefits of nature; and shall only observe, that several other nations can plead a claim to the East India trade, a claim of equal validity with our own; that the Danes have their settlement there, and that the Portuguese discovered the way to those regions of wealth, from which some, perhaps, are inclined to exclude them.

But nothing is more vain than to attempt to exclude them by refusing to ensure their ships, because the opinion that they can be insured by no other nation is entirely without foundation. There are at this time offices of insurance along the whole coasts of the midland sea, among the Dutch, and even among the French. Nothing can debar any nation from the trade of insurance but the want of money; and that money is not wanted by foreigners for this purpose, appears from the great sums which they have deposited in our funds.

That this trade is now carried on chiefly by this nation, though not solely, is incontestable; but what can be inferred from that, but that we ought not to obstruct our own gain; that we ought not to make a law to deprive ourselves of that advantage of which either favourable accidents or our own sagacity have put us in possession.