Chapter VI: Part 6

It is likewise to be remembered, my lords, that a French officer is supported with pay not much larger than that of a private soldier among us, and that, therefore, the argument which arises from the necessity of frugality is not of the same force in both nations.

There is yet another reason why the French are under the necessity of employing more officers than any other nation: the strength of their armies consists in their gentlemen, who cannot be expected to serve without some command: the common soldiers of the French army are a mean, spiritless, despicable herd, fit only to drudge as pioneers, to raise intrenchments, and to dig mines, but without courage to face an enemy, or to proceed with vigour in the face of danger.

Their gentlemen, my lords, are of a very different character; jealous of their honour, and conscious of their birth, eager of distinction, and ambitious of preferment. They have, commonly, their education in the army, and have no expectations of acquiring fortunes equal to their desires by any other profession, and are, therefore, intent upon the improvement of every opportunity which is offered them of increasing their knowledge and exalting their reputation.

To the spirit of these men, my lords, are the French armies indebted for all their victories, and to them is to be attributed the present perfection of the art of war. They have the vigilance and perseverance of Romans joined with the natural vivacity and expedition of their own nation.

We are, therefore, not to wonder, my lords, that there is in the French armies an establishment for more gentlemen than in other countries, where the disparity between the military virtues of the higher and lower classes of men is less conspicuous. In the troops of that nation nothing is expected but from the officers, but in ours the common soldier meets danger with equal intrepidity, and scorns to see himself excelled by his officer in courage or in zeal.

We are, therefore, my lords, under no necessity of burdening our country with the expense of new commissions, which, in the army, will be superfluous, and, in the state, dangerous, as they will fill our senate with new dependents, and our corporations with new adherents to the minister, whose steady perseverance in his favourite scheme of senatorial subordination, will be, perhaps, the only occasion of these new levies, or, at least, has hindered the right application of our standing troops. For what reason, my lords, can invention or imagination assign, why the troops, who had been for some time disciplined, were not rather sent to the assistance of Vernon than the new marines, except that some of them were commanded by men who had obtained seats in the other house, and who, by their settled adherence and avowed fidelity to the minister, had recommended themselves too powerfully to be rashly exposed in the service of their country to the bullets of the Spaniards.

So great, my lords, has been the minister's regard to senatorial abilities, and so strict his gratitude to his friends, that I know of but one member of the other house that has been hazarded in this expedition, and he a hopeless, abandoned patriot, insensible of the capacity or integrity of our ministry, and whom nothing has been able to reconcile to our late measures. He, therefore, who has never exerted himself in defence of the ministry, was, in his turn, thought unworthy of ministerial protection, and was given up to the chance of war without reluctance.

But I hope your lordships will concur with me in the opinion, that it is not always necessary to gratify the ministry, but that our country claims some part of our regard, and, therefore, that in establishing our army we should pursue that method which may be most accommodated to our constitution, and, instead of imitating the military policy of the French, follow the example of those nations by whose troops they have been conquered.

Had this scheme been hitherto followed, had our new levies, instead of being put under the command of boys, been distributed in just proportions among the standing regiments, where they might soon have been qualified for service by the inspection of experienced officers, we might now have seen an army capable of awing the court of Spain into submission, or, if our demands had been still refused, of revenging our injuries, and punishing those who have insulted and despised us.

From an army thus raised and disciplined, detachments, my lords, ought to have been sent on board of all our fleets, and particularly that which is now stationed in the Mediterranean, which would not then have coasted about from one port to another, without hurting or frighting the enemy, but might, by sudden descents, have spread terrour through a great part of the kingdom, harassed their troops by continual marches, and, by frequent incursions, have plundered all the maritime provinces, driven the inhabitants into the inland country, and laid the villages in ashes.

There is yet, my lords, no appearance of a peace, for our success has not enabled us to prescribe terms, and I hope we are not yet fallen so low as to receive them; it is, therefore, proper to form such resolutions as may influence the conduct of the war, and enable us to retrieve the errours of our past measures.

The minister, my lords, is not without panegyrists, who may, perhaps, endeavour to persuade us, that we ought to resign all our understandings to his superiour wisdom, and blindly trust our fortunes and our liberties to his unshaken integrity. They will, in proof of his abilities, produce the wonderful dexterity and penetration which the late negotiations have discovered, and will confirm the reputation of his integrity by the constant parsimony of all his schemes, and the unwillingness with which he at any time increases the expenses of the nation.

But, my lords, it is the great duty of your high station to watch over the administration, and to warn those, who are more immediately intrusted with the publick affairs, against measures which may endanger the safety or happiness of the nation; and, therefore, if I have proved to your lordships, that to raise new regiments is dangerous to our liberties, that a multitude of officers is of no use in war, and that an army may be more expeditiously disciplined by adding new men to every company, I hope your lordships will agree to this resolution, which I have drawn up with the utmost brevity, and of which the meaning cannot be mistaken:

"That the augmenting the army by raising regiments, as it is the most unnecessary and expensive method of augmentation, is also the most dangerous to the liberties of the nation."

The duke of NEWCASTLE next spoke, to this effect:--My lords, as my education and employments have afforded me no opportunity of acquiring any skill in military affairs, it will not be expected by your lordships, that I should be able to confute the arguments of the noble duke, whose acknowledged superiority in the art of war, and the abilities which he has displayed in the administration of every province which he has undertaken, give him a claim to the highest deference.

But, my lords, as I cannot assume the province of disputing on this question, so I cannot, without longer consideration, form any resolution concerning it; for arguments may be fallacious, which, yet, I cannot confute, and to approve without knowledge is no less weak than to censure.

There is not any present necessity, my lords, of forming a resolution on this subject; we are not now called upon particularly to consider it, and certainly it cannot be prudent, by so determinate a decision, pronounced without reflection or deliberation, to preclude a fuller examination of this important question.

Lord CARTERET rose, and spoke in this manner:--My lords, the noble duke who made the present motion has supported it by such strength of argument, and so fully explained the advantages of the method which it tends to recommend, that not only the present age, but posterity may, probably, be indebted to him, for juster notions of a military establishment, than have been yet attained even by those whose profession obliges them to such inquiries.

Nor, my lords, could we expect less from his long experience and extensive capacity; experience gained in the heat of war, and in the midst of danger; a capacity not only cultivated by solitary disquisitions in retirement and security, but exercised by difficulties, and quickened by opposition.

Such abilities, my lords, matured by such an education, have justly made the noble duke the oracle of war, and procured him the esteem and reverence of all the powers upon earth.

As I did not receive from my education any military knowledge, I am not able to add much to the arguments which your lordships have already heard; but, nevertheless, having been under the necessity of regulating the army when I had the honour to be employed in Ireland, and having made, in those countries where I transacted the business of the crown, some observations upon the different forms of military establishments, I hope I shall be allowed to offer what my experience or my remarks may suggest to me, in confirmation of the sentiments of the noble duke.

When I was in Ireland, my lords, the troops of that kingdom consisted of twenty-one regiments, of which ten were, as last year, brought into Britain, and the Irish forces were to be filled up by new levies, which were raised in the manner now proposed, by increasing every regiment from three hundred and forty to six hundred men; so that the eleven regiments remaining composed a body of nearly the same number with the twenty-one regiments, as formerly constituted.

Of the Swedish establishment, my lords, the reputation and success of their troops are an uncontrovertible vindication, attd I have often had an opportunity of comparing the number of officers with that of ours, and found their private men to be far more numerous in proportion to the officers.

In Hanover, my lords, I have seen his majesty's troops remarkable for the elegance of their appearance; and being once asked, by the commander, at what expense one of those gallant troopers and his horse was supported, was told, after confessing my ignorance, that he cost no more than fourteen pounds a year, who could not, in this country, be maintained for less than forty.

I believe, my lords, that the French forces are not more expensive than those of Hanover, and, therefore, we are by no means to imitate their establishment, for the price of provisions and habits of life do not admit of any diminution of the pay of either our officers or soldiers, and we can only lessen our expenses by reducing their numbers, to which I shall, for my part, most willingly contribute.

But as this, my lords, is not the proper time for disbanding our forces, of which the present state of our affairs may, perhaps, demand an augmentation, it is necessary to compare the state of our forces with that of foreign troops, and supply, by prudent methods, the disadvantages to which we are subject, by the peculiar condition of our country. For, if the French can support an army at a fourth part of our expense, what must be the consequence of a war, supposing the wealth of the two nations nearly equal? It will be to little purpose that we boast, however justly, of the superiority of our troops; for though it should be granted that the British cannot be resisted by an equal number, yet it can never be expected that they should conquer troops four times as numerous as themselves.

Thus, my lords, it appears, with all the evidence of arithmetical demonstration, that the method now proposed is highly expedient, nor can any objection, in my opinion, be made to the resolution offered to your lordships.

That this is not a proper time for this inquiry has been, indeed, urged, but surely no time can be more proper than when we may, by a resolution unanimously passed, regulate, in some degree, the conduct of the other house, and faint to them the opinion of this assembly on a question which is, perhaps, to-morrow to be brought before them.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY then spoke thus:--My lords, though I was once honoured with a command in the army, and consequently ought to have attained some military knowledge, yet I have so long resigned my commission, possessed it for so short a time, and have suffered my attention to be diverted from inquiries on that subject by employments of so different a kind, that I cannot presume to oppose any knowledge of my own to the reasons which have been offered; but I cannot think that the conclusions drawn by the noble duke, are so evidently true as to force conviction, and exclude all possibility of reply; nor can I conceive it consistent with the dignity of this assembly, to yield implicitly to any man's assertions, or to pass any resolution without an accurate inquiry.

Some objections, my lords, arise, upon reflection, from my narrow observation and transient reading, and these I shall lay before your lordships, with an open acknowledgment of my insufficiency to discuss the question, and a sincere desire of being instructed where I may be mistaken.

The subordination of the army, my lords, appears to me, in general, to be sufficiently maintained, nor is it ever infringed but by particular partiality, that can never be prevented, or a casual difference in the circumstances of the officers, which, though not relative to their military characters, will always produce some degree of influence.

I know not, my lords, how the general regulation of our forces, and the distribution of military honours, can be condemned, without extending some degree of censure to a person who ought not to be mentioned as concurring in any measures injurious to the publick. Our army, my lords, is maintained by the parliament, but commanded by the king, who has not either done or directed any thing of which his people may justly complain.

Here the duke of ARGYLE interrupted him:--My lords, it is necessary to clear myself from misrepresentations, and to preserve, at the same time, the order of this assembly, by reminding the noble lord, that his majesty is never to be introduced into our debates, because he is never to be charged with wrong; and by declaring to your lordships, that I impute no part of the errours committed in the regulation of the army to his majesty, but to those ministers whose duty it is to advise him, and whom the law condemns to answer for the consequences of their counsels.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY resumed:--My lords, if I misrepresented any assertion of the noble duke, it was by misapprehension, or failure of memory, and not by malice or design; and if in any other objections which I shall make, I shall fall into any errour of the same kind, I desire that it may be ascribed to the same cause.

The ignorance and inexperience of our present officers have been exposed with great gaiety of imagination, and with the true spirit of satirical rhetorick, nor can I presume to support them against so formidable censures. But, my lords, I cannot discover any method of protracting the lives of our old officers beyond the usual term, nor of supplying the loss of those whom death takes away from the army, but by substituting others, who, as they have seen no wars, can have little experience.

With regard to the number of officers in the foreign troops, I have been informed, that they were, by an express stipulation, to be constituted in the same manner with the British and Dutch forces.

Then the duke of ARGYLE again interrupted him:--My lords, as it was my province in the late war to superintend the payment of the foreign troops, I may be allowed to have some knowledge of the establishment, and hope I shall not be imagined to need any information on that subject.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY said:--My lords, I do not presume to dispute any assertion of the noble duke, for whose knowledge I have the highest veneration, but only to offer such hints for inquiry as may be pursued by other lords of greater abilities, and to show, that as some difficulties may be raised, the resolution ought not to be agreed to without farther deliberation; since it not only tends to prescribe the measures which shall be hereafter taken, and prohibit a method of raising forces, which, when diligently examined, may, perhaps, appear most eligible, but to censure the methods, which, when they were put in practice the last year, received the approbation of all the powers of the legislature.

Lord WESTMORELAND spoke next, as follows:--My lords, I have, for my own satisfaction, stated the difference of the expense between the two methods of raising forces, and find it so great, that the method proposed by the noble duke ought, undoubtedly, to be preferred, even though it were attended with some inconvenience, from which he has shown it to be free.

Frugality, my lords, is one of the chief virtues of an administration; a virtue without which no government can be long supported: the publick expense can never be too accurately computed, or the first tendency to profusion too rigorously opposed; for as in private life, so in political economy, the demands of necessity are easily supplied; but if once the calls of wantonness and caprice are complied with, no limits can be fixed, nor will any treasure be sufficient.

Whether the burdens under which the people are now toiling were all imposed by necessity, I will not inquire, but I think, my lords, we may readily determine, that whatever is not necessary is cruel and oppressive, and that, therefore, since the expense of raising new regiments appears, at least, not to be necessary, it ought to be opposed; and how can it be opposed more properly or effectually than by the noble duke's resolution?

Lord HERVEY spoke to this effect:--My lords, I do not claim any superiority of knowledge in any affairs that relate to the publick, but have less acquaintance with the military establishment than with any other part of the government, and can, therefore, neither oppose the resolution now offered to your lordships by such arguments as may deserve your attention, nor agree to it with that degree of conviction which the importance of it seems to require.

That the chief argument which has been produced against raising new regiments, is less formidable than it has been represented, will, I believe, appear to your lordships, when it is considered that the officers are always gentlemen of the first families in the empire, who, therefore, cannot be supposed voluntarily to give up their relations and posterity to the power of any ministry, or, for the sake of their commissions, to betray that constitution by which their own properties are secured.

Whether every other argument may not with equal justice be controverted, is not, without longer consideration, possible to be determined, and, therefore, it cannot be reasonably expected that we should agree to the resolution, which would be only to decide without examination, and to determine what we don't understand; for I am under no apprehension of being imagined to reflect unjustly on this assembly, in supposing that many of your lordships may be strangers to the question, which, when the last levies were made, was neither discussed nor proposed.

I therefore move, that the previous question may be put, which may, perhaps, gain time sufficient for a more exact inquiry upon this important subject.

Lord TALBOT replied to this purport:--My lords, if, in imitation of some noble lords, I profess my ignorance of the subject on which I am to speak, may it not yet be allowed me, after the example of others, to employ the little knowledge which I have in the defence of a resolution, which appears to have no other tendency than the advantage of the publick, and to show my zeal for the happiness of my country, though, perhaps, without the true knowledge of its interest?

The noble lord, who spoke last, is too great a master of eloquence not to be heard with all the attention which pleasure naturally produces, and a reasoner too formidable not to raise in his hearers all the anxiety which is produced by the fear of being deceived by partial representations, and artful deductions. I am always afraid, my lords, lest errour should appear too much like truth in the ornaments which his lordship's imagination may bestow, and lest sophistry should dazzle my understanding whilst I imagine myself only guided by the light of reason.

I shall, therefore, endeavour, my lords, to review his ornaments, and try whether they owe their influence to the force of truth, or to that of eloquence.

His lordship has observed, that the objections which are now made to the method of raising new regiments, were not produced last year upon a like occasion. I know not, indeed, what can be inferred from this assertion; for, surely, it will not maintain, that an errour, once admitted, is to become perpetual.

But, my lords, another reason may be assigned, for which the objections that occurred last year might not be produced. The ministry, after a long course of disgraceful negotiations, and artful delays, were, at length, compelled to a war, by the general clamours of the whole nation; but they acted as men unwilling to execute what they did not approve. They proceeded so slowly in their preparations, and were so languid in all their motions, that it was evident how willingly they would have improved every opportunity of retarding the vengeance which they were forced to threaten; and with what artifices they would have protracted any delay, which they could have imputed to those by whom they were opposed. It was, therefore, to the last degree, improper to embarrass their measures of themselves sufficiently perplexed, or to lay any obstacle in the way of those who would gladly be stopped.

That the army is filled with gentlemen, is so far, my lords, from proving that there is nothing to be feared from it, that it is the only foundation of all our solicitude. For none but gentlemen can injure our liberties, and while the posts of the army are bestowed as rewards of senatorial slavery, gentlemen will always be found who will be corrupted themselves, and can corrupt a borough; who will purchase a vote in the house, and sell it for military preferments. By the posts of the army the senate may be corrupted, and by the corruption of the senate the army be perpetuated.

Those, my lords, who are the warmest opponents of the army, apprehend not any danger from their swords, but from their votes. As they have been of late regulated without discipline or subordination, I should not feel such anxiety at seeing them led on by their new commanders against a body of honest ploughmen, united in the cause of virtue and of liberty; I should, with great alacrity, draw my sword against them, and should not doubt of seeing them in a short time heaped upon our fields.

But, my lords, they are employed to ruin us by a more slow and silent method; they are directed to influence their relations in the senate, and to suborn the voters in our small towns; they are dispersed over the nation to instil dependence, and being enslaved themselves, willingly undertake the propagation of slavery.

That the army is instrumental in extending the influence of the ministry to the senate, cannot be denied, when military preferments are held no longer than while he that possesses them gives a sanction, by his vote, to the measures of the court; when no degree of merit is sufficient to balance a single act of senatorial opposition, and when the nation is rather to be left to the defence of boys, than the minister be suspected of misconduct.

Could either bravery or knowledge, reputation, or past services, known fidelity to his majesty, or the most conspicuous capacity for high trust, have secured any man in the enjoyment of his post, the noble duke who made the motion, had carried his command to his grave, nor had the nation now been deprived either of his arms, or of his counsels.

But, as he has now offered his advice to his country, and supported his opinion with proofs from reason and experience, which even those who oppose them have confessed themselves unable to answer; as the justness of his reasoning, and the extent of his knowledge, have silenced those whose prejudices will not suffer them to own themselves convinced; let us not, my lords, reject what we cannot condemn, nor suffer our country to be defrauded of the advantage of this resolution, by that low senatorial craft, the previous question.

Then the CHANCELLOR spoke to the following purpose:--My lords, I am far from suspecting that an open profession of my inability to examine the question before us, in its full extent, will be imputed to an affectation of modesty, since any knowledge of military affairs could not be acquired in those stations in which I have been placed, or by those studies, in which the greatest part of my life is known to have been spent.

It will not be expected, my lords, that I should attempt a formal confutation of the noble duke's positions, or that I should be able to defend my own opinion against his knowledge and experience; nor would I, my lords, expose myself to the censure of having harangued upon war in the presence of Hannibal.

The noble duke has explained his sentiments to your lordships with the utmost accuracy of method, and the most instructive perspicuity of language; he has enforced them with a strength of reasoning rarely to be found, and with an extent of knowledge peculiar to himself. Yet, my lords, as his arguments, however powerful in themselves, do not strike me with the same force with which others may be affected, who are more capable of receiving them, I hope that your lordships will allow me to mention such objections as occur to me, that in voting on this question I may, at least, preserve my conscience from violation, and neither adopt the opinion of another, however great, without examination, nor obstinately reject the means of conviction.

Every lord who has spoken either in support of the noble duke's opinion, or in opposition to it, has confessed that he is very little acquainted with the subject of our debate; and it may not, therefore, be an improper or useless attempt, if I endeavour by objections, however injudicious, or by arguments, however inconclusive, to procure some illustration of a question so important, and, at the same time, so little understood.

The objections, my lords, which I shall produce, are such as I have heard in conversation with those whose long acquaintance with military employments give them a just claim to authority in all questions which relate to the art of war; among whom I find no uniformity of opinion with regard to the most proper method of augmenting our forces. And, my lords, when we observe those to differ in their sentiments, whose education, experience, and opportunities of knowledge have been nearly the same, and who have all obtained a very great degree of reputation in their profession, what can be inferred, but that the question is in its own nature obscure and difficult? That it involves a multitude of relations, and is diffused through a great variety of circumstances? And that, therefore, it is prudent for every man, who can judge only upon the authority of others, to suspend his opinion?

The chief argument, or that, at least, which impressed itself most strongly on my mind, against any innovation in our military constitution, was drawn from the success of our armies in their present form, with that proportion of soldiers and officers, which the present motion tends to abolish. Our forces, say the advocates for the present establishment, have afforded us a sufficient testimony of the propriety of their regulation, by their frequent victories over troops, whose discipline has been studied with the utmost vigilance, and which have been trained up to war with a degree of attention not disproportioned to the mighty design for which they were raised, the subjection of the world, and attainment of universal monarchy. These troops, who have been taught, almost from their infancy, that cowardice and flight are the greatest crimes, and persuaded, by national prejudices, and principles studiously instilled, that no foreign forces could withstand them, have fled before equal numbers of Britons, and been driven from one province to another, till, instead of grasping at general dominion, they were reduced to defend their wives and children.

How much of this success was to be ascribed to that part of the regulation which this motion proposes to be changed, it is not, my lords, within my province to determine; the great commander whom I have the honour to oppose, can best explain to your lordships the province of every officer in the field, and how far the number of inferiour officers may influence the success of a battle and the fate of a kingdom.

But to me, my lords, the establishment of our armies, comprising different views, and connecting various subordinate regulations, may be compared to a medicine composed of different ingredients, and found infallibly efficacious in a dangerous disease, in which, though some of the parts may seem to physicians of the profoundest learning, superfluous or improper, it would be no less than the folly of preferring experiments to life, to make any alteration.

The wantonness of innovation, my lords, is a dangerous disease of the mind; in a private station, it prompts men to be always discontented with what they find, and to lose the enjoyment of good in search of something better; it incites them to leave the safe and beaten tracks of life, in search of those which they imagine nearer, but, which are, at best, less secure, and which generally lead them to points far different from that to which they originally intended to direct their course.

It is dangerous, my lords, to admit any alteration which is not absolutely necessary, for one innovation makes way for another. The parts of a constitution, like a complicated machine, are fitted to each other, nor can one be changed without changing that which corresponds to it. This necessity is not always foreseen, but when discovered by experience is generally complied with; for every man is more inclined to hazard farther changes, than to confess himself mistaken by retracting his scheme. Thus, my lords, one change introduces another, till the original constitution is entirely destroyed.

By the ambition of innovation, my lords, have almost all those empires been destroyed, of which nothing now is left but the memory. Every human establishment has its advantages and its inconveniencies, and by weak attempts to remedy these defects, which, notwithstanding the utmost attention, will embarrass the machine of government, alterations have been introduced which have been quickly followed by a total dissolution.

There seem, my lords, to be few regulations on which it is more dangerous to make experiments than on that of the armies of a nation. We are sufficiently convinced how much of success is the consequence of courage, and that courage is only an opinion of our own superiority, arising from certain circumstances, either imaginary or real.

The courage which at present animates our forces, arises, my lords, from a very proper ground, their former victories over the enemies which they are now to combat, and will, therefore, doubtless, continue while they can consider themselves as enjoying the same advantage with those particular men by whom the victories were obtained. But, my lords, if any essential part of their establishment be changed, they will be considered, both by themselves and their enemies, as a different army; they will then charge with less alacrity, and be opposed with less dejection; they will consider themselves as fighting without that certainty of success which arises from experience, and their enemies will resolve to try, by an obstinate resistance, whether they are now equally formidable as in their former state.

Thus, my lords, I have attempted, however weakly, to represent the arguments which I have heard for the continuance of the establishment, of which your lordships will examine the validity, and shall now proceed to consider the noble duke's system of a military subordination in time of peace.

Whether a standing army in time of peace is made necessary to the change of conduct in foreign courts, it is now useless to inquire; but it will be easily granted by your lordships, that no motive but necessity, necessity absolute and inevitable, ought to influence us to support a standing body of regular forces, which have always been accounted dangerous, and generally found destructive to a free people.

The chief reason, my lords, of the danger arising from a standing army, may be ascribed to the circumstances by which men, subject to military laws, are distinguished from other members of the same community; they are, by the nature of martial government, exposed to punishment which other men never incur, and tried by forms of a different and more rigorous kind than those which are practised by the civil power. They are, if not exempted from the jurisdiction of a magistrate, yet subject to another authority which they see more frequently and more severely exerted, and which, therefore, they fear and reverence in a higher degree. They, by entering into the army, lay aside, for the most part, all prospect of advantage from commerce or civil employments, and, in a few years, neither fear nor hope any thing but from the favour or displeasure of their own officers.

For these, my lords, or for other reasons, the soldiers have always been inclined to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the community, and independent on it, a government regulated by their own laws, without regard to the general constitution of their country; they have, therefore, been ready to subvert the constitution, from which they received little advantage, and to oppress the civil magistrates, for whom they had lost their reverence.

And how soon, my lords, might such outrages be expected from an army formed after the model of the noble duke, released from the common obligations of society, disunited from the bulk of the nation, directed solely by their own officers, and ultimately commanded by a man who had the right of commanding no other? Would they not soon consider themselves as a separate community, whose interests were, no less than their laws, peculiar to themselves? Would they not consider him, from whom they received all their rewards, and all their punishments, as the proper object of their supreme regard, and endeavour to exalt him to the same dominion over others, which he enjoyed in regard to themselves, that they might share in his superiority?

A body of men, my lords, thus separated from the rest of the people, must consider themselves as either ennobled or degraded by such distinction, and would soon find themselves inclined to use the power of their arms, either in the exertion of their privileges, or the revenge of their disgrace. Then, my lords, would they set at defiance the laws of the nation, nor would one of these noble lords be able to disband, nor the other to resist them.

The army, my lords, is, in time of peace, then best regulated when it is kept under the strictest subordination to the civil power, that power which it is instituted to protect and to preserve.

Thus, my lords, have I examined the proposal and reasons of the noble duke, perhaps not much to the information of your lordships; but it cannot be expected that any capacity should be able, in an unexpected and sudden debate, to dispute on a subject, which the noble duke's education gave him particular opportunities of understanding far beyond almost every other man, and which he has had time to consider with respect to this present motion.

For this reason, my lords, I cannot but think the previous question highly expedient, but not for this reason alone; for as the state of the army, and the proper methods of augmenting it, are soon to be examined by the other house, to prejudice their determinations, may raise a contest about privileges, and oblige us either to persist, for our own honour, in opposition to measures necessary to the security of the publick, or, in compliance with the present exigence, accept their scheme, however opposite to our own resolution.

Lord CARTERET spoke in substance as follows:--My lords, the known abilities of that noble lord incline me always to hear him with uncommon expectation and attention, which seldom fail to be rewarded by such pleasure and information as few other men are able to afford. But his observations on the question before us, my lords, have only convinced me, that the greatest abilities may be sometimes betrayed into errour, and the most candid disposition be vitiated by accidental prejudices. For his own arguments neither appear just, nor his representation impartial, of those advanced in favour of the motion.

With regard to the number of officers necessary in time of war, his lordship asserted nothing from his own knowledge, nor do I believe that any other lord will imagine himself qualified to dispute with the noble duke upon questions purely military. His experience entitles him to the highest authority, in debates of this kind; and if every man has a claim to credit in his own profession, surely, he who has given evidence of his proficiency in the art of war in the eyes of the whole world, will not be denied, in this house, that superiority which would readily be allowed him in any other part of the universe.

And yet less, my lords, can it be suspected, that he intends to deceive us, than that he can be deceived himself; for not only his probity, his love of his country, and his fidelity to the crown, concur to secure him from any temptations to make an ill use of his credit, but his own interest obliges him to offer that scheme for the regulation of our forces, which, in his own opinion, will most certainly contribute to their success. For it is not to be doubted, my lords, that when we shall be engaged in war too far for negotiations and conventions, when we shall be surrounded by enemies, and terrified at the near approach of danger, he will be called upon to lead our armies to battle, and attack, once more, those enemies that have fled so often before him.

Then, my lords, if he has contributed to form a weak plan of our military constitution, must he atone for it with the loss of his reputation; that reputation, for which he has undergone so many fatigues, and been exposed to so many dangers.

But, my lords, it is ridiculous to suspect where nothing appears to provoke suspicion, and I am very far from imagining that the dangers of innovation, however artfully magnified, or the apprehensions of the soldiers, however rhetorically represented, will be thought of any weight.

The establishment of the army, my lords, is an innovation, and, as the noble lord has justly represented it, an innovation that threatens nothing less than the destruction of our liberties, and the dissolution of our government. Our vigilance ought, therefore, to be very anxiously employed in regulating this new part of our government, and adapting it, in such a manner, to the national constitution, that no detriment may arise from it, and that our civil rights may be protected, not oppressed, by the military power.

To this purpose, says the noble lord, the soldiers are to be restrained by a due subordination to the magistrate, a position undoubtedly true, but now superfluously urged: for it was never controverted by the noble person whose opinion he intended to oppose.

Should any man assert, my lords, that the army ought to be formed into a distinct and independent society, which should receive laws only from a council of war, and have no other governour than their officers, none should oppose such an assertion with more ardour or constancy than myself, but what was never advanced it is unnecessary to confute.

Yet, my lords, to obviate those dangers from the army which have been so strongly and justly represented, it is necessary, not only that a legal subordination to the civil authority be firmly established, but that a personal dependence on the ministry be taken away.

How readily men learn to reverence and obey those on whom their fortunes depend, has been already shown by the noble lord, and therefore it will follow, that a minister who distributes preferments at his pleasure, may acquire such an influence in the army, as may be employed to secure himself from justice by the destruction of liberty. And unless it can be proved, that no such minister can ever exist; that corruption, ambition, and perfidy, have place only in the military race; every argument that shows the danger of an army, dependent only on the general, will show the danger, likewise, of one dependent only on the minister.

The influence of the minister, my lords, is known to arise from the number of the officers, and to be proportioned to the value of the preferment, which it is in his power to bestow; it is, therefore, evident, by adding new officers to our army, we shall throw weight into the scale, which already is, at least, an equal balance to our constitution, and enable the ministry either to employ an army in defence of their measures, or to obtain such an influence in the senate, as shall make any other security superfluous.

Such, my lords, is the danger of a multitude of officers, a danger which surely deserves more attention than the imaginary prejudice of the soldiers in favour of the present establishment; a prejudice represented so powerful, both in our own forces, and those of our enemies, that the future success of our arms may probably depend upon it.

Surely, my lords, that cause may be allowed indefensible, which such a patron defends so weakly. What can be more chimerical than to imagine that men would lay down their arms, and forsake their standards, because there are twenty more in a company than have formerly been? That such a panick, from such a cause, was never found, I need not prove; and I scarce think it necessary to assert, that, without supposing a universal depravity of reason, it never can be found.

The establishment proposed by the noble duke, is the same with that of most foreign troops, and particularly with that of his majesty's forces in his foreign dominions, and, therefore, cannot but be approved by him, if it should be proposed by your lordships. For why should he imagine a greater number of officers necessary to the troops of Britain, than to those of any other nation.

The expediency of the motion, my lords, is, in my opinion, so obvious and incontestable, as to require no farther consideration, and, therefore, it is no argument against it, that we were not previously informed of the question.

Much less, my lords, can I discover the force of the assertion, that by such a resolution we shall excite the displeasure of the other house; we have, my lords, at least, an equal right with them to examine any position relating to the publick security, a right which we may exert with less danger of disgusting them, while they have yet formed no determination, and with less danger to the nation, than when their opinion, whatever it may be, cannot be controverted without retarding the important bill against mutiny.

We are never offended, my lords, at receiving the opinions of the other house, which we often adopt without any alteration, and often make use of for our own instruction, and now are become so contemptible as that no regard should be paid by them to our resolutions.

It is well known, my lords, that this assembly is an essential and constituent part of the legislature of this kingdom, and that we received from our ancestors a great extent of power, which it ought to be our care not to suffer to be contracted by degrees, till this assembly shall become merely formal, and sit only to ratify implicitly the determinations of the other house.

[Several other lords spoke in the debate, and the president having put the previous question, "Whether the question should be then put?" upon a division, it passed in the negative. Content, 42. Not content, 59.]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 12, 1740.

RESPECTING OFFICERS ON HALF-PAY.

Mr. SANDYS this day moved for an humble address to his majesty, that, for the future ease of his majesty's subjects, all officers now subsisting upon half-pay, etc. might be employed in the army, and supported it to the following effect:

Sir, though I have often known motions opposed without any just objections, or at least without any proof of such inconveniencies likely to arise from them, as were equivalent to the advantages which they would have produced, yet I cannot but confess, that any opposition to this will be unexpected and surprising; for it is, in my opinion, supported by every law of justice and humanity. If we regard the publick in general, it cannot but produce some alleviation of the national expense; and if we consider the particular persons to whom it immediately relates, they have certainly a just claim to that regard which it is the tendency of this motion to procure them.

To burden with superfluous officers, and unnecessary expenses, a people already overwhelmed with taxes, and overrun with the dependents on the crown, is, surely, to the highest degree cruel and absurd. And to condemn those men to contempt and penury, who have served their country with bravery and fidelity, to prefer unexperienced striplings to those commissions, which would gladly be accepted by men who have already tried their courage in the battle, and borne the fatigues of marches, and the change of climates, is surely not only to oppress the deserving, and scatter promotion without just distinction; but, what is yet more enormous, it is to wanton with the publick safety, and expose us to our enemies.

Nor does it appear to me sufficient, that the veteran officers be restored to the commissions which they formerly enjoyed; they ought, upon an augmentation of our troops, to be recompensed by some advancement for their services and their sufferings; the ensign ought to become a lieutenant, and the lieutenant be exalted to a captain; stations which they will surely fill with more dignity and greater abilities, than boys newly discharged from school, and intrusted with unexpected authority.

If it be reasonable, sir, that expense should be spared in a time of general poverty, if it be politick to carry on war in the manner most likely to produce success, if it be just, that those who have served their country should be preferred to those who have no merit to boast, this motion cannot be rejected.

Sir William YONGE answered to this purpose:--Sir, to the motion now made, it will not, I believe, be objected, that it is unreasonable, or unjust, but that it is unnecessary, and that it is not drawn up with sufficient consideration.

It is unnecessary, because his majesty is advised by it to no other measures than those which he has already determined to pursue; for he has declared to me, sir, his intention of conferring the new commissions upon the officers who receive half-pay, before any other officers shall be promoted.

The motion appears to me not to be very attentively considered, or drawn up with great propriety of expression; for it supposes all the half-pay officers fit for the service, which cannot be imagined by any man, who considers that there has been peace for almost thirty years; a space of time, in which many vigorous constitutions must have declined, and many, who were once well qualified for command, must be disabled by the infirmities of age. Nor is the promotion of one of these gentlemen considered always by him as an act of favour; many of them have, in this long interval of peace, engaged in methods of life very little consistent with military employments, many of them have families which demand their care, and which they would not forsake for any advantages which a new commission could afford them, and therefore it would not be very consistent with humanity to force them into new dangers and fatigues which they are now unable to support.

With regard to these men, compassion and kindness seem to require that they should be suffered to spend their few remaining days without interruption, and that the dangers and toils of their youth should be requited in their age with ease and retirement.

There are others who have less claim to the regard of the publick, and who may be passed by in the distribution of new preferments without the imputation of neglecting merit. These are they who have voluntarily resigned their commissions for the sake of half-pay, and have preferred indolence and retreat to the service of their country.

So that it appears, that of those who subsist upon half-pay, some are unable to execute a commission, some do not desire, and some do not deserve it; and with regard to the remaining part, which can be no great number, I have already stated the intention of his majesty, and therefore cannot but conclude that the motion is needless.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke as follows:--Sir, I know not by what fatality it is, that all the motions made by one party are reasonable and necessary, and all that are unhappily offered by the other, are discovered either to be needless, or of pernicious tendency. Whenever a question can be clouded and perplexed, the opponents of the ministry are always mistaken, confuted, and, in consequence of the confutations, defeated by the majority of votes. When truth is too notorious to be denied, and too obvious to be contested, the administration claim the honour of the first discovery, and will never own that they were incited to their duty by the remonstrances of their opponents, though they never, before those remonstrances, had discovered the least intention of performing it.

But that the motion is allowed to be just and proper, is sufficient; the importance of it will be easily discovered. For my part I shall always consider that motion as important, which tends to contract the expenses of the publick, to rescue merit from neglect, and to hinder the increase of the dependents on the ministry.

Sir Robert WALPOLE answered:--Sir, there is no temper more opposite to that incessant attention to the welfare of the publick, which is the perpetual boast of those who have signalized themselves by opposing the measures of the administration, than a lust of contradiction, and a disposition to disturb this assembly with superfluous debates.

Whether this disposition is not discovered in the reply made to the declaration of his majesty's intentions, and the confession of the propriety of the motion, let the house determine. It must surely be confessed, that it is not necessary to advise what is already determined.

Nor is it less evident, that many of the officers whose interest is now so warmly solicited, must be incapacitated by their age for service, and unable to receive any benefit from the offer of new commissions. To deny this, is to question the flux of time, or to imagine that the constitution of a soldier is exempt from its injuries.

Mr. SANDYS explained himself to this effect:--Sir, I am far from intending by this motion to fill the army with decrepit officers, or to obstruct in any manner the service of the publick; nor have I any other intention, than to secure to those whose years permit, and whose inclinations incite them to enter once more into the army, that preferment to which they have a claim, not only from their past services, but from the state of penury and obscurity in which they have languished.

I desire to preserve those, whose valour has heretofore made our nation the terrour of the world, from the mortification of seeing themselves insulted by childhood, and commanded by ignorance; by ignorance exalted to authority by the countenance of some rhetorician of the senate, or some mayor of a borough.

Whoever has observed the late distribution of military honours, will easily discover that they have been attained by qualifications very different from bravery, or knowledge of the art of war; he will find that regiments and companies are the rewards of a seasonable vote, and that no man can preserve his post in the army, whether given him as the reward of acknowledged merit, or sold him for the full value, any longer than he employs all his influence in favour of the ministry.