Chapter VII: Part 7

Sir Robert WALPOLE then said:--Sir, it has been already admitted, that the motion can only be objected to as superfluous, and, therefore, all farther debate is mere waste of time, without any prospect of advantage; nor is any thing now necessary, but to review the motion, and correct such expressions as may be thought inaccurate or improper.

That _all_ the half-pay officers are not able to enter into the service, has been already shown, and, therefore, I should imagine, that, instead of _all the officers_, we might very justly substitute _officers properly qualified_.

Sir John BARNARD replied:--Sir, though I cannot discover the necessity of any alteration, since it cannot be conceived that the senate can advise impossibilities, yet since so much accuracy is affected, it may be allowed that the word _all_ shall be left out, as seeming to imply more than can be intended.

But the honourable gentleman is not, in my opinion, so happy in his amendment, as in his objection; for the words _properly qualified_ convey to me no distinct idea. He that is qualified is, I suppose, _properly qualified_, for I never heard of _improper qualifications_; but if the word _properly_ be omitted, I have no objection to the amendment.

This motion was agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, JAN. 24, 1740-1.

[DEBATE ON AN ADDRESS FOR PAPERS RELATING TO ADMIRAL HADDOCK.]

Mr. WALLER this day offered the following motion in writing, That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there may be laid before this house copies of two particular letters written by his majesty's secretary of state to admiral Haddock, which had been addressed for before, and of the letters received from admiral Ogle mentioned therein; together with all letters written by admiral Haddock to either of his majesty's secretaries of state, concerning the said letters, and the execution of the orders contained therein.

This motion he supported by arguments to the following effect:--Sir, no man who considers the present situation of our foreign affairs, the expense and inefficacy of our military preparations, the appearance of negligence in our naval expeditions, and the general disappointment of the hopes which the nation had conceived of victories, vengeance, and reparations, can, in my opinion, doubt the expediency of the motion which I have taken the liberty to make.

When the expectations of the nation are deceived, it certainly becomes those who are deputed to watch over the prosperity of the publick, to inquire whence the disappointment proceeds, and either to inform their constituents that their uneasiness arises from their own errour, and that their hopes are destroyed because they had no rational foundation; or to detect the weak management of those by whom the publick measures have been ill-conducted, or the national treasure has been misapplied.

With regard, sir, to the present war, I know not how the nation can be charged with having formed unreasonable expectations. If they considered the speech from the throne, the most authentick declaration of the intentions of the government, they found there the warmest resentments of the injuries which they had sustained, and the strongest assurances of a vigorous prosecution of all those measures which might produce speedy recompense, and inviolable security.

If they reflect, sir, on the preparations for war, on the multitude of ships, the demand of materials for naval equipments, and the high prices at which workmen were retained, they could not but imagine that either some mighty attempt was designed, or some formidable enemy dreaded, and as they know not whom they had to fear, they ascribed the vigour of our proceedings to a resolution of humbling our enemies by one fatal blow, and re-establishing our naval dominion by a single effort.

And justly, sir, might they indulge this pleasing imagination; with reason might they anticipate a triumph over an enemy whose strength bears no proportion to the force that was fitted out against them, and expect that in a few months they should see the ambassadors of Spain supplicating for peace.

To raise their expectations yet higher, their trade was suspended by an embargo, long continued, and in the strictest manner enforced, and the impresses were let loose upon the sailors; they saw nothing omitted, however grievous to the nation, that could contribute to make it formidable, and bore part of the miseries of war without impatience, in hopes of being rewarded by military glory, and repaid by the plunder of Spain.

But, sir, when so long a time has elapsed, and no account is brought of either a victory or a battle, when they hear nothing but that our fleets have visited several neutral ports, and those of the enemy sailed unmolested from coast to coast, and when they are every day told of the losses of our merchants, are insulted in our own channel by the Spanish privateers, and receive no relations of our success upon the shores of our enemies, can it be wondered that they suspect the reality of our designs, or inquire whence it proceeds that their money has been wasted, their trade interrupted, and the liberty of their fellow-subjects invaded to no purpose?

But how much more justly, sir, are they inflamed when they hear of the lucky stratagems, or daring enterprises of those enemies, which a just sense of their own superiority, had induced them to consider as vanquished before the battle, and of whom they had no apprehensions but that their cowardice would always secure them from vengeance? How justly may they murmur when they read, that our fleets leave every part of the enemy's coast where their presence is necessary, and have afforded the Spaniards an opportunity of changing one port for another, as it is most convenient, and at length of joining the French squadrons, and sailing to the defence of their American dominions?

May they not justly, sir, require of their representatives some reason for such inexplicable conduct? May they not reasonably demand an account of the arguments which procured their approbation of measures, which, so far as they can be examined by those who have no opportunity of perusing the necessary papers, appear either cowardly or treacherous?

And what answer, sir, can we return to such remonstrances, unless this motion be agreed to? How can we appease the discontents of our constituents, or discharge the trust reposed in us, without a very minute and attentive inquiry into questions thus obscure and thus important?

Are we to tell our constituents, that we absolutely rely upon the prudence and fidelity of the ministry and admirals, and recommend to them the same implicit dependence? Are we to confess that we have now for two sessions voted in the dark, and approved what we were not suffered to examine and understand?

Such answers, sir, to questions so reasonable, will not contribute to increase the veneration of the people either for ourselves, or our constitution; and yet this answer, and this only, they can receive from us, if the papers mentioned in the motion I have made are denied.

Mr. CLUTTERBUCK replied in the following manner:--Sir, this motion, though so warmly urged, and so artfully supported, I can consider only as a repetition of a former motion which was approved by the assembly, so far as it could properly be complied with, nor was any paper then concealed which it would not have been an injury to the nation to have divulged.

If the design of this motion be to promote the success of the present war, and the zeal with which it has been pressed, be incited only by the ardour of true patriotism, I doubt not but it will easily be withdrawn by those who are now most inclined to support it, when they shall reflect that it tends to the discovery of our schemes, and to the overthrow of our designs, that it will expose all our consultations to our enemies, and instruct them how to annoy us with most success, and how to shelter themselves from our intended attacks.

It is the first care, sir, of every administration, that their military designs should only be discovered by the execution of them, and that their enemies, by being obliged to guard all parts, should be weak in all. If, by laying our papers before this house, the Spaniards should come to be informed against what part of their dominions our expeditions are designed, will they not increase their strength, improve their fortifications, and double their vigilance? And if we are thus obliged to form new schemes, must we not impute the defeat of the former to our own imprudent zeal, or unseasonable curiosity?

Mr. SANDYS spoke to this effect:--Sir, that we should demand the schemes laid for the future conduct of the war with Spain was never proposed, nor, as it may reasonably be concluded, ever imagined; for what is mentioned in the motion but the papers relating to the transactions of the two last years.

That it should be necessary to remind gentlemen of the difference between the _future_ and the _past_, would hardly be suspected by any man not accustomed to senatorial controversies and artifices of state; and yet in the argument which has been offered against the motion, nothing has been asserted but that the orders relating to past transactions are not to be laid before us, lest the enemy should thereby gain intelligence of what we now design against them.

The necessity of secrecy in war needs not be urged, because it will not be denied; but when designs have been laid, and miscarried, the reasons of that miscarriage may surely be inquired, without danger of betraying the councils of our country.

If the negligence of our councils, and the misconduct of our commanders, has been such, that no designs have been premeditated; if a war has been carried on by chance, and nothing has succeeded, because nothing has been attempted; if our commanders have not done ill, and have only done nothing; if they have avoided loss by avoiding danger; we may surely inquire to whom such proceedings are to be imputed, whether the defeat of our designs is to be charged upon the strength of our enemy, or the cowardice of our officers; or whether the inactivity and apparent neutrality of our forces is occasioned by the negligence of our admirals, or the irresolution of our own ministry.

There have been, sir, many incidents in these two last years, of which the examination can be of very little advantage to the Spaniards. I do not know what pernicious intelligence they can glean from an inquiry into the reasons for which Haddock's fleet was divided, and Ogle sent to the defence of Minorca, or for which he afterwards returned.

Nor can I conceive that any advantage, except that of merriment and diversion, can be thrown into the hands of our enemies, though we should seriously inquire into what no man has yet pretended to understand, the wonderful escape of the Spanish squadron. A transaction on which we had dwelt long enough with that admiration which ignorance produces, and on which it may not be improper at length to enable us to reason.

This is an affair, perhaps, much better understood by our enemies than by ourselves, and surely we cannot, therefore, be afraid of informing them of it; at least since the fleet has long since sailed out, and left their coast, we can hardly be restrained in our inquiries by the fear of discovering our _future_ designs.

If, therefore, it be the incontestable right of the senate to examine the conduct of publick affairs, which I suppose will scarcely be denied, this motion cannot be rejected as unseasonable, nor can the papers be refused, without increasing those suspicions which are already too prevalent throughout the nation.

Nor, indeed, for our own sakes, ought we to delay this inquiry any longer, lest by having long acted without being accountable, the minister should form a prescription against our privilege, and, in time, tell us in plain terms that we are his slaves, and that we are not to presume to carry our examinations, however solemn and important they may continue to appear, farther than he shall be pleased to permit; and that, whatever may be the opinion of the people that deputes us, or, whatever ancient claims we may plead to authority, we are now to consider ourselves only as the oppressors of the nation, and the panegyrists of the court.

Mr. WALPOLE next rose, and spoke to this purpose:--Sir, it cannot be denied to be reasonable that all those papers should be laid before the senate, which can be communicated without injury to the publick. Of this number we may justly imagine the orders sent to the admirals, in which the time of their departure is fixed, and many others which may be of use to inform the house, but cannot enable the enemy to judge either of our force or our designs.

But it is evident, that there must be others included in this motion, which our regard for the success of the war, and the prosperity of our country, ought to determine us to conceal, and such as are never exposed by any administration; it is, therefore, proper to limit the address to papers of a certain kind, or a certain date, which may be considered by the house without benefit to our enemies, and for the examination of which a day or two will be more than sufficient.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke in substance as follows:--Sir, I know not what number of papers the wisdom of the administration will allow us, but, if we judge by the time proposed to be spent in examination, we shall not be distracted with a great diversity of subjects; intelligence will be very penuriously dealt out, and if we submit to their choice of the writings which shall be laid before us, our inquiry will probably end without any discoveries made either by our enemies or ourselves.

But I hope, sir, we shall not be so cheaply satisfied, nor exposed by the fear of one enemy, to the insolence of another. I hope we shall resolutely continue our demands of information, while a single line is concealed, from which any light can be expected.

There may, indeed, be circumstances in which our demands, however loud, will necessarily be vain. It is not impossible that we may suspect those transactions of deep art, and secret contrivance, which have been the consequences of mere indolence, and want of consideration. Our great ministers have been, perhaps, only doing nothing, while we have imagined that they were working out of sight.

Misled, sir, by this notion, we may call for the orders that have been despatched in these two last years, when, perhaps, our secretaries of state have been fattening on their salaries without employment, and have slept without care, and without curiosity, while we have been congratulating ourselves upon their vigilance for our preservation.

Or if orders have been given, it is to be considered, that the end of inspecting orders is to compare them with the conduct of the admirals to whom they were directed: from this comparison, I doubt not but many gentlemen expect uncommon discoveries; but to check all unreasonable hopes before they have taken possession of their hearts, for unreasonable hopes are the parent of disappointment, I think it proper to remind them, that to draw any conclusions from the orders, it is necessary to understand them.

This consideration alone is sufficient to redress the ardour of inquiry, for every man that has had opportunities of knowing the wonderful accomplishments of our ministry, the depth of their designs, the subtilty of their stratagems, and the closeness of their reasoning, will easily conceive it probable that they might send such orders as none but themselves could understand; and what then will be the consequence of our idle curiosity, but that we be led into a labyrinth of endless conjectures? For we have long ago found that no explanations are to be expected, and that our ministry are too wise to discover their secrets to their enemies.

Let us, therefore, examine the naked facts which have fallen within our observation, and endeavour to inform ourselves of the meaning of these secret orders by the execution of them.

Admiral Ogle was despatched from Haddock's fleet to protect Minorca, and, in his absence, the Spanish squadron sailed away. Perhaps he was ordered to watch Ferrol and Minorca at the same time, and not understanding how that was to be done, neglected one part of his charge, by an attention to the other: as a watchman who should be employed to guard at once the bank in London, and the treasury in Westminster.

Admiral NORRIS, sir, sailed lately forth, I suppose, in pursuance of orders, with a very formidable fleet, and after having lost sight for some days of the British coast, sailed back again with great precipitation. Whether his orders were only to sail forth, or whether, when he examined them farther, he could not understand them, I pretend not to determine; but it may reasonably be imagined that his orders were of the same kind with those of our other admirals, because they produced the same consequences.

I have been told, that formerly our commanders were ordered to _burn_, _sink_, and _destroy_; and that in those times it was not uncommon for a British admiral to do much mischief with a strong fleet; but it is evident that the style is since changed, for our admirals are now very inoffensive, and go out only to come back. I, therefore, think the motion highly necessary, and such as ought to be complied with.

Admiral NORRIS here rose up, and spoke thus:--Sir, I am not conscious that my conduct in any part of my life has exposed me to be justly treated with contempt and ridicule, and what I have not deserved I will not bear.

If any gentleman in this house can accuse me of having neglected my duty, or deserted it, let him not spare insults or invectives, let him now expose my cowardice or my carelessness, let him prove me unworthy of trust or of command.

But my own conscience acquits me, and I defy any man to produce and support his accusation; nor can you, sir, [Footnote: Addressing himself to Mr. PULTENEY.] who have thus contemptuously treated me, allege any thing against me that may justify your neglect of decency: that you have transgressed the rules of decency is the softest censure that your behaviour admits, and I think it may with equal propriety be asserted, that you have broken the laws of justice.

Mr. PULTENEY replied in this manner:--Sir, I shall submit to you and all who hear me, whether I have treated the honourable gentleman's name with any contemptuous freedom of speech. The usual method of mentioning an expedition is that of naming the commander, who is not thereby necessarily included in the censure of an unsuccessful attempt, and I am very far from calling his courage and capacity into question.

Not that I shall ever think it necessary to make an apology for expressing my sentiments with freedom as a member of this house, in which I shall always speak what I think, and in what manner it shall appear to me most proper, nor shall I fear to repeat without doors what I say here.

Sir Robert WALPOLE next rose up, and spoke to this purpose:--Sir, as I am not acquainted with any measures pursued by the administration, which it is their particular interest to conceal, I am desirous that all papers should be laid before the house which will not afford our enemies any opportunity of obviating our designs.

What necessity there is for this address I cannot, indeed, discover, because I know not any foundation for suspicion of either negligence or treachery, which have been both insinuated in this debate.

Nor are the ministry, however ludicrously their abilities have been treated, afraid of discovering their ignorance, by laying before the house the orders which they have given to our admirals; orders of which they are far from doubting that they will appear, upon a candid examination, rational and proper.

The chief objection to this motion arises from its unreasonableness, and the necessity which it will produce of assigning to a fruitless inquiry those hours that may be more usefully employed.

Mr. PITT replied in terms to the effect following:--Sir, it is my opinion, that our time cannot be more usefully employed during a war, than in examining how it has been conducted, and settling the degree of confidence that may be reposed in those to whose care are intrusted our reputations, our fortunes, and our lives.

There is not any inquiry, sir, of more importance than this; it is not a question about an uncertain privilege, or a law, which, if found inconvenient, may hereafter be repealed; we are now to examine whether it is probable that we shall preserve our commerce and our independence, or whether we are sinking into subjection to a foreign power.

But this inquiry, sir, will produce no great information, if those, whose conduct is examined, are allowed to select the evidence. For what accounts will they exhibit but such as have often already been laid before us, and such as they now offer without concern: accounts obscure and fallacious, imperfect and confused, from which nothing can be learned, and which can never entitle the minister to praise, though they may screen him from punishment.

Mr. PELHAM spoke as follows:--Sir, I am confident that no man engaged in the administration desires to be _screened_ from the most rigorous inquiry, or would defer to exhibit the papers a moment for any other reason than his regard for the publick.

I am confident, that nothing could so much contribute to advance the particular and distinct interest of the ministry as the publication of all the writings that relate to the present war, by which it would incontestably appear that nothing has been omitted that could promote our success, that our commanders have been sent out with orders to act with the utmost vigour, and that our preparations have been not disproportioned to the importance of our design.

It will appear that no former ministry have given greater proofs of their zeal for the publick interest, or have more steadily pursued the most proper measures by which it might be advanced.

I am not, indeed, certain that those who now call so loudly for information would be prevailed on by any degree of evidence to suspend their censures. Them, who are now dissatisfied, I shall despair of influencing by reason or testimony; for they seem to inquire only to condemn; nor is this motion, perhaps, made so much for the sake of obtaining information, as of harassing the ministry with delays, and suspending affairs of greater importance.

This motion was agreed to, and upon another motion made by Mr. SANDYS, it was resolved,

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there may be laid before this house a copy of the reasons sent by admiral Cavendish, in pursuance of an order from the commissioners of the admiralty, which had retarded the sailing of admiral Ogle's squadron, so much beyond expectation."

Likewise,

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there may be laid before this house a copy of the reasons transmitted by admiral Ogle, that did prevent him from sailing, pursuant to his repeated orders for that purpose, and particularly to those sent him by the commissioners of the admiralty."

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 3, 1740-1.

[DEBATE REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH SQUADRONS.]

Mr. SANDYS this day presented a motion in writing, for petitioning his majesty to inform them when the regency received intelligence that the French and Spanish squadrons sailed, which was seconded, as follows, by Mr. WALLER:--

Sir, the information now moved for, appears to me so necessary in their deliberations on the conduct of the war, that without it we can only conjecture in the dark, and entangle ourselves in an inextricable labyrinth.

It is well known, that in war all motions are, in a great degree, to be regulated by those of the enemy, and that, therefore, no vigilance is to be spared by which any knowledge can be gained of their designs, nor any methods omitted of communicating them to those who have the direction of the war.

A ministry may, in conducting military operations, disappoint the expectations of their country, either by neglecting to procure intelligence, or by failing to make use of those opportunities which seasonable information puts into their power, and they may, when their designs fail of success, justify themselves, by proving that they were deceived by intelligence which it was reasonable to believe, or that better intelligence was not attainable, or that they made use, however unsuccessfully, of all the forces that could then be employed, and of all the advantages that were then in their possession.

But how shall we judge of our administration, how shall we know what confidence we ought to repose in their prudence and fidelity, and what miscarriages are to be attributed to the chance of war or superiour force of our enemies, if we cannot be informed with what diligence they endeavour at information, and how early they have notice of the motions of the enemy?

The sailing, or rather escape of the Ferrol squadron, and departure of the French fleet, are the most important events of the present war; events that threaten very dangerous consequences, no less than descents upon our American colonies, the conquest of our dominions, the slavery of our fellow-subjects, and perhaps the destruction of the brave Vernon, who is secure in the imagined vigilance of the other commanders, and may, perhaps, in a few days see himself surrounded by formidable squadrons of different nations, and exposed to the attack of forces to which his little fleet bears no proportion.

Nothing appears more evident, than that we had opportunities of observing, at least, all the preparations of the French, and of watching the moment of their departure, and that our force on the coast of Spain was sufficient to have confined their fleets for ever in their harbours, or to have destroyed them at their first entrance into the open seas, of which we may justly inquire, why it was not attempted, but shall inquire to no purpose till we know when they departed, that we may consider the state of our own forces, and whether our enemies escaped by our negligence, cowardice, or weakness.

Mr. WINNINGTON then spoke to the following purpose:--Sir, that we cannot deliberate upon subjects which we do not understand, and that, therefore, no necessary or useful information ought to be denied to the house, I shall readily admit; but must observe, at the same time, that the reputation of the house would be very little consulted, in demanding information which cannot be given.

To address his majesty to inform us of the time at which the squadrons of our enemies sailed, is to inquire of him what it ought to be the highest care of those princes to conceal from him, and which he can only know by having spies in their privy councils.

And of what importance is it to inquire what intelligence was brought him, or when he received it, if it appears that his intelligence must be in its own nature uncertain and dubitable?

That they have left their ports is now certain, because they have been twice discovered in different parts of the world; but, as we can now only form conjectures on their designs and courses, so, before they sailed, it was impossible to know when they were fully equipped, or what time was fixed for their departure. It is to be remembered, that they form their measures, and make their preparations in their own dominions, and therefore, have more advantages of concealing their schemes than we of discovering them.

Mr. Advocate CAMPBELL then spoke thus:--Sir, this motion, which has been represented as unreasonable and absurd, is, in my opinion, not only proper, but important.

It is important, because it will enable us to judge, upon sufficient foundations, of the conduct of the ministry, who are censured by the voice of the nation, for having been either defective in vigilance or in activity, for having been either ignorant by their own fault of the designs of the enemy, or perfidiously passive in permitting the execution of them.

I am far from believing that such intelligence as our ministry is expected to procure, requires any uncommon subtilty, or any other agents than are always employed by every minister, to transmit to them informations from foreign courts. Such, I am afraid, are always hovering about our consultations, and I know not why our ministers should be less diligent or less successful than those of other princes.

If, therefore, such intelligence might have been obtained, it was criminal not to obtain it; and if the departure of the Spanish squadron was foreseen, it ought to be inquired, why it was not prevented; and if it was only known when it was too late to hinder it from sailing, why it was not pursued, or why succours were not immediately despatched to admiral Vernon.

All these questions can only be resolved, in consequence of the information which his majesty shall give us; and for which it is, therefore, in my opinion, necessary to petition.

Mr. Henry PELHAM spoke next, to this purpose:--Sir, how the regency could be informed of the intention of the Spaniards to leave their ports till it appeared by their departure, or by what means it can be expected that his majesty should be now acquainted with their particular course, or farther designs, I confess myself unable to conceive.

With regard, sir, to the intelligence transmitted from foreign courts by agents and spies, a little consideration will easily discover that it is not to be trusted. For what can be generally expected from them, but that they should catch flying reports, or by chance intercept uncertain whispers, that they should inquire timorously, and, therefore, for the greatest part, of those from whom no satisfactory accounts can be received, and that they should often endeavour to deserve their salaries by such information as is rather pleasing than true.

All the knowledge that can be obtained of an enemy's designs, must arise from a diligent comparison of one circumstance with another, and from a general view of his force, his interest, and his opportunities. And that such conjectures will be often erroneous, needs not be told.

Probability, therefore, is, in such inquiries, all that can be attained, and he that sits idle in the time of war, expecting certain intelligence, will see his enemies enjoying the advantages of his folly, and laying hold on a thousand opportunities which he has neglected to improve.

The war in which we are now engaged, has been carried on by the administration with the utmost diligence and vigour; nor have any measures been omitted that could probably produce success, and the success of the wisest measures is only probable.

Should the great admiral, who is now present in the house, have met the French and Spaniards in the open seas, by what art could he arrive at a certain knowledge of their designs? He might by his acquaintance with the situation and state of neighbouring countries, the observation of their course, the periods of particular winds, and other hints of observation, form probable conjectures, but could never reach to certainty or confidence.

It seems to me, therefore, highly improper, to petition his majesty for intelligence which he cannot be imagined to have received, and I cannot agree to any motion for that purpose.

Mr. SANDYS then made another motion, to address his majesty, that there may be laid before the house copies of all letters received from, or written to, admiral Vernon since his going to the West Indies. Which being seconded,

Mr. PELHAM spoke to this effect:--Sir, this motion, if the intention of it be limited by proper restrictions, is doubtless reasonable and just; for the right of this house to examine into the conduct of publick affairs, and, consequently, for calling for the papers necessary to enlighten their inquiries, is not to be disputed.

But, as the end of all such inquiries is the promotion of the publick welfare, so they are not to be made in a manner by which that end may be defeated. Papers are not to be demanded, which cannot be produced without discovering our own secrets, and acquainting our enemies either with that weakness which we ought carefully to conceal, or that force which will be most effectually employed if it is not known, and, therefore, no preparations are made to oppose it.

It cannot be imagined, but that many of the papers which have passed between the admiralty and the commander in America, contain plans for the prosecution of the war, observations on the conditions of our own colonies, and, perhaps, intelligence of the estate of the Spanish fortresses and towns. Many informations of the utmost consequence to our enemies may be collected from those papers, but nothing can be expected from them, that will enable us to prosecute a senatorial inquiry with more success, that will put it in our power to discover frauds, negligence, or treachery.

There are, sir, other papers which may, indeed, be laid before us, without any benefit to our enemies, and, perhaps, with some advantage to ourselves; the papers which contain the accompts of our preparations and stores, the lists of our forces, and the calculation of our expenses, are the proper subjects of senatorial inquiries; and if the motion be restrained to those, I believe it will not be opposed by any gentleman engaged in the administration of our affairs. I shall beg leave to propose these words may be added, "So far as the same relates to a supply of ships, marines, or land forces."

The motion, thus amended, was agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS, FEB. 13, 1740-1.

DEBATE ON ADDRESSING HIS MAJESTY FOR REMOVING SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The opposition which for a long time had been made in the commons, to the measures of the administration, was on this day pushed to a crisis, and produced a motion in both houses. In the house of lords it occasioned the following debate:

Lord CARTERET began in this manner:--My lords, as the motion which I am about to make is of the highest importance, and of the most extensive consequences; as it cannot but meet with all the opposition which the prejudices of some, and the interest of others, can raise against it; as it must have the whole force of ministerial influence to encounter, without any assistance but from justice and reason; I hope to be excused by your lordships for spending some time in endeavouring to show, that it wants no other support, that it is not founded upon doubtful suspicions, but upon uncontestable facts; that it is not dictated by private interest, but by the sincerest regard to publick happiness; not abetted by the personal malevolence of particular men, but enforced by the voice of the people; a voice which ought always to be attended to, and, generally, to be obeyed.

To endeavour, my lords, to remove from places of publick trust all those who appear to want either the virtues or abilities necessary for executing their offices, is the interest of every member of a community. And it is not only the interest but the duty of all those who are, either by the choice of the people, or by the right of birth, invested with the power of inspecting publick affairs, and intrusted with the general happiness of their country. That, therefore, every motive combines to make it the duty, and every argument concurs to prove it the privilege of your lordships, is too evident to be doubted.

How often this privilege has been exerted by this house, and how often it has rescued our country from oppression, insolence, and rapine; how often our constitution has been reanimated, and impending ruin been averted by it, a superficial acquaintance with history may inform us. And we are now called upon by the universal cry of the nation, and urged by the perplexed and uncertain state of our foreign affairs, and declension of our wealth, and attacks upon our liberties at home, to recollect these precedents of magnanimity and justice, and to make another effort for the relief of our country.

This house, my lords, has proceeded against ministers, whose conduct they disapproved, by methods of greater or less severity, according to the necessity of affairs, or the supposed malignity of the crimes alleged against them; and, therefore, have sometimes thought it necessary to deter posterity from imitating them by rigorous censures, and exemplary punishments, and sometimes have thought it sufficient to set the nation free from its distresses, without inflicting any penalties on those by whose misconduct they imagined them produced.

What were the more violent and vindictive methods of proceeding, it is not necessary, with regard to this motion, to examine; since I shall only propose, that we should, in imitation of our predecessors, in cases of this nature, humbly address his majesty to remove the minister from his presence and councils.

Nothing, my lords, can be more moderate or tender than such an address, by which no punishment is inflicted, nor any forfeiture exacted. The minister, if he be innocent, if his misconduct be only the consequence of his ignorance or incapacity, may lay down in peace an office for which nature has not designed him, enjoy the vast profits of long employment in tranquillity, and escape the resentment of an unhappy people; who, when irritated to the highest degree, by a continuation of the same miscarriages, may, perhaps, in the heat of a more malevolent prosecution, not sufficiently distinguish between inability and guilt.

Those, therefore, among your lordships, that think him honest but mistaken, must willingly agree to a motion like this, as the best expedient to appease the people without the ruin of the minister. For surely no man who has read the history, or is acquainted with the temper of this nation, can expect that the people will always bear to see honours, favours, and preferments, distributed by the direction of one universally suspected of corruption, and arbitrary measures; or will look only with silent envy upon the affluence of those whom they believe to be made great by fraud and plunder, swelled to insolence by the prosperity of guilt, and advanced to wealth and luxury by publick miseries.

Such of your lordships who join with the people in ascribing our present unhappy state not to the errours, but to the crimes of the minister, and who, therefore, think a bare removal not sufficient to satisfy the demands of justice, must, doubtless, give their consent to the motion, for the sake of obtaining proper evidence of his wickedness, which cannot be expected while he stands exalted in prosperity, and distributes the riches of the nation, and the gifts of his sovereign at his own choice; while he is in possession of every motive that can influence the mind, enforce secrecy, and confirm fidelity; while he can bribe the avaricious, and intimidate the fearful; while he can increase the gratification of luxury, and enlarge the prospects of ambition. For, my lords, if it be considered from whom this evidence must be drawn, it will soon appear that no very important discoveries can be made, but by those whom he has intrusted with his secrets, men whose disregard of virtue recommended them to his favour, and who, as they are moved only by interest, will continue faithful while they can hope for recompense; but may, perhaps, be willing to buy their own security by sacrificing their master, when they shall see no farther prospect of advantage from serving him, or any other method of escaping punishment.

But, my lords, all must allow this motion to be reasonable, whatever they think of the minister's conduct, who are of opinion that a free people have a right of complaining when they feel oppression, and of addressing the crown to remove a minister that has incurred their universal detestation. That such is the condition of the present minister, I believe, will scarcely be denied, or may be discovered by those who find themselves inclined to doubt it, by asking any man whom they shall accidentally meet, what are his sentiments on the situation of national affairs, and of the hands by which they are administered. What answer he will receive is well known to most of your lordships. Let him not be satisfied with a single suffrage, let him repeat the question to ten thousand persons, different in their ages, their conditions, and religious opinions, in every thing that produces contrariety of dispositions and affections, he will yet find them unanimous in complaining of publick misconduct, and in censuring one gentleman as the author of it.

Let us not imagine, my lords, that these accusations and murmurs are confined to the lowest class of the people, to men whose constant attention to more immediate distresses, hinder them from making excursions beyond their own employments. For though, perhaps, it might be made evident from the accounts of past times, that no general dissatisfaction, even among men of this rank, was ever groundless; though it might be urged that those who see little can only clamour, because they feel themselves oppressed; and though it might not unseasonably be hinted that they are at least formidable for their numbers, and have, sometimes, executed that justice which they had not interest to procure, and trampled upon that insolence that has dared to defy them; yet I shall not insist upon such motives, because it is notorious that discontent is epidemical in all ranks, and that condition and observation are far from appeasing it.

Whether the discontent, thus general, is groundless, whether it is raised only by the false insinuations of the disappointed, and the wicked arts of the envious, whether it is, in exception to all the maxims of government, the first dislike of an administration that ever overspread a nation without just reasons, deserves to be inquired into.

In this inquiry, my lords, it will be necessary to consider not only the state of domestick affairs, increase or diminution of our debts, the security or violation of our liberties, the freedom or dependence of our senates, and the prosperity or declension of our trade, but to examine the state of this nation, with regard to foreign powers; to inquire, whether we are equally feared and equally trusted now as in former administrations; whether our alliances have contributed to secure us from our inveterate and habitual enemies, or to expose us to them; whether the balance of Europe be still in our hands; and whether, during this long interval of peace, our power has increased in the same proportion with that of our neighbours. France, my lords, is the constant and hereditary enemy of Britons, so much divided from her in religion, government, and interest, that they cannot both be prosperous together; as the influence of one rises, that of the other must, by consequence, decline. Alliances may form a temporal show of friendship, but it cannot continue; for their situation produces a natural rivalship, which every accidental circumstance has contributed to increase. Long wars, for many reigns after the conquest, established a radical and insuperable hatred between us, nor did those wars cease till the reformation produced new occasions of jealousy and aversion. France was, by these reasons, obliged for many ages to employ all her influence and policy in strengthening herself against us, by treaties and alliances; and in our times, has given us a new reason for jealousy by extending her commerce, and improving her manufactures.

It has been, therefore, my lords, the settled principle of every wise administration, of every Briton, whose opinions were not regulated by some other motives than those of reason, to attend, with the highest degree of vigilance, to all the designs of the French, and oppose, with incessant diligence, every attempt to increase their force, or extend their influence, and to check their conquests, obstruct their alliances, and forestal their trade.

For this great end it has been our constant endeavour to support the Austrian family, whose large dominions and numerous forces make a counterbalance on the continent to the power of France. For this end we entered into a long war, of which we still languish under the consequences, squandered the lives of our countrymen, and mortgaged the possessions of our posterity. For failing in the prosecution of this purpose, for leaving France too formidable, and neglecting the interests of the emperour, was the treaty of Utrecht censured, and the authors of it prosecuted by the present minister; but how much he has improved the errours of his predecessors to his own advantage, how diligent he has been to rectify the miscarriages of their conduct, and supply the defect, I shall endeavour to explain.

It is well known, my lords, that during the regency of the duke of Orleans, we had nothing to apprehend from French machinations; his interest, a tie which that nation is seldom found to break, held him steady to his engagements with us; nor is it less known how much he distrusted Spain, and how little, by consequence, he favoured her. We had, at that time, no necessity of anxiously attending to every whisper of the French court, which was sufficiently engaged in regulating their domestick affairs, and repairing the ruins of a destructive war; but, my lords, we ought to observe, that it had been happy for us had our minister laboured with equal address at the same employment.

After the death of this duke, the affairs of France were restored to their former situation, her old schemes were revived, her ancient alliances cultivated, and her general interest pursued. Spain was again considered as the power which had the same views with her, and which could never rival, but might always assist her.

This alliance, my lords, was intended to have been unalterably confirmed by a marriage, but as no human policy can form measures certain of success, an irreconcilable hatred was nearly produced by the measure intended to confirm a settled and indissoluble friendship. The infanta was sent back after her arrival in France, an affront which no nation would soon have forgot, but which the general character and habitual sentiments of the Spaniards inclined them to resent beyond any other people. To any one acquainted with their character in this respect, it will readily appear, that no other insult or injury could so sensibly affect them, or excite so eager a desire of revenge, This, my lords, the sagacity of our minister should have discovered, this opportunity should have been improved with the utmost care, by which Spain and France might possibly have been disunited for ages, and Britain have gained such advantages as would have made her the sole arbitress of Europe.

The Spaniards were not deficient on their side, nor did they neglect to court our friendship, but gave us the highest proof of their confidence by offering us the sole mediation of their differences with the emperour of Germany: but at this time it was, that the gentleman whose conduct I am examining, obtained the chief influence in our councils, and by his peculiar penetration discovered, that nothing was to be done which might give the least offence to the French. We, therefore, refused to mediate, unless French ministers might be associated with ours, which the Spaniards had too much spirit to consent to.

Thus, my lords, was neglected the first opportunity of forming against the French an alliance by which they might have been awed in all their designs, and by which the peace of Europe might have been long preserved.

The Spaniards, finding that we would not undertake to reconcile their differences with the emperour of Germany, and continuing their abhorrence of French mediators, concluded, without the intervention of any other power, a treaty both of peace and alliance with his imperial majesty.

This, my lords, was the famous treaty of Vienna, the source of so many projects and expedients, of so much terrour and solicitude, of such immense expenses, and perplexed negotiations. This treaty, a paper innocent and well-meaning, which related only to the contracting parties, kept, for some time, this nation in alarms, in apprehensions of conspiracies, and expectations of invasions.

To this treaty, had we singly regarded our own affairs, without applying to France for instructions, we ought to have acceded, by which we should have divided the interest of the house of Bourbon, broken the combination of these pontifical powers, and, by improving one lucky incident, obtained what our arms and our politicks had never, hitherto, been able to accomplish.

But the French, sensible of their danger, and well acquainted with our minister, contrived an expedient which, indeed, would not often have succeeded, but which was so well adapted to the intellects of this gentleman, that it extricated them from all their difficulties.

They told us, my lords, and, what is yet more wonderful, they prevailed upon us to believe, that in this dreadful treaty of Vienna, it was stipulated between the German emperour and Spain, that they should employ their joint forces against Britain, that they should exalt the pretender to the throne, take immediate possession of Gibraltar, and, without mercy, debar us for ever from our trade both in Spain and in the Western Indies. This his late majesty was advised to assert in his speech from the throne, which I desire may be read.

Of which the following clauses were read:

"My lords and gentlemen,

"The distressed condition of some of our religious brethren abroad, and the negotiations and engagements entered into by some foreign powers, which seem to have laid the foundation of new troubles and disturbances in Europe, and to threaten my subjects with the loss of several of the most advantageous branches of their trade, obliged me, without any loss of time, to concert with other powers such measures as might give a check to the ambitious views of those who are endeavouring to render themselves formidable, and put a stop to the farther progress of such dangerous designs. For these ends I have entered into a defensive alliance with the French king, and the king of Prussia, to which several other powers, and particularly the Dutch, have been invited to accede, and I have not the least reason to doubt of their concurrence. This treaty shall, in a short time, be laid before you.

"By these means, and by your support and assistance, I trust in God, I shall be able not only to secure to my own subjects the enjoyment of many valuable rights and privileges, long since acquired for them by the most solemn treaties, but effectually to preserve the peace and balance of Europe, the only view and end of all my endeavours.

"It is not to be doubted, but the enemies to my government will conceive hopes, that some favourable opportunity for renewing their attempts may offer, from the prospect of new troubles and commotions: they are already very busy by their instruments and emissaries in those courts whose measures seem most to favour their purposes, in soliciting and promoting the cause of the pretender; but I persuade myself, notwithstanding the countenance and encouragement they may have received, or flatter themselves with, the provision you shall make for the safety and defence of the empire, will effectually secure me from any attempts from abroad, and render all such projects vain and abortive.

"When the world shall see that you will not suffer the British crown and nation to be menaced and insulted, those who most envy the present happiness and tranquillity of this empire, and are endeavouring to make us subservient to their ambition, will consider their own interest and circumstances before they make any attempt upon so brave a people, strengthened and supported by prudent and powerful alliances, and though desirous to preserve the peace, able and ready to defend themselves against the efforts of all aggressors. Such resolutions and such measures, timely taken, I am satisfied, are the most effectual means of preventing a war, and continuing to us the blessings of peace and prosperity."

Who would not have been terrified, my lords, at a treaty like this? Our religion was to be destroyed, our government subverted, and our trade reduced to nothing. What could a ministry, thus intimidated, do, but resign themselves implicitly to the direction of a kind neighbour, that promised to shelter them from the storm?

There have been ministers, my lords, in former times, who, upon hearing such a representation, would have considered, that Britain was an island, that the pretender could not be forced upon us without an army, and that an army could not be transported without ships, that the emperour of Germany had neither navies nor ports, that Gibraltar might be easily supplied with every thing requisite for its defence, and that any attempt made by Spain to injure our trade, might easily be punished by intercepting their Plate fleets.