Chapter XIV (1)

Ti-ping Revolution in 1861.--Official Correspondence.--Its
Review.--Professions of Neutrality.--How carried out.--Captain
Dew's Interpretation.--Ti-ping Remonstrance.--Cause of British
Hostility.--Mr. Bruce's Assertions.--Mr. Bruce's Second
Despatch.--Mr. Bruce's Difficulty.--His Inconsistency.--Despatch
No. 3.--Inconsistent Statements.--Ti-pings approach
Ningpo.--Interview with Ti-ping Chiefs.--Mr. Hewlett's Interview
with "Fang."--General Hwang's Despatch.--General "Fang's"
Despatch.--Capture of Ningpo.--British Intervention.--Ti-ping
Moderation.--Open Hostilities commenced.--Commander Bingham's
Despatch.--Taeping Reply.--Commander Bingham's Rejoinder.

In order to form a just appreciation of the position of the Ti-ping revolution at the close of the year 1861, it becomes necessary to review briefly the political relations of each party engaged in it from the period of ratification of the Yang-tze expedition treaty of neutrality with the Ti-pings (by Admiral Hope), and the commencement of actual hostilities against them at the opening of the year 1862.

By the following review of the official correspondence (as given in Blue Book form of "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China" for 1861) men of every party, partial or impartial, may form an opinion as to British policy in China.

Exactly thirty-six days after his solemn pledges of non-intervention--given in accordance with his instructions from Lord Elgin--to the Ti-ping authorities, at their capital, Admiral Hope, upon hearing of the capture of Chapoo, penned the following orders, dated H.M.S. _Scout_, Nagasaki, May 8, to Captain Dew, H.M.S. _Encounter_:--

"You are further to put yourself in communication with the
leader of the rebel forces, and to point out to him that the
capture and destruction of the town of Ningpo would be extremely
injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally,
and, therefore, that you require him to desist from all hostile
proceedings against the town, and, without committing yourself
to the necessity of having recourse to force, you will remind
him of what took place last year at Shanghae, and the
impossibility of his capturing the place should you find
yourself compelled to assist in its defence, a course, you will
add, you are unwilling to adopt, as placing you in a hostile
position in regard to the Taepings generally, _with whom we have
no wish to quarrel_."

In this despatch the Admiral states he has no "wish to quarrel" with the Ti-pings, yet, in violation of his own pledges, and his orders to "maintain an attitude of _strict neutrality_," he constitutes himself dictator over their operations--operations unavoidable during their expulsion of the Manchoos, and essential to their self-preservation, general interests, and military honour--and interferes between the belligerents and their natural rights; and then continues as follows:--

"You will further, immediately on your arrival at Ningpo, place
yourself in communication with the Chinese authorities for the
purpose of ascertaining what their means of resistance are, and
the probabilities of their proving successful; and should you
find them amenable to advice, you will point out to them such
measures as circumstances may render expedient, _and you will
place every obstruction in the way of the capture of the town by
the rebels_...."

At this time not only was British national faith pledged to a neutral course, but the Admiral's actions were diametrically opposed to his instructions.

Mr. Bruce, writing some time previously to Lord Russell upon this subject, in a despatch dated Tien-tsin, January 3, 1861, states:--

"But I have directed Mr. Sinclair" (Consul at Ningpo) "not to
undertake the defence of the city, and _to confine his efforts_,
should it be attacked, to a _mediation_, which may save the
place from being the scene of pillage and massacre."

In a despatch to Admiral Hope, upon the same affair, Mr. Bruce writes:--

"I do not consider myself authorized to protect the town of
Ningpo from the insurgents...."

In his instructions to the consul at Ningpo, Mr. Bruce stated:--

"But I do not consider myself authorized to afford any military
protection to the town of Ningpo, or to take any active measures
against the insurgents.... Your language should be, _that we
take no part_ in this civil contest, but that we claim exemption
from injury and annoyance at the hands of both parties...."

These _professions_ of neutrality received the following sanction from the British Government:--

LORD J. RUSSELL TO MR. BRUCE.
"Foreign Office, March 28, 1861.

"Sir,--Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which
you gave to Mr. Consul Sinclair, as reported in your dispatch of
the 3rd of January last, with reference to the probability of
the rebel forces attacking Ningpo.

"I am, &c.,
(Signed) "J. RUSSELL."

How, then, can Admiral Hope's offering "every obstruction in the way of the capture" of Ningpo by the Ti-pings be accounted for, otherwise than as the result of secret instructions from the British Government; for it would indeed be preposterous to imagine that the Admiral dared act in direct opposition to the public orders, or that, having done so, his disobedience would have received the unqualified approval his "every obstruction" policy did.

Admiral Hope, in a despatch to Mr. Bruce, of the same date as the "every obstruction" one, in detailing his plan, wrote:--

"There can be no doubt of the importance of Ningpo to _our
trade_ under existing circumstances, and should you therefore
find it expedient to sanction forcible interference for its
security, I request you will communicate with Captain Dew
direct...."

By this it appears that a British Admiral would have felt himself justified in considering his Government's orders, his own pledges, and the national honour, secondary in consequence to the temporary advantages arising from "our trade." Lord Russell, upon receipt of the Admiral's "every obstruction" despatch, instructed Mr. Bruce as follows:--

"I have received ... a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you
of the 8th May, respecting the measures adopted by him for the
defence of Ningpo.... I have caused the Admiralty to be
informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral
Hope's measures should be approved.... You will understand,
however, that Her Majesty's Government _do not wish force to be
used against the rebels in any case except for the actual
protection of the lives and property of British subjects_."

Professions of neutrality are here reiterated, although at the same time the Admiral's hostile policy is approved of. Meanwhile, in the face of these plain orders to "observe neutrality," Admiral Hope thus addressed the Ti-ping chief in command of Chapoo:--

"The following communication from Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope,
K.C.B., commanding the naval forces of Great Britain in China,
is made to the General commanding the Taeping troops at
Chapoo:--

"1. I have been informed that the troops under your orders have
lately captured the town of Chapoo, and that there is an
intention on their part of advancing on Ningpo.

"2. As the capture of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to
British _trade_, and that of foreigners generally, I beg you to
desist from advancing on that town within a distance of two
marches.

"3. Should these my wishes be disregarded, and I sincerely trust
they may not be, as it would be with deep regret that I should
place my forces in a hostile position towards the Taepings,
_with whom we wish to maintain amicable relations_, I may be
compelled to assist in the defence of Ningpo, and in that case I
need hardly point out to you the hopelessness of success on your
part, whilst what occurred at Shanghae last year is still fresh
in your memories.

(Signed) "R. DEW, Captain.
"_Encounter_, June 11, 1861."

In this despatch the Ti-ping general is insulted by menace; an unmanly reference is made to Shanghae; a hostile attitude is threatened if the Ti-pings capture cities the possession of which is most essential to the success of their cause--and yet, withal, a wish "to maintain amicable relations" is professed!

Upon the 8th August, 1861, after the singular interpretation of neutrality by his subordinates and Admiral Hope, Earl Russell indited the following order to Mr. Bruce:--

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done
hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in
China. If British subjects are taken prisoners by either party,
you should do your utmost to save them from torture or capital
punishment, but otherwise you should _abstain from all
interference in the civil war_."[43]

When the massacre before Shanghae, in 1860, is remembered, when the subsequent approval of Admiral Hope's hostile intentions is considered, and when the various modes in which our pledges of neutrality were indirectly violated are counted, this despatch will require no comment.

In fulfilment of the desire (to maintain neutrality, "_as they have done hitherto_," upon the part) of his Government, Captain Dew gave all the assistance he possibly could to the Manchoo defenders of Ningpo; besides framing eight plans[44] for the defence of the city against the Ti-pings; according to Mr. Bruce:--

"He fitted twelve heavy guns with carriages, &c., to mount on
the walls."

Again, in the same despatch,[45] Mr. Bruce states:--

"Captain Dew had gone farther, than he was strictly warranted in
doing, in his desire to save the city of Ningpo...."

We are forced to believe this fitting of heavy guns, and defence of Chinese cities, a part of the neutrality Her Majesty's Government had "hitherto" maintained, and in their opinion a true interpretation of this order, "that excepting intercession for British prisoners our authorities should abstain from _all_ interference in the civil war!"

Captain Dew's next interpretation of this order took the form of a buccaneering exploit against the Ti-ping custom-houses. Upon the occupation of the country between the silk districts and Shanghae by the Ti-pings, Europeans were sent in charge of the silk boats plying on the inland waters, one being placed with each valuable boat load, in order to pass it through the Ti-ping territory as foreign property. Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Captain Dew,[46] writes:--

"The consequence is, that foreign escorts go inland without
passports, and a number of irresponsible seamen are introduced
into the country ... the result of this state of things cannot
be good.... The _principal_ danger to be feared by persons
sending up country arises, not so much from the acts of the
rebels themselves, as from the squeezing and plundering
propensities of the _Imperialist forces_, and from the pilfering
attacks of lawless peasantry.... Both kinds of marauders might
be kept in good check through visits made periodically by Her
Majesty's gun-boats.... If you approve of this scheme, I would
suggest your sending a gun-boat up in the course of the next few
days...."

Captain Dew having approved the "scheme," we will proceed to notice what he did. Instead of paying attention to "both kinds of marauders" pointed out by Consul Medhurst as the "principal danger," the Captain, towards the middle of June, as stated in _The Friend of China_, employed himself about the following piratical outrage:--

"Sixteen boats freighted with bales of silks and cocoons, with
some Europeans in charge of them, and belonging to European
firms in Shanghae, were passing a Taeping custom-house at
Loo-chee, some distance up the Shanghae or Wong-poo river. They
were brought to, and a small duty of four dollars per bale of
silk was demanded. The boats belonging to two of the firms paid
the duty and proceeded on their voyage, but the person in charge
of the boats belonging to Messrs. Adamson & Co., of Shanghae,
refused to pay it, and he was then told he could not proceed
until the duty was paid, and the boat and bales of silk were
consequently taken possession of. This was construed into an act
of 'atrocious piracy,' and the _Flamer_ and Captain Dew went to
Loo-chee to demand restitution. Explanations were given by the
Taeping Governor of the district, but they were unavailing; the
unqualified restoration of the silk was insisted on under a
threat of bombardment; the boats and bales of silk were
therefore surrendered to Captain Dew, but as some small arms
were missing, Captain Dew took possession of the guns of the
custom-house, and seized some customs' police, and took them
away with him to be detained until the arms missing from the
boat should have been returned. The letter written by the
Governor of the district, named Wan, to the authorities of
Shanghae, consequent upon this outrage, is dignified and
forbearing, and it were well for us to act in the spirit it
manifests. The above are only examples of our professed
neutrality; many others, however, have occurred."

The following are extracts from the letter written upon the subject by the Ti-ping chief, Wan:--

"I find on inquiry, that the silk, &c., lost by your merchant,
was seized in lieu of duties, in consequence of an attempt on
his part to get by the custom-house and _evade_ payment of
duties, on which he was arrested, and your charge, therefore,
that he was plundered, is utterly without foundation.

"The Truly Sacred Lord who has established the Divine Dynasty,
has also _established custom-houses wherever the country is
quiet_, and by his law all merchants who pass these must pay the
_regular duties_, and your merchant _in daring to force his way
through and evade the payment of customs, and you_ in coming
here and making a disturbance _and squeezing the money back_,
have behaved in a manner at utter variance with propriety....

"A special communication."

Meanwhile, Mr. Bruce, the chief diplomatist, unable to justify this increasing aggression otherwise, fiercely assailed the Ti-ping theology and civil administration. In a despatch to Lord Russell, dated at "Pekin, June 23, 1861,"[47] he takes upon himself to state (supremely indifferent to, or rather ignoring, the valuable testimony of the Revs. Griffith, John, Edkins, Medhurst, Muirhead, Legge, &c.):--

"The evidence of _all_ classes of observers seems unanimous,
both as to the destructive nature of the insurrection, and as to
the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on
which it is based."

Does Mr. Bruce and those who agree with him, venture to term _our_ Bible the so-called "blasphemous and immoral superstition?"--for on that, and that alone, is the Ti-ping faith established. The following extracts from the same dispatch, and two others, having been approved by Her Majesty's Government, contain a complete key to the course taken against the Ti-pings, and lay bare a policy deduced from false premises, and founded upon utter violation of principle. The three despatches under consideration consist of--1. Mr. Bruce to Lord Russell, June 23, 1861; 2. Mr. Bruce to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, Pekin, June 16; 3. Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope's reply to Mr. Bruce, dated, _Impérieuse_, Hong-kong, July 11.--Dispatch No. 1 states:--

"In the enclosed letter to Sir James Hope, to which I beg to
draw your Lordship's attention, I have stated at length the
dangers to which the progress of the insurrection exposes
British interests in China.... Our permanent interests are those
of _trade_, the prosperity of which is linked with order and
tranquillity. We have, in addition, a _temporary interest
arising out of the indemnities_ payable from the custom-house
revenue, which is, however, intimately linked with the former.

"What is to become of these interests if the ports fall into the
hands of the rebels?"

Here we have the true cause of British hostility to the Ti-pings. Not that our Government feared the trading "interests" would suffer if the Ti-pings captured the treaty ports--by no means; but they dreaded the certain loss of the "temporary interest arising out of the indemnities." They knew full well, as a quotation from dispatch No. 3 will prove, the Ti-pings had never injured our trade; that although the capture of the ports _might_ cause a temporary stagnation, those who would take them came as their "brothers" in Christ, and ultimately would have established a free and general commerce throughout the country; but they also knew that the success of the Ti-pings would imperil their existence, by stopping the indemnification for the last unnecessary and aggressive war with China, and by sweeping away the immense revenue derived from the vile opium traffic.

In the same despatch, Mr. Bruce, with his usual acumen, winds up his syllogism of fallacious assertions--"The nature of the insurrection is destructive" and its religion "blasphemous and immoral;" the insurrectionists are able to capture the Imperial cities, therefore, the "commercial prosperity" of the treaty ports and the "temporary interests" would be destroyed by the success of the Ti-pings--in the following words:--

"The motives of the far larger part of the force are, I
apprehend, a desire to live on the spoils of the rich and
industrious, to carry off women, and to lead a life of alternate
adventure and licence, with little feeling for the Taeping
cause.... I see, therefore, little hopes of communities like
those of Shanghae and Ningpo escaping destruction.... The
commercial prosperity of the ports would receive a fatal
blow.... The proceeds of the custom-houses would fall off, and
nothing but force would enable us to receive the proportion of
duties we are entitled to" (the indemnities) "under the
convention of Pekin, out of their diminished receipts."

Now, I submit, these forebodings with regard to the indemnity having been verified by the capture of Ningpo and the rapid success of the Ti-pings, led to the participation of England in the Chinese internecine war. If Mr. Bruce, by the above-quoted statements, intended to advise his Government to assist the Imperialists--and they cannot admit of any other interpretation--how can that distinguished and consistent statesman reconcile them with his strong disapproval of any such policy expressed only a few months before, and which I have already quoted in a previous chapter:--

"No course could be so well calculated to lower our national
reputation, as to lend our material support to a Government the
corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its
weakness."

Mr. Bruce first states, the worst possible policy England could choose would be to interfere against the Ti-pings; and then he declares, if we do not interfere, "that nothing but force would enable us to receive" indemnities and enjoy trade. The _present_ British Government has thought fit to adopt the suicidal course pointed out by Mr. Bruce, and now it has experienced the fact that "no course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation." The last testimony of Mr., or rather, Sir F. Bruce; of Mr. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs; of Captain Sherrard Osborne, R.N., late Admiral of the so-called Anglo-Chinese flotilla; and of all who have the least opportunity of knowing anything about the subject, unite in confessing the evil of the past policy exercised towards the Ti-pings, and state that the Manchoo Government, despite the fact that it owes its very existence to the help of the British, has thoroughly returned to its exclusiveness, its evasion of treaty obligations, and its hatred of the "outer-barbarians" who have saved it from extinction.

We will now proceed to notice despatch No. 2, addressed by Mr. Bruce to Admiral Hope, which affords further proof of the false principles on which British interference was founded:--

"The Government will soon be in possession of the accounts ...
of the agreement entered into by the rebels not to attack
Shanghae for a _twelvemonth_, and of the corresponding assurance
that, _if we are not molested in trading up the river_, our
_desire_ and _intention_ are to remain _neutral_ in the civil
contest now in progress in China....

"Her Majesty's Government will probably abstain from rendering
active assistance _at present_ to the Imperial Government, both
on account of the assurances of neutrality we have given to the
insurgents, and on account of the serious and indefinite
consequences to which any such intervention would in all
probability lead."

The signification of the "at present" will be seen upon perusal of the following paragraph, which exactly describes the plan very shortly adopted by the British Government, in direct violation of those "assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents":--

"Another course is open to consideration, namely, that of taking
the open ports or the principal ones under our protection and
safeguard, and declaring that we will repel by force any attack
upon them by the insurgents. _Considering that by treaty we have
an interest in the revenue derived at these ports from trade,
and that this, the only source of our indemnities, would be
materially diminished, if not altogether destroyed_, should they
be assaulted and captured ... I think it may be urged, with
truth, in justification of such a course, that it affords the
best means of protecting our interests.... But this course is
not unattended with difficulty. The insurgents would naturally
object, that in leaving the revenue and administration of these
places in Imperial hands, we do in reality assist the
Imperialists."

This conclusion is correct; for, so impossible was it to usurp the treaty ports and not "in reality assist the Imperialists," that the mask was thrown off by openly making war upon the Ti-pings. The only "difficulty" to allude to, which indeed is really almost creditable to the conscience of Mr. Bruce, was the fact that England was pledged to the opposite policy; but it must be remembered that the only tie which bound her to carry out that policy was one of justice and honour, while strong temptations to its violation were in existence; also, that it is not the lot of every minister to be able to discern how the commercial interests of his country may be best provided for.

"To this we should reply that we exercise the legitimate right
of self-defence in protecting our own interests, and that if in
doing so we are obliged to limit the belligerent _rights_ of the
insurgents, _the cause_ is to be found in the ruthless nature of
the war they wage."

This excuse is the principal one given by the British Ministry to justify its breach of faith; but "the cause" must, from what has already been stated, be regarded as utterly false.

But, should we for a moment admit the hypothetical "ruthless nature of the war they wage," by what right were we "obliged to limit the belligerent rights of the insurgents," when it is universally admitted that the Imperialists are quite as ruthless, if not more so? Moreover, did the British Government attempt to limit the belligerent rights of either North or South in America? yet the one was ruthless enough, and the cotton trade was injured. Unscrupulous persons who would justify the destruction of semi-civilized people, when it can be done with impunity, may say these cases are not parallel; nevertheless, the only difference is, that with America we have treaties allowing Englishmen to settle and trade everywhere, while in China the treaty limits the settling and trading to certain parts. The principle of non-intervention applies quite as strongly to the one nation as the other; moreover, the Ti-pings never did, or would have attempted to, blockade the trade of any port at which Europeans were settled. Did either belligerent so far study foreign interests in America?

To resume our review of despatch No. 2, Mr. Bruce continues:--

"The Government would, no doubt, wish to hear from you whether
Nankin could be attacked with success by a purely naval force."
...

After deprecating any partial hostilities against the Ti-pings, the despatch continues:--

"And on the other hand, we should lose a favourable opportunity
of placing our relations with the Emperor on a satisfactory
footing, if we were deprived by some incidental event of the
power of making our aid _a matter of bargain_ with the Imperial
Government.... The longer we are able to preserve an indifferent
attitude between the two parties, the more inclined they will be
to _bid higher_ for our friendship and support."

What an accomplished frequenter of the Rialto the author of these creditable sentences would have made! This despatch was written on the 16th June, 1861; within seven months open hostilities were initiated against the Ti-pings by Admiral Hope, in direct violation of his Government's existing orders to maintain neutrality; and within nine months the British Government adopted the policy "of taking the open ports under our protection," and violated all pledges of neutrality by prosecuting a regular, though never openly declared, war upon the insurgents.

The following are the most important passages from despatch No. 3. They plainly state that our "commercial interests" would _not_ suffer from the acts of the rebels, and that trade was _not_ injured by them, although completely in their power.

After disapproving of any attack upon Nankin, Admiral Hope states:--

"The Taeping authorities will be open to easy access by us so
long as Nankin remains the seat of Government; and from such
experience as our short intercourse has afforded, I see a fair
prospect of our acquiring sufficient influence with them to
enable us to carry _all points which are essential to our
commercial interests_, even to that of eventual abstinence from
molesting the consular ports.

"It is further clear that we cannot afford to quarrel with them,
as _at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghae_,
at this time by far the largest portion of that from China."

Nothing can be more to the point than this admission that the Ti-pings did not injuriously affect our trading interests; but the opium traffic and indemnities _were_ threatened, and to save them the treaty ports were held against the victorious patriots.

In his reply to the three despatches quoted from, Earl Russell wrote:--

"I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree with
Admiral Hope in regarding an attack on Nankin as highly
impolitic, but it _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty
ports _if_ the Chinese" (Manchoos) "would consent not to use
those ports for purposes of aggression."

It will thus be seen Lord Russell did not authorize the defence of the treaty ports even "_if_ the Chinese (Manchoos) would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression," as he indefinitely states that in event of such action upon the part of the Manchoo Government, "it _might_ be expedient to defend" them. Yet, although even this ambiguous suggestion could not become an absolute order in the absence of the fulfilment of the condition precedent, the British authorities in China acted as though Lord Russell had imperatively _ordered_ the military occupation of the ports, upon the proviso having been agreed to by the Imperial belligerent; and it was not till _after_ the open violation of the oft-guaranteed neutrality by the commencement of systematic hostilities against the Ti-pings, that the Foreign Secretary publicly authorized the proceedings.

Admiral Hope declared "all points" could be carried with the Ti-pings, even regarding their avoidance of the treaty ports, "_essential_ to our commercial interests." Most undoubtedly he was correct. The Ti-pings never injured the trade, and would have abstained from molesting the treaty ports had they been made neutral; but the ports having become the principal depôts of the enemy, naturally compelled them to endeavour to obtain possession of them.

When the agreement or treaty of neutrality was made with the Ti-ping authorities by the leaders of the British expedition opening up the Yang-tze to trade, Mr. Parkes reported:--

"They wished to know, however, in which way the Admiral would
use his influence to prevent their being attacked by the
Imperialists from Shanghae; and whether one of their officers
would be allowed to visit Shanghae, to learn what arrangements
were made in this respect."

No such arrangements ever were made, although upon that _condition_ had the Ti-pings consented to refrain from capturing Shanghae for "one year." When at length they were driven to attack the very citadel of the enemy, they truthfully gave this reason:--

"If there were no impish (Manchoo) forces at Shanghae and
Woo-sung, the Chung-wang and She-wang would certainly not think
of sending their troops to take those places."

Upon July 28, the British Consul at Shanghae wrote to Mr. Bruce:--

"The Imperialist authority does not extend beyond a circuit of
from fifty to sixty miles from Shanghae, and I see no reason
whatever to suppose that they will ever be able to drive the
rebels beyond that limit.... The presence of foreign forces in
this city alone saves its authorities from summary ejection.
But, if the rebels were allowed to take possession, the country
in our immediate vicinity would at once lapse into the wretched
state of anarchy which exists beyond the rebel lines; the native
population would inevitably disappear, property would miserably
deteriorate." ...

Mr. Bruce, in his notice of this despatch to Lord Russell, states:--

"Your Lordship will observe that he states that the capture of
Shanghae would be fatal to the commercial prosperity of the
port. To me it is rather a matter of surprise that trade should
continue at all.... The export of silk between June 1860 and
June 1861 has, in spite of these disadvantages, amounted to
85,000 bales."

Directly after this we find Mr. Bruce bearing testimony that Ti-ping "success in any locality is attended with its total _destruction_!" Admiral Hope admitted that the insurgents had the Shanghae trade, "by far the largest portion of that from China," entirely in their power, but did _not_ stop it; Mr. Medhurst (Shanghae Consul) declared the whole country within "fifty to sixty miles" was under Ti-ping jurisdiction; and Mr. Bruce notices the large export of silk from the districts where silk, he states, meets with "total destruction"! Now, common sense may inquire whether this totally destroyed country, "wretched state of anarchy," "native population that inevitably disappeared," and "property that miserably deteriorated," could have managed to produce 88,112 bales of silk in the year 1861? This, with only one exception, was the largest amount _ever_ exported from China in one year. The silk districts were entirely in the possession of the Ti-pings, and every bale had passed through their hands. A reference to the table of statistics[48] will convince the most sceptical that the Ti-pings actually _increased_ the valuable trade, but that since their expulsion from the silk districts, the produce and exportation of that article _has fallen off more than one half_.

There is another matter to be considered with regard to the political morality of Mr. Bruce. At the beginning of the year 1861 he officially stated:--

"It does not appear to me necessary to take any part in this
conflict; but our material interests at Shanghae justify us in
insisting on its being exempted from attack _until_ the
insurgents have sufficiently established their superiority to
enable us to consider the contest as respects that part of China
at an end. In that case, the population of the town will be
quite ready to acknowledge the new power, and the authority of
the Mandarins will fall without a blow."

Yet, when, according to the extracts from the despatch of Consul Medhurst, this "_until_" had arrived by the complete establishment of the Ti-ping superiority, Mr. Bruce singularly enough forgets his declaration of only a few months previous.

The Ti-pings at length, after successively capturing the important cities of Shou-shing, Fung-wha, Yü-yaou, and Tsze-kee, came in contact with the British authorities at Ningpo. Having occupied every part of the Che-kiang and Kiang-su provinces, to the south of the Yang-tze, with the exception of the three treaty ports, Shanghae, Ningpo, and Chin-kiang, the Ti-pings, both to preserve their conquests and prosecute their cause, were obliged to advance upon those cities, which had become the strongholds of the enemy. Upon their approach to Ningpo, a conference was held by the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States. The official report of this meeting states:--

"It has been decided that the undersigned[49] shall proceed this
day (28th Nov.), on board Her Majesty's gun-boat _Kestrel_, to
the rebel head-quarters ... and having obtained an interview
with the insurgent leaders, shall convey to them verbally, as
well as in writing, the following message:--

"'1. That the undersigned take _no part_ in this civil contest,
but that they claim exemption from injury and annoyance at the
hands of both parties." ...

This fresh pledge of neutrality, together with three other clauses respecting the forthcoming occupation of Ningpo, the foreign settlement, and the lives and property of the European residents, was given to the Ti-ping generals at Yü-yaou and Fung-wha. Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the result of this communication. The following are extracts from the account given by Mr. Hewlett (Consular Interpreter) of the interview with the Ti-ping chiefs:--

"We at once informed Hwang (Commanding-General at Yü-yaou) of
the object of our visit," to which "he gave his unqualified
assent, 'although,' he added, 'in the event of the Mandarins
resisting, and of my having to attack Ningpo, I cannot be
responsible for the lives of any of your countrymen who may
remain inside the city. Otherwise, I will do all I can to
prevent their being molested, and will at once behead any of my
followers who dare to offer them any annoyance.'

"He assured us that his desire was to keep well with foreigners,
with whom _he was anxious to open trade_; spoke of us as
worshippers of the same God and the same Jesus as themselves,
and denominated us--'Wai-hsiung-te'--_their foreign brothers_.

"He seemed to entertain no doubt whatever of being successful in
his attack on Ningpo.

"Eager inquiries were made on all sides for foreign firearms, of
which they seem to have but few--a want that would be
sufficiently felt were they ever to come in contact with troops
courageous enough to stand against them."

This paragraph may fairly account for the successes afterwards gained over the ill-armed Ti-pings by Major Gordon's and other troops, well provided with British artillery, shell, rifles, &c., &c.

"As far as human life is concerned, the rebels, at the capture
of Yü-yaou, appear to have used their opportunity with
forbearance; we saw but few dead bodies, and of those some, as
we were informed, _were their own men who had been caught
plundering and burning_.

"Hwang having informed us that another body of troops, also
under the She-wang's orders, and commanded by one Fang, a
general of equal rank with himself, was advancing on Ningpo from
the Fung-wha, or south-west side, we proceeded up that branch of
the river early on Monday morning, the 2nd instant, and found
the said insurgents encamped at a place called Pih-too, but ten
miles from Ningpo."

The following account of Mr. Hewlett's interview with Fang is worthy of the best attention, proving, as it does, the earnest desire of the poor Ti-pings to be on terms of friendship, even brotherhood, with all the nations of their "foreign brethren;" and that _any reasonable_ wish of the British authorities would have been complied with.

"We at once went ashore, and put ourselves in communication with
the leader, Fang, a man of only 25 years of age, and a native of
Kwang-se. We hastened to represent to him the serious injury to
trade that must ensue on the capture of Ningpo by his forces,
and the consequent loss that would accrue to foreign interests,
besides the danger, in reality no slight one, to foreign life
and property, to be apprehended both from the lawless characters
in his own ranks, and equally so from the bands of unruly
Cantonese and Chin-chew men at Ningpo, ever on the look-out for
an opportunity of indiscriminate plunder. We ended by eagerly
dissuading him from advancing on Ningpo.

"To our two objections Fang replied by assuring us that his
party were most anxious to keep well with foreigners, who,
indeed, were no other than their brothers, inasmuch as both
worshipped one God and one Jesus; and that as for trade, that
would be allowed to go on as formerly, while he begged us to
feel quite at ease as to the persons and property of our
countrymen, any molestation shown to whom would be followed by
instant decapitation. _Their object being the overthrow of the
present dynasty, they could not allow Ningpo to remain in the
hands of the Imperialists._

"It was with difficulty that we succeeded in persuading Fang to
delay his attack on Ningpo for one week; another day, he said,
was to have seen him there, had we not interposed.

"One could not help feeling struck with the earnestness and
apparent sincerity of this young leader. Whilst alive to the
dangers attending the cause in which he was engaged, he seemed
to be confident that the support of Heaven would carry them
through all their difficulties, and that, so aided, they must
prevail. He told us that nearly the whole province was in their
hands, or would be before long, and that Hang-chow, the
provincial capital, would fall, 'as soon as Heaven should see
fit to give it into their hands.'"

The General Hwang gave the following reply to the communication of the foreign representatives, which, together with Fang's, fairly expresses the aim and feeling of the Ti-ping Government:--

"HWANG, TAI-PING LEADER AT YU-YAOU, TO CONSUL HARVEY."

"Hwang, a noble of the rank of E,[50] with the prænomen 'Paon
teen' ('Precious Heavenly'), and Commander-in-Chief of the chief
army of his Highness Prince[51] Tsung, who is of the Royal
body-guard in the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty, which is the
dynasty patented under the true Divine Commission as the
Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace, addresses an official
communication to F. Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul; W.
Breck, Esq., United States Consul; Lieutenant H. Huxham, Royal
Navy; Captain L. Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, in reference
to the interview held (this day) for the purpose of deliberating
on the maintenance of friendly relations between the respective
countries.

"From the foundations of the heavens and the earth, the world
has been divided into the central kingdom, China, and the
external kingdoms, foreign countries. Each kingdom, whether
China or those of foreign countries, has been ruled over by men
of its own nation. (This has been the universal practice.)

"But in the time of the Ming dynasty the Tartar imps, originally
serfs from beyond the northern frontier, stole into China, and
usurped the emblems of royalty [_lit._, seized upon the divine
materials], making unclean and polluting the land to a degree
that no tongue can tell of [_lit._, to a degree difficult for
the fingers to reckon].

"Even till now, and during a period of more than 200 years, have
they been going on in their wickedness, until at last their cup
of iniquity is filled to the overflowing.

"At these their sins the Heavenly Father being exceeding wroth
[_lit._, his anger was as an earthquake], would have destroyed
the world; then Jesus, the Heavenly Elder Brother, out of his
mercy and lovingkindness towards mankind, sent down the true and
holy Lord, the Heavenly King, to wash out the stains of the
northern serfs, and to set up anew the house of Han [_i.e._, to
re-establish a purely native dynasty].

"These, then, are the times of changing the dynasty, and of
reforming the kingdom prescribed by Heaven and submitted to by
man.

"The command of the valiant troops of this great army has been
conferred upon me by royal commission, with the allotted task of
rooting out of the earth all that is unholy [_lit._, of
destroying in the east and exterminating in the west, part of a
complete sentence, signifying a thorough eradication of evil
from all the four quarters of the globe], and of visiting on the
heads of their rulers the afflictions of the people.

"The highest object of my mission is none other than the
foundation and establishment of the dynasty; subordinate to
that, my aim is the welfare of the people [_lit._, the
black-haired multitudes], that I may weed out from among them
those that oppress, and give peace to such as are true of heart.

"Hence it is that throughout the whole of my onward course
'there were none' (as it is written) 'that came not forth with
meat and drink to welcome the soldiers of the King.'[52]

"Our great army having at this time invaded the province of
Che-kiang, and the representatives of your several countries,
stationed at Ningpo, having come this day to my head-quarters at
Yü-yaou, to deliberate about maintaining amicable relations with
us, on the understanding of mutual non-interference, and having
requested me to order my troops to abstain, on their arrival at
Ningpo, from injuring the persons or property of your respective
countrymen at that place, I hereby promise to issue the above
orders to my troops, and to command them to respect the terms of
the agreement.

"In case any of my troops should dare, contrary to my orders, to
molest any of your countrymen or to injure their property, I
will, on your arresting and handing over to me the offender, at
once behead him.

"In the same way, if any of the subjects of your respective
countries should, contrary to your orders, take upon themselves
to assist the imps in repelling our advance, you will in your
turn direct them to refrain from so doing.

"From and after this date the friendly arrangement now agreed
upon is to be binding on both parties.

"Sincerely trusting that you will not allow yourselves to feel
anxious about this matter, and with wishes for your good health,
I beg to forward this special communication.

"19th day of the 10th month of the 11th ('Sin-yew') year of the
Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace" [November 29, 1861].

The General Fang gave the following answer:--

"FANG, TAI-PING LEADER AT FUNG-HWA, TO CONSUL HARVEY.

"Fang, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, charged with the
reduction of the disobedient, and a member of the Royal
body-guard in the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., in
official reply to F. Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul; W.
Breck, Esq., United States Consul; Lieutenant H. Huxham, R.N.;
Captain L. Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, requesting them to
set their minds at rest.

"The Almighty God, the Supreme Lord, the Heavenly Father, and
Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, sent our true and holy Lord,
the Heavenly King, down into the world, and ordained him to be
Ruler over the Central Kingdom. To destroy the imps, to deliver
the people, and to rescue the Central Empire; these are the
chief objects of his desires.

"The special task of chastising the nation[53] [_lit._, those
without the palace doors], with a view to the establishment of
the Dynasty, has now been conferred upon me by royal commission.
My mission is simply to show compassion to the people, and to
punish the crimes of their rulers.

"The troops of my great army have now entered the department of
Ningpo, and I fully purpose capturing the departmental city, and
making it revert to the King to serve as a basis from which we
may give peace to and console the four estates of the nation
[scholars, husbandmen, mechanics, and traders].

"I have this day received your letter, and informed myself
completely of its contents; all the requisitions therein
contained I promise to comply with. I will, therefore, order my
troops to frame their conduct after the Divine pattern, and to
abstain from tumult and acts of aggression.

"Wherefore I beg of you to set your minds at rest.

"Good faith, as a principle of action, being a most important
desideratum, no retractation must be made in respect of the
number of days conceded prior to our advance on the city.

"With reference to the persons and property of your respective
countrymen, I will issue the strictest orders, forbidding either
the one or the other to be injured in the very least degree.
Trade shall be allowed to continue as usual, with the additional
advantage of being conducted on a fairer footing. On no account
will acts of violence or robbery be permitted.

"One word from the superior man is sufficient to settle any
affair; he is true, he is sincere, and hence no mistake or
misunderstanding can arise.

"Whilst forwarding this in reply, I beg to express my wishes for
your happiness.

(Enclosed, twenty-one Proclamations.)

"22nd day of the 10th month of the 11th ('Sin-yew') year of the
Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace" [2nd December, 1861].

Faithfully fulfilling that extraordinary example of their willingness to preserve friendship with foreigners--the promise to delay their occupation of Ningpo one week--the Ti-pings, immediately upon the expiration of the seven days, on the morning of December 9, moved up to the city walls, and within an hour Ningpo was completely in their possession; the Manchoos, Mandarins, regular troops, _braves_, pirates, and all, having fled from the city, scarcely striking a blow in its defence.

Although the British authorities contented themselves upon this occasion with underhanded hostility against the Ti-pings, the same unworthy procedure was equally as much a violation of the principle of their pledged neutrality as the open warfare they shortly commenced in the neighbourhood of Shanghae. As all assertions of this description require proof, it is necessary to encumber this narrative with extracts from the official documents that, for the honour of England, should remain in oblivion for ever, were they not necessary to prove the disreputable transactions of various officials, and my reasons for advocating the Ti-ping cause.

I have already noticed the singular sort of interpretation put upon the "no wish to quarrel," "the wish to maintain amicable relations," and the orders to "abstain from all interference in the civil war," "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality," &c., by Admiral Hope and Captain R. Dew. We will therefore conclude the review of "fitting twelve heavy guns," &c. at Ningpo, by one other example of breach of faith and neutrality.

The instructions to the Ningpo Consul by Mr. Bruce were to "take no part" in defending the city. The written guarantee forwarded to the leaders of the _powerful_ advancing army were precisely similar. "The undersigned take _no_ part in this civil contest." Now, in spite of these pledges, we have seen Admiral Hope order "every obstruction" to be placed before the Ti-pings. In his account of the capture of Ningpo he fairly admits his own faithlessness thus:--

"2. Everything had been done to assist the Imperialists in the
defence of the town, except the use of force, in their favour,
and their Lordships will not fail to observe how utterly useless
such measures proved, in consequence of the cowardice and
imbecility of the Mandarins."

This taking "no part" and at the same time doing "everything to assist" one belligerent requires no comment.

When the Ti-ping forces assaulted Ningpo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperialists ran away, and being lowered over the city wall with a number of retainers, received protection from the British Consul, who facilitated their escape. This same Consul, in his report of the city's capture to Lord Russell, states:--

"Ningpo is now in the full and unquestionable possession of the
Taeping forces. I am glad to state that, up to the present time,
there has been no slaughter, or massacre, or fires, within the
walls; and that, with the exception of a few men killed, and a
certain amount of destruction of property, the rebels have, so
far, conducted themselves with _wonderful moderation_."

Admiral Hope, in his report to the Admiralty of the same event, states:--

"The behaviour of the rebels has been good hitherto, and they
profess a strong desire to remain on good terms with
foreigners."

Here we find the most positive proof that the principal alleged reason for the defence of Shanghae against the insurgents, namely, because their "success in any locality is attended with its _total destruction_," is utterly false. While "the ruthless nature of the war they wage" is thus urged (as though even it could justify the dishonouring of British pledges) against the Ti-pings, we find that upon the only occasion this theory was subjected to proof, by the reports of their most bitter opposers, they behaved "_with wonderful moderation_."

Mr. Parkes (late Secretary to Lord Elgin's Embassy), in a memorandum upon the capture of Ningpo, still further proves the great friendliness of the insurgents. He says:--

"The Ningpo rebels have shown the utmost desire to be on
friendly terms with foreigners. Outside the south gate, which
formed the point of attack, stands the establishment of the
Sisters of Charity, which, if occupied, would form excellent
cover for an assaulting force, as its upper windows command the
city walls; yet, although they crouched underneath its
enclosures, as they collected for their rush on the gate, they
did not trespass for a moment within the premises. Another large
Roman Catholic establishment was one of the first buildings they
had to pass, as they poured into the city, flushed and excited
with their success; but they only stopped to _welcome_ a small
knot of foreigners who were standing underneath the porch, and
to charge their people to offer them no harm. Roman Catholics
and Protestants they hailed indiscriminately as being of the
same religion and fraternity as themselves....

"The house of one of the principal Chinese of Ningpo, who is
well known at Shanghae, from his wealth and the prominent
support he has always given to the Government, remain untouched,
_simply because he has hired a Frenchman to live in it, and give
his name temporarily to the premises_."

Now the ignorant and designing have delighted themselves by exhausting the most damnifying epithets upon the so-called "bloodthirsty marauders," "ruthless brigands," &c.; yet the following extract from the same memorandum (of an enemy, be it remembered) seems to indicate those persons as being either remarkably imaginative or mendacious:--

"It must be stated, however, to their credit, that as yet the
capture of Ningpo, and it is believed also of the other cities
of this province, has _not_ been marked with those atrocities
which the rebels are known to have committed elsewhere."

The "atrocities" committed elsewhere were those occasioned by the hard necessity of the war, and when the Ti-pings had no choice but to kill or be killed. But the question of Ti-ping atrocities could not possibly be construed into any fair cause of hostilities against them, it being a well-known fact that of the two belligerents they were by far the most humane.

The occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-ping forces may be justly considered the culminating point of their successes, and the termination of a period of British policy towards them, that period being the deceitful one. Almost immediately after that important event, the hitherto covert hostility of the British Government became exchanged for a more decided action, and the epoch of open hostility was established by the commencement of direct military operations against the Ti-pings from Shanghae, shortly followed by the same policy at Ningpo.

Some few days after the fall of Ningpo, Admiral Hope proceeded to Nankin for the purpose of obtaining a renewal of the promise by the Ti-ping authorities not to attack Shanghae for one year, as the former agreement expired at the end of 1861. The arrangement, however, was not again approved by the Ti-pings, not only because the British contracting officials had broken faith with regard to their pledge of preventing the Imperialists from using Shanghae for purposes of aggression against them, but from the fact that Shanghae had become the very arsenal and rallying-place of their enemy. To these principal and all-sufficient causes, others might be added, such as the undeniable belligerent right of the Ti-pings to capture any city just as they captured Ningpo.

The Ti-ping authorities having very properly refused to become a party to prejudice their own interest, Admiral Hope conducted the following communication with them, as if to find some pretext for making the approach of the Ti-pings upon Shanghae a _casus belli_. The correspondence is well worthy of the closest attention. The open arrogance and unsound reasoning of the British portion being no less conspicuous than the righteous tenor and sound argument of the Ti-pings.

"COMMUNICATION MADE BY COMMANDER BINGHAM TO THE TAEPING
AUTHORITIES AT NANKING, ON THE 27TH OF DECEMBER, 1861.

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of
Her Majesty the Queen of England in the Chinese Seas, to
acquaint you--

"1. That during the last year certain British subjects have
sustained losses by robberies committed in the territories which
are held by your armies, and that it is therefore necessary that
you make immediate and satisfactory arrangements for their
receiving compensation. These losses amount to 7,563 taels 1
mace 7 candarenes, 4,800 dollars, 20 bales of silk, and 2
muskets, as shown by the accompanying list.

"2. That junks which carry British colours are no less British
vessels than those which are foreign-built, and that they must
be allowed to pass up and down the river free from examination
or any other molestation, in conformity with the agreement made
with you in the early part of this year. That in order to insure
that no junk hoists a British flag which is not entitled to do
so, their papers will be examined by the senior officer here,
who will take the British flag away from any vessel not entitled
to wear it, and will give notice of having done so to the Chief
Officer of the Customs.

"3. That the promise made by you that your troops should not
approach within 100 _li_ of Shanghae and Woo-sung has not been
faithfully observed. The Commander-in-Chief now requires that,
in proof of your good faith you select an officer of high rank
who shall accompany him to Shanghae and who shall from thence
proceed in company with one of his officers to the ports in its
vicinity, which are held by your forces, so that the order on
the subject may be shown to the officers commanding them, with
the view of preventing further mistakes.