Chapter XXIV (1)

Kar-sing-foo.--Christmas in Ti-pingdom.--Works of
Art.--Dangerous Companions.--Narrow Escape.--Retribution.--Adieu
to Ti-pingdom.--Mr. White's Case.--The Neutrality
Ordnance.--Order of July 9th, 1864.--Intended Return to
England.--Particulars of the Siege of Soo-chow.--Strength of the
Garrison.--The Assault Described.--The Nar-wang's
Treachery.--Its Cause.--Major Gordon's Report.--The _Friend of
China_.--Gordon's Report Continued.--Narrative by an
Eye-Witness.--The Soo-chow Tragedy.--Major Gordon.--His
Conduct.--Gordon's Letter to Sir F. Bruce.--Analysis
thereof.--Newspaper Extract.--Gordon's "Reasons"
Refuted.--Analysis Continued.--Gordon's "Personal
Consideration."--His Motives explained.--Newspaper
Extracts.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatch.--Its Analysis.--Falsity of
Gordon's Statements.--How Proved.--Extract from the _Times_.

Upon reaching the city of Kar-sing-foo, I was kindly received by the governor, Yoong-wang, who gave us all quarters in the Wei-wang's palace. This latter chief had gallantly assisted in defeating the Anglo-Manchoo forces on their first attack upon Tait-san; he had been promoted for his services, and was celebrated as a brave leader; yet, singular to relate, he had gone over to the enemy with the city (Haining), to which he had been appointed governor only a few days before my arrival.

Previous to the year 1860, treachery was a thing unknown among the Ti-pings. The baneful effect of British meddling had not been felt; they were successful, therefore the mercenary-minded did not find occasion to desert; neither was the number of chiefs so great as since the successes of 1860-61, nor the Tien-wang's appointment of them so imprudent. Latterly, however, the great extent of country and population included within the limits of Ti-pingdom rendered necessary the employment of a large number of civil and military officers; unfortunately, the king, having much secluded himself from the affairs of state to study religious matters, and being influenced by two or three of his non-military ministers, did not exercise sufficient care in selecting or controlling them. Thus, it came to pass that sometimes not only incompetent, but untrustworthy men were placed in high and important commands; and many of these new officials were neither animated by the patriotism, nor inspired with the religious fervour of the older chiefs. Self-aggrandizement was the motive of such men; and although some of them were brave soldiers, directly they found British hostility was making their cause a failing one, they did not scruple to change sides when they could obtain reward for doing so.

At Kar-sing-foo the Shi-wang left me, after having made arrangements for my return either to that city or Hoo-chow-foo (where I had left the engineer and another man from Soo-chow for the purpose of making shell, casting guns, &c.), and then proceeded on his way to other places, in order to collect men and money with which to rejoin the Chung-wang at Chang-chow-foo.

I found the country under the Yoong-wang's administration in a far better state than the desolate regions through which I had passed on my journey to his city, because the Imperialists and their allies had not yet attacked and ravaged the neighbourhood; although, before I started for Shanghae, they made their appearance.

Christmas Day I spent at Kar-sing-foo. The Ti-pings keep the festival two days before we do; and, if possible, venerate it still more. I made the Yoong-wang a present upon the occasion, and passed the day very happily at his palace, where a grand dinner was given to all the chiefs in the city, after special services had been held in the Heavenly Hall. My friend W---- was present with me, and we mutually declared that we had never enjoyed a better Christmas in our lives. Upon the 25th the Yoong-wang sent his own cooks, attendants, plate, &c., and spread a magnificent dinner at my quarters for all the European and Chinese followers I had in the city.

I found much to admire during my stay with the Yoong-wang. He was one of the best veteran Ti-ping leaders, and all his officers were stanch, trustworthy adherents of the cause. Of one Yu, who was a general of brigade, I became the particular friend, and dined with him nearly every day. This officer had charge of the artillery, and I gave him all the instruction I could in casting shell (which he had just commenced to do), making fusees, and sighting his guns. The organization within the city was so perfect that everything went like clockwork. Bars and bolts were not to be found; for thieves, beggars, or robbers were unknown in Kar-sing-foo. I felt a real happiness in living there, and was quite sorry when I took my departure. Here I found the most splendid building I have ever seen in China. It was a new palace, not quite finished, for the Ting-wang, governor-general of the province; and was a standing proof of the fact that the Ti-pings (had they been allowed to succeed by England) would have restored the arts of China, and especially the public works--all of which have fallen into decay since the era of the Manchoo. In general outline the palace resembled those I have already described as existing at Nankin, but every particle was far more beautiful and costly. Neither in China nor elsewhere have I ever seen such a magnificent work of complicated stone and wood carving. The gorgeous gilding and painting was, of course, in Chinese style; and though very effective and varied, too gaudy for European taste. The carved work was exquisite; I have stood for hours watching either the grotesque or the life-like representations. Many hundreds of sculptors, painters, and artisans were employed, at a very high rate of wages, upon the building; and I found that some of the former were the most celebrated professors of the two arts in China, and had been induced to come to Kar-sing from the most distant parts of the empire. From what I have seen of China, I do not believe such a building has been commenced for many hundred years.

At last the Imperialists came to overthrow all Ti-ping improvement, they having succeeded in capturing Pimbong, the nearest town, with the help of one Major Baily and a powerful artillery corps, a few days before I left the city.

Previous to setting out for Shanghae, I gave the rowdies their share of prize-money; and although I fully expected that they might cut each other's throats over the coin, I hardly expected the attack they made upon myself and lieutenant, whereby our lives were placed in danger. It seemed that they were aware that we were taking funds to use at Shanghae; and to three of them the temptation to possess themselves of the same became irresistible. Upon receiving their prize-money, furnished with passes I obtained for them, they set forth from the city; but, on reaching the suburbs, the afore-mentioned trio made a halt for the purpose of planning our murder, and mustering up courage to commit the deed by indulging in a copious supply of that ardent spirit--_samshoo_. At length, having cunningly waited until the Yoong-wang had gone outside the city with nearly all his men, in the direction of Pimbong, they returned upon their murderous mission. Fortunately for myself and W----, they went in on the way for another dose of _samshoo_, which made one of them helplessly intoxicated, but the other two had become brave enough to proceed on their errand without him. After obtaining admittance at one of the city gates, they came straight to the Yoong-wang's palace, where we were engaged with an interpreter and one of the chief's secretaries making up a communication I wished to send to the Chung-wang.

A-ling, my own faithful interpreter and companion, was quite incapacitated by the injury he had received at Wu-see. Although standing directly between him and the enemy's fire when he was struck, the ball passed me and inflicted a severe wound on his left shoulder, passing round the back and lodging on the right shoulder blade. The poor fellow was carried with me to Kar-sing-foo, and suffered much torture from the Chinese doctors, who treated him by thrusting long strips of twisted paper into the wound, and screwing them round until the ball was reached. At last, however, a better doctor was found in the person of the Yoong-wang's own medical attendant, who cut down to the ball and extracted it, much to the patient's relief. A-ling was not sufficiently recovered to accompany me to Shanghae; he therefore remained at Kar-sing-foo, and from that day to the present I have never seen him again, nor probably ever shall, for I believe he was killed when the city subsequently fell into Imperialist hands.

Directly our friends, the rowdies, came into the ante-room in which we were seated, they began to insult myself and lieutenant, knowing that the Yoong-wang was absent and could not arrest them, and that I could not do so either, as my few men were at the Wei-wang's palace in another part of the city. As they were no longer under my command, it was useless ordering them out of the place; I therefore sent an attendant to request the officer left in charge of the city to send a guard to remove them.

At this moment the most forward of the two suddenly drew a revolver and fired it at W----'s head, immediately afterwards turning towards me. Through the smoke I could not see whether my lieutenant had been killed or not; but before the scoundrel could shoot me, I had lodged a bullet in his carcase. Almost at the same instant I heard another shot fired--as it afterwards proved to be, by W----, and saw that my assailant was unable to discharge his revolver, though evidently tugging at the trigger. The other rowdy was now advancing; and as his companion still endeavoured to fire at me, I was compelled to again use my own revolver in self-defence. The would-be murderer now fell dead, while his cowardly friend ran up presenting his pistol by the barrel, and crying, "Don't shoot, don't shoot!"

I really did feel very much inclined to take vengeance upon the fellow, and my Cantonese (who now came up) would certainly have put him to death, had it not been for my lieutenant's request to leave him unharmed. As it was, the wretch seemed nearly frightened out of life, and it was singular how such a coward could have mustered up desperation enough to attempt murder; evidently, he depended upon the determination of his comrade; for, had he been at all resolute, we would assuredly have been killed. Upon examining the dead man's revolver, we found that although the powder had exploded, the bullet had never left the barrel, but had stuck just between it and the revolving chambers, thereby disabling the weapon, and probably saving our lives. We accounted for this singular circumstance by supposing the pistol must have been loaded a long time, and that the powder had consequently lost its strength.

Upon the Yoong-wang's return, I fully intended to give up the surviving ruffian to be dealt with according to the law. Again my brave lieutenant begged him off, blindly and suicidally, as it afterwards appeared, for ultimately he lost his own life through the treacherous act of the wretch he spared. The name of the man who was killed was Hart, an Englishman; his dastardly companion was an American named William Thompson.

I would here give a piece of advice to those who may have the misfortune to fall into the disreputable company of Yankee and cosmopolitan rowdies abroad. Act with quickness and decision, and you will defeat men who are mostly cowards at heart; but if you hesitate or endeavour to temporize, you are a dead man; for these murderous wretches will butcher a fellow-creature with less compunction than people generally feel at killing a fly. I have heard that the man Hart had murdered and robbed several Europeans in the silk districts, and I believe his Yankee confederate is now serving a long term of imprisonment for highway robbery. I engaged the five rowdies in the dark, and it has given me a caution against their _genus_ that will never be forgotten.

The Yoong-wang having supplied me with a boat and guide, accompanied by W----, I bid adieu to Ti-pingdom and set out for the Imperialist territory and Shanghae. Between the outposts of the two belligerents I found a considerable tract of country entirely occupied by large bodies of banditti, who preyed alike upon Ti-ping or Imperialist. At one place we had a very narrow escape from falling into their hands, having to run the gauntlet of a large camp along the two banks of a narrow creek, which we successfully did amid a storm of bullets, not one, however, taking effect. These robbers were the wildest and most ferocious looking men I have ever seen, and it was said that they spared neither man, woman, nor child. Since my departure from China this sort of brigandage has become frequent in the country wrested from the Ti-pings.

At last we reached Shanghae, after running past all the Imperialist stations at night, when our small canoe-like boat was not easily discerned. We at once placed ourselves under medical attendance, and for a few days remained perfectly quiet. Within a week, however, I was grieved to hear that my lieutenant had been seized and thrown into prison _by the British Consul_ for being in the service of the Ti-pings and having captured a Manchoo vessel, the ungrateful blackguard, Thompson, having given the information which led to his arrest.

Englishmen should be aware of the gross injustice exercised by their authorities in all affairs connected with the Ti-pings, and no more striking example is to be found than in the case of Mr. White, who was sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Consular Court for doing upon the side of the Ti-pings exactly what Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley, Michael, and Brown, and Major Gordon, Captain Stack, Dr. Macartney, &c., had done, and were doing, on the side of the Manchoo! He was actually condemned upon the ordinance of _neutrality_ of Sir John Bowring, the said ordinance being instituted in 1855, at Hong-kong, to compel British subjects to observe neutrality towards _both_ parties to the Chinese internecine war. This neutrality regulation had long been annulled by the acts of the above-mentioned gallant officers on behalf of the Manchoo, yet the Englishman who assisted the Ti-pings, and who was no more guilty of breaking the law than they were, was condemned by this broken and obsolete ordinance, and died (or rather, shall we say, was murdered; for confining a man dangerously ill in such a loathsome den was nothing else) a few days afterwards in his damp and comfortless dungeon! Is this British justice? How long have Englishmen understood "neutrality" to mean all help and military assistance to one belligerent, but open hostilities towards the other, and punishment of its allies? Had England remained neutral, or had she regularly declared war against the Ti-pings, there might be some grounds for prosecuting those who have assisted the latter; but as neither the one policy nor the other has been followed, it is no more right and just to punish those who have assisted the Ti-pings, than those who have assisted the Manchoo. The whole course of the hostilities against the Ti-pings was irregular and illegal, and certainly no one can deny that the British officers already referred to have committed a breach of neutrality quite as much as Mr. White did, even taking Sir John Bowring's ordinance as being in full force. The proof that this argument is correct may be gathered from the fact that when Colonel Sykes, M.P., and the Hon. Mr. Liddel, M.P., brought forward Mr. White's case in the House of Commons, the Government, in order to protect its agents from prosecution, _then_ passed an Order in Council[60] _condoning the offences_ against neutrality of all those who had assisted the Imperialists, but not extending the same favour to those who had assisted the Ti-pings. A piece of more iniquitous and unfair legislature, or more opposed to English feeling, it would be impossible to find. Incredible as it may seem, the present state of the law by which British subjects are governed in China, viz., Sir John Bowring's ordinance of neutrality, is re-established, but _one half is declared null and void_, while the other is made executive by the Order in Council above mentioned, which acts both retrospectively and anticipatory! So that a law which can only exist, or be created, for application towards two belligerents, is here made _ex parte_, and exactly the reverse of what its denomination implies. The wording of this fraudulent document runs thus:--

"1. Nothing in the said ordinance, made and passed on the 17th
day January, 1855, shall extend or apply, or be deemed to have
extended or to have been applicable, to any British subject,
who, _at any time heretofore_, may have assisted, _or may
hereafter assist_, the Government of the Emperor of China....

"2. If any subject of Her Majesty ... shall ... levy war, or
take part in any operations of war against the Emperor of China
... such person shall be liable to the several penalties
mentioned in the said ordinance of the 17th day of January,
1855."

It is thus perfectly evident that the ostensible neutrality ordinance is literally an alliance with one of the two belligerents. The style and title are maintained to satisfy and hoodwink the House of Commons, to deceive them into believing that the Government is pursuing a neutral policy in China, while the clauses tacked to the old ordinance entirely change its every intention, and exclude the least particle of neutrality from its meaning.

If Lords Palmerston and Russell are so destitute of allies in Europe that they cannot restrain themselves from rushing into alliance with the Manchoo Emperor of China (who certainly does not reciprocate their extraordinary ebullition of feeling, and who would take infinite delight in making mincemeat of his officious friends and all their countrymen), why do they not proclaim the stupendous and ever-memorable fact openly? Why do they seek the most opposite and roundabout way of effecting their object by employing chicanery and double dealing to convert an ordinance of neutrality into an importunate treaty of alliance; instead of raising themselves from their slough of shuffling and fraudulent means, by repudiating the false ordinance and duly announcing the barbarous Manchoo despot as their very good ally? Surely the noble lords have not been deterred from giving to the world their wonderful act of statesmanship, by doubting that the contented British public would accept the affair as an agreeable compensation for their questionable European policy? Perhaps, however, it is as well that they have preserved a discreet reticence, because the Emperor of China is no party to the alliance they have thrust upon him, and is particularly liable to issue an edict for the extermination of all foreign devils, the noble lords included, at any moment that may appear auspicious.

The shameful Order in Council of July 9, 1864, is quite sufficient proof that the trial and condemnation of my unfortunate lieutenant was illegal; every British officer who committed a breach of neutrality by assisting the Imperialists was equally liable to prosecution. If the Cabinet Council had not, with oily complacency, justified the acts of their military subordinates in China _after_ they were committed to the policy (in fact, when the operations resulting from their illegal intervention had terminated), and _after_ Mr. White's death, the friends of the latter would undoubtedly have obtained heavy compensation.

Besides the fact that my medical adviser ordered a change of climate, directly I became aware of my lieutenant's fate I determined to take a trip to England.

Major Gordon, R.E., had retired with his whole force from active co-operation with the Imperialists since the Soo-chow treachery and massacre for which he was responsible. I therefore naturally concluded that he would not resume the position of tool to the sanguinary, faithless Mandarins, who had so completely dishonoured him. As a Christian, an Englishman, and a British officer, I did not think it possible he could himself wish to continue a participator in deeds of revolting barbarity, and I concluded that his Government would immediately recall him, and cease all active support of the bloodthirsty Manchoo. Although my latter supposition proved correct, the former was quite mistaken, as I found after my return to England. In consequence of these circumstances, and the fact that at Shanghae I was altogether unable to execute any of my projects for the service of the Ti-pings, I decided to abandon the sword for the pen, and to fulfil my instructions from the Ti-ping authorities by writing the present work, trusting that I should serve their cause by appealing to the sympathies of the British people, and hoping that foreign hostility would cease, in which case their ultimate success would be a certainty.

The emissaries of the Manchoo, and the hirelings of the slaves of the Manchoo, were not either intelligent or energetic enough to effect the capture of their humble servant, although they amused themselves by attempting to do so not only before but after his departure from China, by one of the overland mail steamers.

Having brought the history of the Ti-ping revolution and my own adventures down to this period, all that now remains to be noticed are the events which have transpired since I sailed away from the Chinese land. Before, however, proceeding with them, it will be necessary to return to the fall of Soo-chow, and resume our chronicle from the occurrence of that tragedy.

There is but little doubt that the Ti-pings would have been able to hold their own against the enemy, even taking into consideration all the foreign support the latter received, had the betrayal of Soo-chow never taken place. Although Nankin, as the capital and seat of the Tien-wang's Government, occupied the first political place, Soo-chow, in consequence of the extraordinary measures taken to strengthen it, and its central situation in the Ti-ping dominions, became the principal military position. The capital, though surrounded by the highest and most massive walls in China, and defended by some commanding fortifications, was situated on the extreme verge of the Ti-ping territory, and was the most assailable point, while its resources were far inferior to those of Soo-chow. Moreover, directly the latter city became invested by the Anglo-Manchoo forces, a powerful army was moved within its spacious walls, while the Chung-wang, with his own division, co-operated from the outside. These troops constituted the only Ti-ping army in the field at that time, all the remainder of the forces being employed, according to a mistaken defensive policy, in garrisoning the numerous walled cities throughout their kingdom--tactics ordered by the Tien-wang in opposition to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, and which ultimately led to the destruction of the greater number of the garrisons in detail, and the loss not only of Nankin, but all the former possessions of Ti-ping-tien-kwo.

The siege of Soo-chow was prosecuted by an Imperialist army of from 50,000 to 70,000 men, including _General_ Gordon's and other foreign contingents, altogether about 6,000 strong. At least 12,000 of the Imperial troops, under General Ching, were well armed with foreign muskets and rifles; they were partly disciplined, and constituted a very effective force, far superior to the usual class of Chinese soldiers. Attached both to the Anglo-Manchoo legions and ordinary troops, were many British officers, and, what was still more useful, a very large supply of every description of artillery. Three or four heavily armed and shallow steamers, together with a great fleet of Mandarin gunboats, were possessed by the besiegers. Besides all this array of strength in a bad cause, several detachments of _British troops_ were moved up from Shanghae, for the ostensible purpose of giving 'moral support' to the murderous intentions of the Manchoo, but, in reality, to afford succour in case the Ti-pings might defeat their assailants--a contingency far from improbable. The troops so fraudulently prostituted (fraudulent, because they were solely organized for the interests of the British taxpayer and not the Manchoo; prostituted, because yellow gold and mercenary motives caused their disgraceful employment) consisted of some companies of the Beloochee Regiment, sent to garrison Quin-san (about 14 miles from Soo-chow), and a force of H. M. 67th Regiment, Royal Artillery, and 22nd B. N. I., commanded by Captain Murray, R.A. Not only were these troops sent to participate in Manchoo atrocities, but the British General (Brown) in command actually took upon himself _to lend_ the Imperialists every available piece of artillery on the station, as though the same were his private property and did not belong to the British nation, whose trust he was abusing.

To defend Soo-chow, the Ti-pings had a force of about 40,000 fighting men, including some 8,000 attached to the Chung-wang outside the city. About one third of these troops were the _elite_ of the service, while all the others were brave and veteran soldiers. Besides Mo-wang, who was commandant of the city, four or five other Wangs were present; the principal among them was the Nar-wang, who commanded more than half the troops in garrison, his military power being greater than that of the commandant, although he was placed under the orders of the latter.

The Mo and Nar Wangs were the Commander-in-Chief's two principal and favourite generals. The former was a Kwang-si man, and had been the Chung-wang's companion in arms from the commencement of the revolution; the latter chief was a native of Hu-peh, and had joined the Ti-ping cause in the year 1854, since which he had been trained to military tactics by the Chung-wang. Both leaders were associated together in equal rank and command for nearly ten years, and it was always understood among the Ti-pings that they were not only bound together by the strongest ties of adopted brotherhood and friendship, but that they were equally attached to their renowned superior. Yet it will be seen that, in spite of the good influences and kindly associations by which the three were supposed to be governed, the Nar-wang was a man of evil nature, and small, treacherous mind.

After very severe fighting, _General_ Gordon managed to effect the capture of all the stockades outside the walls of Soo-chow. This, however, was only accomplished after many a disastrous repulse, and a great loss of men and officers.

The following account of the last assaults upon the fortifications outside the East Gate, which were defended by a few pieces of artillery, is copied from "How the Taepings were driven out of the Provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang," and will be found to illustrate the bravery with which the garrison of Soo-chow struggled against irresistible odds:--

"On 27th November, after Major Gordon had all infantry (except
1st Regiment) and artillery assembled at Waiquedong, an order
was issued that a night attack should be made on the Low-mun
stockade, which formed the key to all other stockades on the
east side of Soo-chow.

"White turbans were served out to all soldiers, so as to be able
to distinguish them from the rebels, in case it should come to
a hand-to-hand fight. About one o'clock Major Gordon himself,
accompanied by Majors Howard and Williams, started with about
two companies of men towards the stockade, leaving the remainder
of the force behind already fallen in, so as to advance at a
given signal. Everything seemed quiet, and in fact all thought
the plan would succeed. After Gordon and his followers had been
advancing close to the stockade, they found everything quiet,
and no signs of the guards being aware of an attack. The
remainder of the force, therefore, received orders to advance,
while the advance guard had succeeded in climbing inside the
breast-work. Scarcely were all troops up to the front and a
portion of them crossing to reinforce Major Gordon, when the
rebels began to direct a fire of grape, canister, and musketry
on the force, which made every one shiver. The Quin-san
artillery responded vigorously, and it was a fine spectacle to
see fiery rockets and red-hot mortar shells going into the rebel
works. But the rebels stood it gallantly, and did not retreat an
inch. The whole line of stockade which the rebels held seemed
one line of fire, and here Major Gordon perceived that Chinese
are not fit to fight at night time, for all the begging and
encouraging of the European officers could not make the troops
try another attack; they seemed afraid of their own shadows. The
only chance left therefore was to try and shell the rebels out
of their position, and this was done till dawn of day, when
Major Gordon, seeing the rebels still resisting desperately, and
receiving thousands of reinforcements from the city, made good
his retreat, leaving numbers of killed and wounded on the field.
This was one of the most bloody fights the force encountered;
and, judging by what the Quin-san force lost this night, the
rebels must have lost tremendously. Still, the gallant fellows,
encouraged by their brave chiefs, held their position manfully
against a fire of about 20 guns, flying on them for about three
hours. The loss of the Quin-san force was as follows:--Captains
Wylie, 2nd Regt.; Christie, 4th Regt.; and Maule, 2nd Regt.;
Lieut. King, 2nd Regt., killed. Major Kirkham severely wounded
on the head; Lieut. Miok, 4th Regt., wounded in the shoulder;
Major Tapp, wounded in the leg; and several more slightly, with
about two hundred men killed and wounded. Major Gordon seeing
this night attack frustrated, determined to pay the rebels off
for it; and shortly after, on the 28th November, at night, all
guns, about 46 in number, were brought in position within about
700 yards of this formidable stockade, and the infantry was to
fall in near the guns at daylight on 29th of November, to make
another attack. The rebels were quite prepared for it, for no
sooner did they perceive all the artillery and infantry so near
their works, than they hoisted their red flag as a sign that
they meant to fight, and not give up this position so easy.
Precisely at eight o'clock the signal rocket went up, and at
once all guns sent forth their different missiles, some
directing their fire on the Low-mun stockade, others directing
their fire on the stockades lying to the right and left.

"The rebels seemed to preserve their ammunition, for but very
little fire was encountered at first. The 8-inch mortars were
playing havoc in the stockades, for every now and then houses,
boats, etc., would be blown up in the air, under the cheers of
the Imperialist soldiers, of whom thousands, under command of
General Ching, were present, to support Gordon's force. Le Futai
himself had taken up a place in rear, in one of the Imperial
stockades, so as to witness the spectacle. About eleven o'clock
the fire from both sides was furious, even the siege artillery
had advanced within about one hundred yards of the rebel works,
pouring forth grape at the rebels, who, however, inspirited by
their noble leader, the Mo-wang, in person, stood it like
European soldiers. The 5th Regiment, under Major Brennon, was
now ordered up, to storm the stockade on the extreme right, near
the Soo-chow creek, the most favourable point to cross the
ditch; but although this brave regiment advanced with cheers,
and some of the officers succeeded in crossing and trying to
climb up the breast-works, the rebels defended this point
desperately, and poured volley after volley of musketry into the
ranks, so that after about ten minutes' struggle the 5th
Regiment was obliged to retire, having lost several officers and
men. This attack having failed, the bombardment was renewed with
vigour, and orders given to the 3rd Regiment, under Major
Morton, to go to the extreme left, to make feint of attack, so
as to draw the attention of the rebels on that side. Gordon here
succeeded beautifully, for scarcely had Morton and his regiment
begun to engage the rebels on the left, when the Mo-wang, of
course anticipating a real attack on that place, ordered his
best men to defend it. Scarcely, however, had the Mo-wang's men
moved on, than Major Williams, of the 2nd Regiment, made a dash
at the place where Brennon had met with defeat, and not waiting
for bridges, but swimming the moat, followed by several officers
and men, succeeded in getting inside the breast-work, which no
sooner had the rebels perceived than the whole fled in confusion
into the Low-mun evacuating all the stockades along the east
side of the city, and leaving a good number killed and wounded
on the field. The stockades were soon occupied by Imperial
troops, and thus Gordon's force was within one hundred yards of
the city wall. The Quin-san force, however, paid dearly for this
victory, their loss being Lieutenant Jones (Artillery),
Lieutenant Williams, 5th Regiment; Captain Acgar, 4th Regiment,
killed. Captain Shaml'sffel lost both eyes; and several more
officers slightly wounded, with about 100 or 150 soldiers killed
and wounded. The ground around the stockades was as if it had
been ploughed by the shell, and no doubt the rebels deserve
credit for having defended the place so long against such
enormous artillery."

Previous to the capture of the last outwork (the Low-mun stockade), and the day after the Anglo-Manchoos had experienced the severe defeat, in attempting to surprise the position at night, the Nar-wang secretly sent messengers into the besiegers' camp, and declared his wish to betray the city into their hands, requesting their co-operation to dispose of the Mo-wang, whose loyalty would be likely to defeat the proposed treachery.

The motive for this defection at a time when the Imperialist successes had come to a stand-still, and when Gordon himself doubted his ability to capture Soo-chow, seems to have been caused by jealousy the Nar-wang entertained against his old friend and companion, the commandant of the city. Besides this, it is probable that the previous treachery of the Americo-Ti-ping, or Burgevine, force had affected the leading traitor and his evilly disposed associates, by giving them the idea that they might arrange terms with the enemy, by which they would not only be able to obtain security for their lives and property (and retire from the now ceaseless hostilities, if not desperate straits, to which the Ti-ping cause was driven), but also receive substantial rewards from the Manchoo.

The Nar-wang's jealousy probably arose from the fact that the Mo-wang was placed over him, as governor of Soo-chow and its dependencies. That he entertained the most bitter animosity against his former friend and comrade is quite certain, for, in order to succeed with his treachery, he went to the dastardly extreme of assassinating him.

We have now to notice the death of the gallant and noble Mo-wang, the fall of Soo-chow into Manchoo hands, and the various events connected therewith. These cannot be more effectually described than in the words of Major Gordon, R. E., and in a review of his report by the _Friend of China_,--about the oldest and most independent paper in the foreign settlements in that country.

"MEMO. (BY MAJOR GORDON, R.E.) ON THE EVENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN
THE 29TH NOVEMBER AND 7TH DECEMBER, 1863." PUBLISHED IN THE
"FRIEND OF CHINA," SATURDAY, 12TH DECEMBER, 1863.

"The morning after the failure of the attack by night on the
Low-mun stockades, General Ching came to me, and informed me
that Nar-wang, Ling-wang, Kong-wang, and Pe-wang, with
thirty-five Tien-chwangs[61] and their followers, had opened
negotiations with him for the coming over of their troops; that
these men composed their quarter of the garrison, and had
possession of four out of the six gates of Soo-chow, viz.,
She-mun, Tcha-mun, Tche-mun, and Low-mun; and that he had
entertained their views, and had already seen Kong-wang. He said
that they would have difficulty in disposing of Mo-wang, who was
averse to a surrender; but that, if we resumed our attack on the
Low-mun stockades, they would endeavour to shut him out of the
city. _I consented to the defection with a good deed of
pleasure_,[62] as I considered that, if the rebels fought, we
should lose heavily.

"On the night of the 28th November, Chung-wang arrived in the
city from Wusieh, and was present at the combat of the 29th. His
arrival made a change in the state of affairs, and the
disaffected were unable to carry out their intention of closing
the gates on Mo-wang. They, however, sent over three
Tien-chwangs on the night of the 30th November, and proposed to
remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not
to touch their men or horses; their men to be distinguished by
white turbans. These Tien-chwangs told us that Chung-wang, on
his return to the city after his defeat, had proposed to vacate
Nankin and Soo-chow, and for the whole Taeping force to go down
to Kwang-si; and, in fact, give up the cause.[63] The Mo-wang
was averse to this, and proposed to remain and fight it out. I
have since learned that he was most anxious to see me, and I
think to see what could be done. This I learnt from two
Frenchmen who came out after his death, of whom more hereafter.
The other Wangs did not meet the Chung-wang's views, as they
intended coming over. Chung-wang then left the city, and
proceeded to Wusieh. General Ching came to me on the 1st
December, and asked me if I would like to see Nar-wang. I said
no, unless it was necessary, and told Ching at the same time
that, if the Futai did not grant the Wangs sufficiently good
terms as to induce them to come over, _I thought our attack on
the city might be foiled_,[64] as we had lost heavily in
officers and men on the attack of 27th and 29th November; and a
little hitch with the bridge, which had to be seventy yards
long, might cause a repulse. I told Ching on the same day that I
could not see the necessity of my seeing Nar-wang. He, however,
pressed it, and I consented to meet him at the north gate that
evening. I accordingly went, and met Nar-wang in General Ching's
boat. His first words were 'that he wanted to obtain help from
me.' I answered that I was most happy to help him, and then I
told him that this proposal to remain neutral would be of no
avail, and that I could not accept it, as I should be only
deceiving him and his chief if I did so, inasmuch as, if the
city fell by assault, I could not, with an undisciplined force
such as the one I command, restrain them from looting every one;
and that, therefore, unless they could give a gate, it would be
better for them to fight, or else vacate the city. I then told
the Nar-wang what I thought of the Taeping prospects, and the
little chance of success. I said that I wanted to make the
Imperialists and rebels good friends (?); that, since the rise of
the rebellion, the Imperialists had much changed; and did not
dare, from fear of foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties
as heretofore (?). He said he would see with General Ching what
he could do about the city, and that he had no fear of Mo-wang
knowing of his having seen me, or of Chung-wang either; that he
had enough troops to keep both in check. I then left, and
General Ching told me the next day that Nar-wang had decided to
see the other Wangs, and to consult on the course of proceeding.
The next day, the 3rd December, General Ching told me that
Mo-wang had some idea of Nar-wang's negotiations, and wanted to
decapitate him, but that Nar-wang was prepared. Nar-wang also
sent out to tell General Ching that the other Wangs agreed to
come over, that he personally wanted no command, but merely
permission to retire to his home with his property; but that
some of the other Wangs wanted to get commands of different
sorts. He told me further that Nar-wang had some difficulty in
seizing Mo-wang. On the morning of the 4th December, General
Ching came to me, and told me that Nar-wang had determined and
agreed with him to get Mo-wang on the wall of the city, and to
throw him down and hand him over to us as a prisoner. I went to
General Ching, and told him I must have Mo-wang given over to
me; to which he acceded willingly, and in fact joyfully, as he
had known him in former days. I then went to the Futai, who was
out, but I saw a very high Civil Mandarin named Pow, who
undertook to tell the Futai that Mo-wang must be my prisoner. I
told him to tell the Futai that I would secure his not giving
any more trouble to China. I had not come back five minutes
before General Ching sent me over two Frenchmen, who had just
come into the lines. They told me that that afternoon, at 2
p.m., all the chiefs had been assembled in Mo-wang's palace, and
after a dinner, they had offered up prayers and adjourned to the
great court, and having put on their robes, crowns, &c., Mo-wang
mounted his throne and began an address, in which he stated
their difficulties, and expatiated on the fidelity of the
Kwang-si and Canton men. The other Wangs answered him; the
discussion got higher and higher, till Kong-wang got up and took
off his robe. Mo-wang asked him what he was doing, when
Kong-wang drew a dagger and stabbed Mo-wang in the neck.[65] The
Mo-wang fell over the table in front of the throne, and the
other Wangs seized him, and decapitated him in the entrance.
They then mounted their horses and rode off to their troops;
Mo-wang's head being sent to General Ching. Mo-wang's men and
the other troops looted the palace. There was no fighting in the
city till the morning of the 5th, when the Nar-wang's men had
some trouble with the Cantonese, and drove them out of the city,
killing some 50 or 60 of them. General Ching's men advanced, and
with a small body, took charge of the Low-mun, my men being kept
fallen in, as they were under stricter discipline than the
Imperialist soldiers are. On the night of the 4th December the
rebels all shaved their heads. I went to the Futai, and telling
him that it would not do to let my men remain idle, proposed to
him to march on Wusieh, if he would give the men compensation of
two months' pay, as they had received no reward since I had
taken the command. He objected to it, and I told him if he could
only promise, the matter could be settled well. He still
objected, and I then told him I should leave _his service_,[66]
and went myself to the city. The Imperialists had some men
straying about, but not many. I went straight to Nar-wang's
house, and saw him and all the Wangs. I asked him if all was
right. He said that everything was satisfactory, and appeared
quite secure. He had not seen Ching at the time. I went to
Mo-wang's palace, and the body was where it had fallen. I then
went out of the city, and arrived in time to see General Ching,
who came to me on the part of the Futai to arrange matters. It
was now 4 p.m. I told General Ching that I was helpless in the
matter. The colonels of regiments and the officers had little
authority over them unless they used the harshest means, which
they would not do in this question. General Ching offered one
month's pay, and the officers refused it. I told Ching that it
was not my intention to accept anything; but that I felt that
after the length of time the force had been fighting it was only
right the men who wished to leave should have the means of doing
so. Matters began to look bad, and I at last determined to make
the men accept the one month's pay, which I did with difficulty,
the men having made an attempt to march down on the Futai. I
then, at the _Futai's request_,[67] gave orders for the march to
Quin-san. Ching told me at this time that the Futai had written
to Pekin, and said that he had extended mercy to the Wangs and
the rebels. Next morning, after the troops had left, I started
for the city, sending the two steamers to Wu-lung-chiao to meet
me, as I expected to be able to retake the _Fire Fly_ easily
from information I had received from the letters in Mo-wang's
house, and from some Europeans who were with Mo-wang, and who
had escaped. I went to the Low-mun, and there learnt that
Nar-wang and the other Wangs and chiefs were to come out and see
the Futai at 12, noon, and that the city would then be given
over. I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so
I called at his palace, and took him aside and asked him if
everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He
said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to
the Tai-hu; and he said, 'Why not wait? I am coming to see you.'
I said it was important business, and that unless he
particularly wished it, or thought it necessary, I would not
stay. He said very good, and I left. He passed me on his way to
the Low-mun very soon after on horseback, with all the Wangs,
going, as I supposed, to the Futai. I went then to Mo-wang's
palace, and then to the east, or Low-mun, to while away the
time, till the steamers could get round from Wai-quai-dung to
Wu-lung-chow. From the top of the Low-mun I saw a large crowd of
people near Ching's stockades, and thought it was the ceremony
of submission going on. A few minutes after, perhaps 12.30 p.m.,
a large body of Imperial soldiers came up, and passing the gate,
rushed cheering into the city, as they generally do into vacated
stockades. I thought little of it, more than expressing my
disapprobation to some of them. They, however, went on pouring
in and firing off their muskets in the air and yelling. Ching
then came up, and looked rather pale. I asked him if the
interview was over, and if it had been satisfactory. He said
that Nar-wang had not been to the Futai at all. I said I had
seen him going with the others. He said no; that he could not
say for certain; but that he thought he had run away. I said I
could not make out what for, as I had just seen Nar-wang, and he
said everything was all right. I asked Ching if there was any
trouble. He said that Nar-wang had demanded the command of 2,000
men, and of half the city of Soo-chow, the division to be a
wall, and that the Futai had refused it, and also that he had
let some of Chung-wang's men in. _The latter part I knew to be
false, but, strange to say, I believed the former portion._ I
asked him where Nar-wang could go to. He said that he would not
go back to the rebels, but that he would go to some village and
settle there I thought the thing so strange that I asked Dr.
Macartney, who was by me, to go to Nar-wang's house, and to see
him, and tell him not to fear anything.[68] Ching then told me
that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be
no looting; and as I knew before that he had his men in good
discipline, I had no fear, and therefore rode round the wall
with him. He kept on firing vollies in the air, which I
remonstrated at, and could not make out the object. He said it
was merely to prevent Kwang-si men from doing anything to his
men while they were taking possession of the city. I became
uneasy about Nar-wang; and at the south, or Pou-mun, I left
General Ching and rode off to Nar-wang's palace. I got there at
dark, and found it had been gutted. I was then met by Nar-wang's
uncle, who asked me to come to his house. Being only with my
interpreter, I had no one to send for General Ching, or for my
troops; but the entreaties of this Tien-chwang being so great I
agreed to do so, and therefore went with Nar-wang's family to
his house. When I got there his men were all fallen in, and the
streets barricaded. I wanted to send my interpreter for
assistance, but they would not let him go. I therefore remained
till 2 a.m., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2
a.m. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier, who was with
my horse, to get the steamers round to Wai-quai-dung to make the
Futai answerable, and also sent for my body guard. After he had
started, the man who went with him came back and said he had
been beheaded by the Imperialists. I remained till 4 a.m., and
then went out to send orders to the steamers myself. _I was
taken by the Imperialists and detained an hour._ At last I got
to the Low-mun, and sent the body guard to the Nar-wang's house,
but it was too late, the Imperialists had entered and gutted it.
I then went to the Low-mun, and met there General Ching, to whom
I gave my opinion. He was most anxious to excuse himself, but I
did not listen to him. At this time I did not know that the
Wangs had been beheaded. I then went down to Ching's stockades,
and met Major Baily, commanding Ching's artillery there. He said
that General Ching was very much put out; that the Futai had
ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had given orders to the
troops to enter the city, that he had lost face, &c. Baily then
told me that he had Nar-wang's son, and brought him to me. I
refused any communication with General Ching, Nar-wang's son
came to my boat, and, pointing to the other side, said it was
there that the Wangs had been executed. I went over, and
recognised Kong-wang's, Nar-wang's, Sieh-wang's, and Sung-wang's
heads, but the body of Nar-wang was not to be seen, having been
buried. I took, at the son's request, Nar-wang's head. _The
bodies had been cut down the chest, and the wounds on the head
were most horrible, showing the brutality of the executioners._
I then was waiting for the steamers, as I had heard that there
were some high persons still in custody, and I thought that I
could frighten the Futai into giving them up. He, however, heard
of my arrival, and went off to the city. _I left him a note
telling him my opinion, and then moved off with the steamers to
Quin-san._[69] I received, just before leaving, a letter from
Futzu-quai, telling me that a chief had come over with 3,000 men
to my officer in command; and that he, the officer in command,
had received them. I sent orders to him to inform the chief of
the treachery, and to let him go with his men and arms, if he
liked, or else to bring his troops to Quin-san.

"This is a brief summary of the late events, _which will prove
to the Imperial Government a most fatal blow_. I imagine that
the Futai and General Ching arranged this matter, and know that
it is viewed by the mass of Mandarins with disgust.

"Nar-wang's son tells me that Chung-wang was willing to come
over; and that all the people in the silk districts are the
same; but how to come they know not. Is not this a time for
foreign governments to come forward and arrange the terms? The
power is in this force, if the authority from Pekin is given to
it to act under some _honest_ Chinaman. What is now to be feared
is that foreigners will join the rebels, and will thus cause the
war to linger on to the extermination of the unfortunate people
on whom the burden falls, and to the detriment of trade of
every sort. That the rebels really do not possess the qualities
of government cannot be doubted. They merely hold cities, and
let the villages govern themselves. The head chief may know
something of the Christian religion, but I will answer for it
that nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the
subject. It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government will
interfere at this time.[70]

"C. E. GORDON, Major Commanding.

"P.S. Prince F. de Wittgenstein was present at most of the above
occurrences, and can vouch for the correctness of the same."

"'THE FRIEND OF CHINA,' SATURDAY, OCT. 12, 1863.

"We publish to-day a document which we consider one of the most
remarkable that it has been our good or evil fortune to peruse
for many a day. Emanating as it does from a man of Gordon's
ability and position, we have been much more than disappointed.
How we have been so, let our readers judge.