Chapter XXIV (2)

"The exact position of the major is, it would appear, that of
Adjutant of Quin-san, though possessing less power than General
Ching, whose faculty of lying seems to have the wonderful power
(by attraction we suppose) of giving credence; though the major
tells us that he knew the rogue _was_ lying. We give the major's
own words, 'the latter part I _knew_ to be _false_; but, strange
to say, I believed the former portion.'

"This General Ching, this cowardly liar, it was who voted as the
right-hand man on all occasions concerning the conduct of
negotiating with the rebels. The major tells us that the Taeping
Wangs had opened negotiations with Ching for the surrender of at
least four gates of the city. We suppose this was before the
29th of November. On the 4th of December we learn of Ching's
being _joyful_ at the prospect of the Mo-wang falling into the
hands of Major Gordon, and on the same day we hear of his
reception of the unhappy Wang's head.

"Ching next appears as Envoy of the Futai 'to arrange matters,'
we suppose, for the surrender of the city. Here the major slips
out of the 'matter' by declaring himself 'helpless,' and this,
after he had assured the Nar-wang that he wanted to make the
Imperialists and Taepings friends, and only wanted possession of
'a gate' to prevent looting everybody.

"Major Gordon does not tell us _why_, at the 'supreme' moment of
the taking of Soo-chow, he was so anxious to get possession of
the _Fire Fly_. We beg to call our readers' attention to the
following statement:--'I thought I had better see Nar-wang
before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him
aside, and asked him if everything was all right, and if he
wanted me to do anything. He said no; that everything was
proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, "_Why
not_ wait? I am coming to see you at the meeting of the Wangs,"
as he _supposed_, at the Futai's.' Why was Major Gordon absent?
Why did he not make it his business to see that the assurances
which he had given to the Nar-wang were carried out?

"The major tells us that he got 'uneasy' when he found that
Nar-wang's palace had been gutted; however, his remaining till 4
o'clock next morning where he was (though why he did not go
himself for his body-guard instead of sending his servant he has
not told us) hardly seems to prove this assertion; but the
affair of his steamers being of so great a consequence, he sends
an assistant 'to send orders to them,' when he is taken and
detained by the Imperialists for an hour. (General Ching was, of
course, busy just at that moment, and Major Gordon's detention
was most opportune.) The screaming farce of General Ching's
losing face, and Major Gordon's refusal to have anything to do
with him, here opportunely follows the tragedy--(one likes to
laugh after the heavy business!). The idea of frightening the
Futai is nicely got over. The latter gentleman----_goes into the
city_, where, of course, he _couldn't_ be frightened! The major
takes a steamer and goes off to Quin-san.

"_Leaving a note_ for the Futai.

"Our readers have the major's letter before them, and they can
judge for themselves whether our analysis be correct or not. Our
own opinion is that the major--owing to his recent losses,
fearing a repulse if the city of Soo-chow had then been
attacked, and finding occasion of taking it himself by
treachery, and yet desiring to shield himself from the infamy of
such a transaction--would have acted precisely as he declares he
_has_ done.

"Though a considerable reader of history, our recollection does
not supply a parallel to the infamous treachery practised upon
the unsuspecting Taeping chiefs. The conduct of Pizarro, in
Peru, was nothing in comparison. One Inca, and a room full of
treasure, is a small affair when compared with the confiding
Princes of Soo-chow. Now, we ask all right-minded men to take
Major Gordon's statement to Nar-wang, which we quote
literally:--'I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and
rebels good friends. That since the rise of the rebellion the
Imperialists had been much changed; and did not dare, from fear
of the foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as
heretofore.' And compare his account of the atrocities committed
upon the Princes of Kong, Nar, Seih, and Sung.

"Our review of these facts is based upon Major Gordon's own
statements; and if he does not find means of extrication, we
have placed him upon a pinnacle of infamy whence he shall not
readily descend. From the moment Major Gordon first became
_particeps_ in the affair of the surrender with General Ching
(the very ideal of a Manchoo liar), he should have stood between
the Manchoo butcher of a Futai and his confiding victims, and,
as a true soldier (the soul of honour), yielding his life rather
than have exposed himself to the execration of all society as a
traitor of the deepest dye.

"Major Gordon will, no doubt, think us severe upon himself; but
we assure him that what we have said is by no means meant as a
personal attack. We are simply commenting upon his own statement
of what has lately occurred at Soo-chow. It may possibly be true
that he has been victimized by the liar, Ching, and the Futai.
We are half inclined to think such to be the case, considering
his simplicity in telling us, on the authority of the Nar-wang's
son, that 'Chung-wang was willing to come over, and that all the
people in the silk districts are the same.' He also tells us
that the 'rebels do not possess the qualities of government.'
That they actually allow 'villages to govern themselves;' and
that while the 'head chief _may_ know _something_ of the
Christian religion, nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas
on the subject.'

"We are rather astonished at Major Gordon's information as to
this point. We have been for many years in China. We have seen
the way in which the cherished temples and idols of the Manchoos
have been treated by the Taepings; and it is rather late in the
day to tell us what rebel 'ideas' are on the subject of the
Christian religion.

"In conclusion, Major Gordon hopes for the interference of the
'Government.' He means, of course, the _English_ Government. If
there were anything wanting to make Major Gordon contemptible in
the eyes of all Europe and America, it was this last phrase.
What! the English Government interfere to prop up the Manchoos
after the statement of what Major Gordon says has occurred at
Soo-chow! Major Gordon! We thought you not only an English
officer in Chinese employ, but we considered you an honourable
subject of our Sovereign, yet it seems you penned this sentence
after the atrocious perfidy of Soo-chow--'It is sincerely to be
hoped that the Government [English] will interfere at this
time.'

"If he had not added this last sentence we could have pardoned
Major Gordon everything. What! the Government of Englishmen to
sustain a Government which, by Major Gordon's own showing, is so
perfidious that we can make no possible comparison! There is no
Englishman in this or any other part of the world who will not
blush for Gordon, or the era in which it was found that an
Englishman advocated assistance for a Government which has
violated every treaty, and even the most sacred obligations
recognised among men.

"As for ourselves, we are not military adventurers, and,
perhaps, cannot understand how _any stratagem_ may be fair 'in
war as in love,' but we do hereby protest against a violation of
a solemn word of honour given. Major Gordon must clear himself,
or he will go down to posterity not only 'unhonoured and
unsung,' but as a wretch who sold blood to General Ching and the
present Futai of Kiang-nan.

"Major Gordon, in telling us that, or, in fact, asking the
question, viz., 'Is this not the time for foreign Governments to
come forward and arrange terms?' looks as though he fancied
foreign Governments _could_ entertain the idea of an honest
Chinaman under authority from Pekin. But in spite of the
testimony of the Prince Wittgenstein, or any other potentate, we
are inclined to believe that unfortunate Taepingdom has little
to learn from Manchoo morality, and still less from mercenary
soldiers, whose honour is bought and sold!"

Some people may consider the article last quoted as too severe upon Gordon--perhaps they may change their opinion after perusing the following extracts from a narrative of a journey to Soo-chow, by the sub-editor of the _Friend of China_, soon after the great treachery. I prefer giving this authenticated description by an eye-witness, to narrating the facts myself, because I did not enter Soo-chow after its betrayal, and cannot, therefore, vouch for the subsequent massacre (and other disputed points) from my own personal observations, although otherwise I have the strongest proof that the reported atrocities were perpetrated:--

"TO SOO-CHOW AND BACK, VIA QUIN-SAN.

"After leaving Shanghae, our route (or creek) lay through a low,
flat country, intersected by canals innumerable in all
directions; the richest land in China, stretching away to the
very horizon, unbroken to view, except by countless graves,
commemorative arches, and heaps of ruins. The weather, though
superb, seemed oppressive, from the utter abandonment of the
country; not a soul was to be seen as far as the eye could
reach, and the endless fields of neglected and fallow ground
(once the garden of China) deepened that air of sadness which
winter always seems to wear in the country. Though ashore the
desolation is complete, not so on the water; Mandarin squeeze
stations have sprung up in all directions.

"At Wong-doo we were actually stopped, and 400 cash demanded
from our Louda. Our indignation getting the better of us, we did
then and there write our protest against thievery upon the
rogue's ribs; and in round, legible characters, too, we did all
we could to teach _this_ Manchoo robber that the higher the
squeeze, the less commerce, and the less commerce will certainly
produce less revenue. When will all Manchoos, Morrill tariff
men, &c., learn this lesson?

"There were, besides, a few wretches fishing by means of
cormorants (so often described that I will say nothing about
it), making up the sum total of population. At last, Quin-san
pagoda became visible; and after a short run over the country
(our boat following), we reached the city.

"Of course, we went to see the 'lion' of the place. He seemed to
be in a consumedly bad humour; but, nevertheless, granted us
passes for Soo-chow. Dropping metaphor, Major Gordon impressed
us as a very young man (say thirty) _without_ an 'old head on
his shoulders.' We suppose coolness is a quality which he
constantly displays on the field; he certainly displayed it in
his own house when we called upon him.

"On the 18th December, after a run of fifteen miles from
Quin-san, we reached the stockades outside the city of Soo-chow.
They had evidently been the scene of a fierce encounter.
Innumerable shot (solid) in their interiors told the tale of
carnage; and numerous unburied corpses were lying about in all
directions, in spite of the number which had been disposed of in
the creeks. As we drank our tea that evening, we studiously
avoided any remark on _this_ subject. Four or five miles more
brought us to the lofty walls of Soo-chow. Inside the gate
(Lo-mun) an immense stone wall and water-gate (as protecting the
outer bastion) will ever stand a monument of Taeping energy. Of
course, our first move was to see the 'lion' of Soo-chow, the
_in_-famous Futai. The palace of this magnate (the former Ya-mun
of the Chung-wang) really 'impressed' us as something worthy of
the 'Mings,' in which style it is erected.

"We have visited hundreds of such structures, but the Soo-chow
pagoda is certainly the finest we have ever seen. In ascending
we counted 220 steps, and judged the height to be from 150 to
170 feet from base to summit. It is nine stories high (as usual,
an odd number); but when we reached the top, the view there
presented well repaid our trouble. The vast city lay at our
feet--the Venice of China--intersected with hundreds of canals,
pagodas, and temples (in the tent-like style of the Chinese),
relieving the otherwise monotonous view of infinite tiled roofs.

"In many places the city was obscured by the burning of houses,
set on fire by the Imperialist soldiers.

"On the 19th December, having sent our cards before us, we
called upon General Ching. While waiting for his appearance, we
had time to examine a magnificent English clock (looted from
Mo-wang's palace), which formed the main ornament of the
'reception-hall.'

"Over the dial was a fountain of water (in glass), and under it
a pastoral scene, with moving figures of impossible shepherds
and shepherdesses, worthy of Arcadia--all moved by the
mechanical contrivances provided in the clock itself. At last
Ching entered, and at first took us for a second edition of
General Brown, for he immediately entered upon a defence of Le
Futai. After telling him who we really were, he suddenly became
so reserved that we beat a polite retreat (for the fate of the
Taeping-wangs had by no means faded from our memory).

"As it was still noon, we determined on a visit to the residence
of Chung-wang's secretary in the neighbourhood.

"On our arrival we found that the house had not only been
looted, but that the valuable furniture it contained had been
literally smashed to atoms by the Imperialist soldiery.

"In the rear we discovered a large hall, over the entrance of
which a rebel tablet still remained--'Teen-foo-dong'--'Hall of
the Heavenly Father.' But what really astonished us was to find
on the walls a complete set of elegant lithograph engravings,
which Roman Catholics are accustomed to call the 'stations,' a
series of pictures representing the sad journey of Jesus from
the house of Pilate to His place of execution.

"One of the pictures we became possessed of, and we shall ever
keep it as the most precious souvenir of our trip to Soo-chow;
for we think that the affecting story of Jesus' passion and
death was _appreciated_ by these _Missionary-forsaken_ patriots.

"It certainly shows that a high Taeping official loved to
contemplate the various scenes of that awful tragedy (for
principle's sake) over which the world, till the end of time,
shall weep the bitter tears of violated right and triumphant
wrong.

"_20th Dec._--The day being fine, we determined to have a look
at the steamers _Feillong_ and _Sycee_. A smart walk to the
Padi-cho gate brought us to the 'fifty-two arched bridge,' where
we saw the heavy artillery just outside.

"We looked with regret upon those splendid 'peace-makers,' that
_they_ should have been _loaned_ to the butcher of
Soo-chow--that _they_ should be the property of the British
Government--were thoughts upon which we need make no comment.

"Captain Baily in charge, and very creditably too! His
hospitality is the last pleasant impression we had of Soo-chow,
if we omit the feeling of relief we experienced when once
outside of its walls on our way to Shanghae.

"_21st Dec._--On learning (to our surprise) that the _locale_ of
the 'execution ground' was neither more nor less than the
court-yard of the '_Shing-s-tah_,' 'twin pagodas,' where the
unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for
trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled assailants,
we determined on a trip thither. On our arrival, we examined
several most ancient tablets of stone, whence we gathered that
these pagodas were erected long anterior to the Ming dynasty
(_i.e._ reign of Tai Ching, dynasty of Sung); but we will not
detain our readers with antiquarian trifles. On entering the
court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground _soaked_
with HUMAN BLOOD! the creek forming its drain was still (after
twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood, as the officers
of Dr. Macartney's force can testify. The ground for three feet
deep stunk with blood (and the best blood of China); though the
weather, except at noonday, did not favour the corruption of
animal particles, Soo-chow being situated in lat. 31 deg. 23' 25"
N., and long. 120 deg. 25' E.; consequently of rather a warm climate
even in winter.

"Our Chinese informants told us that 30,000 rebels had been led
to these shambles, and executed. We had proofs enough to know
that the number was enormous; we have it on authority of an
European _eye-witness_ that this creek was so full of
decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boatmen to clean
it, by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks outside of the city
into the principal stream.

"We quitted the 'execution ground' (travellers will know it by
the 'twin towers'), faint at these horrible proofs of _human_
butchery which had met our view, and overcome with emotion. Was
it for _this_ that Englishmen fought? Was it for this that
English guns had been loaned by the representatives of the
British people? Was it for _this_ that the 'first nation of the
world' and the two _Scotchmen_, Gordon and Dr. Macartney, had
fought?

"Let the spirit of Robert Bruce forbid it! Let the noble sons of
Scotia contemn it; and all Christendom, in the name of ...
liberty, protest against the unspeakable perfidy, the horrible
treachery, and brutal butchery of Soo-chow!

"_22nd Dec._--Though the experiences of yesterday made us long
to leave Soo-chow, we determined to visit the ruins of Mo-wang's
palace; though completely burned, it had evidently covered an
immense area of several acres; huge bronzes half melted
obstructed the passage, and only a solitary drum stood sentinel
at the entrance.

"It was with a melancholy satisfaction that we gazed at the
wreck of his palace.

"Among so many traitors (his brother Wangs) he had been _true_
to his flag. He knew what Manchoo honour meant, and his death by
the hands of Taeping traitors is his eulogium. If his spirit
_can_ visit this world of ours, we must rejoice that the
Manchoos have not profited (even in money) by his destruction.

"If the infamous barbarity of the Futai _can_ be excused; if his
atrocious violation of justice and right can be pardoned; if
there is any possible Jesuitical ground of justification for his
immeasurable atrocities, it is this--he betrayed the betrayers
of their own cause: he was a traitor to traitors, and has broken
faith with the recreant Wangs.

"Depressed in spirit, we hurried from the ruins of Mo-wang's
palace to our boat, and instantly gave orders to our crew to get
under weigh for Shanghae.

"Hardly had we quitted the gate, when a letter was placed in our
hands by a trusty agent from Chung-wang, dated Kia-ching-foo;
what were our feelings in perusing it and finding these
words:--'You foreigners are like the Manchoos; you have no
honour! you have deceived us!' We, as a foreigner, felt all the
bitterness herein contained. We, a personal friend of his,
blushed for our nationality in being compared to perfidious
Manchoos!

"We candidly avow it, if we thought that the sword was really
stronger than the pen, we would have girded it on, and be one
more 'witness' to the glorious cause of liberty! We should like
to prove to the Taepings that European nations are not _all_
unprincipled liars, devoid of every virtue recognised by men,
and that sacred volume which teaches a morality of which one
would think they were ignorant. So much for our trip to Soo-choo
and back.

"S. E. F. O. C."

The dreadful Soo-chow tragedy may be considered the terminating point of that unrighteous period of British policy commencing with the organization of the Anglo-Manchoo flotilla; the hiring out of Major Gordon and other officers; and the making of those infamous Orders in Council authorizing military and naval support of the Manchoo, while it has since been declared that an ordinance of neutrality was in force all the time! That the terrible result of their policy would have so far influenced the supposed Christian and civilized principles of those members of Lord Palmerston's Government who originated it, as to make them admit their mistake with worthy humility, and seek to rectify the wrong already done by an essay towards the much easier path of right, is very doubtful. However, the spirit of Englishmen could no longer be restrained, and the Government were driven to rescind their former Orders in Council (placing the forces of England at the evil disposal of the Manchoo) by the unanimous voice of the Parliamentary representatives of the people.

Englishmen may thus flatter themselves that they have repudiated the atrocities which they had occasioned; but the very fact that their mistaken policy entirely caused such deplorable results, makes them morally responsible for the same. Still the national complicity _may_ be glossed over. The participation of the agents on the spot, and especially the principal, Gordon, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be excused.

If Major Gordon had resigned his employment in the service of the local servant of the Manchoo Government, he might, by thus immediately forsaking his brother generals when he became involved in their deeds of blood and treachery, have saved his honour from suspicion and his name from everlasting infamy. If he had possessed the least particle of self-respect, humanity, or Christian feeling, he could not possibly have followed any other course. Incredible as the fact must ever seem to right-minded Englishmen, Major Gordon, after craftily passing two months at Quin-san, still in command of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, and still receiving his pay from his employer, resumed active service with those sanguinary monsters and consummate betrayers, General Ching and the Futai Le.

Men judge by actions, but despise words. Gordon has _said_ that his disgust was something stupendous at the revolting barbarities perpetrated by his friends; yet the sentiment did not make him refuse their pay, neither did it prevent his return to participate in fresh atrocities within two months, nor shock him sufficiently to stay his early reconciliation with the blood-stained wretches who had smeared him with the same unfading and polluting mark. Of course, before returning to active service, the British officer induced his Manchoo master to indite a cunningly worded Chinese despatch, setting forth that he was not actually concerned in the massacre of the confiding Soo-chow victims. Naturally enough, to retain the services of Major Gordon (and the consequent assistance of the British Government), without which they would still have been powerless before the Ti-pings, the Manchoos, through Futai Le, verbosely declared all that was required. Shortly afterwards, besides resuming his employment, the major responded by writing an official letter, in which he forgot his former disgust, and had the singular audacity not only to exonerate the Futai from blame for his unparalleled atrocities, but to request Sir F. Bruce not to make any further complaint about the same[71]--events that had seriously stained the honour of Great Britain, and which only the most prompt and unqualified repudiation, together with entire cessation of further countenance and help to the Manchoo, could either erase from her scutcheon, or clear her policy from the imputation of complicity.

Unfortunately for the reputation of Major Gordon, since his elevation to the position of General of Futai Le's Anglo mercenaries, he had been too much accustomed to intrigue and encouragement of treachery to have felt a proper indignation at the Soo-chow affair; and it is possible he might have had some knowledge of the planned perfidy before it was put into execution, and so was not sufficiently horrified to throw up his 1,200 taels (L400) per month. Gordon's behaviour in the treachery of the Burgevine-Ti-ping legion is one specimen, and a very strong one too, of the conduct referred to. He induced the Europeans who went over to him to desert the Ti-ping cause by his promises of office, bribes, and safe conduct to Shanghae for such as were tired of fighting. Some mistaken individuals have ascribed this proceeding to the humane disposition of the man who condoned the ruthless massacre of his paroled prisoners, who assisted as a principal agent in the vast destruction of life and desolation of country during the unjustifiable British hostilities against the Ti-pings, and who never put himself to the trouble of saving the lives of those he assisted to vanquish. It must be a rather lax code of military honour which could reflect any _credit_ on Gordon for rewarding many of the traitors (mostly low American rowdies), by bestowing upon them various commands in his own force; and he--supposed to be an English officer and gentleman--with open arms receiving them as his messmates and brother officers: even less creditable is the fact that he obtained pecuniary reward for those whom he did not make his _friends_.

The letter written to Sir F. Bruce by Gordon as a justification for his fresh alliance with the Futai Le, appears in the Parliamentary Papers, as noticed by the foot-note on the preceding page. This document is so important, as showing the character of Gordon's connection with the Imperialists, that I quote it in full, and then subject it to a close analysis.

"INCLOSURE 1 in No. 9.
"_Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce._
"Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.

"My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,--

Par. 1.--"_In consequence of the danger which will arise by my
delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of
uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footae_ to issue a
proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any
participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have
determined to act immediately."

Par. 2.--"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:--_I know
of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels;
that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of
no character; and that the Footae will not accept another
British officer if I leave the service_, and therefore the
Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put
under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at
times we should never feel certain."

Par. 3.--"_I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for
the course I am about to pursue_; but in the absence of advice,
_and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support
the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run
the risk_. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I
have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful. _But the
rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body_, and it
will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as
possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should
serve to benefit the Imperial Government."

Par. 4.--"_I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months
longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave,
and the Government does not support the Imperialists._ I propose
to cut through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it
into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."

Par. 5.--"If the course I am about to pursue meets your
approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect
to be well rebuked. However, _I know that I am not actuated by
personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most
conducive to the interests of our Government_.

"The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I
imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."

Par. 6.--"_The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some
extenuating circumstances in his favour, for his action_; and
although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can
scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an
European governor.

"This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this
matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I
will answer shortly, I am, &c.,

(Signed) "C. G. GORDON."

Par. 7.--"P.S. _If you would let the matter drop_, and make me
responsible for my action in the matter, _I think it would be
more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government
than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae_.

"C. G. G."

NOTE.--The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to
review.

_Analysis of Major Gordon's Letter._

Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to resume _friendship_ and _alliance_ with the faithless and barbarous wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities? Major Gordon's duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of participation in the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, he should have repudiated both. What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took any _action_ to fulfil his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually had the unparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, to _arrange_ terms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or communication whatever, upon a friendly basis constituted a direct condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an unqualified separation from _all_ interests and future connection imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.

Par. 2. The assertion that Gordon _knew for a certainty_ that Burgevine intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following extract from the _Friend of China_, Shanghae newspaper (issue of September 29, 1864), which, being one of the principal organs among a population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls, may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst; moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause.

The article referred to states:--

"As for Gordon's assertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a
certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that
upwards of 300 Europeans--[This estimate is supremely absurd.
During the whole time Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when
everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never
obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]--of no character,
intended to join him. This being written in February last, we
know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did
Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there
thirty--the tenth of 300--Europeans in this quarter available
for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an
impression that he was writing truth when he made this
assertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as
improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say he
_may_ have been under an impression that he was writing truth.
We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why,
Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the
assistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their
ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well,
moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel
service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if
ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather
as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-ping general. The
assertion--yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called--did
very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz.
Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there
was no possibility of contravening it at the time."

Besides the facts--incontrovertible to those acquainted with the case--in the above refutation of Gordon's "reasons" for his fresh blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another strong argument may be proved against his veracity:--

1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-wang, I am quite assured on this point. 2. Then with respect to the probable action of Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition than at the period of Gordon's statement, he would, consequently, never be disposed to join when its circumstances had become desperate. 3. As for the "300 of no character," mercenaries would certainly not espouse a failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more "unprofitable" than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These propositions cannot fail to damage the "reasons" given by Gordon, because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon's "reasons," while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements. The principal argument is the fact that Burgevine _did not_ join the Ti-ping, and the mythical "300" were never more heard about.

Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon's letter seems to contain about the most severe condemnation of his "reasons" that it would be possible to imagine. He states that "he is open to very grave censure for the course he was about to pursue," and that, "knowing the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done," he had made up his mind to "run the risk;" that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government would approve the treachery and massacre in which the Futai had involved him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.

With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades "the rabble," it is well noticed in the quotation from the _Hong-Kong Daily Press_, at the end of this analysis.

Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the rebellion cannot last "six months;" without that mighty warrior's hostility, it would last "six years." Well, Bombastes did take the field, but the "rebellion" still flourishes. It will be seen that the blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs his value at only twelve times that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the Ti-ping.

Par. 5. Concerning this protestation of disinterested motives--"I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations"--I beg to refer my readers to the concluding paragraph of the analysis, when they will find that this statement is no less questionable than others by the same author. With regard to Gordon's excessive care of the "interests of our Government," and his declaration (in paragraph 2 of the letter), "that the Futai will not accept another British officer if I leave the service," the article in the _Friend of China_, already quoted, continues from where we left off:--"And just as likely to be true was the statement that the Futai would not accept another _British_ officer if he, Gordon, left the Chinese service. How did Gordon learn that fact, or that story? What can there be in _British_ officers that they should be so repugnant to the Deputy Viceroy? What Gordon really meant was:--If I leave, 'the Government' will not find such a faithful tool in any one else as they have found in me."

Par. 6. In this part of the precious letter it is shamelessly declared that "the Futai has extenuating circumstances in his favour" for breaking faith and cruelly butchering the defenceless prisoners at Soo-chow, who solely surrendered upon the terms guaranteed by Gordon himself.

Par. 7. This postscript makes a fitting conclusion to the bad principle and illogical reasoning of the letter we have reviewed. Gordon has the audacity to request that the "matter"--affecting not only his own character, for that is immaterial, but the honour of the British army and the fair fame of England herself--may be "let drop," and to opine that "good relations" should be maintained with the Pekin Government, by no longer expressing any indignation at the immeasurable disgrace reflected upon England by the revolting barbarities perpetrated by her very good Manchoo allies, through the aid, and in the actual presence, of British officers.

Before concluding the analysis of Gordon's apology for resuming active operations with the Futai, it is necessary to make a few further observations. In the first place, it is quite impossible to deduce a sufficient cause from the three "reasons" by which he declares himself to have been actuated (paragraph No. 2). Even suppose we admit the allegations that Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels; that 300 Europeans were ready to join him; and that the Futai would not have accepted another _British_ officer, to what conclusion do they lead us? Simply, that _if_ these suppositions became realized, the event might prove disastrous to the Manchoo. Now, as Gordon chose to make this his excuse for comfortably passing over the Soo-chow affair, and resuming active service, it is perfectly clear that (whether he intends to convey this meaning or not) he pursued such conduct in the interest of his Imperialist friends; and this reduces the three "reasons" into a plea of duty to the Manchoo. Moreover, from the independent action claimed throughout the letter, the writer does not attempt to justify himself by any pretence of duty to his own Government. British officers, and, indeed, all their countrymen, may well feel astonished and disgusted at the extraordinary reasoning of Gordon, who, though merely the hired mercenary of a _local_ Mandarin (Le Futai), and being totally without _status_ in the Imperialist service,[72] made his duty to the Manchoo, forsooth, a reason for condoning the atrocities in which they had already involved him, and justifying his future participation in deeds equally abhorrent to every civilized and Christian sentiment.

We now come to the question as to the worth of this plea of duty. Either Gordon was the servant of the Manchoo Government or the British Government. When the English Commons compelled ministers to revoke the Order in Council authorizing the employment of British officers by the Manchoo, and to recall all so employed, _in consequence of the Soo-chow massacre_, Gordon, eventually, was withdrawn from service with the Futai. Now this proves that he was _bona fide_ the servant of the British Government, and not only destroys his implied plea of duty to the Government of China, but virtually disclaims any countenance or indorsement of his act in joining the Futai and resuming active operations subsequent to the Soo-chow tragedy. Thus it is palpable beyond any manner of doubt that the course Gordon pursued was _entirely_ according to "personal considerations;" was at his own responsibility; and was neither in consonance with duty to his own Government nor that of the Manchoo.

There are but three other motives which might be held to account for Gordon's conduct. The first would be, duty to his God--but this never has been attributed to him, and it would be gross blasphemy to do so; the second, philanthropy, has been professed both by himself and friends; the third, which is pecuniary, has been more frequently ascribed to him. The philanthropical motive will be controverted shortly when we come to a case in which it is attributed to him. With one exception (the _China Mail_), the whole European press of China lamented Gordon's connection with the Futai at Soo-chow; still more indignant were the channels of public opinion when they found that he quietly ignored the treacherous massacre by remaining at his post; and then rumours were not wanting with regard to the mercenary motives believed by many people to be the real cause of his return to active service. Major Gordon has not only brought himself into evil repute, but also the service of which he is so questionable a specimen. Take, for instance, the following extract from the _Friend of China_ (issue February 20, 1864):--"If it be true that Major Gordon has again coalesced with Le Futai, he must not blame us if we judge of his motives according to the old maxim, 'actions speak louder than words.' It would seem that his late rejection of rewards from the hand of Kung was simply because of its having been too little for his acceptance, not too vile. His retirement to Quin-san was a safe dodge to quiet public opinion in regard to the Soo-chow massacre.... We hope that he has stipulated for tens of lacs of rupees. Why should a soldier of fortune not make a fortune? When the major returns to Scotland, will any of his 'canny' countrymen ask impertinent questions as to the source of the 'siller'? To be sure, military men who wear Queen Victoria's uniform may hem and haw, cough and look doubtful; but we assure the major that if one British officer can sell his sword, the others have no right to complain about the price.... Dollars cover every defect, and a wealthy soldier can afford to buy the respect which he cannot exact. Let the trade of murder flourish, as it always has done, and may Major Gordon fully enjoy all the wealth that the Manchoos can give, and that mental satisfaction which faithful servitude never fails to bring to those of integrity! Is not faithfulness bought and sold in 'Vanity Fair,' and should that not be looked for in the conduct of a--British soldier?"

If this article were to be literally intended, it would probably indicate the principles of Gordon. It appears very unfair to judge him by the code of honour, civilized morality, and Christian doctrine, when he does not seem either to appreciate such restraints or conform to them; therefore it is possible that the press has been too severe when condemning acts that, in this case, may, perhaps, be rather virtuous than otherwise.

We now bring the analysis of Gordon's "reasons" to a close by the following extract from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_ (October, 1864), which refers to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the letter, and finishes by making a direct accusation of mercenary motives for his coalescence with the Futai:--

"We believe it is well known that had Gordon left, Macartney
would have succeeded. Certain it is that Macartney was an
applicant for the post when Gordon was nominated, and as he had
subsequently completely won the Futai's confidence, there can be
little doubt about the matter.

"It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon's pretexts are shallow
subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one
moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says,
'knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the
Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the
risk.' That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!

"He then turns round on his comrades--calls them a dangerous
rabble, 'which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as
quietly as possible, and that while in course of dissolution it
should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.'

"Apart from Gordon's unprincipled conduct with respect to the
perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the Wangs--conduct
which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him
from looking an honest man in the face again--we doubt whether,
in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a
victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the
disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon
turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the
reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san
force to victory--how splendidly they behaved in the campaign
which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus
treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made
him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt
whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the
code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining
the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his
comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us.

"A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st
March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of
Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact that,
at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at
Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted
as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr.
Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself,
which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did
not Gordon mention this important circumstance in his letter to
Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the
field?[73] How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his
letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent
on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant
of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so
secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart's
presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers,
let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that
gentleman avers was effected at the interview?

"The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high
standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have
great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent
him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000 _taels_, the colonel might
be assured not only that the money would be placed to his credit
in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction
would be kept an inviolable secret.

"There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon's sacrifice of
principle, and Mr. Hart's visit to Soo-chow."

Before narrating the events subsequent to Gordon's return to active operations, and bringing the history of the Ti-ping revolution down to a close, it is necessary to review a despatch written by Sir F. Bruce, the British Minister in China. The document constitutes the only authority, or rather the only official approval, Gordon ever received for rejoining the Futai. It is necessary to notice the same, because, as it was an entirely conditional approval, and the conditions were _never_ observed, it naturally became null and void. It is, therefore, our duty to prove these facts, and thereby elucidate what might otherwise be held to remove the responsibility from Gordon, and, in fact, justify his conduct. The following despatch is the one in question, and it will be seen that it is the reply to Gordon's letter:--

"Pekin, March 12, 1864.

"Sir,--I have received your letter of the 6th of February,
stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations
in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the
Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere
with the course you have taken, _but that my acquiescence was
founded on the passage in their despatch to me, which states_,
that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is
concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign
nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the
extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing
the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]

"I have received the strongest assurance that it will be
strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be
instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how
essential it is that there should be no repetition of the
occurrence at Soo-chow.

"I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the
correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at
once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You
might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which
rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the
onus of decision before committing yourself to any action.

"But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force,
and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its
composition and with the dangers to which this force, if
indiscreetly handled, might give rise that the decision must be
based on your representations, and you therefore assumed its
responsibility.

"This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to
a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.

"I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step
you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of
the high motives that have guided you while in command of the
Chinese force, _of the disinterested conduct you have observed
in pecuniary questions_, and of _the influence in favour of
humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided
associates from Soo-chow_. [2.]

"I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of
serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily
pursued the _pacification of the province of Kiang-soo_. _In
relieving it_ from being the battle-field of the insurrection,
and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of
their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry,
you may console yourself with the assurance that you are
rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great
material interest. [3.]

"It would be a serious calamity and addition to our
embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work
incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the
Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger
and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has
suffered.

"Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison
Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on
until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits
is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly
and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping
insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from
its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace.

"To the force under your command we must look for that result,
and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is
indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is
full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of
the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow, _provided
you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in
future defeated by the Chinese authorities_.[74] [4.]

"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
"FREDERIC W. A. BRUCE.

"Major Gordon, R.E., &c."

[1.] Now, here we have the _condition_ upon which Sir F. Bruce agreed to Gordon's action. Let us see how the condition has been observed. If my readers will take the trouble to turn back to the preceding chapter, they will find that the capture of Hwa-soo and Wu-see (as corroborated by the letter dated "April 28, 1864," from one of Gordon's own officers) was followed with a complete violation of Sir F. Bruce's conditional "acquiescence" by the wholesale massacre of the unfortunate Ti-pings. Furthermore, the following chapter will prove that at every city captured by Gordon and the Imperialists "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations" were _not_ observed, nor even pretended to be fulfilled according to the terms of the condition upon which Gordon's action was approved: the principal cases referred to will be found to be the capture of Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, Chang-chow-foo, and Nankin.

[2.] The preceding quotation from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_, and the description of Burgevine's hegira in Chapter XXII., sadly differ from Sir F. Bruce's "pecuniary" and "influence in favour of humanity" theories formed at Pekin upon evidence supplied by Gordon himself. Burgevine had actually _left_ Soo-chow before Gordon interfered.

[3.] Readers of this history will at once perceive the falseness of these statements, Major Gordon having, in fact, not only _prevented_ the "pacification of the province of Kiang-soo" by the Ti-pings, but _made_ it "the battle-field of insurrection" by his "steadily pursued" _invasions_ of the otherwise peaceful and settled Ti-ping territories. As for the hypocritical cant about "a service to true humanity," &c., I need only refer to the narrative of the journey to Soo-chow by the sub-editor of the _Friend of China_; the travels of the silk-merchant through the _pacified_ country; the letters from two of Gordon's own officers, &c.