Chapter II: Part 2
[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here that during the first conversation which the chief of the central department had with the Reich Minister Dr. Frank on 3 October 1939 in Posen, the latter explained the task which had been given him by the Führer and the economic-political principles on which he intended to base his administration of Poland. This could only be done by ruthless exploitation of the country. Therefore, it would be necessary to recruit manpower to be used in the Reich, and so on.
I have summarized it, Mr. President.
FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the way it is put here.
DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never spoken to that man?
FRANK: I cannot remember it at all.
DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question.
FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be more important than what was said at the time.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, and undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were due to the guerrilla activities?
FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance movement, which started from the very first day and was supported by our enemies, which presented the most difficult problem I had to cope with during all these years. For this resistance movement perpetually supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and excuses for all those measures which, from the viewpoint of an orderly administration, were very regrettable. In fact, the resistance movement—I will not call it guerrilla activity, because if a people has been conquered during a war and organizes an active resistance movement, that is something definitely to be respected—but the methods of the resistance movement went far beyond the limits of an heroic revolt. German women and children were slaughtered under the most atrocious circumstances. German officials were shot; trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and all measures taken to bring about the recovery of the country were systematically undermined.
And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred day after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period of my activity, that the events in that country must be considered. That is all I have to say to that.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in Warsaw under the leadership of General Bor. What part did the administration of the Government General have, and what part did you have in putting down that revolt?
FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army had advanced to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; and, as it seems to me, also a national Polish action, as the Poles at the last moment wanted to carry out the liberation of their capital themselves and did not want to owe it to the Soviet Russians. They probably were thinking of how, in Paris, at the last moment the resistance movement, even before the Allies had approached, had accomplished the liberation of the city.
The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander of the German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they appointed SS General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, therefore, did not have any part in the fighting. The part played by the civil administration began only after the capitulation of General Bor, when the most atrocious orders for vengeance came from the Reich.
A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged victorious, to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the fleeing population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, distributed throughout the Government General.
During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very seriously damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned down in a few weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order to save time, will probably be in a better position to give us more details.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed the cultural life of the population of the Government General, especially as regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have you to say about that?
FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture as every occupied country. We do not have to look far from this courtroom to see what cultural life is like in an occupied country.
We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. We had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, and we had a Polish school system, that is, elementary schools and high schools, in which at the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the service of the Government General. As far as it was possible Polish theaters were reopened in the large cities, and where German theaters were established we made sure that there was also a Polish theater at the same time. After the proclamation of the so-called total war in August 1944, the absurd situation arose in which the German theater in Kraków was closed, because all German theaters were closed at that time, whereas the Polish theaters remained open.
I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the most well known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and founded the Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. This was in being until the end, and played an important part in the cultural life of Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in Kraków, and from all over Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I believe that is sufficient on this point.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any measures which aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian culture.
FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken with that intention would be sheer nonsense.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you did everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the population?
FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in detail. I can say that everything humanly possible was done.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, has submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the report about a police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here in Pages 33 to 38 the following...
FRANK: [_Interposing._] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary to read that.
DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers to the Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you said...
FRANK: [_Interposing._] May I say something about the Kraków professors right away?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November 1939 before my arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out later, called the Kraków professors to a meeting. They thereupon arrested the men, among them dignified old professors, and took them to some concentration camp. I believe it was Oranienburg. I found that report when I arrived and against everything which may be found there in my diary, I want to emphasize here under oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get every one of the professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940. That is all I have to say to this.
DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt with the so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary Pacification Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned with it, I would like to read to you two entries in the diary. One is dated 16 May 1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary tension then existing, you stated the following: That, first of all, an action for pacification would have to be started, and then you said:
“Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the
safeguarding of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has
to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and
quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.”
On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, who was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said in your own words:
“Regarding the question as to what should happen to the
political criminals who had been arrested during the AB Action,
there is to be a conference with State Secretary Bühler,
Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach and
Ministerialrat Wille.”
End of quotation.
What actually happened during that AB Action?
FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained in the diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after month attempted assassinations increased. The encouragement and support given by the rest of the world to the resistance movement to undermine all our efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to an alarming degree, and this led to this general pacification action, not only in the Government General, but also in other areas, and which I believe was ordered by the Führer himself.
My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, and in this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out that I also made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of reprieve in each individual case; for that purpose I wanted the police and SS verdicts of death by shooting to be submitted to a reprieve committee which I had formed in that connection. I believe that can be seen from the diary also.
DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something about it.
FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used at that time was a tremendous mistake.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the principle introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin?
FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports about it, I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about that peculiar development of the law.
DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and how did it come about?
FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite impossible. He wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, and that state of affairs could be solved only in one way—either he or I had to go. I think that at the last moment, by the intervention of Kaltenbrunner, if I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, this remarkable fellow was removed.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more a personal struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that there were differences of opinion on basic questions?
FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to establish a power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and therefore I had to fight the power of violence, and here personal viewpoints separated altogether.
DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different?
FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him particularly when I say that even in the SS there were many decent men who also had a sense of what was right.
DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the Government General?
FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, criminal, and uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the Ukrainian police. They also were under the German police chief.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important questions. In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you made speeches before large audiences. What was the purpose of these speeches, and what were the consequences for you?
FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that I made to bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response of the German people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. I stated at that time that a Reich without law and without humanity could not last long, and more in that vein. After I had been under police surveillance for several days in Munich, I was relieved of all my Party offices. As this was a matter of German domestic politics under the sovereignty of the German Reich, I refrain from making any more statements about it here.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation? And what was the answer?
FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, and I received the same answer: that for reasons connected with foreign policy I could not be released.
DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your diary a number of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; but in view of the fact that the Prosecution may do that in the course of the cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. I have no more questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what precisely was your legal status and what exactly was the position you occupied in the system of the fascist state. Please answer me: When were you promoted to the post of Governor of occupied Poland? To whom were you directly subordinated?
FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the directive concerning the Governor General became effective.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by Hitler’s order of 12 October 1939 you were directly subordinated to Hitler, were you not?
FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order concerning your appointment as Governor General of Poland? This order was dated 12 October 1939.
FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came into force on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. Before that I was Chief of Administration with the military commander Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you were directly subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, Sub-paragraph 1, of this order.
FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories were all immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation that Paragraph 3 states, “The Governor General is immediately subordinate to me.”
But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid as soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the task of carrying out the military administration.” And this withdrawal, that is, the coming into force of this decree took place on 26 October.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we have information to that effect in the book which you evidently remember. It is Book 5. You do remember this book of the Government General?
FRANK: It is of course in the decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into force, to whom were you directly subordinate?
FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. What is your wish? To what do you wish me to answer?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came into force on the 26 October. Well, when this order actually became valid, to whom were you subordinated? Was there, or was there not, any further order issued by Hitler?
FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor General. That is this one.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no further instructions?
FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was no other decree determining the system of administration, was there?
FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in your book, and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right.
FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall come into effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of October.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That means that after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied Poland, were directly subordinate to Hitler?
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember when, and by whom, you were entrusted with the execution, in occupied Poland, of the Four Year Plan?
FRANK: By Göring.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan in Poland, were you not?
FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The activities of several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the Government General were such that I was greatly concerned about it. Therefore, I approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to appoint me trustee for the Four Year Plan. That was later—in January...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December.
FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the beginning of December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan?
FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember that in October 1939 the first decree regarding the organization of administration in the Government General was promulgated?
FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 of that decree.
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of action of the State Secretary for Security will be determined by the Governor General in agreement with the Reichsführer SS and”—this is the passage which interests me—“the Chief of the German Police.”
Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first day of your appointment as Governor General you undertook the control of the Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility for their actions?
FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I would like to make an explanation....
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; is how could that be explained otherwise?
THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation.
Defendant, you may make your explanation.
FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an old legal principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights to anybody else than he has himself. What I have stated here was the ideal which I had before me and how it should have been. Everybody has to admit that it is natural and logical that the police should be subordinate to the Chief of Administration. The Führer, who alone could have decided, did not make that decree. I did not have the power nor the authority to put into effect this decree which I had so carefully formulated.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to say that this Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, but which you were never able to attain?
FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that question. A little slower please, and may I have the translation into German a little slower?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does this mean that the statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph 3 of this decree was an ideal which you persistently strove to attain, which you openly professed, but which you were never able to attain? Would that be correct?
FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by the fact that later it was found necessary to appoint a special State Secretary for Security in a last effort to find a way out of the difficulty.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in April 1942, special negotiations took place between you and Himmler. Did these negotiations take place in April 1942?
FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your question. I cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my endeavor...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can turn to your diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these negotiations an understanding was reached between you and Himmler.
FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory on the subject I shall ask that the corresponding volume of your diary be handed to you, so that you may have the text before you.
FRANK: Yes, I am ready.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 of this agreement. It states:
THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date 21 April 1942?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; 21 April 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. It has been translated into English, and I shall hand it over immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying to find the place.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the English text.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the contents. It says: “The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State Secretary) is directly subordinate to the Governor General, and, if he is absent, then to his Deputy.”
Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with your ideal in the sense that the Police should be subordinate to you?
FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days later the whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts on my part were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible to put them into effect.
You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, could give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here had reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then comes the matter of the agreement...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I must ask you to refer to another part of the document...
FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was never put into effect, but that this decree was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I do not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that is the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to the “expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a draft of what was to appear in the Führer decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to that subject. You agree that this decision was practically a verbatim decree of the Führer?
FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough to give me the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you about that.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.
[_Turning to the President._] Incidentally this decree appears in your document book, Mr. President.
FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most essential parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this decree, with a few changes. However, the book has been taken away from me and I cannot compare it.
THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now.
[_The book was submitted to the defendant._]
FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to Paragraph 3 of Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here that the State Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the Governor General. And does this not confirm the fact that the police of the Government General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate to you? That is Paragraph 3 of the decree.
FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were not subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are subordinate to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you come to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up in my absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise 1 would have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable.
Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for Security in the field of security and for the preservation of German nationality. If you compare the original agreement with this, as contained in the diary, you will find that in one of the most important fields the Führer had changed his mind, that is, concerning the Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality. This title embraces the Jewish question and the question of colonization.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, that you have only taken into consideration one aspect of this question, and that you have given a rather one-sided interpretation of the excerpt quoted. May I recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of this decree which, in Sub-paragraph 2, reads as follows:
“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the consent of the Governor General before carrying out the directives of the Reichsführer SS and the German Police.”
And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same decree of Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of opinion between the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the SS and the German Police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this connection I would ask you, does not this paragraph testify to the very considerable rights granted by you to the leaders of the police and the SS in the Government General and to your own responsibility for the activities of these organizations?
FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to that in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some influence over the police and the SS also failed.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt it was? In this case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed this decree. Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler?
FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that Krüger went against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, but that has nothing to do with power. That was considered by Himmler as a tremendous concession made to me. I want to refer to a memorandum of the summer of 1942, I think, shortly after the decree of the Führer came into force.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to ask you: Is it possible that you...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the actual leader of the National Socialist Party in the Government General?
FRANK: I hear nothing at all.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you...
FRANK: I hear nothing at all.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to put to you: After 6 May 1940 in the Government General...
FRANK: 6 May?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi organization had been completed in the Government General, who was appointed its leader?
FRANK: I was.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration of the National Socialist Party and of the Police was concentrated in your hands. Therefore you are responsible for the administration, the Police, and the political life of the Government General.
FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you say that I had control of the Police.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only way one could interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents which I have put to you.
FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the realities of the situation.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to another group of questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek only in 1944, isn’t that so?
FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge officially for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be shown a document which was presented by your defense counsel, which was compiled by you, and which is a report addressed to Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read into the record one excerpt, and I wish to remind you that this is dated 19 June 1943:
“As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, I
enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD in the Government General...”
FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. I have the passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is differently worded.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now?
FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The sentence here starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...”
THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last paragraph.
FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...”
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue:
“As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the German
leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, this passage
comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a characteristic
excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and
SD in the Government General for the period from 1 to 31 May
1943, concerning the possibilities of propaganda resulting from
Katyn.”
FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show me the passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in my text.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat earlier in your text.
FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which you find lower down at the bottom. Follow the text:
“A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before,
will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn
and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties,
especially in Auschwitz.”
I omit the next sentence and I continue:
“Among that portion of the working classes which is not
communistically inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same
time it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the
Poles is not any better.”
Please note the next sentence:
“It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz and
Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is carried out
systematically.”
How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions Auschwitz and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your statement that you heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, your report is dated June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek and Auschwitz.
FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek became known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the word “Maidanek” has always been mentioned in connection with extermination of Jews.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I refer to the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you heard of the mass murder of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you heard of the mass murder of Jews?
FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of the Jews at Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the foreign press.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass killings of the Poles in 1943?
FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: these are the facts as I put them before the Führer.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document be shown to you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted with it?
FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the wording agrees with the text of the original decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with the original text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the text and will be able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. What do you think of this law signed by you?
FRANK: Yes, it is here.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich Academy of Law. From the standpoint of the most elementary standards of law, what do you think of this law signed by you?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. President.
FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. It provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of a judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the power to give pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted to me.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how this court for court-martial proceedings was composed, who the members of this court were. Would you please pay attention to Paragraph 3, Point 1 of Paragraph 3?
FRANK: The Security Police, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your hostile attitude to the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right to exert oppression on the Polish population?
FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert any influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, there would have been no possibility of control; and the Police would simply have acted at random.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of reprieve which was entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph 6 of this law. I remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial by the SD was to be put into effect immediately according to the text. I remind you again that there was only one possible verdict: “death.” How could you change it if the condemned person was to be shot or hanged immediately after the verdict?
FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be carried out immediately.
FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued in connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the committee which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files were sent in...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the right to reprieve, I will put to you another question. Do you remember the AB Action?
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this action signified the execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals?
FRANK: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify?
FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of appeasement and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly regulated procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. This was the meaning of that action.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well what you mean. How did you treat persons who were subject to the AB Action? What happened to them?
FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of arrests.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to them later?
FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then?
FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had been established. At least, that is what I intended.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively?
FRANK: The Police were in charge.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took over the extermination of these people after they had been arrested, is that so?
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why you did not exercise your power of reprieve while they were carrying out this inhuman action?
FRANK: I did make use of it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, dated 30 May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with the Police on 30 May 1940, when you gave final instructions to the police before carrying out this action?
FRANK: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following:
“Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene
in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, should
be considered as treason to the State and to German interests.”
Do you remember this statement?
FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account all the circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must consider the statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single sentence. This concerns a development which went on for weeks and months, in the course of which the reprieve committee was established by me for the first time. That was my way of protesting against arbitrary actions and of introducing legal justice in all these proceedings. That is a development extending over many weeks, which you cannot, in my opinion, summarize in one sentence.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which in my opinion can have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote:
“The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not
concerned with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out
exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his
organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting the
country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of a
normal legal trial.”
That is to say you renounced your right of pardon?
FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will see that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. Did you renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this operation or not?
FRANK: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account for your words, this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not concerned with these matters.”?
How should we interpret these words?
FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the matter. It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment and was then negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the final stage of the development, and not merely the various motives as they came up during the development.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, Defendant. But I would like to ask you, was this statement made during a conference with the Police and did you instruct the Police in that matter?
FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some other connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, I also had to talk to State Secretary Bühler.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing the AB Action with the Police you stated that the results of this action would not concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated to you, is that right?
FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, the final result, but rather an intermediate stage.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you another sentence, in order that you may judge the results of this action. Perhaps you can recall this part which I will put to you. You stated the following:
“We need not bring these elements into German concentration
camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an
unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must simply
liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest way.”
What you mean is that this would simply be a question of liquidation in the simplest form, is that not so?
FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take place in this way.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. What do you mean by saying that this was not carried out? Obviously this was carried out, for the persons were executed.
FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right to pardon them was not exercised.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without application of the right of pardon?
FRANK: I do not believe so.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are no more, and therefore obviously they were executed.
FRANK: Which people?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under the AB Action. I will remind you of another excerpt connected with this AB Action. If you did not agree with the Police with regard to certain police actions it would be difficult to explain the celebrations in connection with the departure of Brigadeführer SS Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does this not mean that you were at least on friendly terms with the Police?
FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of praise are spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You know that as well as any other person.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind you of only one passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer Streckenbach, one sentence only. You said:
“What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, have
done in the Government General must not be forgotten; and you
need not be ashamed of it.”
That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward Streckenbach and his people?
FRANK: And it was not forgotten either.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination?
MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor pleases.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In the course of your examination I understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any of the art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not suppose you to mean that you did not have them collected and registered; you did have them collected and registered, isn’t that so?
FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially collected and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court.
MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got there one Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took over your duties.
FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows:
These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the civilian administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to Lvov at the time and took them from the library. I had never been in Lvov before that. These pictures were then taken directly to the Führer headquarters or to Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure which.
MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am driving at. Is that not a fact?
FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me that he came on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken them away on orders of the Reich Marshal.
MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were collected by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, at the time you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war tasks to get involved in that sort of thing?
FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government General. The Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the Government General; and apart from the collection of the composer Elsner and a Jewish library from Lublin I had no official obligation to demand the return of any art treasures from Rosenberg.
MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession when you were captured by the American forces.
FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding them but not for myself. They were also not in my immediate safekeeping; rather I had taken them along with me from burning Silesia. They could not be safeguarded any other way. They were art treasures which are so widely known that they are Numbers 1 to 10 in the list in the book—no one could have appropriated them. You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.”
MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you had said on interrogation there were some in your possession. I am not trying to imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were not. However, I think you have made that clear.
FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with which we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. Otherwise they would have been lost.
MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to clear up and I will not be long.
I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled for some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who were seized and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of Poland. Now, of course, you are probably familiar with what you said about it yourself in your diary, are you?
FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is said in the diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must never forget that I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, people who reported every word I said to the Führer and Himmler.
MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that they should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned there.
FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. I never did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from Kraków and talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted that most of all.
MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking about what you wrote in your own diary about these professors, and I shall be glad to read it to you and make it available to you if you care to contest it. You are not denying that you said they should either be returned for liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, are you? You do not deny that?
FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to hoodwink my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing more happened to them after that.
MR. DODD: All right.
Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General Krüger, the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell?
FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, sir, that I admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I have also sworn to add nothing. No one can admit any more than I have done by handing over these diaries. What I am asking is that you do not ask me to add anything to that.
MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, I was trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult situation, perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot believe what you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can ask us to believe what you say here. You were writing those things yourself, and at the time you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect that you would be confronted with them.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a speech that he has made?
MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary.
THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my enemies”?
MR. DODD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a record of some speech that he made.
MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary.
FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put myself in a difficult position; rather the changing course of the war made the situation difficult for every administrative official.
MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in which you stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the Führer and that you had...
FRANK: When was the last conference, please?
MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March 1941. It’s in your diary.
FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; whether I was alone with him, I don’t know.
MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come to a complete agreement and that he approved all the measures, including all the decrees, especially also the entire organization of the country. Would you stand by that today?
FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval was always very spontaneously given, but one always had to wait a long while for it to be realized.
MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as you told us this morning?
FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to resign on 14 occasions.
MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make many complaints and did you have the approval of the Führer, or did he turn down your complaints on this occasion of the 17th of March, 1941?
FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by saying, “You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.”
MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in your diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved everything, and you make no mention in your diary of any disappointment over the filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a speech that you were recording in your diary; it seems to be a factual entry on your conversations with the Führer. And my question is simply, do you now admit that that was the situation, or are you saying that it was a false entry?
FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. I never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am merely saying that you must judge the words according to the entire context. If I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer received me and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up my own authority. I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. What my thoughts were, is not made clear from this. I should like to emphasize that I’m not arguing about words and have not asked to do that.
MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the Government General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have any decisive influence in the Government General on political and administrative life?
FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of course, only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party officials were appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. There is no special Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the NSDAP in the occupied territories, in which it says that these spheres of activity are directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction.
DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in the territory of the Government General have anything at all to do with any Security Police affairs?
FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important part; it had no state function.
DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed you Document USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial of 1943. It states in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial sentences are to be carried out at once.” Is it correct if I say that no formal legal appeal against these sentences was possible, but that a pardon was entirely admissible?
FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree is impossible.
DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned the issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in particular of the security situation.
FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the present time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made such a demand possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the universal conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation.
DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in 1939 a court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably greater legal guarantees than that of 1943?
FRANK: Yes.
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Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 12Chapter II: Part 2
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