Chapter XXIV: Part 24

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I should have told the Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents Numbers 53 and 54, because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the British Government.

THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn’t object to Numbers 53 or 54.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don’t object to them.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54?

Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you please strike that out.

DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing with the Greek fleet.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard.

DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document Number 71.

Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; and I should like to refer to these collectively and then refer again later to Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, that is, the planning by the Allies with respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with the planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the landing in Bergen, and the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases. The documents mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue getting ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same plan after the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded.

I should like to quote from these documents to prove their relevancy. Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, I ask that these brief references be considered sufficient. The facts contained in these documents agree, point for point, with those reports which Grossadmiral Raeder received from September 1939 until March 1940 from the Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris. These plans agree with the information which Raeder received during the same 6 months through the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a letter from Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939.

The information from these three sources caused the Defendant Raeder to point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall into the hands of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had lost the war. It is, therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do with the prestige or desire for conquest but was concerned solely with these positive pieces of information.

I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder did receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were objective.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document Number 99, are you not?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B.

DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter “F,” which Sir David called Group 6, the last on the page.

THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that document was that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at a time after Germany had invaded Norway. You haven’t said anything about that.

DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document singly, because I believe that these can be treated generally. However, in this specific case...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want you to deal with each document separately. I thought you were dealing with Document Number 99. If you can deal with them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great deal of the Tribunal’s time.

DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational staff of England and France, on 27 April. The heading shows beyond doubt that it was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal objection. The contents of the document show that at this session the participants discussed the happenings during the period before the occupation, and the most important leaders of the Allies took part in this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Alexander Cadogan, _et cetera_ and, on the French side Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, and Darlan were present; and these gentlemen discussed the previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands of the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany’s getting this ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits could be brought about. I believe, therefore, that though this happened at a later date, the train of thought I have presented is of significance.

Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the session of the French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns the same problem: what the Allies had planned and what could be planned now that the report had just come in about the action on the part of Germany.

Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. For Document Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents 101 to 107.

Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, as early as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of America. I wanted to present this in connection with the accusation raised against the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he was instrumental in bringing about a war against the United States by way of Japan. For me this document is not nearly so important as those basic documents which I have referred to at greater length. Therefore, I leave this completely to the discretion of the Prosecution or the Tribunal.

The next group consists of documents which were turned down in the case of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not have the opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position as to the justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore I consider it insufficient simply to state that these documents were refused in the case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop...

THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the arguments and have decided those documents were inadmissible.

DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop case, since no other point of view was discussed during those proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against Raeder in which connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought about the occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation that was not made against Ribbentrop but only against Raeder. How can I refute this accusation if these documents are denied me?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents and know the charges against Raeder, and they don’t desire to hear any further argument on it. They will consider the matter.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances I am compelled to see whether all these documents were covered in Ribbentrop’s case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, do not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. Perhaps after the session, if I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out whether or not the documents are identical.

It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop’s case these documents were not presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does not know them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each individual document is concerned. I know only that in the large majority of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire document because he was presenting it only from the point of view of the Ribbentrop case.

THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts are the same ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents so far. We haven’t seen the extracts.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution conferred._]

My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in German and we haven’t had them translated. We have done the best we could in German.

THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in English.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, My Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says that these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual checking myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the Ribbentrop documents, went through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the basis of our note. That is the position. I can’t tell Your Lordship that I have actually checked these myself.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is untrue?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying that he didn’t know whether they were the same extracts...

DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please? I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific case which extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but they are not the same. I know for certain that they are not the same because in order to relieve the work of the Translation Division I compared the numbers and in the few cases in which they were the same I told the Translation Division that these documents were identical so that they would not be translated a second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view.

I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which are enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, although I made every effort to find them, could not be found in the Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not show which numbers they should be in the Ribbentrop Document Book.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What is said is that they are in the same series which deals with the same subject—that is, the question of Greece and the Balkans—as those documents which the Tribunal ruled out in the case of Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading “C” and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop’s case; and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the documents rejected in Ribbentrop’s case, so as to show they have some relevance to your case; and we shall expect to have that by 5 o’clock.

Now will you go on with the others?

DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir David said regarding group “D”? They were not objected to because they have already been mentioned in Ribbentrop’s case; but only because they deal with the same subject matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely, Greece, is dealt with; and I can only reply that the Prosecution have charged the Defendant Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and brought about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts concerning this statement of three lines I can present only if I am allowed some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were turned down quite generally in Ribbentrop’s case.

Now, I come to group “E” which begins with Document 26. The same statements apply which I have already set forth in regard to Documents Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions in neutral Romania and in the neutral Caucasus—as I should like to remark in parenthesis—have already been dealt with in these proceedings. The Tribunal will remember that I asked Göring during his examination about entries in Jodl’s diary pertaining to this question and he has given information about the reports received by Germany, on Pages 6031 and 6033 of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages 402-404). This testimony too concerns only the subjective side, that is, what was known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the fact that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the subjective side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers 26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes Number 99 which has already been dealt with, which seems to be here in duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also seem to be duplicates.

I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, dealing with the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, set forth my reasons and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these documents under any circumstances. If I am not granted these documents, I shall simply not be in a position to present evidence in a reasonable manner without telling everything myself. I can present proof in regard to a question of such importance only if documents are granted me just as they are granted the Prosecution. But if all the documents, practically all the documents concerning this question are refused, then I do not know how I am to treat such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish to assist me in this matter.

I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When I gave my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, I asked that those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir David did not object at that time but said he would have to consult the British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided accordingly and granted my application. In the meantime the British Admiralty has answered, and I assume that Sir David will agree to my reading the answer which has been put at my disposal. This answer is as follows—it concerns, if I may say that in advance...

THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had the answer and transmitted it to you.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be seen that the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the necessary approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which will be important for my presentation of evidence will be admitted by the British Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to prove anything by means of documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting evidence, that is, the documents contained in the German White Books. These are documents recognized as being correct. In all cases they are facsimiles. They can be carefully examined and I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or general criticism that you have to make. We are only hearing you in answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution.

DR: SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken—in which case you will pleas correct me—Sir David, with a few exceptions, defined his position regarding these documents under “F”—this is a large number, from 59 to 91 with some omissions—as a whole and not his position regarding each individual document. But I have to say the same thing to practically each document and asked only that I be granted those documents as a whole, for I cannot make headway without these documents...

THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at all.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honors. I have already stated very clearly why I need these documents for my presentation of evidence regarding the Norway action. Beyond that I said merely that if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot present any evidence. I am deprived of it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take into consideration the fact that the documents from London, which I had originally counted on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why this request, which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in explanation of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?

DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at all my intention to read all these documents or to spend too much time on them. I believe that if I am granted these documents, the presentation of evidence will be much easier, for these are groups of documents which show the chronological development of certain plans; and if I have the 5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not read each one. But if I am granted just one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult position and will have to speak in greater detail than I would if I could simply refer to these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it.

Now, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we come to the whole question of your alleged knowledge of the direct war objectives of Hitler. You have already mentioned in a general way that Hitler never spoke about war to you. Have you anything to add to this?

SCHACHT: No.

DR. DIX: You also touched upon the question of the sincerity of his peaceful assurances and his disarmament proposals. Have you anything to add to that?

SCHACHT: No, at the beginning I believed that.

DR. DIX: And did the various members of the Cabinet ever speak to you about warlike intentions?

SCHACHT: Never did I hear anything from any of my fellow colleagues in the Reich Cabinet which could lead me to believe that anyone had the intention of going to war or would welcome it if Germany were to start a war.

DR. DIX: Now, we turn to your own attitude towards the war. You already indicated your general attitude when you spoke about your philosophy as a pacifist. I believe, therefore, that it is more expedient if I read from my document book the opinion of a third person, one who knows you very well, the former member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Huelse. It is the Schacht Document 37-C, Page 160 of the German text, and 168 of the English text. It is an affidavit. And there, beginning with Paragraph 2, Huelse says:

“I recall several chance talks with Dr. Schacht during the years
1935 to 1939 about war and rearmament. In these talks he always
expressed his aversion to any war and any warlike conduct. He
held the firm opinion that even to the conqueror war brings only
disadvantages and that a new European war would, on the whole,
be a crime against culture and humanity. He hoped for a long
period of peace for Germany, as she needed it more than other
countries in order to improve and stabilize her unstable
economic situation.

“To my knowledge, until the beginning of 1938, Dr. Schacht at
meetings of the Reichsbank Board of Directors and in private
conversations on the subject of armament always spoke only of
defense measures. I believe I can recall that he told me in the
middle of 1938 that Hitler’s provocative action against Austria
and the Sudeten country was worse than thoughtless from the
military point of view.

“He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive armament,
which would prove absolutely inadequate as a defense in case of
attack by one of the big powers, a possibility with which Hitler
had to reckon. He said that he had never heard that the
Wehrmacht was in any way designed or armed for an aggressive
war.

“When the war did break out and spread more and more, he said
repeatedly that he had greatly erred in his judgment of Hitler’s
personality; he had hoped for a long time that Hitler would
develop into a real statesman who, after the experience of the
World War I, would avoid any war.”

You have already touched upon the question of an annexation of Austria and given your general opinion. I ask you now to make a concrete statement about the Anschluss after it had actually taken place and especially about the manner in which this Anschluss was carried out.

SCHACHT: That this Anschluss would come at some time we Germans all knew. As for the various political negotiations which took place between Hitler, Schuschnigg and others, I naturally was as little informed as were the other Cabinet Ministers, with the probable exception of Göring and Ribbentrop and perhaps one or two more. The actual Anschluss in March was a complete surprise to us, not the fact but the date. A great surprise and we, at any rate my acquaintances and I myself, were completely surprised.

DR. DIX: How did you judge the manner, the nature and development of this Anschluss?

SCHACHT: I believe that much can be said about the manner. What we heard subsequently and what I have learned in these proceedings is certainly not very gratifying, but I believe that it would have had very little practical influence on the Anschluss itself and the course of events. The whole thing was more of a demonstration to the outside world, similar perhaps to the marching into the Rhineland; but it had no great effect in my opinion on the course of the negotiations. I am speaking now of the marching in of the troops. This march was more or less a festive reception.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution have pointed out that in March 1938 you regulated the relation of the schilling to the mark for the event of a possible Anschluss, and by this the Prosecution obviously want to prove that you had previous knowledge of this action. Will you tell us your position as to this?

SCHACHT: The fact to which the Prosecution refer is a communication from a Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann. March 11, at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon—I believe I remember that but I cannot say whether it was by telephone or in person—someone, it may have been Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann, inquired of me how the purchasing power for the troops in Austria was to be regulated if German troops should march into Austria, purely as a matter of currency policy, and whether it was necessary to have any regulation prescribed. I told him that of course everything had to be paid for, everything that the troops might buy there, and that the rate of exchange; if they paid in schillings and not in marks, would be 1 mark to 2 schillings. That was the rate which obtained at the time, which remained fairly steady and was the recognized ratio of the schilling to the mark. The fact that in the afternoon of the 11th I was approached about this matter is the best proof that I had no previous knowledge of these matters.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution further consider it an accusation against you that in your speech to the Austrian National Bank after the marching in of the troops, you used decidedly National Socialist phraseology and thus welcomed the Anschluss.

Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and reply to the accusation made repeatedly by the Prosecution that in speeches, petitions, _et cetera_, you sometimes thought fit to adopt a tone, of which it could perhaps be said that it exuded National Socialist ideas. That has been used as circumstantial evidence against you. Will you please define your position to those arguments and give your reasons for this attitude of yours?

SCHACHT: If I did so in the first years, I did so only in order to remind Party circles and the people of the original program of the National Socialist Party, to which the actual attitude of the Party members and functionaries stood in direct contrast. I always tried to show that the principles which I upheld in many political matters agreed completely with the principles of the National Socialist program as they were stated in the Party program, namely, equal rights for all, the dignity of the individual, esteem for the church, and so forth.

In the later years I also repeatedly used National Socialist phraseology, because from the time of my speech at Königsberg, the contrast between my views and Hitler’s views regarding the Party was entirely clear. And gradually within the Party I got the reputation of being an enemy of the Party, a man whose views were contrary to those of the Party. From that moment on not only the possibility of my co-operation, but also my very existence was endangered; and in such moments, when I saw my activity, my freedom, and my life seriously threatened by the Party I utilized these moments to show by means of an emphatically National Socialist phraseology that I was working entirely within the framework of the traditional policies and that my activity was in agreement with these policies—in order to protect myself against these attacks.

DR. DIX: In other words, recalling the testimony of the witness Gisevius about a remark of Goerdeler’s, you used Talleyrand methods in this case?

SCHACHT: I am not entirely familiar with Talleyrand’s methods, but at any rate I did camouflage myself.

DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to read a passage from the affidavit of Schniewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It is Schacht Number 34. I have often indicated this page. It is Page 118 of the German, Page 126 of the English text. Schniewind says:

“If Schacht on the other hand occasionally made statements, oral
or written, which could be construed as signifying that he went
a long way in identifying himself with the Hitler regime, these
statements were naturally known to us; but what Schacht thought
in reality was known to almost every official in the Reichsbank
and in the Reich Ministry of Economics, above all, of course, to
his closest colleagues.

“On many occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone too
far in these statements. He always replied that he was under
such heavy fire from the Party and the SS that he could
camouflage himself only with strong slogans and sly statements.”

I might explain that Schniewind was a high official in the Reich Ministry of Economics, and worked directly under Schacht and with him.

The Prosecution have also referred to an affidavit by Tilly to the effect that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of aggressive intentions. Will you make a statement about that?

SCHACHT: That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely correct. I told Major Tilly during the preliminary interrogation that in 1938, during the events of the Fritsch affair and afterwards, I had become convinced that Hitler at any rate would not avoid a war at all costs and that possibly he even sought to bring about a war. Looking back I pondered over a number of statements by Hitler and asked myself the reason why Hitler, in the course of the years, had reached the point where he might not avoid a war. And I told Major Tilly that the only reason which I could think of was that looking back I had the impression that Hitler had fallen into the role which necessarily falls to each and every dictator who does not want to relinquish his power in time, namely, that of having to supply his people with some sort of victor’s glory—that that was probably the development of Hitler’s thought.

DR. DIX: That is the same explanation as given by Prince Metternich about Napoleon?

You have already remarked parenthetically that you first became suspicious during the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described the Fritsch affair to the Tribunal in detail. We do not wish to repeat anything. Therefore, I am asking you only to state in regard to the Fritsch affair anything you might have to say to supplement or to amend Gisevius’ testimony. If that is to take a long time—which I cannot judge—then I might suggest to the Tribunal that we have the recess now, if the Tribunal so desires.

SCHACHT: I have just a brief remark to make.

DR. DIX: A brief remark. Then answer the question briefly.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better have it now.

SCHACHT: It is just a single remark that I should like to add. The account given by Gisevius of the development of the Fritsch affair is, according to my knowledge and my own experience, completely correct in every detail. I have nothing to add to that. I can only confirm it. On the other hand, I should like to refer to a speech of Hitler’s on 20 February 1938 in the Reichstag which contains a remark which even at that time aroused my attention. He said—and I quote this speech from Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which all copies were available here:

“The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in the military
administration on 4 February”—that is, changes which were made
following the Fritsch and Blomberg affair—“were for the purpose
of achieving within the shortest time that intensification of
our military means of power, which the general conditions of the
present time indicate as advisable.”

This remark also confirmed my opinion that the change from a peaceful to a military policy on Hitler’s part was becoming obvious; I did not wish to omit reference to this remark which completes the account given by Gisevius.

DR. DIX: This is Exhibit Number Schacht-28 of our document book, Page 81 of the English text, Page 74 of the German text. There this passage is quoted.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Several meetings have been discussed here during which Hitler is said to have spoken directly or indirectly about his war intentions. Did you participate in any such meetings?

SCHACHT: No, not in a single one.

DR. DIX: You disagreed, as you have stated, with Hitler and the Party on many issues. Did you express this disagreement or did you conform to Hitler’s instructions at all times? Can you in particular make statements about your critical attitude, for instance, to the Jewish question, the Church question, the Gestapo question, the Free Mason question, _et cetera_?

SCHACHT: I might say in advance that Hitler never gave me any order or any instructions which would have been in opposition to my inner views and that I also never did anything which was in opposition to my inner convictions. From the very beginning I did not conceal my convictions concerning all these questions which you have mentioned, not only when speaking to my circle of friends and to larger Party circles, but also in addressing the public, and even when speaking to Hitler personally. I have already stated here that as early as the Party purge of 30 June 1934 I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that his actions were illegal.

I refer, furthermore, to a document of which unfortunately only half has been presented by the Prosecution. It is a written report which I personally submitted to Hitler on 3 May 1935. I remember the date very well because it happened during a trial run of the Lloyd Steamer _Scharnhorst_, at which both Hitler and I were present.

On that day I handed him two inter-related memoranda which together formed a unit. In the one half I made it clear that I wanted to stop the unrestrained and constant collections of money by various Party organizations because it seemed to me that the money ought not to be used for Party purposes, particularly Party installations, Party buildings, and the like, but that we urgently needed this money for State expenses which had to be paid and which of course included the rearmament question as well.

The second half of this report dealt with cultural questions. The Defense and I have tried for months to get this second half of the document from the Prosecution, since they had submitted the first half of the document here as evidence. It has not been possible to obtain that second half. I must therefore confine myself to communicating the contents.

I want to say in advance that, of course, I could only bring forward such charges in regard to the mistaken cultural and legal policy of the Party and of Hitler when reasons originating in my own department gave me the excuse to submit these things to Hitler. I stated that very serious harm was being done to my foreign trade policy by the arbitrary and inhuman cultural and legal policy which was being carried out by Hitler. I pointed in particular to the hostile attitude towards the churches and the illegal treatment of the Jews and, furthermore, to the absolute illegality and despotism of the whole Gestapo regime. I remember in that connection that I referred to the British Habeas Corpus Act, which for centuries protected the rights of the individual; and I stated word for word that I considered this Gestapo despotism to be something which would make us despised by the whole world.

Hitler read both parts of this memorandum while still on board the _Scharnhorst_. As soon as he had read it he called me and tried to calm me down by making statements similar to those which he had already made to me in July 1934, when he told me these were still the transitional symptoms of a revolutionary development and that as time went on this would be set right again and disappear.

The events of July 1934 had taught me a lesson, however, and consequently I was not satisfied with this explanation. A few weeks afterwards, on 18 August 1935, I used the occasion of my visit to the Eastern Fair Königsberg to mention these very things in the speech which I had to make there; and here I gave clear expression to the same objections which I had made to Hitler aboard the _Scharnhorst_ at the beginning of May.

I did not talk only about the Church question, the Jewish question, and the question of despotism; I talked also about the Free Masons; and I shall quote just a few sentences from that speech (Exhibit Number Schacht-25), with the permission of the Tribunal. They are very short. I am speaking about people, and I now quote...

DR. DIX: Just one moment. I want to tell the Tribunal that this is the Königsberg speech, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning as a document.

SCHACHT: I am talking about people and I now quote:

“...people who under cover of darkness heroically smear window
panes, who brand as a traitor every German who trades in a
Jewish store, who declare every former Free Mason to be a
scoundrel, and who in the fight against priests and ministers
who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves distinguish
between religion and misuse of the pulpit.”

End of quotation, and then another sentence. I quote:

“In accordance with the present legislation and in accordance
with the various declarations made by the Führer’s Deputy, the
Reich Minister of the Interior, and the Reich Minister for
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the Ministry
of Economics), Jewish businesses are permitted to carry on their
business activities as heretofore.”

End of quotation, and then, in the last sentences, I quote:

“No one in Germany is without rights. According to Point 4 of
the National Socialist Party program the Jew can be neither a
citizen nor a fellow German. But Point 5 of the Party program
provides legislation for him too; that means, he must not be
subjected to arbitrary action but to the law.”

I assumed the same attitude on every other further occasion that offered itself.

DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht; did the regime tolerate this speech?

SCHACHT: It is a good thing that you remind me of that; because in the course of the Gisevius testimony the same question was discussed with reference to the Marburg speech of Herr Von Papen. Since up to then my speeches were not subject to censorship—of course I would not have allowed that—this speech was broadcast by mistake, so to speak, over the Deutschlandsender. In that way the speech was brought to the notice of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and at once he issued an order prohibiting the publication of the speech in the newspapers. As a result, although the speech was broadcast by the Deutschlandsender it did not appear in any newspaper. But as, fortunately, the Reichsbank had its own printing press which was of course not subject to censorship, I had the speech printed in the Reichsbank printing press; and 250,000 copies of it were distributed to the 400 branches of the Reichsbank throughout the country, and in that manner it became known to the entire population.

DR. DIX: You were going to continue, were you not?

SCHACHT: I wanted to go on and say that on every future opportunity which I could find I always returned to these points. I should like to touch upon only two more things in this connection.

This morning I referred to these things in connection with the letter written by me on 24 December 1935 to the Reich Minister of War, which is Document Number EC-293. I should merely like to add and point out the words, which I shall now quote:

“The economic and legal policy for the treatment of the Jews,
the anti-Church activities of certain Party organizations, and
the legal despotism associated with the Gestapo are detrimental
to our armament program...”

The same attitude can also be seen from the minutes of the so-called “small Ministerial Council” for 12 May 1936, which have been submitted in evidence by the Prosecution. It says in these minutes, and I quote: “Dr. Schacht emphasized openly again and again that a cultural and legal policy must be pursued which does not interfere with economy.”

I want to remark in this connection that, of course, as Minister of Economics I always linked my arguments with the work of the departments under the Minister of Economics. And, as a last example, one of many others which I cannot mention today, there is the speech on the occasion of a celebration for the apprentices at the Berlin Chamber of Artisans on 11 May 1937 which is Exhibit Number Schacht-30. On that occasion I said the following, and I quote:

“No community and, above all, no state can flourish which is not
based on legality, order, and discipline.”

And a second sentence, I quote:

“For that reason you must not only respect the right and the
law, but you must also act against injustice and unlawful
actions everywhere, wherever you find them.”

And because I made known my attitude not only to a close circle but also to a wider public by using every opportunity to voice my views frankly—because of this, a few weeks ago in this court, the Chief of the RSHA, Department III, Security Service, the witness Ohlendorf, in reply to a question, described me as an enemy of the Party, at least since the year 1937-1938. I believe that the Chief of the Security Service, the inland department, should know since he had the task of combating political opponents inside Germany.

DR. DIX: May I point out that the statements made during the meeting of the small Ministerial Council on 12 May 1936 are contained in my document book, Exhibit Schacht-20, Page 57 of the English text, Page 51 of the German text and Schacht’s speech to the Chamber of Industry and Commerce on 12 May 1937...

SCHACHT: [_Interrupting._] You mean Chamber of Artisans.

DR. DIX: I shall refer to that later when I have the proper document; and I now continue.

We have talked about your participation at the Party rallies, and I should merely like to ask you in addition: Did you participate in any other Party functions?

SCHACHT: I do not remember that I ever participated in any other functions of the Party.

DR. DIX: The Indictment charges you, in substance, with using your personal influence and your close connections with the Führer for the aims as set forth. Did you, as far as you know and can judge from your experience, have any influence on the Führer?

SCHACHT: Unfortunately, I never had any influence on the Führer’s actions and decisions. I had influence only insofar as he did not dare to interfere with me in my special financial and economic policies. But this lack of influence of all members of Hitler’s entourage has already been mentioned by various witnesses and so much has been said about it that I think I need not take up the Tribunal’s time with any further statements on that subject.

DR. DIX: What you have just said applies in the main to the question of the influence of the Reich Cabinet, the last meetings of the Reich Cabinet, and so forth. Various witnesses have made statements on that subject. Have you anything new to add?

SCHACHT: I can merely add that on the whole the Reich Cabinet did not have the slightest influence on Hitler, and that from November 1937 on—this has been stated repeatedly—there were no more meetings or consultations of the Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet was an uncorrelated group of politically powerless departmental ministers without the proper professional qualifications.

DR. DIX: I should like to add that the number of the speech to the Chamber of Artisans is Exhibit Number 30, Page 89 of the English text and Page 82 of the German text.

[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation regarding rearmament? Whose will was decisive and authoritative as regards the extent of rearmament?

SCHACHT: I am without any basis for judgment as far as that is concerned. But I have no doubt that Hitler’s will, here too, was the sole decisive and authoritative factor.

DR. DIX: That is to say, you had no influence other than that of the credit-giver?

SCHACHT: Within my Ministry, insofar as I administered this Ministry, I did nothing for which I would not assume responsibility myself.

DR. DIX: Did you speak to prominent foreigners about your lack of influence on Hitler?

SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador Bullitt has already been mentioned in some other connection, and Ambassador Bullitt’s memorandum has been presented in evidence to the Tribunal by the Prosecution. I merely refer to the sentence which refers to me, and I quote:

“He”—that is to say Schacht—“prefaced his remarks by saying
that he himself today was ‘completely without influence on that
man’”—meaning Hitler. “He seemed to regard himself as
politically dead and to have small respect for ‘that man.’”

That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add to this, I want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly informed about my position and my entire activity as regards the directing of public affairs in Germany, as I have already mentioned once before. This will be seen on later occasions when various instances are mentioned.

DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, Page 64 of the English text.

[_Turning to the defendant._] And now a few special questions regarding your position as Minister of Economics. You have already made statements regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, that is, you have quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be substituted by home products in your opinion?

SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be replaced by home products. We had learned in the meantime how to produce a large number of new materials which we did not know about before...

DR. DIX: Please be brief.

SCHACHT: ...to produce them synthetically. But a considerable part could not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only through foreign trade.

DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of self-sufficiency?

SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe that, if at a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which would have meant a waste of German public funds and German manpower, certain synthetic materials could be produced in Germany, then one should do so, but that apart from this the maintenance of foreign trade was an absolute necessity for economic reasons, and that it was even more necessary for reasons of international cultural relations so that nations might live together. I always regarded the isolation of nations as a great misfortune, just as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of bringing about international understanding.

DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the self-sufficiency principle?

SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, which was then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with Hitler alone; after Göring was commissioned with the direction of the Four Year Plan, then Göring too, of course, represented that line of thought.

DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Göring and Hitler?

SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at every opportunity.

DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that Göring exclaimed, “I should like to know where the ‘No men’ are.”

I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of “No man” for yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of November 1942.

SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position to do what my inner conviction demanded, I said, “No.” I was not content to be silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by the Party. In every case I expressed my disapproval of these things, personally, officially, and publicly. I said “No” to all those things. I blocked credits. I opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked against the war and I took steps to prevent the war. I do not know to whom else this honorary title of “No man” might apply if not to me.

DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler?

SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain Herr Hitler. I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the State of the German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the Kaiser or to President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in their capacity as head of the State; in the same way I did not swear an oath to Adolf Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear to the head of the German State does not apply to the person of the head of the State; it applies to what he represents, the German nation. Perhaps I might add something in this connection. I would never keep an oath of allegiance to a perjurer and Hitler has turned out to be a hundredfold perjurer.

DR. DIX: Göring has made extremely detailed explanations regarding the Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical opposition by you, and the consequences you took because of this opposition. Therefore we can be brief and deal only with new material, if you have something new to say. Have you anything to add to Göring’s statements or do you disagree on points which you remember or about views held?

SCHACHT: I gather from Göring’s statements that he has described conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at all to add unless you have something special in mind.

DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you had, when did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way of a speedy and extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your economic arguments? Was he satisfied with your policy or not?

SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced in September I could not tell what Hitler’s inner attitude to me was in regard to these questions of economic policy. I might say that it was clear that after my speech at Königsberg in August 1935 he mistrusted me. But his attitude to my activities in the field of economic policy was something which I was not yet sure of in 1936. The fact that I had not in any way participated in the preparation of the Four Year Plan but heard about it quite by surprise during the Party Rally and that, quite unexpectedly, Hermann Göring and not the Minister of Economics was appointed head of the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at the Party Rally in September 1936—these facts naturally made it clear to me that Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the entire rearmament program was concerned, did not have that degree of confidence in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in this prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum which he received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the post of Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail with the Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. In August 1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has been shown to me in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I assume that if I read a number of brief quotations from it with the permission of...

DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We received the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago from the Camp Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind mediation of the Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation so that we might submit it now. But the translation has not yet been completed. I shall submit the entire memorandum under a new exhibit number when I receive it.

THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect to it?

DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted...

THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up?

DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which there exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. This copy arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had discussed our document books with the Prosecution. I intended to submit the translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the same time to ask that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately I am not in a position to do so because the translation is not yet ready. My colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it has been mislaid.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you can submit the document in evidence and a translation afterwards.

DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will quote the most important, very brief passages.

SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this memorandum, among other things, and I quote:

“It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions
to rack their brains about methods of production. This does not
concern the Ministry of Economics at all.”

The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore a reproach for me.

A further quotation:

“It is furthermore essential that German iron production be
increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a
position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German ore,
which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the 45
percent Swedish ores, is unimportant... The objection that in
this case all the German smelting works would have to be
reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none
of the business of the Ministry of Economics.”

As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from 26 percent ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three times those at which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. And I explained further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one would have to have completely different plants from those using 45 percent ore. Herr Hitler states that this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics, and that, of course, means Herr Schacht.

There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote:

“I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks I
see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the
curbing of the armament industry...”

That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy.