Chapter XXVIII: Section 3: (Concerning Articles 3 and 4) (1)

* * * * * * *

If an approved doctor in the course of his official activity learns of a person suffering from a hereditary disease (art. 1, pars. 1 and 2) or from chronic alcoholism, he must report this without delay to the competent district public health officer using the form printed as supplement 3 (p. 1024). Other persons who are concerned with the treatment, examination, or advising of sick persons, have the same obligation. In the case of inmates of institutions, it is the head of the institution who has the duty to report the case.

* * * * * * *

Berlin, 5 December 1933

The Reich Minister of the Interior
FRICK

The Reich Minister of Justice
DR. GUERTNER

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-715
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 112

THIRD DECREE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW FOR THE
PREVENTION OF PROGENY WITH HEREDITARY DISEASES,
25 FEBRUARY 1935

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 289

* * * * * * *

Article 4

Authorized persons and counsel can be barred from appearance before the hereditary health courts and higher hereditary health courts for important reasons; this decision is uncontestable.

* * * * * * *

Article 12

1. The Reich Minister of Justice determines the location and the district of the court which is to render the decision, and the number of court chambers to be established. He may transfer the exercise of this authority to the presidents of the district courts of appeal.

2. The hereditary health courts are to be regarded as parts of the local courts, and higher hereditary health courts are to be regarded as parts of the district courts of appeal, with respect to administration and official supervision.

3. The president of the district court of appeal determines the number of medical members and deputies of the hereditary health courts, as needed.

* * * * * * *

Berlin, 25 February 1935

The Reich Minister of the Interior
The deputy: PFUNDTNER

The Reich Minister of Justice
The deputy: DR. SCHLEGELBERGER

The Reich Minister of Labor
The deputy: DR. KROHN

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-346
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 101

CIRCULAR OF THE REICH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE TO ALL PRESIDENTS
OF THE COURTS OF APPEAL, 11 MAY 1936, ANNOUNCING COURSES
FOR JUDGES DEALING WITH HEREDITARY DISEASE CASES

The Reich Minister of Justice No. 6234-IV. b 472

Berlin W 8, 11 May 1936
Wilhelmstr. 65
A1 Jaeger 0044

To: All Presidents of the Courts of Appeal

Subject: Courses for judges dealing with hereditary disease cases

It is intended that during the second half of the month of June courses will be held in Berlin and Munich to train presiding judges of the courts and courts of appeal dealing with cases of hereditary diseases in matters of the marriage health law. The course in Berlin will probably take place between 15 and 17 June and the course in Munich between 22 and 24 June. In order to save expenses, only the presiding judges of the courts and courts of appeal dealing with cases of hereditary disease will be admitted to these courses, but not their deputies. The course in Berlin is intended for the judges of the district courts of appeal of Berlin, Brunswick, Breslau, Celle, Dresden, Duesseldorf, Hamburg, Hamm, Jena, Kassel, Kiel, Koenigsberg Pr., Marienwerder, Naumburga. S., Oldenburg, Rostock, and Stettin. The course in Munich is intended for the judges of the courts of appeal in Bamberg, Darmstadt, Frankfurt/Main, Karlsruhe, Munich, Nuernberg, Stuttgart, and Zweibruecken. The nonresident participants will have their traveling expenses refunded in accordance with paragraph II of the traveling expenses law. The expenses will be paid by the director of the office to which the official belongs. The amounts paid are to be recorded under chapter 4, title 25 of the budget. Please inform me of the names of the participating judges by 31 May 1936.

An opportunity for a discussion will probably be given on the last day of each course. During the course of these discussions questions may be raised concerning the marriage health law and the law on prevention of progeny with hereditary disease. In consequence of the large number of participants it is however necessary that each judge who wishes to discuss a question will submit it in triplicate directly to us (Berlin W. 9, Vosstrasse 5, Office b) not later than 31 May 1936. If several questions are submitted a separate sheet is to be used for each question. In the case of medical questions a summarized statement of the case is to be attached, if possible; in other cases it is also advisable to state briefly which particular case led to the question. The name, official position, and the court of the judges should be marked at the top of the page on the left hand side.

Enclosed are copies for the presidents of the district courts and for the presiding judges of the main hereditary health courts.

Deputy
Certified [Signed] DR. VOLKMAR

[Signature illegible]

[Stamp: Reich Ministry of Justice] Clerk

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-789
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 432

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE REICH MINISTER OF JUSTICE, 17 DECEMBER 1943, CONCERNING THE APPOINTMENT OF A REFERENT WITH THE DUTY OF TRAINING JUDGES AND OTHERS IN A RACIAL, HEREDITARY, AND CRIMINOLOGICAL-BIOLOGICAL LINE OF THOUGHT

[initials] KLE [Klemm]

_Internal Regulation_

Reference: The consideration of racial, hereditary, and
criminological-biological [kriminalbiologische] viewpoints in
educational questions

With regard to the necessity of putting more emphasis on the racial, hereditary, and criminological-biological viewpoints in connection with educational questions within the meaning of my internal regulation of 12 June 1943--1200 E--Ip 2 340--Oberlandesgerichtsrat Meinhof, without prejudice to his sphere of office in department VI, is also assigned to department II as Referent.

The range of his duties comprises--

The training of judges, public prosecutors, jurists, and other officials, as well as of the entire new generation in a racial, hereditary, and criminological-biological line of thought.

Berlin, 17 December 1943

DR. THIERACK

1200 E--Ip 2 383 [Handwritten] Adjutant KLEMM

TRANSLATION OF KLEMM DOCUMENT 58
KLEMM DEFENSE EXHIBIT 58

DECREE SIGNED BY DR. CONTI[139] AND DEFENDANT KLEMM, 14 NOVEMBER 1944, TEMPORARILY SUSPENDING ACTIVITIES OF HIGHER HEREDITARY HEALTH COURTS, AND AUTOMATICALLY LEGALIZING PENDING CONTESTED DECISIONS

1944 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 330

Seventh decree concerning the execution of the law for the prevention of progeny with hereditary diseases

On the basis of Article 17 of the law for the prevention of progeny with hereditary diseases of 14 July 1938 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 529) in combination with the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the total war effort of 25 July 1944 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 161) it is decreed in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, the chief of the Party Chancellery and the Plenipotentiary General for the administration of the Reich:

Article 1

(1) The higher hereditary health courts discontinue their activity temporarily--for the duration of the suspension the definite decision is with the hereditary health courts.

(2) A trial pending in the higher hereditary health courts ends with the coming into effect of this decree. With the termination the contested decision becomes legal. The hereditary health court investigates officially, whether a resumption of the proceedings according to article 12, paragraph 2, of the law for prohibiting carriers of inherited diseases to reproduce is ruled in consideration of the terminated proceedings.

(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not valid for cases in which the higher hereditary health court has already passed a resolution at the time when this decree came into effect and has merely not yet delivered it.

Article 2

This decree goes into effect on 1 December 1944.

Berlin, 14 November 1944.

The Reich Minister of the Interior
As deputy: DR. L. CONTI

The Reich Minister for Justice
As deputy: KLEMM

6. CIVILIAN COURTS MARTIAL

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-715
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 112

DECREE OF 15 FEBRUARY 1945 ON CIVILIAN COURTS MARTIAL
PROCEDURE

1945 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 30

The seriousness of the fight for existence of the Reich demands of every German determination to fight to the last, and devotion to the utmost. Whoever tries to withdraw from his duties towards the common cause, especially if it is done through cowardice or for personal profit, must at once be called to account with the necessary severity, so that the State will not suffer damage through the failing of one single person. Therefore, the following has been decreed upon the order of the Fuehrer in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, the Reich Minister of the Interior and the chief of the Party Chancellery:

I

Courts martial are to be established in Reich defense districts which are menaced by the approach of the enemy.

II

1. The court martial consists of a judge of a criminal court as president and a member of the Leadership Corps [of the Nazi Party], or a leader of a unit affiliated with the National Socialist Party, and of an officer of the armed forces, the Waffen SS [armed SS] or the police, as associate judges.

2. The Reich defense commissioner appoints the members of the tribunal and designates a state attorney as public prosecutor.

III

1. The courts martial have jurisdiction for all kinds of crimes endangering the German fighting power or undermining the people’s fighting strength and will to fight.

2. For these proceedings, the regulations of the code of criminal procedure will be applied.

IV

1. The sentence of the court martial will be either death, acquittal, or commitment to the regular court. The consent of the Reich defense commissioner is required. He gives orders for the time, place, and kind of execution.

2. If the Reich defense commissioner is not available, but the immediate execution is indispensable, the public prosecutor is authorized to act in his place.

V

The necessary regulations for amendment, changes and execution of this decree are issued by the Reich Minister of Justice in agreement with the Reich Minister of the Interior and the chief of the Party Chancellery.

VI

This decree goes into effect immediately upon its promulgation over the radio.

Berlin, 16 February 1945

The Reich Minister of Justice
THIERACK

D. Expert Opinion by Defense Witness Professor
Jahrreiss concerning the Development of
German Law

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS
PROFESSOR JAHRREISS[140]

_DIRECT EXAMINATION_

DR. SCHILF (counsel for defendants Klemm and Mettgenberg): Professor Jahrreiss, may I ask you to tell us your name, your profession, and your residence.

WITNESS JAHRREISS: Professor at Cologne University; at present on the staff of editors of the record of IMT. Do you also wish me to name my residence, Counsel?

Q. Yes.

A. At this time, in Nuernberg. I was born at Dresden; the date of birth is 19 August 1894.

Q. So that I can afford the Court the opportunity to acquaint itself with your particular research field, may I ask you briefly to describe to us your field of research as professor of law.

A. My work since 1923 has dealt with the fields of constitutional law, international law, and the law by the League of Nations, general constitutional law, and philosophy of law.

Q. May I ask you, just by way of example, to mention your own publications--those of a scientific nature.

A. Well, that is rather a lot; but publications which concern this subject here, I could mention--_Law and Calculability_, on the foundations of law and state; another publication on _The Relation of the Constitution of the Reich to the League of Nations_; then in the textbook which Anschuetz and Thoma edited on German Constitutional Law, my work about _The Equality of the Citizens before the Law_; and above all, my own version of _The German Constitutional System_, of the year 1930.

Q. Concerning the first problem, the German constitutional law, that is the subject on which I wish to start. My first question will open the direct examination. Is it correct that Hitler in the order of the so-called Third Reich was the supreme law giver?

A. Yes, that is correct, although that was not so from the very beginning of that era. That only happened in the course of events. But at the latest, if you’d like me to mention a date, that occurred when the offices of Chancellor and Reich President were united in him; that is to say, 1 August 1934.[141] That is the latest date.

Q. It was like this then--Hitler’s authority developed gradually until it reached its final culmination?

A. Yes, that is correct. If I may add this, one must say that the development under Hitler followed a development which occurred prior to his own era.

Q. Do you mean to say by that, that 30 January 1933 did not bring about a complete break of the development prior to Hitler?

A. Yes, that is what I would say.

Q. Do you also mean to say by this that the so-called change-over, that is the seizure of power by the National Socialist Party, was legal?

A. That is a very difficult question. First of all it is difficult because one would have to say in greater detail what events represented the change-over, whether one adheres to the formation of the government on 30 January 1933, or whether one discusses the enabling act, promulgated on 24 March 1933,[142] or how far altogether one wants to extend the events of the change-over. I can only answer conditionally. If one considers only the formation of the government, that is to say the act of entrusting Hitler with the Chancellorship on 30 January 1933, and if by “legal”, one means the purely outward formality, then it cannot be denied that the operation was carried out legally, namely, under Article 53 of the Weimar constitution,[143] according to which the Reich President forms the cabinet, and the Parliament--the Reichstag--only afterwards has the opportunity to have a destructive influence on the formation of the cabinet. Under the Weimar constitution, the Reichstag does not form the cabinet alone or together with another organ, but the President does that. The other organ is immediately elected by the people of the Reich. That is why the Weimar constitution contains quite rightly article 54[144] which incorporates the parliamentary system by establishing the institution of the vote of nonconfidence and entrusts the President with the formation of the cabinet. Yes, in fact one has to say a little more. In the formation of the government, the appointment of the Reich Chancellor is the sole act of the President; side by side with, let us say, the dismissal, with which the countersignature of the Chancellor is purely formal.

In the development of the Weimar constitution, after initial wavering, there evolved the principle that the new Chancellor appointed or signed the dismissal of the old Chancellor and his own appointment, which is really illogical. I don’t think there is any need for me to explain that any further. But as the Weimar constitution in Article 50[145] provided that every provision made by the president should be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor, or one of the Reich ministers--at least one--one was compelled to have even the appointment of the new Chancellor countersigned. That means naturally for the new Chancellor that he drags himself out of the mire by his own efforts. Counsel, if your question refers to 30 January--formally the procedure was orderly; a great deal more difficult is the question concerning the Reich law of 24 March 1933, that famous law [the Enabling Act], the validity of which was doubted so much; it is much more difficult to answer if your question refers to that. That law has as its main contents--I can almost say with a little exaggeration--the elimination of the division of powers. Three provisions or groups of provisions of the Weimar constitution are excepted, but for the rest the government could now promulgate laws even if that meant changing the constitution of the Reich; for the normal life of the people, legislators, and supreme administrators are one and the same thing. That is a basic change of the entire structure of the Weimar constitution. And I can say frankly if I, during the first years of the Weimar constitution, as an expert on constitutional law, had been asked whether the Reichstag, even if there was a majority, could not change the constitution under article 76[146]--if the Reichstag would make such decisions, could pass a law which, in effect, eliminates the Reichstag,--if I had been asked such a question I would have said there is nothing about that in article 76 that restricts the passing of such laws; but there is not only legality, there is also legitimacy in every constitution; there are certain basic decisions contained in any constitution which one cannot abandon without the entire losing of his character. But I must say the German science of constitutional law, particularly in the person of the most fanatic champions of democracy, did not take that point of view. Gerhard Anschuetz, who if it is permitted to say anything like that about a republic, was the crown jurist of the Weimar republic, wrote the commentary to the constitution of the German Reich which is the authoritative commentary. Gerhard Anschuetz whose last position was that of professor at Heidelberg, was, I might say, a temple guard of the Weimar constitution, and if he only thought an attempt had been made to shake the foundations of democracy, perhaps by creating a group of judges who could have reviewed decisions by the Reichstag, he would have been furious. I must say that because only now it becomes understandable what authority Anschuetz’ opinion carried, which was concurred in by all German constitutional lawyers, that there were no limits for article 76, concerning the amendment of the constitution. Anschuetz stated repeatedly that the Reichstag, with the majority that can amend the constitution, could abolish the republic, the federal state, democracy, even basic laws. No judge was entitled to doubt the constitutional validity of such a law. If previously I said that concerning that law of 24 March, one might have legal misgivings, I had something different in mind. I believe if I had been the President of the Reich, and if I had had the knowledge of the events, I would have refused to issue that law and to promulgate it, for it is the Reich President who has to examine whether the law has come about in a constitutional manner. I am convinced, however, that on no account procedures can be constitutional when the majority present, that is, the majority which passes the resolution, did not constitute the majority of the Reichstag as elected [by the people] but constituted the majority of a Reichstag that had been curtailed by the executive. Much has been said about that, and there is something else that enters into that question, and I have to say that quite openly that has not been discussed before. At that session at which the Reichstag passed that law which changed the constitution, the Reich Chancellor felt that the Reichstag might make difficulties, and he threatened with revolutionary forces; but even that doesn’t help and, particularly, it doesn’t help according to Anschuetz. Anschuetz and [other] German experts on constitutional law consistently upheld the view that the assurance of the Reich President, given by his signature, that the law had been passed in an orderly manner excluded all scrutiny. Therefore, we have to say, under objective law there may be misgivings, serious misgivings about that procedure, but according to what at the time was the guaranteed practice of constitutional law which was upheld by the opinion of the most fanatic upholders of the Weimar constitution, the signature by the Reich President excluded any scrutiny as to whether the law came about in an orderly manner. I believe that I have now indicated that the question for the so-called legality of the change-over, even purely formal, is very difficult to answer, but for the rest it seems to me that this is only an argument about words; [actually, it was] a revolution, and it was meant to be a revolution. Hitler even thought it was the only real revolution. And according to its aim and meaning it [i.e., a revolution] cannot be legal; but in any case, if it comes off--that is how it always will be in the world of states--it provides the soil on which the new order, slowly or more quickly, evolves, according to custom, and custom after all is the source of all law.

Q. Professor, we are particularly interested to explain to the Tribunal the constitutional status of the so-called Hitler decrees. May I ask you, now that you have answered the question of legality on the one hand and theories of legitimacy on the other hand, would you now, from the developments, explain the constitutional status of the Hitler decrees within the meaning of my first question as to whether he was supreme legislator of the Reich.

A. I am afraid I shall have to go back a bit for that because that question really concerns the entire question of the so-called constitution of the Third Reich. Even for many a German, Hitler’s authority is a mystery, but it must be that for all those who are not Germans. Many misunderstandings which I encounter again and again in conversations are due to the fact that certain unavoidable factors which are involved in any ruling, are ascribed to Hitler’s regime. A further difficulty consists in the fact that the peculiar constitutional insecurity in which most of the states in Europe have lived for many years, from the point of view of their constitution, produces phenomena which do not restrict themselves to Hitler’s regime, but only appeared there particularly clearly. But above all--because otherwise I cannot provide you with the background--I should like to explain that a little further to the Tribunal--above all, there is considerable ignorance about certain peculiarities of the German situation, in particular concerning the constitution. I believe I may say without encountering any contradiction that in this courtroom jurists are fighting for clarity among themselves which belonged to various schools of legal thought. Above all, there is between the European continental states and their constitutional and legal thought on the one hand and the Anglo-Saxon legal thought, as far as I understand it, a great difference which cannot be overestimated. On the continent of Europe, in the course of four centuries, a development has taken place by which law and morality in legislative thought are separated sharply; and so as the question of morality arises, the lawyer on the continent of Europe says as a lawyer, “That has nothing to do with me. That may be regrettable, and I myself do think it is regrettable, but after all, that is the historical reality.” How far that development goes, I can show to the Tribunal by giving an example which perhaps is the most important, and again that concerns the opinion of Gerhard Anschuetz concerning article 102 of the constitution[147] as to whether the courts in Germany concerning the validity of the law passed by the Reichstag are entitled to doubt it for ethical reasons. I quote--this is in the commentary of the 14th edition, page 476--“If it cannot even be conceded that the judge is entitled to examine the law as for its being constitutional or not, so it can be conceded even less that he may refuse obedience to a law which was passed constitutionally because according to his opinion concerning certain standards which again according to his opinion are above the legislator, that is to say, morality, ethics, natural law, they contradict these points or because they cannot stand up to certain evaluations.”

I had to read this out verbatim. Therefore, it was rather difficult for the interpreter because of the position of the verbs.

The reason for that situation in Germany, which is a situation that applies to the whole of Europe, is this--and I now have to broach a subject, the effect of which did not affect England or the United States. The state of the European continent came into existence from the fragments of the _Corpus Christianum_ of western Europe. The break of the medieval realm is the soil on which the modern sovereign states grew. These states starting with Italy believe ever more strongly in the idea that they are sufficient to themselves, that they can live by their own efforts, that they are under no obligation to the past or to the future. The state becomes a purpose to itself. That has been emphasized again and again, and that development goes on from Macchiavelli, the great Florentine; Jean Bodin, the great Frenchman; and as far as Hegel, the great German. As a result, ethical evaluations may be made by the legislator, parliament, or the monarch, but the resolution passed by the monarch or parliament deprives those who are governed by these laws of all right of objection.

May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to one event that occurred under the Weimar constitution. During the first years of the republic it became known among the public that Berlin was thinking of forbidding any revalorization [or revaluation-- Aufwertung] by law.[148] The judges of the Reich Supreme Court of Leipzig at that time formed their own association, and that association of judges, in view of that rumor, held a meeting and passed a resolution to the effect that if such a law were to be promulgated, they would refuse to apply it. That happened in 1924, and it was emphasized that such a law would run counter to morality. There was a storm of indignation among the Reich government. The Reich Minister of Justice protested using very sharp expressions, and the Reich Supreme Court did not carry out its threats. However, in 1927 the Reich Supreme Court in a decision published in volume 118 declared--“The legislator in the autocracy is not bound to any other restrictions but those which he draws for himself from the constitution or from other laws.”

Now, I ask to be permitted to speak about a second point which concerns only Germany, at least to that extent. It is easy to forget that the German people for 33 years have never had really normal conditions. If one looks at that from the human point of view, it means that about 50 age-groups of German people--that is more than two-thirds--50 age-groups of people have never seen normal conditions; that is, all the people who were born after 1914, and those who, before 1914, did not have any conscious experiences. For all these people, life--and that was the normal thing for them--was a continuous change from open to latent crisis. One was always exposed to danger and always with a longing for stable conditions. The consequence is that for most Germans, order, which deserves that name, is something hard to imagine. To the German people order has become to mean something transitory, something unstable, something upon which one cannot depend, and doubtless it did not contribute to the stabilization of legal thought that, beginning with the time of the Weimar republic the machinery of legislation was running incredibly fast. I would, indeed, desire for the judges [of this Court] to see the maze of decrees and laws published and showered upon the German people since 1919. Most of those were laws or paragraphs of short existence. We had real inflation of legislation, as far as I know, in history without example at any other period. And that was not only so during the Weimar era, it became worse indeed during the period of the Third Reich. Before Hitler came [to power] he turned with strong criticism against that positive manufacturing of laws. In his opinion, only the “sound sentiment of the people” should find its inclination in laws. But when he was in power, the machinery, if this was possible, then was in even higher gear.

I believe that I do not have to credit it to my own inefficiency but I have to believe that no German jurist can say anything else of himself, but, none of us were in a position to know all the headlines of all the laws and decrees that have been passed. With things as they were, one has to understand that a large portion of the German nation, many jurists among them, became tired and apathetic toward authority, and skeptical. And on the other hand it could not be avoided that many impulsive individuals revolted, wanted to take action, wanted to do something about it, wanted to come to a decision, to a clarification, to a simplification, to find a way to see through all that.

In our era--at least one can say that for Europe--the political disease of fanaticism and doctrinism has broken out; tolerance became more and more rare; each single technical question was tainted with the question of religious allegiance. Under these circumstances, one can easily obtain a picture of the chaotic condition of legal thinking; small wonder that a state, to see to it that laws once decreed have to be carried out by the authorities, demanded _particular_ emphasis because otherwise not even the minimum of order could be guaranteed which was at most possible. Particularly because the entire situation, the entire atmosphere was so unstable. The essence that “an order is an order” had to become the last refuge of those actually in power.

And now, a last part of it. Inflicted against this background of all that we find in the constitution which, on paper, perhaps structurally is the most sympathetic, the most logical democratic constitution of the world, with a tremendous, carefully thought-out system of checks and balances, safety valves in order to assure that the individual citizen would be the one to have its full advantage. But that constitution was worked through elaborately, and I say openly, that my determination to study constitutional law was in part based on that constitution which enthused me as a young man; this constitution, at the same time, was very complicated in its structure, its structural power and in legislative procedure.

With the permission of the Tribunal I shall try to explain that life itself demanded to have these matters simplified--rather less artistry but more efficacy. With that I believe, in all brevity, to have said something of that which is absolutely necessary to know if one wants to understand the essence of the Weimar constitution and its development which, long before Hitler, had led to a situation which does not permit to recognize any longer the situation of 1919.

* * * * * * *

In German we call a law which was brought about by the legislative authority, a law in the formal sense. And the basic thought for all, which is to be found in all European constitutions, is this. If the government wants to, let us say, increase taxation, then that means it wants some acts of legislation which authorize the authorities, or the various agencies, to interfere with property. The government, therefore, wants a law in the material sense; therefore it must have a law in the procedural sense or in the formal sense, through legislation. That is what we call the principle of the necessity of the law, the fact that a law is required. Where this is brought about, we have a division of power. And if it were brought about--and it has never actually been carried out--then this is the way it would have to come about. The legislative body then would have to make all substantive laws, but it would do nothing but just that.

Both these cases do not apply. Parliaments, time and again, are given the privilege or the right to come to resolutions or decisions which have different content, for example, decisions on budget. These decisions on budget are not acts of legislation in the sense of setting standards. In German constitutional law it is definitely prohibited to include into the budgets acts of legislation or standards in that sense. The Parliament has a part in the forming of the cabinet. That is one thing. The other--and this is what we need--is the following. It may happen that the government is authorized to enact legislation by virtue of the constitution itself, or by virtue of later laws passed by the parliament. In German one calls these acts of rule making [Akte der Normsetzung] of the government, that is of the executive--which have a legal maxim as content--legal decrees [Rechtsverordnungen]. “Legal” on account of their content, and “decrees” on account of the method.

This institution, which we find in every European state, was the starting-point for the further development and the paving of the way of the orders by Hitler, because in the Weimar constitution there is a law for the government to decree laws, the utilization, or I should say the exploitation of, which led to the fact that since the middle of 1930 the normal legislative body in Germany was really the government. That is the famous provision of article 48, paragraph 2. As a rule, legal decrees on the basis of this article are called dictatorial decrees, but also apart from that during the Weimar era, much authority was received for the government to issue decrees. In countless laws the Reichstag empowered the government, in order to carry out a law, or in some cases in order to amend a law or repeal a law, to issue legal decrees.

However, not only in the Reich do we find this institution or this instrument of legal decrees, but also in the German states, the German Laender. In the constitution one always finds a [provision concerning the] right to issue emergency decrees (Notverordnungsrecht) and the legislatures of the various states frequently authorize the [state] government to issue decrees in regard to substantive law.

A law of the Reichstag of 13 October 1923, which is called Enabling Law, “Ermaechtigungsgesetz”, signed by Reich President Ebert, conferred upon the Reich government the power, among other things, to issue decrees in regard to substantive law, even deviating from the legal principles of the constitution of the Reich. This law is particularly important. It was published in the first years of the Weimar constitution under Reich President Ebert, and it cleared the way for a development which the founders of this law to this day probably regret deeply.

May I refer the Tribunal to the following:

Several months ago, in Munich, a book was published, “The History of the Weimar Constitution.” The author is Professor Willibalt Apelt, now at the University of Munich. We used to be together at the University of Leipzig, and I also had the honor to lecture for him in addition to my lectures when he became the Minister of Interior in Saxony; that is, the Police Minister.

He was one of the most outspoken democrats we had in Germany. This book throughout is a [settling of an] account [Abrechung] with Hitler. It altogether lauds the Weimar constitution, and therefore it is particularly important to note that Apelt considers this law the beginning of all the evil in this development and states explicitly that this law cleared the way to that other enabling law of 24 March 1933. * * * The date of the law is 13 October 1923. It appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt of 1923, volume I on page 943. Since the middle of 1930 one did no more work with enabling law decrees, but one used article 48, paragraph 2. Earlier already that had been applied. If I am informed correctly under Ebert alone, 136 decrees of that kind were passed, that is to say, until 1925 when Hindenburg became President. At first a little less use was made of this means. It was reactivated again when the economic crisis of 1929 was nearing Europe. Conditions in Germany deteriorated from week to week, and under Bruening whole bundles of emergency decrees, of dictatorial decrees, were passed. In 1932 we had progressed so far in that direction that the Reichstag was practically excluded as a legislative body, and the Reich President, together with the Reich government (the Reich cabinet because according to article 50 they had to work together) was really the normal source of legislation. From then on until Hitler’s acts of legislation it is indeed only a short step, and if Hitler himself would not have set out to give the whole matter a triumphant dictatorial aspect, if he had been satisfied with an enabling act like that of 1923, if he had not had laws enacted by the government but decrees, the entire enabling act would not have caused so much rumpus as it did.

Q. Professor, may I ask you to explain briefly to the Tribunal who Reich President Ebert was, because we have to assume that the name alone does not give a plain indication. * * *

A. We had two Reich Presidents. The first, Friedrich Ebert, who came from the social democratic party of Germany, not elected by the people but by the national assembly, and then the second, von Hindenburg, who was elected by the people.

Q. And my second and other request is that you quote to the Tribunal article 48, paragraph 2 of the Weimar constitution.

A. Article 48, paragraph 2. Concerning the so-called dictatorial powers of the president--and with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall formulate these sentences linguistically in a way which make them easily translatable--“The Reich President may take those measures which are necessary to reestablish public security and order if, in the area of the German Reich, public security and order are considerably disturbed or endangered. If required, he may also intervene with the aid of the armed forces. For that purpose he is authorized temporarily to invalidate in whole or in part the basic laws which are laid down in the articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 153.”[149] May I add, these seven basic laws are the so-called “liberal principles,” [basic liberties], the same which we find, for instance, in the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights.

Q. Professor, we are now concerned with an attempt to explain the Hitler decree to the Tribunal. After all we have heard from you now, the development which has led to it that the government governed by decrees rather than by legislation, that development started already as early as 1923, and according to the information we have from you was again stipulated in 1930 at the time of a different government. I think it will be necessary to explain to the Tribunal that this development led up to the Hitler decree; went through various stages of development, and I may ask you still to describe this to us, because in the course of this case it has become necessary that this development be shown asclearly as possible.

* * * * * * *

The cabinet assumed responsibility [for all orders and directives issued by the Reich President] to the Reichstag by countersigning them, and the Reichstag could react rather disagreeably; the cabinet, if the Reich President and the Reichstag were of different opinions, was forced to make a decision. If the cabinet took the opinion of the Reichstag, then the Reich President either had to give in or change the cabinet; if the cabinet went along with the President, then nothing else was left than to risk the vote of lack of confidence; an essential vote of the Reichstag could lead, therefore, to a struggle of that kind, and in German practice the cabinet which went with the president against the Reichstag was called a “fighting government” [Kampfregierung]; not the other way around. In the long run it showed that the Reich President, when the Chancellor went with him, was stronger than the Reichstag. That also I may be permitted to describe briefly. If the Reichstag did not agree with the president, was not satisfied with the president’s decisions, it could not, properly speaking, do anything. Even though the constitution in article 43[150] reserved to the Reichstag the right to ask the people of the Reich that they demand the resignation or the dismissal of the president. That, in practice, never occurred, and for a very simple reason. If the Reichstag would have come to a decision of that kind, and the people would not have gone along, then that president would have been automatically reelected for another 7 years, and also, the Reichstag would have been dissolved, and that would mean suicide [for the Reichstag]. However, the president is in a much better position; if he is in agreement with the Chancellor, he can dissolve the Reichstag himself. That is where the famous red folder comes in.[151] If, therefore, the president and the cabinet are in agreement, and there is a threat of censure on the part of the Reichstag, then the president can turn over to the Reich Chancellor the order for dissolution [of the Reichstag]. The Reich Chancellor is present in the session, and when it comes to the last, he just shows that red folder and that settles the entire matter. Now, the Tribunal will certainly understand why in discussing article 48, paragraph 2, I did not even read paragraph 3,[152] because there it is expressed that the Reich President has to notify the Reichstag of every dictatorial measure and if the Reichstag wants it withdrawn, and the demands are made of the president, the president has to repeal his measures. If he and the cabinet do not wish to do that, they have the possibility of dissolving the Reichstag, and that brings me back to what I pointed out before. Maybe one cannot understand why the Reichstag permitted itself to be dispossessed, as far as legislation is concerned. It would have had to be made entirely different to be in a position to oppose due to the fact that the major change could not depend upon them. The Reichstag in every demand of repeal risked its own life.

* * * * * * *

Perhaps at this moment I can jump ahead into the Hitler era. When the Hitler government had received the right to pass laws it no longer needed the Reichstag. If one wanted to use the Reichstag at all as a legislative body, one did so to save face. But, now the government did no longer make any suggestions as was, in former times, the normal procedure. The government was the legislator itself. But that way was chosen; a way, which during the Weimar era played no part.

Under Hitler the Reichstag since November 1933, consisted only of one faction. That is just as senseless as one party. This faction introduced a bill with the name of Adolf Hitler and three others. Frick, the faction chairman accomplished this, Goering acted surprised, being the president, and then, the whole game went on as you know it. That abnormal way, therefore, was chosen in order to stage the play. Now I go back to the Weimar era. As to whether the bill was introduced this way or that way, for the Reichstag, that was only raw material. It could say, “We will not do anything.” It could say, “We will pass it.” It could say, “We will change it.” If a bill is passed, it means that the bill is accepted or amended; then the Reich President received the law which was had been passed by the Reichstag for his signature. Signing a law, that meant as to whether the law was passed in the proper way, and as to whether the text which had been submitted to the president was actually the text which was passed under the law by the Reichstag. (It did, in effect, happen that other documents were submitted to him than those passed by the Reichstag, of course, by mistake. Next, the Reichsgesetzblatt had to publish it with a special wrapper in the changed form.) And when that happened, then, the president gave the order for promulgation. In Germany we usually call it promulgation, too. So far so good.

So much so good. But, now, it could happen that the Reich council or the Reich President with the consent of the government or the government with the consent of the president or some of the members of the Reichstag, itself, were dissatisfied with the law, and, in that case, the constitution provided that those unsatisfied persons or bodies could appeal to the people. That is very complicated, Your Honors, and I do not think that we need it for our purpose here. You will find it written down but I don’t think I need to elaborate on it here.

If such an appeal would have been made to the nation--it never happened, it got stuck in the beginning--then that had to be fought out at the time between signature and promulgation. But the constitution had provided for a special procedure, an act of absolute democracy became possible--the people of the Reich, that is to say, at least one-tenth of the whole electorate,--at that time, that was at least four million voters--could join together and demand that a bill which had to be drafted up to the very last [detail], was to be submitted by the Reichstag, and, in that case, the Reichstag was not as free toward the draft as in the other case. But it was under pressure of an ultimatum. It was only left with the choice either to accept it as it was or the government had to ask the nation. That was attempted a few times but it was never carried out properly.

I should assume that those remarks were sufficient to show to the Tribunal that on the one hand the Weimar constitution was very democratic, with the intent to protect the people and its rights; but that on the other hand the constitution was so complicated in the structure of the bodies and in the legislative procedure, that one need not wonder if an ever stronger movement urged for simplification. Furthermore, the constitution in itself had something unclarified, something provisional and that in severe respects and that always happens if a dualism is created; for every dualism of power endeavors at its own dissolution. * * * We had, furthermore, the small dualism between Reich President and Reich Chancellor; and, I haven’t mentioned that yet, there was the old grave German problem of dualism between Reich and Laender; all these various problems of dualism were urging for dissolution and they were in process of dissolution prior to Hitler. Hitler then completed that development. May I explain that in a few remarks?

First of all, the dualism between Reichstag and Reich President was abolished. The Reich President is the victor. Under Hindenburg the formation of the cabinet more and more came under the power of the Reich President and that of the Reichstag decreased. The end of this development was 30 January 1933. The Reichstag was no longer asked to do any work. Purely formally, under article 53, the president appoints the new government. Article 54 was no longer considered a serious threat. The parliamentary system is dead and we have the first demoting of the Reichstag. The second had already started in the meantime, as I have shown. The Reichstag had already resigned more and more as a legislative body; it is only the culmination of the development, what we see in the law of 24 March 1933 [Enabling Act] and the aftermath, the new reconstruction law [Neuaufbaugesetz] of 30 September 1934; the division of powers is dead. The Reichstag in its original and foremost function has been dethroned. What was its purpose now? In July 1933, political parties were definitely prohibited. A genuine parliament was no longer possible. The first Reichstag elected after this July law, in November 1933, was the Reichstag of one faction only elected by voters of one party only. It has been said that it was purely an assembly of acclamation. The great dualism in the Reich ended thereby and on the grave of the Reichstag there are three crosses. The small dualism between Reich President and Reich Chancellor ended with the death of Hindenburg and is expressed in the law of 1 August 1934, concerning the head of State [Staatsoberhaupt-Gesetz]. The greatest and most serious dualism between Reich and Laender in effect was eliminated before that. Usually one says in the German constitutional science that only the reorganization law of 30 January 1934 had turned the Laender into Reich provinces but that is certainly not correct. Looking at the facts themselves, that step was already taken by the Reich governor law [Reichsstatthaltergesetz] of 7 April 1933. When one summarizes all that and looks at those results together, the final phase is this--the entire power of the State in the German Reich is combined in the hand of that one man who quite arbitrarily can use that power to decide individual cases or to set new norms. It depends only on him, from the practical point of view of power, as to how long he refrained from interfering in the field of judiciary. * * *

Q. Professor, that was the question about the development up to the point when this one man, Hitler, held everything in his hand. I would say the result of historical development. We are interested in explaining to the Tribunal, if I may say so, the dogmatical position of the Hitler decree as a legislator. Therefore, my question concerning your statements up to now concerned the development of constitutional law up to that historical point. But now, the Hitler decree and the act of lawmaking became actually one and the same. What was the effect of that on the legislative, on the executive, and on all forms of the state life after that time?

A. Perhaps I may begin with the procedure of the Hitler decrees, that is to say, with the exterior manifestations. I have shown that in German constitutional law we had the difference between statute, in the formal sense, and ordinance. The one was the act of the legislature--the other of the executive. On account of the enabling act and as a consequence of the first acts of the Hitler government, the procedure of legislation became a dual one. We still had more or less--for Sundays only, so to speak--the procedure of legislation through the Reichstag. The normal course of legislation was the statutes enacted by the Reich government, which should not have been called that way. We also had, from the imperial days, and we kept it up during the days of the president, the decree by the head of state, especially distinguished in the way of ordinance, for instance the organization act and we had the ordinance by the government. Hitler, by and by--but it happened rather quickly--emancipated himself from those regulations of the laws which were previously valid and concerning the various forms of norms, he used them arbitrarily. As to whether a statute passed by the Reichstag, as I described it, was brought in by suggestion of the National Socialist Party with Hitler as the first mover of the motion, was passed by way of acclamation, without debate; or whether the law was decided on by the government--that happened very quickly by way of circulation--or whether Hitler called it “Decree by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor”--later called “Fuehrer Decree” or ordinance, such as the famous ordinance on the Enforcement of the Four-Year Plan--for the legal value that did not matter at all. In all cases Hitler alone decided, whether he would take advice or not, whether there was a cosignature or not, for genuine cosignature in the constitutional meaning, of course, could not exist any more. There have been many arguments as to what the cosignatures which weren’t always affixed meant. People have tried very hard to find a meaning, but the only thing that is really certain is that these cosignatures did no longer have the meaning or significance of the proper countersignature. There was nobody toward whom one could have assumed any responsibility by countersigning. Therefore, all fixing of norm, signed by Hitler’s name alone or together with other names, is merely an act of will of that man--whether it calls itself a law or something else.

The only difficulty is represented by the so-called secret laws, although I can’t quite see where the difficulties are when you look at it properly; that a law which is kept secret before the people whom it concerns cannot bind those people is obvious. That is not because of some particular legal system but that is because of the very nature of an order. Nobody can be given an order if he doesn’t know of the order and if he is not meant to have knowledge of that order. But one must not forget that if Hitler passed a secret law, that as an official directive it was binding for those persons to whom it was made known. Then it was not just a legal norm, but it was an official instruction. As for the citizen, that amounted to the same in effect. If I may use an expression from Germanic law, these various forms by which Hitler announced his will were only different as far as the number of people in his entourage were concerned.