Chapter X: Conclusion

It is time to dismiss this subject. But I cannot take a final leave of it, (and probably of all subjects of this kind) without adding the following reflections on our own state in this kingdom.

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It is well known, that MONTESQUIEU has paid the highest compliment to this country, by describing its constitution of government, in giving an account of a perfect government; and by drawing the character of its inhabitants, in giving an account of the manners and characters of a free people.—“All (he says) having, in free states, a share in government, and the laws not being made for some more than others, they consider themselves as _monarchs_, and are more properly _confederates than fellow-subjects_.—No one citizen being subject to another, each sets a greater value on his Liberty than on the glory of any of his fellow-citizens.—Being independent, they are proud; for the pride of kings is founded on their independence.—They are in a constant ferment, and believe themselves in danger, even in those moments when they are most safe.—They reason; but it is indifferent whether they reason well or ill. It is sufficient that they _do_ reason. Hence springs that Liberty which is their security.—This state, however, will lose its Liberty. It will perish, when the _Legislative_ power shall become more corrupt than the _executive_.”[73]

Such is the account which this great writer gave, many years ago, of the _British_ constitution and people. We may learn from it, that we have nothing to fear from that disposition to examine every public measure, to censure ministers of state, and to be restless and clamorous, which has hitherto characterized us.—On the contrary; we shall have every thing to fear, when this disposition is lost. As soon as a people grow secure, and cease to be quick in taking alarms, they are undone. A free constitution of government cannot be preserved without an earnest and unremitting jealousy. OUR Constitution, in particular, is so excellent, that it is the properest object of such a jealousy. For my own part, I admire so much the general frame and principles of it, that I could be almost satisfied with that representation of the kingdom, which forms the most important part of it, had I no other objection to this representation than its _inadequateness_. Did it consist of a body of men, fairly elected for a short term, by a number of independent persons, of all orders in every part of the kingdom, equal to the number of the present voters; and were it, after being elected, under no undue influence; it would be a security of such importance, that I should be less disposed to complain of the injustice done, by its inadequateness, to the greatest part of the kingdom by depriving them of one their natural and unalienable rights. To such a body of representatives we might commit, with confidence, the guardianship of our rights, knowing, that having one interest with the rest of the state, they could not violate them; or that if they ever did, a little time would bring the power of gaining redress without tumult or violence.—Happy the people so blessed.—If wise, they will endeavour, by every possible method, to preserve the purity of their representation; and, should it have degenerated, they will lose no time in effecting a reformation of it.—But if, unhappily, infection should have pervaded the whole mass of the state, and there should be no room to hope for any reformation, it will be still some consolation to reflect, that slavery, in all its rigour, will not immediately follow. Between the time in which the securities of Liberty are undermined, and its final subversion, there is commonly a flattering interval during which the _enjoyment_ of Liberty may be continued, in consequence of fundamental laws and rooted habits which cannot be at once exterminated. And this interval is longer or shorter, according as the progress of corruption is more or less rapid; and men in power more or less attentive to improve favourable opportunities.—The government of this country, in particular, is so well balanced, and the institutions of our common law are so admirable, and have taken such deep root, that we can bear much decay before our liberties fall.—Fall, however, they must, if our public affairs do not soon take a new turn. That very evil, which, according to the great writer I have quoted, is to produce our ruin, we see working every where and increasing every day.—The following facts, among many others, shew too plainly whither we are tending and how far we are advanced.

First. It seems to me, that a general indifference is gaining ground fast among us.—This is the necessary effect of increasing luxury and dissipation; but there is another cause of it, which I think of with particular regret.—In consequence of having been often duped by false patriots; and found, that the leaders of opposition, when they get into places, forget all their former declarations; the nation has been led to a conviction, that all patriotism is imposture, and all opposition to the measures of government nothing but a struggle for power and its emoluments. The honest and independent part of the nation entertain at present most of this conviction; and, therefore, having few public men to whom they can look with confidence, they give up all zeal, and sink into inactivity and despondence.

Secondly. At the Revolution, the House of Commons acquired its just weight in the constitution; and, for some years afterwards, it was often giving much trouble to men in power. Of late, it is well known, that means have been tryed and a system adopted for quieting it.—I will not say with what success—But I must say, that the men whose policy this has been, have struck at the very _heart_ of public liberty, and are the worst traitors this kingdom ever saw.—“If ever, (says Judge _Blackstone_) it should happen, that the independency of any one of the three branches of our legislature should be lost; or that it should become subservient to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of our constitution. The legislature would be changed from that which was originally set up by the general consent and fundamental act of the society; and such a change, however effected, is according to Mr. _Locke_ (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government, and the people are thereby reduced to a state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative power.”[74]

Thirdly. Soon after the REVOLUTION, bills for triennial parliaments passed both Houses, in opposition to the court[75]. At the ACCESSION, septennial parliaments were established. Since this last period, many attempts have been made, by the friends of the constitution, to restore triennial parliaments; and, formerly, it was not without difficulty that the ministry were able to defeat these attempts. The division in the House of Commons in 1735, on a bill for this purpose, was 247 to 184.—I need not say, that _now_ all such attempts drop of themselves. So much are the sentiments of our representatives changed in this instance, that the motion for such a bill, annually made by a worthy member of the House of Commons, can scarcely produce a serious debate, or gain the least attention.—For several years, at the beginning of the last reign, the HOUSE OF COMMONS constantly passed _pension_ and _place_ bills, which were as constantly rejected by the HOUSE OF LORDS. At present, no one is so romantic as ever to think of introducing any such bills into the House of Commons.

Fourthly. Standing armies have in all ages been destructive to the Liberties of the states into which they have been admitted.—MONTESQUIEU[76] observes, that the preservation of Liberty in ENGLAND requires, that it should have no land forces.—Dr. FERGUSON calls the establishment of standing armies “A FATAL REFINEMENT in the present state of civil government.”[77]—Mr. _Hume_ pronounces “our standing army a mortal distemper in the British constitution, of which it must _inevitably_ perish.”[78]—Formerly, the nation was apprehensive of this danger; and the _standing army_ was a constant subject of warm debate in both Houses of Parliament. The principal reason then assigned for continuing it was, the security of the House of HANOVER against the friends of the _Pretender_. This is a reason which now exists no more; the House of _Hanover_ being so well established as not to want any such security.—The standing army also is now more numerous and formidable than ever; and yet all opposition to it is lost, and it is become in a manner a part of the constitution.

Fifthly. For many years after the accession the national debt was thought an evil so alarming, that the reduction of it was recommended every year from the throne to the attention of Parliament as an object of the last importance. The FUND appropriated to this purpose was called the ONLY HOPE of the kingdom; and when the practice of alienating it begun, it was reckoned a kind of sacrilege, and zealously opposed in the House of _Commons_, and protested against in the House of _Lords_. But now, though the debt is almost _tripled_, we sit under it with perfect indifference; and the sacred fund, which repeated laws had ordered to be applied _to no other purpose_ than the redemption of it, is always alienated of course, and become a constant part of the current supplies, and much more an encouragement to dissipation than a preservative from bankruptcy.

Sixthly. Nothing is more the duty of the representatives of a nation than to keep a strict eye over the expenditure of the money granted for public services.—In the reign of King William, the House of Commons passed almost every year bills for appointing commissioners for taking, stating and examining the public accounts; and, particularly, the army and navy debts and contracts. In the reign of Queen Ann such bills became less frequent. But since the accession, only two motions have been made for such bills; one in 1715, and the other in 1741; and both were rejected.

Seventhly. I hope I may add, that there was a time when the kingdom could not have been brought to acquiesce in what was done in the case of the _Middlesex_ election. This is a precedent which, by giving the House of Commons the power of excluding its members at discretion, and of introducing others in their room on a minority of votes, has a tendency to make it a self-created House, and to destroy entirely the right of representation: And a few more such precedents would completely overthrow the constitution.

Lastly. I cannot help mentioning here the addition which has been lately made to the power of the Crown, by throwing into its hands the _East-India Company_. Nothing more unfavourable to the security of public Liberty has been done since the REVOLUTION: And should our statesmen, thus strengthened by the patronage of the EAST, be farther strengthened by the conquest and patronage of the WEST, they will indeed have no small reason for triumph; and there will be little left to protect us against the encroachments and usurpations of power. ROME sunk into slavery, in consequence of enlarging its territories, and becoming the center of the wealth of conquered provinces, and the seat of universal empire. It seems the appointment of Providence, that free states, when, not contented with _self_-government, and prompted by the love of domination, they make themselves masters of other states, shall lose Liberty at the same time that they take it away; and, by subduing, be themselves subdued. Distant and dependent provinces can be governed only by a military force. And a military force which governs abroad, will soon govern at home. The _Romans_ were so sensible of this, that they made it treason for any of their generals to march their armies over the _Rubicon_ into _Italy_. CÆSAR, therefore, when he came to this river, hesitated; but he passed it, and enslaved his country.

“Among the circumstances (says Dr. FERGUSON) which in the event of national prosperity and in the result of commercial arts, lead to the establishment of despotism, there is none perhaps that arrives at this termination with so sure an aim as the perpetual enlargement of territory. In every state the freedom of its members depends on the balance and adjustment of its interior parts; and the existence of any such freedom among mankind depends on the balance of nations. In the progress of conquest those who are subdued are said to have lost their liberties. But, from the history of mankind, to conquer or to be conquered has appeared in effect the same.”[79]

Many more facts of this kind might easily be enumerated; but these are sufficient.—They shew, with sad evidence, how fast we have, for some time, been advancing towards the greatest of all public calamities.

We may, also, infer from the preceding observations, that there is only one way in which our deliverance is possible; and that is, by RESTORING OUR GRAND NATIONAL SECURITY. This is the object which our great men in opposition ought to hold forth to the kingdom, and to bind themselves by some decisive tests to do all they can to obtain. That patriotism must be spurious which does not carry its views principally to this. Without it, nothing is of great importance to the kingdom; and even an accommodation with _America_ would only preserve a limb, and save from present danger, while a gangrene was left to consume the vitals.

But, probably, we are gone too far; and corruption has struck its roots too deep to leave us much room for hope.—Mr. HUME has observed,[80] that as the affairs of this country are not likely to take a turn favourable to the establishment of a perfect plan of Liberty, “an absolute monarchy is the easiest death, the true EUTHANASIA of the British constitution.”—If this observation is just, our constitution (should no great calamity intervene) is likely, in some future period, to receive a very quiet dissolution.—At present, however, it must be acknowledged, that we enjoy a degree of Liberty, civil and religious, which has seldom been paralleled among mankind. We ought to rejoice in this happiness; and to be graceful to that benevolent disposer of all events who blesses us with it. But, at the same time, our hearts must bleed when we reflect, that, the supports of it having given way, it is little more than a _sufferance_ which we owe to the temper of the times; the lenity of our governors; and some awe, in which the friends of despotism are still held, by the voice and spirit of the uncorrupted part of the kingdom.—May these causes, if no better securities can be hoped for, long delay our fate.

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It must not be forgotten, that all I have now said is meant on the supposition, that our affairs will proceed smoothly till, by a common and natural progress, we have gone the round of other nations once free, and are brought to their end.—But it is possible this may not happen.—Our circumstances are singular; and give us reason to fear, that we have before us a death which will not be easy or common.