Chapter IX: Part I

SUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE and VALUE of CIVIL LIBERTY and FREE GOVERNMENT.

SECT. I.

_Of the Nature of Civil Liberty, and the Essentials of a Free Government._

With respect to Liberty in general there are two questions to be considered:

First, What it is?—And Secondly, How far it is of value?

There is no difficulty in answering the first of these questions.—To be FREE, is “to be able to act or to forbear acting, as we think best;” or “to be masters of our own resolutions and conduct.”—It may be pretended, that it is not desirable to be thus free; but, without doubt, this it is to be _free_; and this is what all mean when they say of themselves or others that they are _free_.

I have observed, that all the different kinds of Liberty run up into the general idea of self-government[50].—The Liberty of men as _agents_ is that power of self-determination which all agents, as such, possess.—Their Liberty as _moral_ agents is their power of self-government in their _moral_ conduct.—Their Liberty as _religious_ agents is their power of self-government in _religion_.—And their Liberty, as members of communities associated for the purposes of civil government, is their power of self-government in all their civil concerns. It is Liberty, in the last of these views of it, that is the subject of my present enquiry; and it may, in other words, be defined to be “the power of a state to govern itself by its own will.”—In order, therefore, to determine whether a state is free, no more is necessary than to determine whether there is any will, different from its own, to which it is subject.

When we speak of a state, we mean the _whole_ state, and not any _part_ of it; and the will of the state, therefore, is the will of the whole.—There are two ways in which this will may be expressed. First, by the suffrages of all the members given in person. Or secondly, by the suffrages of a body of Representatives, in appointing whom all the members have voices.—A state governed by its own will in the first of these ways enjoys the most complete and perfect Liberty; but such a government being impracticable, except in very small states, it is necessary that civil communities in general should satisfy themselves with that degree of Liberty which can be obtained in the last of these ways; and Liberty so obtained may be sufficiently ample, and at the same time is capable of being extended to the largest states[51].

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But here, before I proceed, I must desire, that an observation may be attended to, which appears to me of considerable consequence.—A distinction should be made between the _Liberty_ of a state, and its not suffering oppression; or between a free government, and a government under which freedom is enjoyed. Under the most despotic government liberty may happen to be enjoyed. But being derived from a will over which the state has no controul, and not from its own will; or from an accidental mildness in the _administration_, and not from a _constitution_ of government; it is nothing but an indulgence of a precarious nature, and of little importance.—Individuals in private life, while held under the power of masters, cannot be denominated free, however equitably and kindly they may be treated. This is strictly true of _communities_ as well as of _individuals_.—Civil Liberty (it should be remembered) must be enjoyed as a right derived from the Author of nature only, or it cannot be the blessing which merits this name. If there is any human power which is considered as _giving_ it, on which it depends, and which can invade or recall it at pleasure, it changes its nature, and becomes a species of slavery.

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But to return—The force superseding self-government in a state, or the power destroying its Liberty, is of two kinds. It may be either a power _without_ itself, or a power _within_ itself. The former constitutes what may be properly called _external_, and the latter _internal_ slavery.—Were there any distant state which had acquired a sovereignty over this country, and exercised the power of making its laws and disposing its property, we should be in the first kind of slavery; and, if not totally depraved by a habit of subjection to such a power, we should think ourselves in a miserable condition; and an advocate for such a power would be considered as insulting us, who should attempt to reconcile us to it by telling us, that we were _one_ community with that distant state, though destitute of a single voice in its legislature; and, on this ground, should maintain, that all resistance to it was no less criminal than any resistance _within_ a state to the authority of that state.—In short, every state, not incorporated with another by an equal representation, and yet subject to its dominion, is enslaved in this sense.—Such was the slavery of the provinces subject to antient _Rome_; and such is the slavery of every community, as far as any other community is master of it; or as far as, in respect of taxation and internal legislation, it is not independent of every other community. Nor does it make any difference to such a community, that it enjoys within itself a free constitution of government, if that constitution is itself liable to be altered, suspended or over-ruled at the discretion of the state which possesses the sovereignty over it.

But the slavery most prevalent in the world has been internal slavery.—In order better to explain this, it is proper to observe, that all civil government being either the government of a _whole_ by _itself_, or of a _whole_ by a _power extraneous_ to it, or of a _whole_ by a _part_; the first _alone_ is LIBERTY, and the two last are TYRANNY, producing the two sorts of slavery which I have mentioned. Internal slavery, therefore, takes place wherever a whole community is governed by a _part_; and this, perhaps, is the most concise and comprehensive account that can be given of it.—The part that governs may be either a _single_ man, as in _absolute Monarchies_; or, a body of grandees, as in _Aristocracies_. In both these cases the powers of government are commonly held for life without delegation, and descend from father to son; and the people governed are in the same situation with cattle upon an estate, which descends by inheritance from one owner to another.—But farther. A community may be governed by a body of delegates, and yet be enslaved.—Though government by representation alone is free, unless when carried on by the personal suffrages of all the members of a state, yet _all_ such government is by no means free. In order to render it so, the following requisites are necessary.

First, The representation must be _complete_. No state, a _part_ of which only is represented in the Legislature that governs it, is _self_-governed. Had _Scotland_ no representatives in the Parliament of _Britain_, it would not be free; nor would it be proper to call _Britain_ free, though _England_, its other part, were adequately represented. The like is true, in general, of every country subject to a Legislature in which _some_ of its parts, or some classes of men in it, are represented, and others not.

Secondly, The representatives of a free state must be _freely_ chosen. If this is not the case, they are not at all representatives; and government by them degenerates into government by a junto of men in the community, who happen to have power or wealth enough to command or purchase their offices.

Thirdly, After being _freely_ chosen, they must be themselves _free_. If there is any higher will which directs their resolutions, and on which they are dependent, they become the instruments of that will; and it is that will alone that in reality governs the state.

Fourthly, They must be chosen for short terms; and, in all their acts, be accountable to their constituents. Without this a people will have no controul over their representatives; and, in chusing them, they will give up entirely their Liberty; and only enjoy the poor privilege of naming, at certain intervals, a set of men whom they are to _serve_, and who are to dispose, at their discretion, of their property and lives.

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The causes of internal slavery now mentioned prevail, some of them more and others less, in different communities. With respect, in particular, to a government by representation; it is evident, that it deviates more or less from Liberty, in proportion as the representation is more or less imperfect. And, if imperfect in every one of the instances I have recited; that is, if inadequate and partial; subject to no controul from the people; corruptly chosen for long terms; and, after being chosen, venal and dependent;—in these circumstances, a representation becomes an imposition and a nusance; and government by it is as inconsistent with true Liberty as the most arbitrary and despotic government.

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I have been so much misunderstood[52] on this subject, that it is necessary I should particularly observe here, that my intention in this account has been merely to shew what is requisite to constitute a state or a government free, and not at all to define the best form of government. These are two very different points. The first is attended with few difficulties. A free state is a state self-governed in the manner I have described. But it may be free, and yet not enjoy the best constitution of government. Liberty, though the most essential requisite in government, is not the only one. Wisdom, union, dispatch, secresy, and vigour are likewise requisite; and that is the best form of government which best unites all these qualities; or which, to an equal and perfect Liberty, adds the greatest wisdom in deliberating and resolving, and the greatest union, force and expedition in executing[53].

In short, my whole meaning is, that the will of the Community alone ought to govern; but that there are different methods of obtaining and executing this will; of which those are the best which collect into it most of the knowledge and experience of the community, and at the same time carry it into execution with most dispatch and vigour.

It has been the employment of the wisest men in all ages to contrive plans for this purpose; and the happiness of society depends so much on civil government, that it is not possible the human understanding should be better employed.

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I have said in the Observations on Civil Liberty, that “in a free state every man is his own legislator.”—I have been happy in since finding the[54] same assertion in _Montesquieu_, and also in Mr. Justice _Blackstone_’s Commentaries. It expresses the fundamental principle of our constitution; and the meaning of it is plainly, that every independent agent in a free state ought to have a share in the government of it, either by himself _personally_, or by a body of representatives, in chusing whom he has a free vote, and therefore all the concern and weight which are possible, and consistent with the equal rights of every other member of the state.—But though the meaning of this assertion is so obvious, and the truth of it undeniable, it has been much exclaimed against, and occasioned no small part of the opposition which has been made to the principles advanced in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_.—One even of the most candid, as well as the ablest of my opponents, (whose difference of opinion from me I sincerely lament) has intimated, that it implies, that, in a free state,[55] _thieves and pick-pockets have a right to make laws for themselves_.—The public will not, I hope, wonder that I chuse to take little notice of such objections.

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It has been said, that the liberty for which I have pleaded, is “a right or power in every one to act as he likes without any restraint.”—However unfairly this representation has been given of my account of liberty, I am ready to adopt it, provided it is understood with a few limitations.—MORAL LIBERTY, in particular, cannot be better defined than by calling it “a power in every one to do as he likes.” My opponents in general seem to be greatly puzzled with this; and I am afraid it will signify little to attempt explaining it to them by saying, that every man’s will, if perfectly free from restraint, would carry him invariably to rectitude and virtue; and that no one who acts wickedly acts as he _likes_, but is conscious of a tyranny within him overpowering his judgment, and carrying him into a conduct, for which he condemns and hates himself. _The things that he would he does not_;[56] _and the things that he would not, those he does_. He is, therefore, a slave in the properest sense.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, likewise, is a power of acting as we _like_ in religion; or of professing and practising that mode of religious worship which we think most acceptable to the Deity.—But here the limitation to which I have referred must be attended to. ALL have the same unalienable right to this Liberty; and consequently, no one has a right to such a use of it as shall take it from others. Within this limit, or as far as he does not encroach on the equal liberty of others, every one has a right to do as he pleases in religion.—That the right to religious Liberty goes as far as this every one must allow, who is not a friend to persecution; and that it cannot go farther, is self-evident; for if it did, there would be a contradiction in the natures of things; and it would be true, that every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to destroy.—If, therefore, the religious faith of any person leads him to hurt another because he professes a different faith; or if it carries him, in any instances, to intolerance, Liberty itself requires he should be restrained, and that, in such instances, he should lose his liberty.

All this is equally applicable to the Liberty of man in his _civil_ capacity; and it is a maxim true universally, “that as far as any one does not molest _others_, others ought not to molest _him_.”—All have a right to the free and undisturbed possession of their good names, properties and lives; and it is the right all have to this that gives the right to establish civil government, which is or ought to be nothing but an institution (by laws and provisions made with _common_ consent) for guarding this right against invasion; for giving to every one, in _temporals_ and _spirituals_, the power of commanding his own conduct; or, of acting as he pleases, and going where he will, provided he does not run foul of others.—Just government, therefore, does not _infringe_ liberty, but _establish_ it.—It does not _take away_ the rights of mankind, but _protect_ and _confirm_ them.—I will add, that it does not even create any new subordinations of particular men to one another, but only gives security in those several stations, whether of authority and pre-eminence, or of subordination and dependence, which nature has established, and which must have arisen among mankind whether civil government had been instituted or not. But this goes beyond my purpose in this place, and more will be said of it presently.

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To sum up the whole—Our ideas of Civil Liberty will be rendered more distinct by considering it under the three following views:—The Liberty of the _citizen_—The liberty of the _government_—And the liberty of the _community_.—A _citizen_ is free when the power of commanding his own conduct and the quiet possession of his life, person, property and good name are _secured_ to him by being his own legislator in the sense explained in page 10[57].—A _government_ is free when constituted in such a manner as to give this _security_.—And the freedom of a community or nation is the same among nations, that the freedom of a citizen is among his fellow-citizens.—It is not, therefore, as observed in page 3, the mere possession of Liberty that denominates a citizen or a community free; but that _security_ for the possession of it which arises from such a free government as I have described; and which takes place, when there exists no power that can take it away.—It is in the same sense that the mere performance of virtuous actions is not what denominates an agent virtuous; but the temper and habits from whence they spring; or that _inward constitution_, and right balance of the affections, which _secure_ the practice of virtue, produce stability of conduct, and constitute a _character_.

I cannot imagine how it can be disputed whether this is a just account of the nature of Liberty. It has been already given more briefly in the Observations on Civil Liberty; and it is with reluctance I have repeated so much of what has been there said. But the wrong apprehensions which have been entertained of my sentiments have rendered this necessary. And, for the same reason, I am obliged to go on to the subject of the next section.

SECT. II.

_Of the VALUE of Liberty, and the EXCELLENCE of a Free Government._

Having shewn in the preceding section “what Liberty is;” the next question to be considered is, “how far it is valuable.”

Nothing need be said to shew the value of the three kinds of liberty which I have distinguished under the names of _Physical_, _Moral_, and _Religious_ Liberty. They are, without doubt, the foundation of all the happiness and dignity of men, as reasonable and moral agents, and the subjects of the Deity.—It is, in like manner, true of _Civil_ Liberty, that it is the foundation of the whole happiness and dignity of men as members of civil society, and the subjects of civil government.

First. It is Civil Liberty, or such free government as I have described, that alone can give just security against oppression. One government is better than another in proportion as it gives more of this security. It is, on this account, that the supreme government of the Deity is perfect. There is not a possibility of being oppressed or aggrieved by it. Subjection to it is the same with complete freedom.

Were there any men on whose superior wisdom and goodness we might absolutely depend, they could not possess too much power; and the love of liberty itself would engage us to fly to them, and to put ourselves under their direction. But such are the principles that govern human nature; such the weakness and folly of men; such their love of domination, selfishness, and depravity; that none of them can be raised to an elevation above others without the utmost danger. The constant experience of the world has verified this; and proved, that nothing intoxicates the human mind so much as power, and that men, when they have got possession of it, have seldom failed to employ it in grinding their fellow-men, and gratifying the vilest passions.—In the establishment, therefore, of civil government, it would be preposterous to rely on the discretion of any men. If a people would obtain security against oppression, they must seek it in _themselves_, and never part with the powers of government out _of their own_ hands. It is there only they can be safe.—A people will never oppress themselves, or invade their own rights. But if they trust the arbitrary will of any body or succession of men, they trust ENEMIES, and it may be depended on that the worst evils will follow.

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It follows from hence, that a free government is the only government which is consistent with the ends of government.—Men combine into communities and institute government to obtain the peaceable enjoyment of their rights, and to defend themselves against injustice and violence: And when they endeavour to secure these ends by such a free government as I have described, improved by such arrangements as may have a tendency to preserve it from confusion, and to concentrate in it as much as possible of the wisdom and force of the community; In this case, it is a most rational and important institution.—But when the contrary is done; and the benefits of government are sought by establishing a government of _men_, and not of _laws_ made with common consent; it becomes a most absurd institution.—It is seeking a remedy for oppression in _one_ quarter, by establishing it in _another_; and avoiding the outrages of _little_ plunderers, by constituting a set of _great_ plunderers.—It is, in short, the folly of _giving up_ liberty in order to _maintain_ Liberty; and, in the very act of endeavouring to secure the most valuable rights, to arm a body of enemies with power to destroy them.

I can easily believe, that mankind, in the first and rude state of society, might act thus irrationally. Absolute governments, being the simplest forms of government, might be the first that were established. A people having experienced the happy effects of the wisdom or the valour of particular men, might be led to trust them with unlimited power as their rulers and legislators. But they would soon find reason to repent: And the time, I hope, may come, when mankind in general, taught by long and dear experience, and _weary_ of the abuses of power under _slavish_ governments, will learn to detest them, and never to give up that SELF-GOVERNMENT, which, whether we consider men in their private or collective capacities, is the first of all the blessings they can possess.

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Again. Free governments are the only governments which give scope to the exertion of the powers of men, and are favourable to their improvement.—The members of free states, knowing their rights to be secure, and that they shall enjoy without molestation the fruits of every acquisition they can make, are encouraged and incited to industry. Being at liberty to push their researches as far as they can into all subjects, and to guide themselves by their own judgments in all their religious and civil concerns, while they allow others to do the same; error and superstition must lose ground. Conscious of being their own governors, bound to obey no laws except such as they have given their consent to, and subject to no controul from the arbitrary will of any of their fellow-citizens; they possess an elevation and force of mind which must make them great and happy.—How different is the situation of the vassals of despotic power?—Like cattle inured to the yoke, they are driven on in one track, afraid of speaking or even thinking on the most interesting points; looking up continually to a poor creature who is their master; their powers fettered; and some of the noblest springs of action in human nature rendered useless within them. There is nothing indeed more humiliating than that debasement of mankind which takes place in such situations.

It has been observed of free governments, that they are often torn by violent contests, which render them dreadful scenes of distress and anarchy. But it ought to be considered, that this has not been owing to the _nature_ of such governments; but to their having been ill-modelled, and wanted those arrangements and supplemental checks which are necessary to constitute a wise form of government.—There is no reason to doubt, but that free governments may be so contrived, as to exclude the greatest part of the struggles and tumults which have arisen in free states; and, as far as they cannot be excluded, they will do more good than harm. They will occasion the display of powers, and produce exertions which can never be seen in the _still_ scenes of life. They are the active efforts of health and vigour; and always tend to preserve and purify. Whereas, on the contrary, the _quiet_ which prevails under slavish governments, and which may seem to be a recommendation of them, proceeds from an ignominious tameness, and stagnation of the human faculties. It is the same with the _stillness_ of midnight, or the _silence_ and torpor of death.

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Further. Free governments are the only governments which are consistent with the natural equality of mankind. This is a principle which, in my opinion, has been assumed, with the greatest reason, by some of the best writers on government. But the meaning of it is not, that all the subordinations in human life owe their existence to the institution of civil government. The superiorities and distinctions arising from the relation of parents to their children; from the differences in the personal qualities and abilities of men; and from servitudes founded on voluntary compacts, must have existed in a state of nature, and would now take place were all men so virtuous as to leave no occasion for civil government.—The maxim, therefore, “that all men are naturally equal,” refers to their state when grown up to maturity, and become independent agents, capable of acquiring property, and of directing their own conduct. And the sense of it is, that no one of them is constituted by the author of nature the vassal or subject of another, or has any right to give law to him, or, without his consent, to take away any part of his property, or to abridge him of his liberty.—In a state of nature, one man may have received benefits from another; and this would lay the person obliged under an obligation of gratitude, but it would not make his _benefactor_ his _master_; or give him a right to judge for him what grateful returns he ought to make, and to extort these from him.—In a state of nature, also, one man may possess more strength, or more knowledge, or more property than another; and this would give him weight and influence; but it would not give him any degree of authority. There would not be one human being who would be bound to _obey_ him.—A person likewise, in a state of nature, might let out his labour, or give up to another, on certain stipulated terms, the direction of his conduct; and this would so far bring him into the station of a _servant_; but being done by himself, and on such terms only as he chuses to consent to, it is an _instance_ of his liberty; and he will always have it in his power to quit the service he has chosen, or to enter into another.

This equality or independence of men is one of their essential rights.[58] It is the same with that equality or independence which now actually takes place among the different states or kingdoms of the world with respect to one another. Mankind came with this right from the hands of their Maker.—But all governments, which are not free, are totally inconsistent with it. They imply, that there are some of mankind who are born with an inherent right of dominion; and that the rest are born under an obligation to subjection; and that civil government, instead of being founded on any compact, is nothing but the exercise of this right. Some such sentiments seem to be now reviving in this country, and even to be growing fashionable. Most of the writers against the _Observations on Civil Liberty_ argue on the supposition of a right in the _few_ to govern the _many_[59], independently of their own choice. Some of these writers have gone so far as to assert, in plain language, that civil governors derive their power immediately from the Deity; and are _his_ agents or representatives, accountable to him only. And one courtly writer, in particular, has honoured them with the appellation of OUR POLITICAL GODS.—Probably, this is the idea of civil governors entertained by the author of the _Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament of Great Britain_: for it is not easy to imagine on what other ground he can assert, that _property_ and _civil rights_ are derived from civil governors, and their _gifts_ to mankind[60].

If these sentiments are just, civil governors are indeed an awful order of beings; and it becomes us to enquire with anxiety who they are, and how we may distinguish them from the rest of mankind.—Shall we take for such all, whether _men_ or _women_, whom we find in actual possession of civil power, whatever may be their characters; or however they may have acquired their power?—This is too extravagant to be asserted. It would legalize the _American_ Congress.—There must then be some _pretenders_ among civil governors; and it is necessary we should know how to discover them. It is incredible, that the Deity should not have made this easy to us, by some particular marks and distinctions, which point out to our notice his _real_ vicegerents; just as he has pointed out man, by his figure and superior powers, to be the governor of the lower creatures.—In particular; these persons must be possessed of wisdom and goodness superior to those of the rest of mankind[61]; for, without this, a grant of the powers they are supposed to possess would be nothing but a grant of power to injure and oppress, without remedy and without bounds. But this is a test by which they cannot be tryed. It would leave but few of them in possession of the places they hold and the rights they claim. It is not in the high ranks of life, or among the great and mighty, that we are to seek wisdom and goodness. These love the shade, and fly from observation. They are to be found chiefly in the middle ranks of life, and among the contemplative and philosophical, who decline public employments, and look down with pity on the scramble for power among mankind, and the restlessness and misery of ambition.—It is proper to add, that it has never been hitherto understood that any superiority in intellectual and moral qualifications lays the foundation of a claim to _dominion_.

It is not then, by their superior endowments, that the Deity intended to point out to us the _few_ whom he has destined to command the _many_.—But in what other manner could they be distinguished?—Must we embrace _Sir Robert Filmer_’s _Patriarchal_ scheme? One would have thought, that Mr. _Locke_ has said more than enough to expose this stupid scheme. One of my opponents, however, has adopted it; and the necessary inference from it is that, as there is but now one lineal descendent from Adam’s eldest son, there can be but one rightful monarch of the world.—But I will not abuse my reader’s patience by saying more on this subject. I am sorry that in this country there should be any occasion for taking notice of principles so absurd, and at the same time so pernicious[62]. I say, PERNICIOUS; for they imply, that King _James_ the Second was deposed at the Revolution unlawfully and impiously; that the present King is an usurper; and that the present government, being derived from rebellion and treason, has no right to our allegiance.

Without all doubt, it is the choice of the people that makes civil governors.—The people are the spring of all civil power, and they have a right to modify it as they please.

Mankind being naturally equal according to the foregoing explanation, civil government, _in its genuine intention_, is an institution for maintaining that equality, by defending it against the encroachments of violence and tyranny. All the subordinations and distinctions in society previous to its establishment, it leaves as it found them, only confirming and protecting them. It makes no man _master_ of another. It elevates no person above his fellow citizens. On the contrary, it levels all by fixing all in a state of subjection to one common authority.—The authority of the laws.—The will of the community.—TAXES are _given_; not _imposed_. LAWS are regulations of common choice; not injunctions of superior power.—The authority of magistrates is the authority of the State; and their salaries are wages paid by the State for executing its will and doing its business. _They_ do not govern the _State_. It is the _State_ governs _them_; and had they just ideas of their own stations, they would consider themselves as no less properly _servants_ of the Public, than the labourers who work upon its roads, or the soldiers who fight its battles.—A KING, in particular, is only the first executive officer; the creature of the law; and as much accountable and subject to the law as the meanest peasant[63]. And were Kings properly attentive to their duty, and as anxious as they should be about performing it, they could not easily avoid sinking under the weight of their charge.

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The account now given is, I am fully persuaded, in every particular, a true account of what civil government _ought_ to be; and it teaches us plainly the great importance and excellence of FREE Government.—It is this only that answers the description I have given of government; that secures against oppression; that gives room for that elevation of spirit and that exertion of the human powers which is necessary to human improvement; or that is consistent with the ends of government, with the rights of mankind, and their natural equality and independence. _Free_ Government, therefore, only, is _just_ and _legitimate_ government.

It follows farther from the preceding account, that no people can lawfully surrender or cede their Liberty. This must appear to any one who will consider, that when a people make such a cession, and the extensive powers of government are trusted to the discretion of any man or body of men, they part with the powers of life and death, and give themselves up a prey to oppression; that they make themselves the instrument of any injustice in which their rulers may chuse to employ them, by arming them against neighbouring states; and also, that they do this not only for _themselves_, but for their _posterity_.—I will add, that if such a cession has been made; or if through any causes, a people have lost their Liberty, they must have a right to emancipate themselves as soon as they can[64]. In attempting this, indeed, they ought to consider the sufferings which may attend the struggle, and the evils which may arise from a defeat. But at the same time, it will be proper to consider, that the sufferings attending such a struggle must be temporary, whereas the evils to be avoided are permanent; and that Liberty is a blessing so inestimable, “that whenever there appears any probability of recovering it, a people should be willing to run many hazards, and even not to repine at the greatest expence of blood or treasure.”[65]

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I am very sensible, that civil government, as it actually exists in the world, by no means answers to the account I have given of it.—Instead of being an institution for guarding the weak against the strong, we find it an institution which makes the strong yet stronger, and gives them a systematical power of oppressing. Instead of promoting virtue and restraining vice, encouraging free enquiry, establishing Liberty, and protecting alike all peaceable persons in the enjoyment of their civil and religious rights; we see a savage despotism, under its name, laying waste the earth, unreasonably elevating some and depressing others, discouraging improvement, and trampling upon every human right. That force of states, which ought to be applied only to their own defence, we see continually applied to the purpose of attack, and used to extend dominion by conquering neighbouring communities.—Civil governors consider not themselves _servants_ but as _masters_. Their stations they think they hold in their own right. The people they reckon their property; and their possessions, a common _stock_ from which they have a right to take what[66] they will, and of which no more belongs to any individual than they are pleased to _leave_ him.

What a miserable perversion is this of a most important institution? What a grievance is government so degenerated?—But this perversion furnishes no just argument against the truth of the account I have given. Similar degeneracies have prevailed in other instances of no less importance.

Reason in man, like the will of the community in the political world, was intended to give law to his whole conduct, and to be the supreme controuling power within him. The passions are subordinate powers, or an _executive force_ under the direction of reason, kindly given to be, as it were, wind and tide to the vessel of life in its course through this world to future honour and felicity.—How different from this is the _actual_ state of man?—Those powers which were destined to _govern_ are made to _serve_; and those powers which were destined to _serve_, are allowed to _govern_. Passion guides human life; and most men make no other use of their reason than to justify whatever their interest or their inclinations determine them to do.

RELIGION likewise (the perfection of REASON) is, in its true nature, the inspirer of humanity and joy, and the spring of all that can be great and worthy in a character; and were we to see its genuine effects among mankind, we should see nothing but peace and hope and justice and kindness, founded on that regard to God and to his will, which is the noblest principle of action.—But how different an aspect does religion actually wear? What is it, too generally, in the practice of mankind, but a gloomy and cruel superstition, rendering them severe and sour; teaching them to compound for wickedness by punctuality in religious forms; and prompting them to harrass, persecute and exterminate one another?

The same perversion has taken place still more remarkably in CHRISTIANITY; the perfection of RELIGION.—JESUS CHRIST has established among Christians absolute equality. He has declared, that they have but _one_ master, even himself; and that they are all _brethren_; and, therefore, has commanded them not to be called _masters_; and, instead of assuming authority over one another, to be ready to _wash one another’s feet_[67]. The princes of the Gentiles, he says, exercise lordship over them, and are flattered with[68] high titles; but he has ordained, that it shall not be so amongst his followers; and that if any one of them would be _chief_, he must be the _servant_ of all.—The clergy in his church are, by his appointment, no more than a body of men, chosen by the different societies of Christians, to conduct their worship, and to promote their spiritual improvement, without any other powers than those of persuasion and instruction. It is expressly directed, that they shall not make themselves Lords of _God’s heritage_, or exercise dominion over the faith of Christians, but be _helpers of their joy_[69].—Who can, without astonishment, compare these appointments of Christianity, with the events which have happened in the Christian church?—That religion which thus inculcates humility and forbids all domination, and the end of which was to produce _peace an earth, and good-will among men_, has been turned into an occasion of animosities the most dreadful, and of ambition the most destructive. Notwithstanding its mildness and benignity, and the tendency it has to extinguish in the human breast pride and malevolence; it has been the means of arming the spirits of men with unrelenting fury against one another. Instead of _peace_, it has brought a _sword_; and its professors, instead of washing one another’s feet, have endeavoured to tread on one another’s necks.—The ministers, in particular, of Christianity, became, soon after its establishment, an independent body of spiritual rulers, nominating one another in perpetual succession; claiming, by divine right, the highest powers; and forming a HIERARCHY, which by degrees produced a despotism more extravagant than any that ever before existed on this earth.

A considerate person must find difficulties in enquiring into the causes and reasons of that depravity of human nature which has produced these evils, and rendered the best institutions liable to be so corrupted. This enquiry is much the same with the enquiry into the origin of moral evil, which has in all ages puzzled human wisdom. I have at present nothing to do with it. It is enough for my purpose in these observations, that the facts I have mentioned prove undeniably, that the state of civil government in the world affords no reason for concluding, that I have not given a just account of its true nature and origin.

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I have shewn at the beginning of this section, that it is free government alone that can preserve from oppression, give security to the rights of a people, and answer the ends of government. It is necessary I should here observe, that I would not be understood to mean, that there can be no _kind_ or _degree_ of security for the rights of a people, under any government which cannot be denominated free. Even under an absolute Monarchy or an Aristocracy, there may be laws and customs which, having gained sacredness by time, may restrain oppression, and afford some important securities.—Under governments by representation, there must be still greater checks on oppression, provided the representation, though partial, is uncorrupt, and also frequently changed. In these circumstances, there may be so much of a common interest between the body of representatives and the people, and they may stand so much on one ground, that there will be no temptations to oppression.—The taxes which the representative body impose, they will be obliged themselves to pay; and the laws they make, they will make with the prospect of soon returning to the situation of those for whom they make them, and of being themselves governed by them.

It seems particularly worth notice here, that as far as there are any such checks under any government, they are the consequence of its partaking so far of Liberty, and that the security attending them is more or less in proportion as a government partakes more or less of Liberty. If, under an absolute government, fundamental laws and long established institutions give security in any instances, it is because they are held so sacred that a despot is afraid to violate them; or, in other words, because a people, not being completely subdued, have still some controul over the government.—The like is more evidently true under mixed governments of which a house of representatives, fairly chosen and freely deliberating and resolving, forms a part; and it is one of the highest recommendations of such governments that, even when the representation is most imperfect, they have a tendency to give more security than any other governments.—Under other governments, it is the fear of exciting insurrections by contradicting established maxims, that restrains oppression. But, as, in general, a people will bear much, and are seldom driven to resistance till grievances become intolerable, their rulers can venture far without danger; and therefore, under such governments, are very imperfectly restrained. On the contrary; If there is an honest representation, vested with powers like to those of our _House of Commons_, the redress of grievances, as soon as they appear, will be always easily attainable, and the rulers of a state will be under a necessity of regarding the first beginnings of discontent.—Such, and greater than can be easily described, are the advantages of even an _imperfect representation_ in a government. How great then must be the blessing of a COMPLETE REPRESENTATION?—[70] It is this only gives full security; and that can properly denominate a people free.

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It deserves to be added here, that as there can be no private character so abandoned as to want _all_ virtue; so there can be no government so slavish, as to exclude _every_ restraint upon oppression.—The most slavish and, therefore, the worst governments are those under which there is nothing to set bounds to oppression, besides the _discretion_ and _humanity_ of those who govern.—Of this kind are the following governments.

First, All governments _purely_ despotic. These may be either monarchical, aristocratical. The latter are the worst, agreeably to a common observation, that it is better to have _one_ master than _many_. The appetites of a single despot may be easily satiated; but this may be impossible where there is a multitude.

Secondly, All provincial governments.—The history of mankind proves these to be the worst of all governments; and that no oppression is equal to that which one people are capable of practising towards another. I have mentioned some of the reasons of this in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, Part I. sect. 3. Bodies of men do not feel for one another as individuals do. The _odium_ of a cruel action, when shared among many, is not regarded. The master of slaves working on a plantation, though he may keep them down to prevent their becoming strong enough to emancipate themselves, yet is led by _interest_, as well as _humanity_, to govern them with such moderation, as to preserve their use: But these causes will produce more of this good effect, when the slaves are under the eye of their proprietor, and form a part of his family, than when they are settled on a distant plantation, where he can know little of them, and is obliged to trust them to the management of rapacious servants.

It is particularly observable here, that _free_ governments, though happier in themselves, are more oppressive to their provinces than despotic governments. Or, in other words, that the _subjects_ of free[71] states are worse slaves than the subjects of states not free. This is one of the observations which Mr. HUME represents as an universal axiom in politicks[72].—“Though, says he, free governments have been commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, yet are they the most oppressive and ruinous to their provinces; and this observation may be fixed as an universal axiom in politics. What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the world during the time of their commonwealth?—After the dissolution of the commonwealth the Roman yoke became easier upon the provinces, as _Tacitus_ informs us; and it may be observed, that many of the worst Emperors (_Domitian_, for instance) were very careful to prevent all oppression of the provinces.—The oppression and tyranny of the _Carthaginians_ over their subject states in _Africa_ went so far, as we learn from _Polybius_ (Lib. i. cap. 72.) that not content with exacting the _half_ of all the produce of the ground, which of itself was a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes.—If we pass from antient to modern times we shall always find the observation to hold. The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states.”

Thirdly, Among the worst sorts of governments I reckon all governments by a corrupt representation.—There is no instance in which the trite observation is more true than in this, “that the best things when corrupted become the worst.” A corrupt representation is so far from being any _defence_ against oppression, that it is a _support_ to it. Long established customs, in this case, afford no security, because, under the sanction of such a representation, they may be easily undermined or counteracted; nor is there any injury to a people which, with the help of such an instrument, may not be committed with safety. It is not, however, every degree of corruption, that will destroy the use of a representation, and turn it into an evil so dreadful. In order to this, corruption must pass a certain limit. But _every degree_ of it _tends_ to this, saps the foundation of Liberty, and poisons the fountain of Legislation. And when it gets to its last stage, and has proceeded its utmost length: When, in particular, the means by which candidates get themselves chosen are such as admit the _worst_, but exclude the _best_ men; a House of Representatives becomes little better than a sink into which is collected all that is most worthless and vile in a kingdom.—There cannot be a greater calamity than such a government.—It is impossible there should be a condition more wretched than that of a nation, once free, so degenerated.