Chapter XVI: The Battle of Allatoona (1)

From Lovejoy's to Lost Mountain--Big
Shanty--Acworth--Destroying Railroad--In the Rear of
Sherman--Situation of the Two Armies--Orders to Destroy
the Etowah River Bridge--To Fill Up the Railroad
Cut at Allatoona--Hood Not Aware that Allatoona Was
Fortified and Garrisoned--March to Allatoona--Summons to
Surrender--No Answer--Gen. Corse's Report Erroneous--The
Fortifications--Strength of Forces--Equalization of
Forces--Some Federal Dispatches--The Battle--Corse's
Account--Col. Ludlow's Description--Desperate Fighting--The
Main Line Captured--Enemy Driven into an Interior
Fort--Dispatches from Gen. Armstrong Respecting Movements
of the Enemy at Big Shanty--Withdraw to Avoid Being
Surrounded by Converging Forces--Corse's Dispatch to
Sherman--Provisions--Confederates Three Days and Nights
without Rest or Sleep--Pass by the Enemy--Evangelist P. P.
Bliss Writes the (Gospel) Hymn, "Hold the Fort"--Hood and
His Erroneous Publications in His Book--His Admiration for
Corse--My Admiration for the Confederates--The Soldier's
Grave--The Lone Grave--Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart's Note in
Regard to This Account of the Battle.

September 29. This morning Loring's, Walthall's, and my
divisions moved on the Pumpkinton road and _crossed the
Chattahoochee river_ and encamped beyond Villa Rica. The
following day we marched to near Brownsville Post Office.

Saturday, October 1. I remained in camp. At 10 A.M. all the
division commanders were invited to Gen. Hood's headquarters,
and the object of the move was discussed. I found in the room
on my arrival Gens. Stewart, S. D. Lee, Loring, Walthall,
Stevenson, and Clayton. As soon as I entered the room Hood
said to me: "Gen. French, what do you think Gen. Sherman
will do now?" I replied: "I suppose he will turn southwest
and move on to Mobile; or he may go to Augusta to destroy
our powder mills, and then make for Charleston or Savannah."
"In that event do you believe he can sustain his troops on
the march if our cavalry lay waste the country before him?"
I answered: "He will find all he wants as he moves on." To
this Hood replied: "Well, I have nothing to do with that,
as the President has promised to attend to that matter."
Every officer present disagreed with me save Gen. S. D. Lee.
He thought all would have difficulty to subsist except the
cavalry.

On the subject of destroying Sherman's communications my diary says:

I was in favor of an immediate move on the railroad above
Kennesaw with the _whole army_, and expressed my regrets at
the delay.

I received orders to move to-morrow. We were requested to
inform the brigade commanders of the object of moving in
the rear of Sherman's army, and they were to inform the
regimental and company officers.

2d. I left camp and marched to Moon's, and this brought us to
the same ground we occupied on the 24th of May.

3d. When Sherman discovered that Hood had crossed the
Chattahoochee and was marching to obtain possession of his
line of communication, he immediately adopted measures to
defeat Hood's plans and give him battle.

The general situation of the two armies to-day is: Sherman's
main body of troops is at Atlanta, with garrisons at the
Chattahoochee, Vining's, Marietta, Kennesaw, Big Shanty,
Moon's, Acworth, Allatoona Creek, Allatoona fortifications
garrisoned by just about one thousand men, Gen. Elliott,
chief of cavalry, with his command at Kennesaw, Gen. J. E.
Smith, with his division, at Cartersville, Gen. J. M. Corse
at Rome with a division, and the garrisons at important
places on up to Chattanooga, as disclosed by the movements
of troops, dispatches sent directing their movements, and
subsequent information.

Hood's army marched to Lost Mountain, where he remained with
two corps, while Stewart's Corps went thence in the rear
of the enemy's line of fortifications to Big Shanty. Gen.
Featherston captured some forty prisoners at Big Shanty, and
commenced destroying the railroad. Loring, sent to Acworth
(near Allatoona), captured about two hundred prisoners, and
Walthall took seventy prisoners at Moon Station. All night
every one was hard at work destroying the railroad, and the
next day by noon we had about eight miles of the track taken
up and the rails twisted.

4th. At noon, when filling up the railroad cuts at Big
Shanty, I received orders to fill up the deep cut of the
railroad at Allatoona, and then, if possible, destroy the
railroad bridge over the Etowah river. About this time some
one living near by told us that the enemy had fortifications
at Allatoona, well garrisoned and commissary stores there.
Under these peculiar orders (which will be given in full
hereafter in my report) I left Big Shanty with my division at
3 P.M. for Acworth and thence to Allatoona, while Loring and
Walthall were ordered in the direction of New Hope Church.
I was now entering the zone of active movements of the
Federals, and away from all support, and all support from me,
and the enemy converging on Allatoona from all directions. I
reached Acworth about dark, and was detained there till 11
P.M., awaiting rations and getting some one for a guide. I
saw camp fires of the enemy east of the railroad and north
of Kennesaw, and night signals from Allatoona to Kennesaw.
From two young ladies, who to-day had visited Allatoona, I
obtained the name of the commander there, and the probable
strength of the enemy in the several works. I also succeeded,
through some of the citizens, in getting a boy for a guide.
I moved from Acworth about 11 P.M., and on arriving at
Allatoona Creek I left there the Fourth Mississippi Regiment
and one piece of artillery, with instructions to burn the
bridge and capture the garrison of one hundred men in the
blockhouse. When at Acworth I sent fifteen men from a Capt.
Taylor's company of cavalry, Pinson's Regiment, to strike
the railroad near the Etowah river and tear up the track
to prevent reënforcements from reaching Allatoona. I moved
on then from the creek, and arrived before Allatoona about
3 A.M. All was darkness; nothing could be seen except
occasional lights flitting about the place. I put the
artillery, eleven guns, in position, or rather left them
in what the guide said was a good place, and also left two
regiments of Ector's Brigade under Col. Andrews as a support
to them. With the guide directing, I moved the division to
gain the flank and rear of the line of works. There were
five detached works on the high ridge through which the
Western and Atlantic railroad runs. No road leads to this
ridge except the Cartersville road, that ascends the ridge
by a winding ascent, and enters the works, passing within a
few feet of the main redoubt, under its guns, and then runs
on the crest of the ridge for two hundred and fifty yards
to where it passes out through the fortifications. So the
guide directed us through the dark _woods_ and up the steep,
rugged, rocky _hills_, and down into deep _valleys_ until we
were lost, and the guide acknowledged that he could not find
the way. This determined me to stop and rest till daylight.
The pickets had been driven in, and now and then shots were
exchanged. Starting again at dawn, I reached the high ridge
on which the redoubts were at 7:30 A.M. with the leading
brigade. I halted Cockrell's and Ector's Brigades on the
ridge, and sent Gen. Sears to gain the rear of the works. The
artillery opened fire on the forts (one on either side of the
railroad) about 7 A.M., and when we gained the ridge appeared
to keep the enemy quiet.

These dispositions being made, about 8 A.M. I summoned
the commander to surrender the place. I then supposed
the garrison consisted of only about nine hundred men, as
reported to me at Acworth. Maj. D. W. Sanders was instructed
to allow about twenty minutes for the officer to whom he
delivered the message to go and return with the reply. After
waiting longer than the specified time, he returned without
an answer. Believing Sears was now well around on the north
side, and having waited to hear his attack so long, I put
Cockrell's Brigade in motion, supported by Ector's Brigade
(of four regiments), to make the attack, as it was now 10:20
A.M.

The three companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois that were
in the two extreme west redoubts abandoned them without
making much resistance, and fell back to a very strong line
of defense protected by all the entanglements of modern
warfare. Through the center of this work ran the Cartersville
road. This part of the defensive work was occupied by the
Thirty-Ninth Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and seven companies
of the Ninety-Third Illinois, making, in officers and men,
a total of just about nine hundred. Against this force,
placed in carefully constructed works, I could send only the
Missouri brigade and four regiments of the Texas brigade, in
all one thousand three hundred and fifty. I had been informed
by Gen. Armstrong that the enemy's cavalry was moving up
east of the railroad. Then again I received from him a second
dispatch informing me that the Federal infantry was passing
through Big Shanty and moving up the railroad. This dispatch
was dated 9 A.M. Knowing that this column could reach the
junction of the Sandtown and Dallas roads before I could, I
determined to withdraw, trusting to arrive there first.

But as all these matters are more fully referred to in my report, I will here quit, for the present, further extracts from my diary, and give the report.

In Volume 39, Series 1, page 814, will be found in the "War Records" the following report:

HEADQUARTERS FRENCH'S DIVISION, }
TUSCUMBIA, ALA., November 5, 1864.}

_General_: Sometime since I had the honor to submit to you a
brief preliminary report of the battle of Allatoona. As the
report of the brigade commanders are now in, I have the honor
to forward one embracing some of the details of the battle.

About noon on the 4th of October, when at Big Shanty, the
following order was handed me by Lieut. Gen. Stewart, it
being a copy of one to him:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, October 4, 1864, 7:30 A.M.

Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart, Commanding Corps.

_General_: Gen. Hood directs that later in the evening you
move Stevenson back to Davis's Cross Roads, and that you
bring two of your divisions back to Adams's and between
Adams's and Davis's Cross Roads, placing them in such a
way as to cover the position at Adams's now occupied by
Stevenson, and that your third division (say French) shall
move up the railroad and fill up the deep cut at Allatoona
with logs, brush, rails, dirt, etc. To-morrow morning at
daylight he desires Stevenson to be moved to Lieut. Gen.
Lee's actual left, that two of your divisions at that time at
Adams's shall draw back, with your left in the neighborhood
of Davis's Cross Roads, and your right in the neighborhood
of Lost Mountain, and the division that will have gone to
Allatoona to march thence to New Hope Church and on the
position occupied by your other troops--that is, that the
division shall rejoin your command by making this march out
from the railroad and via New Hope. Gen. Hood thinks that
it is probable that the guard at the railroad bridge on
Etowah is small, and when French goes to Allatoona, if he
can get such information as would justify him, if possible
move to that bridge and destroy it. Gen. Hood considers its
destruction would be a great advantage to the army and the
country. Should he be able to destroy the bridge, in coming
out he could move, as has been heretofore indicated, via New
Hope.

Yours respectfully,

A. P. MASON,
_Assistant Adjutant General_.

Soon after an order, of which the following is a copy, was
sent me:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, }
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, October 4, 1864, 11:30 A.M. }

Lieut. Gen. Stewart, Commanding.

_General_: Gen. Hood directs me to say that it is of the
greatest importance to destroy the Etowah railroad bridge, if
such a thing is possible. From the best information we have
now he thinks the enemy cannot disturb us before _to-morrow_,
and by _that time_ your main body will be near the remainder
of our army. He suggests that if it be considered practicable
to destroy the bridge when the division goes there and the
artillery is placed in position the commanding officer shall
call for volunteers to go to the bridge with lightwood and
other combustible material that can be obtained, and set fire
to it.

Yours respectfully,

A. P. MASON,
_Major and Assistant Adjutant General_.

Gen. Stewart's Corps had struck the railroad at Big Shanty
on the evening of the 3d, and all three of his divisions
had worked all night destroying the railroad from near
Kennesaw up to Acworth Station. As we had been informed at
Big Shanty that the Allatoona pass or cut was fortified, and
that the enemy had a garrison there of three regiments, and
had accumulated a considerable amount of provisions, it was
considered a matter of importance that the place should be
captured, and after the orders were handed me, at my request,
Gen. Stewart sent me (with Maj. Myrick) four additional
pieces of artillery. _It would appear, however, from these
orders that the general in chief was not aware that the pass
was fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled
up._ Under these orders I left Big Shanty about 3:30 P.M.,
and marched to Acworth, a distance of six miles, arriving
there before sunset. There I was detained, awaiting the
arrival of rations and cooking them, until 11 P.M.

As I knew nothing of the roads, the enemy's works or
position, it was important to procure a guide, and at last a
young man, or rather boy, was found who knew the roads, and
had seen the position of the fortifications at Allatoona,
he being a member of a cavalry company. At Acworth Capt.
Taylor, of Pinson's Regiment of cavalry, with twenty-five
men, reported to me for duty. He was immediately directed
to send fifteen men under a trusty officer to strike the
railroad as near the Etowah railroad bridge as possible, and
take up the rails and hide or destroy them, to prevent trains
from reaching Allatoona with reënforcements, as well as to
prevent any trains that might be there from escaping. From an
eminence near Acworth the enemy could be seen communicating
messages by their night signals from Allatoona with the
station on Kennesaw; and to the east of us were the fires of
a large encampment of the Federals and apparently opposite
Moon's Station. Citizens residing here informed me that
there was a blockhouse with a garrison of about one hundred
men at the Allatoona bridge; that at Allatoona there were
two small redoubts with outworks, defended with four pieces
of artillery and garrisoned with three and a half regiments
of infantry. About 11 P.M. the march was resumed. The night
was very dark, and the roads bad. After crossing Allatoona
creek, Col. Adaire, with his Fourth Regiment, Mississippi
Volunteers, and one piece of artillery, was left near the
blockhouse with instructions to surround it, capture the
garrison, and destroy the bridge over the creek. Continuing
the march, the division arrived before Allatoona about 3
A.M. Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights
on the opposite heights, and nothing was heard except the
occasional interchange of shots between our advanced guards
and the pickets of the garrison in the valley below. All
was darkness. I had no knowledge of the place, and it was
important to attack at the break of day. Taking the guide
and lights, I placed the artillery in position on the hills
south and east of the railroad, and the Thirty-Ninth North
Carolina Regiment, under Col. Coleman, and the Thirty-Second
Texas were left as a supporting force, both under command
of Col. J. A. Andrews, commanding the latter regiment. This
being done, I proceeded with the guide to gain the heights,
or ridge, crowned by the works of the enemy. Without roads
or paths the head of the line reached the railroad, crossed
it, and began ascending and descending the high, steep, and
densely timbered spurs of the mountains, and after about an
hour's march it was found that we were directly in front of
the works, and not on the main ridge. The guide made a second
effort to gain the ridge, and failed, so dark was it in the
woods. I therefore determined to rest where we were and await
daylight. With the dawn the march was resumed, and finally,
by 7:30 A.M., the head of the column was on the ridge about
six hundred yards west of the main fortifications, and
between those he occupied an abandoned redoubt on our left.

Here the fortifications, for the first time, were seen, and
instead of two redoubts there were disclosed to us three
redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on
the east with outer works and approaches defended to a great
distance by abatis, and nearer the works by stockades and
other obstructions. The railroad emerges from the Allatoona
Mountain by crossing this ridge through a cut sixty-five feet
deep. Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending
Gen. Sears's Brigade to the north side or rear of the works,
Gen. F. M. Cockrell's (Missouri) Brigade to rest with its
center on the ridge, while Gen. W. H. Young, with the four
Texas regiments, was found in the rear of Gen. Cockrell.

Maj. Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and
was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force
should interfere, or until he heard the volleys of musketry.

Gen. Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when
musketry was heard Gen. Cockrell was to move down the ridge,
supported by Gen. Young, and carry the works by (as it were)
a flank attack. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the
troops could not be gotten into position until about 9 A.M.,
when I sent a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a
Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seventeen minutes
to return an answer. The time expired without any answer
being received, whereupon Maj. D. W. Sanders, impatient
at the delay, broke off the interview and returned. No
reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault
by directing the advance of Cockrell's Brigade. Emerging
from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis
formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry
and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the
gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon
fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before
them, again they rushed forward in column, and in a murderous
hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the
dead they became masters of the second redoubt.

The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from
the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was
further crowded by those that were coming out of the fort
on the east side of the road, from the attack of Gen. Sears.
They had to cross the deep cut, through which our artillery
poured a steady and deadly fire. The Federal forces were now
confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch and almost
entirely silenced their fire, and were preparing for the
final attack.

Pending the progress of these events I had received a note
from Gen. F. C. Armstrong, dated 7 A.M., asking me at what
time I would move toward New Hope, and informing me also that
the enemy had moved up east of the railroad above Kennesaw
and encamped there last night. I had observed this movement
when at Acworth, but at 12 M. I received another dispatch
from him, written at 9 A.M., saying: "My scouts report the
enemy's infantry advancing up the railroad. They are now
entering Big Shanty. They have a cavalry force east of the
railroad."

On the receipt of this second note from Gen. Armstrong I
took my guide aside and particularly asked him if, after the
capture of the place, I could move to New Hope Church by any
other route than the one by the blockhouse at Allatoona creek
and thence by the Sandtown road to the Acworth and Dallas
road, and he said I could not. Here, then, was Gen. Sherman's
whole army close behind me, and the advance of his infantry
moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of
affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile
distant at the base of the hills, by men, and I was satisfied
that it would take two hours to get it up and distribute
it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from
prisoners that before daylight the place had been reënforced
by a brigade under Gen. Corse. I knew the enemy was at
Big Shanty at 9 A.M. By noon he could reach Acworth and be
within two miles of the road on which I was to reach New Hope
Church. I knew Gen. Stewart had been ordered to near Lost
Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all
the night of the 3d destroying the railroad; that they had
worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona
on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of
the 5th; and could they pass the entire third day and night
without rest or sleep if we remained to assault the remaining
works? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get
in my rear to intercept my return.

He was, in the morning, but three hours distant, and had
been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these
circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing
the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen,
and when in all probability we could force a surrender before
night. Yet, however desirous I was of remaining before the
last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying this
interior work by assault, I deemed it of more importance
not to permit the enemy to cut my division off from the
army. After deliberately surveying matters as they presented
themselves to me, I sent to Gen. Sears to withdraw his men
at once, moving by the route he went in, and directed Gen.
Cockrell to commence withdrawing at 1:30 P.M.

Before the action commenced it was foreseen that it would
be impossible to carry any wounded, on litters, to the road
where the ambulances were placed, owing to the steepness
of the hills, the ravines, and the dense woods. Accordingly
the wounded were brought to the springs near the ridge. All
who could be moved without the use of litters were taken to
the ambulances. The others were left in charge of surgeons
detailed to remain with them.

The troops re-formed on the original ground, west of the
works, and marched to the south side near the artillery,
and at 3:30 P.M. commenced the move toward New Hope. After
the troops left I rode on down to Col. Andrews's position in
front of the works and directed him to remain until 5 P.M.,
and then withdraw and move on in our rear.

Before I commenced to withdraw the infantry from the captured
works (but after the guide said I would have to return by
the way I came) I sent orders to Maj. Myrick to send two
batteries and caissons to a point beyond the blockhouse
on the Sandtown road, to act in concert with the troops
left there. Having been informed by Col. Andrews that the
blockhouse at the Allatoona bridge had not been captured, I
directed Capt. Kolb, with his battery that had remained with
Col. Andrews, to move on and report to Gen. Cockrell for the
purpose of taking the blockhouse.

Shortly after 4 P.M., and when not a person could be seen in
or around the forts, I left the command of Col. Andrews and
overtook the division near the blockhouse. Col. Adaire had
burned the railroad bridge over Allatoona creek (over two
hundred feet long), and also the duplicate of the bridge,
which had been already framed to replace the old structure.
Under the increased artillery fire the garrison of the
blockhouse surrendered.

We captured two hundred and five prisoners, one United
States flag, and the colors of the Ninety-Third Regiment
of Illinois, a number of horses, arms, etc., and killed and
wounded seven hundred and fifty of the enemy, being, with the
garrison of the blockhouse, over one thousand.

History will record the battle of Allatoona one of the most
sanguinary of the war; and when it is remembered that the
enemy fought from within their strong redoubts the desperate
deeds of daring performed by our troops in overcoming so many
of the foe will win a meed of praise for their heroic valor.

The artillery opened about 7 A.M., and, except when the flag
of truce was sent in, continued until 2 P.M.

The attack, commencing about 10 A.M., continued unremittingly
until 1:30 P.M., and the rattle of musketry did not cease
entirely until 3 P.M., when it died away, and a silence
like the pall of death rested over the scene, contrasting
strangely with the previous din of battle.

I cannot do justice to the gallantry of the troops. No one
faltered in his duty, and all withdrew from the place with
the regret that Gen. Sherman's movements--closing up behind
us--forbade our remaining longer to force a surrender of the
last work.

After leaving out the three regiments that formed no part of
the assaulting force, I had but little over two thousand men.

My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 799,
as follows: Cockrell's Brigade: Killed, 42; wounded, 182;
missing, 22. Sears's Brigade: Killed, 37; wounded, 114;
missing, 200. Ector's Brigade: Killed, 43; wounded, 147;
missing, 11. Staff: Captured, 1. Total: Killed, 122; wounded,
443; missing, 233; captured, 1. Grand total, 799.

Among the killed from Sears's Brigade is Col. W. H. Clark,
Forty-Sixth Mississippi. He fell in the advance, near the
enemy's works, with the battle flag in his hands. He was an
excellent and a gallant officer. Also, were killed Capt. B.
Davidson and Lieuts. G. C. Edwards, J. R. Henry, and J. D.
Davis. Col. W. S. Barry, Thirty-Fifth Mississippi, and Maj.
Partin, Thirty-Sixth Mississippi, were wounded, together with
Capts. R. G. Yates and A. J. Farmer and Lieuts. J. N. McCoy,
G. H. Bannerman, J. M. Chadwick, J. Copewood, R. E. Jones,
E. W. Brown, G. H. Moore, and Ensigns G. W. Cannon and A.
Scarborough.

Texas will mourn for the death of some of her bravest and
best men. Capt. Somerville, Thirty-Second Texas, was killed
after vainly endeavoring to enter the last work, where his
conspicuous gallantry had carried him and his little band.
Capts. Gibson, Tenth Texas, Bates, Ninth Texas, Lieuts.
Alexander, Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and Dixon E. Wetzel,
Ninth Texas, were killed while gallantly leading their men.

Brig. Gen. W. H. Young, commanding the Texas Brigade, was
wounded. Most gallantly he bore his part in the action.
Col. Camp, Fourteenth Texas, one of the best officers in the
service, was seriously wounded. Also Majs. McReynolds, Ninth
Texas, and Purdy, Fourteenth Texas. Of the captains wounded
were Wright, Lyles, Russell, Vannoy, and Ridley, and Lieuts.
Tunnell, Haynes, Gibbons, Agee, Morris, O'Brien, Irwin,
Reeves, and Robertson.

In the Missouri Brigade were killed or mortally wounded Majs.
W. F. Carter and O. A. Waddell, Capts. A. J. Byrne, A. C.
Patton, John S. Holland, Lieuts. Thomas S. Shelly, Joel F.
Yancey, G. R. Elliott. R. J. Lamb, G. T. Duvall, and W. H.
Dunnica, and Ensign H. W. De Jarnette--men who had behaved
well and nobly during the whole campaign.

Among the wounded are Maj. R. J. Williams, Capts. Thompson
Alvord, G. McChristian, G. W. Covell, and A. F. Burns,
Lieuts. Joseph Boyce, Silas H. F. Hornback, J. L. Mitchell,
A. H. Todd, and H. Y. Anderson, and Ensign William A. Byrd.

I have named the killed and wounded officers in this report.
The names of the private soldiers who fell or were wounded
will also be filed with this as soon as they are received.
It is due to the dead, it is just to the living, that they
who have no hopes of being heralded by fame, and who have
but little incentive except the love of country and the
consciousness of a just cause to impel them to deeds of
daring, and who have shed their blood for a just cause,
should have this little tribute paid them by me, whose joy it
was to be with them.

For the noble dead the army mourns, a nation mourns. For
the living, honor and respect will await them wherever they
shall be known, as faithful soldiers, who, for their dearest
rights, have so often gone through the fires of battle
and the baptism of blood. It would perhaps be an invidious
distinction to name individual officers or men for marked or
special services or distinguished gallantry where all behaved
so well, for earth never yielded to the tread of nobler
soldiers.

I am indebted to Gens. Cockrell, Sears, and Young for
bravery, skill, and unflinching firmness.

To Col. Earp, on whom the command of the gallant Texans
devolved, and to Col. Andrews, who commanded on the south
side, and Maj. Myrick, commanding the artillery, I return
thanks for services. Maj. D. W. Sanders, assistant adjutant
general, Lieut. Wiley Abercrombie, aid, Capt. W. H. Cain,
volunteer aid, Capt. Porter and Lieut. Mosby, engineers,
were zealous in the performance of their duties, and E. T.
Freeman, assistant inspector general, was conspicuous for his
gallant conduct. I commend the last-named to the government
for promotion.

Col. E. Gates, First and Third Missouri, Maj. E. H. Hampton,
Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and W. J. Sparks, Tenth Texas,
and Lieut. Cahal, of Gen. Stewart's staff, are named for
gallant services.

Lieut. M. W. Armstrong, Tenth Texas, seized the United States
standard from the Federals, and after a struggle brought it
and the bearer of it off in triumph.

In the inclosed reports of brigade commanders will be found
the names of many officers and soldiers that I know are
entitled to commendation and all marks of distinction that
the government can award.

The cavalry officer who was sent to cut the railroad (early
in the afternoon of the 4th) and failed to perform that duty
is, in my opinion, much to blame. Had he taken up the rails
(and there was nothing to prevent it), reënforcements could
not have been thrown in the works, and the result would have
been different. After events showed that a cavalry force and
_Corse's other brigade arrived just three hours after we left
Allatoona_, and reënforced the garrison in the fort.

Very respectfully submitted.

S. G. FRENCH,
_Major General Commanding_.

You have now my official report of the battle of Allatoona as it was written soon after the event, and I will say here that, had I known it would have been so incorrectly reported by Gen. Corse, it would have embraced much matter of detail elucidating what occurred. I shall now proceed to copy some part of Gen. Corse's report, after which its errors will be pointed out as substantiated by facts not then known, and some that were not regarded. So, with my report, unintentional errors have been made known, as shown by subsequent information.

GEN. CORSE'S REPORT.

... I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the
Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois were formed, ...
and taking two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois down
a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of the
cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as
possible. Three companies of the Ninety-Third, which had been
driven from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in
the ditch south of the redoubt, with instructions to keep
the town well covered by their fire, and to watch the depot
where the rations were stored. The remaining battalion of the
Ninety-Third, under Maj. Fisher, lay between the redoubt and
Rowett's line, ready to reënforce wherever most needed.

I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all
its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois.
Young's Brigade of Texans had gained the west end of the
ridge, and moved with great impetuosity along its crest
till they struck Rowett's command, when they received a
severe check, but, undaunted, came again and again. Rowett,
reënforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope
that we were safe here, when I observed Gen. Sears's Brigade
moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad
(opposite Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the
Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the crest
running north from the redoubt, they having been reënforced
by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the
spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of battle
swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the Thirty-Ninth
Iowa in flank, threatening to ingulf our little band without
further ado. Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire
caught Sears in flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me
to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the
Fiftieth Illinois over to reënforce Rowett, who had lost very
heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive,
Sears and Young both rallied, and made their assaults in
front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force
as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa
fought with the desperation it did, I never should have been
able to get a man back inside the redoubt; as it was, their
hand-to-hand conflict broke the enemy to that extent that
he must stop and re-form before undertaking the assault on
the _fort_. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy the
Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois, and what remained of the
Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell back into the _fort_.

The fighting up to this time, about 11 A.M., was of the
most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from
the west, and from the south, these three regiments (the
Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois)
held Young's and a portion of Sears's and Cockrell's Brigades
at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col.
Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell shot in four places,
and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this
regiment and the Seventh Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular
assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches
all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth and
Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east hill, enabled us to
occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that,
as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little
fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them
to fill every hollow, and take every advantage of the rough
ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench,
seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within
musket range of the fort. We received their fire from the
north, south, and west of the redoubt, completely enfilading
our ditches and rendering it almost impracticable for a man
to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made
to carry our works by assault; but the battery (Twelfth
Missouri) was so ably manned, and so gallantly fought, as to
render it impossible for a column to live within a hundred
yards of the work. Officers labored constantly to stimulate
the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly set
them the example.

The enemy kept a constant and intense fire, gradually closing
around us, and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead
and dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle ball that
rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but
managed to rally on hearing some persons cry "Cease firing!"
which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to
surrender the fort.

Again I urged my staff, the few officers unhurt, and the men
around me to renewed exertions, _assuring them that Sherman
would soon be here with reënforcements_. The gallant fellows
struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapets in
the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated
upon us. The artillery was silent, and a brave fellow, whose
name I regret having forgotten, volunteered to cross the
railway cut, which was under fire of the enemy, and go to
the _fort_ on the east hill to procure ammunition. Having
executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short
time with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30
P.M. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small
house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant
northwest from the fort about one hundred and fifty yards.
The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to enable us
to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the
house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's
column into great confusion, which, being observed by our
men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a fire
that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time
until near 4 P.M. we had the advantage of the enemy, and
maintained it with such success that they were driven from
every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving
their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession
of the field. [See War Records.]

The above extracts _from Gen. Corse's report_ are taken from an address made by Col. William Ludlow, United States army, to the Michigan Commandery, at Detroit, April 2, 1891, and I desire it to be borne in mind that he is a graduate of the Military Academy and was with Gen. Corse at Allatoona during the battle, for I shall have cause to refer to his address after a while.

There have been so many erroneous accounts given to the public of this battle, impugning of motives, _guessing_ at the controlling objects that influence action, falsifying of numbers, glorifying dispatches, and complimentary orders, that won the admiration even of a Confederate lieutenant general, that I purpose, as well as I am able, to give an impartial account of it.

To do justice to the troops engaged on either side in the conflict, it will be necessary: 1. To have a knowledge of the ground or topography of the field of action. 2. The strength of the fortifications, and the time and labor bestowed on them. 3. The strength of the respective forces. 4. The ratio of inequality between men in strong fortifications and men attacking from without, immediately on arrival. 5. The inspiring inducement to the garrison _not to surrender_ when relief is at hand; and the advantage to be gained, if successful, compared with the risk of remaining after ascertaining that the enemy was converging on the place from every point.

1. If an examination of this topographical map be made in connection with the photographic views of the railroad cut, the star fort, and the view from the sally port, it will give you an idea of the rough mountain spurs over which we had to pass.

2. These forts and redoubts were built by a distinguished engineer in the United States army, and, with their mutual defensive relation the one to the other, form a remarkably strong line of fortifications on every side. Sherman wrote to Gen. Blair, June 1, 1864, "Order the brigade left at Allatoona to be provided with tools, and to intrench both ends of the pass very strong," and frequently he speaks of Allatoona as a "natural fortress," etc.

Beginning at the east, we have a fort about fifty feet in diameter in the interior (marked "T" on the map), near three hundred yards east of the railroad, with a deep ditch around it. Walls twelve feet thick, and having embrasures for artillery, for which it was mainly designed. This fort was connected with a line of heavy intrenchments extending to the railroad cut, and along the cut to defend the star fort "C" by a flank fire, and also the redoubt "R." Again, there are intrenchments on the east side of the railroad near the depot that sweep with a flank fire the south front of the star fort "C," the Cartersville road, depot, etc. There was also protection given by inundating the country north by a dam across the creek.

Crossing the railroad to the west, on the summit of the ridge and on the verge of the deep cut, you will find the star fort "C" surrounded by a wide ditch six feet deep. The interior is seventy-five feet in diameter, and has eight embrasures for large guns. It dominates, from its elevation, all the surrounding country, and commands the approach in every direction, completely sweeping the ridge both east and west, protecting the redoubt "R" from any force attacking it. The Cartersville _road_ passes under the muzzle of its guns, and then runs west on the ridge, through redoubt "R."

The two forts, "T" and "C," are interior isolated _works for artillery_, and the fire from each swept all the other works both inside and externally. Both were surrounded by ditches six feet deep, making their parapets about _twelve feet_ high. Consequently they could not be taken by assault without _scaling ladders_, or otherwise, usual in sieges, unless by the sally port. In fact these two inside forts could be used as citadels, or a place of _refuge_ when the long exterior lines of defense were captured. And this was the case with fort "C" in the battle of Allatoona. The whole formed a mountain fortress.

The Federals call the intrenchments at "R" "rifle pits," to which they bear about as much relation, in regard to strength, as a battleship does to a dispatch boat. Commencing about one hundred and twenty-five yards west of the fort "C," and on the south side of the Cartersville road, are two lines of intrenchments running nearly parallel with that road. These two, or double, lines of defense converge and meet below the crest of the ridge, then, turning north, cross the road (with angles for flanking fire) and continue north down the slope. From this north line an intrenchment runs due east toward the main fort. The parapet is revetted with timber, and the interior ditch is very wide. On the parapet are large chestnut _head logs_ to protect the persons of the soldiers. In front were immense entanglements of abatis, stockades, stakes, etc., to check any assault on the works. So well was the work done that in 1890, when I was there, time had not defaced them, and the revetments and "head logs" are today as round as when placed there. I am the more particular about this redoubt because here happened, perhaps, the bloodiest tragedy in the history of the war.

3. _The strength of the respective forces._

Col. Tourtellotte's command was composed of the Ninety-Third Illinois, officers and men, 294; the Eighteenth Wisconsin, guns, 150; Fourth Minnesota, guns, 450; the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, men, 16; giving an apparent total of 910. To this must yet be added the force for the six pieces of artillery, not less than 60. If we add the company officers not enumerated, it will be found that Tourtellotte had about 1,000 officers and men. The above numbers are official.

Corse's official statement is that he brought with him to Allatoona the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, 280 men; Seventh Illinois, 267 men; Fiftieth Illinois, 267 men; Fifty-Seventh Illinois, 61 men; Twelfth Illinois, 155 men; or 1,030 _men_. To this must be added (say) 107 regimental and company officers, making the force that he brought with him 1,137 officers and men. So with Tourtellotte's troops the aggregate is 2,137 instead of 1,944 as reported by him, which excluded himself and officers.

As regards the strength of my division at Allatoona, the War Records show that on September 20, at inspection, I had present for duty 331 officers and 2,945 men. Total, 3,276.

Cockrell's Brigade was composed of eight small regiments consolidated into four, Ector's Brigade of six regiments, and Sears's Brigade of six regiments, and two batteries, 8 guns.

To this force add one four-gun battery sent with me, and deduct one gun and one regiment left at Allatoona creek bridge, and my entire force present was _3,197_.

And thus officially we have Federals, 2,132; Confederates, as above.

4. _Equalization of forces._

The ratio of inequality between a force _within ordinary_ intrenchments in line of battle and the attacking force _without_ is well known.

Gen. Cox in his "Atlanta Campaign," page 129, says: "One man in the trench is equal to five in front." Gen. O. O. Howard, in reference to the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, says: "My experience is that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, _cannot be carried by direct assault_." Gen. R. S. Granger informs Gen. G. H. Thomas that the fort at Athens, manned by 700 men, can hold out an enemy 10,000 strong. (War Records, V. 39, Part 3, page 519.) Vicksburg, Jackson, Cold Harbor, Kennesaw, Petersburg, Atlanta, Knoxville, and other lines repelled the assaults. Now Allatoona was, without doubt, thrice as strong as these, and the attacking force was only _one and a half to one inside_. Then, too, we should consider that the works on the _hills_ were almost inaccessible.

Battery Wagner, a sand fort on a level plain on Morris Island, Charleston, S. C., was garrisoned by only 740 men, who successfully defended it _fifty-eight days and nights_ against the assaults and continuous fire of 11,500 men, with forty-seven cannon, aided by ships--the Ironsides, eight monitors, and five gunboats. And Fort Sumter never was taken by assault. It was quietly abandoned February 18, 1865.

On Sunday, April 16, 1865, seven days after the surrender at Appomattox, a small redoubt or fort, of weak construction, garrisoned by an unorganized force hastily collected, at West Point, Ga., near Atlanta, consisting of 64 men under Gen. Tyler and Col. J. H. Fannan, held the fort all day against 3,750 men of Gen. J. M. Wilson's command, and surrendered only for want of ammunition and loss of men. Col. O. H. LaGrange, of Wisconsin, commanded the Federals. Ratio, 1 to 62.

5. The _inspiring hopes_ given the garrison will be discovered in the following dispatches informing them aid was at hand, begging them to hold out until reënforcements arrived. In these dispatches bear in mind that Gen. Stanley was in temporary command of the Army of the Cumberland, and Gen. Elliott was the commander in chief of Sherman's cavalry. I give only a few of the many dispatches in the War Records.

NO. 1. VOLUME 39, PART 3, PAGE 53.
_SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA._

October 3, 1864.

Hood might slip up to Acworth and Allatoona. I want the
utmost vigilance there. If he goes to Allatoona, I want him
only delayed long enough for me to reach his rear.... If he
moves up to Allatoona, I will surely come in force.

NO. 2. VOLUME 39, PAGE 65.
_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

IN THE FIELD, October 4, 1864.

I heard from Gen. Elliott to-night. He was on the Sandtown
and Allatoona road.... I will be up to-day and move to
Kennesaw.

NO. 3. VOLUME 39, PAGE 66.
_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

October 4, 1864. Received 10 A.M.

Yes, move to Little Kennesaw and west of it. Tell Elliott
in my name to interpose with his whole force between Dallas
and Allatoona, and strike for any force in the direction of
Acworth.

NO. 4. VOLUME 39, PAGE 71.
_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

October 4, 1864, 11 P.M.

Don't risk the safety of your cavalry until I get up with my
whole force, but make bold reconnoissances in connection with
Gen. Stanley. My chief object is to prevent the enemy from
making an attack on Allatoona to-morrow.

NO. 5. VOLUME 39, PAGE 71.
_SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICERS AT ALLATOONA, KINGSTON, AND ROME._

October 4, 1864.

The enemy is moving on Allatoona, thence to Rome.

NO. 6. VOLUME 39, PAGE 52.
_SHERMAN TO GEN. VANDEVER._

October 3, 1864.

Sherman wants the force at Big Shanty cleaned out, and wants
it done to-night if possible.

NO. 7. VOLUME 39, PAGE 75.
_CORSE TO GEN. J. E. SMITH._

ROME, October 4, 1864.

I will move my entire command to Cartersville and unite with
Gen. Raum in attacking the enemy from Allatoona direct.

NO. 8. VOLUME 39, PAGE 75.
_CORSE TO RAUM._

ROME, October 4, 1864.

I am expecting a train every moment; as soon as I can get
ready I will move 3,000 to 4,000 men.

NO. 9. VOLUME 39, PAGE 77.
_VANDEVER TO SHERMAN._

NEAR KENNESAW, October 4, 1864.

Elliott is between Big Shanty and Kennesaw on our left. I am
skirmishing with the enemy now.

NO. 10. VOLUME 39, PAGE 77.
_VANDEVER TO SHERMAN._

NEAR KENNESAW, October 4, 1864.

Gen. Elliott has all his force near the west base of the
mountain. Gens. Kilpatrick and Garrard are both with him, so
couriers report.

NO. 11. VOLUME 39, PAGE 78.
_VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 4, 1864, 2 P.M.

Sherman is moving in force. Hold out.

NO. 12. VOLUME 39, PAGE 78.
_VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA._

NEAR KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 4, 6:39 P.M.

Gen. Sherman says hold fast, we are coming.

NO. 13. VOLUME 39, PAGE 88.
_SIGNAL OFFICER AT ALLATOONA TO SIGNAL OFFICER AT KENNESAW._

ALLATOONA, October 5, 1864.

Gen. Corse is here with one brigade. Where is Sherman?

NO. 14. VOLUME 39, PAGE 89.
_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864, 11:15 A.M.

No news by signal from Allatoona. Heavy firing, indicating an
assault and repulse. Occasional shots now, but too smoky to
see signals. Can see the field about Lost Mountain. No large
force of Rebels there. Can see Kilpatrick's cavalry massed in
a big field this side, but no skirmishing.

NO. 15. VOLUME 39, PAGE 89.
_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864. Received 2:30 P.M.

Throw forward pickets on the Sandtown road. Take strong
position and hold it.

NO. 16. VOLUME 39, PAGE 90.
_STANLEY TO SHERMAN._

PINE TOP, October 5, 1864, 3:10 P.M.

I am on Pine Top.... I saw our cavalry about two miles in
advance of Kemp's Mills.

NO. 17. VOLUME 39, PAGE 90.
_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

I want to control the Sandtown road back to Allatoona.[29]

NO. 18. VOLUME 39, PAGE 91.
_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

Dispatch Garrard to-night to Allatoona, making a circuit to
the right, and to learn if possible the state of affairs
there.... The day was so hazy that we could get but _few_
messages. Corse is there with his division.

NO. 19. VOLUME 39, PAGE 92.
_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

I have heard from Allatoona. All right. Corse is there, but
wounded. You need not send Garrard's cavalry, but send a
squadron.

NO. 20. VOLUME 39, PAGE 92.
_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

I have been up on Kennesaw all day watching the attack. Since
it ceased I have a signal, O. K. Corse wounded.... I want to
establish communication with Allatoona.

NO. 21. VOLUME 39, PAGE 96.
_TOURTELLOTTE TO SHERMAN._

ALLATOONA, GA., October 5, 1864.

_Gen. Sherman_: Corse is here.

NO. 22. VOLUME 39. PAGE 96.
_TO COMMANDING OFFICER, ALLATOONA._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864.

Near you.

NO. 23. VOLUME 39, PAGE 96.
_SIGNAL DISPATCHES FROM AND TO KENNESAW MOUNTAIN._

At 8 A.M. I called Allatoona for two hours and a half. I
asked for news, and at 10:30 A.M. received the following
message: "We hold out. Gen. Corse here."

Adams, _Signal Officer_.

At 4 P.M. I again called Allatoona, and at 4:15 got the
following: "We still hold out. Gen. Corse is wounded."

NO. 24. VOLUME 39, PAGE 97.

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864.

Tell Allatoona to hold on. Gen. Sherman says he is working
hard for you.

NO. 25. VOLUME 39, PAGE 97.
_GEN. G. B. RAUM TO GEN. J. E. SMITH._

CARTERSVILLE, GA., October 5, 1864.

We have won a great victory at Allatoona to-day. _I am just
from there._ Gen. Corse is slightly wounded in the cheek;
Col. Tourtellotte slightly in the left thigh.

NO. 26. VOLUME 39, PAGES 111, 112.
_LIEUT. W. H. SHERFY, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, KENNESAW, REPORTS._

October 4, 1864.

I called Allatoona and sent the messages received last night.
I saw the enemy hard at work destroying the railroad on both
sides of Big Shanty.... At 5 P.M. the enemy began to move off
on the Acworth road, and at _6 P.M. our army moved into camp
at the foot of Little Kennesaw Mountain_.

October 5.

To-day the battle of Allatoona was fought. I could see the
smoke of guns and shells. Gen. Sherman was with me all day
sending and receiving messages.