Chapter CXVI: Part 116

WILL. “In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him: yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of divine grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration, or renovation, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace.” Such were the sentiments of the often misrepresented Arminius on this subject; to which is only to be added, to complete the Scriptural view, that a degree of grace to consider his ways, and to return to God, is through the merit of Christ vouchsafed to every man. Every one must be conscious that he possesses free will, and that he is a free agent; that is, that he is capable of considering and reflecting upon the objects which are presented to his mind, and of acting, in such cases as are possible, according to the determination of his will. And, indeed, without this free agency, actions cannot be morally good or bad; nor can the agents be responsible for their conduct. But the corruption introduced into our nature by the fall of Adam has so weakened our mental powers, has given such force to our passions, and such perverseness to our wills, that a man “cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God.” The most pious of those who lived under the Mosaic dispensation often acknowledged the necessity of extraordinary assistance from God: David prays to God to open his eyes, to guide and direct him; to create in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him, Psalm li, 10; cxix, 18, 33, 35. Even we, whose minds are enlightened by the pure precepts of the Gospel, and urged by the motives which it suggests, must still be convinced of our weakness and depravity, and confess, in the words of the tenth article, that “we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.” The necessity of divine grace to strengthen and regulate our wills, and to coöperate with our endeavours after righteousness, is clearly asserted in the New Testament: “They that are in the flesh cannot please God,” Rom. viii, 8. “Abide in me,” says our Saviour, “and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing,” John xv, 4, 5. “No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him.” “It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure,” Phil. ii, 13. “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God,” 2 Cor. iii, 5. “We know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit helpeth our infirmities,” Rom. viii, 26. We are said to be “led by the Spirit,” and to “walk in the Spirit,” Rom. viii, 14; Gal. v, 16, 25. These texts sufficiently prove that we stand in need both of a prevenient and of a coöperating grace. This doctrine we find asserted in many of the ancient fathers, and particularly in Ambrose, who, in speaking of the effects of the fall, uses these words: “Thence was derived mortality, and no less a multitude of miseries than of crimes. Faith being lost, hope being abandoned, the understanding blinded, and the will made captive, no one found in himself the means of repairing these things. Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin; nor can any one please God without God. But whom does he please who does not please God, except himself and Satan? The nature therefore, which was good is made bad by habit: man would not return unless God turned him.” And Cyprian says, “We pray day and night that the sanctification and enlivening, which springs from the grace of God, may be preserved by his protection.” Dr. Nicholls, after quoting many authorities to show that the doctrine of divine grace always prevailed in the catholic church, adds, “I have spent, perhaps, more time in these testimonies than was absolutely necessary; but whatever I have done is to show that the doctrine of divine grace is so essential a doctrine of Christianity, that not only the Holy Scriptures and the primitive fathers assert it, but likewise that the Christians could not in any age maintain their religion without it,--it being necessary, not only for the discharge of Christian duties, but for the performance of our ordinary devotions.” And this seems to have been the opinion of the compilers of our excellent liturgy, in many parts of which both a prevenient and a coöperating grace is unequivocally acknowledged; particularly in the second collect for the evening service; in the fourth collect at the end of the communion service; in the collect for Easter day; in the collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter; in the collects for the third, ninth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fifth Sundays after Trinity. This assistance of divine grace is not inconsistent with the free agency of men: it does not place them under an irresistible restraint, or compel them to act contrary to their will. Our own exertions are necessary to enable us to work out our salvation; but our sufficiency for that purpose is from God. It is, however, impossible to ascertain the precise boundary between our natural efforts and the divine assistance, whether that assistance be considered as a coöperating or a prevenient grace. Without destroying our character as free and accountable beings, God may be mercifully pleased to counteract the depravity of our hearts by the suggestions of his Spirit; but still it remains with us to choose whether we will listen to those suggestions, or obey the lusts of the flesh. We may rest assured that he will, by the communication of his grace, varied often as to power and distinctness, help our infirmities, invigorate our resolutions, and supply our defects. The promises that if we draw nigh to God, God will draw nigh to us, and pour out his Spirit upon us, James iv, 8; Acts ii, 17, and that he will give his Holy Spirit to every one that asketh him, Luke xi, 13, imply that God is ever ready to work upon our hearts, and to aid our well-doing through the powerful, though invisible, operation of his Spirit: “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit,” John iii, 8. The joint agency of God and man, in the work of human salvation, is pointed out in the following passage: “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure,” Phil, ii, 12, 13; and therefore we may assure ourselves that free will and grace are not incompatible, though the mode and degree of their coöperation be utterly inexplicable, and though at different times one may appear for a season to overwhelm the other. This doctrine has, however, been the subject of much dispute among Christians: some sects contend for the irresistible impulses of grace, and others reject the idea of any influence of the divine Spirit upon the human mind. The former opinion seems irreconcilable with the free agency of man, if held as the constant unvarying mode in which he carries on his work in the soul of man, and the latter contradicts the authority of Scripture; “and therefore,” says Veneer, “let us neither ascribe nothing to free will, nor too much; let us not, with the defenders of irresistible grace, deny free will, or make it of no effect, not only before, but even under, grace; nor let us suffer the efficacy of saving grace, on the other hand, to be swallowed up in the strength and freedom of our wills; but, allowing the government or superiority to the grace of God, let the will of man be admitted to be its handmaid, but such a one as is free, and freely obeys; by which, when it is freely excited by the admonitions of prevenient grace, when it is prepared as to its affections, strengthened and assisted as to its powers and faculties, a man freely and willingly coöperates with God, that the grace of God be not received in vain.” “All men are also to be admonished,” observes Cranmer, in his “Necessary Doctrine,” “and chiefly preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, so temper and moderate themselves, that they neither so preach the grace of God that they take away thereby free will, nor on the other side so extol free will, that injury be done to the grace of God.” And Jortin remarks: “Thus do the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free will or human liberty unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the second, to awaken our caution and quicken our diligence.”

Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and, accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case, and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for capricious or unprincipled conduct,--an excuse which is never admitted by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they achieve to the coöperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question, the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness, under whatever dispensation, Acts x, 35; Romans ii, 7, 10. And surely the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices, of the humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The inquiry is not how the mind _may be_, but how it _is actually_, constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience, not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular, to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case, because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy. Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth, not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is, but what they imagine he _must be_. In their reasonings they differ, as might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did. The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil. Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity, must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture. And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative source of all that is great, glorious, and good in heaven or in earth; while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy, goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other, can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence; and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence, whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it: consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in another point of view,--as a most important class of moral phenomena; inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure, independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God in Christ to bring “life and immortality to light through the Gospel,” it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.

WIND. The Hebrews, like us, acknowledge four principal winds, Ezek. xiii, 16–18: the east wind, the north wind, the south wind, and the west wind, or that from the Mediterranean sea. See WHIRLWIND.

WINDOWS. The method of building both in Barbary and the Levant seems to have continued the same from the earliest ages. All the windows open into private courts, if we except sometimes a latticed window or balcony toward the street. It is only during the celebration of some _zeenah_, or public festival, that these houses and their latticed windows are left open; for this being a time of great liberty, revelling, and extravagance, each family is ambitious of adorning both the inside and outside of their houses with the richest part of their furniture; while crowds of both sexes, dressed out in their best apparel, and laying aside all ceremony and restraint, go in and out where they please. The account we have, 2 Kings ix, 30, of Jezebel’s painting her face, tiring her head, and looking out at a window upon Jehu’s public entry into Jezreel, gives us a lively idea of an eastern lady at one of those solemnities.

WINE, יין, Gen. xix, 32, οινος, Matt. ix, 17, a liquor expressed from grapes. The art of refining wine upon the lees was known to the Jews. The particular process, as it is now practised in the island of Cyprus, is described in Mariti’s Travels. The wine is put immediately from the vat into large vases of potters’ ware, pointed at the bottom, till they are nearly full, when they are covered tight and buried. At the end of a year what is designed for sale is drawn into wooden casks. The dregs in the vases are put into wooden casks destined to receive wine, with as much of the liquor as is necessary to prevent them from becoming dry before use. Casks thus prepared are very valuable. When the wine a year old is put in, the dregs rise, and make it appear muddy, but afterward they subside and carry down all the other feculences. The dregs are so much valued that they are not sold with the wine in the vase, unless particularly mentioned.

The “new wine,” or “must,” is mentioned, Isa. xlix, 26; Joel i, 5; iii, 18; and Amos ix, 13, under the name עסים. The “mixed wine,” ממסד, Prov. xxiii, 30, and in Isaiah lxv, 11 rendered “drink-offering,” may mean wine made stronger and more inebriating by the addition of higher and more powerful ingredients, such as honey, spices, _defrutum_, or wine inspissated by boiling it down, myrrh, mandragora, and other strong drugs. Thus the drunkard is properly described as one that seeketh “mixed wine,” Prov. xxiii, 30, and is mighty to “mingle strong drink,” Isa. v, 22; and hence the psalmist took that highly poetical and sublime image of the cup of God’s wrath, called by Isaiah, li, 17, “the cup of trembling,” containing, as St. John expresses it, Rev. xiv, 10, pure wine made yet stronger by a mixture of powerful ingredients: “In the hand of Jehovah is a cup, and the wine is turbid; it is full of a mixed liquor, and he poureth out of it,” or rather, “he poureth it out of one vessel into another,” to mix it perfectly; “verily the dregs thereof,” the thickest sediment of the strong ingredients mingled with it, “all the ungodly of the earth shall wring them out, and drink them.” “Spiced wine,” Cant. viii, 2, was wine rendered more palatable and fragrant with aromatics. This was considered as a great delicacy. Spiced wines were not peculiar to the Jews; Hafiz speaks of wines “richly bitter, richly sweet.” The Romans lined their vessels, _amphoræ_, with odorous gums, to give the wine a warm bitter flavour: and the orientals now use the admixture of spices to give their wines a favourite relish. The “wine of Helbon,” Ezek. xxvii, 18, was an excellent kind of wine, known to the ancients by the name of _chalibonium vinum_. It was made at Damascus; the Persians had planted vineyards there on purpose, says Posidosius, quoted by Athenæus. This author says that the kings of Persia used no other wine. Hosea, xiv, 7, mentions the wine of Lebanon. The wines from the vineyards on that mount are even to this day in repute; but some think that this may mean a sweet-scented wine, or wine flavoured with fragrant gums.

WINE PRESS. The vintage in Syria commences about the middle of September, and continues till the middle of November. But grapes in Palestine, we are informed, were ripe sometimes even in June or July, which arose perhaps from a triple pruning, in which case there was also a third vintage. The first vintage was in August, the second in September, and the third in October. The grapes when not gathered were sometimes found on the vines until November and December. The Hebrews were required to leave gleanings for the poor, Lev. xix, 10. The season of vintage was a most joyful one, Judges ix, 27; Isaiah xvi, 10; Jer. xxv, 30; xlviii, 33. With shoutings on all sides, the grapes were plucked off and carried to the wine press, פורה, פארה, ληνὸς, which was in the vineyard, Isa. liii, 3; Zech. xiv, 10; Haggai ii, 16; Matt. xxi, 33; Rev. xiv, 19, 20. The presses consisted of two receptacles, which were either built of stones and covered with plaster, or hewn out of a large rock. The upper receptacle, called נת, as it is constructed at the present time in Persia, is nearly eight feet square and four feet high. Into this the grapes are thrown and trodden out by five men. The juice flows out into the lower receptacle, through a grated aperture, which is made in the side near the bottom of the upper one. The treading of the wine press was laborious, and not very favourable to cleanliness; the garments of the persons thus employed were stained with the red juice, and yet the employment was a joyful one. It was performed with singing, accompanied with musical instruments; and the treaders, as they jumped, exclaimed, הידד, Isa. xvi, 9, 10; Jer. xxv, 30; xlviii, 32, 33. Figuratively, vintage, gleaning, and treading the wine press, signified battles and great slaughters, Isa. xvii, 6; lxiii, 1–3; Jer. xlix, 9; Lam. i, 15. The must, as is customary in the east at the present day, was preserved in large firkins, which were buried in the earth. The wine cellars were not subterranean, but built upon the earth. When deposited in these, the firkins, as is done at the present time in Persia, were sometimes buried in the ground, and sometimes left standing upon it. Formerly, also, new wine or must was preserved in leathern bottles; and, lest they should be broken by fermentation, the people were very careful that the bottles should be new, Job xxxii, 19; Matt. ix, 17; Mark ii, 22. Sometimes the must was boiled and made into syrup, which is comprehended under the term דבש, although it is commonly rendered “honey,” Gen. xliii, 11; 2 Chron. xxxi, 5. Sometimes the grapes were dried in the sun and preserved in masses, which were called “bunches or clusters of raisins,” 1 Sam. xxv, 18; 2 Sam. xvi, 1; 1 Chron. xii, 40; Hosea iii, 1. From these dried grapes, when soaked in wine and pressed a second time, was manufactured sweet wine, which is also called new wine, γλεῦκος, Acts ii, 13.

WISDOM is put for that prudence and discretion which enables a man to perceive that which is fit to be done, according to the circumstances of time, place, persons, manners, and end of doing, Eccles. ii, 13, 14. It was this sort of wisdom that Solomon intreated of God with so much earnestness, and which God granted him with such divine liberality, 1 Kings iii, 9, 12, 28. It also signifies quickness of invention, and dexterity in the execution of several works, which require not so much strength of body, as industry, and labour of the mind. For example, God told Moses, Exod. xxxi, 3, that he had filled Bezaleel and Aholiab with wisdom, and understanding, and knowledge, to invent and perform several sorts of work for completing the tabernacle. It is used for craft, cunning, and stratagem, and that whether good or evil. Thus it is said by Moses, that Pharaoh dealt wisely with the Israelites, when he opposed them in Egypt, Exodus i, 10: it is observed of Jonadab, the friend of Ammon, and nephew of David, that he was very wise, that is, very subtle and crafty, 2 Sam. xiii, 3; and Job, v, 13, says, that God “taketh the wise in their own craftiness.” Wisdom means also doctrine, learning, and experience: “With the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days understanding,” Job xii, 12. It is put for true piety, or the fear of God, which is spiritual wisdom: “So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom,” Psalm xc, 12; “The fear of the Lord that is wisdom,” Job xxvii, 28. Wisdom is put for the eternal Wisdom, the Word of God. It was by wisdom that God established the heavens, and founded the earth, Prov. iii, 19. How magnificently does Solomon describe the primeval birth of the eternal Son of God, under the character of Wisdom personified; to which so many references and allusions are to be found in the Old and New Testament! “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth,” Prov. viii, 22–25. The apocryphal book of Wisdom introduces, by a reference to this passage, the following admirable invocation, Wisdom ix, 9, 10:--

“O send forth wisdom, out of thy holy heavens,
Even from the throne of thy glory;
That being present she may labour with me,
That I may know what is pleasing in thy sight!”

And our Lord assumes the title of Wisdom, Luke xi, 49; Matt. xxiii, 34; and declares that “wisdom shall be justified of all her children,” Matt. xi, 19; Luke vii, 35.

WISDOM, BOOK OF, an apocryphal book of Scripture, so called on account of the wise maxims contained in it. This book has been commonly ascribed to Solomon, either because the author imitated that king’s manner of writing, or because he sometimes speaks in his name. But it is certain Solomon was not the author of it; for it was not written in Hebrew, nor was it inserted in the Jewish canon, nor is the style like that of Solomon; and therefore St. Jerom observes justly that it smells strong of the Grecian eloquence; that it is composed with art and method, after the manner of the Greek philosophers, very different from that noble simplicity so full of life and energy to be found in the Hebrew books. It has been ascribed by many of the ancients to Philo.

WOLF, זאב, in Arabic, _zeeb_, Gen. xlix, 27; Isa. xi, 6; lxv, 25; Jer. v, 6; Ezek. xxii, 27; Zeph. iii, 3; Hab. i, 8; λύκος, Matt. vii, 15; x, 16; Luke x, 3; John x, 12; Acts xx, 29; Eccles. xiii, 17. M. Majus derives it from the Arabic word _zaab_ or _daaba_, “to frighten;” and hence, perhaps, the German word _dieb_, “a thief.” The wolf is a fierce, strong, cunning, mischievous, and carnivorous quadruped; externally and internally so nearly resembling the dog, that they seem modelled alike, yet have a perfect antipathy to each other. The Scripture observes of the wolf, that it lives upon rapine; is violent, bloody, cruel, voracious, and greedy; goes abroad by night to seek its prey, and is a great enemy to flocks of sheep. Indeed, this animal is fierce without cause, kills without remorse, and by its indiscriminate slaughter seems to satisfy its malignity rather than its hunger. The wolf is weaker than the lion or the bear, and less courageous than the leopard; but he scarcely yields to them in cruelty and rapaciousness. His ravenous temper prompts him to destructive and sanguinary depredations; and these are perpetrated principally in the night. This circumstance is expressly mentioned in several passages of Scripture. “The great men have altogether broken the yoke and burst the bonds; wherefore, a lion out of the forest shall slay them, and a wolf of the evenings shall spoil them,” Jer. v, 6. The rapacious and cruel conduct of the princes of Israel is compared by Ezekiel, xxii, 27, to the mischievous inroads of the same animal: “Her princes in the midst thereof are like wolves ravening the prey, to shed blood, to destroy lives, to get dishonest gain;” and Zephaniah, iii, 3, says, “Her princes within her are roaring lions, her judges are evening wolves: they gnaw not the bones till the morrow.” Instead of protecting the innocent and restraining the evil doer, or punishing him according to the demerit of his crimes, they delight in violence and oppression, in blood and rapine; and so insatiable is their cupidity, that, like the evening wolf, they destroy more than they are able to possess. The dispositions of the wolf to attack the weaker animals, especially those which are under the protection of man, is alluded to by our Saviour in the parable of the hireling shepherd: “The wolf catcheth them, and scattereth the flock,” Matt. vii, 15. And the Apostle Paul, in his address to the elders of Ephesus, gives the name of this insidious and cruel animal to the false teachers who disturbed the peace and perverted the faith of their people: “I know this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock,” Acts xx, 29.

WORD. Sometimes the Scripture ascribes to the word of God certain supernatural effects, and often represents it as animated and active: “He sent his word and healed them,” Psalm cvii, 20. It also signifies what is written in the sacred books of the Old and New Testament, Luke xi, 28; James i, 22; the divine law which teaches and commands good things, and forbids evil, Psalm cxix, 101; and is used to express every promise of God, Psalm cxix, 25, &c, and prophecy or vision, Isaiah, ii, 1. This term is likewise consecrated and appropriated to signify the only Son of the Father, the uncreated Wisdom, the second Person of the most holy Trinity, equal to and consubstantial with the Father. St. John the evangelist, more expressly than any other, has opened to us the mystery of the Word of God, when he tells us, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made,” John i, 1–3. The Chaldee paraphrasts, the most ancient Jewish writers extant, generally make use of the word _memra_, which signifies “the Word,” in those places where Moses puts the name Jehovah. They say, for example, that it was the _Memra_, or the Word, which created the world, which appeared to Moses on Mount Sinai, which gave him the law, which spoke to him face to face, which brought Israel out of Egypt, which marched before the people, and which wrought all those miracles that are recorded in Exodus. It was the same Word that appeared to Abraham in the plain of Mamre, that was seen of Jacob at Bethel, to whom Jacob made his vow, and acknowledged as God, saying, “If God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, then shall the Lord be my God,” Gen. xxviii, 20, 21. The manner in which St. John commences his Gospel is strikingly different from the introductions to the histories of Christ by the other evangelists; and no less striking and peculiar is the title under which he announces him--“the Word.” It has therefore been a subject of much inquiry and discussion, from whence this evangelist drew the use of this appellation, and what reasons led him, as though intending to solicit particular attention, to place it at the very head of his Gospel. That it was for the purpose of establishing an express opinion, as to the personal character of him it is used to designate, is made more than probable from the predominant character of the whole Gospel, which is more copiously doctrinal, and contains a record more full of what Jesus “_said_” than the others. As to the source from which the term Logos was drawn by the Apostle, some have held it to be taken from the Jewish Scriptures; others, from the Chaldee paraphrases; others, from Philo and the Hellenizing Jews. The most natural conclusion certainly appears to be, that, as St. John was a plain, “unlearned” man, chiefly conversant in the Holy Scriptures, he derived this term from the sacred books of his own nation, in which the Hebrew phrase, _Dabar Jehovah_, “the Word of Jehovah,” frequently occurs in passages which must be understood to speak of a personal Word, and which phrase is rendered Λόγος Κυρίου [the word of the Lord] by the Septuagint interpreters. Certainly, there is not the least evidence in his writings, or in his traditional history, that he ever acquainted himself with Philo or with Plato; and none, therefore, that he borrowed the term from them, or used it in any sense approaching to or suggested by these refinements:--in the writings of St. Paul there are allusions to poets and philosophers; in those of St. John, none, except to the rising sects afterward known under the appellation of Gnostics. The Hebrew Scriptures contain frequent intimations of a distinction of Persons in the Godhead; one of these Divine Persons is called Jehovah; and, though manifestly represented as existing distinct from the Father, is yet arrayed with attributes of divinity, and was acknowledged by the ancient Jews to be, in the highest sense, “their God,” the God with whom, through all their history, they chiefly “had to do.” This Divine Person is proved to have been spoken of by the prophets as the future Christ; the evangelists and Apostles represent Jesus as that Divine Person of the prophets; and if, in the writings of the Old Testament, he is also called the Word, the application of this term to our Lord is naturally accounted for. It will then appear to be a theological, not a philosophic appellation, and one which, previously even to the time of the Apostle, had been stamped with the authority of inspiration.

Celebrated as this title of the Logos was in the Jewish theology, it is not, however, the appellation by which the Spirit of inspiration has chosen that our Saviour should be principally designated. It occurs but a very few times, and principally and emphatically in the introduction to St. John’s Gospel. A cogent reason can be given why this Apostle adopts it; and we are not without a probable reason why, in the New Testament, the title “Son of God” should have been preferred, which is a frequent title of the Logos in the writings also of Philo. Originating from the spiritual principle of connection, between the first and the second Being in the Godhead; marking this, by a spiritual idea of connection; and considering it to be as close and as necessary as the Word is to the energetic mind of God, which cannot bury its intellectual energies in silence, but must put them forth in speech; it is too spiritual in itself, to be addressed to the faith of the multitude. If with so full a reference to our bodily ideas, and so positive a filiation of the second Being to the first, we have seen the attempts of Arian criticism endeavouring to resolve the doctrine into the mere dust of a figure; how much more ready would it have been to do so, if we had only such a spiritual denomination as this for the second! This would certainly have been considered by it as too unsubstantial for distinct personality, and therefore too evanescent for equal divinity. One of the first teachers of this system was Cerinthus. We have not any particular account of all the branches of his system; and it is possible that we may ascribe to him some of those tenets by which later sects of Gnostics were discriminated. But we have authority for saying, that the general principle of the Gnostic scheme was openly taught by Cerinthus before the publication of the Gospel of St. John. The authority is that of Irenæus, a bishop who lived in the second century, who in his youth had heard Polycarp, the disciple of the Apostle John, and who retained the discourses of Polycarp in his memory till his death. There are yet extant of the works of Irenæus, five books which he wrote against heresies, one of the most authentic and valuable monuments of theological erudition. In one place of that work he says, that Cerinthus taught in Asia that the world was not made by the Supreme God, but by a certain power very separate and far removed from the Sovereign of the universe, and ignorant of his nature. In another place, he says that John the Apostle wished, by his Gospel, to extirpate the error which had been spread among men by Cerinthus; and Jerom, who lived in the fourth century, says that St. John wrote his Gospel, at the desire of the bishops of Asia, against Cerinthus and other heretics, and chiefly against the doctrines of the Ebionites, then springing up, who said that Christ did not exist before he was born of Mary.

“It appears,” says Dr. Hill, “to have been the tradition of the Christian church, that St. John, who lived to a great age, and who resided at Ephesus, in Proconsular Asia, was moved by the growth of the Gnostic heresies, and by the solicitations of the Christian teachers, to bear his testimony to the truth in writing, and particularly to recollect those discourses and actions of our Lord, which might furnish the clearest refutation of the persons who denied his preëxistence. This tradition is a key to a great part of his Gospel. Matthew, Mark, and Luke had given a detail of those actions of Jesus which are the evidences of his divine mission; of those events in his life upon earth which are most interesting to the human race; and of those moral discourses in which the wisdom, the grace, and the sanctity of the Teacher shine with united lustre. Their whole narration implies that Jesus was more than man. But as it is distinguished by a beautiful simplicity, which adds very much to their credit as historians, they have not, with the exception of a few incidental expressions, formally stated the conclusion that Jesus was more than man; but have left the Christian world to draw it for themselves from the facts narrated, or to receive it by the teaching and the writings of the Apostles. St. John, who was preserved by God to see this conclusion, which had been drawn by the great body of Christians, and had been established in the epistles, denied by different heretics, brings forward, in the form of a history of Jesus, a view of his exalted character, and draws our attention particularly to the truth of that which had been denied. When you come to analyze the Gospel of St. John, you will find that the first eighteen verses contain the positions laid down by the Apostle, in order to meet the errors of Cerinthus; that these positions, which are merely affirmed in the introduction, are proved in the progress of the Gospel, by the testimony of John the Baptist, and by the words and the actions of our Lord; and that after the proof is concluded by the declaration of Thomas, who, upon being convinced that Jesus had risen, said to him, ‘My Lord, and my God,’ St. John sums up the amount of his Gospel in these few words: ‘These are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God;’ that is, that Jesus and the Christ are not distinct persons, and that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. The Apostle does not condescend to mention the name of Cerinthus, because that would have preserved, as long as the world lasts, the memory of a name which might otherwise be forgotten. But, although there is dignity and propriety in omitting the mention of his name, it was necessary, in laying down the positions that were to meet his errors, to adopt some of his words, because the Christians of those days would not so readily have applied the doctrine of the Apostle to the refutation of those heresies which Cerinthus was spreading among them, if they had not found in the exposition of that doctrine some of the terms in which the heresy was delivered; and as the chief of these terms, Logos, which Cerinthus applied to an inferior spirit, was equivalent to a phrase in common use among the Jews, ‘the Word of Jehovah,’ and was probably borrowed from thence, John by his use of Logos rescues it from the degraded use of Cerinthus, and restores it to a sense corresponding to the dignity of the Jewish phrase.”

The Logos was no fanciful term, merely invented by St. John, _pro re natâ_, [according to circumstances,] or even suggested by the Holy Spirit, as a suitable title for a prophet by whom God chose to reveal himself or his Word. It was a term diversely understood in the world before St. John began his Gospel. Is it possible, therefore, that he should have used the term without some express allusion to these prevailing opinions? Had he contradicted them all, it would, of course, have been a plain proof, that they were all equally fabulous and fanciful; but by adopting the term, he certainly meant to show, that the error did not consist in believing that there was a Logos, or Word of God, but in thinking amiss of it. We might, indeed, have wondered much had he decidedly adopted the Platonic or Gnostic notions, in preference to the Jewish; but that he should harmonize with the latter, is by no means surprising; first, because he was a Jew himself; and, secondly, because Christianity was plainly to be shown to be connected with, and, as it were, regularly to have sprung out of, Judaism. It is certainly, then, in the highest degree consistent with all we could reasonably expect, to find St. John and others of the sacred writers expressing themselves in terms not only familiar to the Jews under the old covenant, but, in such as might tend, by a perfect revelation of the truth, to give instruction to all parties; correcting the errors of the Platonic and oriental systems, and confirming, in the clearest manner, the hopes and expectations of the Jews.

While the reasons for the use of this term by St. John are obvious, the argument from it is irresistible; for, first, the Logos of the evangelist is a _person_, not an _attribute_, as many Socinians have said, who have, therefore, sometimes chosen to render it _wisdom_. For if it be an attribute, it were a mere truism to say, that “it was in the beginning with God;” because God could never be without his attributes. The Apostle also declares, that the Logos was the Light; but that John Baptist was not the light. Here is a kind of parallel supposed, and it presumes, also, that it was possible that the same character might be erroneously ascribed to both. Between person and person this may, undoubtedly, be the case; but what species of parallel can exist between man and an attribute? Nor will the difficulty be obviated by suggesting, that wisdom here means not the attribute itself, but him whom that attribute inspired, the man Jesus Christ, because the name of our Saviour has not yet been mentioned; because that rule of interpretation must be inadmissible, which at one time would explain the term Logos by an attribute, at another by a man, as best suits the convenience of hypothesis; and because, if it be, in this instance, conceived to indicate our Saviour, it must follow, that our Saviour created the world, (which the Unitarians will by no means admit,) for the Logos, who was that which John the Baptist was not, the true Light, is expressly declared to have made the world. Again: the Logos was made flesh, that is, became man; but in what possible sense could an attribute become man? The Logos is “the only begotten of the Father;” but it would be uncouth to say of any attribute, that it is begotten; and, if that were passed over, it would follow, from this notion, either that God has only one attribute, or that wisdom is not his only begotten attribute. Farther: St. John uses terms decisively personal, as that he is God, not divine as an attribute, but God personally; not that he was in God, which would properly have been said of an attribute, but _with_ God, which he could only say of a person; that “all things were made by him;” that he was “in the world;” that “he came to his own;” that he was “in the bosom of the Father;” and that “he hath declared the Father.” The absurdity of representing the Logos of St. John as an attribute seems, at length, to have been perceived by the Socinians themselves, and their new version accordingly regards it as a personal term.