Chapter LXXIII: Part 73

Justification was on both sides supposed to consist entirely in the remission of sins. The popish scholastics, on this head, were remarkably distinct in their ideas, and express in their language. They represented it as an effect produced by the infusion of divine grace into the mind; not as a consequent to a well spent life, but as preceding all remunerable obedience, as the intervening point between night and day, the gloom of a guilty and the light of a self-approving conscience; or, in other words, and to adopt their own phraseology, as the exact boundary where merit of congruity ends and where merit of condignity begins, the infallible result of a previous disposition on our part, which never fails of alluring from on high that supernatural quality which, being itself love, renders the soul beloved. While the Lutherans, however, adhered to the general import of the term as understood in the schools, they waged an incessant warfare upon another point; while they allowed that justification consists in the remission of sin, they denied that this remission is to be acquired by the merit of the individual. Their scholastic opponents maintained that man is justified in the sight of God in consequence of his own preparation, and on account of his personal qualities. They, on the other band, argued with an inflexibility which admitted of no compromise, that, possessing not merits of his own to plead, man freely received forgiveness through the mercy of God solely on account of the merits of Christ. The effective principle, therefore, or _meritorious cause of justification_, was the great point contested. The doctrine of the popish divines, explained more at large, was this: When the sinner, conscious of his past transgressions, inquired where he was to seek the expiation of his crime, and deliverance from the dreadful consequences of it, the general answer was, _In the merit of penitence_; a merit capable of annihilating guilt, and appeasing the anger of incensed Omnipotence. He, they argued, who, having disobeyed the laws of Heaven, is desirous of returning into that state of acceptance from which he has fallen, must not expect free forgiveness; but previously by unfeigned sorrow of heart deserve the restoration of grace, and, with it, the obliteration of his offences. To effect this desirable purpose he is bound strictly to survey and detest his former conduct, accurately to enumerate his transgressions and deeply feel them; and, impressed with a due sense of their magnitude, impurity, and consequences, to condemn his folly and deplore his fault, which have made him an outcast of Heaven, and exposed him to eternal misery. So far he can proceed by that operation of the mind which they denominated ATTRITION, and which, being within the sphere of his natural powers, they regarded as _congruous piety meritorious of justification_, as a preparation of the soul more or less necessary to receive and merit justifying grace. When, therefore, he is arrived at this point, ATTRITION ceases and CONTRITION commences; the habit of sin is expelled, while that of holiness is superinduced in its stead, and with the infusion of charity, the plastic principle of a new obedience, justification becomes complete. But even here it was not conceived that a total deliverance takes place; a liberation from guilt and _eternal_ punishment is effected, but not from _temporal_, which is never remitted unless either by the infliction of some personal suffering or satisfactory compensation required of him who is already justified and approved by Heaven. However, to accomplish this remaining object, nothing more is wanting than a continuation, to a sufficient intensity, of that compunction of heart which is now denominated CONTRITION, grace supplying the defects of nature, and enabling penitential merit not only to justify, but to obtain exemption from punishment of every species. But so great appeared to the popish scholastics the frailty of man and the severity of God, that no inconsiderable difficulty occurred in the due application of this favourite doctrine to individuals; for the means of expiation, they imagined, ought always to be proportionate to the magnitude of the offences. How,” they reasoned, are we to be assured that our contrition has been either sufficient or sincere, and whether it has been so in the obliteration not only of one crime, but of all; whether it has atoned for past transgressions of every kind, the number of which may perplex, as well as their guilt confound, us?” Instead, therefore, of penitence in its strictest acceptation as a perfect virtue, God, they said, in condescension to human infirmity, has substituted for general practice _the sacrament of penitence_, which, for the attainment of full remission, requires only a moderate compunction of soul, with confession to the priest, and the discharge of such satisfaction as he may enjoin. And, still lower to reduce the terms of acceptance, they even argued that it is not absolutely necessary for the penitent to experience an entire conversion of heart, but only not to oppose the impediment of mortal crime, to feel some displeasure at his past conduct, and to express a resolution of amending it in future. But, after all, and in spite of the boasted authority of the keys, complete confidence in divine forgiveness was never inculcated; for it was neither the interest nor the inclination of the church of Rome to teach the simple doctrine of Christian faith, but rather to involve it in metaphysical obscurity. Under the pretext, therefore, of relieving the throbbing breast from its apprehensions, they had recourse to numerous inventions for propping the insecure fabric of penitential hope; asserting, among other extravagancies, that the sacraments are in themselves efficacious by virtue of their own operation, exclusively of all merit in the recipient; and that the sacrament of the altar, in particular, acts so powerful in this respect as to communicate grace not only to those who partake of it, but to others from whom it is received by substitution, provided its operation be not hindered by confessedly flagrant immorality. So deeply rooted in the minds of the papists had become the persuasion of its thus effecting the best of purposes, and that even without the necessity of an actual participation of it by him upon whom the benefit is conferred, that the celebration of the mass was universally regarded as the means of appeasing the anger of Heaven, and obtaining pardon and peace, of procuring divine assistance for the living, and, for the dead, deliverance from the bitter pains of purgatory. Nor by the sacraments alone, but by every good external work, as well as internal disposition, was justifying grace supposed to be merited _congruously_, and satisfaction for sin to be made _condignly_. In monastical institutions, likewise, were found no mean materials for similar purposes; for in those feigned religions,” as the homily _On Good Works_ describes them, the devotees boasted of having lamps which ran always over, able to _satisfy_ not only for their own sins, but also for all other their benefactors, brothers and sisters of religion, as most ungodly and craftily they had persuaded the multitude of ignorant people; keeping in divers places marts or markets of merits, being full of their holy relics, images, shrines, and works of overflowing abundance, ready to be sold.” Yet, whether the dubious penitent was instructed to derive consolation from the efficacy of the sacraments, from his own personal qualities, or from any of what Cranmer aptly termed “the fantastical works of man’s invention,” it should be observed that he was not directly taught to consider these as wholly superseding the virtue of repentance, but as supplying his deficiencies in the performance of it; an incongruous system of atonement, fabricated by the avarice of Rome, and the obsequiousness of scholastical philosophy, to augment the treasures and extend the influence of the church, to extinguish the light of Gospel truth, and, while keeping the world at large in ignorance, to hold the conscience of the individual in slavery. Upon the whole, then, the scholastics maintained that justification is unattainable without repentance, at least, without some degree of attrition on our part; but in the common apprehension of the doctrine even this seems to have been forgotten, and merit of congruity considered in a general point of view as alone efficacious. Thus good works of every species preceding grace were said to deserve it, and, by deserving grace, to deserve the justifying principle. And always were they careful to impute the cause of forgiveness, not to the mercy of God in Christ, but to the sole change in the individual, to his transmutation from a state of unrighteousness to one of righteousness, to his possession of a quality which renders him a worthy object of divine approbation. For in every instance personal merit was conceived to be the solid basis upon which rests the complete remission of sin. Upon no one point, perhaps, has the opinion of Luther been more misrepresented than upon this. Some have ascribed to it a solifidian tendency, if not of the most enthusiastical, at least, of the most unqualified, description. But it seems indeed impossible accurately to comprehend the position which he maintained, if we examine it in an insulated point of view, unless we connect it with that of which in the church of Rome it properly formed a part, and from which he never intended to separate it,--the doctrine of penitence. In opposing the absurdity of papal indulgences, (the first impiety against which his manly mind revolted,) a ray of light, before unnoticed, darted upon him, and opened a completely new scene, which, while it stimulated his efforts as a reformer, animated his hopes as a Christian. Hence, averting with disdain from the speculations of sophists, and turning to the sacred page of revelation, he there beheld an affiance very different from what the schools inculcated; and thus, while _their_ vain language was, Repent, and trust to the efficacy of your contrition, either with or without extraneous works, according to the degree of its intensity, for the expiation of your offences;” _his_, more Scriptural and more consoling, became simply this: Repent, and trust not for expiation to your own merits of any kind, but solely to those of your Redeemer.” Rejecting the dreams of their adversaries with respect to the nature and effects of this important duty, they represented it as consisting of two essential parts, CONTRITION and FAITH, the latter as always associated with the former. Hence, in the Apology of their Confession, they repeatedly declared a disavowal of all faith, except such as exists in the contrite heart. Far was it from their intention to encourage the presumptuous or fanatical sinner in a false security; their object was very different and laudable,--they laboured to fix the eye of him who both laments and detests his offences, upon the only deserving object of human confidence and divine complacency. Properly, then, as they frequently remarked, their doctrine of justification was appropriated to troubled consciences, at every period of true repentance, and particularly at the awful hour of death, when the time for habitual proofs of amendment has elapsed, and when the past appears replete with guilt and the future with terror. At such moments, they taught not, with the schools, an affiance in human merit, but in the gratuitous mercy of God through Christ: to contrition, as a preparatory qualification or previous requisite, they added faith; and from faith they deemed every principle of real piety and virtue inseparable. Good works, or the outward fruits of an inward renovation of mind, were said to _follow_ remission of sins; _internal_ necessarily preceding _external_ reformation. For the individual, they argued, must himself be good before the action can be so denominated, be justified before it can be deemed just, and accepted before it can prove acceptable,--distinguishing between the primary admission into God’s favour, and the subsequent preservation of that favour.

The unfathomable depths of divine predestination and predetermination human reason in vain attempts to sound, finite faculties to scan infinite, or the limited intellect of man to comprehend the immensity of the Godhead. Erasmus, a peculiar favourite with the reformers of our own country, when contemplating this inexplicable subject, observed, that in the Holy Scriptures there are certain secret recesses, which God is unwilling for us too minutely to explore; and which, if we endeavour to explore, in proportion as we penetrate farther, our minds become more and more oppressed with darkness and stupefaction; that thus we might acknowledge the inscrutable majesty of the divine wisdom, and the imbecility of the human mind.” Congenial, also, with the feelings and sentiments of Erasmus upon this point were those of Luther. To acquire any knowledge,” he remarked, of a deity not revealed in Scripture, to know what his existence is, his actions and dispositions, belongs not to me. My duty is only this; to know what are his precepts, his promises, and his threatenings. Pernicious and pestilent is the thought of investigating causes, and brings with it inevitable ruin, especially when we ascend too high, and wish to philosophize upon predestination.” How differently Calvin felt upon the same subject, and with what little reserve, or rather with what bold temerity, he laboured to scrutinize the unrevealed Divinity, is too well known to require any thing beyond a bare allusion to the circumstance. His sentiments, however, were much less regarded than some are disposed to allow; and upon this particular question, so far were they from having attained their full celebrity at the period when the articles of the church of England were framed, that they were not taught without opposition even in his own unimportant territory of Geneva. For at that precise era he was publicly accused (by Sebastian Castellio) of making God the author of sin; and although, not contented with silencing, he first imprisoned and afterward banished his accuser, yet he could not expel the opinions of his adversary. While the church of Rome maintained a predestination to life of one man in preference to another individually _on account of personal merit_, the Lutherans taught a gratuitous predestination of Christians collectively, of those whom God has chosen in Christ out of mankind; and by this single point of difference were the contending opinions principally contradistinguished. With us the system of Calvin still retains so many zealous advocates, that to a modern ear the very term PREDESTINATION seems to convey a meaning only conformable with _his_ particular system. It should, however, be observed that this word was in familiar use for centuries before the Reformation, in a sense, very different from what Calvin imputed to it, not as preceding the divine prescience, but as resulting from it, much in the same sense as that in which it has since been supported by the Arminians. Yet, obvious as this appears, writers of respectability strangely persuade themselves, that, immediately prior to the Reformation, the doctrines of the church of Rome were completely Calvinistical; a conclusion to which, certainly, none can subscribe who are sufficiently conversant with the favourite productions of that time. So far, indeed, was this from being the fact, that Calvin peculiarly prided himself on departing from the common definition of the term, which had long been adopted by the adherents of the schools, and retained with a scrupulous precision. For while they held that the expression _predestinati_ is exclusively applicable to the elect, whom God, foreknowing as meritorious objects of his mercy, predestinates to life; and while they appropriated that of _præsciti_ to the non-elect, whose perseverance in transgression is simply foreknown; Calvin, on the other side, treating the distinction as a frivolous subterfuge, contended that God, decreeing the final doom of the elect and non-elect irrespectively, predestinates both, not subsequently but previously to all foreknowledge of their individual dispositions, especially devotes the latter to destruction through the medium of crime, and creates them by a fatal destiny to perish. Whatever, therefore, modern conjecture may have attributed to the popish scholastics, it is certain that, abhorring every speculation which tends in the remotest degree to make God the author of sin, they believed that only salutary good is predestinated; grace to those who deserve it _congruously_, and glory to those who deserve it _condignly_. They maintained that almighty God, before the foundations of the world were laid, surveying in his comprehensive idea, or, as they phrased it, in his prescience of simple intelligence, the possibilities of all things before he determined their actual existence, foresaw that, if mankind were created, (although he willed the salvation of all, and was inclined to assist all indifferently, yet) some would deserve eternal happiness, and others eternal misery; and that therefore he approved and elected the former, but disapproved or reprobated the latter. Thus, grounding election upon foreknowledge, they contemplated it, not as an arbitrary principle, separating one individual from another under the influence of a blind chance or an irrational caprice; but, on the contrary, as a wise and just principle, which presupposes a diversity between those who are accepted and those who are rejected. Hence it was, that in order to systematize upon this principle of election, and to show how consistent it is as well with the justice as the benevolence of the Deity, the will of God was considered in a double point of view, as _absolute_ and _conditional_, or, in the technical language of the schools, as _antecedent_ and _consequent_. In the first instance, by his absolute or antecedent will, he was said to desire the salvation of every man; in the latter, by his conditional or consequent will, that only of those whom he foresaw abstaining from sin and obeying his commandments: the one expressed his general inclination, the other his particular resolution upon the view of individual circumstances and conditions. To the inquiry, why some are unendowed with grace, their answer was, Because some are not willing to receive it, and not because God is unwilling to give it.” He,” they said, offers his light to all. He is absent from none; but man absents himself from the present Deity, like one who shuts his eyes against the noon-day blaze.” To the foregoing statement it should be added, that they held an election, or rather an ordination, to grace (which they expressly asserted to be defectible) distinct from an election to glory; that according to them, a name may be written in the book of life at one period, which at another many be erased from it; and that predestination to eternal happiness solely depends upon final perseverance in well doing. On the whole it is evident, that they considered the dignity or worthiness of the individual as the meritorious basis of predestination; merit of congruity as the basis of a preordination to grace, and merit of condignity as that of a preordination to glory. Thus, not more fastidious in the choice of their terms than accurate in the use of them, while they denied that the prescience of human virtue, correctly speaking, could be the primary cause of the divine will, because nothing in time can properly give birth to that which has existed from eternity, they strenuously maintained it to be a secondary cause, the ratio or rule in the mind of the Deity which regulated his will in the formation of its ultimate decisions. Although in the established confession of their faith the Lutherans avoided all allusion to the subject of predestination, it was nevertheless introduced into another work of importance, and of considerable public authority, the _Loci Theologici_ of Melancthon, a production which was every where received as the standard of Lutheran divinity. Both Luther and Melancthon, after the Diet of Augsburgh, kept one object constantly in view,--to inculcate only what was plain and practical, and never to attempt philosophizing. But to what, it may be asked, did the Lutherans object in the theory of their opponents when they themselves abandoned the tenet of necessity? Certainly, not to the sobriety and moderation of that part of it which vindicated the justice, and displayed the benevolence, of the Almighty; but, generally, to the principles upon which it proceeded; to the _presumption_, in overleaping the boundary which Heaven has prescribed to our limited faculties, and which we cannot pass without plunging into darkness and error; and to its _impiety_ in disregarding, if not despising, the most important truths of Christianity. A system of such a nature they hesitated not to reject, anxious to conduct themselves by the light of Scripture alone, nor presuming to be wise above what God has been pleased to discover. Maintaining not a particular election of personal favourites, either by an absolute will, or even a conditional one, dependent upon the ratio of merit, but a general election of all who, by baptism in their infancy, or by faith and obedience in mature years, become the adopted heirs of Heaven; they conceived this to be the only election to which the Gospel alludes, and, consequently, the only one upon which we can speak with confidence, or reason without presumption. If it be observed, that the selection of an integral body necessarily infers that of its component parts, the answer is obvious: The latter, although indeed it be necessarily inferred by the former, is nevertheless not a prior requisite, but a posterior result of the divine ordination. What they deemed absolute on the part of God was his everlasting purpose to save his elect in Christ, or real Christians considered as a whole, and contrasted with the remainder of the human race; the completion of this purpose being regulated by peculiar circumstances, operating as inferior causes of a particular segregation. For, persuaded of his good will toward all men without distinction, of his being indiscriminately disposed to promote the salvation of all, and of his seriously (not _fictitiously_, as Calvin taught) including all in the universal promise of Christianity, they imputed to him nothing like a partial choice, no limitation of favours, no irrespective exclusion of persons; but assuming the Christian character as the sole ground of individual preference, they believed that every baptized infant, by being made a member of Christ, not by being comprised in a previous arbitrary decree, is truly the elect of God, and, dying in infancy, certain of eternal happiness; that he who, in maturer years, becomes polluted by wilful crime, loses that state of salvation which before he possessed; that nevertheless by true repentance, and conversion to the Father of mercy and God of all consolation, he is again reinstated in it; and that, by finally persevering in it, he at length receives the kingdom prepared for every sincere Christian before the foundation of the world. Can any man, whom prejudice has not blinded, rank these sentiments with those of Calvin? It may seem almost unnecessary to subjoin, that the Lutherans held the defectibility of grace; its indefectibility being a position supported but by those who think that the Redeemer died for a selected few alone. Upon the whole then it appears, that the Lutherans, affecting not in any way to philosophize, but committing themselves solely to the guidance of Scripture, differed from the church of Rome in several important particulars. For, although on some points they coincided with her, although they inculcated, with equal zeal and upon a better principle, both the universality and the defectibility of grace, as well as a conditional admission into the number of the elect, they nevertheless were entirely at variance with her upon the very foundation of the system. Thus while their opponents taught, that predestination consists in the prospective discrimination of individuals by divine favour, according to the foreseen ratio of every man’s own merit,--works of congruity deserving grace here, and works of condignity eternal life hereafter, and that in this way it principally rests upon human worth; the Lutherans, disclaiming every idea of such a discrimination, placed it upon the same basis as they assumed in the case of justification,--that of an effectual redemption by Christ. Instead, therefore, of holding the election of individuals as men _on account of personal dignity or worthiness_, they maintained the election of a general mass as Christians _on account of Christ alone_; adding that we are admitted into that number, or discarded from it, in the eye of Heaven, proportionably as we embrace or reject the salvation offered to all, embracing it with a faith inseparable from genuine virtue, or rejecting it by incredulity and crime. For neither in this, nor in the instance of justification, did they exclude repentance and a true conversion of the heart and life, as _necessary requisites_, but only as _meritorious causes_, from the contemplation of God’s omniscient intellect. Let those,” said Luther, who wish to be elected avoid an evil conscience, and not transgress the divine commandments.” Instructed then by the unerring page of truth, they asserted no other predestination than what is there expressly revealed; that of the good and gracious Father of mankind, who from eternity has been disposed to promote the happiness and welfare of all men, has destined Christ to be the Saviour of the whole world, and withholden from none the exalted hope of the Christian calling. Convinced that this is the only predestination which Christianity discloses, and consequently the only one which we can either with safety or certainty embrace, they discouraged every attempt at investigating the will, out of the word, of God; every attempt at effecting impossibilities, at unveiling the secret counsels of Him who shrouds his divine perfections in darkness impervious to mortal eyes. With such investigations, indeed, the world had already been sufficiently bewildered by the scholastics, who, endowed with a ready talent at perplexing what before was plain, and at rendering abstruseness still more abstruse, had made the subject totally inexplicable, vainly labouring to develope with precision that mysterious will upon which the wise must ever think it _folly_, and the good _impiety_, to speculate. Disquisitions of this presumptuous nature, from a personal experience of their mischievous tendency, Luther abjured himself, and deprecated in others. Are we, miserable men,” he exclaimed, “who as yet are incapable of comprehending the rays of God’s promises, the glimmerings of his precepts and his works, although confirmed by words and miracles, are we, infirm and impure, eager to comprehend all that is great and glorious in the solar light itself, in the incomprehensible light of a miraculous Godhead? Do we not know, that God dwells in splendour inaccessible? And yet do we approach, or rather do we presume to approach it? Are we not aware, that his judgments are inscrutable? And yet do we endeavour to scrutinize them? And these things we do, before we are habituated even to the faint lustre of his promises and precepts, with a vision still imperfect, blindly rushing into the majesty of that light which, secret and unseen, has never been by words or miracles exhibited. What wonder, then, if, while we explore its majesty, we are overwhelmed with its glory?” For a farther account of the Lutheran views on predestination, see the last pages of the article CALVINISM.

After this very ample exposition of the sentiments of the German reformers on the chief points of Christian doctrine, it is only necessary to give a few additional particulars in corroboration of some portions of the preceding statement. The high estimation in which Luther held the productions of the judicious Melancthon is apparent from a passage in the preface to the first volume of Luther’s works, dated 1545. In that year also appeared the last amended edition of Melancthon’s Common Places,” to which he alludes. Long and earnestly,” he says, have I resisted the importunity of those who have wished me to publish my works, or, to speak more correctly, my confused and disorderly lucubrations; not only because I was unwilling that the labours of the ancients should be turned aside by my novelties, and that the reader should be hindered from perusing them, but likewise because now, by the grace of God, a great number of methodical books are extant; among which the _Common Places_ of our Philip claim the preference, for by them a divine and a bishop may be abundantly and satisfactorily confirmed, so as to become powerful in the word of the doctrine of piety, especially when the Holy Bible itself can now be procured in almost every language. But the want of order in the matters to be discussed in my books induced, nay compelled, me to render them a sort of rude and indigested chaos, which it would now require even on my part no small exertion to digest into a methodical form. Under the influence of such motives as these, I was desirous that all my productions should be buried in perpetual oblivion, that they might give place to others of a better description.” In this preface Luther also gives the following testimony to the general usefulness of Melancthon’s labours: In the same year Philip Melancthon had been called to this university by Prince Frederick to fill the chair of Greek professor, but no doubt with the intention that I should have him as my colleague in the labours of the divinity professorship. For his works are sufficiently in proof of what the Lord hath effected by this his choice instrument, not only in polite literature, but in theology, although Satan be enraged and all his party.” Though the early opinions of Luther upon the doctrine of a philosophical necessity appear to have been occasionally expressed in a harsh and repulsive manner, yet his followers pertinaciously contend that even the harshest of them cannot, with propriety, be construed into a sense favourable to the Calvinistical system. Those of Melancthon in the first edition of his _Loci Theologici_, although occurring but in one or two instances, were nevertheless still more offensive, and less capable of a mitigated interpretation. So far indeed did he carry the doctrine of divine predetermination as to degrade man to a level with the brutes, as will be obvious from the following passage in the edition of 1525. Lastly, divine predestination takes away human liberty. For all things come to pass according to divine predestination, not only external works, but also internal thoughts in all creatures.” After the Diet of Augsburgh in 1530, we hear no more of this obnoxious tenet. Indeed so early as 1527 these reformers seem to have abandoned it. At least, when in that year a form of doctrine was drawn up for the churches of Saxony, free will in acts of morality was thus inculcated: The human will is so far free as to be able in some sort to perform the righteousness of the flesh, or civil justice, when it is obliged by the law and by force not to steal, not to kill, not to commit adultery, &c. Therefore let ministers teach, that it is in a measure in our own hands to restrain carnal affections, and to perform civil justice; and let them diligently exhort men to a strict and proper course of life, because God also requires this kind of righteousness, and will grievously punish those men who live so negligent of their duty. For as we are bound to make a good use of the other gifts of God, so is it likewise our duty to employ to good purpose those powers which God has bestowed on nature.” For God takes no delight in that ferocious mode of life which is adopted by some men, who, after having heard that we are not justified by our own powers and works, foolishly dream that they will wait until they be drawn by God, and in the mean time their course of life is most impure. Such persons God will most severely punish; and they must therefore be earnestly reprehended and admonished by those whose province it is to teach in the churches.” This work, which is generally termed, _Libellus Visitationis Saxonic_, was first composed in German by Melancthon in 1527, and afterward republished by Luther with a preface, in which he thus expresses himself: We do not publish these as rigorous precepts, nor do we again employ ourselves in drawing up pontifical decrees, but we relate matters of history and public deeds, and present the confession and symbol of our belief.” The previous controversy between Luther and Erasmus, on the topic of free will, had probably tended to produce an amelioration of the doctrinal system of the Lutheran church. In this view it was not without reason that Erasmus made the following reflections in a letter dated 1528, soon after he had seen this production: The Lutheran fever, every succeeding day, assumes a milder form; so that Luther himself now writes recantations on almost every thing, and on this account he is considered by the rest as a heretic and a madman.” Similar caustic remarks occur in other letters of Erasmus; and as, in those days of high religious excitement, taunts of this kind were considered too good to be confined as secrets within the breast of the correspondents to whom they were addressed, it is not improbable that Luther might be prevented through them, among other reasons, from making farther doctrinal concessions; it being no uncommon circumstance in the history of the human mind for persons of otherwise strong understandings to be under the influence of this pitiable weakness. That Melancthon not only abandoned but reprehended the doctrine in 1529, we cannot doubt, because his own express testimony in proof of it remains on record. In a letter to Christopher Stathmio, dated March 20th, 1559, which was not long before his death, he notices the subject in these words: Thirty years ago, not through the desire of contention, but on account of the glory of God, and for the sake of discipline, I sharply reprehended the Stoical paradoxes concerning necessity, because they are reproachful toward God and injurious to morals. At this time the legions of the Stoics are waging war against me; but in the answer which I have written in opposition to the Bavarian inquisition, I have once more pointed out in a modest manner that opinion (on fate or predestination) in which anxious minds may acquiesce and be at rest.” On consulting the tract to which his letter alludes, we find him employing this strong and unequivocal language: I also openly reject and abhor those Stoical and Manichean furies who affirm that all things _necessarily_ happen, evil as well as good actions. But concerning these I refrain at present from any lengthened discussion; only I entreat young people to avoid these monstrous opinions, which are contumelious against God, and pernicious to morals.” From the _Loci Theologici_, in which Melancthon had first introduced this obnoxious tenet, he expunged _necessity_ in the edition of 1533, and inserted in its place the opposite one of _contingency_. The following are extracts from this amended work: The discussion on _the cause of sin_ and that on _contingency_ have sometimes greatly agitated the church, and excited mighty tragedies. Men of acute minds collect multitudes of inextricable and absurd things about both these subjects. Because there is some danger in them, young people must be warned to abstain from these interminable disputes, and in preference to search out a simple and pious opinion, beneficial to religion and morals, in which they may abide, nor suffer themselves to be withdrawn from it by those fallacious tricks of disputations. But this is a pious and true sentiment to be embraced with both hands, and to be retained rather by the whole heart,--that God is not the cause of sin, and that he does not will sin. But the causes of sin are the will of the devil, and the will of man.” But this sentiment being once laid down, that God is not the cause of sin, it evidently follows that contingency must be granted. The freedom of the will is the cause of the contingency of our actions.” Neither must the delirious doatings about Stoical fate, or about necessity, be conveyed into the church, because they are inextricable and sometimes injurious to piety and morals.” From these opinions it becomes the pious to be abhorrent in their ears and in their hearts.” These extracts serve to prove, that Melancthon reprobated the idea of introducing into the church the doctrine of Stoical fate, before Calvin had distinguished himself either as an author or a reformer. Into his subsequent productions of almost every description Melancthon introduced the doctrine of contingency, and strenuously defended it, particularly in the amended edition of his _Loci Theologici_ in 1545. Luther never formally revoked any of his own writings; but on this last corrected production of his friend, as we have shown, he bestowed the highest commendations. Yet he did not scruple publicly to assert, that at the beginning of the Reformation he had not completely settled his creed. In the seventh volume of his works this sentence is found: I have also published the confession of my faith; in which I have openly testified what and how I believe, and in what articles I think myself at length to be at rest.” He seems, indeed, to have generally avoided the subject, from the period of his controversy with Erasmus, to the publication of his Commentary on Genesis,--his last work of any importance. But in this, after a long argument to prove that, as we have no knowledge of the unrevealed Deity, we have nothing to do with those things which are above our comprehension; and that we are not to reason upon predestination out of Christianity; he thus apologizes for his former opinions: “It has been my wish diligently and accurately to deliver these charges and admonitions; because, after my death, many persons will publish my books to the world, and by that course will confirm errors of every kind and their own delirious ravings. But among other matters I have written, that all things are absolute and necessary; but at the same time I added, that we must behold God as he is revealed to us, as we sing in the Psalm, ‘Jesus Christ is the Lord of sabaoth, nor is there any other God.’ In several other passages I have used similar expressions. But these people will pass by all such passages, and will only seize upon those concerning a hidden Deity. You, therefore, who now hear me, recollect that I have taught this,--We must not inquire concerning the predestination of a hidden God, but we must abide and acquiesce in those things which are revealed by calling and by the ministry of the word.” But in other passages of my different works I have inculcated the same sentiments, and I now deliver them again with an audible voice; therefore I am excused.” For the more modern state of the Lutheran church see NEOLOGY.

The following account of the union between the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches, as given in the advertisement to Baron Von Wessenberg’s Correspondence with the Court of Rome,” may not be uninteresting to the reader: The Germans have just set the noble example of forming a union between these two branches of the Protestant faith. This union, which originated, we believe, in the grand duchy of Nassau, has taken place almost universally throughout Germany; and the separate appellations of Lutheran and Calvinistic churches have merged in the common appellation of the Evangelical church. The Lutheran and Reformed churches of Prussia met in synod together, on the invitation of their monarch, the first of October, 1817, and soon came to an agreement; and the union was celebrated on the day of the tri-centenary festival of the Reformation. A similar synod of the Lutherans and Calvinists in Hesse-Cassel was held at Hanau in May and June, 1818, and attended with the same result. The royal confirmation was given to the Bavarian union on the first of October following. Saxe-Weimar, and most of the other small states have followed this example. The Protestant Germans have now, therefore, only one Gospel, one temple, one divine Instructer, and one mode of communion; and, what is singular, and highly honourable to their liberality, this union was every where accomplished with the greatest ease, and without a dissentient voice having been raised against it.” How different was this result from that of the synods and councils of other times; and what a change in the state of public opinion does it indicate! And yet it is to be feared that the _liberality_ from which this union has resulted, is rather indifference to the grand peculiarities of the Christian faith than mutual charity.

LYCAONIA, a province of Asia Minor, accounted a part of Cappadocia, having Pisidia on the west, and Cilicia on the south. In it were the cities of Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe, mentioned in the travels of St. Paul. The former was the capital, and the country itself at that time a Roman province. The speech of Lycaonia,” mentioned Acts xiv, 11, is supposed to have been a corrupt Greek, intermingled with many oriental words.

LYCIA, a country of Asia Minor, having Phrygia on the north, Pamphylia on the east, the Mediterranean on the south, and Caria on the west. The greatest part of the country, however, is a peninsula projecting into the Mediterranean. Lycia derived its name from Lycus, the son of Pandion, who settled here. It was conquered by Crœsus, king of Lydia, and passed with his kingdom into the hands of the Persians. It afterward, in common with the neighbouring countries of Asia Minor, formed part of the Macedonian empire, under Alexander; then of that of the Seleucidæ, his successors in those countries; and, at the time of the Apostles, was reduced to the state of a Roman province.

LYDDA, by the Greeks called Diospolis. It lay in the way from Jerusalem to Cæsarea, four or five leagues to the east of Joppa. Lydda belonged to the tribe of Ephraim. It seems to have been inhabited by the Benjamites, at the return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity, Neh. xi, 35. St. Peter coming to Lydda, cured a sick man of the palsy named Eneas, Acts ix, 33, 34.

LYDIA, a woman of Thyatira, a seller of purple, who dwelt in the city of Philippi, in Macedonia. She was converted to the faith by St. Paul, and both she and her family were baptized. She offered her house to the Apostle, and pressed him to abide there so earnestly, that he yielded to her entreaties. She was not a Jewess by birth, but a proselyte, Acts xvi, 14, 15, 40.

2. LYDIA, an ancient celebrated kingdom of Asia Minor, which, in the time of the Apostles, was reduced to a Roman province. Sardis was the capital.

LYSTRA, a city of Lycaonia, the native place of Timothy. The Apostle Paul and Barnabas having preached here, and healed a cripple, were taken for gods. But so fickle are human praise and popular encomiums, that, in the space of a few hours, those who had been deemed gods were regarded as less than mortals, and were stoned by the very persons who so lately deified them. See Acts xiv.

MAACAH, or BETH-MAACHA, a little province of Syria to the east and the north of the sources of the river Jordan, upon the road to Damascus. Abel or Abela was in this country, whence it was called Abelbeth-Maachah. We learn from Joshua xiii, 13, that the Israelites did not destroy the Maachathites, but permitted them to dwell in the land among them. The distribution of the half tribe of Manasseh, beyond Jordan, extended as far as this country, Deut. iii, 14; Joshua xii, 5.

MACCABEES, two apocryphal books of Scripture, containing the history of Judas and his brothers, and their wars against the Syrian kings in defence of their religion and liberties, so called from Judas, the son of Mattathias, surnamed Maccabæus, as some authors say, from the word מכבי, formed of the initials of מי-כמכה באלים יהוה, Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods?” Exod. xv, 11, which was the motto of his standard; whence those who fought under his standard were called Maccabees, and the name was generally applied to all who suffered in the cause of true religion, under the Egyptian or Syrian kings. This name, formed by abbreviation according to the common practice of the Jews, distinguished Judas Maccabæus by way of eminence, as he succeeded his father, B. C. 166, in the command of those forces which he had with him at his death; and, being joined by his brothers, and all others that were zealous for the law, he erected his standard, on which he inscribed the above mentioned motto. Those, also, who suffered under Ptolemy Philopater of Alexandria, fifty years before this period, were afterward called Maccabees; and so were Eleazar, and the mother and her seven sons, though they suffered before Judas erected his standard with the motto from which the appellation originated. And therefore, as these books which contain the history of Judas and his brothers, and their wars against the Syrian kings, in defence of their religion and liberties, are called the first and second books of the Maccabees; so that book which gives us the history of those who, in the like cause, under Ptolemy Philopater, were exposed to his elephants at Alexandria, is called the third book of the Maccabees; and that which is written by Josephus, of the martyrdom of Eleazar, and the seven brothers and their mother, is called the fourth book of the Maccabees.

The first book of the Maccabees is an excellent history, and comes nearest to the style and manner of the sacred historians of any extant. It was written originally in the Chaldee language, of the Jerusalem dialect, and was extant in this language in the time of Jerom, who bad seen it. From the Chaldee it was translated into Greek, from the Greek into Latin. Theodotion is conjectured to have translated it into Greek; but this version was probably more ancient, as we may infer from its use by ancient authors, as Tertullian, Origen, and others. It is supposed to have been written by John Hyrcanus, the son of Simon, who was prince and high priest of the Jews near thirty years, and began his government at the time where this history ends. It contains the history of forty years, from the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes to the death of Simon, the high priest; that is, from the year of the world 3829 to the year 3869, B. C. 131. The second book of the Maccabees begins with two epistles sent from the Jews of Jerusalem to the Jews of Egypt and Alexandria, to exhort them to observe the feast of the dedication of the new altar erected by Judas, on his purifying the temple. The first was written in the 169th year of the era of the Seleucidæ, that is, B. C. 144; and the second, in the 188th year of the same era, or B. C. 125; and both appear to be spurious. After these epistles follows the preface of the author to his history, which is an abridgment of a larger work, composed by one Jason, a Jew of Cyrene, who wrote in Greek the history of Judas Maccabæus, and his brethren, and the wars against Antiochus Epiphanes, and Eupator his son. The two last chapters contain events under the reign of Demetrius Soter, the successor of Antiochus Eupator, and contain such varieties in their style, as render it doubtful whether they had the same author as the rest of the work. This second book does not by any means equal the accuracy and excellency of the first. It contains a history of about fifteen years, from the execution of Heliodorus’s commission, who was sent by Seleucus to fetch away the treasures of the temple, to the victory obtained by Judas Maccabæus over Nicanor; that is, from the year of the world 3828 to the year 3843, B. C. 157.

There are in the Polyglott Bibles, both of Paris and London, Syriac versions of both these books; but they, as well as the English versions which we have among the apocryphal writers in our Bibles, are derived from the Greek. For a farther account of Judas Maccabæus, and of his brothers, whose history is recorded in the first and second books of the Maccabees, and also by Josephus, we refer to the article JEWS. The third book of the Maccabees contains the history of the persecution of Ptolemy Philopater against the Jews in Egypt, and their sufferings under it; and seems to have been written by some Alexandrian Jew in the Greek language, not long after the time of Siracides. This book, with regard to its subject, ought to be called the first, as the things which are related in it occurred before the Maccabees, whose history is recorded in the first and second books; but as it is of less authority and repute than the other two, it is reckoned after them. It is extant in Syriac, though the translator did not seem to have well understood the Greek language. It is in most of the ancient manuscript copies of the Greek Septuagint, particularly in the Alexandrian and Vatican, but was never inserted into the vulgar Latin version of the Bible, nor, consequently, into any of our English copies. The first authentic mention we have of this book is in Eusebius’s _Chronicon_.” It is also named with two other books of the Maccabees in the eighty-fifth of the apostolic canons. But it is uncertain when that canon was added. Grotius thinks that this book was written after the two first books, and shortly after the book of Ecclesiasticus, from which circumstance it was called the third book of Maccabees. Moreover, Josephus’s history of the martyrs that suffered under Antiochus Epiphanes, is found in some manuscript Greek Bibles, under the name of the fourth book of the Maccabees. This book, ascribed to Josephus, occurs under the title, Concerning the Empire or Government of Reason;” but learned men have expressed a doubt whether this was the book known to the ancients as the fourth book of the Maccabees.

MACEDONIA, a kingdom of Greece, having Thrace to the north, Thessaly south, Epirus west, and the Ægean Sea east. Alexander the Great, son of Philip, king of Macedonia, having conquered Asia, and subverted the Persian empire, the name of the Macedonians became very famous throughout the east; and it is often given to the Greeks, the successors of Alexander in the monarchy. In like manner, the name of Greeks is often put for Macedonians, 2 Maccabees iv, 36. When the Roman empire was divided, Macedonia fell to the share of the emperor of the east. After it had long continued subject to the Romans, it fell under the power of the Ottoman Turks, who are the present masters of it.

St. Paul was invited by an angel of the Lord, who appeared to him at Troas, to come and preach the Gospel in Macedonia, Acts xvi, 9. After this vision, the Apostle no longer doubted his divine call to preach the Gospel in Macedonia; and the success that attended his ministry confirmed him in his persuasion. Here he laid the foundation of the churches of Thessalonica and Philippi.

MAGDALA, a city on the west side of the sea of Galilee, near Dalmanutha; Jesus, after the miracle of the seven loaves, being said by St. Matthew to have gone by ship to the coasts of Magdala, Matt. xv, 39; and by St. Mark, to the parts of Dalmanutha,” Mark viii, 10. Mr. Buckingham came to a small village in this situation called Migdal, close to the edge of the lake, beneath a range of high cliffs, in which small grottoes are seen, with the remains of an old square tower, and some larger buildings, of rude construction, apparently of great antiquity. Migdol implies a tower, or fortress; and this place, from having this name particularly applied to it, was doubtless, like the Egyptian Migdol, one of considerable importance; and may be considered as the site of the Migdal of the Naphtalites, as well as the Magdala of the New Testament.

MAGI, or MAGIANS, a title which the ancient Persians gave to their wise men, or philosophers. Magi, among the Persians, answers to σόφοι, or φιλόσοφοι, among the Greeks; _sapientes_, among the Latins; druids, among the Gauls; gymnosophists, among the Indians; and priests, among the Egyptians.