Chapter XCIV: Part 94

It is to be observed, however, that although bishops and presbyters were the same when the epistles of the New Testament were written, it would be going too far to contend that no departure from this should ever take place; because, to justify such a position, it would be requisite that a positive injunction should have been given that equality must at all times be carefully preserved. There is, however, no such injunction. Unlike the Old Testament, which specified every thing, even the most minute, in relation to the priesthood, the New only alludes in general terms, and very seldom, to the ministry; and the reason probably is, that, being intended for all nations, it left Christians at liberty to make such modifications in the ecclesiastical constitution as in their peculiar situation appeared best adapted for religious edification. The simple test to be applied to the varying or varied forms of church government is that indicated by our Lord himself: By their fruits ye shall know them.” Wherever the regulations respecting the ministry are such as to divert it from the purposes for which it was destined, to separate those who form it from the flock of Christ, to relax their diligence in teaching, and to destroy the connection between them and their people, so as to render their exertions of little or of no use, there we find a church not apostolical. But wherever the blessed fruits of Gospel teaching are in abundance produced, where the people and the ministers are cordially united, and where every regulation is calculated to give efficacy to the labours of those who have entered into the vineyard, we have an apostolical church, or, to speak more properly, a church of Christ, built upon a rock, because devoted to the beneficent objects for which our Saviour came into the world.

The form of church government among the Scotch Presbyterians is as follows:--The kirk session, consisting of the minister and lay elders of the congregation, is the lowest ecclesiastical judicature. The next is the presbytery, which consists of all the pastors within a certain district, and one ruling elder from each parish. The provincial synods, of which there are fifteen, meet twice in the year, and are composed of the members of the several presbyteries within the respective provinces. From the kirk sessions appeal lies to the presbyteries, from these to the synods, and from them to the general assembly, which meets annually, and is the highest ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom. This is composed of delegates from each presbytery, from every royal borough, and from each of the Scotch universities; and the king presides by a commission of his own appointment. The Scotch ordain by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery,” before which persons may be licensed to preach as probationers, but cannot administer the sacraments. The clergy are maintained by the state, and nominated to livings by patrons, as in other establishments. Those properly called the English Presbyterians, have no connection with the Scotch kirk. They are now indeed broken into separate churches, and follow the same form of church government as the Congregationalists or Independents. The name Presbyterian, therefore, is now inapplicable to them although retained. So Dr. Doddridge: Those who hold every pastor to be so a bishop or overseer of his own congregation, as that no other person or body of men have, by divine institution, a power to exercise any superior or pastoral office in it, may, properly speaking, be called, so far at least, congregational; and it is by a vulgar mistake that any such are called Presbyterians.” See EPISCOPALIANS.

PRESCIENCE, or foreknowledge, an attribute of God. (See _Omniscience_.) On this subject three leading theories have been resorted to, in order to evade the difficulties which are supposed to be involved in the opinion commonly received. The Chevalier Ramsay, among his other speculations, holds it a matter of choice in God, to think of finite ideas; and similar opinions, though variously worded, have been occasionally adopted. In substance these opinions are, that though the knowledge of God be infinite as his power is infinite, there is no more reason to conclude, that his knowledge should be always exerted to the full extent of its capacity, than that his power should be employed to the extent of his omnipotence; and that if we suppose him to _choose_ not to know some contingencies, the infiniteness of his knowledge is not thereby impugned. To this it may be answered, that the infinite power of God is in Scripture represented, as in the nature of things it must be, as an infinite capacity, and not as infinite in act; but that the knowledge of God is on the contrary never represented there to us as a capacity to acquire knowledge, but as actually comprehending all things that are, and all things that can be. 2. That the notion of God’s choosing to know some things, and not to know others, supposes a reason why he refuses to know any class of things or events; which reason, it would seem, can only arise out of their nature and circumstances, and therefore supposes at least a partial knowledge of them, from which the reason for his not choosing to know them arises. The doctrine is therefore somewhat contradictory. But, 3. It is fatal to this opinion that it does not at all meet the difficulty arising out of the question of the consistency of divine prescience, and the free actions of men; since some contingent actions, for which men have been made accountable, we are sure, have been foreknown by God, because by his Spirit in the prophets they were foretold; and if the freedom of man can in these cases be reconciled to the prescience of God, there is no greater difficulty in any other case which can possibly occur.

A second theory is, that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it does no dishonour to the divine Being to affirm, that of such events he has, and can have, no prescience whatever; and thus the prescience of God, as to moral actions, being wholly denied, the difficulty in question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the former. It does not meet the case, so long as the Scriptures are allowed to contain prophecies of rewardable and punishable actions. The great fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate, that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of meaning. If, however, the term _contingent_ in this controversy has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results from the choice of the agent, is distinguished from a necessary one in this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this specific quality of a free action, that the term contingency is used; it might have been otherwise, in other words, it was not necessitated. Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is, whether they _will_ happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether free or constrained, whether they _must_ happen or not. Those who advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why they object to a certain prescience of moral actions, is this,--they conclude, that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen or not. If contingency meant _uncertainty_, the sense in which such theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with exerted power: for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the act is controlled by the knowledge; and the action, though foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge. But here it is said, If the result of an absolute contingency be certainly foreknown, it _can_ have no other result, it _cannot_ happen otherwise.” This is not the true inference. It _will_ not happen otherwise; but it may be asked, Why _can_ it not happen otherwise? _Can_ is an expression of potentiality, it denotes power or possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from the necessitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the action which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise, nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in that case, must be uncertain.” Not unless any person can prove, that the divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and haltings of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us,” but it is the knowledge of Him who understandeth the thoughts of man afar off.” “But if a contingency _will_ have a given result, to that result it _must_ be determined.” Not in the least. We have seen that it cannot be determined to a given result by mere precognition; for we have evidence in our own minds that mere knowledge is not causal to the actions of another. It is determined to its result by the will of the agent; but even in that case, it cannot be said, that it _must_ be determined to that result, because it is of the nature of freedom to be unconstrained: so that here we have an instance in the case of a free agent that he _will_ act in some particular manner; but it by no means follows from what _will_ be, whether foreseen or not, that it _must_ be.

The third theory amounts, in brief, to this, that the foreknowledge of God must be supposed to differ so much from any thing of the kind which we perceive in ourselves, and from any ideas which we can possibly form of that property of the divine nature, that no argument respecting it can be grounded upon our imperfect notions; and that all controversy on subjects connected with it, is idle and fruitless. But though foreknowledge in God should be admitted to be something of a very different nature” to the same quality in man, yet as it is represented as _something_ equivalent to foreknowledge, whatever that something may be, since in consequence of it, prophecies have actually been uttered and fulfilled, and of such a kind, too, as relate to actions for which men have in fact been held accountable; all the original difficulty of reconciling contingent events to this something, of which human foreknowledge is a kind of shadow,” as a map of China is to China itself,” remains in full force. The difficulty is shifted, but not removed. It may, therefore, be certainly concluded, if at least the Holy Scriptures are to be our guide, that the omniscience of God comprehends his certain prescience of all events however contingent; and if any thing more were necessary to strengthen the argument above given, it might be drawn from the irrational, and, above all, the unscriptural consequences, which would follow from the denial of this doctrine. These are forcibly stated by President Edwards:--“It would follow from this notion, (namely, that the Almighty doth not foreknow what will be the result of future contingencies,) that as God is liable to be continually repenting what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and intentions as to his future conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, namely, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral agents: he must be a Being who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation he must have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see afterward, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually to change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion.”

Socinus and his early followers would not allow that God possesses any knowledge of future contingencies. The schoolmen, in reference to this species of knowledge in God, invented that called _scientia media_, and which they define as that by which God knows _sub conditione_, what men or angels will do according to the liberty which they have, when they are placed in these or those circumstances, or in this or in that order of things.” When Gomarus, the opponent of Arminius, found that his opinion concerning the object of reprobation was clogged with this absurdity--that it made God to be the author of Adam’s sin, he very astutely took refuge in this conditionate foreknowledge, and, in his corrected theses on predestination, published after the death of Arminius, he describes it as that by which God, through the infinite light of his own knowledge, foreknows some future things, not absolutely, but as placed under a certain condition.” Walæus, the celebrated antagonist of Episcopius, had recourse to the same expedient. This distinction has been adopted by very few of those who espouse the doctrines of general redemption; and who believe that every event, how contingent soever to the creature, is, with respect to God, certainly foreknown. An old English divine thinks, that, “in the sacred Scriptures certain not obscure vestiges are apparent of this kind of knowledge, of things that will happen thus or otherwise, on the supposition of the occurrence of this or that circumstance. Omitting the well known example of David in Keilah, 1 Sam. xxii, 12, and of Chorazin and Bethsaida, Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13, consult, among other sayings of the same description, the answer of our Saviour to the chief priests and scribes, who had asked, ‘Art thou the Christ? Tell us.’ And he said unto them, ‘If I tell you, ye will not believe.’ In the subsequent verse he adds, ‘If I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor let me go,’ Luke xxii, 67, 68. You have here three events specified, which yet will not occur even on the supposition of Christ our Lord himself.” This kind of knowledge might very well be included in that of _scientia visionis_, because the latter ought to include, not what God will do and what his creatures will do under his appointment, but what they will do by his permission as free agents, and what he will do, as a consequence of this, in his character of Governor and Lord. But since the predestinarians had confounded _scientia visionis_ with a predestinating decree, the _scientia media_ well expressed what they had left quite unaccounted for, and which they had assumed did not really exist,--the actions of creatures endowed with free will, and the acts of Deity which from eternity were consequent upon them. If such actions do not take place, then men are not free; and if the rectoral acts of God are not consequent upon the actions of the creature in the order of the divine intention, and the conduct of the creature is consequent upon the foreordained rectoral acts of God, then we reach a necessitating eternal decree, which in fact, the predestinarian contends for; but it unfortunately brings after it consequences which no subtleties have ever been able to shake off,--that the only _actor_ in the universe is God himself; and that the only distinction among events is, that one class is brought to pass by God directly, and the other indirectly, not by the agency, but by the mere instrumentality, of his creatures.

PRIEST, a general name for the minister of religion. The priest under the law was, among the Hebrews, a person consecrated and ordained of God to offer up sacrifices for his own sins and those of the people, Lev. iv, 5, 6. The priesthood was not annexed to a certain family till after the promulgation of the law of Moses. Before that time the first-born of every family, the fathers, the princes, the kings were priests. Cain and Abel, Noah, Abraham, Job, Abimelech and Laban, Isaac and Jacob, offered themselves their own sacrifices. In the solemnity of the covenant that the Lord made with his people at the foot of Mount Sinai, Moses performed the office of mediator, Exod. xxiv, 5, 6; and young men were chosen from among the children of Israel to perform the office of priests. But after the Lord had chosen the tribe of Levi to serve him in his tabernacle, and the priesthood was annexed to the family of Aaron, then the right of offering sacrifices to God was reserved to the priests alone of this family. The Lord ordained, Num. xvi, 40, that no stranger, which was not of the seed of Aaron, should come near to offer incense unto the Lord, that he might not be as Korah and his company. The punishment of Uzziah is well known, 2 Chron. xxvi, 19, who, having presumed to offer incense to the Lord, was suddenly smitten with a leprosy, put out of his palace, and excluded from the administration of affairs to the day of his death. However, it seems that, on certain occasions, the judges and the kings of the Hebrews offered sacrifices unto the Lord, especially before a constant place of worship was fixed at Jerusalem; for in 1 Sam. vii, 8, we are told that Samuel, who was no priest, offered a lamb for a burnt-sacrifice to the Lord; and in 1 Sam. ix, 13, it is said that this prophet was to bless the offering of the people, which should seem to be a function appropriated to the priests; lastly, 1 Sam. xvi, 5, he goes to Bethlehem, where he offers a sacrifice at the inauguration or anointing of David. Saul himself offered a burnt-offering to the Lord, perhaps as being king of Israel, 1 Sam. xiii, 9, 10. Elijah also offered a burnt-offering upon Mount Carmel, 1 Kings xviii, 33. David himself sacrificed, (at least the text expresses it so,) at the ceremony of bringing the ark to Jerusalem, and at the floor of Araunah, 2 Sam. vi, 13. Solomon went up to the brazen altar that was at Gibeon, and there offered sacrifices, 2 Chron. i, 5. It is true the above passages are commonly explained by supposing that these princes offered their sacrifices by the hands of the priests; but the sacred text will by no means favour such explanations; and it is very natural to imagine, that in the quality of kings and heads of the people, they had the privilege of performing some sacerdotal functions, upon some extraordinary occasions; thus we see David clothed with the priestly ephod, and consulting the Lord; and upon another occasion we find David and Solomon pronounce solemn benedictions on the people, 2 Sam. vi, 18; 1 Kings viii, 55. God having reserved to himself the first-born of all Israel, because he had preserved them from the hand of the destroying angel in Egypt, by way of exchange or compensation accepted of the tribe of Levi for the service of the tabernacle, Numbers iii, 41. Of the three sons of Levi, Gershon, Kohath, and Merari, the Lord chose the family of Kohath, and out of this the house of Aaron, to exercise the functions of the priesthood. All the rest of the family of Kohath, even the children of Moses and their descendants, remained of the order of mere Levites. See LEVITES.

The posterity of the sons of Aaron, namely, Eleazar and Ithamar, Lev. x, 1–5; 1 Chron. xxiv, 1, 2, had so increased in number in the time of David, that they were divided into twenty-four classes, which officiated a week at a time alternately. Sixteen classes were of the family of Eleazar, and eight of the family of Ithamar. Each class obeyed its own prefect or ruler. The class _Jojarib_ was the first in order, and the class _Abia_ was the eighth, 1 Mac. ii, 1; Luke i, 5; 1 Chron. xxiv, 3–19. This division of the priesthood was continued as a permanent arrangement after the time of David, 2 Chron. viii, 14; xxxi, 2; xxxv, 4, 5. Indeed, although only four classes returned from the captivity, the distinction between them, and also the ancient names, were still retained, Ezra ii, 36–39; Neh. vii, 39–42; xii, 1.

Aaron, the high priest was set apart to his office by the same ceremonies with which his sons the priests were, with this exception, that the former was clothed in his robes, and the sacred oil was poured upon his head, Exod. xxix, 5–9; Lev. viii, 2. The other ceremonies were as follows. The priests, all of them with their bodies washed, and clad in their appropriate dress, assembled before the altar, where a bullock, two rams, unleavened bread, and wafers of two kinds in baskets, were in readiness. When they had placed their hands upon the head of the bullock, he was slain by Moses as a sin-offering. He touched the horns of the altar with the blood, poured the remainder of it round its base, and placed the parts which were to compose the sacrifice on its top. The remaining parts of the animal were all burned without the camp, Exod. xxix, 10–14; Lev. viii, 2, 3, 14–17. They in like manner placed their hands on the head of one of the rams, which was also slain by Moses for a whole burnt-offering, the blood was sprinkled around the altar, and the parts of the ram were separated and burned upon it, Exod. xxix, 15–18; Lev. viii, 18–21. The other ram, when the priests had laid their hands upon him, was likewise slain by Moses for the sacrifice of consecration. He touched with the blood the tip of the right ear of the priests, the thumb of the right hand, and the great toe of the right foot. The rest of the blood he sprinkled in part upon the bottom of the altar, and a part he mingled with the consecrated oil, and sprinkled on the priests and their garments. He anointed the high priest by pouring a profusion of oil upon his head; whence he is called the anointed, Lev. v, 3, 5, 16; vi, 15; Psalm cxxxiii, 2. Certain parts of the sacrifice, namely, the fat, the kidneys, the haunches, the caul above the liver, and the right shoulder, also one cake of unleavened bread, a cake of oiled bread, and a wafer, were placed by Moses upon the hands of the priests, that they might offer them to God. This ceremony was called “filling the hands,” expressions which accordingly in a number of passages mean the same as consecrating, Exod. xxxii, 29; Leviticus xvi, 32; 1 Chronicles xxix, 5. All the parts which have been mentioned as being placed in the hands of the priests, were at last burned upon the altar. This ceremony, which continued for eight days, for ever separated the priests from all the other Israelites, not excepting the Levites; so that there was subsequently no need of any farther consecration, neither for themselves nor their posterity, Exodus xxix, 35–37; Lev. x, 7; Rom. i, 1; Eph. iii, 3; Acts xiii, 2, 3. That the ceremonies of inauguration or consecration, however, were practised at every new accession of a high priest to his office, seems to be hinted in the following passages, Exod. xxix, 29; Lev. xvi, 32; xxi, 10; Num. xx, 26–28; xxxv, 25.

It was not customary for the priests to wear the sacerdotal dress except when performing their official duties, Exod. xxviii, 4, 43; Ezek. xlii, 14; xliv, 19. The description of the dress of the priests which is given in Exodus xxviii, is by some thought defective, as many things are passed in silence, apparently for the reason that they were at that time sufficiently well known, without being expressly stated. Some additional information is communicated to us by Josephus; but the dress of the priests, as he describes it, may have been in some respects of recent origin. It was as follows: 1. A sort of hose, made of cotton or linen, which was fastened round the loins, and extended down so as to cover the thighs, Lev. vi, 10; Ezek. xliv, 18. 2. A tunic of cotton which extended, in the days of Josephus, down to the ankles. It was furnished with sleeves, and was fabricated all of one piece without being sewn, Exod. xxviii, 39, 41; xxix, 5; John xix, 23. 3. The girdle. According to Josephus it was a hand’s breadth in width, woven in such a manner as to exhibit the appearance of scales, and ornamented with embroidered flowers in purple, dark blue, scarlet, and white. It was worn a little below the breast, encircled the body twice, and was tied in a knot before. The extremities of the girdle hung down nearly to the ankle. The priest, when engaged in his sacred functions, in order to prevent his being impeded by them, threw them over his left shoulder, Exod. xxxix, 27–29. 4. The mitre or turban was originally acuminated in its shape, was lofty, and was bound upon the head, Exod. xxviii, 8, 40; xxix, 9; Lev. viii, 13. In the time of Josephus the shape of the mitre had become somewhat altered; it was circular, was covered with a piece of fine linen, and sat so closely on the upper part of the head, (for it did not cover the whole of the head,) that it would not fall off when the body was bent down. The Hebrew priests, like those of Egypt and other nations, performed their sacred duties with naked feet; a symbol of reverence and veneration, Exod. iii, 5; Josh. v, 15.

The ordinary priests served immediately at the altar, offered sacrifices, killed and flayed them, and poured the blood at the foot of the altar, 2 Chron. xxix, 34; xxxv, 11. They kept a perpetual fire burning upon the altar of burnt-sacrifices, and in the lamps of the golden candlestick that was in the sanctuary; they prepared the loaves of shew bread, baked them, and changed them every Sabbath day. Every day, night, and morning, a priest appointed by casting lots at the beginning of the week, brought into the sanctuary a smoking censer, and set it upon the golden table, otherwise called the altar of perfumes, Luke i, 9. The priests were not suffered to offer incense to the Lord with strange fire, Lev. x, 1, 2; that is, with any other fire than what should be taken from the altar of burnt-sacrifices. It is well known with what severity God chastised Nadab and Abihu for having failed in this. Those that would dedicate themselves to perpetual service in the temple were well received, and were maintained by the constant and daily offerings, Deut. xviii, 6–8. The Lord had given no lands of inheritance to the tribe of Levi in the distribution of the land of promise. He designed that they should be supported by the tithes, the first fruits, the offerings that were made in the temple, by their share of the sin-offerings, and thanksgiving-offerings that were sacrificed in the temple, of which certain parts were appropriated to the priests. They had also a share in the wool when the sheep were shorn. All the first-born, both of man and beast, belonged to the Lord, that is, to his priests. The men were redeemed for the sum of five shekels, Num. xviii, 15, 16. The first-born of impure animals were redeemed or exchanged, but the clean animals were not redeemed; they were sacrificed to the Lord, their blood was sprinkled about the altar, and all the rest belonged to the priest, Num. xviii, 17–19. The first fruits of trees, Lev. xix, 23, 24, that is, those that came on the fourth year, belonged also to the priest. They gave also to the priests and Levites an allowance out of the dough that they kneaded. They had the tithe of all the fruits of the land, and of all animals which were fed under the shepherd’s crook, Lev. xxvii, 31, 32. God also provided them with houses and accommodations, by appointing them forty-eight cities for their habitations, Num. xxxv, 1–3. In the precincts of these cities they possessed as far as a thousand cubits beyond the walls. Of these forty-eight cities six were appointed to be cities of refuge, for the sake of those who should commit any casual or involuntary manslaughter; the priests had thirteen of these for their share, and all the others belonged to the Levites, Josh. xxi, 19. One of the chief employments of the priests, next to attending upon the sacrifices and the service of the tabernacle or temple, was the instruction of the people and the deciding controversies, distinguishing the several sorts of leprosy, the causes of divorce, the waters of jealousy, vows, all causes relating to the law, the uncleannesses that were contracted several ways; all these things were brought before the priests, Hosea iv, 6; Mal. ii, 7, &c; Lev. xiii, 14; Num. v, 14, 15. They publicly blessed the people in the name of the Lord. In time of war their business was to carry the ark of the covenant, to consult the Lord, to sound the holy trumpets, and encourage and harangue the army.

The term priest is most properly given to Christ, of whom the high priests under the law were types and figures, he being the high priest especially ordained of God, who, by the sacrifice of himself, and by his intercession, opens the way to reconciliation with God, Heb. viii, 17; ix, 11–25. The word is also applied to every true believer who is enabled to offer up himself “a spiritual sacrifice acceptable to God through Christ,” 1 Pet. ii, 5; Rev. i, 6. But it is likewise improperly applied to Christian ministers, who have no sacrifices to offer; unless, indeed, when it is considered as contracted from _presbyter_, which signifies an elder, and is the name given in the New Testament to those who were appointed to the office of teaching and ruling in the church of God. See AARON.

PRISCILLA, a Christian woman, well known in the Acts, and in St. Paul’s epistles; sometimes placed before her husband Aquila. From Ephesus this pious pair went to Rome, where they were when St. Paul wrote his epistle to the Romans, A. D. 58. He salutes them the first of all, with great commendations, Rom. xvi, 3. They returned into Asia some time afterward; and St. Paul, writing to Timothy, desires him to salute them on his behalf, 2 Tim. iv, 19, A. D. 65.

PROFANE, an epithet applied to those who abuse and contemn holy things. The Scripture calls Esau profane, because he sold his birthright, which was considered a holy thing, not only because the priesthood was annexed to it, but also because it was a privilege relating to Christ, and a type of the title of believers to the heavenly inheritance, Heb. xii, 16. The priests of the race of Aaron were enjoined to distinguish between sacred and profane, between pure and polluted, Lev. x, 10; xix, 7, 8. Hence they were prohibited the use of wine during their attendance on the temple service, that their spirits might not be discomposed by excitement. To profane the temple, to profane the Sabbath, to profane the altar, are common expressions to denote the violation of the rest of the Sabbath, the entering of foreigners into the temple, or the want of reverence in those that entered it, and the impious sacrifices that were offered on the altar of the Lord.

PROMISE, an assurance given by God, in his word, of bestowing blessings upon his people, 2 Pet. i, 4. The word in the New Testament is usually taken for the promises that God heretofore made to Abraham, and the other patriarchs, of sending the Messiah, and conferring his Holy Spirit and eternal life on those that should believe on him. It is in this sense that the Apostle Paul commonly uses the word promise, Rom. iv, 13, 14; Gal. iii, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 29. The promises of the new covenant are called better than those of the old, Heb. viii, 6, because they are more spiritual, clear, comprehensive, and universal than those of the Mosaic covenant. The time of the promise, Acts vii, 17, is the time of fulfilling the promise. The “children of the promise” are, 1. The Israelites descended from Isaac, in opposition to the Ishmaelites descended from Ishmael and Hagar. 2. The Jews converted to Christianity, in opposition to the obstinate Jews, who would not believe in Christ. 3. All true believers who are born again by the supernatural power of God, and who by faith lay hold on the promise of salvation in Jesus Christ.

PROPHECY, the prediction of future events; it is especially understood of those predictions which are contained in the Holy Scriptures; all of which claim divine inspiration, and by their wonderful fulfilment are proved to have proceeded from God, who only with certainty can know the future. Prophecy is one great branch of the external evidence of the truth of the Scriptures; and the nature and force of this kind of evidence may here be properly pointed out. No argument _à priori_ against the possibility of prophecy can be attempted by any one who believes in the existence and infinitely perfect nature of God. The infidel author of “The Moral Philosopher,” indeed, rather insinuates than attempts fully to establish a dilemma with which to perplex those who regard prophecy as one of the proofs of a divine revelation. He thinks that either prophecy must respect events necessary, as depending upon necessary causes, which might be certainly foreknown and predicted; or that, if human actions are free, and effects contingent, the possibility of prophecy must be given up, as it implies foreknowledge, which, if granted, would render them necessary. The first part of this objection might be allowed, were there no predictions to be adduced in favour of a professed revelation, except such as related to events which human experience has taught to be dependent upon some cause, the existence and necessary operation of which are within the compass of human knowledge. But to foretel such events would not be to prophesy, any more than to say that it will be light to-morrow at noon, or that on a certain day and hour next year there will occur an eclipse of the sun or moon, when that event has been previously ascertained by astronomical calculation. If, however, it were allowed that all events depended upon a chain of necessary causes, yet, in a variety of instances, the argument from prophecy would not be at all affected; for the foretelling of necessary results in certain circumstances is beyond human intelligence, because they can only be known to him by whose power those necessary causes on which they depend have been arranged, and who has prescribed the times of their operation. To borrow a case, for the sake of illustration, from the Scriptures, though the claims of their predictions are not now in question; let us allow that such a prophecy as that of Isaiah respecting the taking of Babylon by Cyrus was uttered, as it purports to be, more than a century before Cyrus was born, and that all the actions of Cyrus and his army, and those of the Babylonian; monarch and his people, were necessitated is it to be maintained that the chain of necessitating causes running through more than a century could be traced by a human mind, so as to describe the precise manner in which that fatality would unfold itself, even to the turning of the river, the drunken carousal of the inhabitants, and the neglect of shutting the gates of the city? This being by uniform and universal experience known to be above all human apprehension, would therefore prove that the prediction was made in consequence of a communication from a superior and divine Intelligence. Were events, therefore, subjected to invincible fate and necessity, there might nevertheless be prophecy.

The other branch of the dilemma is founded on the notion that if we allow the moral freedom of human actions, prophecy is impossible, because certain foreknowledge is contrary to that freedom, and fixes and renders the event necessary. To this the reply is, that the objection is founded on a false assumption, the divine foreknowledge having no more influence in effectuating or making certain any event than human foreknowledge in the degree in which it may exist, there being no moral causality at all in knowledge. This lies in the will, which is the determining acting principle in every agent; or, as Dr. Samuel Clarke has expressed it, in answer to another kind of objector, “God’s infallible judgment concerning contingent truths does no more alter the nature of the things, and cause them to be necessary, than our judging right at any time concerning a contingent truth makes it cease to be contingent; or than our science of a present truth is any cause of its being either true or present. Here, therefore, lies the fallacy of our author’s argument. Because, from God’s foreknowing the existence of things depending upon a chain of necessary causes, it follows that the existence of the things must needs be necessary; therefore, from God’s judging infallibly concerning things which depend not on necessary but free causes, he concludes that these things also depend not upon free but necessary causes. Contrary, I say, to the supposition in the argument; for it must not be first supposed that things are in their own nature necessary; but from the power of judging infallibly concerning free events, it must be proved that things, otherwise supposed free, will thereby unavoidably become necessary.” The whole question lies in this, Is the simple knowledge of an action a necessitating cause of the action? And the answer must be in the negative, as every man’s consciousness will assure him. If the causality of influence, either immediate, or by the arrangement of compelling events, be mixed up with this, the ground is shifted; and it is no longer a question which respects simple prescience. (See _Prescience_.) This metaphysical objection having no foundation in truth, the force of the evidence arising from predictions of events, distant, and beyond the power of human sagacity to anticipate, and uttered as authentications of a divine commission, is apparent. “Such predictions, whether in the form of declaration, description, or representation of things future,” as Mr. Boyle justly observes, “are supernatural things, and may properly be ranked among miracles.” For when, for instance, the events are distant many years or ages from the uttering of the prediction itself, depending on causes not so much as existing when the prophecy was spoken and recorded, and likewise upon various circumstances and a long arbitrary series of things, and the fluctuating uncertainties of human volitions, and especially when they depend not at all upon any external circumstances nor upon any created being, but arise merely from the counsels and appointment of God himself,--such events can be foreknown only by that Being, one of whose attributes is omniscience, and can be foretold by him only to whom the “Father of lights” shall reveal them; so that whoever is manifestly endued with that predictive power must, in that instance, speak and act by divine inspiration, and what he pronounces of that kind must be received as the word of God; nothing more being necessary to assure us of this than credible testimony that such predictions were uttered before the event, or conclusive evidence that the records which contain them are of the antiquity to which they pretend.

The distinction between the prophecies of Scripture and the oracles of Heathenism is marked and essential. In the Heathen oracles we cannot discern any clear and unequivocal tokens of genuine prophecy. They were destitute of dignity and importance, had no connection with each other, tended to no object of general concern, and never looked into times remote from their own. We read only of some few predictions and prognostications, scattered among the writings of poets and philosophers, most of which, beside being very weakly authenticated, appear to have been answers to questions of merely local, personal, and temporary concern, relating to the issue of affairs then actually in hand, and to events speedily to be determined. Far from attempting to form any chain of prophecies, respecting things far distant as to time or place, or matters contrary to human probability, and requiring supernatural agency to effect them, the Heathen priests and soothsayers did not even pretend to a systematic and connected plan. They hardly dared, indeed, to assume the prophetic character in its full force, but stood trembling, as it were, on the brink of futurity, conscious of their inability to venture beyond the depths of human conjecture. Hence their predictions became so fleeting, so futile, so uninteresting, that, though they were collected together as worthy of preservation, they soon fell into disrepute and almost total oblivion. (See _Oracles_.) The Scripture prophecies, on the other hand, constitute a series of divine predictions, relating principally to one grand object, of universal importance, the work of man’s redemption, and carried on in regular progression through the patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian dispensations, with a harmony and uniformity of design, clearly indicating one and the same divine Author. They speak of the agents to be employed in it, and especially of the great agent, the Redeemer himself; and of those mighty and awful proceedings of Providence as to the nations of the earth, by which judgment and mercy are exercised with reference both to the ordinary principles of moral government, and especially to this restoring economy, to its struggles, its oppositions, and its triumphs. They all meet in Christ, as in their proper centre, and in him only; however many of the single lines, when considered apart, may be imagined to have another direction, and though they may pass through intermediate events. If we look, says Bishop Hurd, into the prophetic writings, we find that prophecy is of a prodigious extent; that it commenced from the fall of man, and reaches to the consummation of all things; that for many ages it was delivered darkly to a few persons, and with large intervals from the date of one prophecy to that of another; but, at length, became more clear, more frequent, and was uniformly carried on in the line of one people, separated from the rest of the world,--among other reasons assigned, for this principally, to be the repository of the divine oracles; that, with some intermission, the spirit of prophecy subsisted among that people to the coming of Christ; that he himself and his Apostles exercised this power in the most conspicuous manner, and left behind them many predictions, recorded in the books of the New Testament, which profess to respect very distant events, and even run out to the end of time, or, in St. John’s expression, to that period “when the mystery of God shall be perfected.” Farther, beside the extent of this prophetic scheme, the dignity of the Person whom it concerns deserves our consideration. He is described in terms which excite the most august and magnificent ideas. He is spoken of, indeed, sometimes as being “the seed of the woman,” and as “the Son of man;” yet so as being at the same time of more than mortal extraction. He is even represented to us as being superior to men and angels; as far above all principality and power; above all that is accounted great, whether in heaven or in earth; as the word and wisdom of God; as the eternal Son of the Father; as the Heir of all things, by whom he made the worlds; as the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person. We have no words to denote greater ideas than these; the mind of man cannot elevate itself to nobler conceptions. Of such transcendent worth and excellence is that Jesus said to be, to whom all the prophets bear witness! Lastly, the declared purpose for which the Messiah, prefigured by so long a train of prophecy, came into the world, corresponds to all the rest of the representation. It was not to deliver an oppressed nation from civil tyranny, or to erect a great civil empire, that is, to achieve one of those acts which history accounts most heroic. No: it was not a mighty state, a victor people,

_Non res Romanæ perituraque regna_,
[Not the empire of Rome and kingdoms about to perish,]

that was worthy to enter into the contemplation of this divine Person. It was another and far sublimer purpose, which he came to accomplish; a purpose, in comparison of which all our policies are poor and little, and all the performances of man as nothing. It was to deliver a world from ruin; to abolish sin and death; to purify and immortalize human nature; and thus, in the most exalted sense of the words, to be the Saviour of men and the blessing of all nations. There is no exaggeration in this account: a spirit of prophecy pervading all time, characterizing one Person of the highest dignity, and proclaiming the accomplishment of one purpose, the most beneficent, the most divine, the imagination itself can project. Such is the Scriptural delineation of that economy which we call prophetic.

The advantage of this species of evidence belongs then exclusively to our revelation. Heathenism never made any clear and well founded pretensions to it. Mohammedanism, though it stands itself as a proof of the truth of Scripture prophecy, is unsupported by a single prediction of its own.