Chapter III (3)

In the year after this splendid victory the Romans resolved to attempt the reduction of Corsica and Sardinia; for this purpose L. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a squadron under his command. He easily succeeded in reducing Corsica; but it appears, from an inscription on a stone which was dug up in the year 1615, in Rome, that he encountered a violent storm off the coast of that island, in which his fleet was exposed to imminent danger. The words of the inscription are, "He took the city of Aleria and conquered Corsica, and built a temple to the tempests, with very good reason." This storm is not mentioned in any of the ancient authors. Scipio was obliged to be more cautious in his attempts on Sardinia, but afterwards the Romans succeeded in gaining possession of this island.

The Romans having thus acquired Corsica and Sardinia, and all the maritime towns of Sicily, determined to invade, or at least to alarm, the African dominions of Carthage. Accordingly Sulpicius, who commanded their fleet, circulated a report that he intended to sail for the coasts of Africa: this induced the Carthaginians to put to sea; but after the hostile fleets had approached each other, and were about to engage, a storm arose and separated them, and obliged them both to take shelter in the ports of Sardinia. As soon as it abated, Sulpicius put to sea again, surprised the Carthaginians, and captured or destroyed most of their ships.

Five years after the victory of Duilius, the Romans were able to put to sea a fleet of 330 covered gallies. Ten of these were sent to reconnoitre the enemy, but approaching too near, they were attacked and destroyed. This unfortunate event did not discourage the consul Attilius Regulus, who commanded: on the contrary, he resolved to wipe off this disgrace by signalizing his consulship in a remarkable manner. He was ordered by the senate to cross the Mediterranean, and invade Carthage. The Roman fleet, which consisted of 330 galleys, on board of each of which were 120 soldiers and 300 rowers, was stationed at Messina: from this port they took their departure, stretching along the coast of Sicily, till they doubled Cape Pachynum, after which they sailed directly to Ecnomos. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of 360 sail, and the seamen were more numerous, as well as more skilful and experienced, than those of the Romans: it rendezvoused at Heraclea, not far from Ecnomos. Between these two places the hostile fleets met, and one of the most obstinate and decisive battles ensued that are recorded in ancient history. As Polybius has given a very particular account of the manner in which the respective fleets were drawn up, and of all the incidents of the battle, we shall transcribe it from him, because the issue of it may justly be regarded as having proved the Roman superiority at sea, and because the details of this accurate historian will afford us a clear insight into the naval engagements of the ancients.

As there were 330 ships, and each ship had on board 300 rowers, and 120 soldiers, the total number of men in the fleet amounted 140,000. The whole fleet was formed into four divisions: the first was called the first legion; the second, the second; and the third, the third legion. The fourth division had a different name; they were called triarians: the triarii who were on board this division, being old soldiers of approved valour, who, in land battles, formed the third line of the legion, and hence obtained their appellation. The first division was drawn up on the right, the second on the left, and the third in the rear of the other two, in such a manner that these three divisions formed a triangle, the point of which was the two gallies, in which were the consuls, in front of their respective squadrons, parallel to the third legion, which formed the base of the triangle, and in the rear of the whole fleet; the triarian division was drawn up, but extended in such a manner as to out-flank the extremes of the base. Between the triarian division and the other part of the squadron, the transports were drawn up, in order that they might be protected from the enemy, and their escape accelerated and covered in case of a defeat; on board of the transports were the horses, and baggage of the army.

According to Polybius, the seamen and troops on board the Carthaginian fleet amounted to 150,000 men. Their admiral waited to see the disposition of the Roman fleet before he formed his own in order of battle; he divided it into four squadrons, drawn up in one line; one of these was drawn up very near the shore, the others stretched far out to sea, apparently for the purpose of out-flanking the Romans. The light vessels were on the right, under the command of Hanno; the squadron on the left, which was formed of heavier vessels, was under the command of Hamilcar.

It is evident from this description of the order of battle of the Carthaginians, that their line, being so much extended, could easily be broken; the Romans perceiving this, bore down on the middle with their first and second divisions. The Carthaginians did not wait the attack, but retired immediately with the intention of drawing the Romans after them, and thus by separating, weakening their fleet. The Romans, thinking the victory was their own, pushed after the flying enemy, thus weakening their third division, and at the same time exposing themselves to an attack while they were scattered. The Carthaginians, perceiving that their manoeuvre had so far succeeded, tacked about, and engaged with their pursuers. But the Romans, by means of their corvi, which they were now very skilful in using, grappled with the enemy, and as soon as they had thus rendered the engagement similar to a land battle, they overcame them.

While these things were going on between Hamilcar with the left wing of the Carthaginian fleet, and the first and second divisions of the Romans, Hanno, with his light vessels, which formed the right wing, attacked the triarians, and the ships which were drawn up near the shore, attacked the third legion and the transports. These two attacks were conducted with so much spirit and courage, that many of the triarians, transports, and third legion were driven on shore, and their defeat would probably have been decisive, had not the Roman first and second divisions, which had defeated and chased to a considerable distance the Carthaginians opposed to them, returned most opportunely from the chace, and supported them. The Carthaginians were no longer able to withstand their enemies, but sustained a signal defeat; thirty of their vessels having been sunk, and sixty-three taken. The immediate result of this victory was, that the Romans landed in Africa without opposition.

The next victory obtained by the Romans over the Carthaginians was achieved soon after the defeat and captivity of Regulus, and was justly regarded by them as an ample compensation for that disaster. It was a wise and politic maxim of the Roman republic never to appear cast down by defeat, but, on the contrary, to act in such a case with more than their usual confidence and ardour. Acting on this maxim they equipped a fleet and sent it towards Africa, immediately after they learnt the defeat of Regulus. The Carthaginians, who were endeavouring to take all possible advantage of their victory, by expelling the Romans from Africa, as soon as the news arrived of the sailing of this fleet, abandoned the seige of Utica, before which they had sat down,--refitted their old ships, built several new ones, and put to sea. The hostile fleets met near Cape Herme, the most northern point of Africa, a little to the north-east of Carthage. They were again unsuccessful on what they had formerly justly regarded as their own element. One hundred and four of their ships were captured, and 15,000 men, soldiers, and rowers, were killed in the action.

This victory, however, proved of little benefit to the Romans in their grand enterprise of establishing a firm and permanent footing, in Africa; for, in consequence of their inability to obtain a regular supply of provisions for their army, they were obliged soon afterwards to evacuate Clupea and Utica, the principal places they held there, and to re-embark their troops for Italy.

In order to make up for this hard necessity, they resolved to land in Sicily on their return, and, if possible, reduce some cities which the Carthaginians still retained in that island. Such was the plan of the consuls, but it was vehemently opposed by the pilots of the fleet, who represented to them, that as the season was far advanced, the most prudent measure would be to sail directly for Italy, and not go round the northern coast of Sicily, as the consuls wished. The latter, however, persisted in their resolution; the consequences were extremely fatal; a most violent storm arose, during which the greater part of the fleet was destroyed or rendered completely useless, either foundering, or being driven on shore. All the sea coast from Camarina to Pachynum, was covered with dead bodies of men and horses, as well as with the wrecks of the ships. The exact number of ships that were lost is differently represented by different authors, but according to the most accurate account, out of 370 which composed the fleet, only eighty escaped. Besides the destruction of these vessels, a numerous army was lost, with all the riches of Africa, which had been amassed and deposited in Clupea, by Regulus, and which was in the act of being conveyed to Rome.

The Carthaginians, animated by the news of this event, resolved to attempt the subjugation of Sicily, Africa being now liberated from the enemy. But the Romans, by incredible efforts, fitted out a new fleet in the short space of three months, consisting of 120 ships; which, with the old vessels which had escaped, made up a fleet of 250 sail. With these, they passed over to Sicily, where they were successful in reducing the Carthaginian capital in that island.

The next year they sent to sea a fleet of 260 ships to attempt the reduction of Lilibæum, but this place being found too strong, the consuls directed their course to the eastern coast of Africa, on which they carried on a predatory warfare. Having filled their ships with the spoils, they were returning to Italy, when they narrowly escaped shipwreck. On the coast of Africa, there were two sand-banks, called the Greater and Lesser Syrtes, which were very much dreaded by the ancients, on account of their frequently changing places; sometimes being easily visible, and at other times considerably below the water. On the Lesser Syrtes the Roman fleet grounded; fortunately it was low water, and moderate weather at the time, so that on the return of flood tide, the vessels floated off, with little or no damage, but the consuls were dreadfully alarmed.

This, however, was only a prelude to real disaster: the fleet arrived safe at Panormus, where they remained a short time. On their departure for Italy, the wind and weather were favourable till they reached Cape Palinurus; here a dreadful storm arose, in which 160 galleys, and a considerable number of transports, were lost. This second storm seems to have so dispirited the Roman senate, that they resolved to confine their efforts to land, and accordingly a decree was issued, that, as it seemed the will of the gods that the Romans should not succeed against their enemy by sea, no more than fifty vessels should in future be equipped; and that these should be employed exclusively in protecting the coasts of Italy, and in transporting troops to Sicily.

This decree, however, was not long acted upon; for the Carthaginians, perceiving that the Romans no longer dared to meet them at sea, made such formidable preparations for invading Sicily, by equipping a fleet of 200 sail, and raising an army of 30,000 men, besides 140 elephants, that the Romans, being reduced to the alternative of either losing that valuable island, or of again encountering their enemy at sea, resolved on the latter measure. Accordingly a new fleet was built, consisting of 240 galleys, and sixty smaller vessels, and Lilibæum was besieged by sea and land. This city was deemed impregnable, and as it was the only place of retreat for the Carthaginian armies in Sicily, it was defended with the utmost obstinacy.

During this siege, two bold and successful enterprises were undertaken for the purpose of supplying the garrison with provisions. The Romans had shut up the port so closely, that the governor could have no communication with Carthage: nevertheless, Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, resolved to enter it with a supply of provisions. With this intention, he anchored with a few vessels under an island near the coast, and as soon as a strong south wind arose, he set all sail, and plied his oars with so much vigour and alacrity, that he passed safely through the midst of the Roman fleet, and landed 10,000 men and a considerable quantity of provisions. Having succeeded thus far, and being convinced that the Romans would be on the alert to prevent his sudden escape, he resolved to intimidate them, if possible, by the open boldness of the attempt; and in this also he succeeded.

Shortly afterwards the harbour was again so closely blockaded, that the senate of Carthage were quite uninformed of the state and resources of the garrison. In this emergency, a Rhodian, of the name of Hannibal, undertook to enter the harbour, and to come back to Carthage with the requisite and desired intelligence. The Roman fleet lay at anchor, stretched across the mouth of the harbour. Hannibal, following the example of his namesake, with a very light galley of his own, concealed himself near one of the islands which lie opposite to Lilibæum. Very early in the morning, before it was light, with a favourable wind blowing rather strong, he succeeded in getting through the Roman fleet, and entered the port. The consul, mortified at this second enterprise, ordered ten of his lightest vessels to lie as close as possible to each other, across the mouth of the harbour; and that they might not be taken by surprise and unprepared, he further directed that the men should constantly have their oars in their hands, stretched out, so as to be ready to plunge them into the water at a moment's warning. The skill and experience of the Rhodian, however, and the extreme lightness and celerity of his vessel, rendered all these precautions unavailing; for, not content with securing his escape, he mocked the Romans, by often lying to till they came near him, and then rowing round them. The Carthaginian senate were now able to have frequent communication with the garrison by means of this Rhodian: his success, and the recompence which rewarded it, induced several Carthaginians to make the same attempt. They were all successful except one, who, not knowing the force and direction of the currents, was carried by them ashore, and fell into the power of the Romans. The Rhodian still continued to pass between the besieged and Carthage; but his good fortune was near an end. The Romans had fitted out the Carthaginian galley which they had captured, and "waited with impatience for a fresh insult from the Rhodian: it was not long before he entered the port in the night time, according to custom, and was preparing to sail out in broad day, not knowing that the Romans were now masters of a galley which was as good a sailer as his own. He weighed anchor with great confidence, and sailed out of the port in sight of the enemy's fleet, but was greatly surprized to see the Romans pursue him close, and at length come up with him, notwithstanding the lightness of his vessel. He had now no way left but to engage them, which he did with an undaunted bravery; but the Romans, who were all chosen men, soon put an end to the dispute. The Rhodian vessel was boarded and taken with all her crew. The Romans being now in possession of two light galleys, shut up the port so effectually, that no Carthaginian ever after attempted to enter it."

The following year the Romans were obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, in consequence of the Carthaginians having succeeded in destroying all their works. One of the consuls was P. Claudius Pulcher, an obstinate and ambitious man, who, contrary to the advice of those who were better skilled in maritime affairs, and better acquainted with the Carthaginians than he was, determined to surprize Drepanon, where the Carthaginian admiral was posted. Claudius had under his command a fine and formidable fleet of 120 galleys; with these he sailed from before Lilibæum in the night time, having taken on board a great number of the best troops employed in the blockade of that place. At break of day, Asdrubal, the Carthaginian admiral, was surprized to perceive the hostile fleet approaching Drepanon: he formed his plan immediately, preferring an immediate engagement to the certainty of being shut up in the harbour. Accordingly, with ninety ships, he sailed out, and drew them up behind some rocks which lay near the harbour. As the Romans had not perceived him come out, they continued to sail on without forming themselves into line of battle, when as they were about to enter the harbour, the Carthaginians attacked them, with such celerity and vigour, that, being taken quite unprepared, they were thrown into confusion. Claudius might still have saved his fleet by immediate flight, but this he absolutely refused to do, notwithstanding the strong and urgent remonstrances of his officers. By great exertions the Roman fleet was formed into line of battle, on a lee shore, and close to rocks and shoals. It was on this occasion, that the Romans' veneration for auguries was so dreadfully shocked, by Claudius exclaiming, when the sacred chickens refused to feed, "If they will not feed, let them drink," at the same time ordering them to be thrown into the sea. The bad omen, and the sacrilegious insult, added to the situation in which they were placed, and their want of confidence in Claudius, seemed to have paralysed the efforts of the Romans: they fought feebly: the enemy boarded their ships without difficulty or resistance; so that ninety vessels were either taken or driven ashore, 8,000 of their seamen and soldiers were killed, and 20,000 taken prisoners. As soon as Claudius perceived the probable result of the battle, he fled precipitately with thirty vessels. The Carthaginians did not lose a single ship or man on this occasion. This was the most signal and disastrous defeat which the Romans had suffered at sea since the commencement of the war. According to Polybius, Claudius was tried, condemned, and very severely punished.

The other consul, Lucius Pullus, was not more successful, though his want of success did not, as in the case of Claudius, arise from ignorance and obstinacy. He was ordered to sail from Syracuse with a fleet of 120 galleys, and 800 transports, the latter laden with provisions and stores for the army before Lilibaeum. As the army was much pressed for necessaries, and the consul himself was not ready to put to sea directly, he sent the quaestors before him with a small squadron. The Carthaginians, who were very watchful, and had the best intelligence of all the Romans were doing, having learnt that the consul was at sea with a large fleet, sent 100 galleys to cruize off Heraclea. As soon as the squadron under the quaestors came in sight, the Carthaginian admiral, though he mistook it for the consular fleet, yet resolved to engage it: but the quaestors, having received orders not to hazard a battle if they could possibly avoid, took refuge behind some rocks, where they were attacked by the enemy. The Romans defended themselves so well with balistae and other engines, which they had erected on the rocks, that the Carthaginian admiral, after having captured a few transports, was obliged to draw off his fleet.

In the mean time, the light vessels, employed on the lookout, informed him that the whole consular fleet were directing their course for Lilibaeum: his obvious plan was to engage this fleet before it could join that of the quæstors; he therefore steered his course to meet them. But the consul was equally averse with the quaestors to hazard the supply of the army by a battle, and he, therefore, also took shelter near some rocks. The Carthaginian admiral was afraid to attack him in this position, but resolved to watch him: while thus employed his pilots observed certain indications of an approaching storm, which induced him to take shelter on the other side of Cape Pachynum. He had scarcely doubled the cape, when the storm arose with such violence that the whole Roman fleet was destroyed. According to Polybius, not one vessel, not even a plank, was saved out of a fleet which consisted of 120 galleys and 800 transports.

Two such losses occurring during the same consulate, induced the Romans again to resolve to desist from all naval enterprizes and preparations, so that for some time no public fleet was equipped. This resolution, however, yielded to the conviction that they could not hope even to retain their possessions in Sicily, or even to secure their commerce on the coasts of Italy, if they did not endeavour to cope with the Carthaginians by sea. But as the senate thought it would appear derogatory to their dignity and consistency to equip a public fleet, after they had a second time resolved solemnly and officially not to do so, they passed a decree, by which all the Roman citizens who were able and so disposed, were permitted to build, equip, and arm vessels at their own expence; with these ships they were directed to land on the coast of Africa, for the purpose of pillage, the fruit of which was to be their own private gain. The senate even went further to evade, by a pitiful subterfuge their own decree, for they lent the few ships which still remained to the republic, to private citizens, on condition that they should keep them in repair, and make them good if they were lost. By these measures a very considerable fleet was equipped, which committed great depredations on the coast of Africa. Emboldened by their predatory warfare, they resolved to attempt a more arduous enterprize. One of the most celebrated of the Carthaginian harbours was that of Hippo; besides the port there was a citadel, and large arsenals for naval stores, &c. As the inhabitants were much engaged in commerce, there were in the town always a considerable quantity of merchandize. This port the privateer squadron determined to enter. The inhabitants, aware of their design, stretched a very strong chain across the harbour mouth; but it did not avail; for the Roman ships broke through it, took possession of the town and ships, burnt most of them, and returned safe with an immense booty. This success was quickly followed by another, for as they were re-entering Panormus, they fell in with a Carthaginian fleet loaded with provisions for Hamilcar, who commanded in Sicily, and captured several of the transports. These advantages began to inspire the Romans with renewed confidence and hopes that their naval disasters were at an end, and that the gods had at length permitted them to become masters of the sea, when the privateer fleet, after having gained a considerable victory over a Carthaginian squadron, near the coast of Africa, was almost totally destroyed in a storm.

For a few years afterwards, the Romans seem to have desisted entirely from maritime enterprizes; but in the year of the city 516, they changed their plan, as it was indeed evident that unless they were masters at sea, they must be content to lose the island of Sicily. In order, however, that the Roman armies might not suffer by their losses at sea, it was decreed that the new fleet should be manned with hired troops. There was still another difficulty to overcome; the protracted war with Carthage, and the heavy and repeated losses which they had suffered during it, had nearly exhausted the Roman treasury; from it therefore could not possibly be drawn the sums requisite for the proper and effective equipment of such a fleet as would be adequate to meet that of the enemy. This difficulty was removed by the patriotism of all ranks and classes of the citizens. The senators set the example; the most wealthy of whom built, each at his own cost, a quinquereme: those who were not so wealthy joined together, three or four of them fitting out a single galley. By these means a fleet of 200 large vessels was made ready for any expedition, the state having bound themselves to repay the individuals whenever her finances were adequate to such an expence. This fleet was not only very numerous and well equipped, but most of the vessels which composed it were built on an entirely new model, which combined an extraordinary degree of celerity with strength. The model was taken from that light Rhodian galley, which we have already mentioned, as having been employed by its owner, Hannibal, in conveying intelligence between Carthage and Lilibæum, and which was afterwards captured by the Romans. The command of this fleet was given to the consul Lutatius: and the great object to be accomplished was the reduction of Lilibæum, which still held out. The first step of the consul was to occupy all the sea-ports near this place: the town of Drepanon, however, resisting his efforts, he resolved rather to decide its fate, and that of Sicily in general, by a sea battle, than to undertake a regular siege.

The Carthaginians soon gave him an opportunity of acting in this manner, for they sent to sea a fleet of 400 vessels, under the command of Hanno. In the building and equipment of this fleet, the senate of Carthage had nearly exhausted all their means; but though their fleet was numerically much greater than that of Rome, in some essential respects it was inferior to it. Most of the seamen and troops on board it were inexperienced and undisciplined; and the ships themselves were not to be compared, with regard to the union of lightness and strength, with the Roman vessels, as they were now built. Besides, the Romans trusted entirely to themselves-- the Carthaginians, in some measure, to their allies or to hired seamen. The Romans, though firm and determined, were not rashly confident; whereas the Carthaginians even yet regarded their adversaries with feelings of contempt.

The hostile fleets met off Hiera, one of the Aeolian islands. The Carthaginian admiral's first object was to reach Eryx, a city which had lately been taken by Hamilcar, there to unload his vessels, and after having taken on board Hamilcar and the best of his troops, to sail again in quest of the Roman fleet. But the consul prevented this design from being carried into execution, by coming up with the Carthaginians, as we have just stated, off Hiera, while they were steering for Eryx. As the wind was favourable for the Romans, they were extremely anxious to commence the engagement immediately; but before they had formed into order of battle, it changed, blew hard, and a heavy sea arose. The determination of the consul to engage was for a short time shaken by this circumstance, but he reflected that though the sea was rough, the enemy's ships were heavily laden, and therefore would suffer more from it than his ships would; while if, on the other hand, he delayed the engagement till the Carthaginians reached Eryx, they would then have lighter vessels, as well as a greater number of experienced seamen and soldiers on board of them. These considerations determined him to fight immediately, and accordingly he gave orders for the line of battle to be formed. The battle was of very short duration, and terminated decidedly in favour of the Romans. The loss of the Carthaginians is variously stated, but, according to Polybius, who is the best authority for every thing relating to the Punic wars, the Romans sunk fifty of their vessels, and captured seventy, with all their crews. The remainder would probably have been either captured or destroyed, had not the wind again changed, and enabled them to save themselves by flight.

The consequences of this defeat, in the capitulation of Hamilcar, which, in a manner, determined the fate of Sicily, were so disheartening to the Carthaginians, that they were obliged to submit to a disadvantageous and dishonorable peace. Among other terms, it was stipulated that they should evacuate all the places they held in Sicily, and entirely quit that island; that they should also abandon all the small islands that lie between Italy and Sicily; and that they should not approach with their ships of war, either the coasts of Italy or any of the territories belonging to the Romans or their allies.

Soon after the conclusion of the first Punic war, a circumstance occurred which nearly renewed the hostilities. The Carthaginians were engaged in a bloody and arduous contest with their Mercenaries, and the Roman merchants supplied the latter with military stores and provisions. While engaged in this unlawful enterprize, several of them were captured by the Carthaginians, and their crews detained as prisoners of war. The senate of Carthage, however, were not then in a condition to offend the Romans; they therefore restored both the ships and their crews. During this war between the Carthaginians and the Mercenaries, the latter having obtained possession of Sardinia, (which though formerly conquered by the Romans, had been restored to the Carthaginians,) offered to put the Romans in possession of it. At first the senate refused to occupy it; but they soon changed their mind, and accepted the offer, and moreover obliged the Carthaginians to pay the expence of the armament by which it was occupied, and the further sum of 1200 talents.

Sicily, which immediately after the conclusion of the Punic war, was made a Roman province, and Sardinia, were the first territories which the Romans possessed out of Italy. In conformity with our plan, we shall enquire into the advantages they brought to the commerce of the Romans, before we proceed to the naval occurrences of the second Punic war.

Sicily was anciently called Sicania, Trinâcria, and Triquetra; its three promontories are particularly celebrated in the classic authors; viz. Lilibæum on the side of Africa; Pachynum on the side of Greece, and Pelorum towards Italy. Its vicinity to the continent of Italy, and the resemblance of their opposite shores, gave rise to an opinion among the ancients that it was originally joined to Italy. Pliny particularly mentions their separation, as a circumstance beyond all doubt. The dangers which were supposed to beset mariners in their passage through the narrow strait which divides it from Italy, on one side of which was Sylla, and on the other Charybdis, sufficiently point out the ignorance and inexperience of the ancients in the construction and management of their ships.

The principal town on the eastern coast of Sicily, opposite Greece, was Messana, now called Messina: it was the first which the Romans possessed in the island: it was one of the most wealthy and powerful cities in ancient Sicily. Taurominium stood near Mount Taurus, on the river Taurominius; the coast in its vicinity was anciently called Coproea, because the sea was supposed to throw up there the wrecks of such vessels as were swallowed up by Charybdis. The hills near this city were famous for the excellent grapes they produced. On a gulph in the Ionian Sea, called Catana, stood a city of the same name; it was one of the richest and most powerful cities in the island.

But by far the most celebrated city in this island for its advantageous situation, the magnificence of its buildings, its commerce, and the wealth of its inhabitants, was Syracuse. According to Thucydides, in his time it might justly be compared to Athens, even when that city was at the height of its glory; and Cicero describes it as the greatest and most wealthy of all the cities possessed by the Greeks. Its walls were eighteen miles in circumference, and within them were in fact four cities united into one. It seems also to have possessed three harbours: the great harbour was nearly five thousand yards in circumference, and the entrance to it five hundred yards across; it was formed on one side by a point of the island Ortygia, and on the other by another small island, on each of which were forts. The second harbour was divided from the greater by an island of inconsiderable extent; both these were surrounded with warehouses, arsenals, and other buildings of great magnificence. The river Anapis emptied itself into the great harbour; at the mouth of this river was the castle of Olympia. The third harbour stood a little above the division of the city called Acradina. The island of Ortygia, which formed one of the divisions, was joined to the others by a bridge.

The other maritime towns of consequence were Agrigentum, Lilibaeum, and Drepanum; though the first stood at a short distance from the sea, yet being situated between and near two rivers, it conveniently imported all sorts of provisions and merchandize. Lilibaeum was famous for its port, which was deemed a safe retreat for ships, either in case of a storm, or to escape from an enemy. During the wars between the Romans and Carthaginians, the former repeatedly attempted to render it inaccessible and useless by throwing large stones into it, but they were always washed away by the violence of the sea, and the rapidity of the current. Drepanum, which had an excellent harbour, was much resorted to by foreign ships, and possessed a very considerable commerce.

The Greeks were the first who colonized Sicily; and they founded Syracuse and other towns. About the same period the Phoenicians settled on the coast for the purposes of commerce; but they seem to have retired soon after the Greek colonies began to flourish and extend themselves. The Carthaginians, who generally pushed their commerce into all the countries with which their parent state had traded, seem to have visited Italy as merchants or conquerors at a very early period; but when their first visit took place in either character is not known. The treaty between them and the Romans, (to which we have had occasion to refer more than once,) which was formed in the year after the expulsion of the Tarquins, expressly stipulated that the Romans, who should touch at Sardinia, or that part of Sicily which belonged to the Carthaginians, should be received there in the same manner as the Carthaginians themselves. They must, however, soon afterwards have been driven out of the island; for at the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, (which happened about thirty years after the expulsion of the Tarquins,) Gelon, the king of Syracuse, expressly states that they no longer possessed any territory there, in a speech which he made to the ambassadors of Athens and Sparta, the Cathaginians having united with Xerxes, and he having offered to ally himself with the Greeks. The circumstances and even the very nature of the victory which Gelon gained over the Carthaginians, which ended in their expulsion from Sicily, cannot accurately be ascertained: but from a comparison of the principal authorities on this point, it would, appear that it was a naval victory; or at least that the Carthaginian fleet was defeated as well as their army. Their loss by sea was enormous, amounting to nearly the whole of their ships of war and transports, the former consisting of 2000 and the latter of 3000.

Such is a short sketch of the island of Sicily, so far as its commercial facilities and its history are concerned previously to its conquest by the Romans. It was peculiarly valuable to them on account of its extreme fertility in corn; and by this circumstance it seems to have been distinguished in very early times; for there can be no doubt that by its being represented by the poets as the favourite residence of the goddess Ceres, the fertility of the island in corn, as well as its knowledge of agriculture, were intended to be represented. When Gelon offered to unite with the Greeks in their war with Xerxes, one of his proposals was that he would furnish the whole Greek army with corn, during all the time of hostilities, if they would appoint him commander of their forces. In the latter period of the Roman republic, it became their principal dependence for a regular supply of corn.

Sardinia seems to have been as little explored by and known to the ancients, as it is to the moderns. The treaty between the Carthaginians and Romans, the year after the expulsion of the Tarquins, proves that the former nation possessed it at that time. Calaris, the present Cagliari, was the principal town in it. From the epithet applied to it by Horace, in one of his odes, _Opima_, it must have been much more fertile in former times than it is at present; and Varro expressly calls it one of the granaries of Rome. Its air, then, as at present, was in most parts very unwholsome; and it is a remarkable circumstance that the character of the Sardi, who, after the complete reduction of the island by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, were brought to Rome in great numbers, and sold as slaves, and who were proverbial for their worthlessness, is still to be traced in the present inhabitants; for they are represented as extremely barbarous, and so treacherous, and inhospitable, that they have been called the Malays of the Mediterranean. The island of Corsica, which, indeed, generally followed the fate of Sardinia, was another of the fruits of the first Punic war which the Romans reaped, in some degree favourable to their commerce. It possessed a large and convenient harbour, called Syracusium. The Carthaginians must have reduced it at an early period, since, according to Herodotus, the Cyrnians (the ancient name for the inhabitants), were one of the nations that composed the vast army, with which they invaded Sicily in the time of Gelon.

During the interval between the first and second Punic wars, the Roman commerce seems to have been gradually, but slowly extending itself, particularly in the Adriatic: we do not possess, however, any details on the subject, except a decisive proof of the attention and protection which the republic bestowed upon it, in repressing and punishing the piracies of the Illyrians and Istrians. These people, who were very expert and undaunted seamen, enriched themselves and their country by seizing and plundering the merchant vessels which frequented the Adriatic and adjacent Mediterranean sea; and their piracies were encouraged, rather than restrained by their sovereigns. At the period to which we allude, they were governed by a queen, named Teuta, who was a woman of a bold and enterprising spirit: the Roman merchants, who traded, in the Adriatic, had frequently been plundered and cruelly treated by her subjects; upon this, the Roman senate sent two ambassadors to her, to insist that she should put a stop to these measures. The Romans had also other grounds of complaint against her and her subjects; for the latter extended their piracies to the allies of Rome, as well as to the Romans themselves, and the former was at that time besieging the island of Issa, in the Adriatic, which was under the protection of the republic. The inhabitants of this island seem to have been rather extensively engaged in commerce, and were celebrated for building a kind of light ships, thence called _Issaei lembi_.

Teuta received and treated the Roman ambassadors with great scorn and haughtiness; she promised, indeed, that she would no longer authorise the piracies of her subjects; but, with regard to restraining them, she would not do it, as they enjoyed a perfect and full right to benefit themselves as much as possible, and in every way they could, by their skill and superiority in maritime affairs. On the ambassadors' replying in rather threatening language, she ordered one of them to be put to death.

For a short time Teuta was alarmed at the probable consequences of her conduct, and endeavoured to avert them by submission; but, the Romans being otherwise engaged, and she having experienced some successes over the Acheans, her haughtiness and confidence revived, and she sent a fleet to assist in the reduction of Issa. Upon this, the Romans resolved to act with immediate vigour; and they had little difficulty in compelling Teuta to sue for peace. It was granted to her, on condition that not more than three ships of war should at any one time sail beyond Lyssus, on the frontier of Macedonia, and that the islands of Corcyra, Issa, and Pharos, together with Dyrrhachium should be given up to the Romans.

It was not, however, to be supposed that the Illyrians and Istrians, who had been so long accustomed to piracy, and who in fact derived nearly all their wealth from this source, would totally abstain from it. A few years after this treaty of peace, they resumed their depredations, which they carried on with so much audacity and disregard to the power of Rome, that they even seized the ships that were laden with corn for Rome. As this commerce was one of the greatest consequence to the Romans, in which the Roman government, as well as individuals, principally embarked, and on the regularity and safety of which the subsistence and tranquillity of the city itself depended, the senate resolved to punish them more effectually; and this resolution was strengthened by the Illyrians having broken the terms of the peace by sending no fewer than 50 vessels of war beyond the prescribed limits, as far as the Cyclades. The consequence of the new war which the Romans waged against them, was the reduction of Istria and of Illyricum Proper.

The destruction of Saguntum by the Carthaginians was the cause of the second Punic war. At what period the Carthaginians first established themselves in Spain, is not known. Their principal object in colonizing and retaining it, undoubtedly may be found in the richness of its mines, and the fertility of its soil. According to Diodorus Siculus, they were principally enabled to equip and support their numerous, and frequently renewed fleets, by the silver which they drew from these mines. And Strabo expressly informs us, that when the Carthaginians first colonized Spain, silver was in such abundance, and so easily obtained, that their most common utensils, and even the mangers for their horses, were made of it. One mine of extreme richness is particularly described by Pliny: according to him, it yielded 300 pounds of silver in a day. There are other circumstances which point out the extreme value of Spain to whoever possessed it, and lead us to the motives which induced the Romans to use all their efforts to wrest it from the Carthaginians. It cannot be doubted that the Carthaginians drew from it all the wealth, in various shapes, which it could possibly supply; and yet we know that in the short space of nine years, 111,542 pounds weight of silver, 4095 of gold, besides coin, were brought out of it by the Roman praetors, who governed it. Scipio, when he returned to Rome, brought from Spain 14,342 pounds weight of silver, besides coin, arms, and corn, &c. to an immense amount. And Lentulus returned from this country with 44,000 pounds of silver, and 2550 of gold, besides the coin, &c., which was divided among his soldiers. Manlius brought with him 1200 pounds of silver, and about 30 of gold. Cornelius Lentulus, who was praetor of Hither Spain for two years, brought with him 1515 pounds of gold, and 2000 of silver, besides a large amount of coin, while the praetor of Farther Spain returned with 50,000 pounds of silver. And these immense sums, as we have already stated, were brought away in the space of nine years.

Cornelius Scipio was sent into Spain at the commencement of the second Punic war. Of the events of this war, however, we shall confine ourselves exclusively to such as were maritime, and which trace the steps of the Roman superiority at sea, and, consequently, of the advancement and extension of their commerce. The exertions of the rival nations to contest the empire of the sea were very great: the Romans equipped 220 quinqueremes, and twenty other light vessels, beside 160 galleys, and twenty light vessels, which were employed to transport troops to Africa. Their allies, the Syracusans, also, were active and alert in the equipment of a fleet to assist their allies, the Romans; and Hiero, their king, had the good fortune to give an auspicious commencement to the war, by capturing some Carthaginian ships, part of a fleet, whose object was to plunder the coasts of Italy, but which had been dispersed by a storm. The Carthaginians were equally unfortunate in their second maritime enterprise against Lilibaeum, for the Syracusans and Romans, having learnt their intention, anchored before the mouth of the harbour. The Carthaginians, finding that they could not, as they expected, surprise the place, drew up their fleet in line of battle, a little way out at sea: the allies immediately got under weigh; a battle ensued, in which the Carthaginians were defeated, with the loss of seven ships. These successes, however, were dreadfully counterbalanced by the advance of Hannibal into Italy, and the decisive victories which he obtained in the very heart of the Roman territories. Under these circumstances, maritime affairs were naturally disregarded.

Of the actual state of the Roman commerce about this time we know very little, but that it was lucrative, may fairly be inferred from the following circumstance:--A little before the commencement of the second Punic war, Caius Flaminnus was extremely desirous to obtain the support and good will of the populace; with this object in view, he joined the tribunes of the people in passing a law, which is called the Flaminian, or Claudian law. By it, the senators, who had been accustomed to acquire considerable wealth by fitting out ships and trading, were expressly forbidden to possess or hire any vessel above the burden of 300 amphorae or eight tons, and not more than one vessel even of that small tonnage. This vessel was allowed them, and was deemed sufficient to bring the produce of their farms to Rome. By the same law, the scribes, and the clerks, and attendants of the quæstors, were prohibited from trading; and thus the liberty of commerce was exclusively confined to the plebeians.

Whilst Hannibal threatened the Romans in the vicinity of Rome itself, they had neither leisure, inclination, or means, to cope with the Carthaginians by sea; at length, however, Marcellus, having checked the enemy in Italy, maritime affairs were again attended to. Scipio, who had been successful in Spain, resolved to attempt the reduction of New Carthage: this place was situated, like Old Carthage, on a peninsula betwixt a port and a lake: its harbour was extremely commodious, and large enough to receive and shelter any fleet. As it was the capital of the Carthaginian dominions in Spain, here were deposited all their naval stores, machines used in war, besides immense treasures. It was on this account extremely well fortified, and to attempt to take it by a regular siege seemed to Scipio impracticable: he, therefore, formed a plan to take it by surprise, and this plan he communicated to C. Lælius, the commander of the fleet, who was his intimate friend. The Roman fleet was to block up the port by sea, while Scipio was to blockade it by land. The ignorance of the Romans with regard to one of the most common and natural phenomena of the sea, is strongly marked in the course of this enterprise. Scipio knew that when the tide ebbed, the port of New Carthage would become dry and accessible by land; but his soldiers, and even his officers, were ignorant of the nature of the tides, and they firmly believed that Neptune had wrought a miracle in their favour, when, according to Scipio's prediction, the tide retired, and the army was thus enabled to capture the town, the walls of which on that side were extremely low, the Carthaginians having directed all their attention and efforts to the opposite side. The capture of New Carthage depressed, in a great degree, the spirits, as well as weakened the strength of the Carthaginians in Spain: eighteen galleys were captured in the port, besides 113 vessels laden with naval stares; 40,000 bushels of wheat, 260,000 bushels of barley, a large number of warlike machines of all descriptions, 260 cups of gold, most of which weighed a pound, 18,300 pounds weight of silver, principally coin, besides brass money, were among the spoils.

About the year of Rome 556, Scipio had succeeded in reducing all Spain. It does not appear, however, that the Romans were thus enabled greatly to extend their commerce; indeed, at this period, we have no evidence that any other town in Spain, except Gades, possessed any considerable trade. This island and city were situated in a gulph of the same name, between the straits of Gibraltar and the river Boetis; and, from the remotest period of which we possess any records, was resorted to by foreigners for the purposes of commerce. Gradually, however, the inhabitants of Spain, under the Roman government, enriched themselves and their conquerors by their industry: large quantities of corn, wine, and oil were exported, besides wax, honey, pitch, vermilion, and wool. The oil and wool were deemed equal, if not superior, to those of any other part of the world: the excellent quality of the wool is a strong fact, against an opinion entertained by many, that the fineness of the Spanish was originally derived from the exportation of some English sheep to Spain, since it appears to have been celebrated even in the time of the Romans: how important and lucrative an object it was considered, may be collected from the attention that was paid to the breed of sheep; a ram, according to Strabo, having been sold for a talent, or nearly 200_l_. Horace incidentally gives evidence of the commercial wealth of Spain in his time, when he considers the master of a Spanish trading vessel and a person of great wealth as synonimous terms.

As Hannibal still continued in Italy, the senate of Rome resolved to send Scipio into Italy, with a discretionary power to invade Africa from that island. He lost no time in equipping a fleet for these purposes, and his efforts were so well seconded by the zeal and activity of the provinces and cities, many of which taxed themselves to supply iron, timber, cloth for sails, corn, &c. that, in forty days after the timber was felled, Scipio had a fleet of thirty new galleys.

Soon after he landed in Sicily, he resolved to invade Africa: for this purpose his fleet was collected in the port of Lilibæum. Never was embarkation made with more order and solemnity: the concourse of people who came from all parts to see him set sail, and wish him a prosperous voyage, was prodigious. Just before he weighed anchor, he appeared on the poop of his galley, and, after an herald had proclaimed silence, addressed a solemn prayer to the gods. It is foreign to our purpose to give any account of the campaign in Africa, which, it is well known, terminated in the utter defeat of the Carthaginians, who were obliged to sue for peace. This was granted them on very severe terms: all the cities and provinces which they possessed in Africa previously to the war, they were indeed permitted to retain, but they were stripped of Spain, and of all the islands in the Mediterranean; all their ships of war, except ten galleys, were to be delivered up to the Romans; and, for the future, they were not to maintain above that number at one time: even the size of their fishing boats and of their trading vessels was regulated. In the course of fifty years ten thousand talents were to be paid to the Romans. During a short truce which preceded the peace, the Carthaginians had seized and plundered a Roman squadron, which had been dispersed by a storm, and driven near Carthage; as a satisfaction for this, they were obliged to pay the Romans 25,000 pounds weight of silver. The successful termination of the second Punic war gave to the Romans complete dominion of the sea, on which they maintained generally 100 galleys. Commerce flourished, particularly that most important branch, the trade in corn, with which Rome, at this period, is said to have been so plentifully furnished, that the merchants paid their seamen with it.