Chapter III (5)

Notwithstanding, however, the exertions he made to acquire a naval force equal to that of the Romans, and the experience which his subjects gradually obtained in maritime affairs, he was not able to sustain their attacks, either by land or sea, but was compelled in a very few years to sue for peace. This he obtained, on the condition, that he should deliver up to the Romans all his covered gallies, and reserve to himself only a few smaller vessels: he was permitted, however, to retain one galley of sixteen banks of oars, a vessel rather for shew than use.

The success of the Romans, the extent of their conquests, and the ambitious views, which seemed wider and wider in proportion to their successes, alarmed Antiochus, king of Syria, who, not intimidated by the fate of Philip, resolved to declare war against them. They were never averse to engage in hostilities. The fleet of Antiochus consisted of 100 ships; that of the Romans was nearly equal in number; the ships of Antiochus, however, were inferior to those of his opponents in respect to strength and size, though surpassing them in swiftness. The hostile fleets met and engaged on the coast of Ionia; that of Antiochus was defeated, and would have been utterly captured or destroyed, had it not been for the swiftness of the vessels. In order to repair his loss, Antiochus sent for additional vessels from Sicily and Phoenicia; but these were taken on their passage by the Rhodians, who were at this time in alliance with the Romans. The Rhodians, however, in their turn were attacked and defeated by the fleet of Antiochus, near Samos, whither they had gone to join a Roman squadron.

In the meantime the Romans had collected a fleet of eighty ships, and with these they fought one hundred ships of their opponent off the coast of Ionia; the victory of the former was decisive, all the ships of Antiochus being captured or destroyed. This disaster, in connection with a signal defeat he sustained by land, compelled him to submit; and the Romans, always attentive to their maritime interests, which however they had not hitherto pushed nearly to the extent which they might have done, refused to grant him peace, except on the conditions, that he should cede all that part of Asia which lies between the sea and Mount Taurus; that he should give up all his vessels except ten; and that these should not, on any account, sail beyond the promontories of Cilicia. The Romans, extremely strict, and even severe, in enforcing the conditions of peace, not only destroyed fifty covered galleys, but, the successor of Antiochus having built additional vessels to the ten he was by treaty allowed to keep, they compelled him to burn them.

The temporary success of the Carthaginians against the Romans induced Philip, king of Macedon, to engage in that war which proved his ruin. The advice of Hannibal, when an exile at the court of Antiochus, likewise led to the disastrous war of that monarch with the same people; and by the advice of Hannibal also, Prusias, king of Bythinia, was engaged in hostilities with them. This king seems to have paid considerable attention to naval and commercial affairs, for both of which, indeed, his territories were admirably suited. In conjunction with the Rhodians, he made war against the inhabitants of Byzantium, and obliged them to remit the tax which they had been accustomed to levy on all vessels that sailed to or from the Euxine Sea, The maritime war between this sovereign and the Romans, who were at this time in alliance with Eumenes, king of Pergamus, offers nothing deserving our notice, except a stratagem executed by Hannibal. In order to compensate for the inferiority of Prusias' fleet, Hannibal ordered a great many serpents to be collected; these were put into pots, which, during the engagement, were thrown into the enemy's ships. The alarm and consternation occasioned by this novel and unexpected mode of warfare, threw his opponents into disorder, and compelled them to save themselves by flight.

The conquest of all the islands on the coast of Greece, from Epirus to Cape Malea, by the Romans, was the result of a naval war, in which they engaged with the Etolians, a people who, at this time, were so powerful at sea, and so much addicted to piracy, as to have drawn upon themselves the jealousy and the vengeance of the Romans. This extension of their dominions was followed by a successful war with the Istrians, which made them masters of all the western parts of the Mediterranean Sea; and by an equally successful war with Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, who was compelled to deliver up his fleet to them, as well as all the sea-ports of consequence on the coast of Sparta.

The Rhodians hitherto had been generally in alliance with the Romans; but differences arose between them during the war between the latter and Perseus, king of Macedon.

The island of Rhodes was remarkably well situated for maritime commerce; and its inhabitants did not fail to reap all the advantages in this respect which nature had so kindly bestowed on them. It appears from Homer, that in his time there were three cities in the island; but during the Peloponnesian war, the greater part of the inhabitants, having formed the resolution to settle in one place, built the city of Rhodes, after the designs of the same Athenian architect, who built the Piræus. This city was situated on the east coast of the island, at the foot of a hill, in the form of an amphitheatre: it possessed a very convenient and safe harbour, at the entrance of which there were two rocks; and on these, which were fifty feet asunder, the famous Colossus was placed. The arsenals of Rhodes were filled with every thing requisite for the defence of the city, or the equipment of a large fleet: its walls, which were extremely high, were defended by towers: its houses were built of stone: in short, the whole city presented a striking picture of wealth, magnificence, and beauty, for which it was not less indebted to art and commerce than to nature.

Before the era of the Olympiads, the Rhodians applied themselves to maritime affairs: for many years they seem to have been masters of the Mediterranean Sea; and their code of maritime laws became the standard with all the maritime nations of antiquity, by which all controversies regarding maritime affairs were regulated. There is great doubt among the learned, whether what still exist as the fragments of these laws are genuine: we know, however, that the Romans had a law which they called Lex Rhodia; according to some, this contained the regulations of the Rhodians concerning naval affairs; according to others, however, only one clause of the law, _de jactu_, about throwing goods overboard in a storm, was borrowed from the Rhodians.

Besides the commerce in which they themselves were engaged, the constant arrival of ships from Egypt to Greece, and from Greece to Egypt, the island being situated exactly in the passage between these countries, contributed much to their wealth. As this encreased, they formed settlements and colonies in many places; at Parthenope and Salapia, in Italy; Agrigentum and Geta, in Sicily; Rhodes, on the coast of Spain, near the foot of the Pyrenees, &c. They were particularly celebrated for and attentive to the construction of their vessels; aiming principally at lightness and speed, the discipline observed on board of them, and the skill and ability of their captains and pilots. All these things were under the direct management and controul of magistrates, appointed for the express purpose, who were excessively attentive and even rigid in the execution of their duty. Whoever entered certain places in the arsenals without permission, was punished with death.

A few of the most remarkable events in the maritime history of Rhodes, prior to their dispute with the Romans, call for some general and cursory notice. Till the foundation of the city of Rhodes, which, as we have already stated, took place during the Peleponnesian war, there is scarcely any thing to attract our attention: a short time before this, the republican form of government was established, and the trade and navigation of the Rhodians seem to have acquired a fresh impulse and spirit. But their enterprizes were soon checked by Artemisia, queen of Caria, gaining possession of their city: this she effected by a stratagem. The Rhodians invaded Caria with a design of gaining possession of Halicarnassus: by the direction of the queen, the inhabitants made a signal that they surrendered; the Rhodians suspecting no treachery, and delighted with their apparent success, left their fleet to take possession of the town; in the meantime, the queen brought her fleet from an adjoining creek, by means of some canal or other inland communication, to the port where the Rhodian vessels lay, and quietly took them. This disaster was the cause of another, still more calamitous to the Rhodians; for Artemisia sailed with the Rhodian ships to Rhodes, and the inhabitants, under the belief that their fleet was returning victorious, permitted the enemy to land and to seize the city. To what cause the Rhodions were indebted for the restoration of their liberty and independence we are not informed; but it was owing, either to the interference of the Athenians, or the death of Artemisia.

From the period of these events, which occurred about 350 years before Christ, till the reign of Alexander the Great, the Rhodians enjoyed profound and uninterrupted tranquillity; their commerce extended, and their wealth encreased. To this conqueror they offered no resistance, but of their own accord surrendered their cities and harbours; as soon, however, as they learnt that he was dead, they resumed their independence. About this time the greater part of their city was destroyed by a dreadful inundation, which would have swept the whole of it away, if the wall between it and the sea had not been broken down by the force of the waters, and thus given them free passage. This misfortune seems only to have encouraged the inhabitants to attend still more closely and diligently to commerce, which they carried on with so much industry and skill, and in such a profitable manner, that they soon rebuilt their city, and repaired all the losses they had sustained. Their alliance was courted by all their neighbours; but they resolved to adhere to a strict neutrality, and thus, while war raged among other nations, they were enabled to profit by that very circumstance, and thus became one of the most opulent states of all Asia. Their commerce, as well as that of all the states on the Mediterranean, being much molested and injured by the pirates, they undertook, of their own accord, and at their own expence, to root them out; and in this they completely succeeded.

But that commerce, on account of which they were so very anxious to keep at peace, involved them in war. Their most lucrative trade was with Egypt. When hostilities began between Ptolemy and Antigonus, the latter insisted that they should join him; this they refused to do; upon which his fleet blockaded Rhodes, to prevent their commerce with Egypt. The Rhodians were thus compelled to act against him in their own defence, in order to free their harbour. The raising of the blockade, and the defeat of his fleet, incensed Antiochus; and to the remonstrances and entreaties of the Rhodians to be permitted to remain at peace, he replied, "that they must declare war against Ptolemy, admit his fleet into their harbour, and give hostages for the performance of these articles." War now was inevitable, and great preparations for it were made on both sides: the attack on the city was committed by Antigonus to his son Demetrius; for this purpose he collected a fleet of 200 ships of war, 170 transports with 40,000 men on board, and 1000 vessels laden with provisions, stores, warlike engines, etc. This immense armament was composed partly of pirates and mercenaries, who were induced to join Demetrius, by the hope of partaking in the plunder of Rhodes. It is foreign to our purpose to enter on the details of this memorable siege: the Rhodians trusted principally to their own valour and resources; from Ptolemy, however, they received most ample and seasonable supplies of provisions: at one time he sent them 300,000 measures of corn; a few days afterwards Cassandra sent them 100,000 bushels of barley, and Lysimachus 400,000 bushels of corn, and as many of barley: these supplies, the valour of the inhabitants, and the ill success of some new and immense engines, on which Demetrius had mainly depended, at length induced him to raise the siege and make peace with the Rhodians.

The Rhodians endeavoured to make up for the time they had lost, and the money they had expended, during their war with Antiochus, by applying themselves entirely to navigation and commerce; so that, according to Polybius, they became masters of the sea, and the most opulent and flourishing state of those times. The next war in which they were engaged was occasioned entirely by their attention and regard to their commercial interests. We have already slightly noticed this war; but in this place it will be proper to go more into detail respecting it. The people of Byzantium determined to lay a toll on all ships that traded to the Euxine, in order to defray an annual tribute which they were obliged to pay to the Greeks. As one of the most important and lucrative branches of the commerce of Rhodes was to the countries lying on this sea, they were much aggrieved by this toll, and endeavoured to persuade the Byzantines to take it off, but in vain. Under these circumstances, they, in conjunction with Prusias, king of Bythinia, declared war against the Byzantines; and while their ally took Hieron, which seems to have been a great mart of the Byzantines, and the resort of most of the merchants trading to these parts, the Rhodians, with a powerful fleet, ravaged their coasts, and seized all their ships trading to the Euxine. The war was at length terminated under the mediation of the king of the Thracian Gauls; the Byzantines agreeing to take off the toll.

Their success in this war was counterbalanced by a dreadful earthquake, which threw down the Colossus, destroyed the arsenal, and damaged part of the walls and city. As the Rhodians, however, were much esteemed by most of their neighbours, who found their prosperity intimately connected with the prosperity of Rhodes, they soon recovered from these calamities and losses. Hiero, king of Syracuse, gave them 100 talents, and exempted them from all duties and taxes. Ptolemy gave them also the like sum, besides one million measures of wheat, and timber, etc. requisite for building fifty ships. Antiochus exempted all their vessels, which traded to his ports, from every kind of tax and duty. They received from other princes presents or privileges of equal importance and value; so that, in a very short time, they recovered their former opulence and trade, and rebuilt their walls, etc.

Their alliance with Attalus, king of Pergamus, involved them in a war with Philip king of Macedonia, and was the cause of their forming an alliance with the Romans. In this war the Rhodian fleet, in conjunction with the fleets of their allies, gained several victories over the fleet of Philip. The latter was at length obliged to sue to the Romans for peace, and they, in fixing the terms, included the Rhodians, to whom were ceded Stratonice, and the greater part of Caria. In the meantime Antiochus and the Romans had commenced hostilities, and the Rhodians were again involved in them: almost at their very commencement, their fleet was surprized by a stratagem of Antiochus's admiral, and of thirty ships of war of which it consisted, only seven escaped.

They soon, however, repaired their losses, and fitted out another fleet, with which they put to sea, for the purpose of preventing the junction of Hannibal with Antiochus's ships: the former had thirty-seven large ships; the Rhodian fleet was nearly equal in numbers, but inferior in size. The hostile fleets met off the coast of Pamphilia. The battle was obstinate: at first, by an oversight of the Rhodian admiral, some disorder occurred in part of his fleet; but this was soon repaired, and a decisive victory obtained. Part of Hannibal's fleet was captured, and the rest blocked up in the harbours of Pamphilia. The defeat of Antiochus, both at sea and land, by the Romans, to which we have already adverted, obliged this monarch to sue for peace, in which the Rhodians were included.

We have now arrived at that period of the history of Rhodes when the first difference arose between that city and the Romans: the latter suspected that the Rhodians favoured Perseus king of Macedon, with whom they were at war, and were moreover displeased at their presuming to interfere with them in his favour. In order to watch their inclinations and motions, the senate sent three commissioners to Rhodes: these found a fleet of forty galleys, which there was reason to believe had been intended to act against the Romans; but which, by the advice of the chief magistrate, were, on the arrival of the commissioners, ordered to sea, to act in union with them. Scarce, however, were the commissioners departed, when the Rhodians became lukewarm in the cause of the Romans; and although they sent a few of their galleys to join the Roman admiral, they kept the greatest number in port, waiting the issue of the war between them and the king of Macedonia. As soon as they heard of the defeat of the former in Thessaly, they entered into negotiations with Perseus, and at the same time sent ambassadors to Rome, who complained, that in consequence of the war between Perseus and the Romans, the navigation and commerce of Rhodes was greatly injured, their island deprived of provisions and other necessaries, and the customs and duties which their maritime situation formerly afforded them kept back, from their no longer being able to sail with safety along the coasts of Asia, where they used to levy the most important and productive of them.

After the defeat of Perseus, they ceased to remonstrate, and became submissive to the Romans. It is probable, however, that the Romans would have seized this opportunity of attacking them, had not Cato spoken very strongly in their favour: in consequence of his arguments and influence, and by the cession of Lycia and Caria, they were again admitted to an alliance with the Romans.

The advantages they derived from this alliance were so great, that they resisted the promises and the threats of Mithridates, when he engaged in hostilities with the Romans. This monarch, therefore, resolved to employ his whole force by sea and land against them: they were not however dismayed, but placed a firm reliance on their skill in maritime affairs. They divided their fleet into three squadrons: one drawn up in a line protected the entrance of the harbour; and the other two, at a greater distance from the shore, were stationed to watch the approach of the enemy. Mithridates also divided his fleet, which was more numerous than that of the Rhodians, into three squadrons; one of these he himself commanded, on board of a quinquereme, and directed to attack the squadron which was protecting the port. The Rhodians gradually retired before the enemy, till they came close to the mouth of the harbour: Mithridates in vain endeavoured to break their line, and force an entrance; in all his attempts he was defeated with considerable loss; and his land forces, which he had embarked in transports, being dispersed in a storm, he was obliged to retire from before the city.

The Romans acknowledged the benefits they derived from the valour of the Rhodians on this occasion; and they again experienced it, in the war which Pompey carried on against the Cilician pirates, though that commander took all the merit to himself. In the civil war between him and Caesar, they assisted the former with a numerous fleet, under the command of one of their best seamen, who distinguished himself above all Pompey's captains, and gained very considerable advantages over Caesar's fleet. On the death of Pompey they joined Csesar: this exposed them to the hostility of Cassius; they endeavoured to pacify him by promising to recal the ships they had sent to the assistance of Caesar, but he demanded the delivery of their whole fleet, and that he should be put in possession of their harbour and city. To these terms they would not accede, but prepared for war, by equipping a fleet of thirty-three ships, and placing it under the command of one of their best officers. A battle ensued which was fought on both sides with great skill and bravery; but the Rhodians were obliged to yield to the superior number of the Roman fleet, and to return to the harbour, having lost two of their ships, and the rest being very much damaged. It is remarked by the ancient historians who relate this battle, that it was the first time the Rhodians were fairly overcome in a sea-fight.

Cassius followed up his success by bringing against Rhodes a fleet of eighty ships of war, and 200 transports. Against this formidable armament the Rhodians again put to sea, and a second battle ensued, which was more obstinately contested than the first: the Romans however were again victorious, and the city of Rhodes was blocked up by sea and land. Its fate was soon determined; for some of the inhabitants, dreading a famine, opened the gates to the Romans. Cassius, besides other severe terms, obliged the Rhodians to deliver up all their ships, and all their public treasures; the temples were plundered, and 8000 talents extorted from private individuals, besides a fine of 500 levied on the city.

From this time till the reign of Vespasian, when the island became a Roman province, it was sometimes oppressed, and sometimes favoured by the Romans; according, as Tacitus remarks, as they obliged them with their assistance in foreign wars, or provoked them with their seditions at home.

In order to complete the maritime history of Rhodes, we have rather advanced beyond the period to which we had brought down our notices of the Roman navigation and commerce: these therefore we shall now resume at the war between Perseus king of Macedonia and the Romans. Perseus harassed the coasts of Italy, plundered and sunk all their ships, while they found it difficult to oppose him by sea, or protect their coasts, for want of a fleet. This induced them to prepare for service fifty vessels; but though their allies augmented this number, the Romans do not seem to have performed any thing of consequence by sea. This is attributed principally to the circumstance, that the fleet, on examination, was discovered to be in bad condition, neither equipped sufficiently in stores or provisions, and the seamen who were to have navigated it were either dead or absent, while those who did appear were ill paid and worse clothed; these facts sufficiently demonstrate the little care which the Romans, even at this period, bestowed on maritime affairs. The defeat of Perseus at Pidna, and his subsequent capture by the Romans in the island of Samothrace, rendered it unnecessary for them to supply the deficiences of their fleet. The immense ship, which, as we have already mentioned, Philip, Perseus's father, employed in his war against the Romans, was taken on this occasion; and Paulus Emilius, the consul, sailed up the Tiber in it: it had 16 banks of oars. Many other ships of large size were also captured; these were brought to Rome, and drawn into the Campus Martius.

One of the allies of the unfortunate Perseus was the king of Illyria, who was powerful at sea, and ravaged the coasts of Italy opposite to his dominions. While the consul was sent against Perseus, the management of the naval war against the Illyrians was committed to the praetor: as he was well aware of the maritime force of his opponent, he acted with great caution; his first success, in capturing some of their snips, induced him to land all his forces in Illyria, where, after an obstinate battle, he compelled the king to surrender at discretion. Macedonia and Illyria were thus reduced to the state of Roman provinces; but the Romans regarded these victories as of importance, more on account of the accession they made to their territories, than on account of the advantages which they might thence derive to their commerce or their naval power: so little, indeed, did they regard them in the latter point of view, that they gave the 220 ships which were surrendered to them by the king of Illyria, to the inhabitants of Cephalonia, of Apollonia, and Dyrrhachium, who at the time were much celebrated for their trade and navigation. Although their seacoasts had been repeatedly ravaged, we are informed by Polybius, that, from the time of Philip, king of Macedonia, till long after the defeat of Perseus, they entirely neglected the coasts of Illyria, from which, till this country was subdued by them, their own coasts were generally invaded, and by means of the ports and produce of which, after it became a Roman province, they might greatly have augmented their navy and commerce.

The Carthaginians had been gradually recovering from the losses which they had sustained during the second Punic war, and witnessed with satisfaction their enemies involved in constant hostilities, in the hope that the issue of these would prove fatal to them, or, at least, so far weaken them, as to enable them to oppose Rome with more success than they had hitherto done. While the war was carried on between the Romans and the Macedonians, they made great, but secret, preparations to regain their former power; but the Romans, who always kept a watchful and jealous eye on the operations of all their rivals, were particularly nearsighted with regard to whatever was doing by the Carthaginians. They received information that at Carthage there was deposited a large quantity of timber, and of other naval stores: on learning this, Cato, their inveterate enemy, who had been sent into Africa, to mediate between them and Masinissa, with whom they were at war, went to Carthage himself, where he examined every thing with a malicious eye. On his return to Rome, he reported that Carthage was again become excessively rich,--that her magazines were filled with all kinds of warlike stores,--that her ports were crowded with ships, and that by her war with Masinissa, she was only preparing to renew the war against Rome. His exhortations to his countrymen to anticipate the Carthaginians, by immediately commencing hostilities, had no effect at first; but being frequently repeated, and intelligence being received, that preparations were making at Carthage for an open declaration of war, and that the Carthaginians were fitting out a fleet, contrary to the terms of their treaty with the Romans; and this information being confirmed by the report of deputies sent to Carthage; war was declared against Carthage in the year of Rome 605. The Carthaginians endeavoured to pacify the Romans by surrendering to them their cities, lands, rivers, &c., in short, by a complete surrender of whatever they possessed, as well as of themselves. At first the Romans appeared disposed to abstain from war on these conditions; and the Carthaginians actually delivered up all their arms and warlike engines, and witnessed the burning of their fleet; but the Romans, having thus degraded them, and stript them in a great measure of the means of defence, now insisted that Carthage itself should be destroyed, and that the inhabitants should build a city at the distance of five leagues from, the sea. Indignant at these demands, they resolved to sustain a siege; and, in a very short time, they made immense preparations for defending their city. At first they gained some success over the Romans; for their fleet having come very near the shore, to transport the troops, who were suffering from the vicinity of the marshes, to a healthier spot, the Carthaginians fitted out a great number of fire ships, filled with tar, sulphur, bitumen, &c., and taking advantage of a favourable wind, they sent them among the Roman fleet, great part of which was thus destroyed.

But these and other successes did not ultimately avail them: Scipio who had been chosen consul, arrived in Africa, and Carthage was immediately strictly blocked up by sea and land. His exertions were indeed astonishing; as the new port of Carthage was effectually shut up by the Roman fleet, so that no assistance or provisions could enter by it; and as lines of circumvallation were formed on land, the consul's great object was to block up the old port. The Romans were masters of the western neck of land, which formed one side of its entrance; from this to the other side they built a mole, ninety feet broad at bottom, and eighty at top; when this was completed, the old port was rendered quite inaccessible and useless.

The Carthaginians on their part, imagined and executed works as surprising as those of the Romans: deprived of both their ports, they dug, in a very short time, a new harbour, from which they cut a passage to the sea; and they built and equipped a fleet of fifty ships, which put to sea through this new harbour. The Romans were astonished when they beheld a fleet, of the existence or possibility of which they had no conception, advancing out of a harbour, the formation of which equally astonished them, and this fleet daring to hazard an engagement. The battle continued during the whole day, with little advantage on either side; but, notwithstanding all their efforts, and some partial and temporary successes, Carthage was at length compelled to submit to Scipio, and was at first plundered, and afterwards destroyed. The Romans burnt the new fleet which the Carthaginians had built: indeed, in general, instead of augmenting their own naval force, when they subdued any of their maritime enemies, they either destroyed their ships or bestowed them on some of their allies; a certain proof, as Huet remarks, of the very little regard they paid to sea affairs.

We are expressly informed, in the Life of Terence, generally ascribed to Suetonius, that before the destruction of Carthage, the Romans did not trade to Africa: but though his words are express, they must not be taken literally; for we have already proved, that in the treaties between Rome and Carthage at a very early period, the voyages undertaken by the Romans, on account of trade, to Sicily, Sardinia, and parts of Africa are expressly mentioned in diem, and the people of Utica are particularized as the allies of the Romans, and a people with whom they traded. It is certain, however, that the author of the Life of Terence is correct, if he merely meant, that till after the destruction of Carthage the Romans had no regular commerce with Africa. From the date of this event, it became of great importance, though confined chiefly to slaves, most of whom were brought from Africa, to the island of Delos: this, as has been already stated, was a great depôt for them, as well as other kinds of merchandize. The capture of Carthage and of Corinth, which took place nearly at the same time, increased considerably the number of slaves for sale.

Still, however, though the Romans now began to be sensible of the value of commence, they did little to protect it; for soon after the termination of the third Punic war, the Mediterranean swarmed with pirates, who plundered the merchant ships of all nations. These pirates belonged principally to the Balearic islands, to Cilicia and to Crete. In one of the Balearic islands, called Minor by the ancients, the present Minorca, there were two cities built near the mouths of convenient harbours; the inhabitants of these carried on a considerable commerce, and at the same time engaged in piracy. They were uncommonly active and daring in this pursuit, attacking and robbing every ship they met with; they even had the courage, or the rashness, to oppose the Roman fleet, under the command of the consul Metellus; but they were beaten, and for a time obliged to abstain from their piratical proceedings.

They were soon again, however, emboldened to resume them, by the assistance and example of the inhabitants of Crete and Cilicia. This latter country, situated in Asia Minor, and possessing a sea-coast which extended along the Mediterranean, from east to west, nearly 250 miles, was fertile beyond most parts of Asia Minor; though on the coast, it was reckoned unhealthy. The principal commercial town was Alexandria, built by Alexander the Great, between Issus and the straits that lead from Cilicia into Syria; its situation being very favourable for carrying on trade to all the western parts of the Mediterranean, as well as to Egypt, the Euxine, &c. it soon became one of the most flourishing cities in the world. But the Cilicians were not content with lawful and regular trade: in the time of the Mithridatic war, and even before it, they began to plunder the neighbouring coasts; and being successful in these predatory expeditions, they extended them as far as the coasts of Greece and Italy, on which they landed, and carried off a great number of the inhabitants, whom they sold as slaves. The Romans at length deemed it absolutely necessary to act with vigour against them. Publius Servilius, who was employed on this occasion, defeated them in a sea-battle, and took most of their strong-holds. For a short time afterwards, they abstained from their predatory excursions; but, as we shall soon have occasion to notice, they resumed them whenever they had repaired their losses, and thought the Romans otherwise employed.

The island of Crete was regarded by the ancients as difficult of access; most of its harbours were exposed to the wind; but as it was easy for ships to sail out of them, when the wind was moderate and favourable, they were convenient for commerce to almost any part of the then commercial world. The ancients, according to Strabo, reckoned that ships which sailed from the eastern part of Crete would arrive in Egypt in three or four days; and, according to Diodorus Siculus, in ten days they would arrive at the Pulus Mæotis. The principal seaports were Bithynia, which had a very convenient haven; and Heracles, the seaport of the Gnossians. To these, merchants from all parts of the world resorted. There were, besides, a great many creeks and bays. This island would have been much more commercial and flourishing than it actually was, considering its favourable situation, &c., had it not been divided into a great number of independent states, who were jealous of each other's prosperity, and almost constantly at war amongst themselves. In very early times, when the whole island was subject to one sovereign, the Cretans were powerful at sea; they had subjected even before the Trojan war, some of the islands in the Egean Sea, and formed colonies and commercial establishments on the coasts of Asia Minor and Europe. At the breaking out of the Trojan war, they sent eighty ships to the assistance of the Greeks. But as soon as the island was divided into independent republics, their navigation and commerce seem to have declined. Their piratical expeditions were conducted with so much boldness and success, especially at the time when the Romans were engaged in hostilities with Mithridates, that they determined to curb them. Anthony, the father of Marc Anthony, was appointed to execute their vengeance; but, too confident of success, he was beaten by the Cretans in a sea-battle. This naturally encouraged them to carry on their piracies on a greater scale, and with more boldness; but their triumph was of short duration, for Metellus, the proconsul, having defeated their forces, united with those of the Cilician pirates, landed on the island, and subdued the whole of it.

In the meantime, Mithridates, who had been very instrumental in encouraging the pirates to commit depredations on the Roman vessels and coasts, was vigorously preparing for war with the republic. His naval force, formed partly of his own ships, and partly from those of most of the maritime states, all of whom were jealous and afraid of the Romans, and regarded Mithridates as their protector and deliverer, insulted even the coasts of Italy. We have already noticed his unsuccessful sea-fight with the Rhodians, almost the only people who continued faithful to the Romans. The latter, at length, were fully sensible of the absolute necessity of forming such a fleet as would enable them successfully to oppose Mithridates, who was master, not only of Asia, but of all Greece, and the adjacent islands, except Rhodes. Sylla was employed against him; but as he had very few ships, he sent Lucullus to Syria, Egypt, Lybia, and Cyprus, to collect a fleet. From Ptolemy, who was afraid of the power of Mithridates, and, perhaps, jealous of the Romans, he received no vessels; but from the other quarters he received considerable supplies of ships and experienced mariners. It is probable, however, that by sea the Romans would not have been able to cope with Mithridates, had not that monarch been beaten by land, and had not his admiral, Archelaus, delivered up the fleet under his command to Sylla. In the meantime, Mithridates was blocked up in Pitane, a city near Troy, from which he could not have escaped, if Lucullus had brought his fleet against it; this, however, out of jealousy to the Roman general Fimbria, he refused to do, contenting himself with naval operations. In these he was successful, gaining two victories over Mithridates's fleet, near the coast of Troy. These defeats, and the treachery of Archelaus, nearly annihilated the maritime force of Mithridates. But this monarch was not easily dispirited; in a short time he collected another fleet, and invaded Bithynia. It was therefore necessary for the Romans to send a fleet thither, which they did, under the command of Cotta. This fleet, however, was far inferior to that of the king, which consisted of 400 ships of thirty oars, besides a great many smaller vessels. On learning this, Lucullus, who had the chief command, ordered Cotta to remain in the harbour of Chalcedon; but Mithridates, relying on his strength, sailed into the very harbour, and burnt the Roman fleet. The loss of the Romans consisted of sixty ships, and 8000 of their mariners slain, besides 4500 taken prisoners. As this success of Mithridates encouraged the cities of Asia to revolt, Lucullus resolved, if possible, to counterbalance it with still more decisive success on his part by land; he accordingly besieged him in his camp. Being reduced to great straits, Mithridates was forced to escape by sea towards Byzantium; but on his voyage he was overtaken by a violent storm, in which sixty of his ships were sunk; he himself must have perished, if he had not been rescued by a pirate, who landed him safe in Pontus. Mithridates still had a small float of fifty ships, on board of which were 10,000 land forces. These were at sea; but with what object does not appear: they were met, however, near Lemnos, by a Roman squadron, and entirely defeated; thirty-two of them being captured, and the rest sunk. On receiving information of this victory, the Roman senate ordered Lucullus to be paid 3000 talents to repair and augment his fleet; but he refused them, answering, "that with the succours he could get from their allies, he should be able to gain the dominion of the sea, and conquer Mithridates:" at the same time he sent to Rome 110 galleys, armed with beaks. Mithridates, however, was still formidable at sea, and continued so, till the Romans gained another victory over him, near the island of Tenedos, in which they took and sunk sixty ships: after this, he was not able to fit out another fleet. As the remainder of the war between him and the Romans was entirely confined to land operations, we shall pass it by, and proceed to the other naval enterprizes of the Romans about this period.

The war with Mithridates employed the attention and the resources of the Romans so completely, that the pirates again infested the Mediterranean seas without control. Their numbers and force were greatly augmented by the destruction of Carthage and Corinth; for the inhabitants of these cities, having neither a place of retreat, nor the means of subsistence, naturally turned their thoughts to piracy, having been accustomed to sea affairs, and to commerce. In this they were encouraged by Mithridates, and assisted by some persons of considerable rank and wealth. The inability of the Romans to attend to them, and the success and encouragement they obtained, induced them to conduct their piracies on a regular, systematic, and extensive plan. Their ships were constantly at sea: all commerce was interrupted; with their 1000 galleys--for so numerous were they--they exercised a complete sovereignty over all the coasts of the Mediterranean. They formed themselves into a kind of commonwealth, selected magistrates and officers, who appointed each fleet its respective station and object, and built watch-towers, arsenals, and magazines. They depended chiefly on Cilicia for the necessary supplies for their fleets. Emboldened by their success, and by the occupation afforded to the Romans by Mithridates, they ravaged the whole line of the Italian coast; sacked the towns and temples, from which they expected a considerable booty; plundered the country seats on the sea-shore; carried off the inhabitants for slaves; blocked up all the ports of the republic; ventured as far as the entrance of the Tiber; sunk part of the Roman fleet at Ostia, and even threatened Rome itself, which they more than once deprived of its ordinary and necessary subsistence. The scarcity of provisions was, indeed, not confined to Rome; but no vessel venturing to sea in the Mediterranean without being captured, it extended to those parts of Asia and Africa which lie on that sea. Their inveteracy, however, was principally directed against the Roman commerce, and the Romans themselves. If any of their captives declared himself to be a Roman, they threw themselves in derision at his feet, begging his pardon, and imploring his protection; but after they had insolently sported with their prisoner, they often dressed him in a toga, and then, casting out a ship's ladder, desired him to return home, and wished him a good journey. If he refused to leap into the sea, they threw him overboard, saying, "that they would not by any means keep a free-born Roman in captivity!"

In order to root out this dreadful evil, Gabinius, the tribune of the people, proposed a law, to form, what he called, the proconsulate of the seas. This law, though vigorously opposed at first, eventually was carried. The person to whom this new office was to be entrusted, was to have maritime power, without control or restriction, over all the seas, from the Pillars of Hercules to the Thracian Bosphorus, and the countries lying on these seas, for fifty miles inland: he was to be empowered to raise as many seamen and troops as he deemed necessary, and to take, out of the public treasury, money sufficient to pay the expence of paying them, equipping the ships, and executing the objects of the law. The proconsulate of the seas was to be vested in the same person for three years.

As Gabinius was the known friend of Pompey, all Pompey's enemies strenuously opposed this law, as evidently intended to confer authority on him; but the people not only passed it, but granted Pompey, who was chosen to fill the office, even more than Gabinius had desired, for they allowed him to equip 500 ships, to raise 120,000 foot, and to select out of the senate twenty senators to act as his lieutenants.

As soon as Pompey was vested with the authority conferred by this law, he put to sea; and, by his prudent and wise measures, not less than by his activity and vigour, within four months (instead of the three years which were allowed him) he freed the seas from pirates, having beaten their fleet in an engagement near the coast of Cilicia, and taken or sunk nearly 1000 vessels, and made himself master of 120 places on the coast, which they had fortified: in the whole of this expedition he did not lose a single ship. In order effectually to prevent the pirates from resuming their depredations, he sent them to people some deserted cities of Cilicia.

It might have been supposed that as the Romans had suffered so much from the pirates, and as Rome itself was dependent for subsistence on foreign supplies of corn, which could not be regularly obtained, while the pirates were masters of the seas, they would have directed their attention more than they did to maritime affairs and commerce, especially after the experience they had had of the public calamities which might thus be averted. This, however, was not the case, even after the war against the pirates, which was so successfully terminated by Pompey; for Pompey's son, who opposed the triumvirate, by leaguing with the pirates, (of what nation we are not informed,) repeatedly, during his warfare, reduced the city of Rome to great straits for want of corn.

As the operations by sea which he carried on, in conjunction with the pirates, are the last recorded in history, by means of which Rome was reduced to such straits, and as this repeated proof of the absolute necessity of rendering her independent of any maritime power for supplies of corn, seems to have been the chief inducement with Augustus to establish regular and powerful corn fleets, we shall notice them in this place, though rather posterior to the period of Roman history at which we have arrived.

The younger Pompey, it would appear, was sensible that his father's fame and fortune had been first established by his success at sea: this induced him to apply himself to maritime affairs, and, when he resolved to oppose the triumvirate, to trust principally to his experience and force by sea, to oblige them to comply with his terms. Accordingly, he built several ships, some of which are said to have been covered with leather: he associated himself with all the pirates he could meet with; and, when sufficiently powerful, he took possession of Sardinia, Sicily, and Corcyra, made himself master of the whole Mediterranean sea, and intercepted all the convoys which were carrying provisions and other necessaries to Rome. The occupation of Sicily enabled him to prevent any corn from being shipped from that island, and to intercept all that came from the eastern ports of the Mediterranean. His possession of Sardinia and Corcyra enabled him to intercept all that came from the west, while he captured all that came from Africa by his squadrons, which were constantly cruising in that direction.

It may easily be imagined, that when Rome was deprived of her supplies of corn from Sicily, Africa, and the Euxine, she could not long subsist, without being threatened with famine: this was actually the case, the inhabitants were near starving, and it became necessary for the triumvirate to relieve them, either by conquering Pompey, or coming to terms with him. But Rome alone did not suffer: the rest of Italy was also deprived, in a great measure, of provisions, and its coasts insulted and plundered. Octavianus, one of the triumvirate, at first resolved, with the advice of Anthony, to raise a naval force, and oppose Pompey; but when he attempted to lay a tax on the inhabitants of Rome and the rest of Italy, though it was to prevent them from starving, they resisted it with so much violence and determination, that he was obliged to abandon the measure.

As, however, the famine still continued, the triumvirate agreed to come to an accommodation with Pompey: the principal terms were, that the latter should retain possession of Sicily, Sardinia,. &c.; and that he should moreover receive Peloponnesus; that he might endeavour to obtain the consulate; that the dignity of Pontifex Maximus should be granted him; that he should be paid 70,000 great sesterces out of his father's confiscated estate; and that such of his companions as chose should be allowed to return. On his part, he promised, that he would no longer interrupt the Roman trade and navigation; that he would no longer build ships, nor make descents on the coasts of Italy, nor receive the slaves who fled to him; and that he would immediately send to Rome the corn he had detained, oblige the Sicilians to pay annually the tribute of corn due to Rome by that island, and clear the seas of all the pirates.

From these terms it may be seen how dependent Rome, even at this period, was on foreign supplies of corn, and how weak she was at sea. Pompey and the triumvirate seem neither to have been sincere in this treaty: the former, who still retained the title of governor of the maritime coasts, had derived too great advantage from his superiority at sea, and his connection with the pirates, easily to relinquish either; while, on the other hand, the triumvirate could not regard themselves as masters of the republic, so long as Pompey had it in his power to starve the city of Rome. They, therefore, soon quarrelled; upon which Pompey caused his old ships to be refitted, and new ones to be built; and, when he had got a sufficient force, he again blocked up the ports of Italy, and reduced the inhabitants of the capital to the utmost distress for want of provisions. Octavianus, (Augustus Cæsar,) to whom the protection of Italy was assigned, had neither the courage nor the means to oppose Pompey, who, probably, would speedily have forced the triumvirate, to grant him conditions still more favourable than the former ones, had it not been for the defection of one of his admirals. As he was an officer of great valour and experience in maritime affairs, and carried over with him the numerous fleet which he commanded, Augustus was emboldened and rendered better able to cope with Pompey by sea. The latter, rather enraged than intimidated by this defection, sent another of his admirals, who had always been jealous of the one who had gone over to Augustus, with a numerous fleet, to ravage the coasts of Italy. On his return, he fell in with a fleet of Augustus, on board of which was his rival. An obstinate battle ensued: at first Pompey's fleet was worsted; but in the issue it was victorious, and the greater number of Augustus' ships were sunk, captured, or driven on shore. As soon as Augustus learnt the issue of this battle, he resolved to sail from Tarentum, where he then was, pass the straits of Messina, and reinforce the shattered remains of his squadron; but, while he was in the straits, his ships were attacked by Pompey himself, and most of them sunk or dashed to pieces: with great difficulty he escaped. He was now in a dreadful situation; without ships or money; while the inhabitants of Rome were on the point of rising against his authority, for want of corn. In this extremity he applied to Anthony, who immediately came to his aid with 300 sail of ships. As Anthony needed land-forces, which, under the present circumstances, were of no use to Augustus, they agreed to an interchange: Augustus gave Anthony two legions; and Anthony, on his part, left with Augustus 100 armed galleys. In addition to these, Octavia obtained from her husband twenty small ships, as a reinforcement to her brother.