Chapter XIV: Book II: Entitled Lucullus (1)

§§1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was
absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to
attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great
general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory
(2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander
and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my
consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now
tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher,
having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those
enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know
philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who
hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge
show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics
do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.
This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to
inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools
are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
_Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of
Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the
doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He
spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius
the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time
the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of
Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old
teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the
latter against Philo (12).

§1. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_: a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_ comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading _dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold. _Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._ _Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation. _Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II. 16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.

§2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures, though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_ is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether. In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in _T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants. _Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_. _Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12, Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making it active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus ad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf. _consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.

§3. _Genere_: "department" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: [Greek: naumachiais]. _Instrumento et adparatu_: [Greek: kataskeuê kai paraskeuê]. _Rex_: Mithridates. _Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course _rex_ to be nom. to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and that _quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think improbable. _Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_, which however, is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and _Verr._ V. 64, the _que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On this subject see Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows that in Cic. a parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with its principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same holds of _quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use of litigation, [Greek: sykophantia]. The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but the conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n. on 23.

§4. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words. _Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu, nunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_, arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he could not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be _pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying "_veterem lectionem iugulavit Faber_". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter give _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like ours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS. has _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv. _Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as simply = _libris_.

§5. _Ac_: strong, as often, = [Greek: kai mên]. _Personarum_: public characters, [Greek: prosôpôn poleôs] (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_ 6. _Multi ... plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_ by _dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it. On the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of _putant_ or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._ followed by genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling see Introd. p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". _Historiae loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than "history," which is better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb _loqui_ not _dicere_ is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings in Egypt and the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the embassy see _Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_, Dav. _auditorem_.

§6. _Illigari_: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc. qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar argument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the ballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb, as in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often wrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after _nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not the dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De Republica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of. _Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_: notice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences.

§7. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ §3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was. _Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra omnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and _quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction, while another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The omission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. 2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60. _Contentione_: = [Greek: philoneikia] as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_: cf. I. 44 _rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_. _Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has _diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to be Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: [Greek: ep' amphotera], cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: "embody," cf. n. on I. 19.

§8. _Probabilia_: [Greek: pithana], for which see 33. _Sequi_: "act upon," cf. 99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105, also _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._ 64. _Integra_: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "_non mihi integrum est_"--"I have committed my self." _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_. _Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_: Orelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_, c.

§9. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which was simply _ut potuerunt_, "granting that they had the ability, they gained it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a single hearing," etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_. Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "_arguta hariolatio_," read _an_ for _aut_ and put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann (Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125 has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and _ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says "_non solum Latina non est, sed sanae menti repugnat_." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf. _N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: "which they have learned to love;" the _ad_ has the same force as [Greek: pro] in [Greek: promanthanein], which means "to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees" (cf. [Greek: proumathon stergein kakois]), not, as the lexica absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly." _Constantissime_: "most consistently". _Quae est ad Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this _xystus_ was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called [Greek: xystos] from its polished floor and pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14.

§10. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence, found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in promptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_: Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read _dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non fuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_ etc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note. _Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in _Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to his separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the perfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is indeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum Responsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a rule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with _labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33. _Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in the learning of Lucullus.

§11. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj. _Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this passage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the _Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this indication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50. _Implorans_: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with tears," see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_: i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have Tetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has _Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like _Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a derivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_ would then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and _Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an ill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on _denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." _De_ and _ex_ are common in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I. 39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3.

§12. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer. makes it mean, "_coram Philone_." I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus the elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the title. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems unknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual with these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for _leniter_.

§§13--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious
tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of
scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of
Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they
were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made
during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of
ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti.
Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really
been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no
argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add
nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however
do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was
induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to
avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the [Greek: katalêptikê
phantasia] really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he
was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in
to the sceptics (18).

§13. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: [Greek: dêmotikous]. _Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav. _aut hos_. The omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s letters. _C. Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_: one good MS. has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have _annos_. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed it may be doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to express duration (cf. Prop. I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this is L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (_De Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and so severe a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently the man who made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C. _P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_: Lamb. _viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in the year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the legal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.

§14. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_. _Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471) has _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name Zeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of Lucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage. _Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_ in _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August. _Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia vel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._ II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of the _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo nascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_.

§15. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14. _Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: "had denied, as they said." _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the _Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf. Madv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has _agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his "Annals." The same statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3).

§16. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid _Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps _vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I. 197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not _knowledge_, but mere _opinion_." The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for _vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable. _Quod investigata sunt_: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again disturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._ V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est igitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads _quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of the _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek [Greek: tropoi] (_Brut._ 69) and [Greek: allêgoria] in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is given. _Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem eripere_), _N.D._ I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 (_quasdam nebulas obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the use of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known at all, from these two passages only.

§17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by saying [Greek: ouk agô scholên pros tauta]" (Zeller 85, n.). In another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr. occurs in 74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf. fragm. 1 of Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7, not _verbum de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. _Comprehensio_: cf. I. 41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. 44 _ut Democritus_. _Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were _illustratio_ (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15). _Fabricemur_: cf. 87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_: this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa evidentia_: note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.

§18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. 19. [Greek: Akatalêpton]: the conj. of Turnebus [Greek: katalêpton] is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in _negaret_. _Visum_: cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum effictumque_ are equivalent to [Greek: enapesphragismenê kai enapomemagmenê] in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration ([Greek: heteroiôsis]) of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset_: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv. Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic. omits to represent the words [Greek: kat' auto to hyparchon]. Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The [Greek: phantasia] therefore which he had although [Greek: apo hyparchontos] (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not [Greek: kata to hyparchon], i.e. did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: [Greek: kritêrion], a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime volt_: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia], which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be [Greek: akatalêpta], Philo held them to be [Greek: katalêpta], and Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be _in their own nature_ [Greek: katalêpta (hoson de epi tê physei tôn pragmatôn autôn katal.)]. But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in themselves_ were incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia] professed to be able to get at _the thing in itself_, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the [Greek: katal. phant.] and substituted no other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic against the [Greek: katal. phant.] as a mere feint intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in 112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "_quod impressum esset e vero_" ([Greek: phantasia apo hyparchontos enapomemagmenê]), refusing to add "_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ ([Greek: hoia ouk an genoito apo mê hyparchontos]), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the [Greek: dêlon] or [Greek: pithanon] of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The scarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book entitled _Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_ knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.

§§19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give
perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain
the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which
impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we
always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated
senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!
(20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions
of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since
they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at
definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic
memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).
That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would
act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?
(23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence
must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action
is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end
to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be
discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should
be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy
too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the
Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is
impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades
said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the
supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus
declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if
they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).

§19. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like [Greek: aisthêsis] means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an individual act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II. 67. _Non videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo inflexo et de collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The [Greek: kôpê enalos keklasmenê] and [Greek: peristeras trachêlos] are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I. 119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27. _Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic. held all sensation, _per se_, to be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_: cf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ... diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I. 118 [Greek: pemptos esti logos] (i.e. the 5th sceptic [Greek: tropos] for showing sense to be untrustworthy) [Greek: ho para tas theseis] (_situs_) [Greek: kai ta diastêmata] (_intervalla_) [Greek: kai tous topous]. _Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 [Greek: panta poiei mechris an tranên kai plêktikên spasê phantasian]. _Sui iudicii_: see for the gen. _M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. _Persa_ V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus quisque_ as a single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46.

§20. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin cernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II. 27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and _lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. [Greek: skia] and [Greek: skiasma] are opposed to [Greek: lampra]; cf. also [Greek: skiagraphein], _adumbrare_, and Aesch. _Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an answer is given) and [Greek: anabolê]. _Antiopam_: of Pacuvius. _Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._ I. 23. _Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the Socratic Schools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: [Greek: aisthêsis] being their only [Greek: kritêrion]. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_, comparing 39, 58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition of _inter_ cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction between pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For the sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102.

§21. _Illud est album_: these are [Greek: axiômata], judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too long to quote entire: [Greek: aisthêsesi men oun monais labein talêthes] (which resides only in the [Greek: axiôma]) [Greek: ou dynatai anthrôpos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achthênai tou toioutou pragmatos "touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin." tôi de toioutôi pragmati ouketi tês aisthêseôs ergon estin epiballein ... syneseôs te dei kai mnêmês]. _Ille deinceps_: _deinceps_ is really out of place; cf. 24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._ _Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to consider that the [Greek: axiôma], which affirms the existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts. _Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII. [Greek: anthrôpos esti zôon logikon thnêton, nou kai epistêmês dektikon]. The Stoic [Greek: horoi], and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II. 208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of [Greek: prolêpsis] and [Greek: ennoia], for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40 _notiones rerum_ is given. _Sine quibus_: [Greek: dia gar tôn ennoiôn ta pragmata lambanetai] Diog. VII. 42.

§22. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_: so Sextus constantly uses [Greek: akolouthon]. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and n. _Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae potest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the like, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato _Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition of an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II. 17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: technên einai systêma ek katalêpseon syngegymnasmenôn] _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from plural to singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._ II. 61, _Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 [Greek: ou dioisei tês atechnias hê technê]. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of [Greek: technai] called [Greek: apotelesmatikai] to the usual [Greek: theôrêtikai] and [Greek: praktikai], also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where [Greek: poiêtikê] corresponds to the [Greek: apot.] of Sext. _Continget_: "will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb _contingit_ denotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on _T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: [Greek: mellei metacheirizesthai].

§23. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of [Greek: katalêpsis] here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but _multa_. This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all [Greek: epistêmê] depends on [Greek: katalêpseis]; cf. I. 40, 41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. _Stabilem_: [Greek: bebaion kai ametaptôtou]. _Artem vivendi_: "_tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos_" _M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about [Greek: hê oneiropoloumenê peri ton bion technê] (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq). _Ille vir bonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the _sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29, 75, _T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the [Greek: sophos] in Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think C.F. Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts _ut_ after _potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms that _ut_ is frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De Off._ I. 86, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy must be _desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the famous _abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption that the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus sit ... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj. expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir bonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368.

§24. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held that the sceptic must, if consistent, be [Greek: anenergêtos en biôi] (Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate [Greek: telos] are made in D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I. 23 for the phrase _Naturae accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression, [Greek: hômoiômenon tê physei]; cf. 38 and _D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390. _Impellimur_: [Greek: kinoumetha], Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.

§25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122 of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I. 262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42. _Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.

§26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_. _Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as [Greek: anairein] does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The expression _dux vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5 and Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural light, _lumen_ artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus, nec satis lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is the same difference between [Greek: phôs] and [Greek: phengos], the latter is used for the former ([Greek: phengos hêliou]) just as _lumen_ is for _lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not often _vice versa_. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where the [Greek: phantasia] is called [Greek: phengos]. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom. Eth._ Aristot. assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a [Greek: telos]. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos] etc., cf. Sextus _passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = [Greek: archê ... telos]. _Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be _ratio_ above. [Greek: Apodeixis]: cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II. 143 [Greek: logos di' homologoumenôn lêmmatôn] (premisses) [Greek: kata synagôgên epiphoran] (conclusion) [Greek: ekkalyptôn adêlon], also Diog. VII. 45, [Greek: logon dia tôn mallon katalambanomenôn to hêtton katalambanomenon perainonta] (if the reading be right).

§27. _Notio_: another trans. of [Greek: ennoia]. _Conclusisse_: although the Greeks used [Greek: symperasma] instead of [Greek: epiphora] sometimes for the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb [Greek: symperainein] which has been supposed to correspond to _concludere_. It is more likely to be a trans. of [Greek: synagein], and _conclusum argumentum_ of [Greek: synaktikos logos], which terms are of frequent occurrence. _Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus answers, [Greek: ouk estin anankaion tas ekeinon] (the dogmatists) [Greek: dogmatologias probainein, plasmatôdeis hyparchousas] (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367). _Sapientiae ... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv. _Gram._ 241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this book. _Lex veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the determination of what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy. _Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque sit_ of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run _neque dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of the sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.

§28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: [Greek: akolouthon einai]. _Ut alia_: _although_ others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.

§29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14, _Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of course the Academics would say they did not hold this [Greek: dogma] as _stabile fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_ in _D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_. _Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, [Greek: psilê phasei ison pheretai psilê phasis] (_A.M._ VII. 315), [Greek: phasei men phasis epischethêsetai] (_ib._ 337). _Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a rather unusual phrase for the ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so [Greek: kineisthai] is perpetually used in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek [Greek: hikanos eioêsthô] and the like. The subj. is supported by _D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14, 3, where _ut opinor_ is thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III. 21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109, where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.

§§30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that
nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed
for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses
the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection
of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained
through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some
sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the
absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.
Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on
the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the
other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between
true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.
How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility
remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be
"evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is
no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they
only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we
reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).

§30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_: _et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = [Greek: parrêsia] as often in Tacitus. _Abditis rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word [Greek: syneskiasmenos] Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_ (n. on 26), cf. 38, 103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also 61. _Artificio_: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all its senses, cf. 114 and _De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression is sneered at in 87. _Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS. _prima_ or _primo_, which latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in Cicero. _Primum_ is out of position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_, set in motion. For [Greek: hormê] see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx. given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir," rather than "source" here. It will be noted that [Greek: synkatathesis] must take place before the [Greek: hormê] is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this theory is made in Plat. _Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 350 [Greek: kai hoi men diapherein autên tôn aisthêseôn, hôs hoi pleious, hoi de autên einai tas aisthêseis ... hês staseôs êrxe Straton]. All powers of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the [Greek: hêgemonikon], cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_. "_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to produce them. _Recondit_: so the [Greek: ennoiai] are called [Greek: apokeimenai noêseis] (Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 373 [Greek: mnêmê] is called [Greek: thêsaurismos phantasiôn]. _Similitudinibus_: [Greek: kath' homoiôsin] Sext. _Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In _D.F._ III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so MSS. Orelli gave _constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to distinguish between the [Greek: physikai ennoiai] or [Greek: koinai] which are the [Greek: prolêpseis], and those [Greek: ennoiai] which are the conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. _Rerumque_: "facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_, are almost convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I. 20.

§31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23. _Cognitionem_: [Greek: epistêmên]. _Cognitio_ is used to translate [Greek: katalêpsis] in _D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ... dicemus_: For the repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future tense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read _dicamus_; cf. n. on 29. _Per se_: [Greek: kath' autên], there is no need to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the _reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in 99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows _animus_ to all animals, not merely _anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is therefore wrong. _Temeritate_: [Greek: propeteia], which occurs _passim_ in Sext. The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic is called [Greek: embrontêtos] for rejecting the [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia].