Chapter VIII: Book I (2)

§25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._ III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_: Hülsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called [Greek: allokoton onoma]. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5. _Suis utuntur_: so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = [Greek: metapherein], which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, _De Or._ III. 153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the spelling _secula_ is wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from _secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is exceedingly fond of separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from the words with which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. _Lael._ 53 _quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_, II. 68 _tam in praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.

§26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his ortae_: the Greek terms are [Greek: hapla] and [Greek: syntheta], see Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi multiformes_: evidently a trans. of [Greek: polyeideis], which is opposed to [Greek: haplous] in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A, and often. Plato uses also [Greek: monoeidês] for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch. VII., a transl. of Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc. _qualitates_) is the needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ = _genera_, [Greek: eidê]. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._ I. 19; cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the section of Stob. _Phys._, entitled [Greek: peri archôn kai stoicheiôn kai tou pantos]. It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and _elementa_ here and in 39 ([Greek: archai] and [Greek: stoicheia]) convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements [Greek: stoicheia] but _not_ [Greek: archai], which term would be reserved for the primary Matter and Force. _Aër et ignis_: this is Stoic but _not_ Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these properties, _one_ active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements; each therefore is to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only _one_ property to each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II. 26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. _Accipiendi ... patiendi_: [Greek: dechesthai] often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum genus_: the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39. _Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153; cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.

§27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the [Greek: hypokeimenê hylê] of Aristotle, from which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_: _species_ here = _forma_ above, the [Greek: eidos] or [Greek: morphê] of Arist. _Omnibus_ without _rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21 in _quibusdam_, _quae_. _Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. _expressa effigies_ _De Off_. III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter (see II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter is called an [Greek: ekmageion] in Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these words have given rise to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. _Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf. _materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_ cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50 B ([Greek: dechetai gar êi ta panta]), 51 A ([Greek: eidos pandeches]). The word [Greek: pandeches] is also quoted from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in taking _tota_ and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the _Tim._ well and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between Plato's [Greek: hylê] and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.; Halm after Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said loosely of the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of course the [Greek: prote hylê], whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is imperishable (cf. _Tim._ 52 A. [Greek: phthoran ou prosdechomenon]). _Non in nihilum_: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that infinite subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing and their reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere. _Infinite secari_: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne illud quidem physici credere esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 [Greek: ouk estin elachiston megethos]. The history of ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie close enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, tripping over the old [Greek: antiphasis] of the One and the Many, denied [Greek: pan megethos diaireton einai kai meros echein] (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is the theory of motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf. also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the existence of void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1), the Stoics did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae intervalla ... possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.

§28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has _ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_. Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_ is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as [Greek: ousia] = existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_, themselves existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. _totam commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was formed." For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast, substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II. 19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._ II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of [Greek: aisthêtê ousia] = substance which can affect the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should not be forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf. _N.D._ II. 29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms with the Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while believing that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being _in_ the Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34) In a curious passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, extends through all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119 and _N.D._ II. 118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the Universal World God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some Stoics however denied the [Greek: ekpyrôsis]. _Nihil enim valentius_: this is an argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid potest esse mundo valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo intereat_: _interire_ here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. [Greek: anastênai, ekpiptein hypo tinos].

§29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do. The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance, Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_. Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics. _Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi prudentium quandam_: the Greek [Greek: pronoia] is translated both by _prudentia_ and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in _N.D._ II. 77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World God is perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160 (where there is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. _Necessitatem_: [Greek: anankên], which is [Greek: eirmos aitiôn], _causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf. _N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I. 125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. [Greek: Tuchê] therefore is defined as [Greek: aitia adêlos anthrôpinôi logismôi] (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on _posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), [Greek: oude ti gignetai ergon epi chthoni sou dicha daimon]. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a trans. of the Gk. [Greek: katênankasmenon]. I see no reason for suspecting _inter_, as Halm does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De Div._ II. 49; cf. also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to studying the reff. given above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's _Physica_ II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation, for the views of Aristotle about [Greek: tychê] and [Greek: to automaton], also ch. 8--9 for [Greek: anankê]. Plato's doctrine of [Greek: anankê], which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in _Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.

§§30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the
senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the
mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The
senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of
such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,
or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained
constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous
flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).
Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they
_defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal
explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes
consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric
(32).

§30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic [Greek: ên], = was, as we said. _In ratione et disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._ I. 22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is inexact, it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the criterion of truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n. _Iudicium_: the constant translation of [Greek: kritêrion], a word foreign to the older philosophy. _Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with his pet MS. writes _esse rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before and after, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam censebant ... tale quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus translated by Cic., _Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius modi_ ([Greek: aei kata tauta echousês] cf. 28 A. [Greek: to kata tauta echon]) _et sui simile_, cf. also _T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam_ [Greek: idean] _appellat ille, nos speciem_, and _Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ [Greek: idean], etc.: there is more than one difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to exclude Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic tractabatur ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of [Greek: ideai], and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's [Greek: ideai] and Aristotle's [Greek: ta kathalou] would naturally seem microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato has, however, probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more cautious step.

§31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 9, [Greek: ta hypopiptonta tê aisthêsei]. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf. [Greek: estêkos], which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even the word [Greek: eme] is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore ought to be [Greek: tous eme]. _Continenter_: [Greek: ounechôs]; cf. Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, [Greek: en metabolê gar synechei ta onta]. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases [Greek: rhoê, panta rhei, hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta], etc., which are scattered thickly over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: [Greek: doxastên], so _opinabile_ = [Greek: doxaston] in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R. and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the [Greek: doxaston] and the [Greek: epistêton], e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264).

§32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for _motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation for [Greek: ennoia], which is Stoic. This statement might have been made both by Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on the word _notio_. [Greek: Epistêmê] in Plato is of the [Greek: ideai] only, while in Aristotle it is [Greek: ton katholou]; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R. and P. 264), [Greek: legô noun archên epistêmês]. _Definitiones rerum_: these must be carefully distinguished fiom _definitiones nominum_, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and P. 265, note b. The _definitio rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to Aristotle from the passages quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as clear as it can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_: this is quite a different thing from those _definitiones nominum_ just referred to; it is _derivation_, which does not necessitate definition. [Greek: etymologian]: this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek Prose, as are [Greek: etymos] and all its derivatives. ([Greek: Etymôs] means "etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The word [Greek: etymologia] is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather [Greek: onomatôn orthotês] (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the subject preserved by Diog. is generally "[Greek: peri tôn etymologikôn]" The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in _Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation _veriloquium_ of [Greek: etymologia] and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek [Greek: symbolon]) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated [Greek: etymologia] by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_, the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for _notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The _quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of [Greek: symbolon]. Davies therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in _T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for _in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30 _pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. _in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. _huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as [Greek: logikê] had not been Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote [Greek: logikê], of which [Greek: dialektikê] is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, [Greek: rhêtorikê] which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio perpetua_ under the influence of [Greek: rhêtorikê]. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a trans. of Aristotle's [Greek: antistrophos] in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_. _Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in _Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: [Greek: to pithanon] is with Arist. and all ancient authorities the one aim of [Greek: rhêtorikê].

§§33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old
Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the [Greek:
ideai] of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato
abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates,
Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas,
pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing
but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_
to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes,
some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and
some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and
called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them
_rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on
the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_
belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate
action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things
_preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in
the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_
of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not
but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and
immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and
believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow
the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed
sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding
judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).
Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).
_Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor
wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving
assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them
of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect
wisdom (42).

§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_, comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for _disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase _disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's _Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf. _et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_: "system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded. _Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of the relation in which Plato's [Greek: ideai] stand to his notion of the deity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in 22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of [Greek: eudaimonian]. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does not elsewhere employ them.

§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the [Greek: agathon]. _Diligenter ... tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf. Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P. _Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ... Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, [Greek: symphoitôntes para Polemôni ephilo timêthêsan]. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.

§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl. missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl. _partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in _Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III. 83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._ 135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses [Greek: neura ektemnein] metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but _poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS. _quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_" with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.

§36. _Cetera_: Stoic [Greek: adiaphora], the presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_: Gr. [Greek: kata physin, para physin]. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk. [Greek: mesa], which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to _actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. [Greek: lêpta]. _Aestimatione_: [Greek: axia], positive value. _Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a word to express [Greek: apaxia] (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73.

§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic. appears at first sight to have made the [Greek: apoproêgmena] a subdivision of the [Greek: lêpta] (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the [Greek: apoproêgmena] formed a branch of the [Greek: lêpta]. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the [Greek: adiaphora], nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the whole class of [Greek: adiaphora], which he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum obtinent_, [Greek: proêgmena] _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed, the [Greek: apoproêgmena] are made of a subdivision of the [Greek: proêgmena], though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these virtues.

I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_ Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and _minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the [Greek: axia] and [Greek: apaxia] of the Greek, _not_ different degrees of [Greek: axia] (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_ should mean [Greek: apaxia] need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing this [Greek: apaxia] or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing [Greek: apaxia]. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes [Greek: elattôn axia] equivalent to [Greek: pollê apaxia] (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining [Greek: apoproêgmena] as [Greek: ta hikanên apaxian echonta] (_Adv. Math._ XI. 62--64) again speaks of them as [Greek: ta mê hikanên echonta axian] (_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, [Greek: ta mê hikanên axian echonta]. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the [Greek: adiaphora], some have [Greek: axia] while others have [Greek: apaxia]. He may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the terms [Greek: hikanê axia] and [Greek: hikanê apaxia] which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of [Greek: ta metaxy aretês kai kakias]. (This does not contradict his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, [Greek: aretês de kai kakias ouden metaxy], which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = [Greek: katorthôma], _peccatum_ = [Greek: hamartêma], _officium_ = [Greek: kathêkon] (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.

§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes natura perfectae_, the [Greek: dianoêtikai aretai] of Arist., could be said to belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's [Greek: êthikai aretai]. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. [Greek: to men hôs logon echon, to de epipeithes logôi]); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name [Greek: hêgemonikon] (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the [Greek: hêgemonikon] was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word [Greek: hexis], a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the _Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a [Greek: hexis], according to the Stoics, but a [Greek: diathesis] (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a [Greek: hexis], VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 [Greek: duo genê tôn anthrôpôn einai to men tôn spoudaiôn, to de tôn phaulôn, kai to men tôn spoudaiôn dia pantos tou biou chrêsthai tais aretais, to de tôn phaulôn tais kakiais]. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic [Greek: pathesi], which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; [Greek: hêdonê] or _laetitia_ for instance is [Greek: alogos eparsis]. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.

§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; cf. Diog. VII. 111. [Greek: ta pathê kriseis einai]. Instances of each in Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. [Greek: akolasia], see Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the [Greek: pemptê ousia] or [Greek: pempton sôma] of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from [Greek: aithêr], which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element ([Greek: sôma aitherion] in the _De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed [Greek: nous en aitheri] (see Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion that [Greek: nous] or [Greek: psychê] came from [Greek: aithêr] was also fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as [Greek: aeikinêtos] in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is [Greek: aeikinêtos] in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the [Greek: aithêr] or [Greek: pempton sôma], that fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that the [Greek: aeikinêtos psychê] of Plato came from the [Greek: aeikinêtos aithêr] of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that the soul as an [Greek: archê kinêseôs] must be [Greek: akinêtos], but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist. placed his [Greek: pempton sôma] Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being [Greek: analogon tô tôn astrôn stoicheiô] (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, between [Greek: aithêr] and [Greek: pyr], see Zeller 189, 190. _Ipsam naturam_: [Greek: pyr] is [Greek: kat' exochên stoicheion] (Stob. I. 10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the [Greek: apoios hylê]; from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is [Greek: logikon], from it comes the [Greek: hêgemonikon] of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus ([Greek: ou gar enchôrein ta hetera kai diapheronta paschein hyp' allêlôn], qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old [Greek: physikoi], (Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines [Greek: gaiai men gaian opôpamen], etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp. 134, 135.

§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum_, but having to explain [Greek: phantasia] was obliged to break off and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44 _e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav. _punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say. [Greek: Phantasian]: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = [Greek: synkatathesin]. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is involuntary ([Greek: akousion] Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia] _compels_ assent (see II. 38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.

§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner citadel of the [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia]. _Declarationem_: [Greek: enargeian], a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own [Greek: enargeia], which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. [Greek: Katalêpton]: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be [Greek: katalêpton], but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. _Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use [Greek: katalêpsis] for [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia] very often. _Quae manu prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the term [Greek: aisthêsis] to the [Greek: phantasia]. _Scientiam_: the word [Greek: epistêmê] is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or systematised perceptions ([Greek: katalêpseis] or [Greek: katalêptikai phantasiai]) sometimes also called [Greek: technê] (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: technên de einai systêma ek katalêpseôn syngegymnasmenôn]); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all [Greek: katalêptikai phantasiai] were [Greek: asphaleis, ametaptôtoi hypo logou]. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every [Greek: katalêptikê phantasia], instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; [Greek: amathia] is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: [Greek: doxa], see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.

§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of [Greek: epistêmên kai doxan kai tên en methopiai toutôn katalêpsin]. _Soli_: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk. word, [Greek: kritêrion] perhaps, or [Greek: gnômôn] or [Greek: kanôn]. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic [Greek: ennoiai]; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms [Greek: enapesphragismenê, enapomemagmenê, entetypômenê] occur constantly, but generally in relation to [Greek: phantasiai], not to [Greek: ennoiai]. _Non principia solum_: there seems to be a ref. to those [Greek: archai tês apodeixeôs] of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof. (See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's _Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._) Zeno's [Greek: ennoiai] were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. _Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.

§§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.
Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory
in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the
ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely
(45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were
carried on by Carneades (46).

§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_. This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15, _aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from Cic.