Chapter XV: Book II: Entitled Lucullus (2)

§32. _Incerta_: [Greek: adêla]. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ... abstruserit_: "_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of the verb, and cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far as to complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7, 12, [Greek: diaphoran einai adêlou kai akatalêptou, kai panta men einai akatalêpta ou panta de adêla] (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this book. _Docere_: "to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45. _Stellarum numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. e.g. _P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned among things [Greek: aiônion echonta agnôsian]. So in the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_: contemptuous; [Greek: aponenoêmenous tinas]. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 refers to this passage, which must have been preserved in the second edition.

§33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_. _Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the [Greek: aparallaktos] of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf. [Greek: koinê phantasia alêthous kai pseudous] Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175. _Notam_: the [Greek: sêmeion] of Sextus; cf. esp. _P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) [Greek: oudemia estin alêthês phantasia hoia ouk an genoito pseudês]. _Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n. on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus; _ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit dicere_. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe _quem_ as a strong relative, making a pause between _quis_ and _quem_. _Visionem_: Simply another trans. of [Greek: phantasia]. _Ut Carneades_: see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 [Greek: tên te pithanên phantasian kai tên pithanên hama kai aperispaston kai diexôdeumenên] (R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation. The merely [Greek: pithanê] is that sensation which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no sensation is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside ([Greek: perispan, perielkein]) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is only called [Greek: aperispastos] when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.) The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The [Greek: diexôdeumenê] ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext. 181--189).

§34. _Communitas_: [Greek: aparallaxia] or [Greek: epimixia tôn phantasiôn]; Sext. _A.M._ VII. 403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext. often uses [Greek: idioma], e.g. _A. M._ IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_ for _nota_, merely from love of variety. The _in_ before _communi_, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after _notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186. _Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "_Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio_." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word _once_ in the plural (_Ad Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, and elsewhere. _Perspicua_: [Greek: enargê], a term used with varying signification by all the later Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what _they_ call 'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_: Halm retains the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of [Greek: katalambanesthai]; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of [Greek: akribôs] or [Greek: kat' akribeian] (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123). _Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._ IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = [Greek: kenôs] = [Greek: pseudôs]. Cf. n. on I. 35, also II. 47, _D.F._ V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II. 120, 126, 140 (_per se moveri_), Greek [Greek: kenopathein] (Sext. _P.H._ II. 49), [Greek: kenopatheia] (= _inanis motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184), [Greek: kenopathêmata kai anaplasmata tês dianoias] (_ib._ VIII. 354), [Greek: diakenos helkysmos] (_ib._ VII. 241), [Greek: diakenos phantasia] (_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase [Greek: kinêma tês dianoias]. For the meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. [Greek: apoleipein] is constantly used as the opposite of [Greek: anairein] (_tollere_).

§35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ [Greek: pithanê phantasia] is here meant; see 33.

§36. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the [Greek: diexôdeumenê]; see n. on 33. _Primum quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II. p. 796. _Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting a number of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each _appearance_ to the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any _appearance_ even if you have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf. 47, and also 7. _Insigne_: [Greek: sêmeion], the same as _nota_ and _signum_ above. _Quo obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm keeps. Cf. _quam obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33. _Argumentum_: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word [Greek: tekmêrion], which, however, the Stoics hardly use. _Id quod significatur_: [Greek: to sêmeiônton] in Sext.

§§37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must
either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to
phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a
firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away
with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).

§37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_). _Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23. _Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless, cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 [Greek: to men gar phantasiôthênai aboulêton ên]). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9, _N.D._ I. 69

§38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_: cf. [Greek: eikein, eixis] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, [Greek: tôn de aisthêtikôn meta eixeôs kai synkatatheseôs ginontai [hai phantasia]]; also 66 of this book. [Greek: Oikeion]: cf. 34. _Adsentitur statim_: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. _Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra potestate_: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Ac. Post._, which see.

§39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on 25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._ V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.

§§40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give
a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different
classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have
been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly
capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must
be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to
distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly
true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_,
while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now
sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly
perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also
a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1)
false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are
indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.
The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are
partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a
reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an
unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions
into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from
sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either
class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known
sensation."]

§40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of [Greek: themelios] or the like; cf. [Greek: hôsper themelios] in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method, like [Greek: technê], cf. _M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_: the general character which attaches to all [Greek: phantasiai]; _genera_ the different classes of [Greek: phantasiai]. _Totidem verbis_: of course with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the _reductio ad absurdum_ method. _Contineant ... quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65 _una res videtur causam continere_. _Quae ita_: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish clearly the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the _thing_ which causes it. Here the _things_ are meant; two _things_ are supposed to cause two _sensations_ so similar that the person who has one of the _sensations_ cannot tell from which of the two _things_ it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide _things_ into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of _things_, though not of _sensations_. If we could only pierce _through_ a sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume that _sensation_ and _thing_ correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 [Greek: peri men tou phaisthai toion ê toion to hypokeimenon] (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) [Greek: oudeis isôs amphisbêtei, peri de tou ei toiouton estin hopoion phainetai zêteitai]. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them. _Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from _recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.

§41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf. Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. n. on I. 29.

§42. _Proposita_: cf. [Greek: protaseis] _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: = _in ea, quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general experience" [Greek: empeiria], cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_: cf. I. 33. _quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is against Cic.'s usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton without being ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus ducuntur_. _In singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_, not _things_, to which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly apply. _Adiuncta_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) [Greek: pasêi tê dokousêi alêthei kathestanai eurisketai tis aparallaktos pseudês], also VII. 438, etc.

§§43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a
definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition
is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being
thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes
of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only
proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false
sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge
therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is
none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of
_visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).

§43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = [Greek: ouden mallon], which was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. _P.H._ I. 14. _Num illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out that the [Greek: horos] of the Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa vera_: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if _even_ the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In falsum_: note that _falsum_ = _aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 209 [Greek: mochthêrous horous einai tous periechontas ti tôn mê prosontôn tois horistois], and the schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet latior esse definito suo_. _Minime volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_ hardly ever stands for _omn. rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter rebus_ for _partibus_. A little closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_, _T.D._ III. 24, where _genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision.

§44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of [Greek: enantiousthai] as Goer. says, but of [Greek: apantan], which occurs very frequently in Sext. _Sumpta_: the two premisses are in Gk. called together [Greek: lêmmata], separately [Greek: lêmma] and [Greek: proslêpsis] (_sumptio et adsumptio_ _De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like _ratio_ ([Greek: syllogismos]), cf. _De Leg._ I. 48 _conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. _Profiteatur_: so [Greek: hypischneisthai] is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII. 283. _Patefacturum_: n. on 26, [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos, dêlôtikos] (the last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ... nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_, _in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference. _Non iungitur_: a supposed case of [Greek: diartêsis], which is opposed to [Greek: synartêsis] and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.

§45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.

§§46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate
clearness of some phenomena ([Greek: enargeia]) is due to two causes,
(1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which
these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic
paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom
sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is
easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be
mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom
sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The
dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command
assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so
closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)

§46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted [Greek: parenthetikôs]! Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_. _Interrogationibus_: cf. I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_ and _conclusio_ are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms are very frequently called [Greek: erôtêseis], and that he often introduces a new argument by [Greek: erôtatai kai touto], when there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all. _Dissolvere_: [Greek: apolyesthai] in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.

§47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic. cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it may be a mere [Greek: phantasma] or [Greek: anaplasma tês dianoias], a phantom behind which there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis videantur_: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination see Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7, etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from _dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage can only be properly explained in connection with 50 and with the general plan of the Academics expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate it as follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in 41 and 42 viz. _omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism in 50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known to be Stoic, _omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_) sensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by 40, where see n.)? _Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as have only a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding stages the resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_ is a sort of tertiary predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to be probable"). It _must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section placed out of harmony with 50. _Plane proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36.

§48. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as [Greek: dianoia] is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_: so Madv. for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_ with an interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III. 58 for _sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here is merely "as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_ here is a repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before _esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 241 [Greek: êtoi tôn ektos ê tôn en hêmin pathôn], and the two classes of _falsa visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there _are_ false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.

§§49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and
therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity
between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the
impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We
contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we
require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we
make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our
opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our
waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the
wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he
will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about
dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).

§49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: [Greek: auta ta kephalaia]. _Interrogationis_: the _sorites_ was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. _De Div._ II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary), _Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n. on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf. _D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere, quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50 _ille sorites, quo nihil putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read _hos_, which indeed in 136 is a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_: i.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_: sc. [Greek: tini]. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.: cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_: not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf. _M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._ II. 112, and an instance of _proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75. _Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above.

§50. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf. _De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere essent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are divisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the _sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so divisible.

§51. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In quiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr. I. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1, 50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it to stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably be written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects.

§52. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n. on 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non quid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46. _Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: "have slept _off_ the effects," cf. [Greek: apobrizein] in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. [Greek: anienai tês orgês] Aristoph. _Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in _D.F._ II. 94. _Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 62.

§53. _Sustinet_: [Greek: epechei]; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the point of the Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the [Greek: epochê] of the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the attempt to distinguish between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers that, did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even in the sane condition. _Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56 ([Greek: syncheousi ta pragmata]), _ib._ VIII. 157 ([Greek: syncheomen ton bion]), VIII. 372 ([Greek: holên syncheei tên philosophon zêtêsin]), Plut. _De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 ([Greek: hôs panta pragmata syncheousi]). _Utimur_: "we have to put up with," so [Greek: chrêsthai] is used in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than _vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_, but the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "_non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its _consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "_tu dictis Albane maneres_" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the condition "_if_ thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng. without "_if_," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with [Greek: ei gar], etc., and even without [Greek: ei]) is susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in his _Gram._ 351 _b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]

§§54--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do
away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is
childish (54). They press into their service the old physical
philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them
(55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every
particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists,
who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The
Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and
Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which
hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are
able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that
they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between
individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58).
Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they
profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are
indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified [Greek: epochê] of
Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the
truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero,
the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian
darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the
force of your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus
ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then
Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus
were to induce me to change my view (63).

§54. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. "not even" for "_ne quidem_" is often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this _either_," cf. n. on I. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An sano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads. _Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410. _Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second, especially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could. _Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with _phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re differens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term [Greek: aparallaktos] (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla communitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of Lamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated thus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ ([Greek: oude hyparchei epimigê aparallaktos]). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and it will be evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs (_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_ is in no way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read _nulla re differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_ and _ut_ and changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for _bonas_ in 72). This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi sint_, Dav. _at si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_ after C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in. _Eosdem_: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this section, I may point out that the [Greek: epimigê] or [Greek: epimixia tôn phantasiôn] supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic [Greek: tropoi], see _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124.

§55. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita paris_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change be needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has yet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25.

§56. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_, e.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum est, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_: the [Greek: idiotêtes] or [Greek: idiômata] of Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue between dogmatism and scepticism. _Cognoscebantur_: Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker _internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf. 42, "experience". _Minimum_: an adverb like _summum_.

§57. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not recognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: [Greek: technên], a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in proverbii usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_ are all used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1. _Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was discussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic actually wrote a book entitled, [Greek: ôi skopia] (egg investigation) [Greek: ê peri sophisteias pros Akadêmaikous], mentioned by Suidas.

§58. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one read _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is correct, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, "we are quite content not to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive assertion about the eggs." _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb cf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd. and Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the _quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_: cf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny. They refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to _phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one MS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) "_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in aliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_," will require modification. _Species et quasdam formas_: [Greek: eidê kai genê], _quasdam_ marks the fact that _formas_ is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two _genera_ than between two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were removed a better sense would be given. It has often been inserted by copyists when _sed_, _tamen_, or some such word, comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11, discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.

§59. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often takes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A veris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the Academic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ... retentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6, 8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi constares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo and Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. on 104. _Id est peccaturum_: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. 42. _Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause.

§60. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_: Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were _servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller 534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. 279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_: this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv. _Gram._ 214 c.

§61. _Amicissimum_: "_because_ you are my dear friend". _Commoveris_: a military term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53. _Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word _omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf. 59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in reproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that the Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_. Goer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v. _Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus aliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus aliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and _aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the latter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival, _aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._ IV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De Off._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g. _deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._ XIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_ (_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person _aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.). _Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De Div._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see.

§62. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure verbal noun like [Greek: praxis], cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like _actio vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the similar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's n.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_. _Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. was often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_: this is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or. have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy see 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in most of which Lucullus is also mentioned.

§63. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv. _Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration, which the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, "which admiration he had shown ... to such an extent that, etc." _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_ implies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_ alone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make this mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, "_laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae_" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in the _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see Madv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv., seeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._ 160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after Christ asserts that _tantum non_ = [Greek: monon ou] occurs nowhere else in Cic. Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil praeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_. _Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13. _Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and by the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2.

§§64--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of
Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be
answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and
would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate
inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to
assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must
deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in
giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever
gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will
_opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so
the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument
must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible
(68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted,
what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some
think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more
probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other
schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for
an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71).

§64. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not _quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_ above. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has wrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to insert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7.

§65. _Studio certandi_: = [Greek: philoneikia]. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_: n. on 14. _Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of his consulship.

§66. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or [Greek: doxa] is judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de sapiente_: cf. 115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego sed quid orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu. this passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I. 15 _magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s _Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact is mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_: the best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_: the MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very rare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim maximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in _D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: "idea". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._ I. 7, and the charge of [Greek: propeteia] constantly brought against the dogmatists by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing first.

§67. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant the Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam opinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies in the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_, etc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_.

§68. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could _adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: [Greek: ephekteon]. _Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_: for the position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen in_. Madv. altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words are often confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_, etc.: cf. the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est_. _Nitamur ... percipi_: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_, or some such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_.

§69. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads _acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._ 161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments against it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_: on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv. _Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on 132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see _Dict. Biogr._

§70. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I. 14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him _foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae causa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam veritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_. _Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant em. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told of Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a "_tabula_" which hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by comparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I have before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_. _Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were probably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc.

§71. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread is picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by _ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and must be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_, which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163, _Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen esse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to _nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_. _Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called [Greek: ho metathemenos]) from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog. Laert. VII. 166--7. _A vero_: "coming from a reality," cf. 41, n. _Is curavit_: Goer. reads _his_, "_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_," says Madv. The scribes often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer. generally patronises their vulgar error.

§§72--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a
revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers
of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge,
and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles,
Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You
said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why?
Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato
pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do
not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus
stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience.
You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he
admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75).
The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held
strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_.
Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible.
_Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a
definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is
the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_
and _perception_, and the [Greek: epochê] of Arcesilas follows at once
(77, 78).

§72. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr. Lamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_: MSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber ingeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written _nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes it as an instance of the refutation of [Greek: phainomena] by means of [Greek: nooumena], "[Greek: Anaxagoras tôi leukên einai tên chiona, anetithei hoti chiôn estin hydor pepêgos to de hydor esti melan kai hê chiôn ara melaina]." There is an obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_ II. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat_. _Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of philosophy. _Ostentationis_: = [Greek: epideixeos].

§73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42. _Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the [Greek: skotiê gnôsis] of Democr., by which he meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a [Greek: gnêsiê gnôsis], dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist [Greek: eteêi] and not merely [Greek: nomôi] as appearances do. See R. and P. 51.