Chapter V: A. Th. denotes a text in the Berlin Museum (6)

(M364) Marriages are not infrequent which impose conditions upon the husband and wife with relation to outside parties. Thus a mother gives her daughter in marriage to a man, on condition that she shall continue to support her mother as long as she lives. In this case, if the husband put away his wife, he was to pay one mina of silver; while, if she hated her husband, she was to be thrown from a pillar, _dimtu_.(320) This pillar may be the real meaning of the _AN-ZAG-GAR-KI_, which looks very like an attempt to express _zigguratu_, a tower, in an ideographic way. A very similar case is where a lady takes a girl to be wife to her son but stipulates that the wife shall treat her as mistress. If she shall say to her mother-in-law, “Thou art not my mistress,” she shall be branded and sold. As long as the mother lives, they two together shall support her.(321) One may suspect that such maternal power, as is here shown over the children, arises from their having been adopted by their mother in order to provide for her in her old age. This was often done. The children may have been slaves before adoption. In the second case, the mother leaves her son all she has, or may acquire.

XI. Divorce And Desertion

(M365) Divorce is regulated by the Code. The Sumerian laws seem to regard the marriage-tie as dissoluble on the part of the man by an act of simple repudiation, accompanied by a _solatium_, fixed at half a mina. The wife, however, was punished by death for repudiating her husband.(322) The Code limits the facility of divorce for the man and renders it possible for the woman to obtain.

(M366) Divorce of either a wife or concubine involved her being given a maintenance. The divorced wife had the custody of her children, if any. They were not disinherited by the divorce. The divorced woman retained the marriage-portion which she had brought to the home. She had a share with her children in the divorced husband’s property at his death. If he married again, the children of both marriages shared equally. She was also free to marry again, but apparently not until her children had come into their share of the late husband’s property, therefore not during his life.(323)

(M367) Divorce was permitted on the ground of childlessness. The husband gave back to his wife all her marriage-portion. Also he had to give the bride-price which he had paid to her parents during his courtship, and which they had returned to him, as a rule, on marriage.(324) If this bride-price had not been given, then he paid her a fixed sum of money; one mina, if he was a patrician, a third, if he was only a plebeian.(325) A slave does not seem to have had the liberty of divorce.

(M368) The wife might take a dislike to her husband and set her face to leave him and deny him conjugal rights. This was probably equivalent to desertion. Then a judicial inquiry was required. If his ill treatment or neglect was made clear and she was blameless, a divorce was granted. She took her marriage-portion and went back to her family. But as this was of her own seeking, she received no alimony.(326) It is assumed that it was an unhappy marriage from the first and that there were no children.

If it were proved that she was a bad wife, she was treated as an adulteress and drowned.(327) On the other hand, even if she were a bad wife, the husband might repudiate her simply without paying any price for divorce. In this case there was no suspicion of her infidelity. Or the husband might degrade her to the position of a slave.(328) There is no mention in these cases of a return to her father’s house.

Chronic illness on the part of a wife was not a ground for divorce. The husband had to maintain her. He might, however, take a second wife.(329) If she did not care to remain in his house in such conditions, she could leave him, take her marriage-portion and return to her family.(330)

(M369) We have already seen that the Code regulates the questions arising out of divorce.(331) The examples at this period are but few. In one case a man put away his wife and she received her price of divorce. It is expressly stated that she may marry another man and her former husband will not complain.(332) This document is, however, little more than an agreement to abide by the terms of the divorce.

In another case a marriage-contract names the penalty a man shall pay for divorcing his wife.(333) In all these cases the word for divorce, _ezêbu_, is literally “to put away.” But a man divorced his wife by the simple process of saying, “You are not my wife.” He then paid her a fine, returned her marriage-portion and so on, as laid down in the Code.(334) It was far harder for a woman to secure a divorce from her husband. She could do so, however, but only as the result of a lawsuit.(335) As a rule, the marriage-contracts mention death as her punishment, if she repudiates her husband. The death by drowning is usually named. This was in accordance with Law V. of the Sumerian Code.

We may regard repudiation of husband and wife, one by the other, and desertion as leading to divorce; and therefore these may be appropriately considered next.

(M370) Desertion of a wife by her husband might be involuntary. The Code deals with the case of a man captured by the enemy. If the wife were left at home well provided for, she was bound to be true to her absent husband. If she entered another man’s house, she was condemned to death as an adulteress.(336) But if she was not provided for, she might enter another man’s house without blame.(337) There she might bear children. But, if so, she yet had to go back to her original husband on his return. The children she had borne in his absence were to be counted to their real father.(338) That the law provides for such cases points to the existence of frequent wars, in which fortune was not always on the side of Babylonia.

(M371) But the husband might desert his wife voluntarily. Then, if she was left unprovided for, the wife might enter another man’s house. The errant husband, when he returned, could not reclaim his wife.(339)

We have a legal decision in a case(340) where a man had deserted his wife for twenty years and “left her to her fate, did not love her.” During this time a daughter, whether real or adoptive we are not told, took care of her mother. To her the mother left property, among other things, a slave. The mother being dead, the truant husband returned and claimed the slave from the daughter. He was nonsuited.

Among the provocations which gave the wife cause for divorce was the “going out” of the husband, probably a euphemism for adultery on his part. Belittling his wife was another ground for her complaint. What this means is not quite clear, but we may regard it as persistent neglect.

XII. Rights Of Widows

(M372) The Code makes clear what was the position of the widow. She had a right to stay on in her husband’s house until she died,(341) but was not compelled to do so.(342) If she remained, she was the head of the family. To her the young sons looked to furnish them with means to court a wife, and the daughters for a marriage-portion. She acted in these matters with the consent and assistance of her grown-up children. But she might elect to leave the home and remarry.

(M373) As long as she remained in her husband’s home she enjoyed to the full whatever she had brought there as a marriage-portion, whatever her husband had settled upon her, and also received a share from her husband’s goods at his death. The widow’s share was the same as a child’s. But she had no power to alienate any of these possessions. The Code expressly declares that they were her children’s after her.(343) The children had no power to turn her out. If they desired her to leave, the matter came before the law-courts, and her private wishes were consulted. If she wished to remain, she might do so, and the judge bound over the children to allow her to do so.(344)

(M374) A very clear example of the permanence of the Code regulations on this subject meets us in the fifth year of Cambyses.(345) Ummu-tâbat, daughter of Nabû-bêl-usur, wife of Shamash-uballiṭ, son of Bêl-ebarra, a Shamash priest, who was dead, whose sons were Shamash-eṭir, Nidittum, and Ardi-Ḥar, swore to Bêl-uballiṭ, priest of Sippara, saying, “I will not remarry, I will live with my sons, I will bring up my sons to manhood, until they are numbered with the people.” On the day that Ummu-ṭâbat remarries, according to her bond, the property [of her late husband] which is in the possession of Bêl-uballiṭ, the priest of Sippara, [she shall forfeit]. The tablet is defective here, but on the edge of the tablet we see that the care of her sons was given her. To remarry is expressed here by the words, “going into the _bît zikari_.”

(M375) A widow could remarry at her discretion. She no longer had to be given in marriage. She was free to marry the man of her choice.(346) She might take with her her marriage-portion to her new home, but she had to leave behind any settlement which her former husband had given her, or any share of his goods that had come to her at his death. Her family were not called upon to find any fresh marriage-portion for her. But she was not completely mistress of even her marriage-settlement. If she had children of the former marriage, they and any children of her second marriage shared her marriage-portion equally. Only she had the enjoyment of it for life.(347) If there were no children of the second marriage, those of the first took all she left.(348)

(M376) We have assumed that when her husband died her children were old enough to care for themselves. If they were not, she had no power to enter upon a second marriage and desert her first family. She was not free to marry at all without consent of the law-court.(349) But there is no evidence that this could be withheld, if proper conditions were observed. The first husband’s property was inventoried and consent for the second marriage being granted, she and her new husband were bound by deed to preserve the whole estate of the late husband for his children. With that proviso, the newly married pair entered into full use of the deceased’s property and were bound to educate the children until grown up. They had no inducement to neglect them, as in any case none of the deceased’s property could ever be theirs. If the children died, it would all revert to the family of the deceased. The newly married pair had no further interest in it than the enjoyment of it until the children could manage for themselves. They could not alienate any of it. The sale of even a utensil was not possible.(350)

XIII. Obligations And Rights Of Children

(M377) It is customary to say that the father had absolute power over his children, but it is better to state only what is known with certainty regarding the extent of his power. The father could treat his child, or even his wife, equally with a slave, as a chattel to be pledged for his debts.(351) We may therefore conclude that he could sell his child. An actual example cannot be cited from early times, but they are very common later.

The son was not capable of entering into an independent contract with an outside person.(352) We may assume that this means simply while yet living in his father’s house. The father had rights over what his son earned. A man could also hire out his child and take the wages.(353)

(M378) The father had the right to prefer one son above the rest. He could endow him with house, field, and garden. But this must be done in his lifetime and by written deed. This gift did not in any way affect the son’s claim to inherit equally with his brethren on the father’s death, when he took a full share over and above what he had by gift.(354)

(M379) The father had full power to dispose of his daughters in marriage. But he was expected to furnish them with a marriage-portion. This was not obligatory, being probably a matter of negotiation with the parents of the bridegroom. In later times the obligation evidently became irksome and oppressive, and Law E was passed to relieve the strain. A father was bound to do his best to fulfil his promise to dower his daughter, but no more. A father could not hinder his daughter from becoming a votary.(355) If he approved her choice, he might give her a portion, as if for marriage,(356) but he was not compelled to do so. A father could give his daughter to be a concubine.(357)

The father’s consent was also needed to his son’s marriage.(358) He had to provide the youth with a bride-price, and secure a wife for him.(359)

(M380) It is not easy to determine when children ceased to be under the paternal power. Betrothed daughters remained in their father’s house; so did married sons sometimes. Whether the birth of a child, making the young man himself a father, freed him as head of a family, or whether it was entering a house of his own, we cannot yet say.

(M381) The Sumerian laws are very severe upon a child’s repudiation of a father. That degraded him to the status of a slave. He might also be branded. Obviously he was disinherited. The repudiation is expressed in the words, “You are not my father,” but it may be intended to cover all unfilial conduct. The Code is more explicit. If a son struck his father, his hands were cut off.(360)

(M382) The Sumerian laws preserved the father’s rights to disinherit the son by a simple repudiation, saying, “You are not my son.” The son then had to leave house and enclosure. The Code limits this power. It insists on legal process and good reason alleged. Also it was not allowed for a first offence on the son’s part.(361)

(M383) The mother was in much the same position of authority as the father. A son who repudiated his mother was branded and expelled from house and city. He was not, however, sold as a slave. The Sumerian laws also reserved to the mother the right to repudiate her son, and he must quit house and property. The Code gives no such power to mothers. Indeed, we find examples of a son disputing with a mother.(362) Mothers took up the father’s place toward the children on the death of the father as regards marriage-portions, bride-price, and other family affairs. But they usually acted in concert with the elder children.

(M384) The repudiation of adoptive parents was a very grievous sin, especially on the part of those who were children of parents who were forbidden to have children. Something worse than illegitimacy was their lot. The penalties of having the eye torn out, or the tongue cut out,(363) show the abhorrence felt for their ingratitude.

XIV. The Education And Early Life Of Children

(M385) Much has been made of the knowledge of writing shown by the Babylonians and Assyrians. The ability to draw up deeds and write letters seems at first sight to have been widely diffused. In the times of the First Dynasty of Babylon almost every tablet seems to have a fresh _tupšar_, or scribe. Many show the handiwork of women scribes.(364) But most of the persons concerned in these documents were of the priestly rank. There is no evidence that the shepherds or workpeople could write. In the Assyrian times the scribe was a professional man. We find _aba_ or _tupšar_ used as a title. So, too, in later Babylonian times. The witnesses to a document can only be said to sign their names in so far as that they impressed their seals. This was done, at any rate, in early times. In the Assyrian period the only parties who sealed were the owners of the property transferred to a new owner. The whole of a tablet shows the same handwriting throughout. Anyone who reads carefully through the facsimile copies in _Cuneiform Texts_ can readily see this. Different scribes, especially in early times, wrote differently, but this was still the case in Assyrian days. Yet no change of hand can be noted anywhere in one document, save where, as in the forecast tablets, a date or note was added by a different person, often in Assyrian script, to a text written in Babylonian. The only safe statement to make is that from the earliest times a very large number of persons existed, at any rate in the larger towns, who could write and draw up documents.

(M386) The use of Sumerian terms and phrases in the body of a document written in Semitic Babylonian might be ascribed to a mere tradition. But they were no meaningless formulæ. The many variations, including the substitution of completely different though synonymous words, show that these Sumerian phrases were sufficiently understood to be intelligently used. In later times they either disappear altogether, or are used with little variation. They had become stereotyped and were conventional signs, doubtless read as Semitic, though written as Sumerian. Our own retention of Latin words is a close parallel. The First Dynasty of Babylon was bilingual at any rate in its legal documents, though the letters are all pure Semitic. The earlier documents show few signs of Semitic origin, though its influence can be traced as far back as we can go.

(M387) The discovery at Sippara of a school dating from the First Dynasty of Babylon is very fully worked out by Professor Scheil in _Une Saison de fouilles à Sippara_, pp. 30-54. Professor Hilprecht gives further details in _Explorations in Bible Lands_, pp. 522-28 and _passim_.

The methods of learning to write and the lessons in Sumerian are well described by these authors, and illustrated by numerous extant examples of practice-tablets. The subjects were very numerous and included arithmetic, mensuration, history, geography, and literature. As Dr. Pinches has shown by his edition of some of these practice-tablets,(365) these contain very valuable fragments of otherwise lost or imperfectly known texts.

(M388) Slaves were often bound as apprentices to learn a trade or handicraft. A man might adopt a child to teach him his trade, and his duty to him was sufficiently discharged by doing so.

(M389) We do not yet know in any authoritative way, when or with what ceremonies children were named. In the case of slaves we have a boy, still at the breast,(366) or a girl of three months, not named.(367) On the other hand, a girl still at the breast is named. Hence Meissner concludes, that at the end of one year, at latest, the child was given a name.(368) But the usage with respect to slaves is hardly a rule, and, as appears from the above, they were not consistently named.

(M390) A child seems often to have been put out to nurse. From the phrase-book we learn that a father might “give a child to a wet-nurse to be suckled, and give the wet-nurse food and drink, oil for anointing, and clothing for three years.”(369) That this was not only done with adopted children is clear from the Code;(370) where we find a severe penalty laid on a wet-nurse, who substitutes another child for the one intrusted to her, without the parents’ consent.

(M391) It will hardly do to interpret the phrase-book(371) as meaning that all children were made to learn writing. But that this was commonly done is evident from the number, both of men and women, who could act as scribes.(372)

XV. Adoption

(M392) Adoption primarily means a process by which parents could admit to the privileges of sonship children born of other parents. There were many reasons which might impel them to such a course. If they were childless, a natural desire for an heir might operate. But under the Babylonian law a man might take a second wife, or a maid, if his wife were childless, to bear him children. A more operative cause was that children were a source of profit to their parents while they remained with them. But it seems that men married early. Hence this alone does not seem sufficient to account for the great frequency of adoption. Besides, in that case, what induced a parent to part with his child for adoption? It seems that the real cause most often was that the adopting parents had lost by marriage all their own children and were left with no child to look after them. They then adopted a child whose parents would be glad to see him provided for, to look after them until they died, leaving him the property they had left after portioning their own children.

(M393) The Code admits all kinds of adoption, but regulates the custom. A man might adopt an illegitimate son, or the child of a votary or palace-warder, who had no right to children, or the child of living parents. In the latter case alone was the parents’ consent necessary. We have examples of cases of adoption of relatives, of entirely unrelated persons, of a slave even.(373) We learn from the series _ana ittišu_(374) that a man might take a young child, put it out to nurse, provide the nurse with food, oil for anointing, and clothing, for a space of three years; and then have it taught a trade or profession, such as that of scribe.(375)

(M394) Adoption was effected by a deed, drawn up and sealed by the adoptive parents, duly sworn to and witnessed. Such contracts definitely state the relationship, which was in all respects the same as that of a son born in matrimony. But it laid down the obligations of the son, while it stipulated what was the inheritance to which he might expect to succeed. It brought responsibilities to both parties and fixed them. The son was bound to do that which a son would naturally have done, explicitly, to maintain his parents while they lived. The parents were bound, not only to leave him property, but to treat him as a son. But, as a rule, all was matter of contract and carefully set down. If such a contract was not drawn up, although the adoptive parents had brought him up, the child must return to his father’s house.(376) Only, for an artisan, it was sufficient to have taught the child his trade.(377)

So far as our examples go, some color might be given to the suggestion that adoption was always merely for the convenience of old people who wanted to be taken care of. But we know that children were adopted on other grounds. That they were children and not always grown-up men and women is clear from the above. This we may regard as adoption pure and simple. Other cases are a legal method of making provision for old age, or for other purposes for which an heir as legal representative was desirable. In the case of no legal heir, the property went back to the next of kin.

(M395) That such a process did take place in Babylonia is made clear by the Code.(378) But few examples are known where a father takes into his family an additional child. The case, in which the son is not only adopted by parents who have a family living, but is ranked as their eldest son, deserves reproducing in full.(379)

Ubar-Shamash, son of Sin-idinnam, from Sin-idinnam, his father,
and Bititum, his mother, have Beltum-abi and Taram-ulmash taken to
sonship, and let him be the son of Beltum-abi and Taram-ulmash.
Ubar-Shamash shall be their eldest son. The day that Beltum-abi,
his father, and Taram-ulmash, his mother, say to Ubar-Shamash,
their son, “You are not our son,” he shall leave house and
furniture. The day that Ubar-Shamash shall say to Beltum-abi, his
father, or Taram-ulmash, his mother, “You are not my father or my
mother,” one shall brand him, put fetters upon him, and sell him.

Both parents of the adopted son were living. That the son is to be reckoned eldest implies that the adopting parents had other children. This is made clear in one case where the adoptive parents are expressly said to have five children.(380) In another case where a child is adopted a certain person is expressly said to be his brother.(381)

(M396) The existing members of the family had a real interest in the proceeding. For, as inheriting with them, the addition of another son could not but affect their prospects. We may wonder what influenced them to consent. That they did consent is clear from the often-occurring covenant by which they bound themselves not to object. One explanation may be that they had grown up and left home and were anxious for the welfare of their parents, but could not arrange to look after them themselves. Hence for their parents’ sake they were willing to forego their share, or submit to a stranger taking precedence of them, or in some cases to give up all claim to the property in their parents’ possession in return for being relieved of the responsibility of looking after them. Of course, when the adopted son was only taken in as one, even the eldest, among several, he would only have a share at the parents’ death. But it even seems that the children might of their own motion adopt a brother to be son to their parents.(382)

(M397) The clause which implies disinheritance in case the parents repudiate the son, or he repudiates them, could only be enforced by a law-court.(383) But it was nevertheless most regularly inserted in the contract. In one case the document merely consists of it,(384) leaving us to infer that an adopted son was concerned. But this is not absolutely certain. The son might have been rebellious to his mother, who was therefore minded to cut him off, and this may be the result of her bringing her son before the judge. The judge was bound to try and conciliate the parties.(385) Hence, not infrequently the son was bound over not to repeat the offence on pain of disinheritance, while the mother retained her right to disinherit. There was no mention of his being sold for a slave, or branded, as was usual when a son was adopted and then repudiated his parents.

According to the contracts entered into by the parties, parents could repudiate adopted sons. This was contrary to the law by which the consent of the judge was needed for disinheritance. It seems to be an attempt to contract without the support of the law. The son was then to take a son’s share and go away.(386)

(M398) The word _aplûtu_, abstract of _aplu_, “son,” and therefore literally “sonship,” being also used to denote the relation of a daughter to a parent, came to denote the “share” which a son or daughter received. If a man adopted a son, he granted him an _aplûtu_, or “sonship,” and this carried with it a material property. But the father, while still living, might grant the son his _aplûtu_ and stipulate for maintenance during the rest of his life. Such a grant begins with _aplûtu ša_ B, where B is the son. But it by no means follows that B is an adopted son. The question is only decided for us when the parentage of B is given. If he is said to be the “son of C,” then we know that A giving him “sonship” must mean that A adopted him. But if B is merely indicated as the son of A, we cannot tell whether he was born to A, or only adopted by A.

(M399) So when the property given to B is in his power to dispose of later as he may choose, this privilege is expressed by the words, “he may give his sonship to whom he chooses.” The choice is sometimes expressed as “that which is good to his heart,” or “in his eyes,” or “whom he loves.” A modified choice is often mentioned, as when it is said that a votary may leave her “sonship” after her to whom she likes “among her brothers.”

(M400) We have a large number of documents which make reference to the _aplûtu_ of a certain person, which we can render here by “heritage.” These are especially common on the part of votaries. As we have seen, they were not supposed to have children of their own, but possessed the right to nominate their heir within limits. In return for exercising this right in favor of a certain person, they usually stipulated that such person shall maintain them as long as they live and otherwise care for them. Even outside actual deeds of heritage, we find references to property derived from votaries subject to certain duties. Such dispositions of property are closely related to a will or testament, but anticipate the death of the testator. They are really settlements for the future, which exactly answers to the title given them by the Babylonian scribes, _ridit warkati_.

The following example makes these details clear:(387)

The heritage of Eli-eriṣa, votary of Shamash, daughter of
Shamash-ilu. Belisunu, votary of Shamash, daughter of Nakarum, is
the caretaker of her future life. One-third _GAN_ of unreclaimed
land in Karnamkarum, next the field of Issurîa, one _SAR_ house in
Ḥalḫalla, next the house of Nakarum, one-third _SAR_ four _GIN_ in
Gagim, one maid Shala-beltum, price ten shekels of silver, all
this for the future in its entirety, what Eli-eriṣa, votary of
Shamash, daughter of Shamash-ilu, has or shall acquire, she gives
to Belisunu, votary of Shamash, daughter of Nakarum. Every year
Belisunu shall give to Eli-eriṣa three _GUR_ of corn, ten minas of
bronze, and twelve _ḲA_ of oil.

(M401) The _aplûtu_ thus given was in many cases an alienation of property on which some relative had claims. Even where their consent was not necessary it was desirable that they should not involve the heir in legal processes. Hence, such relatives are called up to covenant that they will raise no objection to the heir’s peaceable succession.(388)

(M402) The obligation to support the adoptive parent is emphasized. The amount of sustenance varies much. Another list of yearly allowances reads one shekel of silver, woollen yarn, six _ḲA_ of oil, four _išinni Shamašh_, ten _ḲA_ of fat, one side, two _GUR_ of corn. Many others could be instanced, but they make no great addition to our knowledge.

(M403) The obligation might be service; as when a lady adopts a maid to serve her for life and inherit a certain house.(389) In another case a lady adopts a son to bring up her daughter and give her to a husband. “If he vexes his adoptive mother, she will cut him off. He shall not have claim on any of the goods of his adoptive mother, but shall inherit her field and garden.”(390) Evidently the mother intended her personal effects to be her daughter’s and to form her marriage-portion. The obligation did not always last long. Thus we find that Lautum, who was adopted by a votary and was herself a votary, two years later was in a position to adopt as her daughter another votary.(391) She handed on the same property, indicating that her adoptive mother was dead.

The adoption of a child by a lady of fortune was evidently a good settlement for the child, and usually the real parents raised no objection. We even find the father of a girl adopted by a lady, making an addition to her heritage in the form of a gift to the adopting mother on her effecting the deed of adoption. He gave them two male and two female slaves. Here also the girl covenanted to support the adoptive mother.(392)

(M404) Occasionally the adopted child did not carry out his duties. This was good ground for disinheriting him. But disinheritance was not to be inflicted without the sanction of the judges.(393) Hence we find that when a lady had adopted a daughter who failed to give her food and drink, the judges summoned them to the great temple of Shamash in Sippara, there cut off the daughter from her heritage, took away the tablet of adoption granted her, and destroyed it.(394)

(M405) A curious case is where A, the daughter of B and C, endows D to take care of B and C. As long as D lives A covenants to allow her so much. When she dies A will herself perform the duties.(395) Here A evidently expected her parents would not live long, but also D must have been aged, or infirm, as A contemplates the chance of her parents outliving D. This is not a case of adoption, but is so similar in purpose to those above as to deserve a place here.

(M406) Occasionally, however, the adopting parent reserved the usufruct of the property for life only, fixing by deed the rightful heir.(396) This was, in effect, a will or testament, since the inheritance did not take effect until after the death of the testator.

XVI. Rights Of Inheritance

(M407) The division of property among the children invariably followed the death of the father. We have a very large number of contracts bearing on this custom. The contract sets forth the particulars of the division and includes a sworn declaration on the part of the recipients to make no further claim. There were certain reservations to be made in the case of minors, for whom a portion had to be set aside to provide for their making the proper gifts to the parents of their brides on marriage.

(M408) The Code deals at length with the laws of inheritance, which are best treated under the head of marriage. The actual examples occurring in the documents of the period serve to illustrate the practical working of these laws, but hardly add to our knowledge. They are usually occupied with the division of property among brothers. Sometimes we have some light on the reservations made in favor of other members of the family. Thus two brothers divide the property of their “father’s house” and of their sister, a votary. The sister did not take her property, but the brothers were trustees for her enjoyment of it during her life, when it reverted to them in full.(397) The document merely states the amount of one brother’s share and the other’s agreement to be content with the division. In another case, where four brothers share the property of their “father’s house,” no details of their shares are given, but only their agreement to abide by the division made.(398) In another case the eldest brother allots to each of two younger brothers a share and takes a woman slave and her children as his portion. He is said to do this of his “own power,” _ina emur ḳamanišu_, and to have given them this of his “own graciousness,” _ina tûbâtišu_. The brothers swear to make no further claim on the “grant,” _maršîtu_, of their father. Either the property to which they were legally entitled had already been allotted them, or possibly they had no legal claim on any. The eldest brother is a high official, a _pa-pa_, and perhaps had succeeded his father in office. The father’s property would then be the endowment of his office, a grant from the king, and as such inalienable from the office to which the eldest son had succeeded. The three slaves may have thus been all the private property of the father which was available for division. But the context seems to suggest that what the brothers received was a concession from the eldest brother on which they had no claim. He may in consideration of his succeeding to his father’s appointment have made this concession to his brothers as a consolation.(399) In another case a mother gives certain sums to her three sons. She had still left two sons and two daughters, and the first three agree to make no claim on all that she and these four children have or shall acquire.(400) It is noteworthy that one of the three receives ten shekels as the _terḫatu_ of the wife he shall marry. He was evidently not of marriageable age, or, at any rate, still unmarried. In such a case the Code directed that on partition of the father’s property, a special sum should be laid aside for this necessary present to the bride’s father.(401) So we find two brothers giving a sister a share consisting of one-third _SAR_ of a house, next her brother’s, one maid, a bed and a chair, with the promise that on the day that she marries and enters her husband’s house she shall receive further two-thirds _GAN_ of land and slaves.(402) The list of property is often given, especially where brothers give shares to their sisters. Sometimes the relationship is less close. Thus a man shares with two sons of his father’s brother, _i.e._, with two cousins, ten _SAR_ of unreclaimed land, taking three and a half _SAR_ as his share.(403) Sometimes the property included the mother’s marriage-portion. Thus three brothers divide their property and two of them, as her sons, share their mother’s marriage-portion:(404)

(M409)

One _SAR_ of built land and granary, next the house of Ubarrîa and
next that of Bushum-Sin, two exits to the street, the property of
Urra-nâṣir, which he divided with Sin-ikisham and Ibni-Shamash.
From mouth (?) to gold the share is complete. Brother shall not
dispute with brother. By Shamash, Malkat, Marduk, and Sin-mubaliṭ
they swore. Nine witnesses. Thirteenth year of Sin-mubaliṭ.(405)

The property which fell to Urra-nâṣir was a house occupying one _SAR_ of land. The text means not that the three men, Urra-nâṣir, Sin-ikisham, and Ibni-Shamash, divided the house among them, but that at the division this house was the share of the first named. What the two, Sin-ikisham and Ibni-Shamash, had as their share we are not here told. But the three agreed not to call in question the division of property, which probably came to them from their father or mother. Fortunately we know in this case what the others got. Thus we find:

One _SAR_ of built land, (and) granary, next the house of
Ibni-Shamash and next the street, its exit to the street, the
property of Sin-ikisham, which he divided with Ibni-Shamash and
Urra-nâṣir. From mouth (?) to gold the share is complete. Brother
shall not dispute with brother. By Shamash, Malkat, and
Sin-mubaliṭ they swore. Nine witnesses. Thirteenth year of
Sin-mubaliṭ.(406)

And again:

One _SAR_ of built land, (and) granary, next the house of
Sin-ikisham and next the house of Ishtar-Ummasha, two exits to the
street, the property of Ibni-Shamash, which he divided with
Sin-ikisham and Urra-nâṣir. From mouth (?) to gold the share [is
complete]. Brother shall not dispute with brother. By Shamash,
Malkat, Marduk, and Sin-mubaliṭ they swore. Nine witnesses.
Thirteenth year of Sin-mubaliṭ.(407)

Thus we see that each brother, if they were brothers, obtained exactly the same share, one _SAR_ of land on which a house was built. Two of them, Sin-ikisham and Ibni-Shamash, were next door to each other. Ibni-Shamash had the street on the other side of him, in fact, occupied a corner house. The third brother, Urra-nâṣir, had a house in another part of the town. We therefore must understand the word “divided” in the sense “obtained on division.” In the second and third case the word rendered share is literally “all.” But the first text shows that “all is complete” means “the share is complete.” The meaning of the expression, “from mouth (?) to gold,” is still obscure. It is not certain that _bi-e_ really means “mouth.” But as Meissner has shown,(408) it exchanges with the ideogram for “mouth.” He therefore suggests that the whole phrase means “from the first verbal discussion of the division to its consummation by payment the partition of the property is now at an end.” That seems probable enough, but we may yet find a different explanation. If this be correct, it is of interest to note that while silver seems to have been the usual money, this phrase seems to assume that gold would be used in payment. A curious parallel is the fact that while in later times we always find the order gold and silver, in Sumerian texts it is silver and gold. We must not press this too far, but it really looks as if in early times silver was more valued, or at any rate, less in use than gold.

It will be noted that the second text omits Marduk from the oath, while the others name him. The third text omits _gamru_, “is complete.” The nine witnesses and the date are the same for all three. In the first and last the names of the witnesses only are given, but in the second the name of the father is added to several of them.

(M410) In the case of testamentary documents, using the phrase in a loose way to cover gifts embodied in a deed, we usually find a list of property donated. These lists give rise to insuperable difficulties to the translator. The difficulties are not so much due to the imperfections of our knowledge of Babylonian methods of writing as to the practical impossibility of finding exact terms in one language for the terms relating to domestic furniture in another. Even in the case of languages so well known to us as French and German are, we are obliged to transfer their words unaltered into our own tongue. The most skilled translator must leave a French or German _menu_ untranslated. We know for instance that the signs, _GIŠ-GU-ZA_ were used to denote the Babylonian _kussû_. When a god or king sat upon a _kussû_ we may be satisfied with the rendering “throne,” but when we find a lady leaving her daughter six _kussê_ we feel that “throne” is rather too grand. But whether we elect to call them chairs, stools, or seats, we are guilty of some false suggestion. A careful examination of the sculptured and pictured monuments may give us a clearer idea of what seats were used. The reader may consult Perrot and Chipiez, or the dictionaries of the Bible, under the articles: chairs, couches, _et cetera_, for illustrations. Unless we can find a picture with a named article upon it we are still left a wide margin of conjecture. The picture of Sennacherib receiving the tribute and submission of Lachish gives the contemporary representation of a _kussû nimedu_, but we cannot argue that every _kussû_ was of the same pattern.

We may decline to attempt a solution and merely give the original word, we may make a purely arbitrary rendering, or we may accompany the original word with an approximate indication of what is known of its nature. In neither case do we translate, for that is clearly impossible. But the reader needs a word of caution against the translations which show no signs of hesitancy. They are not indicative of greater knowledge, but of less candor. Further, to scholars a reminder is needed that even the syllabaries and bilingual texts do not give exact information. Thus alongside _GIŠ-GU-ZA_ we find a number of other ideograms, all of which are in certain connections rendered _kussû_, adequately enough no doubt, but that they all denoted exactly the same article of furniture is far from likely. A closer approximation to an exact rendering may come with the knowledge of a large number of different contexts, each of which may shade off something of the rough meaning. One of the great difficulties of the translator is that the same word often occurs again and again, but always in exactly the same context. This is especially the case in the legal documents, filled as they are with stock phrases.

(M411) According to the Sumerian laws disinheritance appears to have been simply the result of repudiation of a child by a parent, who has said to him, “You are not my son.” The penalty for a child’s repudiation of parents is to be reduced to the condition of a slave. There may also be a reference to renunciation on the part of an adopted child, but there are no legal documents to clear up the point.(409)

(M412) The Code is much clearer. Here the father is minded to cut off his son. But the disinheritance must be done in legal form. The father must say to a judge, “I renounce my son.” The judge must then inquire into the grounds of this determination. A grave fault must be alleged. What this was we are not told. But rebellious conduct, idleness, and failure to provide for parents are probable. A parent had the right to his son’s work. An adoptive parent had a right by the deed of adoption to maintenance. If the fault could be established as a first offence, the judge was bound to try and reconcile the father. If it was repeated, disinheritance took place legally. It was done by a deed duly drawn up. The Sumerian laws show that a mother had the same power as the father. Whether this was only exercised when there was no father, or whether a wife could act in this way independently of her husband in disinheriting children, does not appear. But possibly she had power in this respect only over her own property.(410)

It has been suggested that disinheritance sometimes took place as a legal form and with consent of a child, in order to admit of his adoption into another family or to free the parents from responsibility for the business engagements of the son.

(M413) An adoptive parent, who had brought up a child and afterwards had children of his own, could not entirely disinherit his adopted child. He was bound to allow him one-third of a child’s share. But he could not alienate to him real estate.(411)

XVII. Slavery

(M414) In modern thought slavery concerns personal rights. But it was not thus regarded by the Babylonians, for the slave was an inferior domestic, and, like the son in his father’s house, _minor capitis_. That he was actually a chattel is clear from his being sold, pledged, or deposited. He was property and as such a money equivalent. He might be made use of to discharge a debt, according to his value. Hence, while some account of slavery belongs with the discussion of the family, it is also a part of the section dealing with property, since the slave was a piece of property.

(M415) But the slave had a great amount of freedom, and was in no respect worse off than a child or even a wife. He could acquire property, marry a free woman, engage in trade, and act as principal in contract with a free man. Only, his property, at his death, fell to his master. He was bound to do service without pay, though he had the right to food and drink. He could not leave his master’s service at his own will, but he might acquire enough property to buy his freedom. He was tied to one spot, not being allowed to leave the city, but might be sent anywhere at command.

(M416) His status was, however, a complex of seeming inconsistencies. Yet it was so well understood that we rarely get any hints as to the exact details. It is only by collecting a vast mass of statements as to what actually occurred that we can deduce some idea of the actual facts. Professor Oppert in his tract, _La Condition des Esclaves à Babylone, Comptes Rendues_, 1888, pp. 11 ff.; and Dr. B. Meissner, in his dissertation, _De Servitute Babylonico-Assyriaca_, have gathered together the chief facts to be gleaned from the scattered hints in the contracts. Professor Kohler and Dr. Peiser discussed the question thoroughly in their _Aus Babylonische Rechtsleben_. Many articles discussing the contracts, and most of the histories touch upon the subject. We shall come back to it later under the head of Sales of Slaves. It is very difficult to disentangle facts from the mass of scattered hints, often consisting of no more than a word or two in a long document.

(M417) The institution of slavery dates back to the earliest times. We cannot in any way attempt to date its rise.

Already in the stele of Manistusu we find a slave-girl used as part of the price of land and worth thirteen shekels;(412) while nine other slaves, male and female, are reckoned for one-third of a mina apiece. This remained a fair average price for a slave in Babylonia down to the time of the Persian conquest. For the variations, see later under Sales of Slaves.(413) The Code shows that the slave was not free to contract except by power of attorney,(414) and that it was penal to seduce him from his master’s service,(415) or to harbor him when fugitive.(416) It fixes a reward for his recapture,(417) makes it penal to retain a recaptured slave,(418) and deals with his re-escape.(419) It shows that he was subject to the “levy.”(420) It also determines the position of a slave-woman who bears children to her master,(421) or of a slave who marries a free woman.(422) In each case the children are free. It fixes the fees to be paid by the slave’s master for his cure,(423) deals with injuries done to a slave,(424) damages being paid to his master;(425) enacts that if captured and sold abroad he must be freed, if re-patriated,(426) and a native of Babylonia, otherwise he returned to his master.

(M418) By far the greatest number of references to the slave condition occur in documents relating to the sale of slaves. These may be summarized here. One peculiarity always marked the sale of a slave, it was not so irrevocable as that of a house or field. For a slave might not be all he seemed. He might be diseased, or subject to fits, he might have vices of disposition, especially a tendency to run away. A female slave might be defective in what constituted her chief attraction. Hence there was usually a stipulation that if the buyer had a legitimate cause of complaint he could return his purchase and have his money back. In fact, an undisclosed defect would invalidate the sale. These defects might be physical, inherent, contingent, or legal.

(M419) There seems to have been a dreaded disease called the _bennu_. Professor Jensen(427) has shown how largely it bulks in the literature, and what dire effects are ascribed to it. But it was not the only severe disease from which men suffered then. It is associated with several others as bad. Hence in legal documents we may take it as a typical example of a serious disease, which would so detract from the value of a slave that the purchaser would not keep him. It is evident that it was something that the purchaser could not detect at sight. Perhaps it was a disease which took some time to show itself. It is mentioned in the Code and in the sales of slaves of the First Dynasty of Babylon. It also occurs in Assyrian deeds of sale, down to the end of the seventh century B.C. The Code and the contemporary contracts allow one month within which a plea could be raised that the slave had the _bennu_. The purchaser could then return him and have his money back. In the Assyrian deeds one hundred days is allowed.

In the Assyrian deeds _ṣibtu_ is also allowed a hundred days. This is often associated with _bennu_ in the mythological texts as equally dreaded. It affected the hands or the mouth. We may render it “seizure,” and think of some form of “paralysis.”

(M420) The objections which come under the head of legal defects are summed up in the Code as a _bagru_, or “complaint.” In the contracts and Code this could be pleaded at any time. So in Assyrian times a _sartu_, “a vice,” could be the ground for repudiation at any time. This might arise from the disposition of the slave. The sale might also be invalidated by a claim on him for service to the state; by a lien held by a creditor; by a claim to free citizenship. But we are not yet in a position to state definitely what was the exact nature of these claims. Doubtless the recovery of further codes will fix them finally.

In later Babylonian times Law B specially provides for the return of the slave at any time, if a claim be made on him.