Chapter X: Part 10

Thus Germany decided to take her stand on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors for the sake of the Triple Alliance--a fatal blunder, which Prince Lichnowsky describes as "all the more striking since a sudden Franco-Russian assault--the only hypothesis which could justify the Triple Alliance policy--could, in fact, be ruled out of our calculations."

DANGEROUS BALKAN POLICY

It was not only unnecessary, he declares, but dangerous, to pay attention to Austria's wishes, since to look at the Eastern question through Austrian spectacles must lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.

Such a policy, moreover, was bound to alienate sympathy among
the young, strong, and aspiring communities of the Balkan
Peninsula, who were ready to turn to us and to open their
markets to us. The opposition between courts and peoples,
between the dynastic and the democratic idea of the State, was
clearly defined, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. * *
* In Serbia, against our own economic interests, we supported
the Austrian policy of strangulation. We have always ridden
horses whose collapse could be foreseen--Kruger, Abdul Aziz,
Abdul Hamid, and William of Wied--and finally we came to grief
in Berchtold's stable.

Prince Lichnowsky proceeds to describe the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913, and the influential and conciliatory part played there by Sir Edward Grey, who always, he says, found a way out of every apparent deadlock.

But we, instead of taking up a position analogous to that of
England, invariably espoused the standpoint of Vienna. Count
Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London; I was his second.
My task consisted in supporting his proposals. In Berlin the
prudent and experienced Count Szögyény was in control. "Here the
casus foederis arises," was his constant refrain, and when I
once ventured to question the correctness of this conclusion I
was seriously warned for Austrophobia. At all points we accepted
and supported the views of Austria and Italy. Sir Edward Grey,
on the other hand, practically never sided with Russia or
France. Usually, indeed, he took the side of our group, so as
not to provide any pretext for conflict. That pretext was
supplied later by a dead Archduke.

THE GUILT ESTABLISHED

Lichnowsky states that a few days after the Serajevo murder of June 28, 1914, he was in Berlin, and from interviews with Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg he found that the latter did not share the Prince's belief that peace might be maintained, and complained of Russian armaments. The memorandum continues:

I then went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was representing Herr von
Jagow, [Foreign Secretary,] and from him learned that Russia was
about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an
unmistakable animosity toward Russia, which, he said, was
everywhere in our way. Of course, I was not told that General
von Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr
von Tschereschky [the German Ambassador in Vienna] had received
a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in
Vienna toward Serbia.

Subsequently I learned that at a decisive conversation in
Potsdam July 5 an inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found
positive assent among all personages in authority. Indeed, they
added that there would be no harm if war with Russia were to
result. I received instruction that I was to induce the English
press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the
deathblow to the Great Serbian movement, and as far as possible
I was, by my influence, to prevent public opinion opposing
Austria.

I gave warning against the whole project, which I described as
adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation be
recommended to the Austrians because I did not believe in
localization of conflict.

Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not ready, that there
doubtless would be a certain amount of bluster, but that the
more firmly we stood by Austria the more would Russia draw back.
He said Austria already was accusing us of want of spirit and we
must not squeeze her; and that, on the other hand, feeling in
Russia was becoming ever more anti-German and so we must simply
risk it.

I knew that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be
turned to use in favor of peace, so I used my friendly relations
with Sir Edward, [British Foreign Secretary,] and in confidence
begged him to advise moderation in Russia if Austria demanded
satisfaction from Serbia.

At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly
to the Austrians because the murder was condemned, but gradually
more and more voices were heard to insist that, however
necessary it was to punish the crime, exploitation of crime for
political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly
urged to show moderation.

When the ultimatum appeared, all the papers, except The
Standard, which was always like slow water and apparently was
paid by the Austrians, were as one in their condemnation. The
whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it
meant war, and indeed a world war.

The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for review, was
not demobilized.

England and Russia for Peace

At first I pressed for a conciliatory answer as far as possible
on the part of Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian
Government left no further doubt of the seriousness of the
situation. The Serbian reply was in accordance with the British
efforts, and everything actually had been accepted except two
points, about which a readiness to negotiate had been expressed.

If Russia and England had wanted war in order to fall upon us a
hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard of
[Austrian] note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey
went through the Serbian reply with me and pointed to the
conciliatory attitude of the Government at Belgrade. We then
discussed his mediation proposal, which was to arrange an
interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties.

Cambon, [French Ambassador in London,] Marquis Imperiali,
[Italian Ambassador in London,] and I should have met under Sir
Edward Grey's presidency, and it would have been easy to find an
acceptable form for the disputed points which, in the main,
concerned the participation of Austrian officials in the
investigation at Belgrade.

Given good will, everything could have been settled in one or
two sittings, and mere acceptance of the British proposal would
have relieved the tension and would further have improved our
relations to England. I urgently recommended the proposal,
saying that otherwise a world war was imminent, in which we had
everything to lose and nothing to gain.

In vain! I was told that it was against the dignity of Austria
and that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business
but left it to our ally. I was told to work for localization of
conflict. Of course, it would only have needed a hint from
Berlin to make Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister,
satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the
Serbian reply, but this hint was not given.

Germany Forced the War

On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it
would have been! After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come
forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I
could get no other answer from Berlin than that it was enormous
conciliation on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation
of territory.

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without
annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and
subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation
which she would not stand. The impression became ever stronger
that we desired war in all circumstances, otherwise our attitude
on the question, which after all did not directly concern us,
was unintelligible.

The urgent appeals and definite declarations of Sazonoff
[Russian Foreign Minister] later on the positively humble
telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the
warnings of San Giuliano, [Italian Foreign Minister,] my own
urgent advice--all were of no use, for Berlin went on insisting
that Serbia must be massacred. The more I pressed the less
willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was
not to have the success of saving peace in company with Sir
Edward Grey.

So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I
replied I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon
English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister
said to me repeatedly, "If war breaks out it will be the
greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen." After that events
moved rapidly.

When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played strong man on
instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course,
we answered Russian mobilization--after Russia had waited and
negotiated in vain for a whole week--with our ultimatum and
declaration of war.

Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the
part of England. As late as August the King of England replied
evasively to the French President, but in a telegram from
Berlin, which announced the threatening danger of war, England
already was mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one
already reckoned upon war with England.

Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on Aug. 5 at his
house. I went there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said
to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and "We do not
want to crush Germany." Unfortunately this confidential
conversation was published, and thereby von Bethmann Hollweg
destroyed the last possibility of reaching a peace via England.

Questions of Guilt

As it appears from all official publications without the facts
being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its
poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no
German interest was involved and the danger of a world war must
have been known to us; whether we knew the text of the ultimatum
is a question of complete indifference.

2. In the days between July 23 and 30, 1914, when Sazonoff
emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack
on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation,
although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had
accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement
about the two points in question could easily have been reached
and Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian
reply.

3. On July 30, when Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without
Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere
mobilization by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and on
July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had
pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a
man should march--so that we deliberately destroyed the
possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that
the whole world outside of Germany attributes to us sole guilt
for the world war.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

Anglo-German negotiations concerning the Berlin-Bagdad Railway and German naval and commercial jealousy of Great Britain are touched upon in further sections of the personal memorandum.

Prince Lichnowsky says that the Bagdad Railway treaty aimed in fact at a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the rights of the Sultan of Turkey. Sir Edward Grey asserted repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor. The greatest concession that Sir Edward made to Prince Lichnowsky personally was for the continuation of the railway line to Basra.

By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became a German zone of interest by which all British rights and the question of shipping on the Tigris were left untouched. The British economic territories, the Prince adds, included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aden Railway, the French territory was Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had the treaty been concluded and published, he continues, an agreement would have been reached with Great Britain which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of Anglo-German co-operation.

GERMANY'S NAVAL THREAT

Referring to the difficult question of German naval activity, Prince Lichnowsky says that the creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into a most important naval power had at least to be recognized by Great Britain as uncomfortable. To preserve the supremacy of the seas which Great Britain must have in order not to go down, the Prince adds, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayers. Nevertheless, the powers become reconciled to the German fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to Great Britain and, the Prince says, constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England to join hands with Russia and France.

On account of the German fleet alone, Prince Lichnowsky says, Great Britain would have drawn the sword as little as on account of German trade, "which, it is pretended, called forth her jealousy and finally brought about war."

"NAVAL HOLIDAY"

During Prince Lichnowsky's term of office Winston Spencer Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, raised the question of the so-called naval holiday, proposing it for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party. Churchill wanted a pause of one year in building ships. Prince Lichnowsky maintains it would have been difficult to support this plan on account of the workmen employed and the technical personnel. The German naval program was settled, and it would have been difficult to alter it. The Prince asserts that it was possible, in spite of the German fleet and without a naval holiday, to come to an understanding. In that spirit he had carried out his mission and had almost succeeded in realizing his program when the war broke out and destroyed everything.

Discussing the question of trade jealousy, Prince Lichnowsky says it rested on a faulty judgment of circumstances. In British commercial circles, he says, he found the greatest good-will and the desire for further economic interests in common. In order to get in touch with the most important business circles he accepted invitations from the Chambers of Commerce in London, Bradford, Newcastle, and Liverpool, and he had a hearty reception everywhere.

In conclusion Prince Lichnowsky gives his impressions of English society. King George he describes as very amiable and well-meaning, with sound understanding and common sense, and invariably well disposed toward the German Ambassador.

LICHNOWSKY EXPLAINS

The German Vice Chancellor, Friedrich von Payer, announced in the Reichstag late in March that on account of the disclosures Prince Lichnowsky had resigned his rank and expressed regrets. Herr von Payer stated that Prince Lichnowsky himself, on March 15, made a statement to the Imperial Chancellor in which he said:

Your Excellency knows that the purely private notes which I
wrote down in the Summer of 1916 found their way into wider
circles by an unprecedented breach of confidence. It was mainly
a question of subjective considerations about our entire foreign
policy since the Berlin Congress. I perceived in the policy
hitherto pursued of repelling Russia and in the extension of the
policy of alliances to Oriental questions the real roots of the
world war. I then submitted our Morocco naval policy to a brief
examination. My London mission could at the same time not
remain out of consideration, especially as I felt need in regard
to the future and with a view to my own justification of noting
the details of my experiences and impressions there before they
vanished from my memory.

Prince Lichnowsky then described how the memorandum, which he had shown to a few political friends, got into wider circulation owing to an indiscretion, and finally expressed lively regret at such an extremely vexatious incident.

VICE CHANCELLOR'S REPLY

Herr von Payer said that Prince Lichnowsky had meanwhile tendered his resignation of his present rank, which had been accepted, and, as he had doubtless no bad intention, but had simply been guilty of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him. The Vice Chancellor proceeded:

Some assertions in his document must, however, be contradicted,
especially his assertions about political events in the last
months preceding the war. Prince Lichnowsky was not of his own
knowledge acquainted with these events, but he apparently
received from a third and wrongly informed quarter inaccurate
information. The key to mistakes and false conclusions may also
be the Prince's overestimation of his own services, which are
accompanied by hatred against those who do not recognize his
achievements as he expected. The entire memorandum is penetrated
by a striking veneration for foreign diplomats, especially the
British, who are described in a truly affectionate manner, and
on the other hand by an equally striking irritation against
almost all German statesmen. The result was that the Prince
frequently regarded Germany's most zealous enemies as her best
friends because they were personally on good terms with him. The
fact that, as he admits, he attached at first no great
importance to the assassination of the heir to the Austrian
throne, and was displeased that the situation was judged
otherwise in Berlin, makes it plain that the Prince had no clear
judgment for the events that followed and their import.

VON PAYER'S DENIALS

The Vice Chancellor then characterized as false all Prince Lichnowsky's assertions about General von Moltke's urging war at the Potsdam Crown Council of July 5, 1914, and the dispatch of the Austrian protocol by "this alleged Crown Council" to Count Mensdorff with the postscript that it would be no great harm even if war with Russia arose out of it.

Herr von Payer also denied the statement that the then Foreign Secretary was in Vienna in 1914, as well as the statement that Count von Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in Petrograd, had reported that Russia would in no circumstances move. The Sukhomlinoff trial had shown how unfounded were Prince Lichnowsky's reproaches against Germany for replying to the Russian mobilization by an ultimatum and a declaration of war. It was also false to assert that the German Government rejected all Great Britain's mediation proposals. Lord Grey's last mediation proposal was very urgently supported in Vienna by Berlin. The aim of the memorandum was obvious. It was to show the reader how much better and more intelligent Prince Lichnowsky's policy was and how he could have assured the peace of the empire if his advice had been followed. The Vice Chancellor added: "The memorandum will cause enough harm among malevolent and superficial people; it has no historical value whatever."

Dr. Payer then discussed the revelations of Dr. Mühlon, at present in Switzerland. Dr. Mühlon, an ex-Director of Krupps, had made a statement according to which he had a conference with two exalted personages in the latter half of July, 1914, from which it appeared that it was not the intention of the German Government to maintain peace. The Vice Chancellor alleged that Dr. Mühlon was suffering from neurasthenia at the time, and that no importance could be attached to his revelations, since the two gentlemen referred to had denied making the statements attributed to them.

VON STUMM'S STATEMENT

Herr von Stumm, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that while in London the Prince devoted himself zealously to his task. His views had frequently not agreed with those of the German Foreign Office, especially regarding his strong optimism in reference to Anglo-German relations. When his hopes, aiming at an Anglo-German understanding, were destroyed by the war, the Prince returned to Germany "greatly excited," and even then did not restrain his criticism of German policy. His excitement increased owing to attacks against him in the German press. All these circumstances, said von Stumm, must be taken into consideration when gauging the value of the memorandum.

In the subsequent discussion disapproval of Prince Lichnowsky's attitude was expressed, but some speakers urged the need for the reorganization of Germany's diplomatic service.

According to the report of the debate published by the Neues Wiener Journal, Herr von Payer himself acknowledged that prior to the war German diplomacy had made some bad blunders, and that reform was urgently needed. Herr Müller (Progressive) sharply criticised Herr von Flotow, who was German Ambassador in Rome at the beginning of the war, and charged him with having declared to the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian Foreign Minister, that there existed for Italy no casus foederis. Prince Bülow also came in for severe criticism.

The Former Foreign Minister's Reply

The former Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr von Jagow, published a reply to Prince Lichnowsky in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which he virtually confirmed the Prince's main assertions. He applied such phrases as "an unheard-of assertion," "a mass of inaccuracies and perversions," to Lichnowsky's memorandum, but he did not meet the former Ambassador's charges with any new evidence, merely referring his readers to former publications of the German Government.

Von Jagow's reply bears out the assertion that in 1913 England was prepared to enter into friendly agreements with Germany. She was "ready to meet us." A Bagdad railway agreement was almost completed when Germany drew the sword. Negotiations about the future of the African colonies of Portugal in certain contingencies had been resumed, and the German Foreign Secretary looked forward to further agreements in the Far East and elsewhere.

The former Foreign Minister refuses to adopt the Pan-German view that "England laid all the mines which caused the war." On the contrary, he bears witness with former Ambassador Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey's "love of peace and his serious wish to reach an agreement with us." He says that it is true that Sir Edward could have prevented war, but he is careful not to indicate how. Presumably he means he could have done it by following Germany's example and treating England's engagements as "scraps of paper."

He agrees that the war was not popular with the British people, and that Belgium had to serve as a battlecry. Germany, on the other hand, had to maintain her prestige. It had been damaged by her political defeat in Morocco. A fresh diminution of it would have been, he remarks, "intolerable for our position in Europe and in the world."

In one point of fact he corrects Prince Lichnowsky. He denies that he himself visited Vienna at any time between the Spring of 1913 and the outbreak of the war. He confirms, as far as he remembers, all the expressions attributed to him by Lichnowsky.

His only reference to the Potsdam Council of July 5, 1914, (when, it is asserted, the Teuton leaders made the final decision for war,) is not a denial that the meeting took place, but a single sentence: "On July 5 I was absent from Berlin."

In regard to Lichnowsky's main charges, Herr von Jagow talks of "unheard-of" assertions and "inaccuracies and perversions," but he does not bring forward any fresh arguments to meet the charges, and merely refers to the publications of the German Government concerning the conversations which took place in June, 1914, between the Kaiser and Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Herr von Jagow says:

At Konopischt no plan was laid down (festgelegt) for an active
policy against Serbia. Archduke Francis Ferdinand was not at all
an advocate of a policy leading to war, although he was often
reckoned as such. During the London conference he advised
moderation and avoidance of war.

Herr van Jagow here avoids the issue raised by Lichnowsky, who did not say that a definite scheme was arranged at Konopischt, but that the indication was, not that Archduke Francis Ferdinand was in favor of war, but that his death was a positive relief to the advocates of war.

In the course of his statement Herr von Jagow, who remained Foreign Secretary until late in 1916, says:

When I was appointed State Secretary in January, 1913, it seemed
to me that a German-English rapprochement was desirable, and an
understanding upon those points where our interests touched and
sometimes even crossed, and this I deemed feasible. At least, it
was my intention to work on this.

With regard to the Bagdad question Herr von Jagow says:

If England insisted upon excluding us from Mesopotamia, it
appeared to me that a conflict would be avoided with difficulty.
We were met in a conciliatory manner by the English Government,
and an agreement had almost been reached just previous to the
outbreak of the world war.

He meets Lichnowsky's assertion that Germany drove Russia "into the arms of France and England by our Oriental and Balkan policy" with the contention that the Pan-Slavism which governed Russian politics was directly anti-German. Upon the London conference on Algeciras he says:

We no more desired war on Albania's account than did Sir Edward
Grey. That is why, in spite of our former experiences at
Algeciras, we consented to the conference. The merit of a
conciliatory attitude at the conference must not be denied to
Sir Edward Grey, but it is going a little too far to say that he
in nowise took up his stand on the side of the Entente. He
certainly often urged St. Petersburg to give way, and found
principles of accord (Einigungs Formeln) suitable to this end.
But outwardly he represented the Entente, as he could no more
leave his associates in the lurch than could we. Nor did he wish
to do so.

On the other hand, the assertion that we adopted without
exception the standpoint prescribed for us by Vienna is
absolutely untrue. We played, as England did, a conciliatory
rôle, and urged moderation upon Vienna far more than Lichnowsky
seems to be aware of, or at any rate admits. Vienna thereupon
made a variety of the most far-reaching concessions, Dibra and
Djakowa.

ENGLAND EXONERATED

Mentioning the Serajevo murders as the climax of the continued Russian provocations against Austria, von Jagow says:

The prestige and existence of the Danube monarchy were at stake.
We could not agree to the English proposal concerning a
conference of Ministers, as it would doubtless have led to a
serious diplomatic defeat for us.

I do not intend to adopt the theory now widespread among us that
England was the originator of all the intrigues leading to the
war. On the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of
peace and his genuine desire to arrive at an understanding with
us, but he had allowed himself to become too hopelessly
entangled in the network of Franco-Russian policy. He could find
no way out, and therefore failed to do that which had been in
his power to prevent the world war. War was not popular among
the English people, therefore Belgium had to serve as a battle
cry.

At the end of his observations von Jagow restates his policy as follows:

I also pursued a policy which aimed at an agreement with England
because I was of the opinion that this was the only road by
which we could get out of the unfavorable situation into which
the unequal distribution of strength and weakness of the Triple
Alliance had brought us. Political marriages "until death us do
part" are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, impossible in
international relations, but in the existing state of affairs in
Europe isolations are equally impossible. The history of Europe
is composed of coalitions, some of which have led to avoidance
of wars and some to violent conflicts. A loosening and final
dissolution of old unions, which no longer satisfy all
conditions, cannot be recommended until new constellations are
within reach. That was the aim of our policy of rapprochement
with England. As long as this policy did not provide trustworthy
guarantees we could not abandon the old securities and
obligations which they involved.

Our Morocco policy led to political defeat. Happily, this had
been avoided in the Bosnian crisis and at the London conference.
Fresh diminution of our prestige was intolerable for our
position in Europe and in the world. Prosperity of States and
their political and economic successes depend upon the prestige
which they enjoy in the world.

A FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Captain Persius, the military editor of the Berlin Tageblatt, in discussing the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky and the reply of Herr von Jagow in their relation to a possible peace by agreement, used these words:

"An understanding ought to be easier, now that we have heard from two opposing sources, from von Jagow and Lichnowsky, that England was not responsible for the war, as has been believed hitherto in wide circles in Germany."

Decrease of Birth Rate in Hungary

_The following statistics were read by the Karolyist Deputy, Lodovico Hollo, to the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, at the session of Jan. 16, 1918: _

(1) Births.--Before the war 765,000 children a year were born in Hungary. In the first year of the war, 1914, the number of births was reduced by 18,000; in 1915 only 481,000 children were born--that is, 284,000 less than in time of peace. In 1916 the number of births was 333,000--that is, a reduction of 432,000. In 1917 the births amounted to 328,000--that is, the reduction was 438,000. Therefore our losses (in Hungary alone) behind the front reach the number of 1,172,866 individuals.

(2) Deaths.--Whereas in time of peace infant mortality for a period of seven years was 34 per cent., in 1915 the proportion was increased to 48 per cent. and in 1916 to 50 per cent.

These facts prove what sacrifices Hungary is making, to the prejudice of her own people, to continue the war.

Count Czernin on Peace Terms

A Reply to President Wilson and a Survey of Results of the Russian Peace Treaties

_Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, delivered
an address April 2, 1918, to a deputation of the Vienna City
Council, in the nature of a reply to President Wilson's address
of Feb. 11 on "Peace Aims," the text of which appeared in the
March issue of Current History Magazine. Count Czernin spoke as
follows:_

GENTLEMEN: I am quite ready to reply to the questions put by the Burgomaster and thereby to give both you and the wider public a full view of political conditions as I see them at the moment. I had hoped to speak before the competent forum, but the fact that one of our commissions cannot meet at present makes this impossible, so I take this opportunity of affording in brief a review of the international situation.

With the signing of peace with Rumania the war in the east is ended. Three treaties of peace have been signed--with Petrograd, Ukraine, and Rumania. One principal section of the war is thus ended.

Before discussing the separate peaces which have been signed, and before going into details, I wish to return to the statements of the President of the United States wherein he replied to the speech I made before the delegations on Jan. 24. In many parts of the world Mr. Wilson's speech was regarded as an attempt to drive a wedge between Vienna and Berlin. I do not believe that, because I have much too high an opinion of Mr. Wilson's statesmanship to suspect him of such a train of thought.

According to my impressions, Mr. Wilson does not want to separate Vienna from Berlin. He does not desire that, and knows that it is impossible.

He perhaps thinks, however, that Vienna presents more favorable soil for sowing the seeds of a general peace. He has perhaps said to himself that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has the good fortune to have a monarch who genuinely and honorably desires a general peace, but that this monarch will never be guilty of a breach of faith; that he will never make a shameful peace, and that behind this monarch stand 55,000,000 souls.

I imagine that Mr. Wilson says to himself that this closely knit mass of people represents a force which is not to be disregarded and that this honorable and firm will to peace with which the monarch is imbued and which binds him to the peoples of both States is capable of carrying a great idea in the service of which Mr. Wilson has also placed himself.

Before I discuss Mr. Wilson's last utterances I would like to clear up one misunderstanding. In my last speech which I delivered before the Austrian delegations I replied to an inquiry in this connection that probably Mr. Wilson was already in possession of my utterances. Later Mr. Wilson corrected this, and pointed out that there must be some mistake. I had prepared my speech beforehand, so as to avoid any possibility of its being incorrectly or incompletely transmitted, and at the moment I made my speech I supposed that it had already reached Washington. Apparently, however, it only arrived there some days later.

This does not affect the matter itself. My object was to assure that the President of the United States should get the exact text of my speech, and this object was attained and the trifling delay of a few days was a matter of indifference.

With regard to Mr. Wilson's reply, I can only say that I consider it very important that the German Chancellor, in his admirable speech of Feb. 25, took the answer out of my mouth and declared that the four points developed by Mr. Wilson in his speech of Feb. 11 are the basis upon which a general peace can be discussed. I entirely agree with him in this.

President Wilson's four points are a suitable basis upon which to begin negotiating about a general peace. The question is whether or not Mr. Wilson will succeed in uniting his allies upon this basis.

SAYS FRANCE ASKED TERMS

God is my witness that we have tried everything possible to avoid a new offensive. The Entente would not have it. A short time before the beginning of the offensive in the west M. Clemenceau inquired of me whether and upon what basis I was prepared to negotiate. I immediately replied, in agreement with Berlin, that I was ready to negotiate, and that as regards France I saw no other obstacle for peace than France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine.

The reply from Paris was that France was willing to negotiate only on that basis. There was then no choice left.

The gigantic struggle in the west has already begun. Austro-Hungarian and German troops are fighting shoulder to shoulder as they did in Russia, Serbia, Rumania, and Italy. We are fighting united for the defense of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Our armies will show the Entente that French and Italian aspirations to portions of our territory are Utopias which will be terribly avenged.

The explanation of this attitude of the Entente Powers, which verges on lunacy, is to a great extent to be sought in certain domestic events here, to which I shall return later. Whatever may happen, we shall not sacrifice German interests any more than Germany will desert us. Loyalty on the Danube is not less than German loyalty. We are not fighting for imperialist or annexationist ends, either for ourselves or for Germany, but we shall act together to the end for our defense, for our political existence and for our future.

The first breach in the determination of our enemies to war has been driven by the peace negotiations with Russia. That was a break-through by the idea of peace.

It is a symptom of childish dilettantism to overlook the close relationship of the various peace signatures with each other. The constellation of enemy powers in the east was like a net. When one mesh was cut through the remaining meshes loosened of their own accord.

We first gave international recognition to the separation of Ukraine from Russia, which had to be accomplished as an internal affair of Russia. Profiting from resultant circumstances which were favorable to our aims, we concluded with the Ukraine the peace sought by that country.

This gave the lead to peace with Petrograd, whereby Rumania was left standing alone, so that she also had to conclude peace. So one peace brought another, and the desired success, namely, the end of the war in the east, was achieved.

The peace concluded with Rumania, it is calculated, will be the starting point of friendly relations. The slight frontier rectifications which we receive are not annexations. Wholly uninhabited regions, they serve solely for military protection. To those who insist that these rectifications fall under the category of annexations and accuse me of inconsistency, I reply that I have publicly protested against holding out a license to our enemies which would assure them against the dangers of further adventures.

ROBBING RUMANIA

From Russia I did not demand a single meter, but Rumania neglected the favorable moment. The protection of mercantile shipping in the lower Danube and the guarding of the Iron Gate are guaranteed by the extension of the frontier to the heights of Turnu-Severin, by leasing for thirty years a valuable wharf near this town, together with a strip along the river bank at an annual rental of 1,000 lei, and, finally, by obtaining the leasing rights to the islands of Ostrovo, Marecorbu, and Simearu, and the transfer of the frontier several kilometers southward in the region of the Petroseny coal mine, which better safeguards our possessions in the Szurdok Pass coal basin.

Nagy-Szeben and Fogaras will receive a new security frontier of an average width of from 15 to 18 kilometers at all passes of importance, as, for instance, Predeal, Bodz, Gyimes, Bekas, and Tolgyes. The new frontier has been so far removed to Rumanian ground as military reasons require.

The rectification east of Czernowitz has protected that city against future attacks.

At the moment when we are successfully endeavoring to renew friendly and neighborly relations with Rumania, it is unlikely that we would open old wounds, but every one knows the history of Rumania's entrance into the war and will admit that it was my duty to protect the monarchy against future surprises of a similar kind.

BURDENS OF THE FUTURE

I consider the safest guarantee for the future, international agreements to prevent war. In such agreements, if they are framed in binding form, I should see much stronger guarantees against surprise attacks by neighbors than in frontier rectifications, but thus far, except in the case of President Wilson, I have been unable to discover among any of our enemies serious inclination to accept this idea. However, despite the small degree of approval this idea receives, I consider that it will be realized.

Calculating the burdens with which the States of the world will emerge from the war, I vainly ask myself how they will cover military expenditures if competition in armaments remains unrestricted. I do not believe that it will be possible for the States after this war adequately to meet the increased requirements due to the war. I think, rather, that financial conditions will compel the States to enter into a compromise regarding the limitation of armaments.

This calculation of mine is neither idealistic nor fantastic, but is based upon reality in politics in the most literal sense of the word. I, for my part, would consider it a great disaster if in the end there should be failure to achieve general agreements regarding the diminution of armaments.

It is obvious that in the peace with Rumania we shall take precautions to have our interests in the questions of grain, food supply, and petroleum fully protected. We shall further take precautions that the Catholic Church and our schools receive the state of protection they need, and we shall solve the Jewish question. The Jew shall henceforth be a citizen with equal rights in Rumania.

MAKING RUMANIA PAY

The irredentist propaganda, which has produced so much evil in Hungary, will be restrained and, finally, precautions will be taken to obtain indemnification for the injustice innocently suffered by many of our countrymen owing to the war.

We shall strive by means of a new commercial treaty and appropriate settlement of the railway and shipping questions to protect our economic interests in Rumania.

Rumania's future lies in the east. Large portions of Bessarabia are inhabited by Rumanians, and there are many indications that the Rumanian population there desires close union with Rumania. If Rumania will adopt a frank, cordial, friendly attitude toward us we will have no objections to meeting those tendencies in Bessarabia. Rumania can gain much more in Bessarabia than she lost in the war.

[Count Czernin said that he was anxious that the rectifications of the frontier should not leave any embitterment behind, and expressed the opinion that Rumania in her own interest must turn to the Central Powers.]

In concluding peace with Rumania and Ukraine, it has been my first thought to furnish the monarchy with foodstuffs and raw materials. Russia did not come into consideration in this connection owing to the disorganization there.

We agreed with Ukraine that the quantity of grain to be delivered to the Central Powers should be at least 1,000,000 tons. Thirty cars of grain and peas are now en route, 600 cars are ready to be transported, and these transports will be continued until the imports are organized and can begin regularly. Larger transports are rendered possible by the peace with Rumania, which enables goods to be sent from Odessa to Danube ports.

We hope during May to undertake the first large transport from Ukraine. While I admit that the imports from Ukraine are still small and must be increased, nevertheless our food situation would have been considerably worse had this agreement not been concluded.

From Rumania we will obtain a considerable surplus of last year's harvest. Moreover, about 400,000 tons of grain, peas, beans, and fodder must be transported via the Danube. Rumania must also immediately provide us with 800,000 sheep and pigs, which will improve our meat supply slightly.

It is clear from this that everything will be done to obtain from the exploitation of the regions which peace has opened for us in the east whatever is obtainable. The difficulties of obtaining these supplies from Ukraine are still considerable, as no state of order exists there. But with the good-will of the Ukrainian Government and our organization we will succeed in overcoming the difficulties.

An immediate general peace would not give us further advantages, as all Europe today is suffering from lack of foodstuffs. While the lack of cargo space prevents other nations from supplying themselves, the granaries of Ukraine and Rumania remain open to the Central Powers.

[Replying to the annexationists, Count Czernin said:]

The forcible annexation of foreign peoples would place difficulties in the way of a general peace, and such an extension of territories would not strengthen the empire. On the contrary, considering the grouping of the monarchy, they would weaken us. What we require are not territorial annexations, but economic safeguards for the future.

We wish to do everything to create in the Balkans a situation of lasting calm. Not until the collapse of Russia did there cease to exist the factor which hitherto made it impossible for us to bring about a definite state of internal peace in the Balkans.

We know that the desire for peace is very great in Serbia, but Serbia has been prevented by the Entente Powers from concluding it. Bulgaria must receive from Serbia certain districts inhabited by Bulgarians. We, however, have no desire to destroy Serbia. We will enable Serbia to develop, and we would welcome closer economic relations with her.

We do not desire to influence the future relations between the monarchy and Serbia and Montenegro by motives conflicting with friendly, neighborly relations. The best state of egoism is to come to terms with a beaten neighbor, which leads to this: My egoism regarding Austria-Hungary is that after being conquered militarily our enemies must be conquered morally. Only then is victory complete, and in this respect diplomacy must finish the work of the armies.

THE DESIRE FOR PEACE

Since I came into office I have striven only after one aim, namely, to secure an honorable peace for the monarchy and to create a situation which will secure to Austria-Hungary future free development, and, moreover, to do everything possible to insure that this terrible war shall be the last one for time out of mind. I have never spoken differently. I do not intend to go begging for peace, or to obtain it by entreaties or lamentations, but to enforce it by our moral right and physical strength. Any other tactics, I consider, would contribute to the prolongation of the war.

I must say, to my regret, that during the last few weeks and months much has been spoken and done in Austria that prolongs the war. Those who are prolonging the war are divided into various groups, according to their motives and tactics. There are, first, those who continuously beg for peace. They are despicable and foolish. To endeavor to conclude peace at any price is despicable, for it is unmanly, and it is foolish because it continuously feeds the already dying aggressive spirit of the enemy. The desire for peace of the great masses is natural as well as comprehensible, but the leaders of the people must consider that certain utterances produce abroad just the opposite effect from what they desire.

Firmly relying on our strength and the justice of our cause, I have already concluded three moderate but honorable peace treaties. The rest of our enemies also begin to understand that we have no other desire than to secure the future of the monarchy and of our allies, and that we intend to enforce this and can and will enforce it. I shall unswervingly prosecute this course and join issue with any one who opposes me.

The second group of war prolongers are the annexationists. It is a distortion of fact to assert that Germany has made conquests in the east. Lenine's anarchy drove the border people into the arms of Germany. Is Germany to refuse this involuntary choice of foreign border States?

The German Government has as little desire for oppressions as we, and I am perfectly convinced that neither annexationists nor weaklings can prevent forever a moderate and honorable peace. They delay it, but they cannot prevent it.

The hopes of our enemies of final victory are not merely based on military expectations and the blockade. They are based to a great extent on our interior political conditions and on certain political leaders, not forgetting the Czechs. Recently we were almost on the point of entering into negotiations with the Western Powers, when the wind suddenly veered round and, as we know with certainty, the Entente decided it had better wait, as parliamentary and political events in our country justified the hope that the monarchy would soon be defenseless.

[Count Czernin attacked the Czech leaders and Czech troops, who, he declared, "criminally fight against their own country," and appealed to the people to be united against this "high treason." The Government, he said, was quite ready to proceed to the revision of the Constitution, but this would not be helped by those who hoped through the victory of the Entente to gain their ends. "If we expel this poison," he declared, "a general honorable peace is nearer than the public imagines, but no one has the right to remain aside in this last decisive struggle."]

Great Britain's Reply to Count Czernin

_Lord Robert Cecil, Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, made the following statement in answer to Count Czernin_:

Whatever doubt about Count Czernin might have existed before his latest declaration, there can be no doubt now that he stands for Prussian ideals and Prussian policy. I must confess that I prefer Prussian brutality to Austrian hypocrisy. If you are going to rob and strangle your neighbor it is better not to talk of your moderation.

Count Czernin claims with the greatest audacity that he and his allies have just made proposals that are moderate, and even guided by the principles of self-determination, no annexations, and no indemnities. As far as self-determination is concerned, in every one of the new States they have set up they have done so without the slightest regard to the wishes of the peoples and no serious attempt was made even to follow racial boundaries or racial antecedents.

The province of Dobrudja, (Rumania,) which has been handed over to Bulgaria, has only 18 per cent. Bulgarians and 50 per cent. Rumanians, and Southern Bessarabia, which apparently is offered to Rumania, is the part of Bessarabia having the fewest Rumanians. As for no annexations, Count Czernin claims that all he has done is to carry out slight frontier rectifications. What he really has done is to take an important part of the Danube and all the passes between Austria-Hungary and Rumania. Not only this, he has driven back the Carpathian frontier eight or ten miles.

But the most hypocritical part of Czernin's peace terms, while affecting not to demand a war indemnity for the Central Powers, is the fact that they have imposed one of the heaviest war indemnities ever levied. It is a curious provision which applies to the new States that they are to be under no obligation whatever toward Russia arising from former relations with her. The result is to concentrate on the remainder of Russia the debt which hitherto was spread over the whole of Russia.

No wonder that Count Czernin, in a moment of candor, says that in the conclusion of peace with the Ukraine and Rumania the first thought was to furnish Austria with necessary foodstuffs and material. That has been the object of this peace, and it has been accomplished by giving to Austria-Hungary such economic and strategic advantages as to place these two countries at the mercy of the Central Powers.

From the Ukraine particularly Czernin claims there is to be secured all food obtainable. No doubt this will be not a question of purchase, but of seizure. All the cost of requisitions made by the Central Powers will be written off in Rumania.

It will amount to £50,000,000. Beyond that they claim the exclusive right to exploit the petroleum fields, and any disputes arising from this are to be settled by a tribunal set up in Leipsic.

Austro-French "Peace Initiative" Controversy

Clemenceau Flatly Contradicts Czernin

Count Czernin's assertion in his speech of April 2 that Premier Clemenceau of France had initiated a peace parley with Austria-Hungary was immediately denied by the French Premier with the curt declaration: "The statement is a lie." There followed a somewhat extended controversy on the subject, which Count Czernin sought to utilize for his own purposes of war diplomacy, and which is placed on record here for the side lights it sheds on a hitherto secret chapter of the continuous peace intrigues of the Central Powers.

Premier Clemenceau's curt "démenti" was followed on April 6 by this official statement from the French Government:

Premier Clemenceau, upon assuming the duties of President of the
Council, found that conversations had been entered into in
Switzerland upon Austria's initiative between the Count
Revertata, a personal friend of Emperor Charles, and Commandant
Armand of the Second Bureau, French General Staff, designated
for that purpose by the French Minister at the time.

M. Clemenceau did not wish to assume the responsibility of
interrupting conferences which had yielded no results, but which
might furnish useful sources of information. Commandant Armand
thus was allowed to continue his journey in Switzerland, upon
the request of Count Revertata. Instructions were given M.
Armand in the presence of his chief by M. Clemenceau as follows:
"Listen and say nothing."

Count Revertata, becoming convinced that his attempt to bring
about a German peace was doomed to failure, in order fully to
characterize his mission, gave Commandant Armand a letter
written in his own hand, dated Feb. 25, 1918, the first sentence
of which reads: "During the month of August, 1917, with a view
to obtaining from the French Government a proposition to Austria
which might lead to future peace and be of such a nature as to
be susceptible of being indorsed by Austria and presented to the
German Government, conferences have been entered upon."

Count Revertata, being himself the solicitor, acknowledges it in
the following terms: "That the purpose was to obtain from the
French Government propositions of peace, under cover of Austria,
for transmission to Berlin."

Such is the fact established by an authenticated document which
Count Czernin has dared to refer to in the following terms:
"Clemenceau, shortly before the beginning of the offensive on
the western front, had me asked whether I was ready to enter
upon negotiations, and upon what basis." In speaking thus he
not only did not tell the truth, but told the opposite of truth,
which in France is termed "lying."

It is but natural that Premier Clemenceau should be unable to
restrain his indignation when Count Czernin, justly anxious as
to the final consequences of the western offensive, reversed the
roles with such audacity, representing the French Government as
begging for peace at the very moment when, with our allies, we
were preparing for the infliction of a supreme defeat upon the
Central Empires.