Chapter XIII: Part 13

10. Between the hours of 7 and 8 A. M. on the last day of November the enemy attacked, after a short but intense artillery preparation, on the greater part of a front of some ten miles from Vendhuille to Masnières inclusive. From Masnières to Banteux, both inclusive, four German divisions would seem to have been employed against the three British divisions holding this area. Between Banteux exclusive and Vendhuille one German division and portions of two others were employed against the northern half of the British division holding that front.

On the Masnières front the 29th Division, composed of English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Guernsey, and Newfoundland battalions, although seriously threatened as the day wore on by the progress made by the enemy further south, where their battery positions had been taken in reverse, most gallantly beat off a succession of powerful assaults and maintained their line intact.

At the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector the swiftness with which the advance of the enemy's infantry followed the opening of his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed our troops, both in line and in immediate support, almost before they had realized that the attack had begun.

The nature of the bombardment, which seems to have been heavy enough to keep our men under cover without at first seriously alarming them, contributed to the success of the enemy's plans. No steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German assault columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by the many deep folds and hollows typical of a chalk formation, and shielded from observation from the air by an early morning mist. Only when the attack was upon them great numbers of low-flying German airplanes rained machine-gun fire upon our infantry, while an extensive use of smoke shell and bombs made it extremely difficult for our troops to see what was happening on other parts of the battlefield, or to follow the movements of the enemy. In short, there is little doubt that, although an attack was expected generally, yet in these areas of the battle at the moment of delivery the assault effected a local surprise.

Stubborn British Resistance

None the less, stubborn resistance was offered during the morning by isolated parties of our troops and by machine-gun detachments in the neighborhood of Lateau Wood and southeast of La Vacquerie, as well as at other points. In more than one instance heavy losses are known to have been inflicted on the enemy by machine-gun fire at short range. Northeast of La Vacquerie the 92d Field Artillery Brigade repulsed four attacks, in some of which the enemy's infantry approached to within 200 yards of our guns before the surviving gunners were finally compelled to withdraw, after removing the breechblocks from their pieces. East of Villers-Guislain the troops holding our forward positions on the high ground were still offering a strenuous resistance to the enemy's attack on their front at a time when large forces of German infantry had already advanced up the valley between them and Villers-Guislain. South of this village a single strong point known as Limerick Post, garrisoned by troops of the 1st and 5th Battalions, (King's Own,) Royal Lancaster Regiment, and the 1st and 10th Battalions, Liverpool Regiment, held out with great gallantry throughout the day, though heavily attacked.

The progress made by the enemy, however, across the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and up the deep gully between Villers-Guislain and Gonnelieu, known as 22 Ravine, turned our positions on the ridge as well as in both villages. Taking in flank and rear, the defenses of Villers-Guislain, Gonnelieu, and Bonavis were rapidly overrun. Gouzeaucourt was captured about 9 A. M., the outer defenses of La Vacquerie were reached, and a number of guns which had been brought up close to the line in order to enable them to cover the battle front about Masnières and Marcoing fell into the hands of the enemy.

At this point the enemy's advance was checked by the action of our local reserves, and meanwhile measures had been taken with all possible speed to bring up additional troops. About midday the Guards came into action west of Gouzeaucourt, while cavalry moved up to close the gap on their right and made progress toward Villers-Guislain from the south and southwest.

The attack of the Guards, which was delivered with the greatest gallantry and resolution, drove the enemy out of Gouzeaucourt and made progress on the high ground known as the St. Quentin Ridge, east of the village. In this operation the Guards were materially assisted by the gallant action of a party of the 29th Division, who, with a company of North Midland Royal Engineers, held on throughout the day to a position in an old trench near Gouzeaucourt. Valuable work was also done by a brigade of field artillery of the 47th Division, which moved direct into action from the line of march.

During the afternoon three battalions of tanks which, when they received news of the attack, were preparing to move away from the battlefield to refit, arrived at Gouzeaucourt and aided the infantry to hold the recaptured ground. Great credit is due to the officers and men of the tank brigade concerned for the speed with which they brought their tanks into action.

Meanwhile, the defense of La Vacquerie had been successfully maintained, and our line had been established to the north of that village, in touch with our troops in Masnières.

The Northern Attack

11. In the northern area, from Fontaine-notre-Dame to Tadpole Copse, the German attack was not launched until some two hours later. This was the enemy's main attack, and was carried out with large forces and great resolution.

After a heavy preliminary bombardment, and covered by an artillery barrage, the enemy's infantry advanced shortly after 9 A. M. in dense waves, in the manner of his attacks in the first battle of Ypres. In the course of the morning and afternoon no less than five principal attacks were made in this area, and on one portion of the attack as many as eleven waves of German infantry advanced successively to the assault. On the whole of this front a resolute endeavor was made to break down by sheer weight of numbers the defense of the London Territorials and other English battalions holding the sector.

In this fighting the 47th (London) Division (T.), the 2d Division, and the 56th (London) Division (T.) greatly distinguished themselves, and there were accomplished many deeds of great heroism.

Under the fury of the enemy's bombardment a company of the 17th Battalion Royal Fusiliers were in the course of being withdrawn from an exposed position in a saphead in advance of our line between Bourlon Wood and Moeuvres when the German attack burst upon them. The officer in command sent three of his platoons back, and with a rearguard composed of the remainder of his company held off the enemy's infantry until the main position had been organized. Having faithfully accomplished their task, this rearguard died fighting to the end with their faces to the enemy.

Somewhat later in the morning an attack in force between the Canal du Nord and Moeuvres broke into our foremost positions and isolated a company of the 13th Battalion, Essex Regiment, in a trench just west of the canal. After maintaining a splendid and successful resistance throughout the day, whereby the pressure upon our main line was greatly relieved, at 4 P. M. this company held a council of war, at which the two remaining company officers, the company Sergeant Major, and the platoon Sergeants were present, and unanimously determined to fight to the last and have "no surrender." Two runners who were sent to notify this decision to battalion headquarters succeeded in getting through to our lines and delivered their message. During the remainder of the afternoon and far into the following night this gallant company were heard fighting, and there is little room for doubt that they carried out to a man their heroic resolution.

Enormous German Losses

Early in the afternoon large masses of the enemy again attacked west of Bourlon Wood, and, though beaten off with great loss at most points, succeeded in overwhelming three out of a line of posts held by a company of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berks Regiment, on the right of the 2d Division. Though repeatedly attacked by vastly superior numbers, the remainder of these posts stood firm, and when, two days later, the three posts which had been overpowered were regained, such a heap of German dead lay in and around them that the bodies of our own men were hidden.

All accounts go to show that the enemy's losses in the whole of his constantly repeated attacks on this sector of the battle front were enormous. One battery of eight machine guns fired 70,000 rounds of ammunition into ten successive waves of Germans. Long lines of attacking infantry were caught by our machine-gun fire in enfilade, and were shot down in line as they advanced. Great execution also was done by our field artillery, and in the course of the battle guns were brought up to the crest line and fired direct upon the enemy at short range.

At one point west of Bourlon the momentum of his first advance carried the enemy through our front line and a short way down the southern slopes of the ridge. There, however, the German masses came under direct fire from our field artillery at short range and were broken up. Our local reserves at once counterattacked and succeeded in closing the gap that had been made in our line. Early in the afternoon the enemy again forced his way into our foremost positions in this locality, opening a gap between the 1st and 6th Battalions and the 1st and 15th Battalions, London regiments. Counterattacks led by the two battalion commanders, with all available men, including the personnel of their headquarters, once more restored the situation. All other attacks were beaten off with the heaviest losses to the enemy.

The greatest credit is due to the troops at Masnières, Bourlon, and Moeuvres for the very gallant service performed by them on this day. But for their steady courage and stanchness in defense, the success gained by the enemy on the right of our battle front might have had serious consequences.

I cannot close the account of this day's fighting without recording my obligation to the Commander in Chief of the French Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops within reach for employment in case of need at the unfettered discretion of the 3d Army commander. Part of the artillery of this force actually came into action, rendering valuable service, and though the remainder of the troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were available should occasion arise was a great assistance.

At Gonnelieu and Masnières

12. On Dec. 1 fighting continued fiercely on the whole front.

The Guards completed the capture of the St. Quentin Ridge and entered Gonnelieu, where they captured over 350 prisoners and a large number of machine guns. Tanks took an effective part in the fighting for the ridge. At one point, where our infantry were held up by fire from a hostile trench, a single tank attacked and operated up and down the trench, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy's garrison. Our infantry were then able to advance and secure the trench, which was found full of dead Germans. In it were also found fifteen machine guns that had been silenced by the tank. In the whole of this fighting splendid targets were obtained by all tank crews and the German casualties were seen to be very great.

Further south a number of tanks co-operated with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division and with the Guards in the attacks upon Villers-Guislain and Gauche Wood, and were in great measure responsible for the capture of the wood. Heavy fighting took place for this position, which it is clear that the enemy had decided to hold at all costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally took possession of the wood, great numbers of German dead and smashed machine guns were found. In one spot four German machine guns, with dead crews lying round, were discovered within a radius of twenty yards. Three German field guns, complete with teams, were also captured in this wood.

Other tanks proceeded to Villers-Guislain, and, in spite of heavy direct artillery fire, three reached the outskirts of the village, but the fire of the enemy's machine guns prevented our troops advancing from the south from supporting them, and the tanks ultimately withdrew.

Severe fighting took place, also, at Masnières. During the afternoon and evening at least nine separate attacks were beaten off by the 29th Division on this front, and other hostile attacks were repulsed in the neighborhood of Marcoing, Fontaine-notre-Dame, and Bourlon. With the Bonavis Ridge in the enemy's hands, however, Masnières was exposed to attack on three sides, and on the night of Dec. 1-2 our troops were withdrawn under orders to a line west of the village.

On the afternoon of Dec. 2 a series of heavy attacks developed against Welsh Ridge in the neighborhood of La Vacquerie, and further assaults were made on our positions in the neighborhood of Masnières and Bourlon. These attacks were broken in succession by our machine-gun fire, but the enemy persisted in his attempts against Welsh Ridge, and gradually gained ground. By nightfall our line had been pushed back to a position west and north of Gonnelieu.

Next day the enemy renewed his attacks in great force on the whole front from Gonnelieu to Marcoing, and ultimately gained possession of La Vacquerie. North of La Vacquerie repeated attacks made about Masnières and Marcoing were repulsed in severe fighting, but the positions still retained by us beyond the Canal de l'Escaut were extremely exposed, and during the night our troops were withdrawn under orders to the west bank of the canal.

Withdrawal From Bourlon

13. By this time the enemy had evidently become exhausted by the efforts he had made and the severity of his losses, and Dec. 4 passed comparatively quietly. For some days, however, local fighting continued in the neighborhood of La Vacquerie, and his attitude remained aggressive. Local attacks in this sector were repulsed on Dec. 5, and on this and the following two days further fierce fighting took place, in which the enemy again endeavored without success to drive us from our positions on Welsh Ridge.

The strength which the enemy had shown himself able to develop in his attacks made it evident that only by prolonged and severe fighting could I hope to re-establish my right flank on the Bonavis Ridge. Unless this was done, the situation of my troops in the salient north of Flesquières would be difficult and dangerous, even if our hold on Bourlon Hill were extended.

I had therefore to decide either to embark on another offensive battle on a large scale, or to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquières Ridge.

Although this decision involved giving up important positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of Dec. 4-5 the evacuation of the position held by us north of the Flesquières Ridge was commenced. On the morning of Dec. 7 this withdrawal was completed successfully, without interference from the enemy.

Before withdrawing, the more important of the enemy's field defenses were destroyed, and those of his guns which we had been unable to remove were rendered useless. The enemy did not discover our withdrawal for some time, and when, on the afternoon of Dec. 5, he began to feel his way forward, he did so with great caution. In spite of his care, on more than one occasion bodies of his infantry were caught in the open by our artillery.

Much skill and courage were shown by our covering troops in this withdrawal, and an incident which occurred on the afternoon of Dec. 6 in the neighborhood of Graincourt deserves special notice. A covering party, consisting of two companies of the 1st and 15th Battalions, London Regiment, 47th Division, much reduced in strength by the fighting at Bourlon Wood, found their flank exposed by a hostile attack further east, and were enveloped and practically cut off. These companies successfully cut their way through to our advanced line of resistance, where they arrived in good order, after having inflicted serious casualties on the enemy.

The new line taken up by us corresponded roughly to the old Hindenburg reserve line, and ran from a point about one and a half miles north by east of La Vacquerie, north of Ribecourt and Flesquières to the Canal du Nord, about one and a half miles north of Havrincourt--i. e., between two and two and a half miles in front of the line held by us prior to the attack of Nov. 20. We therefore retained in our possession an important section of the Hindenburg trench system, with its excellent dugouts and other advantages.

Results of the Battle

14. The material results of the three weeks' fighting described above can be stated in general terms very shortly.

We had captured and retained in our possession over 12,000 yards of the former German front line from La Vacquerie to a point opposite Boursies, together with between 10,000 and 11,000 yards of the Hindenburg line and Hindenburg reserve line and the village of Ribecourt, Flesquières, and Havrincourt. A total of 145 German guns were taken or destroyed by us in the course of the operations, and 11,100 German prisoners were captured.

On the other hand, the enemy had occupied an unimportant section of our front line between Vendhuille and Gonnelieu.

There is little doubt that our operations were of considerable indirect assistance to the allied forces in Italy. Large demands were made upon the available German reserves at a time when a great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in Flanders. There is evidence that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our allies were making their first stand on the Piave line.

General Review

15. I have already summarized in the opening paragraphs of this dispatch both the reasons which decided me to undertake the Cambrai operations and the limitations to which these operations were subject.

In view of the strength of the German forces on the front of my attack and the success with which secrecy was maintained during our preparations, I had calculated that the enemy's prepared defenses would be captured in the first rush. I had good hope that his resisting power behind these defenses would then be so enfeebled for a period that we should be able on the same day to establish ourselves quickly and completely on the dominating Bourlon Ridge from Fontaine-notre-Dame to Moeuvres and to secure our right flank along a line including the Bonavis Ridge, Crèvecour, and Rumilly to Fontaine-notre-Dame. Even if this did not prove possible within the first twenty-four hours, a second day would be at our disposal before the enemy's reserves could begin to arrive in any formidable numbers.

Meanwhile, with no wire and no prepared defenses to hamper them, it was reasonable to hope that masses of cavalry would find it possible to pass through, whose task would be thoroughly to disorganize the enemy's systems of command and intercommunication in the whole area between the Canal de l'Escaut, the River Sensée, and the Canal du Nord, as well as to the east and northeast of Cambrai.

My intentions as regards subsequent exploitation were to push westward and northwestward, taking the Hindenburg line in reverse from Moeuvres to the River Scarpe, and capturing all the enemy's defenses and probably most of his garrisons lying west of a line from Cambrai northward to the Sensée, and south of that river and the Scarpe.

Time would have been required to enable us to develop and complete the operation; but the prospects of gaining the necessary time, by the use of cavalry in the manner outlined above, were in my opinion good enough to justify the attempt to execute the plan. I am of opinion that on Nov. 20 and 21 we went very near to a success sufficiently complete to bring the realization of our full program within our power.

The reasons for my decision to continue the fight after Nov. 21 have already been explained. Though in the event no advantage was gained thereby, I still consider that, as the problem presented itself at the time, the more cautious course would have been difficult to justify. It must be remembered that it was not a question of remaining where we stood, but of abandoning tactical positions of value, gained with great gallantry, the retention of which seemed not only to be within our power, but likely even yet to lead to further success.

Whatever may be the final decision on this point, as well as on the original decision to undertake the enterprise at all with the forces available, the continuation of our efforts against Fontaine-notre-Dame gave rise to severe fighting, in which our troops more than held their own.

Risks Voluntarily Accepted

On Nov. 30 risks were accepted by us at some points in order to increase our strength at others. Our fresh reserves had been thrown in on the Bourlon front, where the enemy brought against us a total force of seven divisions to three and failed. I do not consider that it would have been justifiable on the indications to have allotted a smaller garrison to this front.

Between Masnières and Vendhuille the enemy's superiority in infantry over our divisions in line was in the proportion of about four to three, and we were sufficiently provided with artillery. That his attack was partially successful may tend to show that the garrison allotted to this front was insufficient, either owing to want of numbers, lack of training, or exhaustion from previous fighting.

Captured maps and orders have made it clear that the enemy aimed at far more considerable results than were actually achieved by him. Three convergent attacks were to be made on the salient formed by our advance; two of them delivered approximately simultaneously about Gonnelieu and Masnières, followed later by a still more powerful attack on the Bourlon front. The objectives of these attacks extended to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault, and the enemy's hope was to capture and destroy the whole of the British forces in the Cambrai salient.

This bold and ambitious plan was foiled on the greater part of our front by the splendid defense of the British divisions engaged; and, though the defense broke down for a time in one area, the recovery made by the weak forces still left and those within immediate reach is worthy of the highest praise. Numberless instances of great gallantry, promptitude, and skill were shown, some few which have been recounted.

I desire to acknowledge the skill and resource displayed by General Byng throughout the Cambrai operations and to express my appreciation of the manner in which they were conducted by him as well as by his staff and the subordinate commanders.

In conclusion, I would point out that the sudden breaking through by our troops of an immense system of defense has had a most inspiring moral effect on the armies I command and must have a correspondingly depressing influence upon the enemy. The great value of the tanks in the offensive has been conclusively proved. In view of this experience, the enemy may well hesitate to deplete any portion of his front, as he did last Summer, in order to set free troops to concentrate for decisive action at some other point.

I have the honor to be, my Lord, your obedient servant,
D. HAIG,
_Field Marshal, Commanding in Chief, British Armies in France_.

Millions of Horses Used by the Armies

Figures compiled by the Red Star Animal Relief Society show that at the beginning of 1918 there were 4,500,000 horses in use by all the armies in the war, and that the losses on the western front alone averaged 47,000 a month. About 1,500,000 horses had been bought by the Allies in America; 33,000 of these had died before they could be embarked, and 6,000 died in the ships. The value of horses shipped to Europe in 1917 was more than $50,000,000, and the loss in a heavy month of fighting is about $1,500,000. The United States Army in France will need 750,000 horses for draft purposes and mounts, with several hundred thousands more to fill losses. Experience on both sides has proved that a shortage of horses means a corresponding loss of guns in battle and the impossibility of rapid advance. Only well animals can be used, and there are always thousands in the hospitals. Behind the British lines there is a horse hospital within four miles of any point, and eight miles away from each is another. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has hospitals for 10,000 horses and mules, with well-designed buildings, complete operating equipments, ambulances, forage barns, cooking kitchens, quarters for the staff, and every detail for curing the wounded animals. The veterinary surgeons of this society are saving 80 per cent. of the injured horses and sending them back to the batteries.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

In the Hands of His Friends --_From The San Francisco Chronicle_.]

"Vorwärts Mit Gott!" Sacrificing the Manhood and Youth of a Nation to Save a Throne.]

In Danger of Shipwreck --_From Il 420, Florence._ President Wilson's war aims threaten to bring disaster to the Central Powers' peace boat.]

If They Had Been Rationed --_From London Opinion._ How certain great historical personages might have looked if they had lived in the days of bread cards.]

Smoking the Peace Pipe --_From Der Brummer, Berlin._ THE ENTENTE: "What a pity we are excluded!"]

The Rescuer's Usual Fate! --_From London Opinion._ POLICEMAN JOHN BULL: "But I only came on the scene because he had started to knock you about!" MRS. RUSSIA: "Never mind about that. Go on, Bill, teach 'im to interfere--hit me again."]

Proving a Fallacy --_From The Chicago Herald._ Russia's faith in Socialist pacifism, and what came of it.]

A Threatened Interruption --_From London Opinion._ ["Japan will take steps of the most decided and most adequate character to meet the occasion."--VISCOUNT MOTONO, Minister for Foreign Affairs.]]

Russia's Fate --_From The Passing Show, London._ If he _would_ go fooling around with him what could they do?]

Futurist Art in Russia --_From The National News, London._ STURDY OLD BURGESS: "And what, Sir, may your picture represent?" PLUPERFECT FUTURIST TROTZKY: "The mental state of a Bolshevik contemplating 'German capitalists, bankers, and landlords, supported by the silent co-operation of English and French bourgeoisie.'" STURDY OLD BURGESS: "Sir, you have produced a priceless masterpiece--and if it is true that you have sold it for £22,000 you have given it away!"]

The Wurst Is Yet to Come --_San Francisco Call-Post._]

Judging the Landslide by a Pebble --_From Collier's._]

Italy's Troubles --_From Der Brummer, Berlin._ ITALY: "Hang it all! I have been at this window for nearly three years!"]

Austria and America --_From De Amsterdammer, Amsterdam._ GERMAN DRILL SERGEANT: "Now, Austrians! Eyes front! Mark time! Keep your eyes on me!"]

That Dinner in Paris --_From Il 420, Florence._ WILHELM: "Now that we have settled Russia, prepare that Paris feast." CHEF: "For Paris, Sire? I am afraid the food will turn bad, as it did the other time."]

The Hohenzollern Fingerprints --_Macauley in Butterfield Syndicate._]

"Here's to Dear Old Trotzky!" --_Passing Show, London._]

In the Lion's Mouth --_Knickerbocker Press, Albany._]

The Russian Campaign "Where are you running?" "To kill our General before he commits suicide." --_From La Victoire, Paris._]

The Progress of Kultur --_From The New York World._]

Under His New Colonel--R. E. Morse --_Bushnell for Central Press Association._]

"Sire, Ve Haf Located die Sammies!" --_Baltimore American._]

Another German Substitute --_Dayton Daily News._]

The Bolsheviki as Art Collectors --_From Novi Satirikon, Petrograd._]

--_From Novi Satirikon, Petrograd._]

_SUPPLEMENT TO MAY CURRENT HISTORY_

LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM

Full Text of the Suppressed Document in Which the Former German Ambassador at London Reveals Germany's Guilt in Starting the War

_The full text of the memorandum of Prince Lichnowsky, who was
German Ambassador in London at the outbreak of the war, was
obtained in this country in installments, which had appeared in
various European newspapers, chiefly the Politiken of Stockholm,
the Vorwaerts of Berlin, and the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten.
The earlier installments to reach America were translated and
summarized in the regular pages of this issue of Current History
Magazine, beginning on Page 314. After the issue had gone to
press the complete text became procurable. In order to give its
readers the immediate benefit of this opportunity, Current
History Magazine herewith presents the entire document--one of
the most important of the war--in the form of a special
supplement, despite the fact that some parts of it are
duplicated in the abridged version on Page 314._

_Prince Lichnowsky's now famous memorandum bears the title "My
London Mission, 1912-1914" and is dated "Kuchelna, (his country
seat,) 16 August, 1916." It became public in March, 1918, and
created a profound sensation in Germany as well as in the
Entente countries._

_Kuchelna, 16 August, 1916._

Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only. His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation, he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression.

To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me, and I spent my time on my farm and in my garden, on horseback and in the fields, but I read industriously and published occasional political articles. Thus eight years passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to his Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Grätz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me, as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not died, it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favorable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

THE MOROCCO QUESTION

Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: "The French had begun to forget la révanche. You have regularly reminded them of it by tramping on their toes." After we had declined Delcassé's offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there--an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions--we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world war. The pitiable conference of Algeciras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcassé's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British rapprochement. In face of "the German peril" all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.

WORTHLESS AGREEMENTS

The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algeciras, and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under "encirclement," and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wächter, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's fall and before the Algeciras conference we could have obtained harbors and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Councilor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties--which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question--to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war.

GREY'S DESIRES

This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his own words: "Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together."

In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as The Westminster Gazette, The Manchester Guardian, and The Daily Chronicle. To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on "the writing on the wall," and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of The Observer. During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and simple-minded, while the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

BALKAN QUESTIONS

The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator.

I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favored Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support, neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France, alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece.

In Greece today whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty was also in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world war.

TURKEY, RUSSIA, ITALY

Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, while at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosporus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia--our natural friend and best neighbor--into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations.

As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance, consequently, was worthless.

Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other point d'appui. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aehrenthal was during the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless.

I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Hapsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy.

BALKAN QUARRELS

Since the seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also, perhaps, in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pan-German particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so there a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our interests would suffer; while, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest, we should have to "épouser les querelles de l'Autriche."

We, therefore, had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our alliance with its single original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and under those conditions he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation.

BACKED WRONG HORSES

We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally--and this was the most miserable mistake of all--Count Berchtold.

Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his rôle of "honest broker" he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good-will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view, we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second.

GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY

My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was "casus foederis," and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war--which was afterward brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask "our allies" to make concessions.

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives.

AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA

Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia.

As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question--the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question--was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.

The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.

His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat--tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France.

I once said: "The feeling in Russia is very anti-German." He replied: "There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian."

It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests.

PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY

[The next passages, which had formerly been suppressed by the
Swedish Government, appeared in the Politiken of Stockholm on
March 26:]

At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and savoir faire he could always win sympathy.

Next to him a great rôle was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention.

M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold--and naturally we with him--was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers.

AUSTRIA'S PRESTIGE INJURED

Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan war and Serbia's victory, as well as the Rumanian advance, naturally constituted a reproach to Austria. The idea of equalizing this by military intervention in Serbia seems to have gained ground rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by the Italian disclosure, and it may be presumed that the Marquis di San Giuliano, who described the plan as a "pericolossissima adventura," (an extremely risky adventure,) saved us from a European war as far back as the Summer of 1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian relations were, the aspiration of Vienna must have been known in St. Petersburg. In any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that an attack on Serbia on the part of Austria meant war with Russia.

In the Spring of 1914 one of my Secretaries, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirsohky (German Ambassador in Vienna) had declared that war must soon come. But as I was always kept in the dark regarding important things, I considered his pessimism unfounded.

Ever since the peace of Bucharest it seems to have been the opinion in Vienna that the revision of this treaty should be undertaken independently, and only a favorable opportunity was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest could naturally count upon our support. This they knew, for already they had been reproached several times for their slackness. Berlin even insisted on the "rehabilitation" of Austria.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

When I returned to London in December, 1913, after a long holiday, the Liman von Sanders question had led to our relations with Russia becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey called my attention with some uneasiness to the consequent unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: "I have never seen them so excited." Berlin instructed me to beg the Minister to urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was quite willing, and his intervention contributed not inconsiderably to smoothing matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg served in a like manner on several occasions when it was a question of carrying through something of which our representative there was completely incapable.

During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support." The good and dependable relations I was fortunate in making not only in society and among influential people, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with others at public dinners, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward devoted himself honestly to further this rapprochement, and his intentions were especially noticeable in two questions--the Colonial Treaty and the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway.

THE AFRICAN AGREEMENT

[This portion is translated from the Muenchener Neueste
Nachrichten.]