Chapter XI: Part 11

It would be too easy to recall to what extent Austria has
importuned Rome, Washington, and London with solicitations for
an alleged separate peace which had no other aim than to slip
upon us the yoke which she professes to find to her taste. Who
does not know the story of a recent meeting (in Switzerland, of
course) of a former Austrian Ambassador and a figure high in the
councils of the Entente Allies? The conferences lasted only a
few minutes. Here again it was not our ally who sought the
interview. It was the Austrian Government.

Does not Count Czernin remember another attempt of the same sort
made in Paris and London only two months before that of Count
Revertata by a person of much higher rank? That again, as in the
present case, is authentic, but much more significant proof
exists.

CONFIRMED BY PAINLEVE

Professor Paul Painlevé, who preceded M. Clemenceau as Premier, issued the following explanatory statement:

During the year 1917 Austria made several attempts to open
semi-official negotiations with the Entente Allies. Notably in
June, 1917, I was advised by the Second Bureau that Austria,
through the person of Count Revertata, had several times asked,
through a Swiss intermediary, for an interview with the officer
attached to the Second Bureau, Major Armand, a distant relative.

Alexander Ribot, then Premier, having been consulted, Major
Armand and Count Revertata met in August, 1917. The matter
stopped there, and no interview took place from August until
November, when I left office.

The events which occurred afterward naturally are unknown to me,
but I presume, from the statement made by Premier Clemenceau,
that Count Revertata returned to the charge.

AUSTRIA'S OFFICIAL STATEMENT

The following official statement regarding the matter was issued the same day at Vienna by the Imperial Government:

On instructions from the Foreign Minister Count Revertata,
Counselor of the Legation in Switzerland, repeatedly had
discussions in Switzerland with a confidential agent of M.
Clemenceau, Count Armand, attached to the French War Ministry,
who was sent to Switzerland to interview Count Revertata. As a
result of the interview of these two gentlemen in Freiburg,
Switzerland, on Feb. 2, the question was discussed whether and
on what basis a discussion concerning the bringing about of a
general peace would be possible between the Foreign Ministers of
Austria-Hungary and France, or between official representatives
of these Ministers.

Thereupon Count Revertata, after obtaining instructions from the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, toward the close of February
declared on behalf of the Minister to Count Armand, for
communication to M. Clemenceau, that Count Czernin was prepared
for a discussion with a representative of France, and regarded
it as possible to hold a conversation with the prospect of
success as soon as France renounced its plan for the conquest of
Alsace-Lorraine.

Count Revertata received a reply in the name of M. Clemenceau to
the effect that the latter was not in a position to accept the
proposed renunciation by France of this disannexation, so that a
meeting of the representatives at that time would, in the view
of both parties, be useless.

GENERAL SMUTS'S TESTIMONY

The Paris Matin on April 7 stated that General Smuts, South African representative in the British Cabinet, was the "figure high in the councils of the Entente Allies" referred to by the French Government in the statement of April 5 denying the assertion of Count Czernin that the French Prime Minister had sought to open peace negotiations with Austria-Hungary. The representative of the Dual Monarchy who met General Smuts in Switzerland was Count Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London when the war broke out. Immediately upon being introduced to Count Mensdorff, says the newspaper, General Smuts, taking the initiative in the conversation, bluntly said:

"Is it true that you wish to make a separate peace?"

This direct query was too much for the trained diplomat, and the Count began a long, evasive reply.

"Yes or no?" reiterated the British representative.

Obtaining no direct reply General Smuts said:

"Then--good-night!"

The interview lasted barely three minutes. Vienna was shocked, Le Matin says, at the boorish manner of the "old Transvaal warrior."

VIENNA'S SECOND STATEMENT

Further elaboration of Count Czernin's version of the case was proffered on April 8 in a second official statement issued at Vienna by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, as follows:

In contrast to the first brief declaration of Premier
Clemenceau, in which he gave the lie to Foreign Minister
Czernin, it is observed with satisfaction that M. Clemenceau's
statement of April 6 admits that discussions in regard to the
question of peace took place between two confidential agents of
Austria-Hungary and France. The account given by M. Clemenceau
of the initiation and course of these negotiations, and likewise
the statement by M. Painlevé on the same subject, however,
deviate in many important particulars and to such a degree from
the facts that a detailed correction of the French communication
appears to be necessary.

In July, 1917, Count Revertata was requested by an intermediary
in the name of the French Government to state whether he was in
a position to receive a communication from that Government to
the Government of Austria-Hungary. When Count Revertata, after
having obtained the sanction of the Austro-Hungarian Government,
replied in the affirmative to this inquiry, in the same
month--July, 1917--Major Armand was charged with such
communication by the then French Premier, Ribot. He arrived on
Aug. 7, 1917, at Count Revertata's private residence in
Freiburg, the Count being distantly related to him.

Major Armand then addressed to Count Revertata a question as to
whether discussions between France and Austria-Hungary were
possible. Thus the initiative for these discussions was taken
from the French side.

Count Revertata reported to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign
Minister that this question had been put on instructions of the
French Government, and the Minister thereupon requested Count
Revertata to enter into discussions with the French confidential
agent, and in the course of these discussions to establish
whether by this means a basis for bringing about a general peace
could be secured.

On Aug. 22 and 23 Count Revertata entered into discussions with
Major Armand, which, however, as Premier Clemenceau quite
correctly declares, yielded no result. The negotiations
thereupon were broken off.

Parleys Resumed in January

The Clemenceau version that the discussions between Revertata
and Armand were proceeding on his entry into office is
incorrect. Not until January, 1918, did Armand, this time on
instructions from Clemenceau, again get in touch with Revertata.
The thread had been broken in August, 1917, and was therefore
again taken up by Clemenceau himself in January, 1918.

From this fresh contact there resulted the discussions referred
to in the official communiqué of April 4, 1918. It is, however,
correct that Count Revertata handed to Major Armand on Feb. 23,
1918, the memorandum regarding which Premier Clemenceau only
cites the first sentence and which confirms that in the
discussions with Armand, which had taken place in August, 1917,
Revertata was charged with the task of finding out whether
proposals were obtainable from the French Government, which had
addressed to Austria-Hungary an offer of a basis for a general
peace, and also whether they would be such as Austria-Hungary
could bring to the knowledge of her allies.

It, therefore, entirely corresponded with the facts when Count
Czernin in his speech on April 2 last declared that Premier
Clemenceau, some time before the beginning of the western
offensive, had inquired of me whether I was prepared for
negotiations and on what basis.

The accusation of lying brought against Count Czernin by M.
Clemenceau cannot therefore be maintained, even in the
restricted sense made by the present communiqué of the French
Government.

Admits Other Peace Manoeuvres

Nothing is known to the Austro-Hungarian Government of
entreaties for an alleged separate peace with which the
Austro-Hungarian Government worried the Governments of Rome,
Washington, and London. When M. Clemenceau asks the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister whether he remembers that two
months before the Revertata affair--that is, about a year
ago--an attempt of a like nature was made by a personage of far
higher rank, Count Czernin does not hesitate to reply in the
affirmative. But for the sake of completeness and entire
correctness it should be added that this attempt also led to no
result.

So much for the establishment of the facts. For the rest, it
need only be remarked that Count Czernin for his part would see
no reason to deny it if, in this or any similar case, he had
taken the initiative, because, in contrast to M. Clemenceau, he
believes that it cannot be a matter for reproach for a
Government to make attempts to bring about an honorable peace,
which would liberate all peoples from the terrors of the present
war.

The dispute raised by M. Clemenceau has, moreover, diverted
attention from the real kernel of Count Czernin's statement. The
essence of this statement was not so much who suggested the
discussions undertaken before the beginning of the western
offensive, but who caused their collapse. And M. Clemenceau up
to the present has not denied that he refused to enter upon
negotiations on the basis of the renunciation of the
reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine.

RETORT BY CLEMENCEAU

Premier Clemenceau replied to this Vienna statement on the same day by issuing the following:

A diluted lie is still a lie. Count Czernin told a lie when he
said that some time before the German offensive began Premier
Clemenceau caused him to be asked "if he was ready to open
negotiations and upon what basis."

As to the passage in the manuscript note of Count Revertata,
where he says he acted for Austria to obtain peace proposals
from France, the solicitant's text is authentic, and Count
Czernin has not dared to dispute it.

To hide his confusion he tries to maintain that the conversation
was resumed at the request of M. Clemenceau. Unfortunately for
him, there is a fact which reduces his allegation to nothing,
namely, that Clemenceau was apprised of the matter on Nov. 18,
1917, (that is to say, the day after he took over the Ministry
of War,) by communication from the intermediary dated Nov. 10,
and intended for his predecessors. For Count Czernin's
contention to be true, M. Clemenceau would have had to take the
initiative in question before he was Premier. Thus Count Czernin
is categorically contradicted by facts.

He is reduced to maintaining that Major Armand was M.
Clemenceau's confidential man. Well, until this incident M.
Clemenceau had seen this officer of the Intelligence Department
only once, for five minutes at a riding school fifteen or twenty
years ago.

Finally, Count Czernin, as a last resource, says that what he
attributes to M. Clemenceau is unimportant. "What is really
important," he affirms, "is not to know who took the initiative
for the conversations before the offensive, but who caused them
to fail." Then why all this fuss? To demonstrate that every
French Government, like France itself, is immovable on the
question of Alsace-Lorraine?

Who could have thought it would have been necessary for Count
Revertata to elucidate for Count Czernin a question upon which
the Emperor of Austria himself has said the last word? It was no
other than Emperor Charles who, in a letter dated March, 1917,
put on record in his own writing his adhesion to "France's just
claim relative to Alsace-Lorraine." A second imperial letter
stated that the Emperor was "in agreement with his Minister." It
only remained for Czernin to contradict himself.

Ex-Premier Ribot stated on April 9 that during his Premiership "France never directly or through a neutral intermediary took the initiative in any such proceeding as the Austrian official communication asserted."

German Designs on Madeira

Colonel Lord Denbigh, in an address before the Royal Colonial Institute, London, recently told how German designs upon the Island of Madeira were checkmated by Great Britain in 1906. He said it was more or less a piece of secret history outside diplomatic and naval circles. At Madeira, he said, the Germans first took a hotel. Then they wanted a convalescent home, and, finally, desired to establish certain vested interests. They demanded certain concessions from Portugal. The German Ambassador, early in 1906, called on the Portuguese Government, and said that, if the concessions asked for were not granted, the Kaiser would send his navy up the Tagus to Lisbon. The Portuguese Government telegraphed to England, and that night the British Admiralty were on the point of mobilizing the whole resources of the British fleet. They thought of another way of meeting the situation, however, and sent the Atlantic fleet close up against the Portuguese coast. They let the Kaiser know what had happened through an undiplomatic source, with the result that next day the German Ambassador had to call again on the Portuguese Government and explain that he had exceeded his instructions.

I.--Battle of Jutland: First Phase

The British battle cruisers, and, presumably, those of Hipper also, were formed in _bow and quarter line_; or _line of bearing_--the ships on parallel courses but diagonally astern of the leader. During the approach the light cruisers and destroyers on each side--the position of which is not indicated--were spread out ahead of the main squadrons. The British second light cruiser squadron later took station ahead of Beatty and at 4:38 gave warning of the approach of the German battle fleet.

At 4:42 the British battle cruisers turned _in succession_, (squadron right countermarch,) the rear ships following the course of the leader. According to the diagram published with the official British reports in The London Times, Admiral Hipper's turn at 4:52 was _to the left_; but the German charts and some later British diagrams indicate the direction as above.]

II.--Battle of Jutland: Main Engagement

A Review of the Battle of Jutland

By Thomas G. Frothingham

_Member of Military Historical Society of Massachusetts and of the United States Naval Institute_

NOTE--_The reader of this review will be greatly helped in
following the movements of the opposing fleets by the two charts
on the preceding pages. These have been ably prepared by Allan
Westcott of the United States Naval Academy, and they should be
carefully studied._

Sufficient time has now passed since the battle of Jutland (May 31, 1916) to eliminate the early distorted versions of the action and to give a proper perspective of the tactics of the opposing fleets. To understand the battle, it is necessary to realize that it had become the custom of the British fleet to leave its safeguarded bases in the north of the British Isles and make periodical sweeps through the North Sea. At the beginning of his report of the battle Admiral Jellicoe describes this practice:

The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy
of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its base on
the previous day in accordance with instructions issued by me.
In the early afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, the first and
second battle cruiser squadrons, the first, second, and third
light cruiser squadrons, and destroyers from the first, ninth,
tenth, and thirteenth flotillas, supported by the fifth battle
squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to
the southward of the battle fleet.

With the object of engaging a fleet that had been usually so disposed and so employed, the Germans came out from their bases. For some time after the battle there were tales of other objectives--to cover the escape of raiders, to get ships through the Baltic, &c. But all these theories have been abandoned, and it is now agreed that the Germans planned to fight the superior British fleet under conditions advantageous to themselves. All the German manoeuvres indicate that this was their design, and no other.

The opposing forces in the battle of Jutland were as follows:

1. An advance British force under Vice Admiral Beatty, consisting of six battle cruisers, (four Lions of 28.5 knots speed, each carrying eight 13.5-inch guns, and two Indefatigables of 25 knots speed, each carrying eight 12-inch guns,) supported by the fifth battle squadron, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, (four 25-knot battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, each carrying eight 15-inch guns.)

The fleet speed of this advance force was 25 knots.

2. The main body of the British Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, flying his flag in the Iron Duke--consisting of a fast wing under Rear Admiral Hood, (three 26-knot battle cruisers of Invincible class, each carrying eight 12-inch guns,) a division of four armored cruisers under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot, and twenty-five dreadnoughts in three squadrons commanded by Vice Admirals Burney, Jerram, and Sturdee.

The fleet speed of this main body was 20 knots, and its formidable armament will be found in the table on Page 338.

3. About twenty light cruisers and 160 destroyers, divided between the advance force and the main body.

The German strength comprised:

1. An advance force under Vice Admiral Hipper, consisting of five battle cruisers, (three Derfflingers of probably 27 knots speed, each carrying eight 12-inch guns, and two Moltkes of probably 28 knots speed, each carrying ten 11-inch guns.)

The fleet speed of this advance force was 27 knots.

2. The main body of the German High Seas Fleet, under Admiral Scheer, consisting of sixteen dreadnoughts and six predreadnought battleships.

The fleet speed of this main body was 17 knots, because the German dreadnoughts had been eked out with predreadnought battleships of less speed. Four dreadnoughts carried twelve 11-inch guns each, four twelve 12-inch guns each, the rest ten 12-inch guns each. The six old German battleships were very inferior, carrying only four heavy guns each.

3. About twenty light cruisers and eighty or ninety destroyers, divided between the advance force and the main body.

The above-described makeup of the opposing fleets must be kept in mind when studying the course of the action. The day of the battle was cloudy, but the sun shone through the clouds most of the time. At no time was there anything approaching a sea. Visibility was reported as good in the first stages of the action, but late in the afternoon, there being little wind, mist and smoke hung heavy over the surface of the sea. These conditions must also be remembered.

DISPOSITION OF BRITISH FLEET

First of all, it should be said that any criticism of Admiral Jellicoe as to the makeup of the British advance force is not justified. The Queen Elizabeth class of dreadnoughts had been designed with the great speed of 25 knots for the purpose of working with battle cruisers on such service. This gave them a speed that was uniform with the fleet speed of Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons, although the individual ships of the Lion class were faster. The name ship of this battleship class, the Queen Elizabeth, had been through a long, racking service in the Dardanelles operations, and was not with the fleet. The other four ships of the class made up the fifth battle squadron under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, which was under Vice Admiral Beatty's command.

This disposition of Admiral Jellicoe's fleet, with the advance force flung out ahead, seems sound from every tactical point of view, with the assumption that the advance was to be in touch with the main fleet, or, if out of touch, tactical possibilities had been provided for and plans of action prearranged.

In the sweep through the North Sea, with the main body of the British Grand Fleet some fifty miles astern, Vice Admiral Beatty's advance force was cruising to southward of Admiral Jellicoe May 31, 1916, when, at 2:20 P. M., the presence of enemy ships was reported by a light cruiser. Admiral Beatty altered course "to the eastward and subsequently to northeastward, the enemy being sighted at 3:31 P. M. Their force consisted of five battle cruisers."[2]

BEGINNING OF THE ACTION

It is stated in Vice Admiral Beatty's report that it was over an hour after the first news of the vicinity of enemy ships before he increased speed to 25 knots to engage ("at 3:30 P. M."[2]). Yet Vice Admiral Beatty reports that Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas's fifth battle squadron (the four Queen Elizabeths) was still 10,000 yards away when he made this move to engage the enemy with his battle cruisers. This forces us to the conclusion that Admiral Beatty thought his six battle cruisers would be able to take care of the situation. His confidence is explained by the fact that all previous sorties of the Germans had been made by battle cruisers or small craft.

Both sides threw out screens of light cruisers, which clashed, and at 3:48 "the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both sides opening fire practically simultaneously."[3] The British battle cruisers fought on a course curving to the southeast, and then on a straight south-southeast course, and the five German battle cruisers fought them on a parallel course, instead of edging away from the superior British force. It is now easy to see that the trend of the action was absolutely in the direction of the approaching main body of the German High Seas Fleet, but this very naturally was not apparent at the time to Admiral Beatty.

The first phase of the battle may properly be studied as a fight between the British and German battle cruisers, in consequence of the before-stated gap separating the two parts of Admiral Beatty's command. This interval of 10,000 yards prevented the fifth battle squadron of Queen Elizabeth dreadnoughts from being a factor at the time. Vice Admiral Beatty reports that this squadron "opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards," and he continues: "The fifth battle squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range." (It is interesting to note this comment on a range of 20,000 yards, in view of the fantastic distances at which the Queen Elizabeth had been depicted by alarmists as shelling our coast cities.)

In this part of the action came the first of the many upsets of pre-war calculations. Comparing the given strength of the two opposing squadrons in action, it will be seen that the British battle cruisers were greatly superior; in fact, the odds would have been considered prohibitive before this battle. Yet it was the British squadron that suffered, losing one-third of its ships. Ten minutes after the beginning of the action the Indefatigable was sunk, and at 4:30 the Queen Mary met the same fate. In each case it is said that there was a great explosion up through the turrets, suggesting that a weak turret construction is really a conductor of fire to the magazine in case of a heavy hit, and pointing to the need of better separation of the supply of ammunition from the magazine.

DESTROYERS TAKE PART

At 4:15 there was an attack "simultaneously"[4] by British and German destroyers which resulted in a lively fight, but no damage to any of the capital ships. Yet the possibilities of such torpedo attacks were so evident, here and later in the battle, that the destroyer at once attained a greater value as an auxiliary of the battleship. It should also be noted that German submarines were reported present at this stage, but they accomplished nothing against the screened fighting ships. A British airplane had been sent up from a mother ship just before the engagement, though Admiral Beatty reports that it was forced to fly low on account of the clouds, and had a hard task "to identify four enemy light cruisers." There was apparently no chance of a wide observation that would have warned Admiral Beatty of the approaching German High Seas Fleet. In this short hour were concentrated many new problems of naval warfare.

The advancing German High Seas Fleet was reported at 4:38 by a light cruiser, and sighted at 4:42 by the British battle cruisers. A few minutes later Vice Admiral Beatty's ships turned right about (180 degrees) in succession. The German battle cruisers also turned to a northwesterly course, closely followed up by the van of the German High Seas Fleet, and the action was continued on this course.

The report of Admiral Beatty and his conduct in this part of the action show that he had not suspected the presence of the German High Seas Fleet, but the lavish criticism of his turn in succession is without reason. In the first place, his ships met no disaster at the turn, and the manoeuvre is absolutely justified by the fact that it brought the four Queen Elizabeth battleships into position to fight a rearguard action against the greatly strengthened enemy. Any other disposition of Admiral Beatty's command would have been a mistake.

It also follows that, against the turn made in this way, it would have been an error for Vice Admiral Hipper to try for a capping position, with the object of smothering Admiral Beatty's cruisers in detail at their pivoting point. Such an attempt would have exposed his own battle cruisers to the 15-inch guns of the approaching dreadnoughts of Admiral Evan-Thomas's squadron. Admiral Hipper's conduct in turning to the northwest ahead of the van of the German High Seas Fleet seems the best thing he could have done at the time. The leading German battleships, which were of the König class, fell into line, closely following Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, and the battle was continued at 14,000 yards on a northwest course.

On the British side the brunt of the action was sustained by Admiral Evan-Thomas's fifth battle squadron, which from this time was in line astern of Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The German battle cruisers could not stand up with the same effectiveness against the heavy guns of the fifth battle squadron, and this, with an increase to full speed, enabled Admiral Beatty to draw ahead. He again opened up a gap between his battle cruisers and the fifth battle squadron, taking a course that curved to the north and northeast, in search of Admiral Jellicoe's battle fleet, which was hastening to his assistance. The leading ships of the Grand Fleet were sighted at 5:56, and Admiral Beatty altered his course to the east at extreme speed. The German van also turned to eastward.

In the meantime from the north the British Grand Fleet had been closing at utmost fleet speed on a southeast by south course. Ahead of the battle fleet was the squadron of three battle cruisers under Rear Admiral Hood. This squadron, well in advance of the main body, took position ahead of Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers, which had turned to their southerly course, as shown by the diagram.

In the second phase of the action, which has just been described, there were clashes of light cruisers and isolated torpedo attacks, none of which had any tactical effect on the battle. It is now evident from the conduct of the German command that the German fleet was not led into a trap, and that Admiral Scheer deliberately chose to engage the British Grand Fleet, thinking the conditions favorable, although his course necessarily curved away to the southwestward and left the British Grand Fleet between the German fleet and all its bases. It is also evident that the ships of the German van had not been damaged by the fifth British battle squadron to the extent of demoralizing the German gunfire. The immediate damage inflicted on the advance of the British Grand Fleet is proof enough of this.

HOOD'S FLAGSHIP SUNK

As stated, Rear Admiral Hood took station ahead of Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers, with his advance squadron of battle cruisers (6:21) closing to a range of 8,000 yards, (6:25.) A few minutes later his flagship, the Invincible, was sunk by gunfire. Almost at the same time three of Rear Admiral Arbuthnot's armored cruisers, Black Prince, Warrior, and Defense, "not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships,"[5] were put out of action. (Defense was sunk; Warrior sank while attempt was being made to tow her home; Black Prince was sunk later, probably by gunfire.)

At this stage the British Grand Fleet formed in battle line astern of the battle cruisers, and engaged the enemy on a course to the southwest, the German fleet now being to the westward, as shown on the diagram. The fifth battle squadron then took position astern of Admiral Jellicoe's main body. It was here that the Warspite, a dreadnought of the Queen Elizabeth class, jammed her helm, and was out of control for a time, as described by her Captain after the action. The battleship was, however, extricated from her predicament. The battle cruiser Lützow, the flagship of the German advance force, had become totally disabled, and Vice Admiral Hipper had trans-shipped his flag to another battle cruiser.

By this time smoke and mist hung over the sea, and the Germans took advantage of these conditions, also using smoke screens, to fight the only action possible for their fleet against the overwhelming force now in line against them. The German ships would appear and disappear in the smoke and mist. Admiral Jellicoe reports of this stage of the action:

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was
possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle
line. Toward the van only some four or five ships were ever
visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but
never more than eight to twelve. * * * The action between the
battle fleets lasted intermittently from 6:17 P. M. to 8:20 P.
M., at ranges between 9,000 yards and 12,000 yards. During this
time the British fleet made alterations of course from southeast
by east to west (168¾ degrees) in the endeavor to close, but the
enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of
destroyer attacks and smoke screens. The alterations of course
had the effect of bringing the British fleet (which commenced
the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy)
to a quarterly bearing from the enemy's battle line, but at the
same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.

JELLICOE'S NIGHT MANOEUVRE

As the darkness came on, it is evident that these tactics on the part of the Germans, with increasing threats of torpedo attacks, became more and more baffling to the British command, and then came the crucial decision which ended the battle. Admiral Jellicoe reports:

At 9 P. M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat
of torpedo boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching
darkness made it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for
the night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, while
providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly
manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing
our flotillas in a position in which they would afford
protection to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same
time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy
ships.

Concerning this stage of the action Admiral Jellicoe in his report quotes Vice Admiral Beatty as follows:

In view of the gathering darkness and the fact that our
strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that
we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favorable
circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to
close the enemy battle fleet during the dark hours.

Here the British Admiral and his second in command were in accord, but the responsibility for the resultant movement of the British fleet must rest with Admiral Jellicoe as chief in command. By his order the British fleet steamed through the dark hours at moderate speed on southerly courses some ninety miles from the battlefield. Although the British fleet was thus placed in the general direction of Heligoland, this meant that Admiral Jellicoe had relinquished all touch with the German fleet, and this left the German fleet practically free to proceed to its bases, which was done without any interference, bringing in their damaged ships. The Germans even attempted to tow the wreck of the Lützow into port, but she sank on the way in.

This move to the southward by the British fleet ended the battle of Jutland. In the night there were isolated clashes of small fry, the adventures of lame ducks, &c., but there was nothing that affected the tactical results, and nothing that was in any sense a part of a battle of fleets. None of these encounters even indicated the location of the German fleet.

DEPARTURE OF GERMAN FLEET

At the early coming of light in these latitudes (about 3 A. M., June 1) the British fleet was to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, about ninety miles from the battlefield. The British fleet then retraced its course to the battlefield. This return of the British fleet, by the same lane it followed in the night, did not give much opportunity to regain touch with the German fleet. Admiral Jellicoe reports that he remained in the vicinity of the battlefield until 11 A. M. when he was "reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Seas Fleet had returned into port." Soon afterward the British fleet proceeded to its bases.

In the early accounts of the battle there were fanciful tales of pursuit of the German ships through the night, and even after Admiral Jellicoe's report, the British public did not at first realize the situation at the end of the action. But, after a time, when this was better understood, there arose one of the greatest naval controversies that have ever agitated Great Britain, centred around the alleged "defensive" naval policy for maintaining the supremacy of Great Britain on the seas--the pros and cons as to closing the Germans while there was light, and keeping in touch through the dark hours. With that discussion this article has nothing to do, but the tactical situation at the end of the battle should be stated.

At 9 o'clock the German fleet was to the westward. The British fleet was between it and all its bases. The British fleet was superior in speed, and had such an overwhelming superiority in ships and guns that it could afford to discard its damaged ships without impairing this superiority. The British Admiral had plenty of light cruisers and destroyers to throw out a screen and to maintain touch with the German fleet. There undoubtedly was a proportion of damaged ships in the German fleet; and this, with its original inferior fleet speed, would have made it a hard task for the German fleet to attempt to ease around the British fleet and reach its bases. These conditions were in favor of keeping in touch with the German fleet--and it is needless to point out the great results that would have come from a successful action with the German fleet in the morning.

On the other hand, one should state the elements which influenced Admiral Jellicoe's decision, first of all to safeguard his ships, and yet remain at a distance in the direction of a German base. Upon his fleet depended the established British control of the seas. Many of his ships had received hard knocks--and many were short of ammunition and fuel. Above all, there was the ominous threat of torpedo attacks in the night.

These were the conditions of the problem that confronted the British Admiral, brought about by the culminating tactics of the battle. Admiral Jellicoe's decision was that the situation did not justify him in imperiling his fleet and with it the naval supremacy of Great Britain.

In this greatest of all naval actions it is interesting to study the course of the battle in comparison with pre-war calculations. The outstanding feature, the collapse of the three British battle cruisers, was not entirely unexpected by naval opinion. The battle cruiser had found a great vogue, especially in England, but before this battle a reaction had already set in, aided by the fact that the Lion had been put out by weaker gunfire in the Dogger Bank chase. Many naval men had come to believe that the battle cruiser was only a cruiser after all--though a valuable cruiser--and not up to taking a place in a real line of battle.

More surprising was the fact that at no stage of the action did the heavier British guns dominate the German guns. This was evident in the first phase, when Admiral Beatty's six battle cruisers were fighting on parallel courses with Admiral Hipper's five battle cruisers. The British ships carried thirty-two 13.5-inch and sixteen 12-inch guns, against their enemy's twenty-four 12-inch guns and twenty 11-inch guns.

In the second stage of the action on northerly courses, when Admiral Beatty's command was engaging the van of the German fleet, the four Queen Elizabeths, with their thirty-two 15-inch guns, were in position, and there was nothing heavier than a 12-inch gun in the German fleet.

In the third phase, after Vice Admiral Beatty's command had joined the main body of Admiral Jellicoe's fleet, the superiority of the British in heavy guns was enormous, as can be seen from the table on Page 338. It is true that the Germans took advantage of the mist and smoke as described. Yet, from Admiral Jellicoe's report, it is evident that there were many chances to let off salvos at the enemy ships, and he reports the ranges as very moderate, ("between 9,000 and 12,000 yards.")

WEIGHT OF METAL HURLED

As to the shooting on both sides, it is evident that there must be a great deal of hard thinking going on in the navies of the world as to improvement in this respect. The weight of metal hurled into the sea was prodigious. "In the first and second phases it is estimated that each of the ships under Vice Admiral Beatty and Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas fired about 600 tons and the Germans quite as much if not more."[6]

The battleships stood up well, and everything in the battle confirmed the judgment of those who had pinned their faith to the battleships as the essential of naval power.

The two most revolutionary elements in naval warfare were present, but they cannot be said to have exerted any tactical effect on the battle. The limited use of the airplane has been told, and a Zeppelin was reported at about 4 A. M. June 1, which may have observed the location of the British fleet. U-boats were reported early in the action, but there is no hint that they took any real part in the battle. Yet this does not mean that they are not to be considered. With the great improvements in the type, it is probable that in many conditions the U-boat will be a factor in battles of fleets, and such contingencies should be safeguarded in advance.

The destroyer came to its own in the battle of Jutland as an auxiliary of the battle fleet, both for offense and defense. The whole course of the action proved that a screen of destroyers was absolutely necessary. For offense, it might be argued truthfully that, of the great number of torpedoes used, very few hit anything. The Marlborough was the only capital ship reported struck in the real action, and she was able afterward to take some part in the battle, and then get back to her base. It is supposed that the damaged Pommern may have been so destroyed later, and torpedoes may have struck other scattered marks. But above all things stands out the fact that it was the threat of night torpedo attacks by destroyers which made the British fleet withdraw from the battlefield.

There is no question of the fact that this withdrawal of the British fleet had a great moral effect on Germany. The announcement to the people and to the Reichstag had a heartening effect on the Germans at just the time they needed some such stimulant. But the actual tactical result of the battle was indecisive. It may be said the Germans had so manoeuvred their fleet that a detached part of the superior British force was cut up, but the damage was not enough to impair the established superiority of the British fleet, and the end of the battle left the British control of the sea absolutely unchanged.

The following is the British statement of losses:

BATTLE CRUISERS
Tonnage Armor Main
Belt. Battery. Sp'd. Men. C'p'd
Queen Mary 27,000 9 in. 8 13.5-in. 28 1,000 '13
Indefatigable 18,750 8 in. 8 12-in. 26 899 '11
Invincible 17,250 7 in. 8 12-in. 26 750 '08

ARMORED CRUISERS
Defense 14,600 6 in. 4 9.2-in. 23 755 '08
Black Prince 13,550 6 in. 6 9.2-in. 20.5 704 '06
Warrior 13,550 6 in. 6 9.2-in. 22.9 704 '08

DESTROYERS
Tipperary 1,900 ... ... 31 160 '14
Turbulent ... ... ... .. ... ..
Fortune 920 ... ... 29.50 100 '12
Sp'w Hawk 950 ... 3 4-in. 31.32 100 '12
Ardent 950 ... 3 4-in. 31.32 100 '12
Nomad ... ... ... ... ... ..
Nestor ... ... ... ... ... ..
Shark 950 ... 3 4-in. 31.32 100 '12

The losses admitted by the German Admiralty are:

BATTLESHIP
Tonnage. Armament. Date
Sp'd. Completion.
Pommern 13,040 4 11-in. 19 1907
14 6.7-in.

BATTLE CRUISER
Luetzow 28,000 8 12-in. 27 1915
12 6-in.

LIGHT CRUISERS
Rostock 4,820 12 4.1-in. 27.3 1914
Frauenlob 2,656 10 4.1-in. 21.5 1903

NEW LIGHT CRUISERS
Elbing ... ... ... ...
Wiesbaden ... ... ... ...

DESTROYERS
Five ... ... ... ...

TOTAL TONNAGE LOST
British 117,150
German 60,720

TOTAL PERSONNEL LOST
British 6,105
German 2,414

NOTE BY EDITOR.--No official confirmation of the German losses was published. The British Admiralty maintains that the losses, including only German vessels "seen to sink," aggregated 109,220 tons. Other Admiralty claims were that the Germans lost one dreadnought of the Kronprinz type, 25,480 tons; one of the Heligoland type, 22,440 tons; battleship Pommern, 13,000 tons; battle cruiser Lützow, 28,000 tons; five Rostocks, 24,500 tons; destroyers, 4,000 tons; submarines, 800 tons; total, 117,220 tons.

British Analysis of the Jutland Battle

Expert British Admiralty writers do not concur in all the conclusions of our contributor, Mr. Frothingham, especially where he refers to the withdrawal of the British fleet.

The official report of Admiral Jellicoe states that "German vessels were entirely out of the fight at 9 o'clock," and that "the withdrawal of the British fleet was a 'manoeuvre' so as to remain between the Germans and their bases."

Sir Cyprian Bridge, a British naval expert, in referring to the situation of the German fleet when darkness fell after the battle, writes: "It was a beaten and a broken fleet that escaped from the trap," (referring to the British Battle Fleet at the north and the battle cruisers at the south, acting in strategic harmony.) "Many of its units had been lost. Its gunnery had become demoralized, and no one can blame its discretion in making for home at its top-most speed and leaving the British fleet once more in undisputed command of the North Sea. For this, in a word, was the result of the battle. * * * Whatever their effort signified, it failed to shake our hold upon the sea. * * * We have fought many indecisive actions, * * * few which have more fully freed us of all fear of what the enemy fleet might be able to accomplish. By such standards the battle off Jutland will well hold its own against all but a few of our most famous victories."

John Buchan published a description of the battle of Jutland by authority of the British Government. He, a historical authority, says: "The result of the battle of Jutland was that Britain was more confirmed than ever in her mastery of the sea. * * * From a technical point of view the battle appears as an example of a tactical division of the fleet, undertaken in order to coax a laggard enemy to battle. * * * It defeated, utterly defeated, the German plan. If it was not--as with two hours more daylight it would have been--a complete destruction of Germany's sea power, it was a complete demonstration of Britain's crushing superiority."

Arthur Pollen, an expert naval writer in British periodicals, referred to the results of the battle in these words: "Thus the Germans, who had entered the North Sea, according to their own account, to engage and destroy the British ships that have been systematically sweeping the waters north and east of the Horn Reef, attained the first part of their objective only. They did succeed in engaging. But the consequences were disastrous. The plan of overwhelming the British fast division with superior numbers was defeated by the masterly handling of the British force, combined with the effective use that force made of its artillery. So far from Sir David Beatty having been overwhelmed, he succeeded admirably in his main object, which was to draw the German fleet into a position where Sir John Jellicoe's squadrons could engage it. The enemy was only saved from total destruction by mist and by the approach of night. Not only did his whole plan miscarry, but he was driven ignominiously from the field, and with a very heavy loss in ships and men."

FOOTNOTES:

[2] Report of Vice Admiral Beatty.

[3] Report of Vice Admiral Beatty.

[4] Report of Vice Admiral Beatty.

[5] Report of Admiral Jellicoe.

[6] "Naval Power in the War." Lieut. Commander Charles C. Gill, U. S. N.

A Leading German Churchman Defends Poison Gas

The International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva early in 1918 issued an appeal against the use of poisonous gases. The Rev. Dr. Balan, President of the Consistory for the Prussian Province of Posen and head of the Protestant Church in that province, refused, "after conscientiously examining it before God," to indorse or circulate the appeal, and wrote as follows to the President of the International Committee:

The first question that occurred to me on reading your appeal
was, Is it really a more inhumane method of waging war when
Germany, in defending herself against an immensely superior
force of enemies in a fight for existence forced upon her, makes
use also of poisonous gas, than when her enemies pour over our
armies, so much weaker in numbers, devastating and
disintegrating showers of iron, lasting days and weeks, and to
which we cannot reply in such volume because we have not so many
human hands at our disposal for the manufacture of munitions as
our enemies have? I say, No. I ask further, Is it more humane to
set the whole world in motion in order by starving it to prevent
a great nation that, with its noble, chivalrous Kaiser at its
head, has manifested clearly enough its unbounded love of peace,
from taking the place to which it is entitled by the side of
other nations than when this nation uses every means of defense
that its enlightened scientists have discovered? I say again,
No.

Dr. Balan maintains in the further course of his letter that the enemies of Germany cannot expect to be treated humanely in any special manner, for all war is inhumane, because they have from the outset persistently and constantly utterly disregarded the laws of nations and the "sacred sign of the Red Cross." In conclusion this Prussian church dignitary informs the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross that if he and his friends really wish to render the whole suffering population of Europe a truly great service, they should do their utmost to bring home to the French people, who are so deeply to be pitied, the fact that the phantom which, deluded by the lies of their and England's rulers, they still pursue is dragging them every day to deeper and more hopeless misery. At the very moment that France realizes this, Dr. Balan asserts, there will be peace. He explains that the phantom pursued by the French is "the recovery of two provinces that have been German from time immemorial, and of which we were once robbed against all right and justice."

Great Britain's War Work in 1917

War Cabinet's Official Survey of Military Events and Far-Reaching Economic Changes

_A report issued by the British War Cabinet on March 18, 1918,
in the form of a Blue Book of 200 pages or more, presents a
historical review of what Great Britain accomplished in 1917,
with a survey of the changes that came over the character of the
war in that year, and of the far-reaching Governmental and
economic developments that took place in the British Nation. As
the introductory chapter is in itself a comprehensive summary,
the main portions of it are here presented._

The year 1917 saw two marked developments. On the one hand there was a profound change in the character of the war itself. The inauguration of a general attack upon the sea communications of the Allies through the unrestricted use of the submarine greatly widened the scope of warlike operations and forced the people of the British Isles to expend an immense amount of time and energy on counterpreparations of all kinds. The Russian revolution completely upset the allied plan for a concerted offensive against the Central Powers on all fronts during the Spring and Summer of 1917, and eventually led to such a disintegration of the Russian Army as enabled the German Government to transfer the greater part of its military resources from the eastern to the western theatre of war. Finally, the overthrow of the Russian autocracy, coupled with the entry of the United States into the war and the adhesion of Greece, Brazil, China, and other neutrals to the allied cause, widened the war itself from a battle for the liberty of small nations and the defense of public right in Europe into a world-wide struggle for the triumph of a free civilization and democratic government.

The year brought a gradual growth of inter-ally co-operation and creation of the Imperial War Cabinet. This development and the sessions of the Imperial War Conference were the natural outcome of the spirit of unity and self-sacrifice which has enabled the peoples of the British Commonwealth to produce no less than 7,500,000 men to fight for freedom in addition to vast quantities of munitions and supplies of all kinds. So successful was this experiment in the opinion of its members that it was decided unanimously that there ought to be an annual meeting of the Imperial Cabinet and that the Prime Ministers of the empire or their specially delegated representatives, together with the Ministers in charge of the great imperial offices, should be its _ex officio_ members.

War Cabinet Reorganization

Another sphere in which reorganization and expansion were necessary was that of home affairs. The period began with a reconstruction of the administrative machinery at the centre. It had become increasingly evident that the older system under which the supreme direction of the war rested, with a Cabinet consisting of the departmental chiefs under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, was not sufficiently prompt and elastic for the conduct of a war which involved the mobilization and direction of the resources not only of the United Kingdom but of the British Empire. Even the formation of a smaller Cabinet committee of the departmental Ministers chiefly concerned in the war did not meet the needs of the case. With the advent of the new Government a modification was introduced whereby the supreme direction of the war was intrusted to a small War Cabinet, freed from all administrative duties, and yet in the closest touch with all departmental Ministers, while administrative responsibility was placed in the hands of Ministers who were left free to devote their whole time to this aspect of Governmental work.

By this arrangement the War Cabinet was able to give all its attention to the task of co-ordination and direction, and so make more effective use of the immense resources which the empire had gradually produced during the preceding years. It also made it easier to create a number of much-needed new administrative departments. The most important of these were the Ministry of Shipping, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Food, and the Ministry of Pensions, to which were added at later dates the Ministry of Reconstruction, the Ministry of National Service, and the Ministry of the Air. * * *

The Man-Power Problem

The first problem was that of man power. During the preceding year all sources which could be tapped without trenching upon the essential supplies of the allied armies and the nation had been exhausted, and the question had narrowed itself down to that of finding substitutes for fit men of military age still engaged in industry. An attempt was, therefore, made to enroll a large army of volunteers to take the place of the men called to the army. Partly owing to difficulties in withdrawing labor from the great war industries and partly owing to the limited supply of labor, great obstacles presented themselves in the execution of this scheme. But though the plan of enrolling an army of industrial volunteers had eventually to be abandoned the system of dilution and substitution was steadily carried out, and 820,646 men of all categories were taken for the service of the army during the year.