Chapter VIII: Part 8
These figures refer to the British Isles alone. In the fourth quarter of 1917 foreign construction was 512,000 tons, giving a total output for the world, exclusive of enemy countries, of 932,000 tons for the last quarter of last year. Against that we have the losses due to enemy action and to maritime risk.
THE MONTHLY DEFICIENCY
These losses amounted for the last quarter of last year to 1,200,000 tons. That was by far the lowest quarter of sinkings we have had since unrestricted submarine warfare began, and it looks as if this quarter was going to be lower still. So that we have the fact that by increase in output and decrease in sinkings for the last quarter of last year the Allies were within 100,000 tons, on the average per month, of making good the loss due to enemy action and marine risks. Considering British losses and output alone, the proportionate deficiency is somewhat higher. We lost on the average 260,000 tons per month during the last quarter of 1917, and we built 140,000 tons per month, an average deficiency of 120,000 tons per month. We must all regret that the British position has suffered most among the Allies, but we have contributed the greatest naval effort, and have sustained the greatest attacks, and I do not think we, as a nation, will bemoan our stars or our naval efforts in this great war.
The net result of maritime risk and enemy action, whether by surface, air or submarine craft, from the beginning of the war until the end of last year is a reduction of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, and from the last quarter of last year the Allies and neutrals are replacing 75 per cent. of the lost tonnage, or only 100,000 tons a month below the losses from all causes.
It is well within the capacity of the allied yards, or even our own yards, before very long, with a proper supply of material and man power entirely to make good the world losses.
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS
I do not think I am divulging information which should not be made public when I say that the output of guns and ammunition of all calibres in 1917 is not far short of twice the output in 1916. I need not remind the House of the special effort being made in the output of airplanes. These, I understand, are nearly two and a half times the output of 1916, and arrangements for labor and material to secure a still greater output this year were in progress during the later months of 1917. We have been able to accomplish what I think must be admitted as an enormous development in the shipbuilding industry. We have reached in 1917 a total warship and merchant tonnage output practically equal to the biggest shipbuilding year this country has ever known. We have multiplied by ten the number of naval craft repaired and refitted, and in six months we have increased the merchant ship repaired tonnage by 80 per cent.--an increase of 237,000 tons per week. I would ask the House to notice this fact, that, notwithstanding all these great extensions of work in many directions, and notwithstanding all these great extensions of power of the country, we ended 1917 with an output of new merchant tonnage of 420,000 for the last quarter, against 213,000 for the last quarter of 1916. That was done, moreover, with a dislocated industry, with yards only gradually being cleared of unfinished work, and with large numbers of unskilled personnel in the yards.
Admiralty Summary of Shipping Losses
Record of Three Years
_The British Board of Admiralty, with the sanction of the War
Cabinet and the concurrence of the Allies, on March 21 published
a memorandum revealing the world's total shipping losses from
the beginning of the war to Jan. 1, 1918. The essential portions
are as follows:_
In the Spring of 1917 the full menace of the submarine campaign was first disclosed. Since that date we have steadily increased our knowledge and our material resources for this novel warfare. Three statements are attached, showing for the United Kingdom and for the world, for the period August, 1914, to December, 1917:
1. Losses by enemy action and marine risk.
2. Mercantile shipbuilding output.
3. Enemy vessels captured and brought into service.
Diagrams showing in graphic form the losses and shipbuilding output for the United Kingdom and for the world are also attached. The situation should be viewed from the standpoint of the world's tonnage, as in these problems the mercantile navies of the whole world, excluding the enemy, may be regarded as one. It will be noticed that the diagrams record facts, and that nothing has been included in the nature of an estimate.
The results of the last year have shown the ability of our seamen to get upon terms with the submarine menace and gradually to gain the upper hand. This has been achieved in spite of an imperfect knowledge of a new and barbarous method of warfare and of a scarcity of suitable material. Our material resources for this warfare are already improved and are being rapidly augmented, while science is placing at our disposal means of offense and defense of which we have been in need.
With regard to the other factor, a rapid and continuous increase in the output of merchant tonnage will inevitably follow the united efforts of all engaged in merchant shipbuilding in this country. * * * During the critical period that confronts us we must rely to a large extent on our own shipyards and on ourselves. Our partners in the war are making every effort to increase their production of ships, but a considerable time must elapse before the desired output is secured.
To produce in the United Kingdom 1,800,000 tons in 1918, and to reach an ultimate production at the rate of 3,000,000 tons per annum, is well within the present and prospective capacity of our shipyards and our marine engineering shops. But the ranks of the skilled men must be enlarged without delay by the introduction of men and women at present unskilled. The education of these newcomers, upgrading, and interchangeability of work are essential, and must be pressed on with the good-will of employers, foremen, and men.
It is to insure the vigorous co-operation of all concerned that the Admiralty has recommended the publication of the facts.
POSITION AT THE END OF 1917
The following table summarizes the position at the end of 1917:
British. Foreign. World.
Losses 7,079,492 4,748,080 11,827,572
Gains:
New construction 3,031,555 3,574,720 6,606,275
Enemy tonnage captured 780,000 1,809,000 2,589,000
--------- --------- ---------
Total gains 3,811,555 5,383,720 9,195,275
Net loss (world) 2,632,297
RECORD OF THREE YEARS
The following statement shows United Kingdom and world's merchant tonnage lost through enemy action and marine risks since the outbreak of war:
United Total for
Period. Kingdom. Foreign. World.
Gross Gross Gross
Tons. Tons. Tons.
1914.
August and September 314,000 85,947 *399,947
4th Quarter 154,728 126,688 281,416
1915.
1st Quarter 215,905 104,542 320,447
2d Quarter 223,676 156,743 380,419
3d Quarter 356,659 172,822 529,481
4th Quarter 307,139 187,234 494,373
1916.
1st Quarter 325,237 198,958 524,195
2d Quarter 270,690 251,599 522,289
3d Quarter 284,358 307,681 592,939
4th Quarter 617,563 541,780 1,159,343
1917.
1st Quarter 911,840 707,533 1,619,373
2d Quarter 1,361,870 875,064 2,236,934
3d Quarter 952,938 541,535 1,494,473
4th Quarter 782,889 489,954 1,272,843
-------- ------- ---------
Totals 7,079,492 4,748,080 11,827,572
* This figure includes 182,839 gross tonnage interned in enemy ports.
The next statement shows output of merchant shipbuilding of the United Kingdom and the world (excluding enemy countries) since the outbreak of war:
United Total for
Period. Kingdom. Foreign. World.
Gross Gross Gross
Tons. Tons. Tons.
1914.
August and
September 253,290}
4th Quarter 422,320} 337,310 1,012,920
1915.
1st Quarter 266,267}
2d Quarter 146,870}
3d Quarter 145,070} 551,081 1,202,000
4th Quarter 92,712}
1916.
1st Quarter 95,566}
2d Quarter 107,693}
3d Quarter 124,961} 1,146,448 1,688,000
4th Quarter 213,332}
1917.
1st Quarter 246,239 282,200 528,439
2d Quarter 249,331 377,109 626,440
3d Quarter 248,283 368,170 616,453
4th Quarter 419,621 512,402 932,023
--------- --------- ---------
Total 3,031,555 3,574,720 6,606,275
ENEMY TONNAGE CAPTURED
A further statement shows the enemy tonnage captured and brought into service by United Kingdom and by Allies since the outbreak of war:
United
Kingdom. Allies. Total.
Period. Gross Gross Gross
Tons. Tons. Tons.
1914.
August and
September 725,500 453,000 1,178,500
4th Quarter 28,000 5,000 38,000
1915.
1st Quarter 5,000 1,000 6,000
2d Quarter 500 500 1,000
3d Quarter 3,500 6,000 9,500
4th Quarter 2,500 ... 2,500
1916.
1st Quarter ... 241,000 241,000
2d Quarter 3,500 8,000 11,500
3d Quarter ... 47,500 47,500
4th Quarter ... ... ...
1917.
1st Quarter ... ... ...
2d Quarter 7,000 702,500 709,500
3d Quarter 4,500 266,500 271,000
4th Quarter ... 78,000 78,000
------- --------- ---------
Total 780,000 1,809,000 2,589,000
The Month's Submarine Record
British merchant ships sunk during the month ended April 7, 1918, were fewer than in the preceding month, the weekly official reports showing a sharp increase followed by an unusually low record, resulting in a considerably decreased total. The British Admiralty figures were:
Over 1,600 Under 1,600 Fishing
Tons. Tons. Vessels.
Week ended March 17, 1918 11 6 2
Week ended March 24 16 12 1
Week ended March 31 6 7 5
Week ended April 7 4 2 2
-- -- --
Total for four weeks 37 27 10
Total previous 4 weeks 53 16 9
One of the largest vessels sunk was the British steamship Minnetonka, 13,528 gross tons, formerly in the New York-London service of the Atlantic Transport Line. This happened in the Mediterranean in February, 1918, while the Minnetonka was in the service of the British Admiralty. The Minnetonka was the last of the four passenger ships of the line, aggregating 55,099 gross tons, to remain afloat. The others all have been sunk since the war began. The three others were the Minneapolis, sunk March 22, 1916; Minnehaha, sunk Sept. 7, 1917, and the Minnewaska, sunk Nov. 29, 1917.
Incomplete French records show the loss of three vessels of over 1,600 tons and five under 1,600 tons. Italian losses included seven steamships of over 1,500 tons, three sailing vessels of over 100 tons, and fifteen smaller sailing craft.
Official dispatches from Barcelona reported the sinking by German submarines of two Spanish vessels, one in the Mediterranean and the other off the Canary Islands. These reports confirmed the statement that Germany had commenced a blockade of the Spanish coast to prevent the use of Spanish shipping to help the Allies.
A German submarine of the largest seagoing type on April 10 appeared in the port of Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, on the west coast of Africa, and bombarded the wireless and cable stations there. The submarine threw scores of shells from her deck guns into the wireless station, causing extensive damage. She had just turned her attention to the cable offices when a steamer was sighted passing the harbor mouth. The submarine left in chase and did not return. Liberia declared war on Germany Aug. 4, 1917.
Some indication of the losses sustained by the German U-boat fleet is contained in the following reports:
Nine members of the crew of a German submarine which was sunk by an American liner on March 10, when two days out from a French port, were taken prisoners. The rest of the crew perished, the Captain committing suicide when he saw that his submarine was doomed.
Under a heavy attack from three German submarines and three German destroyers, a British seaplane persisted in its efforts against another enemy U-boat and succeeded in sinking it before being damaged by the fire of the other enemy warships. Seaplanes also accounted for three other submarines.
A German U-boat while laying mines on the British coast struck one of them and was blown in two. The only survivor was the Captain, who was taken prisoner. The remainder of the crew, numbering seventeen, were drowned in the submarine.
The German submarine, it is stated in the report of the British War Cabinet, has a surface speed up to 18 knots and a submerged speed of 10 to 11 knots. She carries from fifteen to twenty torpedoes; she can travel 100 miles completely submerged; and she can remain under water on the bottom for a period up to forty-eight hours. A submarine attacking with a torpedo only shows about three inches of periscope at intervals, with the result that few ships which are torpedoed ever see the submarine which has carried out the attack. The range of the torpedoes fired by a submarine is anything up to five miles, and the speed of the torpedo is as high as 40 knots.
Typical U-Boat Methods
From British Admiralty Records
_The British Admiralty on March 17, 1918, permitted publication
of the logs of a number of vessels that had been sunk by German
submarines. These records reveal many stories of heroism and
sacrifice. Some of the incidents recorded are as follows:_
In the case of one ship, on which there were forty-seven hands, the boatswain was standing abreast of the mainmast when he saw the wake of a torpedo as it approached, and he had no time to report before the vessel was struck. After the explosion all hands were sent on deck. The ship sank stern first. There was no time to lower the boats, and practically the whole crew had lifebelts on when thrown into the water. When the submarine came to the surface a line was thrown to a raft which the crew had managed to launch, and it was hauled alongside the enemy vessel. A colored man was ordered on board, and as soon as he stepped on the submarine both his wrists were seized, and he was firmly held while being interrogated. The enemy took a photograph of him and also of a man on the raft. When the interrogation was completed the colored sailor dived from the submarine and swam to the raft. As the ship was sinking the master dived off the bridge; he was not seen later. A number of men were rescued after being in the water for four hours.
Robbery was reported in connection with another attack. After the vessel had been shelled many times, the master and crew abandoned the ship, lowered the lifeboat, and rowed toward the submarine. Eight shots were fired at the lifeboat, followed by four revolver shots. It was only then that the crew saw the submarine, which was about 500 yards away. The Captain and his men were taken on board; and the commander of the submarine boarded the vessel, removed the clothes, provisions, and papers, and left bombs on board which afterward blew her up. The master was searched, and £22 5s., with his watch and chain, was taken from him. The commander of the enemy vessel said that there was no food left in the submarine, which had been six weeks out, and he also mentioned that food in Germany was very short. During the night the crew were picked up by a destroyer.
"Torpedoed, and on her beam ends, but not actually seen to sink," is the description given by a Captain of an attack on his vessel. She was struck between the stokehold and No. 2 hold, both of which were blown in. The crew had time to take to the boats. The German Captain, speaking perfect English, asked for the name of the ship and her tonnage, and verified the particulars given to him by reference to _Lloyd's Register_. The master's boat, with twenty-three men, reached shore the following day, and the mate's boat, with the remainder of the crew, was picked up. It was reported by the master that the officers and men of the submarine were "quite friendly and polite."
One night a vessel was struck by a torpedo. The engines were stopped, and all hands went to the boat stations. The port boat was lowered safely, but within three minutes the ship sank and the davit caught it and capsized it, all hands being thrown into the water. The second officer went down with the ship, but seized hold of the capsized boat and climbed on top of it. The boatswain also was taken down, and he, too, as well as a seaman, got on the boat. After they had been on the upturned boat for some minutes a submarine appeared and hailed them to come on board. They explained that it was impossible. The submarine went ahead, and about a quarter of an hour later returned, and the men were again asked, in a rough voice, to come on board. The same answer was given, whereupon the submarine again went ahead, putting her helm over, and the men were thrown into the water. Those on the submarine must have known that there was a man under the boat, as they could easily have heard him knocking. His comrades, however, pulled out the plug and gave him air, and eventually the boat was righted and he was rescued.
One of a group of other ships was torpedoed and the crew took to the boats, one of which capsized, and seven of the men managed to reach the lifeboat. The submarine came close, flashed her searchlight on the boat and on the men in the water, and, after jeering at them, made off. The survivors were picked up by a French torpedo boat next morning.
Attacked by a U-boat, which fired two shots, the master got out the boats, left the ship, and pulled toward the enemy vessel. The commander took four or five of his own men in the ship's boat and put some bombs on board. As these failed to explode he went back for more explosives, taking with him everything out of the ship that could be carried--food, clothing, compass, and all the metal that the enemy could lay hands on. The vessel was then blown up, the crew in the meantime being on the deck of the submarine. They were treated very badly, their clothes being thrown out of the boat into the sea. Only one oar was left them, five having been flung overboard. The master begged for another, but he could not get any more.
Two submarines were sighted at a distance of about six miles attacking a bark. The master of the observing vessel altered his course and lit a smoke cowl to screen his ship, but it was not very effective. Shortly afterward he was attacked by one of the submarines. Being armed, the vessel opened fire, but the U-boat was not within range, and a shot from the submarine struck the ship. Orders were given to haul down the ensign, and steps were taken to abandon her. The boats were lowered and the ship was abandoned, the enemy still firing. The ship was hit nineteen times before the crew was properly clear. When the submarine came up the vessel was "generally looted," everything the enemy could lay their hands on being taken, including the spirits in the bonded room. Some of the Germans were seen drinking on the bridge. The enemy were alongside for about an hour, and "treated our men quite fairly, even returning some of their personal gear which they had looted." The enemy crew were very particular in getting all the leather they possibly could, even going so far as to take old boots which were long past usage. Soap was also in great request, and a tin of lard was considered a prize.
In another instance a vessel struck on the port side in the engine room went down at once, the crew having only time to launch the boats. About ten minutes before the ship was torpedoed a floating object was sighted, which appeared like a small vessel bottom upward. This was reported by flag code to another vessel close by, but no reply was received before the ship was hit. The master was of opinion that this object must have been placed there as a decoy by the submarine to draw the attention of the lookouts away from herself.
When a motor schooner was struck the ship's boat was rowed to the submarine and the master and one man were taken aboard. The submarine then towed the boat to the disabled ship, and sent two men on her with bombs. An officer asked the master, "What was the cargo? Where from? Where bound? Why did the ship not come with convoy?" The officer spoke very good English, being prompted in German by the Captain of the U-boat. The master and crew were much struck by the pallid appearance of the officers and crew of the submarine and by their nervous and excited manner. The commander was continually urging haste, and the officer who was placing the bombs on board could hardly hold them, owing to his nervous tension. One of the crew of the submarine who had lived long in England, speaking to the ship's crew, cursed the war and said that he wished it was over, exclaiming that it was not their fault, but that they had to do their duty. "You won't believe it in England," he added, "but it's true." The submarine appeared to be of an old type and to have been a long time at sea.
The Story of an Indomitable Captain
Told by Joseph Conrad
_The story of a certain British steamship traveling from Lerwick to
Iceland and torpedoed on the way has been told in The London Daily
Mail by the British novelist, Joseph Conrad, in these words:_
The ship went down in less than four minutes. The Captain was the last man on board, going down with her, and was sucked under. On coming up he was caught under an upturned boat to which five hands were clinging.
"One lifeboat," says the chief engineer, "which was floating empty in the distance, was cleverly manoeuvred to our assistance by the steward, who swam off to her pluckily. Our next endeavor was to release the Captain, who was entangled under the boat. As it was impossible to right her, we set to to split her side open with the boat hook, because by awful bad luck the head of the axe we had flew off at the first blow and was lost. The work took thirty minutes, and the extricated Captain was in a pitiable condition, being badly bruised and having swallowed a lot of salt water. He was unconscious. While at that work the submarine came to the surface quite close and made a complete circle round us, the seven men which we counted on the conning tower laughing at our efforts.
"There were eighteen of us saved. I deeply regret the loss of the chief officer, a fine fellow and a kind shipmate showing splendid promise. The other men lost--one A. B., one greaser, and two firemen--were quiet, conscientious good fellows."
With no restoratives in the boat, they endeavored to bring the Captain around by means of massage. Meantime the oars were got out in order to reach the Faroes, which were about thirty miles dead to windward, but after about nine hours' hard work they had to desist, and, putting out the sea anchor, they took shelter under the canvas boat cover from the cold wind and torrential rain. Says the narrator:
"We were all very wet and miserable, and decided to have two biscuits all around. The effects of this and being under the shelter of the canvas warmed us up and made us feel pretty well contented. At about sunrise the Captain showed signs of recovery, and by the time the sun was up he was looking a lot better, much to our relief."
After being informed of what had been done, the revived Captain "dropped a bombshell in our midst" by proposing to make for the Shetlands, which were "only 150 miles off." "The wind is in our favor," he said. "I will take you there. Are you all willing?" This--comments the chief engineer--from a man who but a few hours previously had been hauled back from the grave! The Captain's confident manner inspired them, and they all agreed.
Under the best possible conditions a boat run of 150 miles in the North Atlantic and in Winter weather would have been a feat of no mean merit, but in the circumstances it required a man of uncommon nerve and skill to make such a proposal. With an oar for a mast and the boat cover cut down for a sail, they started on their dangerous journey, with the boat compass and the stars for their guide. The Captain's undaunted serenity buoyed them all up against despondency. He told them what point he was making for. It was Ronas Hill--"and we struck it as straight as a die."
"And there was our captain, just his usual self, as if nothing had happened, as if bringing the boat that hazardous journey and being the means of saving 18 souls was to him an everyday occurrence."
The Naval Defense of Venice
By E. M. B.
[FROM INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY ITALIAN NAVY DEPARTMENT]
_The Italian Navy and the Italian 3d Army divided the honor of
holding back the Austro-German forces during the retreat of
October, 1917, thus enabling the main army to reorganize for
defense on the line of the Piave. The navy's work was
particularly difficult, as it had no means at hand to meet the
attack of land forces. It was obliged, therefore, to improvise
the necessary troops and material in order to hold back the
invasion, to make swift and skillful use of the lighter naval
craft, and to adapt all available means to the end in view. How
the task was achieved is related herewith:_
The enemy advance guards met a stubborn resistance from the Italian Navy on the lower Tagliamento line. Here a small body of sailors contested the passage of the lower course of the river. Hydroplanes bombed the bridges which the Austrians were endeavoring to construct near Latisana and the troops which were gathering on the opposite bank from Latisana to the sea. Submarine chasers ascended the Tagliamento several times, as well as the Lemene and the Livenga, in order to engage and disperse the patrols which the enemy was sending out along the coast in the hope of reaching Venice before the Italian Army could construct a solid protecting ring to the north of the city. Detachments of marines opened fire at each stage of the retreat along the interior canals of the Tagliamento to Caorle, and from Caorle to the Venetian lagoons, thus helping to check the oncoming forces of Boroevic and to give time for the necessary clearing of that region. In spite of an exceptionally difficult sea, barred by mine fields and shoals, the Italian torpedo boats were finally able not only to cover the flank of all the moving forces but also to escort and protect the numerous convoys laden with war material which had been forced to go out in the Adriatic to prevent capture by the enemy.
HARD TASKS OF MARINES
The retreat was accomplished by stages. Each stopping place, where the land and marine forces were gathered and rearranged before carrying out the established plan, had to be protected during the counterattacks of the Italian rear guards, which became more frequent and vigorous with the increasing accuracy of the enemy fire. These attacks were made more difficult by the swampy nature of the ground. This flat and marshy land offers no points of defense and has no traversable and continuous roads. The marines were outnumbered by the regiments confronting them.
Every difficulty was overcome by the valor and self-sacrifice of the Italian sailors. Aviators were seen flying for several consecutive days without resting--attacking the moving enemy columns with machine guns; defending themselves against numerous enemy airplanes, or dropping messages under fire at the points of reunion of the Italian troops in order to insure co-operation between the navy and the army; and continually alternating flights of observation with those of bombardment under the most adverse conditions.
Platoons of marines stood in the mud behind guns corroded by the inundations, holding back entire companies of enemy troops for days and nights without the possibility of obtaining relief or food. Some of the gun crews dragged not only the mounts and the guns by hand across very swampy ground, with the water up to their knees, but also the munition cases, without taking time for sleeping or eating.
Armed submarine chasers threaded their way up winding and narrow canals, in which they could not even have turned around in case of a forced retreat, and hammered a Hungarian battalion for hours, until it had to retire in disorder before the determination of a handful of men with a few cannons and machine guns. Batteries of marines prolonged the defense of Caorle, a few hundred meters from the enemy advance guards, and did not cease firing until every civilian and everything movable had been placed in security. After this they succeeded in reaching the line of the Piave with their efficiency unimpaired.
Some companies of sailors clad in gray-green held off a big group of "Honveds," [Hungarian guards,] forced back the boats which were attempting to cross the river, made prisoners of men who had succeeded in crossing with machine guns, captured their arms, defended their own flank from the continuous encircling movements of other enemy troops who had crossed the Piave further up stream, and finally formed a firm pillar of defense for the right flank of the army where it made its final stand.
This is a short summary of the work carried out by the Italian Navy during the two weeks following the evacuation of Monfalcone and Grado. When the navy was called upon not only to co-operate and to protect but to constitute an important part of the line of resistance on the lower Piave, its duties were multiplied and assumed the character of a direct participation in the land war. Its special mission was to defend the Lagoons of Venice. The work of forming the principal ring of defense around the City of the Doges was confided to the machine gunners of the navy. The duty of defending the approaches along the seacoast was given to the sailors, and that of observing the battlefields on the lagoons to the aviators. The torpedo boats were asked to guarantee the extreme right wing against surprise from the sea.
BATTERIES ON THE LAGOONS
The artillery employed by the navy in the defense of the lower Piave and of Venice may be divided into three groups: Floating batteries on pontoons, batteries set up on the ground, and armed ships. Most of the floating pontoons came from Monfalcone on the lower Isonzo and from the marine defense of Grado. The crews working these guns had given magnificent proof of their valor during all the battles of the Carso, fighting in the open in almost impossible positions. The sailors suffered great fatigue and difficulties during the retreat in transporting these floating batteries along the waterways to their present position in stormy weather; but still greater were the sacrifices the naval gunners had to undergo in order to transform the intricate canals and muddy ground into solid positions. This life in the midst of swamps is a melancholy one. The officers and men working the guns have to live and sleep inside the pontoons between the depots of powder and projectiles. The tides and currents are continuously displacing the floating batteries, and constant work, day and night, is necessary to maintain the defense.
It is due to the Italian sailors to recognize that this gigantic work, so rapidly undertaken, saved Venice and gave the army, its retreat having been accomplished, a strong support on its right wing. They helped to repel all the Hungarian attacks around Zenson. At the side of these floating batteries the British monitors held the bridges which the Austro-Hungarians were obstinately throwing across the new Piave under the fire of their guns, and destroyed them with surprising accuracy.
ENEMY BRIDGES DESTROYED
When the enemy succeeded in landing troops on the point of the island, which was mostly inundated, between the new and the old Piave, they tried to augment this advance guard by using a bridge of boats at Grisolera. But the float was shattered, the boats sunk. Enemy forces higher up the river then threw a floating bridge across at Ca' Sacco. Italy's naval guns shattered this bridge also. The enemy then ascended higher up the Piave and built three massive bridges at Agenzia Trezze. These were likewise destroyed. The Austrians descended the river and built another bridge at Tombolino; but they were also prevented from crossing here. They then endeavored to establish communication at San Doná, but here also the shells from the big guns on the floats reached them. There is now [April, 1918] a daily struggle between the enemy desiring to force their way across the river and the great guns on the lagoons impeding the passage, defending the approach, and ruining the work they accomplish.
The Italian armed ships sometimes participate in actions against the enemy infantry. Recently one evening the ship Captain Sauro went up the old Piave, wending its way into an artificial canal which divided the Italian first line of defense from the enemy line. The sailors of the Sauro replied steadily to the rifle fire of Hungarian advance posts in the houses along the canals and landed on the shore occupied by the enemy patrols, forcing them to flee and firing the abandoned shelters after taking out the captured munitions. They then returned to the ship and, though harassed by enemy fire, succeeded in returning safely to their point of departure.
WORK OF LAND BATTERIES
Some of the land batteries had equally hard tasks. In the middle of last November many batteries had to withstand continual attacks from the sea by Austrian battleships of the Monarch type, escorted by destroyers, which had been sent to the Venetian shore with the purpose of rendering the Piave untenable. One naval battery of medium-calibre guns, commanded successively by two brothers, fired ceaselessly, without resting, though subjected to the fire of enemy artillery and machine guns, not only from the front and side, but also from the Adriatic in the rear. During the last days of the retreat, while the defense line of the Lagoons of Venice was not yet consolidated, that battery was for a long time isolated from every communication, without food, reinforcements, or support, yet it did not cede one inch, it never slackened fire, and it never asked for help. It was one of the heroic deeds of the Italian defense between Cavazuccherina and the sea. In the afternoon of Nov. 16, though attacked by the Austrian battleships Budapest and Wien, not only did these same batteries protect the return of two Italian submarine chasers which had gone out to attack the Austrian naval division, but they effectively counterattacked the battleships and their twelve destroyers until their return in the direction of Istria. The battleships never attempted this attack again.
NAVAL AVIATION
The plain extending from Zenson to the sea does not offer any elevated points for observation and the control of artillery fire. Therefore, the task of directing the shellfire had to be confided to the airplanes, and in the lagoons to the seaplanes. But in order that the seaplanes may fulfill their work of observation with safety they must be defended from enemy airplanes and must, therefore, be escorted by chasing machines.
The Italian seaplanes and their escorts did not spare themselves. The aviators of one squadron accomplished seventy-nine bombarding and observation flights in the first twenty days of November during a total of ninety-two hours of flight--not counting practice flights.
THE SUBMARINE CHASERS
Every one now knows, at least by reputation, the M. A. S., [Motoscafi Antisommergibili di Scorta,] the Italian little armored boats that are doing effective work in the Tyrrhenean and the Adriatic, but few understand the great assistance they have given in their support of the army in the marshy Venetian plain covered with watercourses.
The M. A. S. were not built to fight on rivers, but to scour the seas; yet they are frequently seen engaging some enemy advance post. Where the enemy lines border on a river or a canal the menacing prow of an M. A. S. will now and then rise under the barbed wire of the Hungarian trenches. These swift motor boats have become the cavalry of the marshes. They are slaves to their fragility, but they have the advantage of speed and surprise.
The M. A. S. attacked the moving enemy companies across the lagoons with machine guns and their little guns. They were bombarded in turn; but their bravery and their size made them often very fortunate. At Bevazzano a big column of Honveds marching along the shore was put to flight by them. Again they shelled a cyclist corps, killing a large number. They landed a few men on ground already occupied by the enemy and succeeded in destroying or in capturing various machine-gun outposts. Elsewhere they supported isolated companies of sailors, protecting the lagoons, with their small guns. With great daring they pushed up to Porto Gruaro, which had already been invaded from Lemene. Shortly after, while the present line of Intestadure-Capo Sile-Cavazuccherina-Cortelazzo was being organized, the M. A. S. ran up and down for entire days through the Piave, the old Piave, and the Cavetta Canal, undertaking frequent sporadic fights with the machine gunners and the picked shooters of Boroevic.
The armed motor boats by themselves insured the liaison between the lines for several days, and today, when the line of resistance from the lagoons is safe, the tactical use of the M. A. S. in the interior canals is still frequent and efficacious.
FIGHTING LARGER CRAFT
These armored motor boats also held the Adriatic coast, especially between the mouth of the Piave and the Venetian estuary. Nor were opportunities lacking for the little craft to fight against superior forces, as was the case on Nov. 16, 1917. The battleships of the Monarch type--Wien and Budapest--escorted by a division of torpedo boats and destroyers, appeared that morning before Cortelazzo and opened a violent bombardment against the Italian lines, attacking them from the flank. Assailed by seaplanes, counterattacked by Italian coast artillery, and threatened by approaching destroyers, they retired, but in the afternoon they returned and reopened fire at the mouth of the Piave.
Thereupon, the M. A. S. appeared from the open sea and plunged into the enemy formation. They intervened where the duel between the coast artillery and the battleships was most intense. When the motor boats had approached within less than a mile, the guns of the Monarch, ceasing to fire on land, turned a violent fire against the audacious newcomers. The enemy destroyers threw themselves on the two Italian chasers, shooting with every gun on board, while the battleships were manoeuvring to retire eastward. The M. A. S. approached the large ships within a few hundred meters, fired their torpedoes, and reversed their course. The Monarchs were able to avoid the torpedoes by rapid evolutions and returned toward the Istrian coast, while even the turret guns continued their fire against the minute Italian chasers.
The battleships having withdrawn, the chasers found themselves surrounded by five adversary torpedo boats, which were attempting to cut off their retreat. They gave a good account of themselves, however, meanwhile gaining the protection of the coast batteries; the enemy destroyers retired, while the M. A. S. returned to their base with insignificant damage and with crews unhurt.
THE NAVAL BATTALIONS
When the news of the Austro-German invasion first spread through the Italian naval bases, the Captains of the battleships saw an unusual procession passing before their cabins, all asking the same thing--to be moved into the infantry and sent to the front. Special orders of the day were necessary to make the rank and file understand that each man could best play his part by remaining at his own post. It was announced, however, that those whose services were not absolutely necessary at their bases would be given full satisfaction. The first naval infantry companies were thus formed in a few days. Sections of the navy belonging to the defense of Monfalcone and Grado were under fire on foot from the first days of the resistance between the Tagliamento and the Livenza, and many others wished to join these gray-green companies.
The first battalion of sailors, perfectly equipped and organized for trench warfare, went into the front line the 1st of November. Most of these men were not experiencing land firing for the first time, as they had participated with small groups in the defense of Monfalcone and Grado, but they had never before been used as real naval infantry. The lower Piave, where it forms a zigzag before flowing into the Adriatic, was assigned to the naval battalion as its line of defense. At dawn on Nov. 13 the battalion underwent a tremendous shock from the advance guard of the left flank of Boroevic's army. The attack was definitely repulsed. However, a few kilometers to the west, where the line of the Piave was held by battalions of territorials, the enemy succeeded in throwing a bridge of boats across the river near Grisolera and getting an armed patrol with machine guns to the opposite shore.
The territorials withdrew to Case Molinato, in the direction of Cavazuccherina, and groups of Honveds crossed the large watery island between the old and new Piave. The naval battalion, therefore, found its left flank suddenly exposed and had to face both front and lateral attacks. The Italians were commanded by an officer of great strength of character, Lieut. Commander Starita, who decided to hold and to counterattack in spite of the difficult position. The enemy was therefore unable to enlarge the breach and was energetically held in the delta of the river.
"ARDITI" OF THE NAVY
In the meantime the Hungarian machine gunners who had crossed the Piave fortified themselves in the houses, barricaded the doors and windows with sandbags, and, supported by these machine gunners, other enemy patrols crept over, especially at night, through the dense vegetation of the delta, and with riflefire and bombs tormented the sailors, who had remained without any contact with the army. Lieut. Commander Starita, though having only a few hundred men at his disposal, held a front of several kilometers on three sides and organized a special corps of "braves" to clean out the infested zone. He improvised the "Arditi" of the navy and led them into action. Near Case Allegri a platoon of Hungarians had established themselves in an old guardhouse and had made a small fort with several machine guns. A patrol led by Captain Starita was able to surround them and to penetrate and kill the commanding officer despite the heavy fire of the machine gunners. The twenty surviving Hungarians, as soon as they saw their leader fall, raised their hands and called out "Kamerad!" The marines disarmed them, bound them with their puttees, captured the machine guns, and conducted them to the main battalion.
The same day, near Revedoli, a boat full of enemy soldiers attempted to cross the river and to outflank the marines on the right, aided by a bend in the river. The outlook post discovered what was happening and another Italian patrol came to the rescue and engaged the Honveds. The Hungarians were almost all captured and the boat taken. The following day the Starita battalion, which in the meantime had remained isolated from the rest of the army with a dismounted squadron of cavalry and with a company of Alpine machine gunners, was put under a hard strain, as the left flank of Boroevic's army was renewing the attack with great strength. The enemy was repulsed, and the marine patrols took new prisoners and fresh booty. As these operations had produced appreciable losses, the line of the battalion was withdrawn on the evening of Nov. 14 from Case Allegri to the mouth of the river, without any communication with the rest of the front.
The Italian troops of the lagoon section also had established a definite line on the Sile and the old Piave, covering Cavazuccherina with a bridgehead. The retirement of the naval battalion to the new line of the Cavetta Canal from Cavazuccherina to the sea was then decided upon. Lieut. Commander Starita received orders to reach the final positions on the night of the 15th. It would have been an unnecessary sacrifice to continue an isolated fight on the new Piave, as the sailors wished to do. Therefore, the battalion made an orderly retirement with their booty and all their prisoners to the line of Cavetta.
Between the 16th and 17th the enemy succeeded in sending some chosen fighters with machine guns and hand grenades to the houses of Cortelazza, north of the bend of the river. As the distance between the two banks is only a few yards, the sailors opened a heavy fire on the enemy advance guards, intensifying it at night. The battalion did not have sufficient material to undertake a strong counterattack and to repulse the advance guards beyond Cortelazza. On the 18th the necessary material and hand grenades began to arrive. The counterattack was immediately opened with great energy, the houses were retaken, and so the marines were able to throw a bridgehead beyond the Cavetta Canal and Cortelazza, which, consolidated, represents the extreme point of the land resistance toward the sea.
This first naval company, which did so much to arrest the progress of the Austro-Hungarians toward the Lagoon of St. Mark, now gives a veteran's greeting to every new group of marines that comes to add its strength to the ring around Venice.
Venice Under the Grim Shadow
The City's Wartime Aspects
[A Rotogravure Etching of Venice Appears in This Issue Opposite Page 269]
When the Austro-German armies swept down through the Venetian plain last October and November, leaving ruin in their wake, they were stopped at the Piave River, whose waters flow into the lagoon a few miles east of Venice. Though the Italian Army and Navy made a ring of steel around the City of the Doges, and have held the enemy at bay from that time to the present, the sounds of battle have been constantly in the ears of the inhabitants, and frequent air raids have left jagged scars on many buildings and even in the pavement of the Piazza San Marco.
Throughout the Winter of 1917-18 Venice remained a city without tourists, its population dwindling from 150,000 to about 40,000, its canals silent and almost empty of life, yet full of a new and wistful beauty. The first days of peril had brought the enemy within twelve or thirteen miles of Venice. From the Fondamento Nuovo, at the northern end of the city, the people could see the flash of guns and the bursting of shells. The roar of guns disturbed their work by day and their sleep by night.
EVACUATING THE CITY
The civilian population was a hindrance rather than a help to the defenders, so the Admiral in command (for Venice is under naval, not military authority) thought it well to arrange for the partial evacuation of the city. In conjunction with the Syndic, Count Erimani, he first asked all foreigners to remove themselves to places of safety. Then offices were opened in each of the thirty parishes, and the people were ordered to report within forty-eight hours. This census was taken, so that railway facilities for traveling might be provided for all, and that places of safety might be found for those who were too poor to go away at their own expense, and pay their way afterward.
In a few days nearly half the population, some 70,000, had gone, the majority to Florence, Rome, and other places in Central and Southern Italy, and the others to Genoa and the Riviera. Some were sent by sea to the Ancona coast. After this first rush the exodus went on more leisurely, some 3,000 leaving each day. Institutions of all kinds, offices, shops, restaurants, and cafés, closed their doors, even the Café Florian, which had been open day and night continuously for over 100 years. Banks and offices transferred their businesses to other towns.
There are no cellars in Venice, nor can the inhabitants have any dugouts in which to conceal valuables, for at a depth of two or three feet below the ground floors of all buildings water is reached. Accordingly the authorities at the Municipal Building, at St. Mark's Library, at the Ducal Palace, at the Archives, as well as at banks and insurance offices, had their documents and valuables conveyed to places of security by boat and rail.
When Italy first went into the war precautions had been taken to protect the public monuments of Venice against aerial bombardment. The Doges' Palace and the Church of St. Mark were protected by barricades of sandbags, as were all the more valuable statues throughout the city. St. Mark's gilded copper horses, beaten out by hand, the only example extant of a Roman Quadriga--
The four steeds divine,
That strike the ground resounding with their feet,
And from their nostrils snort ethereal flame--
were removed at that time from their pedestals above the main entrance to the church, and stabled under an archway on the ground floor of the Doges' Palace. When the new peril came with the invasion, however, they were conveyed by a battleship to a safer refuge in Rome. The precious equestrian statue of Colleoni, so much admired by Ruskin, with other treasures familiar to the tourist, also has been removed to a place of security. The bells of St. Mark's campanile and those of every church in the city have been taken away.
By the first weeks of 1918 the population had shrunk to less than 60,000, and at night one could walk through miles and miles of stilled and empty streets, darkened against the peril of air raids, or could travel by gondola along lonely canals rippled only by the Winter wind, with the cold moonlight silvering a deserted fairyland. Two months later the population was further reduced by sending away 20,000 women, children, and old men with a view to eliminating useless mouths to feed and preventing unnecessary slaughter. By that time Austro-German ingenuity had invented a new system of dropping bombs; instead of scattering them over the city the missiles were grouped in large numbers in a very limited space so that the destruction on that area was complete.
LIKE A DEAD CITY
An English war correspondent who visited Venice in the Winter drew this word picture:
"Shuttered palaces face each other across silent canals. A footstep ringing down those narrow alleys, which are like deep, dark slits in a close-crowded mass of many-storied houses, starts echoes that die undisturbed away. The black gondola glides through a dead city more beautiful in the silence and stillness of this war trance of hers than ever in the fullness of her vivacious life. At each corner of the narrow water lane the white-haired gondolier raises his mournful cry, but by long habit, for he knows that no answer will ring out from beyond the angle of the dark stone wall, and no tapering prow glide out to be avoided by a turn of his skillful oar.
"The Grand Canal is a green and gleaming vista of desertion. The scream of seagulls, beating its tranquil surface with their wings, is the only sound that disturbs the quiet of its reverie. A pleasing melancholy invests the deserted quays, and in remote corners of little lost canals you can almost hear the whispering of innumerable spirits of the Venice of long ago who have been drawn back to their old home by this strange peace that lies upon the city.
"Venice, without tourists, without guides, without postcard sellers and hotel touts, is a close preserve of beauty for the few who have the fortune to be here. The atmosphere and the dignity of the days when she was a ruling city are here as they have never been before in modern times, nor ever will be again."
THE WORST AIR RAID
The greatest air raid of all the forty-five which Venice had endured since the war's beginning was that of the night of Feb. 26-27, 1918. It lasted eight hours--from 10:20 to 6:15 A. M.--and there was not a single interval of more than half an hour during all that time of brilliant moonlight in which bombs were not falling on the city. There were 300 in all. Thirty-eight houses were smashed, the Royal Palace was struck, one wing of an old people's home was blown to pieces, and three churches were damaged, including that of St. Chrysostom, in which an altar with one of Cellini's last landscapes was wrecked. Fifteen bombs fell near the Doges' Palace, one barely missing the Bridge of Sighs and falling into the narrow canal which it spans. Ten bombs fell around the Rialto Bridge. About fifteen civilians were wounded seriously, including two women. Only one man was killed, thanks to the promptness with which the Venetians now take shelter.
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Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918Chapter VIII: Part 8
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