Chapter XXXV: Ionic Revolt (1)

Hitherto, the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiæus, he left Artaphernês, his brother, as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histiæus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity,—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B. C., from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years,—“a respite from suffering,” to use the significant phrase of the historian.[520]

[520] Herodot. v, 28. Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, ἄνεως κακῶν ἦν—or
ἄνεσις κακῶν—if the conjecture of some critics be adopted. Mr.
Clinton, with Larcher and others (see Fasti Hellen. App. 18, p.
314), construe this passage as if the comma were to be placed
after μετὰ δὲ, so that the historian would be made to affirm that
the period of repose lasted only a short time. It appears to me
that the comma ought rather to be placed after χρόνον, and that
the “short time” refers to those evils which the historian had
been describing before. There must have been an interval of eight
years at least, if not of ten years, between the events which the
historian had been describing—the evils inflicted by the attacks
of Otanês—and the breaking out of the Ionic revolt; which latter
event no one places earlier than 504 B. C., though some prefer
502 B. C., others even 500 B. C.

If, indeed, we admitted with Wesseling (ad Herodot. vi, 40; and
Mr. Clinton seems inclined towards the same opinion, see p.
314, _ut sup._) that the Scythian expedition is to be placed in
508-507 B. C., then indeed the interval between the campaign of
Otanês and the Ionic revolt would be contracted into one or two
years. But I have already observed that I cannot think 508 B. C.
a correct date for the Scythian expedition: it seems to me to
belong to about 515 B. C. Nor do I know what reason there is for
determining the date as Wesseling does, except this very phrase
οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, which is on every supposition exceedingly
vague, and which he appears to me not to have construed in the
best way.

It was about the year 506 B. C., that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernês at Sardis. He now, doubtless, found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus, whose favor with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in his design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace,—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety.[521] Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that he was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but, fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

[521] Herodot. v, 96. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφέρνης ἐκέλευέ σφεας εἰ βουλοίατο
σόοι εἶναι, καταδέκεσθαι ὀπίσω τὸν Ἱππίην.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here, too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles,—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians.[522] It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of eight thousand heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark in the project along with him,—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly, he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighboring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of one hundred ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernês warmly entered into the scheme, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring two hundred ships instead of one hundred. A messenger despatched to Susa, having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped, under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras,—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.[523]

[522] Herodot. v, 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as
despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (Herodot. i, 64), was expelled
from this post by the Lacedæmonians (De Herodot. Malignitat. c.
21, p. 859). I confess that I do not place much confidence in the
statements of that treatise, as to the many despots expelled by
Sparta: we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed
them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

[523] Herodot. v, 30, 31.

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont. On reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbor of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance, and the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabatês, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch, and discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus), left without a single man on board. Incensed at this neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards through one of the apertures for oars in the ship’s side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who, on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabatês for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabatês with disdain, reminding him that, according to the instructions of Artaphernês, he was only second and himself (Aristagoras) first. The pride of Megabatês could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the shore of the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.[524]

[524] Herodot. v, 34, 35.

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabatês, deceived Artaphernês, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, when it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law, Histiæus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiæus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved,—branded upon it the words necessary,—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined.[525] Histiæus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to reëstablish order. His message, arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Milêtus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception,—the historian Hekatæus of Milêtus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighboring temple of Apollo, at Branchidæ, for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone, he said, could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea,—while, if _they_ did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy surely would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, were listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures,—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekatæus anticipated,—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial:[526] perhaps, indeed, Hekatæus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have urged the question as if Milêtus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

[525] Herodot. v, 35: compare Polyæn. i, 24, and Aulus Gellius,
N. A. xvii, 9.

[526] Herodot. v, 36.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt, and their first step was to conciliate popular favor throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities,—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendency, as Histiæus had well urged at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favorable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. The fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Iatragoras was despatched from Milêtus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands,—among them Histiæus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians),[527] Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans.[528]

[527] Compare Herodotus, v, 121, and vii, 98. Oliatus was son of
Ibanôlis, as was also the Mylasian Herakleidês mentioned in v,
121.

[528] Herodot. v, 36, 37; vi, 9.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekatæus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia,—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals, and to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenês; to whom he addressed himself, “holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers.” Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus.[529] Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom,—he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle, and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare of the Asiatics. The latter, he said, could be at once put down, and the former appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans,—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian.[530] He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich; but he magnified especially the vast treasures at Susa: “Instead of fighting your neighbors, he concluded, Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself ruler of all Asia,[531] a prize not less easy than lucrative?” Kleomenês replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered, with more frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months’ journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenês interrupted him: “Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger; you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months’ journey from the sea.” In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource: he took in his hand the bough of supplication, and again went to the house of Kleomenês, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgô, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenês to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length, the little girl suddenly exclaimed, “Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away.” The exclamation so struck Kleomenês, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.[532]

[529] Herodot. v, 49. Τῷ δὴ (Κλεομένεϊ) ἐς λόγους ἤϊε, ~ὡς
Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι~, ἔχων χάλκεον πίνακα, ἐν τῷ γῆς ἁπάσης
περίοδος ἐνετέτμητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by
Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see
Strabo, i, p. 7; Agathemerus, 1, c. 1; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 1.

Grosskurd, in his note on the above passage of Strabo, as well
as Larcher and other critics, appear to think, that though this
tablet or chart of Anaximander was the earliest which embraced
the whole known earth, there were among the Greeks others still
earlier, which described particular countries. There is no proof
of this, nor can I think it probable: the passage of Apollonius
Rhodius (iv, 279) with the Scholia to it, which is cited as
evidence, appears to me unworthy of attention.

Among the Roman Agrimensores, it was the ancient practice to
engrave their plans, of land surveyed, upon tablets of brass,
which were deposited in the public archives, and of which copies
were made for private use, though the original was referred
to in case of legal dispute (Siculus Flaccus ap. Rei Agrariæ
Scriptores, p. 16, ed. Goes: compare Giraud, Recherches sur le
Droit de Propriété, p. 116, Aix, 1838).

[530] Herodot. v, 49. δεικνὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἐς τὴν τῆς γῆς
περίοδον, τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τῷ πίνακι ἐντετμημένην.

[531] Herodot. v, 49. πάρεχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίης πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως,
ἄλλο τι αἱρήσεσθε;

[532] Herodot. v, 49, 50, 51. Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm.
Laconic. p. 240.

We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life
and time of Kleomenês, that the Spartan king has the active
management and direction of foreign affairs,—subject, however,
to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehavior
(Herodot. vi, 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually
taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. But we may be permitted to doubt, whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras,—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450-440 B. C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B. C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face.[533] To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented, that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B. C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

[533] Herodot. vi, 112. πρῶτοί τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν
ὁρέοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι
καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas,—a character which we thus find more and more recognized and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance, that Crœsus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now they accepted such priority as a matter of course.[534]

[534] Aristagoras says to the Spartans (v, 49)—τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ
ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρων, ὄνειδος
καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν,
ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Herodotus, v, 49). In reference to
the earlier incident (Herodot. i, 70)—Τουτέων τε ὦν εἵνεκεν οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν συμμαχίην ἐδέξαντο, καὶ ὅτι ἐκ πάντων σφέας
προκρίνας Ἑλλήνων, αἱρέετο φίλους (Crœsus).

An interval of rather more than forty years separates the two
events, during which both the feelings of the Spartans, and the
feelings of others towards them, had undergone a material change.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. And here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis, or mother-city, of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favor by the Athenians: who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves,—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians,—ships which are styled by Herodotus, “the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians,”—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus farther remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one,—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenês, thus imposed upon the thirty thousand citizens of Athens.[535] But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.[536]

[535] Herodot. v, 97. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον
διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μοῦνον οὐκ
οἷός τε ἐγένετο διαβαλέειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε
τοῦτο.

[536] Herodot. v, 98; Homer, Iliad, v, 62. The criticism of
Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herodot. p. 861) on this passage, is
rather more pertinent than the criticisms in that ill-tempered
composition generally are.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Milêtus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succor of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus, with others. The ships were left at Korêssus,[537] a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first, along the river Kayster, next, across the mountain range of Tmôlus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Miletus,[538] and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighboring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus; who found himself, moreover, obliged to evacuate Sardis, owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs; hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in flame. Obliged to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious: they evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmôlus, and, when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkidês, the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle;[539] a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 B. C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.[540]

[537] About Korêssus, see Diodor. xiv, 99, and Xenophon, Hellen.
i, 2, 7.

[538] Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysanias in his history of
Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milêtus, and
the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to
Sardis; see Plutarch, de Herodot. Malignit. p. 861,—though the
citation is given there confusedly, so that we cannot make much
out of it.

[539] Herodot. v, 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of
Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian
and Ionian force: see Plutarch, de Herodot. Malign. _ut sup._

[540] About Derkyllidas, see Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 2, 17-19.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides,—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him: the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians, who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island,—finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant,—shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who, however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.[541]

[541] Herodot. v, 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in
Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of
Salamis (Diodor. xiv, 98, xv, 2), about 386 B. C.: most of the
petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects,
but in 351 B. C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor.
xvi, 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander
besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii, 20, 8).

The rebellion had now assumed a character more serious than ever, and the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces,[542] the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army,[543]—while the force under Artaphernês at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit, and we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.[544]

[542] Herodot. v, 116. Κύπριοι μὲν δὴ, ἐνιαυτὸν ἐλεύθεροι
γενόμενοι, αὖτις ἐκ νέης κατεδεδούλωντο.

[543] Herodot. vi, 6. Κίλικες καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι.

[544] Herodot. v, 109. Ἡμέας δὲ ἀπέπεμψε ~τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων~
φυλάξοντας τὴν θάλασσαν, etc.: compare vi, 7.

Apprized of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favor of the seafight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished.[545] But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy’s ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind legs and strike out with his fore legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse; and by previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example. The brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli, on the north coast of the island: this latter being son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before, in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remained for the revolters, and the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken: not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.[546]

[545] Herodot. v, 112.

[546] Herodot. v, 112-115. It is not uninteresting to compare,
with this reconquest of Cyprus by the Persians, the conquest of
the same island by the Turks in 1570, when they expelled from it
the Venetians. See the narrative of that conquest (effected in
the reign of Selim the Second by the Seraskier Mustapha-Pasha),
in Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, book xxxvi,
vol. iii, pp. 578-589. Of the two principal towns, Nikosia in
the centre of the island, and Famagusta on the north-eastern
coast, the first, after a long siege, was taken by storm, and the
inhabitants of every sex and age either put to death or carried
into slavery; while the second, after a most gallant defence, was
allowed to capitulate. But the terms of the capitulation were
violated in the most flagitious manner by the Seraskier, who
treated the brave Venetian governor, Bragadino, with frightful
cruelty, cutting off his nose and ears, exposing him to all sorts
of insults, and ultimately causing him to be flayed alive. The
skin of this unfortunate general was conveyed to Constantinople
as a trophy, but in after-times found its way to Venice.

We read of nothing like this treatment of Bragadino in the
Persian reconquest of Cyprus, though it was a subjugation after
revolt; indeed, nothing like it in all Persian warfare.

Von Hammer gives a short sketch (not always very accurate as to
ancient times) of the condition of Cyprus under its successive
masters,—Persians, Græco-Egyptians, Romans, Arabians, the dynasty
of Lusignan, Venetians, and Turks,—the last seems decidedly the
worst of all.

In reference to the above-mentioned piece of cruelty, I may
mention that the Persian king Kambysês caused one of the royal
judges (according to Herodotus v, 25), who had taken a bribe
to render an iniquitous judgment, to be flayed alive, and his
skin to be stretched upon the seat on which his son was placed
to succeed him; as a lesson of justice to the latter. A similar
story is told respecting the Persian king Artaxerxês Mnêmon; and
what is still more remarkable, the same story is also recounted
in the Turkish history, as an act of Mohammed the Second (Von
Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannisch. Reichs, book xvii, vol. ii, p.
209; Diodorus, xv, 10). Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii, 6) had good
reason to treat the reality of the fact as problematical.

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis,—Daurisês, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurisês attacked the towns near the Hellespont,[547]—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and Pæsus,—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who, with another division, had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast,—the former taking Klazomenæ,[548] the latter Kymê. There remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighborhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favor of a contrary policy,[549]—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory, however, after a sharp contest, declared in favor of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers: two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, reunited after the flight, in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius, near Labranda,[550] were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate forever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians.[551] The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault Karian cities, but Herakleidês of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurisês with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honor to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Milêtus.[552]

[547] Herodot. v, 117.

[548] Herodot. v, 122-124.

[549] Herodot. v, 118. On the topography of this spot, as
described in Herodotus, see a good note in Weissenborn, Beyträge
zur genaueren Erforschung der alt. Griechischen Geschichte, p.
116, Jena, 1844.

He thinks, with much reason, that the river Marsyas here
mentioned cannot be that which flows through Kelænæ, but another
of the same name which flows into the Mæander from the southwest.

[550] About the village of Labranda and the temple of Zeus
Stratius, see Strabo, xiv, p. 659. Labranda was a village in
the territory of, and seven miles distant from, the inland town
of Mylasa; it was Karian at the time of the Ionic revolt, but
partially Hellenized before the year 350 B. C. About this latter
epoch, three rural tribes of Mylasa—constituting along with the
citizens of the town, the Mylasene community—were, Ταρκόνδαρα,
Ὀτώρκονδα, Λάβρανδα,—see the Inscription in Boeckh’s Collection,
No. 2695, and in Franz, Epigraphicê Græca, No. 73, p. 191. In
the Lydian language, λάβρυς is said to have signified a hatchet
(Plutarch, Quæst. Gr. c. 45, p. 314).

[551] Herodot. v, 118, 119.

[552] Herodot. v, 120, 121; vi, 25.

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milêtus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace, near the Strymon (which Histiæus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekatæus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighboring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Milêtus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered.[553] Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. And it is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekatæus,—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless, the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since, probably, no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company; but he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighboring Thracian town.[554] Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief,[555] paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras, with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained: nevertheless, it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

[553] Herodot. v, 125; Strabo, xiv, p. 635.

[554] Herodot. v, 126.

[555] Herodot. vi, 5. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι, ἄσμενοι ἀπαλλαχθέντες καὶ
Ἀρισταγόρεῳ, οὐδαμῶς ἕτοιμοι ἔσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δέκεσθαι ἐς τὴν
χώρην, οἷά τε ἐλευθερίης γευσάμενοι.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiæus of Milêtus, his father-in-law, and jointly with him the fomenter of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active coöperation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius), who are _they_?” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying: “Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner: “Master, remember the Athenians;” for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.[556]

[556] Herodot. v, 105. Ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαί μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι.
Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by
shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot. iv, 94).

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards Marathon and Salamis,—and he marks the beginning of the new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklus and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first, Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiæus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he, Histiæus, had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa. “Send me down to the spot, he asseverated, and I engage not merely to quell the revolt, and put into your hands the traitor who heads it, but also, not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia.” An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favorite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.[557] By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them.[558]

[557] Herodot. v, 107, vi, 2. Compare the advice of Bias of
Priênê to the Ionians, when the Persian conqueror Cyrus was
approaching, to found a Pan-Ionic colony in Sardinia (Herodot. i,
170): the idea started by Aristagoras has been alluded to just
above (Herodot. v, 124).

Pausanias (iv, 23, 2) puts into the mouth of Mantiklus, son of
Aristomenês, a recommendation to the Messenians, when conquered a
second time by the Spartans, to migrate to Sardinia.

[558] Herodot. v, 106, 107.

But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiæus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernês detected his evasions, and said: “I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiæus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on.”[559] Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia: he was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt. And he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia,—to prevent which translation he, Histiæus, had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the good-will of the Chians, who carried him back to Milêtus. But before he departed, he avenged himself on Artaphernês by despatching to Sardis some false letters, implicating many distinguished Persians in a conspiracy jointly with himself: these letters were so managed as to fall into the hands of the satrap himself, who became full of suspicion, and put to death several of the parties, to the great uneasiness of all around him.[560]

[559] Herodot. vi, 1. Οὕτω τοι, Ἱστίαιε, ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα
τὰ πρήγματα· τοῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα ἔῤῥαψας μὲν σὺ, ὑπεδήσατο δὲ
Ἀρισταγόρης.

[560] Herodot. vi, 2-5.

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiæus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot. Nevertheless, he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine.[561] The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice, amidst the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

[561] Herodot. vi, 5-26.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Milêtus, against which city Artaphernês had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than six hundred ships strong, coöperated on the coast.[562] To meet such a land-force in the field, being far beyond the strength of the Ionians, the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of three hundred and fifty-three ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê,—then a little island near Milêtus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing; while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teôs,—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy from Lesbos.[563]

[562] Herodot. vi, 6-9.

[563] Herodot. vi, 8.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success, therefore, were at least equal between the two; and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians,—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavoring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative.[564] And the confederates at Ladê seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans, and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

[564] Herodot. vi, 9-10.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale,—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they _were_ Athenians,—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise: each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phôkæan Dionysius,—unfortunately, the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phôkæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships; and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Ladê, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or coöperation in the hour of battle,—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty,—you will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterwards. But if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me; and I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten.”[565]

[565] Herodot. vi, 11. Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ
πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ
τούτοισι ὡς δρηπέτῃσι· νῦν ὦν ὑμέες, ἢν μὲν βούλησθε ταλαιπωρίας
ἐνδέκεσθαι, τὸ παραχρῆμα μὲν πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται, οἷοί τε δὲ ἔσεσθε,
ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους, εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι, etc.

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Ladê and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labors and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer’s sun. Such labor, new to the Ionian crews, was endured for seven successive days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: “Which of the gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phôkæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships![566] He has now got us, and is ruining us without remedy: many of us are already sick, many others are sickening; we had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer.” And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

[566] Herodot. vi, 12. Οἱ Ἴωνες, οἷα ἀπαθέες ἐόντες πόνων
τοιούτων, τετρυμένοι τε ταλαιπωρίῃσί τε καὶ ἡελίῳ, ἔλεξαν πρὸς
ἑωϋτοὺς τάδε—Τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες, τάδε ἀναπίμπλαμεν, οἵτινες
παραφρονήσαντες, καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου, ἀνδρὶ Φωκαέει
ἀλαζόνι, παρεχομένῳ νέας τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν,
etc.