Chapter X: Brest-Litovsk (1)

1

In the summer of 1917 we received information which seemed to suggest a likelihood of realising the contemplated peace with Russia. A report dated June 13, 1917, which came to me from a neutral country, ran as follows:

The Russian Press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the
following state of affairs:

At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife as
to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the Allies
and now also energetically advocated by Kerenski in speeches
throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists
under the leadership of Lenin, with their Press, are taking a
definite stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the
Mensheviks as well, _i.e._ Tscheidse's party, to which the present
Ministers Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong, is likewise opposed to
the offensive, and the lack of unanimity on this question is
threatening the unity of the party, which has only been maintained
with difficulty up to now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled
Internationalists from their trying to re-establish the old
_Internationale_, also called _Zimmerwalder_ or _Kienthaler_, and
led by Trotski, or, more properly, Bronstein, who has returned
from America, with Larin, Martow, Martynoz, etc., returned from
Switzerland, are on this point, as with regard to the entry of
Menshevik Social Democrats into the Provisional Government,
decidedly opposed to the majority of the party. And for this
reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of the Marxian Social
Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the party, as being too
little patriotic for his views and not insisting on final victory.
He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief supporters of the
Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed, after their
Press organ, the "Echinstvo" group, but is of no importance either
as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that the
official organ of the Mensheviks, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_, is
forced to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for
instance, frequent articles against the offensive.

There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the
Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is,
perhaps, the strongest of all the Russian parties, having
succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its
course--at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the
peasants' deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social
Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants'
Deputies' Council. A section of this party, and, it would seem,
the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to
any offensive. This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the
party, _Delo Naroda_ and _Zemlja i Wolja_. Only a small and
apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ _Volja
Naroda_, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for
an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group.
Kerenski's party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People's
Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food,
Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here
or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press,
as, for instance, the _Retch_, assert that Kerenski's health gives
grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time. The
official organ of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Council,
the _Isvestia_, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great
emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is
characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture,
Tschernow, to the Peasants' Congress, was interpreted as meaning
that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to
justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that
such had been his meaning.

While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question
of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined
to undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the
Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with
satisfaction or with regret. The infantry in particular are
against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among
the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery.
It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war.
These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by
success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the
revolutionary régime. For there is this to be borne in mind: that
while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property
exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all,
every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which is
constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land
question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of
the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also
that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of
the Tsar.

Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the
following details:

At the sitting on May 30 of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers'
Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3rd
Elizabethengrad Hussars is stated, according to the _Retch_ of May
1, to have given, in a speech for the offensive, the following
characteristic statement: "You all know to what extremes the
disorder at the front has reached. The infantry cut the wires
connecting them with their batteries and declare that the soldiers
will not remain _more than one month_ at the front, but will go
home."

It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from
the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority
Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the _Rabocaja
Gazeta_, May 18 and 19--this is the organ of the Mensheviks, i.e.
that of Tscheidse, Tseretelli and Skobeleff. These Entente
Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness
that the Russian army could not and would not fight for the
imperialistic aims of England and France. The state of the
transport, provisions and forage supplies, as also the danger to
the achievements of the Revolution by further war, demanded a
speedy cessation of hostilities. The English and French Socialist
delegates were said to be not altogether pleased at this state of
feeling at the front. And it was further demanded of them that
they should undertake to make known the result of their experience
in Russia on the Western front, i.e. in France. There was some
very plain speaking, too, with regard to America: representatives
from the Russian front spoke openly of America's policy of
exploitation towards Europe and the Allies. It was urged then that
an international Socialist conference should be convened at the
earliest possible moment, and supported by the English and French
majority Socialists. At one of the meetings at the front, the
French and English Socialists were given the following reply:

"Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your
Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We
will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be
Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement
between the workers of all countries for the termination of the
war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued,
prove disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude
any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims
as soon as possible."

According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether
converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case,
from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and
Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other
hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined
somewhat toward the Russian point of view.

Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the
Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at
the Russian front.

The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or
soldier at the front in the same organ, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_ for
May 26, as follows:

"The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye,
even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts),
is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it
passionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and
in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army
fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse
this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy
fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war.

The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates'
Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg
June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the
following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for
peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a
declaration with regard to the answer already received at the
beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This
congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination
for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals
with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out
between the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and
the Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of
the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an
"Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the
conflict.

With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing
seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in
connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed
report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded
later.

Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following letter, which I have given _in extenso_, as it shows faithfully my estimate of the situation at the time:

_Vienna, November 17, 1917._

MY DEAR FRIEND,--After many days, full of trouble, annoyance and
toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very
noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my
thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at
least, to forget the wretchedness of every day.

You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well
between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am
sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the
friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree.
As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out--and it does so fast
enough--all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed
strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing
my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures--I
myself am the carrion--they can scent from afar that there is
something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the
lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to
increasing existing differences--really, they are worthy of
admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine?

Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture.

And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of
those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of
political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted
because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my
influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly
negligible quantity, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly.

In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief
is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia
quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all
round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the
Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as
possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can
throw their massed forces against the West, they have no doubt of
being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly
threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to
peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of
conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after
losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as _inter
pares_--it would at least be necessary to make every endeavour in
that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he
promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes
in his forthcoming success in the West--always taking for granted,
of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace
with Russia. The Russian peace, then, _may_ prove the first step
on the way to the peace of the world.

I have during the last few days received reliable information
about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews,
with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country
that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the
most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make
peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for
they cannot carry on the war.

In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines
to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage,
the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless
unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the
third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I
_will_ treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of
his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's
period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent
Russian Government will recommence the war--and I cannot take a
Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had.

The Germans are hesitating--they do not altogether like the idea
of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons
already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the
case. The German military party--which, as everyone knows, holds
the reins of policy in Germany entirely--have, as far as I can
see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up
"something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there,
and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even
though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen
for oneself.

It is impossible to get any exact information about these
Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information
available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this:
everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture
must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and
equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only
a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The
Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly
as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like
sheep.

True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had
the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to
force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would
be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to
march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the
power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our
own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get
to Paris--and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front
is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German
military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether
illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal
grounds.

I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this
to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which
you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate
peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this
would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could
not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under
some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to
make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a
division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would
avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to
receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the
remainder is to be broken up into separate states--Czechish,
Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact
between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would
mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be
hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must
fight on, and that, moreover, _against_ Germany, which will, of
course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy.
The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the
Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to
make _Austria itself the theatre of war_. So that instead of
bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one
opponent for another and delivering up provinces hitherto
spared--such as Bohemia and Tyrol--to the fury of battle, only to
be wrecked completely in the end.

On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time, secure
peace all round, with Germany as well--a tolerable peace of mutual
understanding--always provided the German offensive turns out
successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage,
one pulls this way, another that--and we gain nothing in that
manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the
confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy,
then let him do it--_le remède sera pire que le mal_--but to be
for ever dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the
pose without carrying it out in reality--this I cannot regard as
prudent policy.

I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding;
we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain
nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the
entire structure of the Monarchy--after the fashion of the
_fédération Danubienne_ proposed in France--and I am certainly
rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the
Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I
hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the
London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into
Paris, and then the Entente _must_ utter the decisive word that
they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly
determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the
_peoples_ of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to
fight on for conquest or if they will have peace.

To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through
the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to
make peace--even at a loss--that is my plan and the hope for which
I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading"
men--with the exception of the Emperor Karl--will demand a "good"
peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of
having "spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself.

So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled.
But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in
throes and convulsions. I said so publicly some time back, in my
Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically
on all sides.

This has made a long letter after all, and it is late. _Lebe
wohl_, and let me hear from you again soon.--In friendship as of
old, yours

(Signed) CZERNIN.

With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, I will leave my diary to speak for itself. Despite many erroneous views that may appear in the following notes, and various unimportant details, I have not abbreviated it at all, since it gives, in its present form, what I believe will be a clear picture of the development.

"_December 19, 1917._--Departure from Vienna, Wednesday, 19th.

"Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party already assembled there: Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo, Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut. Field-Marshal Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden.

"I took the opportunity on the journey to give Csicserics an idea of my intentions and the tactics to be pursued. I told him that in my opinion Russia would propose a _general_ peace, and that we must of course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first steps for a general peace would be taken at Brest, and not given up for a long time. Should the Entente not accept, then at least the way would be open for a separate peace. After that I had long discussions with Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the whole day.

"_December 20, 1917._--Arrived at Brest a few minutes past five. At the station were the Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann, with some ten of his suite, also the emissary Rosenberg and Merey with my party. I greeted them on the platform, and after a few words Merey went into the train with me to tell me what had happened during the past few days. On the whole, Merey takes a not unfavourable view of the situation, and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops up, we should succeed within a reasonable time in arranging matters satisfactorily.

"At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General Hoffmann; he gave me some interesting details as to the mentality of the Russian delegates, and the nature of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I had the impression that the General combined expert knowledge and energy with a good deal of calm and ability, but also not a little Prussian brutality, whereby he had succeeded in persuading the Russians, despite opposition at first, to agree to very favourable terms of truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of Bavaria came in, and I had some talk with him on matters of no importance.

"We then went to dinner, all together, including the whole staff of nearly 100 persons. The dinner presented one of the most remarkable pictures ever seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the Prince sat the leader of the Russian delegation, a Jew called Joffe, recently liberated from Siberia; then came the generals and the other delegates. Apart from this Joffe, the most striking personality in the delegation is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign Minister, Trotski, a man named Kameneff, who, likewise liberated from prison during the Revolution, now plays a prominent part. The third delegate is Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past. Her husband is a minor official; she herself took an early part in the revolutionary movement. Twelve years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor of some Russian city, who had been condemned to death by the Socialists for his energy. She appeared before the general with a petition, holding a revolver under her petticoat. When the general began to read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him on the spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived for twelve years, at first in solitary confinement, afterwards under somewhat easier conditions; she also owes her freedom to the Revolution. This remarkable woman learned French and German in Siberia well enough to read them, though she cannot speak them, not knowing how the words should be pronounced. She is the type of the educated Russian proletariat. Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious determined set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up passionately at times. All that is taking place around her here she seems to regard with indifference. Only when mention is made of the great principles of the International Revolution does she suddenly awake, her whole expression alters; she reminds one of a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand and preparing to fall upon it and rend it.

"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war, as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end worth all it would cost. I contented myself with telling him that he must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was the way to a happier age; when he had shown this to be so, the rest of the world would be won over to his ideals. But until his theory had been proved by example he would hardly succeed in convincing people generally to adopt his views. We were ready to conclude a general peace without indemnities or annexations, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the development of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment of the Russian Government itself. We should also be willing to learn something from Russia, and if his revolution succeeded he would force Europe to follow him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there was a great deal of scepticism about, and I pointed out to him that we should not ourselves undertake any imitation of the Russian methods, and did not wish for any interference with our own internal affairs: this we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavouring to carry out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on ourselves, he had better go back home by the next train, for there could be no question of making peace. Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost imploring tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet be able to raise the revolution in your country too.'

"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage that, if the Entente persist in refusing to come to terms.

"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same time of the universal blessing of freedom--it is sheer lying.

"_December 21, 1917._--I went with all my party to lunch at noon with the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in a little bit of a palace half an hour by car from Brest. He seems to be much occupied with military matters, and is very busy.

"I spent the first night in the train, and while we were at breakfast our people moved in with the luggage to our residence. We are in a small house, where I live with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite close to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that could be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at work with my people, and in the evening there was a meeting of the delegates of the three Powers. This evening I had the first talk with Kühlmann alone, and at once declared positively that the Russians would propose a _general_ peace, and that we must accept it. Kühlmann is half disposed to take my view himself; the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand annexations or indemnities'; then, if the Entente agree, we shall have an end of all this suffering. But, alas! it is hardly likely that they will.

"_December 22, 1917._--The forenoon was devoted to the first discussion among the Allies, the principles just referred to as discussed with Kühlmann being then academically laid down. In the afternoon the first plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being opened by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Dr. Kühlmann. It was decided that the Powers should take it in turns to preside, in order of the Latin alphabet as to their names, i.e. Allemagne, Autriche, etc. Dr. Kühlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles on which he considered a future peace should be based, and the Russian delegate then went through the six main tenets already familiar from the newspapers. The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give a reply as early as possible after having discussed the matter among ourselves. These, then, were the proceedings of the first brief sitting of the peace congress.

"_December 23, 1917._--Kühlmann and I prepared our answer early. It will be generally known from the newspaper reports. It cost us much heavy work to get it done. Kühlmann is personally an advocate of general peace, but fears the influence of the military party, who do not wish to make peace until definitely victorious. But at last it is done. Then there were further difficulties with the Turks. They declared that they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately on the conclusion of peace, a proposal to which the Germans would not agree, as this would obviously mean that they would have to evacuate Poland, Courland, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany would never consent. After a hard struggle and repeated efforts, we at last succeeded in persuading the Turks to give up this demand. The second Turkish objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly declared its intention of refraining from all interference in internal affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister agreed that internal affairs in Austria-Hungary were an even more perilous sphere for Russian intrigues than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in accepting, he also could be content.

"The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the Minister of Justice, as their chief, and some of whom cannot speak German at all, some hardly any French, did not get any proper idea of the whole proceedings until later on, and postponed their decision until the 24th.

"_December 24, 1917._--Morning and afternoon, long conferences with the Bulgarians, in the course of which Kühlmann and I on the one hand and the Bulgarian representatives on the other, were engaged with considerable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded that a clause should be inserted exempting Bulgaria from the no-annexation principle, and providing that the taking over by Bulgaria of Roumanian and Serbian territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such a clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts null and void, and could not under any circumstances be agreed to. The discussion was attended with considerable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we did not give way. Kühlmann and my humble self remained perfectly firm, and told them we had no objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they could also, if they pleased, send their own answer separately to the proposal, but no further alteration would be made in the draft which we, Kühlmann and I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th, and the Bulgarian delegates wired to Sofia for fresh instructions.

"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and presumably the snub we had expected. They were very dejected, and made no further difficulty about agreeing to the common action. So the matter is settled as far as that goes.

"In the afternoon I had more trouble with the Germans. The German military party 'fear' that the Entente may, perhaps, be inclined to agree to a general peace, and could not think of ending the war in this 'unprofitable' fashion. It is intolerable to have to listen to such twaddle.

"If the great victories which the German generals are hoping for on the Western front should be realised, there will be no bounds to their demands, and the difficulty of all negotiations will be still further increased.

"_December 25, 1917._--The plenary sitting took place to-day, when we gave the Russians our answer to their peace proposals. I was presiding, and delivered the answer, and Joffe replied. _The general offer of peace is thus to be made, and we must await the result._ In order to lose no time, however, the negotiations on matters concerning Russia are being continued meanwhile. We have thus made a good step forward, and _perhaps_ got over the worst. It is impossible to say whether yesterday may not have been a decisive turning point in the history of the world.

"_December 26, 1917._--The special negotiations began at 9 A.M. The programme drawn up by Kühlmann, chiefly questions of economical matters and representation, were dealt with so rapidly and smoothly that by 11 o'clock the sitting terminated, for lack of further matter to discuss. This is perhaps a good omen. Our people are using to-day to enter the results of the discussion in a report of proceedings, as the sitting is to be continued to-morrow, when territorial questions will be brought up.

"_December 26, 1917._--I have been out for a long walk alone.

"On the way back, I met an old Jew. He was sitting in the gutter, weeping bitterly. He did not beg, did not even look at me, only wept and wept, and could not speak at first for sobs. And then he told me his story--Russian, Polish, and German, all mixed together.

"Well, he had a store--heaven knows where, but somewhere in the war zone. First came the Cossacks. They took all he had--his goats and his clothes, and everything in the place--and then they beat him. Then the Russians retired, beat him again, _en passant_ as it were, and then came the Germans. They fired his house with their guns, pulled off his boots, and beat him. Then he entered the service of the Germans, carrying water and wood, and received his food and beatings in return. But to-day he had got into trouble with them in some incomprehensible fashion; no food after that, only the beatings; and was thrown into the street.

"The beatings he referred to as something altogether natural. They were for him the natural accompaniment to any sort of action--but he could not live on beatings alone.

"I gave him what I had on me--money and cigars--told him the number of my house, and said he could come to-morrow, when I could get him a pass to go off somewhere where there were no Germans and no Russians, and try to get him a place of some sort where he would be fed and not beaten. He took the money and cigars thankfully enough; the story of the railway pass and the place he did not seem to believe. Railway travelling was for soldiers, and an existence without beatings seemed an incredible idea.

"He kept on thanking me till I was out of sight, waving his hand, and thanking me in his German-Russian gibberish.

"A terrible thing is war. Terrible at all times, but worst of all in one's own country. We at home suffer hunger and cold, but at least we have been spared up to now the presence of the enemy hordes.

"This is a curious place--melancholy, yet with a beauty of its own. An endless flat, with just a slight swelling of the ground, like an ocean set fast, wave behind wave as far as the eye can see. And all things grey, dead grey, to where this dead sea meets the grey horizon. Clouds race across the sky, the wind lashing them on.

"This evening, before supper, Hoffmann informed the Russians of the German plans with regard to the outer provinces. The position is this: As long as the war in the West continues, the Germans cannot evacuate Courland and Lithuania, since, apart from the fact that they must be held as security for the general peace negotiations, these countries form part of the German munition establishment. The railway material, the factories, and, most of all, the grain are indispensable as long as the war lasts. That they cannot now withdraw from there at once is clear enough. If peace is signed, then the self-determination of the people in the occupied territory will decide. But here arises the great difficulty: how this right of self-determination is to be exercised.

"The Russians naturally do not want the vote to be taken while the German bayonets are still in the country, and the Germans reply that the unexampled terrorism of the Bolsheviks would falsify any election result, since the 'bourgeois,' according to Bolshevist ideas, are not human beings at all. My idea of having the proceedings controlled by a _neutral_ Power was not altogether acceptable to anyone. During the war no neutral Power would undertake the task, and the German occupation could not be allowed to last until the ultimate end. In point of fact, both sides are afraid of terrorisation by the opposing party, and each wishes to apply the same itself.

"_December 26, 1917._--There is no hurry apparently in this place. Now it is the Turks who are not ready, now the Bulgarians, then it is the Russians' turn--and the sitting is again postponed or broken off almost as soon as commenced.

"I am reading some memoirs from the French Revolution. A most appropriate reading at the present time, in view of what is happening in Russia and may perhaps come throughout Europe. There were no Bolsheviks then, but men who tyrannised the world under the battle-cry of freedom were to be found in Paris then as well as now in St. Petersburg. Charlotte Corday said: 'It was not a man, but a wild beast I killed.' These Bolsheviks in their turn will disappear, and who can say if there will be a Corday ready for Trotski?

"Joffe told me about the Tsar and his family, and the state of things said to exist there. He spoke with great respect of Nicolai Nicolaievitch as a thorough man, full of energy and courage, one to be respected even as an enemy. The Tsar, on the other hand, he considered cowardly, false, and despicable. It was a proof of the incapacity of the bourgeois that they had tolerated such a Tsar. Monarchs were all of them more or less degenerate; he could not understand how anyone could accept a form of government which involved the risk of having a degenerate ruler. I answered him as to this, that a monarchy had first of all one advantage, that there was at least one place in the state beyond the sphere of personal ambition and intrigues, and as to degeneration, that was often a matter of opinion: there were also degenerates to be found among the uncrowned rulers of states. Joffe considered that there would be no such risk when the people could choose for themselves. I pointed out that Hr. Lenin, for instance, had not been 'chosen,' and I considered it doubtful whether an impartial election would have brought him into power. Possibly there might be some in Russia who would consider him also degenerate.

"_December 27, 1917._--The Russians are in despair, and some of them even talked of withdrawing altogether. They had thought the Germans would renounce all occupied territory without further parley, or hand it over to the Bolsheviks. Long sittings between the Russians, Kühlmann, and myself, part of the time with Hoffmann. I drew up the following:--

"1. As long as general peace is not yet declared, we cannot give up the occupied areas; they form part of our great munition works (factories, railways, sites with buildings, etc.).

"2. After the general peace, a plebiscite in Poland, Courland, and Lithuania is to decide the fate of the people there; as to the form in which the vote is to be taken, this remains to be further discussed, in order that the Russians may have surety that no coercion is used. Apparently, this suits neither party. Situation much worse.

"_Afternoon._--Matters still getting worse. Furious wire from Hindenburg about "renunciation" of everything; Ludendorff telephoning every minute; more furious outbursts, Hoffmann very excited, Kühlmann true to his name and 'cool' as ever. The Russians declare they cannot accept the vague formulas of the Germans with regard to freedom of choice.

"I told Kühlmann and Hoffmann I would go as far as possible with them; but should their endeavours fail, then I would enter into separate negotiations with the Russians, since Berlin and Petersburg were really both opposed to an uninfluenced vote. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, desired nothing but final peace. Kühlmann understands my position, and says he himself would rather _go_ than let it fail. Asked me to give him my point of view in writing, as it 'would strengthen his position.' Have done so. He has telegraphed it to the Kaiser.

"_Evening._--Kühlmann believes matters will be settled--or broken off altogether--by to-morrow.

"_December 28, 1917._--General feeling, dull. Fresh outbursts of violence from Kreuznach. But at noon a wire from Bussche: Hertling had spoken with the Kaiser, who is perfectly satisfied. Kühlmann said to me: 'The Kaiser is the only sensible man in the whole of Germany.'

"We have at last agreed about the form of the committee; that is, a committee _ad hoc_ is to be formed in Brest, to work out a plan for the evacuation and voting in detail. _Tant bien que mal_, a provisional expedient. All home to report; next sitting to be held January 5, 1918.

"Russians again somewhat more cheerful.

"This evening at dinner I rose to express thanks on the part of the Russians and the four Allies to Prince Leopold. He answered at once, and very neatly, but told me immediately afterwards that I had taken him by surprise. As a matter of fact, I had been taken by surprise myself; no notice had been given; it was only during the dinner itself that the Germans asked me to speak.

"Left at 10 P.M. for Vienna.

"From the 29th to the morning of the 3rd I was in Vienna. Two long audiences with the Emperor gave me the opportunity of telling him what had passed at Brest. He fully approves, of course, the point of view that peace must be made, if at all possible.

"I have dispatched a trustworthy agent to the outer provinces in order to ascertain the exact state of feeling there. He reports that _all_ are against the Bolsheviks except the Bolsheviks themselves. The entire body of citizens, peasants--in a word, everyone with any possessions at all--trembles at the thought of these red robbers, and wishes to go over to Germany. The terrorism of Lenin is said to be indescribable, and in Petersburg all are absolutely _longing_ for the entry of the German troops to deliver them.

"_January 3, 1918._--Return to Brest.

"On the way, at 6 P.M., I received, at a station, the following telegram, in code, from Baron Gautsch, who had remained at Brest:

"'Russian delegation received following telegram from Petersburg
this morning: To General Hoffmann. For the representatives of the
German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish delegations. The
Government of the Russian Republic considers it necessary to carry
on the further negotiations on neutral ground, and proposes
removing to Stockholm. Regarding attitude to the proposals as
formulated by the German and Austro-Hungarian delegation in Points
1 and 2, the Government of the Russian Republic and the
Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of
Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies consider, in entire
agreement with the view expressed by our delegation, that the
proposals are contrary to the principle of national
self-determination, even in the restricted form in which it
appears in Point 3 of the reply given by the Four Powers on the
12th ult. President of the Russian Delegation, A. Joffe." Major
Brinkmann has communicated this by telephone to the German
delegation, already on the way here. Herr von Kühlmann has sent a
telephone message in return that he is continuing the journey, and
will arrive at Brest this evening.'

"I also went on of course, considering this manoeuvre on the part of the Russians as rather in the nature of bluffing. If they do not come, then we can treat with the Ukrainians, who should be in Brest by now.

"In Vienna I saw, among politicians, Baernreither, Hauser, Wekerle, Seidler, and some few others. The opinion of almost all may be summed up as follows: 'Peace _must_ be arranged, but a separate peace without Germany is _impossible_.'

"No one has told me how I am to manage it if neither Germany nor Russia will listen to reason.

"_January 4, 1918._--Fearful snowstorm in the night; the heating apparatus in the train was frozen, and the journey consequently far from pleasant. On awaking early at Brest the trains of the Bulgarians and Turks were standing on adjacent sidings. Weather magnificent now: cold, and the air as at St. Moritz. I went across to Kühlmann, had breakfast with him, and talked over events in Berlin. There seems to have been desperate excitement there. Kühlmann suggested to Ludendorff that he should come to Brest himself and take part in the negotiations. After long discussion, however, it appeared that Ludendorff himself was not quite clear as to what he wanted, and declared spontaneously that he considered it superfluous for him to go to Brest; he would, at best, 'only spoil things if he did.' Heaven grant the man such gleams of insight again, and often! It seems as if the whole trouble is more due to feeling against Kühlmann than to anything in the questions at issue; people do not want the world to have the impression that the peace was gained by 'adroit diplomacy,' but by military success alone. General Hoffmann appears to have been received with marked favour by the Kaiser, and both he and Kühlmann declare themselves well satisfied with the results of their journey.

"We talked over the reply to the Petersburg telegram, declining a conference in Stockholm, and further tactics to be followed in case of need. We agreed that if the Russians did not come, we must declare the armistice at an end, and chance what the Petersburgers would say to that. On this point Kühlmann and I were entirely agreed. Nevertheless, the feeling, both in our party and in that of the Germans, was not a little depressed. Certainly, if the Russians do break off negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant position. The only way to save the situation is by acting quickly and energetically with the Ukrainian delegation, and we therefore commenced this work on the afternoon of the same day. There is thus at least a hope that we may be able to arrive at positive results with them within reasonable time.

"In the evening, after dinner, came a wire from Petersburg announcing the arrival of the delegation, including the Foreign Minister, Trotski. It was interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at the news; not until this sudden and violent outbreak of satisfaction was it fully apparent how seriously they had been affected by the thought that the Russians would not come. Undoubtedly this is a great step forward, and we all feel that peace is really now on the way.

"_January 5, 1918._--At seven this morning a few of us went out shooting with Prince Leopold of Bavaria. We went for a distance of 20 to 30 kilometres by train, and then in open automobiles to a magnificent primeval forest extending over two to three hundred square kilometres. Weather very cold, but fine, much snow, and pleasant company. From the point of view of sport, it was poorer than one could have expected. One of the Prince's aides stuck a pig, another shot two hares, and that was all. Back at 6 P.M.

"_January 6, 1918._--To-day we had the first discussions with the Ukrainian delegates, all of whom were present except the leader. The Ukrainians are very different from the Russian delegates. Far less revolutionary, and with far more interest in their own country, less in the progress of Socialism generally. They do not really care about Russia at all, but think only of the Ukraine, and their efforts are solely directed towards attaining their own independence as soon as possible. Whether that independence is to be complete and international, or only as within the bounds of a Russian federative state, they do not seem quite to know themselves. Evidently, the very intelligent Ukrainian delegates intended to use us as a springboard from which they themselves could spring upon the Bolsheviks. Their idea was that we should acknowledge their independence, and then, with this as a _fait accompli_, they could face the Bolsheviks and force them to recognise their equal standing and treat with them on that basis. Our line of policy, however, must be either to bring over the Ukrainians to our peace basis, or else to drive a wedge between them and the Petersburgers. As to their desire for independence, we declared ourselves willing to recognise this, provided the Ukrainians on their part would agree to the following three points: 1. The negotiations to be concluded at Brest-Litovsk and not at Stockholm. 2. Recognition of the former political frontier between Austria-Hungary and Ukraine. 3. Non-interference of any one state in the internal affairs of another. Characteristically enough, no answer has yet been received to this proposal!

"_January 7, 1918._--This forenoon, all the Russians arrived, under the leadership of Trotski. They at once sent a message asking to be excused for not appearing at meals with the rest for the future. At other times also we see nothing of them. The wind seems to be in a very different quarter now from what it was. The German officer who accompanied the Russian delegation from Dunaburg, Captain Baron Lamezan, gave us some interesting details as to this. In the first place, he declared that the trenches in front of Dunaburg are entirely deserted, and save for an outpost or so there were no Russians there at all; also, that at many stations delegates were waiting for the deputation to pass, in order to demand that peace should be made. Trotski had throughout answered them with polite and careful speeches, but grew ever more and more depressed. Baron Lamezan had the impression that the Russians were altogether desperate now, having no choice save between going back with a bad peace or with no peace at all; in either case with the same result: that they would be swept away. Kühlmann said: 'Ils n'ont que le choix à quelle sauce ils se feront manger.' I answered: 'Tout comme chez nous.'

"A wire has just come in reporting demonstrations in Budapest against Germany. The windows of the German Consulate were broken, a clear indication of the state of feeling which would arise if the peace were to be lost through our demands.

"_January 8, 1918._--The Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, arrived during the night, and has just been to call on me. He seems emphatically in favour of making peace; but I fancy he would like, in case of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into the foreground and keep out of the way himself. Talaat Pasha is one of the cleverest heads among the Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of them all.

"Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the telegraph service, and was on the revolutionary committee. In his official capacity, he got hold of a telegram from the Government which showed him that the revolutionary movement would be discovered and the game be lost unless immediate action were taken. He suppressed the message, warned the revolutionary committee, and persuaded them to start their work at once. The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and Talaat was made Minister of the Interior. With iron energy he then turned his attention to the suppression of the opposing movement. Later, he became Grand Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha, the will and power of Turkey.

"This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads of the allied delegations and the Russian. Afterwards, plenary sitting.

"The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are still not ready with their preparations. Late in the evening I had a conversation with Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics. I said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany's breaking off the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a free hand. Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially Kühlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow the negotiations to prove fruitless. As to details, we agreed to demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form of an ultimatum.

"_January 9, 1918._--Acting on the principle that attack is the best defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum.