Chapter X: Brest-Litovsk (2)

"Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered state of affairs called for new resolutions. The removal of the conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us, for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the start--to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take the lead--would infallibly have taken place. We must now wait to see what to-morrow brings: either a victory or the final termination of the negotiations.

"Adler said to me in Vienna: 'You will certainly get on all right with Trotski,' and when I asked him why he thought so, he answered: 'Well, you and I get on quite well together, you know.'

"I think, after all, the clever old man failed to appreciate the situation there. These Bolsheviks have no longer anything in common with Adler; they are brutal tyrants, autocrats of the worst kind, a disgrace to the name of freedom.

"Trotski is undoubtedly an interesting, clever fellow, and a very dangerous adversary. He is quite exceptionally gifted as a speaker, with a swiftness and adroitness in retort which I have rarely seen, and has, moreover, all the insolent boldness of his race.

"_January 10, 1918._--The sitting has just taken place. Trotski made a great and, in its way, really fine speech, calculated for the whole of Europe, in which he gave way entirely. He accepts, he says, the German-Austria 'ultimatum,' and will remain in Brest-Litovsk, as he will not give us the satisfaction of being able to blame Russia for the continuance of the war.

"Following on Trotski's speech, the Committee was at once formed to deal with the difficult questions of territory. I insisted on being on the Committee myself, wishing to follow throughout the progress of these important negotiations. This was not an easy matter really, as the questions involved, strictly speaking, concern only Courland and Lithuania, i.e., they are not our business, but Germany's alone.

"In the evening I had another long talk with Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in the course of which the General and the Secretary of State came to high words between themselves. Hoffmann, elated at the success of our ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same fashion and 'give the Russians another touch of the whip.' Kühlmann and I took the opposite view, and insisted that proceedings should be commenced quietly, confining ourselves to the matters in hand, clearing up point by point as we went on, and putting all doubtful questions aside. Once we had got so far, in clearing up things generally, we could then take that which remained together, and possibly get telegraphic instructions from the two Emperors for dealing therewith. This is undoubtedly the surest way to avoid disaster and a fresh breach.

"A new conflict has cropped up with the Ukrainians. They now demand recognition of their independence, and declare they will leave if this is not conceded.

"Adler told me at Vienna that Trotski had his library, by which he set great store, somewhere in Vienna, with a Herr Bauer, I fancy. I told Trotski that I would arrange to have the books forwarded to him, if he cared about it. I then recommended to his consideration certain prisoners of war, as L. K. and W., all of whom are said to have been very badly treated. Trotski noted the point, declared that he was strongly opposed to ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and promised to look into the matter; he wished to point out, however, that in so doing he was not in the least influenced by the thought of his library; he would in any case have considered my request. He would be glad to have the books.

"_January 11, 1918._--Forenoon and afternoon, long sittings of the Committee on territorial questions. Our side is represented by Kühlmann, Hoffmann, Rosenberg, and a secretary, in addition to myself, Csicserics, Wiesner, and Colloredo. The Russians are all present, but without the Ukrainians. I told Kühlmann that I only proposed to attend as a second, seeing that the German interests were incomparably more affected than our own. I only interpose now and again.

"Trotski made a tactical blunder this afternoon. In a speech rising to violence, he declared that we were playing false; we aimed at annexations, and were simply trying to cover them with the cloak of self-determination. He would never agree to this, and would rather break off altogether than continue in that way. If we were honest, we should allow representatives from Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to come to Brest, and there express their views without being influenced in any way by ourselves. Now it should here be noted that from the commencement of the negotiations it has been a point of conflict whether the legislative bodies at present existing in the occupied territories are justified in speaking in the name of their respective peoples, or not. We affirm that they are; the Russians maintain they are not. We at once accepted Trotski's proposal, that representatives of these countries should be called, but added that, when we agreed to accept their testimony, then their judgment if in our favour should be taken as valid.

"It was characteristic to see how gladly Trotski would have taken back what he had said. But he kept his countenance, fell in with the new situation at once, and requested that the sitting be adjourned for twenty-four hours, as our reply was of such far-reaching importance that he must confer with his colleagues on the matter. I hope Trotski will make no difficulty now. If the Poles could be called, it would be an advantage. The awkward thing about it is that Germany, too, would rather be without them, knowing the anti-Prussian feeling that exists among the Poles.

"_January 12, 1918._--Radek has had a scene with the German chauffeur, which led to something more. General Hoffmann had placed cars at the disposal of the Russians in case they cared to drive out. On this occasion it happened that the chauffeur was not there at the proper time, and Radek flew into a rage with the man and abused him violently. The chauffeur complained, and Hoffmann took his part. Trotski seems to consider Hoffmann's action correct, and has _forbidden_ the entire delegation to go out any more. That settled them. And serve them right.

"No one ventured to protest. They have indeed a holy fear of Trotski. At the sittings, too, none of them dare to speak while he is there.

"_January 12, 1918._--Hoffmann has made his unfortunate speech. He has been working at it for days, and was very proud of the result. Kühlmann and I did not conceal from him that he gained nothing by it beyond exciting the people at home against us. This made a certain impression on him, but it was soon effaced by Ludendorff's congratulations, which followed promptly. Anyhow, it has rendered the situation more difficult, and there was certainly no need for that.

"_January 15, 1918._--I had a letter to-day from one of our mayors at home, calling my attention to the fact that disaster due to lack of foodstuffs is now imminent.

"I immediately telegraphed the Emperor as follows:

"'I have just received a letter from Statthalter N.N. which
justifies all the fears I have constantly repeated to Your
Majesty, and shows that in the question of food supply we are on
the very verge of a catastrophe. The situation _arising out of the
carelessness and incapacity of the Ministers_ is terrible, and I
fear it is already too late to check the total collapse which is
to be expected in the next few weeks. My informant writes: "Only
small quantities are now being received from Hungary, from
Roumania only 10,000 wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease
of at least 30,000 wagons of grain, without which we must
infallibly perish. On learning the state of affairs, I went to the
Prime Minister to speak with him about it. I told him, as is the
case, that in a few weeks our war industries, our railway traffic,
would be at a standstill, the provisioning of the army would be
impossible, it must break down, and that would mean the collapse
of Austria and therewith also of Hungary. To each of these points
he answered yes, that is so, and added that all was being done to
alter the state of affairs, especially as regards the Hungarian
deliveries. But no one, not even His Majesty, has been able to get
anything done. We can only hope that some _deus ex machina_ may
intervene to save us from the worst.'"

"To this I added:

"'I can find no words to describe properly the apathetic attitude
of Seidler. How often and how earnestly have I not implored Your
Majesty to intervene forcibly for once and _compel_ Seidler, on
the one hand, and Hadik, on the other, to set these things in
order. Even from here I have written entreating Your Majesty to
act while there was yet time. But all in vain.'

"I then pointed out that the only way of meeting the situation would be to secure temporary assistance from Germany, and then to requisition by force the stocks that were doubtless still available in Hungary; finally, I begged the Emperor to inform the Austrian Prime Minister of my telegram.

"_January 16, 1918._--Despairing appeals from Vienna for food supplies. Would I apply at once to Berlin for aid, otherwise disaster imminent. I replied to General Landwehr as follows:

"'Dr. Kühlmann is telegraphing to Berlin, but has little hope of
success. The only hope now is for His Majesty to do as I have
advised, and send an urgent wire at once to Kaiser Wilhelm. On my
return I propose to put before His Majesty my point of view, that
it is impossible to carry on the foreign policy if the food
question at home is allowed to come to such a state as now.

"'Only a few weeks back your Excellency declared most positively
that we could hold out till the new harvest.'

"At the same time I wired the Emperor:

"'Telegrams arriving show the situation becoming critical for us.
Regarding question of food, we can only avoid collapse on two
conditions: first, that Germany helps us temporarily, second, that
we use this respite to set in order our machinery of food supply,
which is at present beneath contempt, and to gain possession of
the stocks still existing in Hungary.

"'I have just explained the entire situation to Dr. Kühlmann, and
he is telegraphing to Berlin. He, however, is not at all sanguine,
as Germany is itself in straitened circumstances. I think the only
way to secure any success from this step would be for Your Majesty
to send at once, through military means, a Hughes telegram to
Kaiser Wilhelm direct, urgently entreating him to intervene
himself, and by securing us a supply of grain prevent the outbreak
of revolution, which would otherwise be inevitable. I must,
however, emphatically point out that the commencement of unrest
among our people at home will have rendered conclusion of peace
here absolutely impossible. As soon as the Russian representatives
perceive that we ourselves are on the point of revolution, they
will not make peace at all, since their entire speculation is
based on this factor.'

"_January 17, 1918._--Bad news from Vienna and environs: serious strike movement, due to the reduction of the flour rations and the tardy progress of the Brest negotiations. The weakness of the Vienna Ministry seems to be past all understanding.

"I have telegraphed to Vienna that I hope in time to secure some supplies from the Ukraine, if only we can manage to keep matters quiet at home for the next few weeks, and I have begged the gentlemen in question to do their utmost not to wreck the peace here. On the same day, in the evening, I telegraphed to Dr. von Seidler, the Prime Minister:

"'I very greatly regret my inability to counteract the effect of
all the errors made by those entrusted with the food resources.

"'Germany declares categorically that it is unable to help us,
having insufficient for itself.

"'Had your Excellency or your department called attention to the
state of things _in time_, it might still have been possible to
procure supplies from Roumania. As things are now, I can see no
other way than that of brute force, by requisitioning Hungarian
grain for the time being, and forwarding it to Austria, until the
Roumanian, and it is to be hoped also Ukrainian, supplies can come
to hand.'

"_January 20, 1918._--The negotiations have now come to this: that Trotski declares his intention of laying the German proposals before Petersburg, though he cannot accept them himself; he undertakes, in any case, to return here. As to calling in representatives from the outer provinces, he will only do this provided he is allowed to choose them. We cannot agree to this. With the Ukrainians, who, despite their youth, are showing themselves quite sufficiently grown to profit by the situation, negotiations are proceeding but slowly. First they demanded East Galicia for the new 'Ukrainia.' This could not be entertained for a moment. Then they grew more modest, but since the outbreak of trouble at home among ourselves they realise our position, and know that we _must_ make peace in order to get corn. Now they demand a separate position for East Galicia. The question will have to be decided in Vienna, and the Austrian Ministry will have the final word.

"Seidler and Landwehr again declare by telegram that without supplies of grain from Ukraine the catastrophe is imminent. There _are_ supplies in the Ukraine; if we can get them, the worst may be avoided.

"The position now is this: Without help from outside, we shall, according to Seidler, have thousands perishing in a few weeks. Germany and Hungary are no longer sending anything. All messages state that there is a great surplus in Ukraine. The question is only whether we can get it in time. I hope we may. But if we do not make peace _soon_, then the troubles at home will be repeated, and each demonstration in Vienna will render peace here most costly to obtain, for Messrs. Sewrjuk and Lewicky can read the degree of our state of famine at home from these troubles as by a thermometer. If only the people who create these disturbances know how they are by that very fact increasing the difficulty of procuring supplies from Ukraine! And we were all but finished!

"The question of East Galicia I will leave to the Austrian Ministry; it must be decided in Vienna. I cannot, and dare not, look on and see hundreds of thousands starve for the sake of retaining the sympathy of the Poles, so long as there is a possibility of help.

"_January 21, 1918._--Back to Vienna. The impression of the troubles here is even greater than I thought, and the effect disastrous. The Ukrainians no longer treat with us: they _dictate_!

"On the way, reading through old reports, I came upon the notes relating to the discussions with Michaelis on August 1. According to these, Under-Secretary of State von Stumm said at the time:

"'The Foreign Ministry was in communication with the Ukrainians, and the separatist movement in Ukrainia was very strong. In furtherance of their movement, the Ukrainians demanded the assurance that they should be allowed to unite with the Government of Cholm, and with the areas of East Galicia occupied by Ukrainians. So long as Galicia belongs to Austria, the demand for East Galicia cannot be conceded. It would be another matter if Galicia were united with Poland; then a cession of East Galicia might be possible.'

"It would seem that the unpleasant case had long since been prejudged by the Germans.

"On January 22 the Council was held which was to determine the issue of the Ukrainian question. The Emperor opened the proceedings, and then called on me to speak. I described first of all the difficulties that lay in the way of a peace with Petersburg, which will be apparent from the foregoing entries in this diary. I expressed my doubt as to whether our group would succeed in concluding general peace with Petersburg. I then sketched the course of the negotiations with the Ukrainians. I reported that the Ukrainians had originally demanded the cession of East Galicia, but that I had refused this. With regard to the Ruthenian districts of Hungary also they had made demands which had been refused by me. At present, they demanded the division of Galicia into two parts, and the formation of an independent Austrian province from East Galicia and Bukovina. I pointed out the serious consequences which the acceptance of the Ukrainian demands would have upon the further development of the Austro-Polish question. The concessions made by the Ukrainians on their part were to consist in the inclusion in the peace treaty of a commercial agreement which should enable us to cover our immediate needs in the matter of grain supplies. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary would insist on full reciprocity for the Poles resident in Ukraine.

"I pointed out emphatically that I considered it my duty to state the position of the peace negotiations; that the decision could not lie with me, but with the Ministry as a whole, in particular with the Austrian Prime Minister. The Austrian Government would have to decide whether these sacrifices could be made or not, and here I could leave them in no doubt that if we declined the Ukrainian demands we should probably come to no result with that country, and should thus be compelled to return from Brest-Litovsk without having achieved any peace settlement at all.

"When I had finished, the Prime Minister, Dr. von Seidler, rose to speak. He pointed out first of all the necessity of an immediate peace, and then discussed the question of establishing a Ukrainian crown land, especially from the parliamentary point of view. Seidler believed that despite the active opposition which was to be expected from the Poles, he would still have a majority of two-thirds in the House for the acceptance of the bill on the subject. He was not blind to the fact that arrangement would give rise to violent parliamentary conflicts, but repeated his hope that a two-thirds majority could be obtained despite the opposition of the Polish Delegation. After Seidler came the Hungarian Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle. He was particularly pleased to note that no concessions had been made to the Ukrainians with regard to the Ruthenians resident in Hungary. A clear division of the nationalities in Hungary was impracticable. The Hungarian Ruthenians were also at too low a stage of culture to enable them to be given national independence. Dr. Wekerle also laid stress on the danger, alike in Austria, of allowing any interference from without; the risk of any such proceeding would be very great, we should find ourselves on a downward grade by so doing, and we must hold firmly to the principle that no interference in the affairs of the Monarchy from without could be tolerated. In summing up, however, Wekerle opposed the point of view of the Austrian Prime Minister.

"I then rose again to speak, and declared that I was perfectly aware of the eminent importance and perilous aspects of this step. It was true that it would bring us on to a down-grade, but from all appearances, we had been in that position already for a long time, owing to the war, and could not say how far it might lead us. I put the positive question to Dr. Wekerle, what was a responsible leader of our foreign policy to do when the Austrian Prime Minister and both the Ministers of Food unanimously declared that the Hungarian supplies would only suffice to help us over the next two months, after which time a collapse would be absolutely unavoidable, unless we could secure assistance from somewhere in the way of corn? On being interrupted here by a dissentient observation from Dr. Wekerle, I told him that if he, Wekerle, could bring corn into Austria I should be the first to support his point of view, and that with pleasure, but so long as he stood by his categorical denial, and insisted on his inability to help us, we were in the position of a man on the third floor of a burning house who jumps out of the window to save himself. A man in such a situation would not stop to think whether he risked breaking his legs or not; he would prefer the risk of death to the certainty of the same. If the position really were as stated, that in a couple of months we should be altogether without food supplies, then we must take the consequences of such a position. Dr. von Seidler here once more took up the discussion, and declared himself entirely in agreement with my remarks.

"During the further course of the debate, the probability of a definitive failure of the Austro-Polish solution in connection with the Ukrainian peace was discussed, and the question was raised as to what new constellation would arise out of such failure. Sektionschef Dr. Gratz then took up this question. Dr. Gratz pointed out that the Austro-Polish solution must fail even without acceptance of the Ukrainian demands, since the German postulates rendered solution impossible. The Germans demanded, apart from quite enormous territorial reductions of Congress-Poland, the restriction of Polish industry, part possession of the Polish railways and State domains, as well as the imposition of part of the costs of war upon the Poles. We could not attach ourselves to a Poland thus weakened, hardly, indeed, capable of living at all, and necessarily highly dissatisfied with its position. Dr. Gratz maintained that it would be wiser to come back to the programme already discussed in general form; the project, by which United Poland should be left to Germany, and the attachment of Roumania to the Monarchy in consequence. Dr. Gratz went at length into the details of this point of view. The Emperor then summed up the essence of the opinions expressed to-day as indicating that it was primarily necessary to make peace with Petersburg and the Ukrainians, and that negotiations should be entered upon with Ukrainia as to the division of Galicia. The question as to whether the Austro-Polish solution should be definitely allowed to drop was not finally settled, but shelved for the time being.

"In conclusion, Dr. Burian, the Minister of Finance, rose to speak, and pointed out, as Dr. Wekerle had done, the danger of the Austrian standpoint. Burian declared that, while the war might doubtless change the internal structure of the Monarchy, such alteration must be made from within, not from without, if it were to be of any benefit to the Monarchy at all. He further pointed out that if the Austrian principle of the division of Galicia were to be carried through, the _form_ of so doing would be of great importance. Baron Burian advised that a clause referring to this should be inserted, not in the instrument of peace itself, but in a secret annexe. This form was, in his, Burian's, view, the only possible means of diminishing the serious consequences of the steps which the Austrian Government wished to take."

Thus the notes in my diary relative to this Council. The Austrian Government was thus not only agreed as to the proposed arrangement with the Ukraine; it was indeed at the direct wish of the Government, by its instigation and on its responsibility, that it was brought about.

"_January 28, 1918._--Reached Brest this evening.

"_January 29, 1918._--Trotski arrived.

"_January 30, 1918._--The first plenary session has been held. There is no doubt that the revolutionary happenings in Austria and in Germany have enormously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a general convulsion, and it seems to me altogether out of the question now to come to any peace terms with the Russians. It is evident among the Russians themselves that they positively expect the outbreak of a world-revolution within the next few weeks, and their tactics now are simply to gain time and wait for this to happen. The conference was not marked by any particular event, only pin-pricks between Kühlmann and Trotski. To-day is the first sitting of the Committee on territorial questions, where I am to preside, and deal with our territorial affairs.

"The only interesting point about the new constellation seems to be that the relations between Petersburg and Kieff are considerably worse than before, and the Kieff Committee is no longer recognised at all by the Bolsheviks as independent.

"_February 1, 1918._--Sitting of the Territorial Committee, I myself presiding, with the Petersburg Russians. My plan is to play the Petersburgers and the Ukrainians one against the other, and manage at least to make peace with one of the two parties. I have still some slight hope that a peace with one may so affect the other that possibly peace with both may be attained.

"As was to be expected, Trotski replied to my question, whether he admitted that the Ukrainians should treat with us alone on questions dealing with their frontiers, with an emphatic denial. I then, after some exchange of words, proposed that the sitting be adjourned, and a plenary sitting convened, in order that the matter might be dealt with by the Kieff and Petersburg parties together.

"_February 2, 1918._--I have tried to get the Ukrainians to talk over things openly with the Russians, and succeeded almost too well. The insults hurled by the Ukrainians to-day against the Russians were simply grotesque, and showed what a gulf is fixed between these two Governments, and that it is not our fault that we have not been able to bring them together under one hat on the question of peace. Trotski was so upset it was painful to see. Perfectly pale, he stared fixedly before him, drawing nervously on his blotting paper. Heavy drops of sweat trickled down his forehead. Evidently he felt deeply the disgrace of being abused by his fellow-citizens in the presence of the enemy.

"The two brothers Richthofen were here a little while ago. The elder has shot down some sixty, the younger 'only' some thirty enemy airmen. The elder's face is like that of a young and pretty girl. He told me 'how the thing is done.' It is very simple. Only get as near to the enemy as possible, from behind, and then keep on shooting, when the other man would fall. The one thing needful was to 'get over your own fright,' and not be shy of getting quite close to your opponent.--Modern heroes.

"Two charming stories were told about these two brothers. The English had put a price on the head of the elder Richthofen. When he learned of this, he sent down broadsheets informing them that to make matters easier for them, he would from the following day have his machine painted bright red. Next morning, going to the shed, he found all the machines there painted bright red. One for all and all for one.

"The other story is this: Richthofen and an English airman were circling round each other and firing furiously. They came closer and closer, and soon they could distinctly see each other's faces. Suddenly something went wrong with Richthofen's machine-gun, and he could not shoot. The Englishman looked across in surprise, and seeing what was wrong, waved his hand, turned and flew off. Fair play! I should like to meet that Englishman, only to tell him that he is greater, to my mind, than the heroes of old.

"_February 3, 1918._--Started for Berlin. Kühlmann, Hoffmann, Colloredo.

"_February 4, 1918._--Arrived Berlin. Nothing this afternoon, as the Germans are holding council among themselves.

"_February 5, 1918._--Sitting all day. I had several violent passages of arms with Ludendorff. Matters seemed to be clearing up, though this is not yet altogether done. Apart from deciding on our tactics for Brest, we have at last to set down _in writing_ that we are only obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of Germany. Ludendorff was violently opposed to this, and said, 'If Germany makes peace without profit, then Germany has lost the war.'

"The controversy was growing more and more heated, when Hertling nudged me and whispered: 'Leave him alone, we two will manage it together without him.'

"I am now going to work out the draft at once and send it in to Hertling.

"Supper this evening at Höhenlohe.

"_February 6, 1918._--Arrived Brest this evening. Wiesner has been at it untiringly and done excellent work; the situation, too, is easier now. The leader of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part his Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest, speaks nationally, far more chauvinistically than when I thought I knew him in Vienna, and we have at last agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands. I gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish with the Ukrainians as soon as possible. I could then in the name of Germany commence negotiations with Trotski, and try if I could not get speech with him privately, and find out whether any agreement were possible or not. It is Gratz's idea. After some opposition we agreed.

"_February 7, 1918._--My conversation with Trotski took place. I took Gratz with me; he has far exceeded all my expectations of him. I began by telling Trotski that a breach of the regulations and a resumption of hostilities were imminent, and wished to know if this could not be avoided before the fatal step were definitely taken. I therefore begged Herr Trotski to inform me openly and without reserve what conditions he would accept. Trotski then declared very frankly and clearly that he was not so simple as we appeared to think, that he knew well enough force was the strongest of all arguments, and that the Central Powers were quite capable of taking away the Russian provinces. He had several times tried to bridge a way for Kühlmann during the conference, telling him it was not a question of the right of self-determination of the peoples in the occupied districts, but of sheer brutal annexation, and that he must give way to force. He would never relinquish his principles, and would never give his consent to this interpretation of the right of self-determination. The Germans must say straight out what were the boundaries they demanded, and he would then make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexation and nothing else, but that Russia was too weak to oppose it. Only the Moon Sound Islands seemed to be more than he could swallow. Secondly, and this is very characteristic, Trotski said he could never agree to our making peace with the Ukraine, since the Ukraine was no longer in the hands of its Rada, but in the hands of his troops. It was a part of Russia, and to make peace with it would be interfering in the internal affairs of Russia itself. The fact of the matter seems to be that about nineteen days ago the Russian troops really did enter Kieff, but were subsequently driven out, the Rada once more coming into power as before. Whether Trotski was unaware of this latter development or purposely concealed the truth I cannot say for certain, but it seems as if the former were the case.

"The last hope of coming to an understanding with Petersburg has vanished. An appeal from the Petersburg Government to the German soldiers has been discovered in Berlin, inciting them to revolt, to murder the Kaiser and their generals, and unite with the soviets. Following on this came a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm to Kühlmann ordering him to terminate negotiations at once, by demanding, besides Courland and Lithuania, also the unoccupied territories of Livonia and Esthonia--all without regard to the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned.

"The dastardly behaviour of these Bolsheviks renders negotiation impossible. I cannot blame Germany for being incensed at such proceedings, but the instructions from Berlin are hardly likely to be carried out. We do not want to drag in Livonia and Esthonia.

"_February 8, 1918._--This evening the peace with Ukraine is to be signed. The first peace in this terrible war. I wonder if the Rada is still really sitting at Kieff? Wassilko showed me a Hughes message dated 6th inst. from Kieff to the Ukrainian delegation here, and Trotski has declined my suggestion to dispatch an officer of the Austrian General Staff to the spot, in order to bring back reliable information. Evidently, then, his assertion that the Bolsheviks were already masters of Kieff was only a ruse. Gratz informs me, by the way, that Trotski, with whom he spoke early this morning, is much depressed at our intention of concluding peace with Ukraine to-day after all. This confirms me in my purpose of having it signed. Gratz has convened a meeting with the Petersburgers for to-morrow; this will clear matters up, and show us whether any agreement is possible, or if we must break off altogether. In any case, there can be no doubt that the intermezzo at Brest is rapidly nearing its end."

After conclusion of peace with Ukraine, I received the following telegram from the Emperor:

"'_Court train, February 9, 1918._

"'Deeply moved and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace
with Ukraine. I thank you, dear Count Czernin, from my heart for
your persevering and successful endeavours.

"'You have thereby given me the happiest day of my hitherto far
from happy reign, and I pray God Almighty that He may further
continue to aid you on your difficult path--to the benefit of the
Monarchy and of our peoples.

KARL.'

"_February 11, 1918._--Trotski declines to sign. The war is over, but there is no peace.

"The disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna will be seen clearly from the following message from Herr von Skrzynski, dated Montreux, February 12, 1918. Skrzynski writes:

"'I learn from a reliable source that France has issued the
following notification: We were already quite disposed to enter
into discussion with Austria. Now we are asking ourselves whether
Austria is still sound enough for the part it was intended to give
her. One is afraid of basing an entire policy upon a state which
is perhaps already threatened with the fate of Russia.' And
Skrzynski adds: 'During the last few days I have heard as follows:
It has been decided to wait for a while.'"

Our position, then, during the negotiations with Petersburg was as follows: We could not induce Germany to resign the idea of Courland and Lithuania. We had not the physical force to do so. The pressure exerted by the Supreme Army Command on the one hand and the shifty tactics of the Russians made this impossible. We had then to choose between leaving Germany to itself, and signing a separate peace, or acting together with our three Allies and finishing with a peace including the covert annexation of the Russian outer provinces.

The former alternative involved the serious risk of making a breach in the Quadruple Alliance, where some dissension was already apparent. The Alliance could no longer stand such experiments. We were faced with the final military efforts now, and the unity of the Allies must not in any case be further shaken. On the other hand, the danger that Wilson, the only statesman in the world ready to consider the idea of a peace on mutual understanding, might from the conclusion of such a peace obtain an erroneous impression as to our intentions. I hoped then, and I was not deceived, that this eminently clever man would see through the situation and recognise that we were forced to act under pressure of circumstances. His speeches delivered after the peace at Brest confirmed my anticipation.

The peace with Ukraine was made under pressure of imminent famine. And it bears the characteristic marks of such a birth. That is true. But it is no less true that despite the fact of our having obtained far less from Ukraine than we had hoped, we should, without these supplies, have been unable to carry on at all until the new harvest. Statistics show that during the spring and summer of 1918 42,000 wagon-loads were received from the Ukraine. It would have been impossible to procure these supplies from anywhere else. Millions of human beings were thus saved from death by starvation--and let those who sit in judgment on the peace terms bear this in mind.

It is also beyond doubt that with the great stocks available in Ukraine, an incomparably greater quantity could have been brought into Austria if the collecting and transport apparatus had worked differently.

The Secretary of State for Food Supplies has, at my request, in May, 1919, furnished me with the following statistical data for publication:

Brief survey of the organisation of corn imports from Ukraine (on
terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace) and the results of same:

When, after great efforts, a suitable agreement had been arrived
at with Germany as to the apportionment of the Ukrainian supplies,
a mission was dispatched to Kieff, in which not only Government
officials but also the best qualified and most experienced experts
which the Government could procure were represented.

Germany and Hungary had also sent experts, among them being
persons with many years of experience in the Russian grain
business, and had been in the employ of both German and Entente
grain houses (as, for instance, the former representative of the
leading French corn merchants, the house of Louis Dreyfuss).

The official mission arrived at Kieff by the middle of March, and
commenced work at once. A comparatively short time sufficed to
show that the work would present quite extraordinary difficulties.

The Ukrainian Government, which had declared at Brest-Litovsk that
very great quantities, probably about one million tons, of
surplus foodstuffs were ready for export, had in the meantime
been replaced by another Ministry. The Cabinet then in power
evinced no particular inclination, or at any rate no hurry, to
fulfil obligations on this scale, but was more disposed to point
out that it would be altogether impossible, for various reasons,
to do so.

Moreover, the Peace of Brest had provided for a regular exchange
system, bartering load by load of one article against another. But
neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was even approximately in a
position to furnish the goods (textiles especially were demanded)
required in exchange.

We had then to endeavour to obtain the supplies on credit, and the
Ukrainian Government agreed, after long and far from easy
negotiations, to provide _credit valuta_ (against vouchers for
mark and krone in Berlin and Vienna). The arrangements for this
were finally made, and the two Central Powers drew in all 643
million karbowanez.

The Rouble Syndicate, however, which had been formed under the
leadership of the principal banks in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest,
was during the first few months only able to exert a very slight
activity. Even the formation of this syndicate was a matter of
great difficulty, and in particular a great deal of time was lost;
and even then the apparatus proved very awkward to work with.
Anyhow, it had only procured comparatively small sums of roubles,
so that the purchasing organisation in Ukraine, especially at
first, suffered from a chronic lack of means of payment.

But, in any case, a better arrangement of the money question would
only have improved matters in a few of the best supplied
districts, for the principal obstacle was simply _the lack of
supplies_. The fact that Kieff and Odessa were themselves
continually in danger of a food crisis is the best indication as
to the state of things.

In the Ukraine, the effects of four years of war, with the
resulting confusion, and of the destruction wrought by the
Bolsheviks (November, 1917, to March, 1918) were conspicuously
apparent; cultivation and harvesting had suffered everywhere, but
where supplies had existed they had been partly destroyed, partly
carried off by the Bolsheviks on their way northward. Still, the
harvest had given certain stocks available in the country, though
these were not extensive, and the organisation of a purchasing
system was now commenced. The free buying in Ukraine which we and
Germany had originally contemplated could not be carried out in
fact, since the Ukrainian Government declared that it would itself
set up this organisation, and maintained this intention with the
greatest stubbornness. But the authority in the country had been
destroyed by the Revolution, and then by the Bolshevist invasion;
the peasantry turned Radical, and the estates were occupied by
revolutionaries and cut up. The power of the Government, then, in
respect of collecting supplies of grain, was altogether
inadequate; on the other hand, however, it was still sufficient
(as some actual instances proved) to place serious, indeed
insuperable, obstacles in our way. It was necessary, therefore, to
co-operate with the Government--that is, to come to a compromise
with it. After weeks of negotiation this was at last achieved, by
strong diplomatic pressure, and, accordingly, the agreement of
April 23, 1918, was signed.

This provided for the establishment of a German-Austro-Hungarian
Economical Central Commission; practically speaking, a great firm
of corn merchants, in which the Central Powers appointed a number
of their most experienced men, familiar, through years of activity
in the business, with Russian grain affairs.

But while this establishment was still in progress the people in
Vienna (influenced by the occurrences on the Emperor's journey to
North Bohemia) had lost patience; military leaders thought it no
longer advisable to continue watching the operations of a _civil_
commercial undertaking in Ukraine while that country was occupied
by the military, and so finally the General Staff elicited a
decree from the Emperor providing that the procuring of grain
should be entrusted to Austro-Hungarian army units in the
districts occupied by them. To carry out this plan a general, who
had up to that time been occupied in Roumania, was dispatched to
Odessa, and now commenced independent military proceedings from
there. For payment kronen were used, drawn from Vienna. The War
Grain Transactions department was empowered, by Imperial
instructions to the Government, to place 100 million kronen at the
disposal of the War Ministry, and this amount was actually set
aside by the finance section of that department.

This military action and its execution very seriously affected the
civil action during its establishment, and also greatly impaired
the value of our credit in the Ukraine by offering kronen notes to
such an extent at the time. Moreover, the kronen notes thus set in
circulation in Ukraine were smuggled into Sweden, and coming thus
into the Scandinavian and Dutch markets undoubtedly contributed to
the well-known fall in the value of the krone which took place
there some months later.

The Austro-Hungarian military action was received with great
disapproval by the _Germans_, and when in a time of the greatest
scarcity among ourselves (mid-May) we were obliged to ask Germany
for temporary assistance, this was granted only on condition that
independent military action on the part of Austria-Hungary should
be suppressed and the whole leadership in Ukraine be entrusted to
Germany.

It was then hoped that increased supplies might be procured,
especially from Bessarabia, where the Germans have established a
collecting organisation, to the demand of which the Roumanian
Government had agreed. This hope, however, also proved vain, and
in June and July the Ukraine was still further engaged. The
country was, in fact, almost devoid of any considerable supplies,
and in addition to this the collecting system never really worked
properly at all, as the arrangement for maximum prices was
frequently upset by overbidding on the part of our own military
section.

Meantime everything had been made ready for getting in the harvest
of 1918. The collecting organisation had become more firmly
established and extended, the necessary personal requirements were
fully complied with, and _it would doubtless have been possible to
bring great quantities out of the country_. But first of all the
demands of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in
many cases a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian
and finally the very considerable contingents of German and
Austro-Hungarian armies of occupation. Not until supplies for
these groups had been assured would the Ukrainian Government allow
any export of grain, and to this we were forced to agree.

It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout
the whole country had seriously declined--owing to the entire
uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution.
The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were
little inclined to agree to export, and it actually came to local
embargoes, one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to
any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves.

In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which
had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of
the German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position
of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was
unusually weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements
throughout the whole country were now working with increasing
success against our organisation. All this rendered the work more
difficult in September and October--and then came the collapse.

The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had
either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube,
or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient
wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition,
often instances of resistance on the part of the local railways,
incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort.

However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much
the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have
contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing
of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may
nevertheless maintain that _all that was humanly possible_ was
done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And
in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and
experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were
utilised to the utmost degree.

Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import
organisation--apart from the before-mentioned interference of the
military department and consequent fluctuations of the system--was
largely upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on
more particularly from Galicia. As such smuggling avoided the high
export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian
Government were constantly being overbid. This smuggling was also
in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether the
nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and
frequently criticising our own organisation in public, or
upsetting arrangements before they could come into operation, did
a great deal of damage. It should also be mentioned that Germany
likewise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted
smuggling, with ill effects on the official import organisation,
and led to similar conditions on our own side.

Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen
from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not
inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned,
amounting in all to about 42,000 wagons, though unfortunately the
quantities delivered did not come up to the original expectations.

SURVEY OF THE IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE DATING FROM COMMENCEMENT OF
IMPORTATION (SPRING, 1918) TO NOVEMBER, 1918.

I. Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Department
(corn, cereal products, leguminous fruits, fodder, seeds):

Total imported for the contracting states
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) 113,421 tons
Of which Austria-Hungary received 57,382 "
Grain and flour amounting to 46,225 "

II. Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Company:

Of which
Austria-Hungary
Total received:

Butter, fat, bacon 3,329,403 kg. 2,170,437 kg.
Oil, edible oils 1,802,847 " 977,105 "
Cheese, curds 420,818 " 325,103 "
Fish, preserved fish, herrings 1,213,961 " 473,561 "
Cattle 105,542 head 55,421 head
(36,834,885 kg.) (19,505,760 kg.)
Horses 98,976 head 40,027 head
(31,625,172 kg.) (13,165,725 kg.)
Salted meat 2,927,439 " 1,571,569 "
Eggs 75,200 boxes 32,433 boxes
Sugar 66,809,969 kg. 24,973,443 kg.
Various foodstuffs 27,385,095 " 7,836,287 "
------------- -------------
Total 172,349,556 " 61,528,220 "
and 75,200 boxes and 32,433 boxes
eggs eggs
(Total, 30,757 wagons) (Total, 13,037 wagons)

The goods imported under II. represent a value of roughly 450
_million kronen_.

The quantities _smuggled_ unofficially into the states concerned
are estimated at about 15,000 wagons (about half the official
imports).

So ended this phase, a phase which seemed important while we were living through it, but which was yet nothing but a phase of no great importance after all, since it produced no lasting effect.

The waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, washing it away as completely as a castle of sand on the shore is destroyed by the incoming tide.

Long after I was reproached by the Polish element in the Herrenhaus, who asserted that I had proved my incapability by my own confession that the Peace of Brest had not withstood the test of subsequent events. But should I have shown more capability by asserting, after the collapse of the Central Powers, that the peace still existed?

The term "bread peace" (_Brotfrieden_) was not coined by me, but by Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the occasion of my reception by the Gemeinderat of Vienna at the Nordbahnhof. The millions whose lives were saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat the words without a sneer.