Chapter VI: Attempts at Peace (1)

1

The constitutional procedure which prevails in every parliamentary state is ordered so that the minister is responsible to a body of representatives. He is obliged to account for what he has done. His action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the body of representatives. If the majority of that body are against the minister, he must go.

The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in the hands of the delegations.

Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently, the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and the Prime Minister."

It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's régime it had become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore, to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign policy was, therefore, twofold--both by the delegation and the Prime Minister.

Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the friendship between us, still his constant supervision and intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians. He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the Tyrol.

Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungary's internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered. Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite of eventual disagreement.

This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different reasons.

I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly, Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the _status quo ante_. His support--and that was the third reason--was of great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight. He had become hard and old on the battlefield of parliamentary controversy. He stood in awe of nothing and nobody--and he was true as gold. Fourthly, this upright man was one of the few who openly told the Emperor the truth, and the Emperor made use of this, as we all did.

I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change would not improve the situation for me. Esterhazy, who succeeded Tisza, certainly never put obstacles in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed the strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and the stern voice that warned the Emperor, and I did not place the same reliance on Wekerle as on Tisza, perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friendship with him as with Tisza.

Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one of the dearest reminiscences of my time of office that, up to the death of this remarkable man, our friendship remained unchanged. For many years Hungary and Stephen Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose brave and manly character, stern and resolute nature, fearlessness and integrity raised him high above the average man. He was a thorough man, with brilliant qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare in Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast long shadows; and he was great, and modelled out of the stuff from which the heroes of old were made--heroes who understood how to fight and die. How often did I reproach him with his unhappy "_puszta_" patriotism, that was digging a grave for him and all of us. It was impossible to change him; he was obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was that, all his life, he was under the ban of a petty ecclesiastical policy. Not a single square metre would he yield either to Roumania in her day, nor to the Czechs or the Southern Slavs. The career of this wonderful man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove like none other for his people and his country; for years he filled the breach and protected his people and his Hungary with his powerful personality, and yet it was his obstinate, unyielding policy that was one of the chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so dearly loved; the fall that he saw when he died, killed by the accursed hand of some cowardly assassin.

Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that someone had said to him that his greatest fault was that he had come into the world as a Hungarian.

I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a human being and as a man, he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar way of thinking spoilt him.

Hungary and her Constitution--dualism--were one of our misfortunes in the war.

Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment, through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops. The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition; therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war. Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck."

If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion.

But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was impossible.

Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind fate preserve us from a return of dualism.

2

On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the tactics to be observed:

All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously
threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania,
etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour,
and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared
with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried
out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers.

From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that
our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war
aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a
plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly
desire peace.

We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to
neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the
necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for
our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from
making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions.

An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose the
belligerent parties in both camps to unfavourable criticism and
might easily make the situation more strained; _a one-sided
announcement of the war aims would simply afford the leader of the
belligerent enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything_.

It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication of
the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially,
but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints
concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting
interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief
aim, _the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the
English at sea_, is in the interests of the entire world, and that
our peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the
future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral
side.

I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest
friendship, your devoted

TISZA.

My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had drawn up a peace proposal together with Bethmann. The Entente's scornful refusal is still fresh in everyone's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and there have been opportunities of talking to members of the Entente, I have often heard the reproach made that the offer of peace could not have been accepted by the Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a conqueror who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although I will not attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very arrogant--an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza's speeches in the Hungarian Parliament--I think, nevertheless, that even had it been differently worded it had small prospect of success. However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end.

In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government. It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A Government can make use of a private individual to take the first step--it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the latter occurred frequently during my term of office.

I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace, even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an understanding with Germany.

The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance.

I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent.

After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her Allies.

An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been instructed to let me know that our enemies--or at least one of them--were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that _these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the hostile country heard of the step_.

The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to negotiate unknown to the others.

I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27 through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the application, not being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for peace _with us only_, or with the entire _group of Powers_, and I was constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made clear.

This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result.

I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier, would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole world.

The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve.

If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat could be paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was only in the course of the summer that the success of the anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed.

In the early summer of 1917 very favourable news was received relative to English and French conditions. Information was sent from Madrid, which was always a reliable source, that some Spanish officers returning to Madrid from England reported that the situation there during the last few weeks had become very much worse, and that there was no longer any confidence in victory. The authorities seized all the provisions that arrived for the troops and the munition workers; potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the poorer classes; the majority of sailors fit for service had been enrolled in the navy, so that only inefficient crews were left in the merchant service, and they were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats, and, therefore, many British merchantmen were lying idle, as there was no one to man them.

This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming from different sources. Similar accounts, though in slightly different form, came from France. It was stated that in Paris great war-weariness was noticeable. All hope of definite victory was as good as given up; an end must certainly come before the beginning of winter, and many of the leading authorities were convinced that, if war were carried on into the winter, the result would be as in Russia--a revolution.

At the same time, news came from Constantinople that one of the enemy Powers in that quarter had made advances for a separate peace. The Turkish Government replied that they would not separate from their Allies, but were prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis of non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once of the request and his answer. Thereupon nothing more was heard from the enemy Power. At the same time news came from Roumania evincing great anxiety concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and acknowledging that she considered the game was lost. The revolution and the collapse of the army in Russia still continued.

Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more hopeful picture for us, and justified the views of those who had always held that a little more "endurance"--to use a word since become ominous--would lead to a decision.

During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must attach an important and adequately estimated significance to confidential reports. The hermetic isolation which during the world war divided Europe into two separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they must be accepted, for various reasons, with a certain amount of scepticism. Those persons who write and talk, not from any material, but from political interests, from political devotion and sympathy, are, from the nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for their own personal reasons, more optimistically than is justified. But they are apt to be deceived. Nations, too, are subject to feelings, and the feelings of the masses must not be taken as expressing the tendencies of the leading influences. France was tired of war, but how far the leading statesmen were influenced by that condition, not to be compared to our own war-weariness, was not proved.

In persons who make this _métier_ their profession, the wish is often present, alongside the comprehensible mistakes they make, to give pleasure and satisfaction by their reports, and not run any risk of losing a lucrative post. I think it will be always well to estimate confidential reports, no matter from what source they proceed, as being 50 per cent. less optimistic than they appear. The more pessimistic opinion that prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin, was due, first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news coming from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was quite certain that we were losing time, although Bethmann once thought fit in the Reichstag to assert the contrary; but the German military leaders and the politicians looked at the situation _among our opponents_ differently from us.

When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the summer of 1917 he related to me some instances of the rapidly increasing food trouble in England, and was genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress, there was no question of a famine. I told the Emperor that the great problem was whether the U-boats would actually interfere with the transport of American troops, as the German military authorities asserted, or not, but counselled him not to accept as very serious facts a few passing incidents that might have occurred.

After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, I repeat that many grave fears were entertained in England. It is a well-known fact. But it was a question of fears, not actualities. A person who knew how matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken into account by German opinion.

However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented a more hopeful phase for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it was essential to make the most of the situation. Germany must be brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became stronger.

I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words that he sought for peace. I asked him to authorise me to state in Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union.

The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the conference terminated with a request from the Germans for consideration of the question.

In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once, nevertheless, to take the proposed step.

I, however, thoroughly believed then--though wrongly--that in the circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany.

In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting that he would submit it to the Emperor William.

The report was as follows:--

Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from
the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my
responsible opinion of the situation?

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an
end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to
take up Your Majesty's time needlessly.

I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production
of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and,
above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to
under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of
the sufferings from the war.

Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few
months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless
quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely
out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in
the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs.

Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace
negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the
fact of our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a
moment when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the
coming breakdown every step will have been in vain, and the
Entente will agree to no terms except such as would mean the
absolute destruction of the Central Powers. To begin at the right
time is, therefore, of extreme importance.

I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the
whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising
on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is
demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarchs have been
dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the
strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make us
feel anxious and call to our memory the saying: _exempla trahunt_.
Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria-Hungary the
conditions are different; let it not be contested that the firmly
rooted monarchist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the
possibility of such an event. This war has opened a new era in the
history of the world; it is without example and without precedent.
The world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be
vain to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the
happenings that have now become daily occurrences.

The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the
dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound
to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses, and if he be
conscious of his own responsibility he must pay due regard to that
factor.

Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of the
town. Two things are obvious. The Russian Revolution affects our
Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for
the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the Monarch
whose country is only united through the dynasty than for the one
where the people themselves are fighting for their national
independence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the
population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; Your
Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any
day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances
occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal
the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further
efforts to secure peace will be defeated.

I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely
different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military
circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I
am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached
the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders
in Berlin do not seek to deny it.

I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark
on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the
interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than
a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central
Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months,
it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide
of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers
fought and died.

I do not wish to make any _oratio pro domo_, but I beg Your
Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the
Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when
I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very
day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as
convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and
I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the
dangers that I see ahead.

Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly
aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can
throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact,
the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the
situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies
have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait
longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be
said what course events will take in Russia. I hope--and this is
the vital point of my whole argument--that Russia has lost her
motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that
this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless,
that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be
launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we
shall be able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds--and I
reckon it can be done in two or three months--we must then, before
America takes any further military action to our disadvantage,
make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not
shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to
make.

Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider such
hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous
deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that the
tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the
success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been
achieved.

Your Majesty will remember that Admiral Holtzendorff, when last in
Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat warfare
would bring England to her knees within six months. Your Majesty
will also remember how we combated the prediction and declared
that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign would seriously
affect England, yet the looked-for success would be discounted by
the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is now two and a
half months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare
started, and all the information that we get from England is to
the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most
dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in, spite of
many scruples, Your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and
consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian Navy to take part in the
U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the German
arguments, but because Your Majesty deemed it to be absolutely
necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters and
because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately,
would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted
U-boat warfare.

To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the
U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory
will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that
England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will
lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics
than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more
fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall
a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible
awakening will follow.

England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay
down her arms in a few months' time, but perhaps--and here I
concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme--perhaps England in
a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to
continue this war _à l'outrance_, or whether it would not be more
statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central
Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for
great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers.

Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to
separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the
responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any
dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty
instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that
our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer
Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these
commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for
Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this
one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say:

We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility
of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed,
then we must--and at the right time--play our last card and make
the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has
proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect
from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be
ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected.

Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples to
make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the
Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to
defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with
all the means in your power and to your very last breath.

On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor Charles, and then to me:--

In accordance with Your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly to
submit the following in answer to the enclosed _exposé_ from the
Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult.

Since the _exposé_ was drawn up, the French and English on the
Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a
wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous
quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance of
the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every
reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the
men and the iron will of their leaders.

Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may
consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the
same confidence.

The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political
upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a
large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the
situation would release more men even if it were considered
necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to
guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary
movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West
would become more favourable for us. The withdrawal of men would
also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for
the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front
until the end of the war is reached.

In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material
for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards
provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out
until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary,
especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken
into consideration.

The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When
Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic
Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success
for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the
expected military advantages weighed against the political risk.
We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a
blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the
entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling
off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies
would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we
were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the
U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest
share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been
transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where
English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the
resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and
favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined
attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England.

The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat
warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest
statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing
difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies,
as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include
urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength,
but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the
distress that England is suffering.

The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head
Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed
account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The
review was published in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of
the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.[8]

According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda,
owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to
specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so
restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by
hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from
abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by
cutting down such imports as absorbed much space. England requires
not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for
the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to
enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of
the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country,
it is not possible to restrict the cargo space in these two
instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it
is a fact that the shortage of cargo space caused by the U-boats
reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable
extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope
of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater
number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport
facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries
in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed
with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the
possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo
space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat
warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last
year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if
they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But
they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the
subject have already said quite openly that there are only two
ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build
vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy
the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has
proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than
the new vessels building.

England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss
of tonnage.

The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people's provisions and
on all private and Government activities will be felt more and
more.

I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare
with the greatest confidence.

According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister
Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that
France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed
before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since
then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping
up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased.

The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this
war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after
it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France,
which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable.

As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the
difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe
fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe
that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without
permanently endangering the nation's strength and general welfare,
without any further crises and without menace to Government
organisation.

Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a
favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with
Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as
possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of
our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the
important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and
that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a
time when both political and military initiative are still in our
hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or
three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a
matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of
the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not
having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too
pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to
failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the
hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers' forces. At the present
moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to
the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be
tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the
Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as
regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative
necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been
favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within
the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political,
economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day
that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will
be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to
follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in
Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but
yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace
negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any
appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to
find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace
between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have
the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the
general peace.

As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance
with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an
end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a
prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies.

This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously not only based on the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as we did.

I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the following passage:--

The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no
doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all
essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with
_sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a
love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more
peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be
crushed.

I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your
report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the
leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that
you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both
His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the
world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they
cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not
persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.

It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct touch with the German Reichstag.

One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the Ministry eventually to disavow the advances.

My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9] and Südekum in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it was to be peace or war _à l'outrance_. France was tired and not anxious for America's entry into the war if it was not to be the latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvious to the whole world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was that a universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the war.)

Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following:

(1) No annexations, no indemnities.

(2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium
(politically and economically).

(3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be
evacuated as soon as both those States had had their
territories restored to them (including the German
colonies).

(4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general
disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible.

Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the Reichstag, and to be made public.

The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step. The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable. When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were satisfied.

Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace," the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any decided attitude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it."

The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany's views regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:--

_Berlin, August 17, 1917._