Chapter VI: Attempts at Peace (2)

DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,--According to our agreement, I take the
liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of
the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your
Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my
activities.

The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies
me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand
a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than
we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of
the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably
higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less
than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out
economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories,
including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with
regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915.

There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The
people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is
very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really
morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will
be no worse than it was last year.

This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the
condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from
the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change
for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary
to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as
would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is
already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly
prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it.
It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war
in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most
earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace
as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to
come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion,
would be a great tactical error. Our _démarche_ for peace last
December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered
by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind
would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any
peace advances must come now from the enemy.

The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the
watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm
of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal
co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the
spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency
agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our
enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to
agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he
states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into
if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down
there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen
to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations
for peace.

At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a
proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the
reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on
which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as
follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is
not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is
ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession
of any German territory; with such a conception of the term
"reinstatement of the _status quo_," that form would be a very
suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the
desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by
negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close
economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer
to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany's
frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the
continent and overseas.

Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but
must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace
negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of
Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal
grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any
noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.

I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the
matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and
economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at
the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until
the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany,
the acquisition of Liége (or a long-term rental thereof)--were
the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The
Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or
similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on
England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and
military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the
matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much
resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to
see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a
prosperous future.

As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your
Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State
is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France,
which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as
out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent
State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of
November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an
actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the
future will be tested later. There are already many signs of
danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the
Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of
her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in
the administration of the whole state.

It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger
caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary
through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would
not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the
frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to
grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the
possibility of being joined to Russia.

The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the
Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in
connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany
respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland.

It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin,
here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the
questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there
may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling
us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full
agreement.

With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very
devoted

MICHAELIS.

I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course, the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore, conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view, and I failed to understand it.

I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers.

I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and that it would be out of the question for the German Government to ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question of whether we _wished_ to go on fighting, but whether we _could_, and it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end the war.

Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor.

It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession of the English Fleet to Germany, and I forget how many milliards in war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the Ambassador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case for a doctor.

There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis's ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling.

About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the scenes which had a very pronounced influence on the course of affairs.

Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of persons who, without being in any important position, had access to diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names, especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very unsatisfactory way--at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the Entente were slackening.[10]

It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance.

I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered and the Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us.

Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that when I heard of the episode I immediately _possessed myself of documents proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the matter_, but could not possibly have known.

Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite, from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of course, would alter the entire military situation.

Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies, the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other forces were at work.

The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the case was different.

One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.

The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs, separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of 1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less. It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final military victory.

These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire group of Powers.

Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace; for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.

There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in any case, would claim the promises made to her.

In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had already begun to do so.

When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations, opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the foregoing events.

The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace. For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance.

Later I had information from England relating to the official view of the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our intervention--would have put an end to the war.

This information was to the effect that England was less than ever inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power. Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states like Poland.

This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy's power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then.

Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible.

By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous without the second; and the splendid German army was in England's eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat. According to England's view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of France under Bonaparte--if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"--and just as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the lust for conquest and the policy of violence.

The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns.

Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety as to Germany's plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the "hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France, too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.

In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not the slightest impression on him.

The _démarche_ for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been published in the European Press. We accepted the noble proposals made by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter.

In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued passports to the representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear by the following letter to Tisza.

(_Not dated._)

DEAR FRIEND,--I hear that you do not approve of the delegation of
Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a delegation.
The men came to me of their own accord and applied for permission
to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz were
there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I value
them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The two
last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous of
peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of the
Empire.

If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor
will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear
friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor
will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that.

Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my
prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved
to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service
but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war
not coming to an end.

If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they
would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been
allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.

Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the
Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to
"buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if
they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but
that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace.

I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the
death-blow to the Customs dues--but I felt rather like Daniel in
the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very
indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside
Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam.

Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the
octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more,
but the contention is false.

You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we
shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it
is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to
prepare the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the
valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous
steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none
of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of
using _sabotage_ with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps
tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they
understand and have the conviction that it cannot be
otherwise--that a _vis major_ predominates; in other words, that
peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill
will or stupidity of the Ministers.

The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the
speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we
were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and
made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to
a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm.

You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's
what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the
slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an
anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the
dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are
always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard
helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this
movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only
way to keep a straight course--he must hold out. Such is the case
of statecraft in Vienna--it is always carried out of the course of
the Alliance.

It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought
feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully.
Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not
carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing
either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this--_you_
share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk
about Stockholm again.--In true friendship, your old

CZERNIN.

As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known.

As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the Ambassador Mennsdorff and General Smuts, which were referred to in the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and which finally wrecked them all.

The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism. Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices. The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted. Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was, naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however, the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the frontier posts in the Monarchy.

It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back. I referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone accepting these views of the Entente. I was full of confidence in the future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in other terms, even if we were beaten. To lose Trieste and access to the Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.

Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory. Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But in England especially there were various currents of thought; not everyone shared Lloyd George's views. The main point was, however, to lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was assured by some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war; she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The Entente's idea was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war. She would make up for loss of time and "hit out again." The Entente, therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of German militarism. I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility. It might be imagined what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the enemy country, full of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had to lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept such a proposal. Meanwhile, a general disarmament of all the Powers was both possible and necessary. Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitration under international control: that, according to my idea, would present an acceptable basis. I mentioned my fears that the Entente rulers in this, as in the territorial question, would not mete out the same measure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless I had some guarantee in the matter I should not be in a position to carry the plan through here and with our Allies; anyhow, it would be worth a trial.

Long and frequent were the debates on the Central European question, which was the Entente's terror, as it implied an unlimited increase in Germany's power. In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred that the Monarchy should be made independent of Germany, and any further advances to Berlin on the part of Vienna checked. We rejoined that to us this was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the mutilation caused by the resolutions of the Pact of London forced us to investigate the matter. Apart from the question of honour and duty to the Alliance, as matters now stood, Germany was fighting almost more for us than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it, concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and her military superiority on land; but we, with our territory, would have to pay the Italians, Serbians, and Roumanians for their part in the war.

I heard it said on many sides that there were men in the Entente who readily understood this point of view, but that the Entente nations would do what they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the war on promises from London. Roumania also had been given very solid assurances, and heroic Serbia must be compensated by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situation that had arisen through the conference in London, but a treaty is a treaty, and neither London nor Paris could forsake their Allies. Meanwhile, it was thought likely in Entente circles that both the new Serbian and Polish states, probably Roumania as well, would have certain relations with the Monarchy. Further details respecting such relations were still unknown. Our reply was: we would not give up Galicia to Poland, Transylvania and the Bukovina to Roumania, and Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return for a vague promise of the closer relations of those states with the pitiful remains left to us of the Monarchy. We were not impelled thereto by dynastic interests. I myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice Galicia to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many Germans and Magyars who simply could not be made a present of, and above all the concessions, to Italy! I once asked a neutral statesman if he could understand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily give up the arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass. The storm that would be let loose by such a peace would uproot more than merely the Minister who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there were certain sacrifices which on no conditions could be expected of any living being. I would not give up German Tyrol, not even though we were still more unfavourably situated. I reminded him of a picture that represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the driver threw out fur, coat, and whatever else he had to the pack to check them and save himself--but he could not throw his own child to them: rather would he suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about Trieste and the German Tyrol. We were not in the position of the man in the sledge, for, thank God, we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept a peace that deprived us of Bozen and Meran.

My listener did not disagree with my argument, but could see no end to the war in that way. England was ready to carry on the war for another ten years and, in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German people, for whom no hatred was felt--always the same repetition of that deceptive argument--but German militarism. England was in a condition of constraint. Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany were not defeated in this war she would continue with still more extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in London; she would then, in a few years, have not 100, but 1,000, U-boats, and then England would be lost. Then England was also fighting for her own existence, and her will was iron. She knew the task would be a hard one, but it would not crush her. In London they cite again the example of the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with: "What man has done man can do again."

This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all occasions, and the suggestion constantly was put forward that if we were to declare ourselves satisfied with a general disarmament, that in itself would be a great advantage and an important step towards peace.

My speech on October 2, 1917, at Budapest, on the necessity of securing a reorganised world was prompted by the argument that militarism was the greatest obstacle in the way of any advance in that direction.

At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an audience of party leaders. I had to take into consideration that too pacifist a tone would have an effect at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At home the lesser powers of resistance would be still further paralysed, and abroad it would be taken as the end of our capacity for fighting, and would further check all friendly intentions.

The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a new world organisation is as follows:--

The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to have said:
words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was true
respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine a
maxim less suited to the present day. The millions who are
fighting, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to
know why and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to
know why peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet
been made.

When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly
to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should
tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace
negotiations as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of
a peace of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained,
though on broad lines only, the peace idea of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have
reproached me for speaking so openly. The arguments of the said
critical gentlemen have only confirmed my belief in the justness
of my views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am
that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my
attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called
upon to-day to tell the public how the Imperial and Royal
Government will deal with the further development of the utterly
distorted European conditions.

Our programme for the reconstruction of the world organisation,
preferably to be called the building of a new world organisation,
is given in our answer to the peace Note of the Holy Father. It,
therefore, only remains for me to-day to complete the programme
and, above all, to state what were the considerations that decided
us to accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It
will come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear
incomprehensible, that the Central Powers, and especially
Austria-Hungary, should be willing to desist from future military
armament, as it is only their military power that has protected
them through these trying years against vastly superior forces.

Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but it
has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the
foundations of former European policy. Among many other political
theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring
state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the
Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and
caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But
having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at
any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on
a proper understanding of our vital needs in Europe and that no
hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms.
Until the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could
not do without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to
unfavourable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the
legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have
been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down
arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration.
This being recognised by the world affords us the possibility of
not only accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of
arbitration, but, as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with
all our energy for its realisation, as we have for some time past.

After this war Europe must without doubt be placed on a new
political basis, the permanency of which can be guaranteed. This
basis will, I believe, be of a fourfold nature:

In the first place, it must furnish a guarantee that there shall
be no war of revenge on any side; we must make sure that we can
bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will
be spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have
undergone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can
achieve that. The only manner by which it can be attained is
international disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of
the principle of arbitration. It is needless to say that these
measures for disarmament must not be confined to one separate
state or to a single group of Powers, and that they apply equally
to land, water and air. War as a factor in policy must be
combated. A general, uniform and progressive disarmament of all
states in the world must be established on an international basis
and under international control, and the defensive forces limited
to the utmost. I am well aware that this object will be difficult
to achieve and that the path that leads thereto is long and thorny
and full of difficulties. And yet I am firmly convinced it is a
path that must be trodden and will be trodden, no matter whether
it is approved of individuals or not. It is a great mistake to
imagine that after such a war the world can begin from where it
left off in 1914. A catastrophe such as this war does not pass by
and leave no trace, and the most terrible misfortune that could
happen to us would be if the race for armaments were to continue
after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean the economic ruin
of all states. Before the war began the military burdens to be
borne were heavy--though we specially note that Austria-Hungary
was far from being on a high level of military preparedness when
we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and it was only during
the war that she resumed her armaments--but after this war an open
competition in armaments would render state burdens all round
simply intolerable. In order to keep a high standard of armaments
in open competition all the states would have to secure a tenfold
supply of everything--ten times the artillery, munition factories,
vessels and U-boats of former days, and also many more soldiers to
work the machinery. The annual military budget of all the Great
Powers would comprise many milliards--it would be impossible with
all the other burdens which the belligerent states will have to
bear after peace is concluded. This expense, I repeat, would mean
the ruin of the nations. To return, however, to the relatively
limited armaments in existence previous to 1914 would be quite
impossible for any individual state, which would be so far behind
that its military strength would not count. The expense incurred
would be futile. But were it possible to return to the relatively
low level of armaments in 1914, that in itself would signify an
international lowering of armaments. But then there would be no
sense in not going further and practically disarming altogether.

There is but one egress from this narrow defile: the absolute
international disarmament of the world. There is no longer any
object in such colossal fleets if the states of the world
guarantee the freedom of the seas, and armies must be reduced to
the lowest limit requisite for the maintenance of order in the
interior. This will only be possible on an international basis;
that is, under international control. Every state will have to
cede some of its independence to ensure a world peace. The present
generation will probably not live to see this great pacifist
movement fully completed. It cannot be carried out rapidly, but I
consider it our duty to put ourselves at the head of the movement
and do all that lies in human power to hasten its achievement. The
conclusion of peace will establish the fundamental principles.

If the first principle be laid down as the compulsory
international arbitration system as well as general disarmament on
land, the second one must be that of the freedom of the high seas
and disarmament at sea. I purposely say the high seas, as I do not
extend the idea to straits or channels, and I readily allow that
special rules and regulations must be laid down for the connecting
sea routes. If these first two factors have been settled and
assured, any reason for territorial adjustments on the plea of
ensuring national safety is done away with, and this forms the
third fundamental principle of the new international basis. This
idea is the gist of the beautiful and sublime Note that His
Holiness the Pope addressed to the whole world. We have not gone
to war to make conquests, and we have no aggressive plans. If the
international disarmament that we so heartily are longing for be
adopted by our present enemies and becomes a fact, then we are in
no need of assurances of territorial safety; in that case, we can
give up the idea of expanding the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
provided, of course, that the enemy has entirely evacuated our own
territory.

The fourth principle to enforce in order to ensure a free and
peaceful development of the world after the hard times we have
experienced is the free economic participation by everyone and the
unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature
must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we conclude
peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies
have given up that idea.

Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world
organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based
on general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note,
has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament.
Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted
these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points, but
agree thoroughly on one--that there nevermore should be a war of
revenge.

The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most pessimistic expectations. In order not to approach too closely the subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be hypocritical and a peace trap. This needs no comment.

Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders. But the sword was knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came from Berlin: Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of disarmament as they reject everything coming from us. There is only one way out of it--a fight to the end and then victory.

Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side unconditionally with the generals.

Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as after my speech--both for and against, with both sides equally impetuous. "Death sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement.

In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly. The U-boat fiasco was very obvious. England saw that she was able to overcome the danger. The German military leaders still spoke of the positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of their predictions became very different. There was no longer any talk of the downfall of England within a few months. A new winter campaign was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting the ultimate effect of the U-boats and that England would collapse. The U-boat warfare had achieved this amount of success, that the Western front remained intact, though it would otherwise have fallen.

The military situation underwent a change in the autumn. The end of the war in the East was within sight, and the possibility of being able to fling the enormous masses of troops from the East into the line in the West, and at last break through there, greatly improved the situation.

It was not on the sea that the U-boat campaign had brought about a decision, but it enabled a final decision on land to be made; such was the new military opinion. Paris and Calais could not be taken.

In these different phases of military hopes and expectation we floated like a boat on a stormy sea. In order to land in the haven of peace, we needed a military wave to carry us nearer to the land; then only could we unfurl the sail of understanding that would help us to reach the saving shores. As long as the enemy persisted only in dealing with the crushed and depopulated Central Powers all was in vain.

I never believed in the success of the U-boat warfare. I believed in a break-through on the Western front, and during the winter of 1917-1918 lived in the hope that by such means we might break the obstinate love of destruction in our enemies.

As long as our adversaries' peace terms remained the same peace was impossible, as was also the bringing of any outside pressure to bear on Germany, for it was true that "the German army was fighting more to support Austria-Hungary than it was for its own existence."

Threatening and breathing disaster, the decisions of the Pact of London confronted us. They forced us always to take up arms again, and drove us back into the field.

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