Chapter C: Jordan to Tilden

"TREASURY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, _March 27, '86_.

"HON. SAML. J. TILDEN.

"DEAR SIR,--You, as a matter of course, have heard of our loss, and will regret it as much, or more, than I do, if such a thing be possible. I am about to take a liberty that, I think, the situation will justify--that is, suggest that you tender to the Secretary the use of your yacht. He is fond of the water, and if he recovers will need rest and recreation. He can obtain it nowhere so well as on the water. I feel that I have taken a great liberty, but my desire to serve Mr. Manning is very great. He deserves all the affection and esteem of his friends, and now their air and sympathy.

"Yours very respectfully,
"C. N. JORDAN."

S. J. TILDEN TO GOVERNOR HILL

"15 GRAMERCY PARK, NEW YORK, _March 28, 1886_.

"DEAR GOVERNOR HILL,--I feel that Mr. Husted[38] is permitting the resolution on coast defences to slumber too long, and that New York is failing to take the position which is necessary to the safety of the whole country, and especially to her own safety.

[38] Mr. Husted, then Republican leader in the Assembly at Albany,
had charge of some resolutions urging the New York members in
Congress to push Mr. Tilden's policy of strengthening our coast
defences. The paper that immediately follows this letter, entitled
"Sea-coast Defences," is a contribution which Mr. Tilden made to Mr.
Manning, with a view of its being made a part of the annual report.

"I think it is highly desirable that you should call his attention to the subject.

"Very truly yours,
"S. J. TILDEN.

"I am here until Monday afternoon."

"SEA-COAST DEFENCES

"In considering the state of the public revenues, the subject involves the question whether we shall extinguish the surplus by reducing the revenue; or, whether we shall apply the surplus to payments on the public debt; or, whether we shall seize the occasion to provide for our sea-coast defences, which have been too long neglected. The Secretary is of the opinion that the latter is a paramount necessity, which ought to precede the reduction of the revenue; and ought, also, to precede an excessive rapidity in the payment of the public debt.

"The property exposed to destruction in the nine seaports--Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and San Francisco--cannot be less in value than five thousand millions of dollars. To this must be added a vast amount of property dependent for its use on three seaports. Nor does this statement afford a true measure of the damage which might be carried to the property and business of the country by a failure to protect these seaports from hostile naval attacks.

"They are the centres, not only of foreign commerce, but of most of the internal trade and exchanges of domestic productions. To this state of things the machinery of transportation of the whole country has become adapted.

"The interruptions of the currents of traffic by the occupation of one of our principal seaports by a foreign enemy, or the destruction of them by bombardment, or by the holding over them the menace of destruction for the purpose of exacting contribution or ransom, would inflict upon the property and business of the country an injury which can neither be foreseen nor measured.

"The elaborate and costly fortifications, which were constructed with the greatest engineering skill, are now practically useless. They are not capable of resisting the attacks of modern artillery.

"A still greater defect exists in our coast defences. The range of the best modern artillery has become so extended that our present fortifications, designed to protect the harbor of New York, where two-thirds of the import trade and more than one-half of the export trade of the whole United States is carried on, are too near to the great populations of New York city, Jersey City, and Brooklyn to be of any value as a protection.

"To provide effectual defences would be the work of years. It would take much time to construct permanent fortifications. A small provision of the best modern guns would take several years. Neither of these works can be extemporized in presence of emergent danger. A million of soldiers with the best equipments on the heights surrounding the harbor of New York, in our present state of preparation, or, rather, in our total want of preparation, would be powerless to resist a small squadron of war-steamers.

"This state of things is discreditable to our foresight and to our prudence.

"The best guarantee against aggression--the best assurance that our diplomacy will be successful and pacific, and that our rights and honor will be respected by other nations, is in their knowledge that we are in a situation to vindicate our reputation and interests. While we may afford to be deficient in the means of defence, we cannot afford to be defenceless. The notoriety of the fact that we have neglected the ordinary precautions of defence invites want of consideration in our diplomacy, injustice, arrogance, and insult at the hands of foreign nations.

"It is now more than sixty years since we announced to the world that we should resist any attempts, from whatever quarter they might come, to make any new colonizations on any part of the American continent--that while we should respect the _status quo_, we should protect the people of the different nations inhabiting this continent from every attempt to subject them to the dominion of any European power, or to interfere with their undisturbed exercise of the rights of self-government.

"This announcement was formally made by President Monroe, after consultation with Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson. It was formulated by John Quincy Adams. Our government has firmly adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, and even so late as 1865 it warned Napoleon III. out of Mexico.

"It is impossible to foresee, in the recent scramble of the European powers for the acquisition of colonies, how soon an occasion may arise for our putting in practice the Monroe Doctrine. It is clear that there ought to be some relation between our assertion of this doctrine, and our preparation to maintain it.

"It is not intended to recommend any attempt to rival the great European powers in the creation of a powerful navy. The changes which have rapidly occurred by the diminution of the relative resisting power of the defensive armor of ironclads, and by the increased efficiency of modern artillery--which, on the whole, has gained in the competition--suggest that we should not, at present, enter largely into the creation of armored vessels.

"In the questions that beset this subject until they shall have reached a solution, we can content ourselves with adding but sparingly to our navy. But what we can add should be the very best that experience and science can indicate. This prudential view is reinforced by the consideration that the annual charge of maintaining a war-vessel bears an important proportion to the original cost of construction.

"In constructing permanent fortifications, and in providing an ample supply of the best modern artillery, the annual cost of maintenance is inconsiderable. Nearly the whole expenditure is in the original outlay for construction.

"If we do not make this expenditure necessary to provide for our sea-coast defences when we have a surplus, and have no need to levy taxes, we certainly will not make those expenditures when we have no longer a surplus in the Treasury.

"To leave our vast interests defenceless, in order to reduce the cost of whiskey to its consumers, would be a solecism.

"The present time is peculiarly favorable for providing for this great national necessity too long neglected. Not only does the surplus in the Treasury supply ample means to enable us to meet this great public want, without laying new burdens upon the people, but the work can now be done at a much lower cost than has ever before been possible. The defensive works would consist almost entirely of steel and iron. Those materials can now be had at an unprecedentedly low price. A vast supply of machinery, and of labor, called into existence by a great vicissitude in the steel and iron industries, offers itself to our service. We should have the satisfaction of knowing that while we were availing ourselves of these supplies, which would ordinarily be unattainable, we were setting in motion important industries, and giving employment to labor in a period of depression. With encouragement by the guarantee of work, or, perhaps, by the government itself furnishing the plant, the inventive genius of our people would be applied to the creation of new means and improved machinery, and establishments would spring into existence capable of supplying all of the national wants, and rendering us completely independent of all other countries in respect to the means of national defence."

TILDEN TO C. JORDAN

"15 GRAMERCY PARK, NEW YORK, _March 30, 1886_.

"DEAR MR. JORDAN,--You need have no hesitation in suggesting to me anything in my power which you think would be beneficial to Mr. Manning.

"The _Viking_ is laid up for the winter, and has to undergo some refitting before she can be brought into service.

"But I do not think Mr. Manning could, by any possibility, use her with advantage, unless his present situation should be greatly changed.

"It is too late in the season to go South. I do not believe that Mr. Manning could bear the motion of the largest ocean steamer, still less the greater motion of a small steamer, or the gas and noise of the machinery. A great deal of strength and health is required by the roughing incident to a sea voyage of any considerable duration. I have myself to limit my excursions in the _Viking_ to a few hours at a time. Nor would it be easy to take on board a man weighing 280 pounds who cannot walk, and more difficult still to convey him down the narrow gangway.

"The medical treatment, as I understand, prescribes absolute quiet; this is incompatible with yachting. I am here for a few days, and shall then return to Greystone. I receive frequent information in regard to Mr. Manning, but should be glad of anything which you may be able to communicate.

"I should be delighted if Mr. Manning should become able to use the _Viking_ with benefit.

"Very truly yours,
S. J. TILDEN."

WILLIAM E. SMITH TO TILDEN

"_Personal._

"TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., _March 31, 1886_.

"MY DEAR SIR,--Mr. Manning's condition is apparently about the same, but he is now believed to be out of danger, although it will probably be many months before he can attend to any business whatever. His case is complicated by disease of the kidneys, but the physicians say they do not fear any serious trouble from this cause. It is very difficult to obtain any reliable information as to his actual condition.

"Yours truly,
"W. E. SMITH."