Chapter XIII: Part II: , 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 555 (4)

To them the resolution seemed no more than the enunciation of a sentiment. “No movement was then made to provide and appropriate the funds required to carry it into effect; and we were not encouraged to believe that funds would be provided. And our belief has been fully justified by subsequent events. Not to mention other circumstances, it is quite sufficient for our purpose to bring to your notice the fact that, while this resolution was under consideration in the Senate our colleague, the Senator from Kentucky, moved an amendment appropriating $500,000 to the object therein designated, and it was voted down with great unanimity. What confidence, then, could we reasonably feel that if we committed ourselves to the policy it proposed, our constituents would reap the fruits of the promise held out; and on what ground could we, as fair men, approach them and challenge their support?”

They denied that if, as the President alleged, they had supported the resolution of March 6, the war would be substantially ended, and they added, “The resolution has passed and if there be virtue in it, it will be quite as efficacious as if we had voted for it.”

The war, they asserted, was prolonged not by reason of their conduct, but because of the union of all classes in the South. Those who wished to break down national independence and set up State domination, the State-rights party, could not be reconciled; but the large class who believed their domestic interests had been assailed by the Government might be if only they were convinced “that no harm is intended to them and their institutions,” but that the Government was simply defending its legitimate authority.

“Twelve months ago,” adds this response, “both Houses of Congress, adopting the spirit of your message, then but recently sent in, declared with singular unanimity the objects of the war, and the country instantly bounded to your side to assist you in carrying it on. If the spirit of that resolution had been adhered to, we are confident that we should before now have seen the end of this deplorable conflict. But what have we seen?

“In both Houses of Congress we have heard doctrines subversive of the principles of the Constitution, and seen measure after measure founded in substance on those doctrines proposed and carried through which can have no other effect than to distract and divide loyal men, and exasperate and drive still further from us and their duty the people of the rebellious States. Military officers, following these bad examples, have stepped beyond the just limits of their authority in the same direction, until in several instances you have felt the necessity of interfering to arrest them.... The effect of these measures was foretold, and may now be seen in the indurated state of Southern feeling.”

To these causes, and not to the failure of the border delegations to support the measure, they attributed the terrible earnestness of those in arms against the Government. Nor was the institution of slavery the source of insurgent strength, but rather the apprehension that the powers of a common Government would be wielded against the institutions of the Southern States.

The reply concludes: “If Congress, by proper and necessary legislation, shall provide sufficient funds and place them at your disposal, to be applied by you to the payment of any of our States or the citizens thereof who shall adopt the abolishment of slavery, either gradual or immediate, as they may determine, and the expense of deportation and colonization of the liberated slaves, then will our State[s] and people take this proposition into careful consideration, for such decision as in their judgment is demanded by their interest, their honor, and their duty to the whole country.”[265]

The minority, seven in number, in their reply of the 15th declared themselves ready to make any sacrifice to save the Government and the institutions of their fathers, and promised to ask the people of their States calmly, deliberately and fairly to consider the recommendations of the President; they were encouraged to assume this position because the leaders of the rebellion had offered to abolish slavery among them as a condition of foreign intervention in favor of their independence as a nation.[266]

Horace Maynard, though not representing a border State proper, expressed his approval of the President’s policy and stated the physical impossibility of submitting to the consideration of his people that or any other proposition until Tennessee had first been freed from hostile arms.[267]

A fourth paper submitted to the President was that of Senator J. B. Henderson, of Missouri, who had cheerfully supported the measure at the time of its introduction; he believed the proposition would have received the approbation of a large majority of the border State delegations if they could have foreseen that the war would have been protracted a twelvemonth and had felt assured that the dominant party in Congress would, like the President, be as prompt in practical action as they had been in the expression of a sentiment. “In this period of the nation’s distress,” says Senator Henderson, “I know of no human institution too sacred for discussion; no material interest belonging to the citizen that he should not willingly place upon the altar of his country, if demanded by the public good.”[268]

Mr. Henderson did not agree with the opinion of the President that “the war would now be substantially ended” had the members from the border States supported the measure in the preceding March. Personally he was favorable to the proposition, but remembered that he was the servant not the master of the people of Missouri.

To the sudden and unexpected collapse of McClellan’s Richmond campaign has been ascribed the determination of President Lincoln to adopt general military emancipation so much sooner than he otherwise would have done. The great and decisive element of military strength in the slave population which he saw so clearly a little later could not even then, June and July, 1862, have been altogether concealed from his keen insight into affairs. His personal appeal to the border Congressmen was made July 12; the result of that conference he easily anticipated. Nor was the receipt of their written replies necessary to inform him that his offer would be rejected. So much he could readily collect from their oral objections and verbal criticisms. The decision to give notice of his intention to issue a proclamation concerning slavery was probably made within a few hours after he had assured Mr. Crisfield that the emancipation policy extended no farther than to a refusal of the border States to accept his tender of pecuniary aid to any commonwealth voluntarily adopting the plan of gradual abolishment. However this may be, he confided on the following day, July 13, 1862, to Secretaries Seward and Welles his intention to emancipate slaves by proclamation if their masters did not cease to make war on the Government. From the diary of the latter, we learn under what circumstances this important communication was made.

President Lincoln [writes Mr. Welles] invited me to accompany him in
his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton.
Secretary Seward and Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the
carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time, for a summer residence,
the house of a naval officer, some two or three miles west or
northwesterly of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this
ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of
emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the rebels did not
cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of
which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity,
importance, and delicacy of the movement; said he had given it much
thought, and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military
necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation,
that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc.
This was, he said, the first occasion where he had mentioned the
subject to any one, and wished us to frankly state how the
proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved
consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to bestow on
it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer; but his
present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps
he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two
or three times on that ride the subject, which was of course an
absorbing one for each and all, was adverted to, and before
separating, the President desired us to give the subject special and
deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that
something must be done. It was a new departure for the President,
for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the
question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in
any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing
any interference by the General Government with the subject. This
was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of
whom, including the President, considered it a local domestic
question appertaining to the States respectively, who had never
parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before
Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the
insurrection, which extended through all the slave States and had
combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union,
impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to
preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and
disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as
field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in
attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and
teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed
by them.[269]

The session of Congress was drawing to a close, but before adjournment the Confiscation Act, passed July 17, 1862, was approved by the President. This with kindred laws increased the number of forfeitures of title to slaves for the crimes of treason and rebellion. These penalties were by him considered just and their imposition constitutional.

Within five days after the adjournment of Congress the President, July 21, 1862, reached his final conclusions on the subject of emancipation. The diary of Secretary Chase contains the following record:

[Having received notice of a Cabinet meeting, Mr. Chase says:] I
went to the President’s at the appointed hour and found that he was
profoundly concerned at the present aspect of affairs, and had
determined to take some definite steps in respect to military action
and slavery. He had prepared several orders, the first of which
contemplated authority to commanders to subsist their troops in the
hostile territory; the second, authority to employ negroes as
laborers; the third, requiring that both in case of property taken
and negroes employed, accounts should be kept with such degree of
certainty as would enable compensation to be made in proper cases.
Another provided for the colonization of negroes in some tropical
country.

A good deal of discussion took place upon these points. The first
order was unanimously approved. The second was also unanimously
approved; and the third by all except myself. I doubted the
expediency of attempting to keep accounts for the benefit of
inhabitants of rebel States. The colonization project was not much
discussed.

The Secretary of War presented some letters from General Hunter, in
which General Hunter advised the Department that the withdrawal of a
large proportion of his troops to reënforce General McClellan
rendered it highly important that he should be immediately
authorized to enlist all loyal persons without reference to
complexion. Mr. Stanton, Mr. Seward, and myself expressed ourselves
in favor of this plan, and no one expressed himself against it. Mr.
Blair was not present. The President was not prepared to decide the
question, but expressed himself as averse to arming negroes.[270]

This Cabinet meeting came to no final conclusion, and, as we learn from the same source, the discussion was resumed on the following day, July 22, when the question of arming the slaves was brought up.

I advocated it warmly [writes Secretary Chase].[271] The President
was unwilling to adopt this measure, but proposed to issue a
proclamation on the basis of the Confiscation Bill, calling upon the
States to return to their allegiance—warning rebels that the
provisions of the act would have full force at the expiration of
sixty days—adding, on his own part, a declaration of his intention
to renew, at the next session of Congress, his recommendation of
compensation to States adopting gradual abolishment of slavery—and
proclaiming the emancipation of all slaves within States remaining
in insurrection on the first day of January, 1863.[272]

Mr. Chase promised the measure his cordial support, but preferred that no new expression on the subject of compensation be made at that time. Secretary Chase, in the diary mentioned, says: “The impression left upon my mind by the whole discussion was, that, while the President thought that the organization, equipment, and arming of negroes, like other soldiers, would be productive of more evil than good, he was not unwilling that commanders should, at their discretion, arm for purely defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines.”[273] On the kindred policy of emancipation, however, the President had reached a definite conclusion which was in advance of the opinions entertained by even the most radical members of his Cabinet. When, therefore, he read to them, on July 22, his draft of an emancipation proclamation they were for the most part taken completely by surprise. This momentous document deserves to be reproduced entire.

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled
“An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and
rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other
purposes,” approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint
resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham
Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and
warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to
cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the
existing rebellion, or any rebellion, against the Government of the
United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the
United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and
by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting
of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure
for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of any
and all States which may then be recognizing and practically
sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then
have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt,
gradual abolishment of slavery within such State or States; that the
object is to practically restore, thenceforward to be maintained,
the constitutional relation between the General Government and each
and all the States wherein that relation is now suspended or
disturbed; and that for this object the war, as it has been, will be
prosecuted. And as a fit and necessary military measure for
effecting this object, I as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy
of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of
January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States
wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not
then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall
then, thenceforward, and forever be free.[274]

The diary of Secretary Chase, as well as the President’s endorsement on his draft, shows the emancipation proclamation to have been read to the Cabinet July 22, 1862. Various suggestions were offered; but except an objection of Secretary Seward they had all been fully anticipated by Mr. Lincoln and settled in his own mind. Secretary Seward said: “Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted Government, a cry for help; the Government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the Government.”

Speaking afterwards of this incident, Mr. Lincoln said: “Seward’s idea was ‘that it would be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat. Now,’ added Mr. Seward, ‘while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war!’ The wisdom of this view,” said Mr. Lincoln in recalling the occasion, “struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory.”[275]

Instead of the proclamation so carefully discussed, a short one was published three days later, of which the most important part is as follows:

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled
“An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and
rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for
other purposes,” approved July 17, 1862, and which act, and the
joint resolution explanatory thereof, are herewith published, I,
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim
to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth
section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or
abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion, against the
Government of the United States, and to return to their proper
allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and
seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.[276]

This warning was required by the sixth section of the act mentioned.

During the following month President Lincoln waited patiently for tidings of some unquestioned success that would justify the publication of his proclamation, but when instead he received in the closing days of August intelligence of the second disaster at Manassas his anxiety must have become intense. This victory, together with the succession of others recently attending Confederate arms, encouraged General Lee’s invasion of Maryland. An army, notwithstanding its late reverses, still formidable in numbers and once more thoroughly reorganized marched leisurely from the vicinity of Washington to locate and destroy him. When, where or how the battle-cloud would break was uncertain. All eyes were turned on McClellan, again in command of the Union forces and strengthened by every soldier that could be spared from the defences of the Federal capital. It was in this state of suspense, and on the very day, September 13, that Lee’s victorious legions entered Frederick City that the President gave audience to a deputation from the religious denominations of Chicago, presenting a memorial for the immediate issue of an emancipation proclamation, which was enforced by some remarks from the chairman. The President replied that he had for weeks past, even for months, thought much upon the subject of their memorial.

“I am approached,” said he, “with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps, in some respect, both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal His will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed He would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right.”

The difficulties of the subject and the impossibility of even anti-slavery men, in or out of Congress, agreeing upon any measure of emancipation were then referred to. However, he would discuss the merits of the case and asked pointedly:

“What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative.... Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there?”

He admitted to his visitors, however, that he raised no objections to such a proclamation as they desired on legal or on constitutional grounds; for, continued he, “as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy, nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion.”

The committee replied, and the President added, “I admit that slavery is at the root of the rebellion.... I will also concede that emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine.... Unquestionably, it would weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could do much with the blacks.”[277] The President, too, called attention to the fact that the border slave States had 50,000 bayonets in the Union army. It would be a serious matter if in consequence of such a proclamation they should go over to the South. In conclusion he said that he had not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but held the matter under advisement and assured them that the subject was on his mind by day and by night more than any other.

It was currently reported among anti-slavery men in Illinois that the emancipation proclamation was extorted from the President by the pressure of such delegations as this from the Christian Convention.[278] To determine how little foundation there is for this opinion it is only necessary to recall what had occurred in the Cabinet on July 22 preceding.

The repulse of Lee’s veterans at Antietam, September 17, 1862, raised somewhat the hopes of the President. On the 19th General McClellan telegraphed an account of his victory, and Mr. Lincoln three days later announced his intention to issue the postponed proclamation.

All the Cabinet members, having been summoned by messenger from the State Department, were in attendance at the White House on September 22, 1862. After some talk of a general nature, and the reading by Mr. Lincoln of a humorous chapter from a book by Artemus Ward, the conversation assumed a more serious tone. What subsequently transpired on that eventful occasion we learn from the following record in the diary of Secretary Chase:

“Gentlemen, [said the President] I have, as you are aware, thought a
great deal about the relation of this war to slavery, and you all
remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had
prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections made by
some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much
occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the
time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come
now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better
condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been
quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out
of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion.
When the rebel army was at Frederick I determined, as soon as it
should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of
emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said
nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and [hesitating a
little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am
going to fulfill that promise. I have got you together to hear what
I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main
matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without
intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already
know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore
expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and as carefully
as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have
determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use
or in any minor matter which any one of you thinks had best be
changed, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other
observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in
this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was
satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any
one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which
he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield
it to him. But though I believe that I have not so much of the
confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know
that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however
this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put
where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the
responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take.”

The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation,
making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that
he had fully considered the subject in all the lights under which it
had been presented to him.

After he had closed, Governor Seward said: “The general question
having been decided, nothing can be said further about that. Would
it not, however, make the proclamation more clear and decided to
leave out all reference to the act being sustained during the
incumbency of the present President; and not merely say that the
Government _recognises_, but that it will maintain the freedom it
proclaims?”

I followed, saying: “What you have said, Mr. President, fully
satisfies me that you have given to every proposition which has been
made a kind and candid consideration. And you have now expressed the
conclusion to which you have arrived clearly and distinctly. This it
was your right, and, under your oath of office, your duty to do. The
proclamation does not, indeed, mark out the course I would myself
prefer; but I am ready to take it just as it is written and to stand
by it with all my heart. I think, however, the suggestions of
Governor Seward very judicious, and shall be glad to have them
adopted.”

The President then asked us severally our opinions as to the
modifications proposed, saying that he did not care much about the
phrases he had used. Every one favored the modification, and it was
adopted. Governor Seward then proposed that in the passage relating
to colonization some language should be introduced to show that the
colonization proposed was to be only with the consent of the
colonists, and the consent of the states in which the colonies might
be attempted. This, too, was agreed to, and no other modification
was proposed. Mr. Blair then said that the question having been
decided, he would make no objection to issuing the proclamation; but
he would ask to have his paper, presented some days since, against
the policy, filed with the proclamation. The President consented to
this readily. And then Mr. Blair went on to say that he was afraid
of the influence of the proclamation on the border States and on the
army, and stated, at some length, the grounds of his apprehensions.
He disclaimed most expressly, however, all objections to
emancipation _per se_, saying he had always been personally in favor
of it—always ready for immediate emancipation in the midst of slave
States, rather than submit to the perpetuation of the system.[279]

The foregoing account from the diary of Secretary Chase is fully corroborated by a narrative of Mr. Welles describing the same event.[280] Mr. Blair, as already observed, believed the time inopportune for issuing the proclamation and feared as a result that the border States would go over to secession. The President, however, thought the difficulty not to act as great as to act. There were two sides, he said, to that question. For months he had labored to get those States to move in this matter, convinced in his own mind that it was their true interest to do so, but his labors were vain. “We must take the forward movement,” he declared. “They would acquiesce, if not immediately, soon; for they must be satisfied that slavery had received its death-blow from slave-owners—it could not survive the rebellion.”[281]

When the Cabinet had concluded its deliberations the document was duly attested, the seal affixed and the President’s signature added. On the following morning, September 23, 1862, the proclamation was published in full by all the leading newspapers of the loyal States, where it excited the most profound surprise. Indicating, as it does, the progress of opinion, it was the first great landmark of the war; behind it lay the old, before it the new order of things. The successive steps by which Mr. Lincoln reached this position have been sketched in the present chapter with fullness and, it is believed, with accuracy. It has been shown how fugitive slaves escaping to the Federal lines were at first surrendered to their masters; how soon afterward, as in the case of General Butler’s command, they were protected by the army and employed as laborers; how in a later stage, certain Union commanders who proposed to confiscate slave property or to arm negroes as soldiers were gently rebuked and their acts disavowed by the President. This forbearance, however, was without effect on the Southern people, whose hatred was quite as likely to ascribe it to Yankee cowardice as to Yankee magnanimity.

With this account of the introduction into the problem of reconstruction of a novel and very perplexing element we are prepared to examine the various theories of State status held by those whose position and ability made them leaders of public opinion. That subject will be more properly discussed in a separate chapter.

-----

Footnote 213:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 209.

Footnote 214:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 1.

Footnote 215:

Addresses and Papers of Edward L. Pierce, pp. 20–25.

Footnote 216:

Addresses and Papers of E. L. Pierce, p. 26.

Footnote 217:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist. p. 244.

Footnote 218:

Ibid.

Footnote 219:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 244.

Footnote 220:

Ibid., p. 245.

Footnote 221:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 235n.

Footnote 222:

Addresses and Papers of E. L. Pierce, p. 29.

Footnote 223:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 245.

Footnote 224:

Appendix, Globe, 1 Sess. 37th Cong., p. 42.

Footnote 225:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 245.

Footnote 226:

Ibid., pp. 245–246.

Footnote 227:

General Anderson had telegraphed President Lincoln that an entire
company of Kentucky soldiers had laid down their arms upon hearing of
Fremont’s action.

Footnote 228:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 77.

Footnote 229:

Ibid., pp. 78–79.

Footnote 230:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 247–248.

Footnote 231:

Ibid., p. 248.

Footnote 232:

N. Y. Tribune, November 8, 1861.

Footnote 233:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 90.

Footnote 234:

Ibid.

Footnote 235:

Ann. Cycl., 1861, p. 646.

Footnote 236:

First Annual Message, December 3, 1861. McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p.
134; Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 102–103.

Footnote 237:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 249.

Footnote 238:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 91.

Footnote 239:

See “Journal of the Senate of the State of Delaware, At a Special
Session of the General Assembly, Commenced and held at Dover, on
Monday, the 25th day of November, 1861.”

Footnote 240:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 250.

Footnote 241:

Ibid., p. 248.

Footnote 242:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 250.

Footnote 243:

Ibid.

Footnote 244:

Ibid., p. 251.

Footnote 245:

Addresses and Papers of E. L. Pierce, p. 87; also Letters and State
Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 126.

Footnote 246:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 129.

Footnote 247:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 129–130.

Footnote 248:

Ann. Cycl., 1862, pp. 799–800.

Footnote 249:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 132.

Footnote 250:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 210.

Footnote 251:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 133–135; also
McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 210–211.

Footnote 252:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 137–138.

Footnote 253:

Ann. Cycl., 1862, pp. 346–347.

Footnote 254:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 37th Cong., p. 1496.

Footnote 255:

See p. 143, _ante_.

Footnote 256:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 226–227.

Footnote 257:

The question of colonizing free blacks out of the United States
engaged the attention of Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, who had
some correspondence on the subject at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. Late in the year 1816 there was organized in the city of
Washington the “National Colonization Society,” of which the expressed
purpose was to encourage emancipation by procuring a place outside the
United States, preferably in Africa, to which free negroes could be
aided in emigrating. This, it was believed, would rid the South of its
free colored population which had already become a nuisance. Until
1830 it was warmly supported everywhere, and branches of the society
were established in nearly every State. In the South its purposes were
furthered by James Madison, by Charles Carroll and by Henry Clay.
Bushrod Washington became president of the association. Rufus King and
President Harrison were among its friends in the North.

Though Texas and Mexico were looked upon as favorable places for
locating a colony of free blacks, they were sent to the British
possession of Sierra Leone. In 1821 a permanent location was purchased
in Liberia. This settlement, with Monrovia as its capital, became
independent in 1847. The American Colonization Society attracted
little notice after the rise, about 1829–30, of those known as
immediate abolitionists.

Footnote 258:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 155.

Footnote 259:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 251.

Footnote 260:

Ibid., p. 252.

Footnote 261:

Globe, Part III., 2 Sess. 37th Cong., p. 2068.

Footnote 262:

Ibid., p. 2618. Ibid., p. 2769.

Footnote 263:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 233.

Footnote 264:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 204–205.

Footnote 265:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 214–217.

Footnote 266:

Ibid., pp. 217–218.

Footnote 267:

Ibid., p. 218.

Footnote 268:

Ibid., pp. 218–220.

Footnote 269:

Quoted in Nicolay and Hay’s Abraham Lincoln, A History. Vol. VI. p.
121 _et seq._

Footnote 270:

Schuckers’ Life of Salmon Portland Chase, pp. 439–440.

Footnote 271:

Ibid., p. 440.

Footnote 272:

Shuckers’ Life of Chase, pp. 440–441.

Footnote 273:

Ibid., p. 441.

Footnote 274:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 213.

Footnote 275:

Carpenter’s Six Months at the White House, pp. 21–22.

Footnote 276:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 214.

Footnote 277:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 231–232.

Footnote 278:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 233.

Footnote 279:

Quoted in Schuckers’ Life of Chase, pp. 453–455.

Footnote 280:

The Galaxy, December, 1872, pp. 846–847.

Footnote 281:

Ibid., p. 847.

VI
THEORIES AND PLANS OF RECONSTRUCTION

In considering the different plans of reconstruction it is not deemed necessary to discuss further than has been done in the preceding pages the President’s theory of State status. There, in his effort to establish loyal governments in three of the rebellious States, as well as in the protection and encouragement extended to reorganized Virginia, we have seen practical applications of that theory. In his first inaugural Mr. Lincoln said: “It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination,” and on the same occasion he added, “No State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that _resolves_ and _ordinances_ to that effect are legally void.”[282] From the principles of March 4, 1861, was logically deduced the central idea of the plan announced in December, 1863, and maintained by the President till the last hour of his life. In his first message to Congress, submitted at the special session beginning July 4, 1861, he again attempted to remove the fears of those whose prejudice ascribed to the dominant political party a purpose to interfere in the domestic concerns of the slaveholding States. As will be seen by the following quotation he little more than reiterated on that occasion what he had solemnly declared four months earlier:

Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what
is to be the course of the Government towards the Southern States
_after_ the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive
deems it proper to say, it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be
guided by the Constitution and the laws; and that he probably will
have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the
Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the
people, under the Constitution, than that expressed in the inaugural
address.

He desires to preserve the Government, that it may be administered
for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal
citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their
Government, and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect
it. It is not perceived that, in giving it, there is any coercion,
any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those
terms.[283]

The first paragraph quoted expresses his perfect confidence in a successful conclusion of the war, and in this respect suggests the faith of Charles Sumner, in whose private correspondence the same thought constantly occurs. In his message the President observed also that Virginia had allowed “this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders; and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it _where_ it finds it. And it has the less regret, as the loyal citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recognize, and protect, as being Virginia.”[284]

As early as June, 1861, Mr. Lincoln, on application of Governor Pierpont, recognized the restored State of Virginia by promising assistance to repel invasion and to suppress domestic violence; his example was followed by both Houses of Congress: first, in the prompt admission of Senators and Representatives from that Commonwealth, and long afterward, when there was ample time for reflection, by consenting to admit the new State of West Virginia, to whose separate and independent existence the reorganized Legislature had formally assented. The recognition of Pierpont’s government, however, involved on the constitutional question little difference of opinion between the President and Congress. Thus far the political departments, if not in complete harmony, were at any rate not in conflict. This act, though it marked no distinct Executive policy, was the occasion of some discordant notes which will be referred to in their proper relation.

It may not be unnecessary to observe that underlying the early policy of the President was a conviction that the rebellion was effected by a small but treasonable faction; indeed, in the message of July 4 he expressed his belief that, with the probable exception of South Carolina, the disloyal were in a minority in all the seceding States. The great mass of Southern people, it was assumed, opposed disunion, and with Federal assistance would soon right themselves. Peaceful citizens of that section, being regarded as still under protection of the Constitution, were, therefore, not to be molested. The conflict waged by the General Government was a personal war against insurgents. Leaders who encouraged sedition and committed acts of hostility against the United States could be tried precisely as in a consolidated state like Great Britain, and upon conviction punished for their treason. This attitude was not only wise, but had the additional merit of greatly simplifying the method of restoration. It asserted further that the rebellious States were still in the Union, and under the existing compact could not lawfully withdraw from it; being in the Union, they were entitled to all the rights accorded to other members of the confederation. In brief, its essential idea was the indestructibility of a State, and it denied that the integrity of the national domain had been impaired or the number of States diminished by the ordinances of secession. The General Government could properly aid the people of a State to express their will, but, beyond what was demanded by the exigencies of the war, could not legally exercise those powers constitutionally reserved to the States. By the treasonable act of levying war against the Republic the rights and franchises incident to United States citizenship were forfeited. The power of Congress extended no further than to a guaranty of preëxisting republican forms of government.

To the correctness of these principles Democrats and Republicans alike gave almost universal assent. But the war was increasing in magnitude, and the measures adequate to the suppression of a gigantic rebellion proved to be very different from those adapted to a local insurrection. The President’s original intention was to overcome armed resistance to Federal power and as speedily as possible restore the States to their former relations. This task, however, was more easily conceived than accomplished, and in the terrible conflict that ensued political parties as well as individual statesmen were swept onward from point to point to very different resting-places. From this condition resulted the great number of theories of reconstruction presented before the end of the rebellion.

The President early in the war adopted principles that found little favor with conservative Democrats. His readiness to recognize the restored State of Virginia was equivalent to a declaration that if a majority of the people in one of the seceded States voluntarily transferred their obedience and support to a hostile power the loyal minority constituted the State and should govern it. In this connection will be remembered the objections of Bayard and Saulsbury to receiving Senators Willey and Carlile from the reorganized government of Virginia. A further advance is indicated by Mr. Lincoln’s appointment, early in 1862, of military governors for those States that had been brought partly within Federal military lines. After the proclamation of September 22, 1862, and that of January 1 succeeding, the question of restoration was left permanently out of view. If the erring States were ever to resume their places they must first recognize the anti-slavery legislation summarized in the preceding chapter. Hitherto the paramount consideration with the President was a speedy restoration of former relations; thenceforth “the Union as it was” became impossible, because slaves liberated in the progress of the war could never be returned to a condition of servitude. The introduction of this element greatly increased the difficulties of a problem already sufficiently intricate. But neither this nor any other consequence of his proclamation appears to have been overlooked by the Executive.

The message of December 8, 1863, together with the accompanying proclamation sketched in outline the only plan which Mr. Lincoln ever published on the subject of reconstruction, and even to this mode of reinstatement he did not require exact conformity, recognizing that its modification might be demanded by inherent differences in situation among the returning States. By its terms all persons participated in the rebellion, except certain described classes, were promised amnesty with restoration of property (excluding slaves and those cases of property in which rights of third parties intervened) upon taking an oath which pledged support of the Constitution and the Union; of the slavery legislation enacted during the war (unless such acts were repealed by Congress, or were modified or annulled by the Supreme Court), and adherence to all Executive proclamations on that subject so long and so far as not modified or declared void by the Judiciary. Whenever in any of the rebellious States a number of persons equal to one tenth of the voters participating in the Presidential election of 1860, who were qualified electors under the laws existing immediately before the ordinance of secession, should reëstablish a State government republican in form, and not contravening this oath, it would be recognized as the true government of that State and should receive the benefits of the constitutional guaranty. To the emancipated race renewed assurance of permanent freedom was given. It was also suggested that in reorganization the political framework of the States be maintained. The admission of members elected to Congress was a matter for the determination of its respective Houses.

It is proper to notice in this method of reorganization, known afterward as “the Louisiana Plan,” the absence of any provision for conferring on the freedmen the elective franchise. In a private letter to Governor Hahn the President had, it is true, expressed his personal preference for including among the electors such of the colored race as had fought gallantly in the Union ranks and also the very intelligent among them[285]. This, however, was only an unofficial suggestion. Nor were securities of any sort required for the future as a condition of reinstatement.

Under this plan, which was presented as only a rallying point, Union governments had been inaugurated in Tennessee, Louisiana and Arkansas; the first two participated in the Presidential election of 1864, and before the close of the war they had all elected members to Congress. The legality of these governments Mr. Lincoln always maintained. How Congress regarded them will be related in succeeding chapters.

Long before the announcement of any mode of reorganization by the Executive, members of the Legislative branch of Government had made some efforts in this field; these, however, were for the most part tentative and hesitant. The question had not yet been brought fairly before Congress; indeed, it was in discussing the results and tendencies of Presidential reconstruction that the Congressional plan, destined ultimately to prevail, slowly assumed definitive form.

As early as December, 1861, Mr. Harlan, of Iowa, introduced into the Senate a bill for the establishment of provisional governments for the territory embraced by the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee. It was referred to the Committee on Territories, but was never reported.

More important, however, than this proposed enactment, both because of the acknowledged position of their author and the influence which they exerted upon the mode of reconstruction finally adopted, were the nine resolutions offered, February 11, 1862, by Charles Sumner. These were “declaratory of the relations between the United States and the territory once occupied by certain States, and now usurped by pretended governments, without constitutional or legal right.” A preamble in the characteristic style of this celebrated statesman introduced his famous propositions, which were as follows:

Whereas certain States, rightfully belonging to the Union of the
United States, have through their respective governments wickedly
undertaken to abjure all those duties by which their connection with
the Union was maintained; to renounce all allegiance to the
Constitution; to levy war upon the national Government; and, for the
consummation of this treason, have unconstitutionally and unlawfully
confederated together, with the declared purpose of putting an end
by force to the supremacy of the Constitution within their
respective limits; and whereas this condition of insurrection,
organized by pretended governments, openly exists in South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas,
Tennessee, and Virginia, except in Eastern Tennessee and Western
Virginia, and has been declared by the President of the United
States, in a proclamation duly made in conformity with an act of
Congress, to exist throughout this territory, with the exceptions
already named; and whereas the extensive territory thus usurped by
these pretended governments and organized into a hostile
confederation, belongs to the United States, as an inseparable part
thereof, under the sanctions of the Constitution, to be held in
trust for the inhabitants in the present and future generations, and
is so completely interlinked with the Union that it is forever
dependent thereupon; and whereas the Constitution, which is the
supreme law of the land, cannot be displaced in its rightful
operation within this territory, but must ever continue the supreme
law thereof, notwithstanding the doings of any pretended governments
acting singly or in confederation, in order to put an end to its
supremacy: Therefore:

1. _Resolved_, That any vote of secession or other act by which any
State may undertake to put an end to the supremacy of the
Constitution within its territory is inoperative and void against
the Constitution, and when sustained by force it becomes a practical
_abdication_ by the State of all rights under the Constitution,
while the treason which it involves still further works an instant
_forfeiture_ of all those functions and powers essential to the
continued existence of the State as a body politic, so that from
that time forward the territory falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress as other territory, and the State being,
according to the language of the law, _felo-de-se_, ceases to exist.

2. That any combination of men assuming to act in the place of such
State, attempting to insnare or coerce the inhabitants thereof into
a confederation hostile to the Union, is rebellious, treasonable,
and destitute of all moral authority; and that such combination is a
usurpation incapable of any constitutional existence and utterly
lawless, so that everything dependent upon it is without
constitutional or legal support.

3. That the termination of a State under the Constitution
necessarily causes the termination of those peculiar local
institutions which, having no origin in the Constitution or in those
natural rights which exist independent of the Constitution, are
upheld by the sole and exclusive authority of the State.

4. That slavery, being a peculiar local institution, derived from
local laws, without any origin in the Constitution or in natural
rights, is upheld by the sole and exclusive authority of the State,
and must therefore cease to exist legally or constitutionally when
the State on which it depends no longer exists; for the incident
cannot survive the principal.

5. That in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over the
territory once occupied by the States, it is the duty of Congress to
see that the supremacy of the Constitution is maintained in its
essential principles, so that everywhere in this extensive territory
slavery shall cease to exist practically, as it has already ceased
to exist constitutionally or legally.

6. That any recognition of slavery in such territory, or any
surrender of slaves under the pretended laws of the extinct States
by any officer of the United States, civil or military, is a
recognition of the pretended governments, to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of Congress under the Constitution, and is in the
nature of aid and comfort to the rebellion that has been organized.

7. That any such recognition of slavery or surrender of pretended
slaves, besides being a recognition of the pretended governments,
giving them aid and comfort, is a denial of the rights of persons
who, by the extinction of the States, have become free, so that,
under the Constitution, they cannot again be enslaved.

8. That allegiance from the inhabitant and protection from the
Government are corresponding obligations, dependent upon each other,
so that while the allegiance of every inhabitant of this territory,
without distinction of color or class, is due to the United States,
and cannot in any way be defeated by the action of any pretended
Government, or by any pretence of property or claim to service, the
corresponding obligation of protection is at the same time due by
the United States to every such inhabitant, without distinction of
color or class; and it follows that inhabitants held as slaves,
whose paramount allegiance is due to the United States, may justly
look to the national Government for protection.