Chapter XXIII: Section 13: provided that “if any person declared free by this or any law (6)

In urging on Mr. Stephens separate State action to effect a cessation of hostilities, the President said: “If I resided in Georgia, with my present sentiments, I’ll tell you what I would do if I were in your place. I would go home and get the Governor of the State to call the Legislature together, and get them to recall all the State troops from the war; elect Senators and Members to Congress, and ratify this constitutional amendment prospectively, so as to take effect—say in five years. Such a ratification would be valid, in my opinion. I have looked into the subject, and think such a prospective ratification would be valid. Whatever may have been the views of your people before the war, they must be convinced now that slavery is doomed. It cannot last long in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, for your public men to pursue would be to adopt such a policy as will avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation. This would be my course, if I were in your place.”[431]

The advice was wasted. When the party was on the point of separating, Mr. Stephens again asked the President to reconsider the plan of an armistice on the basis of a Mexican expedition. “Well, Stephens,” replied Mr. Lincoln, “I will reconsider it; but I do not think my mind will change.” Thus ended the famous Hampton Roads conference.

On their return to Richmond the commissioners made a formal report to Mr. Davis of the failure of negotiations; this he transmitted to the Confederate Congress with an artful letter designed to strengthen the war party in the South, and to silence effectually the adversaries of his administration. To improve this advantage a day was appointed for the purpose of getting a popular expression on the result of the conference. Business was generally suspended, and the people crowded every building in the city suitable for holding large assemblies. Churches, theatres and halls of legislation were engaged for the occasion. Twenty orators, among the ablest in the South, told their hearers of the Northern “ultimatum,” not omitting to describe eloquently all the consequences of subjugation. The old war spirit appeared to have been kindled once more; “But,” says Mr. Pollard, “it was only the sickly glare of an expiring flame; there was no steadiness in the excitement; there was no virtue in huzzas; the inspiration ended with the voices and ceremonies that invoked it; and it was found that the spirit of the people of the Confederacy was too weak, too much broken to act with effect, or assume the position of erect and desperate defiance.”[432] In March General Lee revealed the weakness of his army at Fort Steadman; Grant’s movements around Petersburg followed in April; the rest is a familiar story.

From this brief discussion of topics only allied to the Presidential method of reunion it is time to resume our examination of the main theme.

It is almost a trite observation to remark that President Lincoln’s opinions on public questions were formed only after mature deliberation, and that to the conclusions thus reached he adhered with inflexible tenacity. Notwithstanding the sentiments of Congress on the question of reconstruction he evinced a decided preference for his own. This is proved by a number of letters and speeches from which two may be selected both because of the time of their appearance and the station of the persons to whom they were addressed. To General Hurlbut, who had temporarily succeeded Banks in command at New Orleans, the President wrote, November 14, 1864, the following admonitory letter:

Few things, since I have been here, have impressed me more painfully
than what, for four or five months past, has appeared a bitter
military opposition to the new State government of Louisiana. I
still indulged some hope that I was mistaken in the fact; but copies
of a correspondence on the subject between General Canby and
yourself, and shown me to-day, dispel that hope. A very fair
proportion of the people of Louisiana have inaugurated a new State
government, making an excellent new constitution—better for the poor
black man than we have in Illinois. This was done under military
protection, directed by me, in the belief, still sincerely
entertained, that with such a nucleus around which to build we could
get the State into position again sooner than otherwise. In this
belief a general promise of protection and support, applicable alike
to Louisiana and other States, was given in the last annual message.
During the formation of the new government and constitution they
were supported by nearly every loyal person, and opposed by every
secessionist. And this support and this opposition, from the
respective standpoints of the parties, was perfectly consistent and
logical. Every Unionist ought to wish the new government to succeed;
and every disunionist must desire it to fail. Its failure would
gladden the heart of Slidell in Europe, and of every enemy of the
old flag in the world. Every advocate of slavery naturally desires
to see blasted and crushed the liberty promised the black man by the
new constitution. But why General Canby and General Hurlbut should
join on the same side is to me incomprehensible.

Of course, in the condition of things at New Orleans, the military
must not be thwarted by the civil authority; but when the
constitutional Convention, for what it deems a breach of privilege,
arrests an editor in no way connected with the military, the
military necessity for insulting the Convention and forcibly
discharging the editor is difficult to perceive. Neither is the
military necessity for protecting the people against paying large
salaries fixed by a legislature of their own choosing very apparent.
Equally difficult to perceive is the military necessity for forcibly
interposing to prevent a bank from loaning its own money to the
State. These things, if they have occurred, are, at the best, no
better than gratuitous hostility. I wish I could hope that they may
be shown to not have occurred. To make assurance against
misunderstanding, I repeat that in the existing condition of things
in Louisiana, the military must not be thwarted by the civil
authority; and I add that on points of difference the commanding
general must be judge and master. But I also add that in the
exercise of this judgment and control, a purpose, obvious and
scarcely unavowed, to transcend all military necessity, in order to
crush out the civil government, will not be overlooked.[433]

A similar communication, though less peremptory in tone, he felt constrained to send to General E. R. S. Canby, who had been assigned to command in the military division of West Mississippi. Under date of December 12, 1864, he wrote that officer:

I think it is probable that you are laboring under some
misapprehension as to the purpose, or rather the motive, of the
Government on two points—cotton and the new Louisiana State
government.

It is conceded that military operations are the first in importance;
and as to what is indispensable to these operations, the department
commander must be judge and master.

But the other matters mentioned I suppose to be of public importance
also; and what I have attempted in regard to them is not merely a
concession to private interest and pecuniary greed.

* * * * *

As to the new State government of Louisiana. Most certainly there is
no worthy object in getting up a piece of machinery merely to pay
salaries and give political consideration to certain men. But it is
a worthy object to again get Louisiana into proper practical
relations with the nation, and we can never finish this if we never
begin it. Much good work is already done, and surely nothing can be
gained by throwing it away.

I do not wish either cotton or the new State government to take
precedence of the military while the necessity for the military
remains; but there is a strong public reason for treating each with
so much favor as may not be substantially detrimental to the
military.[434]

That Mr. Lincoln never modified these opinions is conclusively proved by the last public utterance of his life. In addressing the citizens of Washington, who were holding a demonstration in consequence of Lee’s surrender, the President on the evening of April 11 said:

By these recent successes the reinauguration of the national
authority—reconstruction—which has had a large share of thought from
the first, is pressed much more closely upon our attention. It is
fraught with great difficulty. Unlike a case of war between
independent nations, there is no authorized organ for us to treat
with—no one man has authority to give up the rebellion for any other
man. We simply must begin with and mold from disorganized and
discordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrassment that
we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner,
and measure of reconstruction. As a general rule, I abstain from
reading the reports of attacks upon myself, wishing not to be
provoked by that to which I cannot properly offer an answer. In
spite of this precaution, however, it comes to my knowledge that I
am much censured for some supposed agency in setting up and seeking
to sustain the new State government of Louisiana.

In this I have done just so much as, and no more than, the public
knows. In the annual message of December, 1863, and in the
accompanying proclamation, I presented a plan of reconstruction, as
the phrase goes, which I promised, if adopted by any State, should
be acceptable to and sustained by the executive Government of the
nation. I distinctly stated that this was not the only plan which
might possibly be acceptable, and I also distinctly protested that
the executive claimed no right to say when or whether members should
be admitted to seats in Congress from such States. This plan was in
advance submitted to the then Cabinet, and distinctly approved by
every member of it. One of them suggested that I should then and in
that connection apply the Emancipation Proclamation to the
theretofore excepted parts of Virginia and Louisiana; that I should
drop the suggestion about apprenticeship for freed people, and that
I should omit the protest against my own power in regard to the
admission of members of Congress. But even he approved every part
and parcel of the plan which has since been employed or touched by
the action of Louisiana.

The new constitution of Louisiana, declaring emancipation for the
whole State, practically applies the proclamation to the part
previously excepted. It does not adopt apprenticeship for freed
people, and it is silent, as it could not well be otherwise, about
the admission of members to Congress. So that, as it applies to
Louisiana, every member of the Cabinet fully approved the plan. The
message went to Congress, and I received many commendations of the
plan, written and verbal, and not a single objection to it from any
professed emancipationist came to my knowledge until after the news
reached Washington that the people of Louisiana had begun to move in
accordance with it. From about July 1862, I had corresponded with
different persons supposed to be interested [in] seeking a
reconstruction of a State government for Louisiana. When the message
of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans,
General Banks wrote me that he was confident that the people, with
his military coöperation, would reconstruct substantially on that
plan. I wrote to him and some of them to try it. They tried it, and
the result is known. Such has been my only agency in getting up the
Louisiana government.

As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad
promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad
promise, and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it
is adverse to the public interest; but I have not yet been so
convinced. I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to
be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind
has not seemed to be definitely fixed on the question whether the
seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it. It would
perhaps add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I
have found professed Union men endeavoring to make that question, I
have purposely forborne any public expression upon it. As appears to
me, that question has not been, nor yet is, a practically material
one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains
practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the
mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, whatever it may
hereafter become, that question is bad as the basis of a
controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious
abstraction.

We all agree that the seceded States, so called, are out of their
proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object
of the Government, civil and military, in regard to those States is
to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe
that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without
deciding or even considering whether these States have ever been out
of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it
would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let
us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper
practical relations between these States and the Union, and each
forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether in doing
the acts he brought the States from without into the Union, or only
gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. The
amount of constituency, so to speak, on which the new Louisiana
government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained
50,000, or 30,000, or even 20,000, instead of only about 12,000, as
it does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective
franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer
that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who
serve our cause as soldiers.

Still, the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it
stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, will it be
wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and
disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation
with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State
government? Some twelve thousand voters in the heretofore slave
State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be
the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized
a State government, adopted a free State constitution, giving the
benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering
the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored
man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the
constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing
slavery throughout the nation. These twelve thousand persons are
thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetual freedom in the
State—committed to the very things, and nearly all the things, the
nation wants—and they ask the nation’s recognition and its
assistance to make good their committal.

Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize
and disperse them. We, in effect, say to the white man: You are
worthless or worse; we will neither help you, nor be helped by you.
To the blacks we say: This cup of liberty which these, your old
masters, hold to your lips we will dash from you, and leave you to
the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some
vague and undefined when, where, and how. If this course,
discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any tendency
to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I
have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we
recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse
of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms
of the twelve thousand to adhere to their work, and argue for it,
and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it,
and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing
all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and
daring, to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective
franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already
advanced steps toward it than by running backward over them? Concede
that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as
the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching
the egg than by smashing it.

Again, if we reject Louisiana we also reject one vote in favor of
the proposed amendment to the national Constitution. To meet this
proposition it has been argued that no more than three fourths of
those States which have not attempted secession are necessary to
validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit myself against this
further than to say that such a ratification would be questionable,
and sure to be persistently questioned, while a ratification by
three fourths of all the States would be unquestioned and
unquestionable. I repeat the question: Can Louisiana be brought into
proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by
discarding her new State government? What has been said of Louisiana
will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities
pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur
in the same State, and withal so new and unprecedented is the whole
case that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed
as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan
would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and
must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it
may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the
South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied
that action will be proper.

The promised announcement was never made; for within three days the great career of Abraham Lincoln was brought to a close. The inherent difficulties of reconstruction, as well as the mischievous consequences of faction among Union men, he perceived and acknowledged at the outset. Precisely how he would have removed the one and, without breaking with his party, have avoided the other we can never know. His uniform success in dealing with other embarrassing questions appears to justify the opinion that he would not have failed altogether in solving the greater problem presented by the return of peace. This subject will be further discussed in the succeeding chapter.

-----

Footnote 425:

Globe, 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 141 (appendix).

Footnote 426:

Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln, by James R. Gilmore.

Footnote 427:

Gorham’s Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Vol. II. pp.
148–153.

Footnote 428:

N. and H., Vol. X. pp. 101–102.

Footnote 429:

N. and H., Vol. X. p. 107.

Footnote 430:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 644–645.

Footnote 431:

An interesting account of this entire subject will be found in Nicolay
and Hay’s Lincoln, Vol. X. ch. VI.; see also Raymond’s Life of
Lincoln, pp. 647–662.

Footnote 432:

The Lost Cause, pp. 684–685.

Footnote 433:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 597–598.

Footnote 434:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 616–617.

XII
CULMINATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PLAN

Able and candid exponents of public opinion in the South, even those who were a part of the “Lost Cause,” are almost unanimous in regarding the assassination of President Lincoln as one of the greatest calamities that befell their section of the Union.[435] Indeed, the writer has heard a distinguished editor ascribe to Jefferson Davis himself the opinion that next to the failure of the Confederacy the untimely death of Mr. Lincoln was the severest blow inflicted on Southern interests.[436] Many of the evils experienced by their States during the early years of Congressional reconstruction would have been avoided, they believe, under a continuance of the wise and considerate policy of the martyr President. While it is true that the confidence which he enjoyed among the masses in the loyal States, his unquestionable integrity and his splendid intellectual powers would have made him a formidable adversary even in a controversy with Congress, yet we have no assurance that these undoubted elements of strength would have enabled him, in the confused times following the Rebellion, to do more than postpone a contest with the Legislative branch in which a desire to discipline the South was even then winning adherents. The passions of the hour would have discovered a weakness in his clemency to the vanquished, while his very breadth of soul and sense would have been regarded by radical members of his party as only an evidence of his desire to facilitate the restoration to power of red-handed rebels. But it is idle to speculate on what might have been the result of his endeavors to heal the wounds of war, for, by the assassin’s bullet, the execution of his policy passed into other hands.

While the terrible tragedy of April 14 was still unknown to a great majority of American citizens, Andrew Johnson was quietly installed in the office of President. As every detail of the simple ceremony in the Kirkwood Hotel is familiar to this generation of readers, that event requires only a passing allusion. In the presence of the constitutional advisers of his predecessor, except Secretary Seward, who had been dangerously wounded by one of Booth’s accomplices, the oath of office was administered by Chief Justice Chase, who, with the Attorney-General, had examined the precedents and the law. Besides these officials a few members of Congress, who still lingered at the capital, were in attendance as witnesses.

Something of Andrew Johnson’s political career has been related in the chapter on Tennessee. As military governor of that State his high courage, his acknowledged patriotism, his honesty of purpose and principle were evident to all. Traits of character suspected, but not then fully disclosed, were developed by more complex conditions. The problem that confronted him may be briefly stated.

When Mr. Johnson succeeded to the Presidential office Confederate armies somewhat broken, indeed, but still capable of mischief were retarding the victorious march of Sherman’s legions. Measures for disbanding the former became necessary when Southern leaders, recognizing the hopelessness of further resistance, made overtures looking to an armistice which took place and to the surrender that subsequently followed. It became necessary to discontinue at once the enlistment of men in the loyal States, and, to economize expense, to muster out of service as expeditiously as possible the grand army of Union volunteers. The energy and promptness with which this task was accomplished were not the least of Secretary Stanton’s services to the nation. The perfection to which years of experience had brought the machinery of the War Department enabled the bulk of the Union armies to return without delay to their homes, where, discarding the character of soldiers, they melted insensibly into the civil population and speedily resumed the pursuits of peace. Relations with France were somewhat strained, and, owing to a succession of unfriendly acts, a war with Great Britain was not improbable. The public finances, too, required attention. To provide a revenue adequate to the extraordinary demands of the time was beginning to tax the resources of Government. A satisfactory settlement of even the least of these might well have appeared a serious question. The cessation of hostilities, however, presented a problem far transcending the greatest of them in importance.

Many of the late Confederate States were threatened with anarchy, for in those commonwealths the recent authority had been extinguished and no organizations existed which the Administration could recognize as State governments. The political reconstruction of four of them, it is true, had been commenced under encouragement and direction of the national Executive, but even in those much remained to be done. Before examining the condition of the insurgent States as a whole it may be well, therefore, to summarize the most important events that occurred in Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana and Virginia between the institution of loyal governments in those commonwealths and the meeting of the Thirty-ninth Congress in December, 1865.

The General Assembly of Arkansas, though lacking its full membership, convened in March, 1865, and unanimously adopted on April 14 succeeding the proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution. The action of Congress, however, in submitting that proposition to the States had been anticipated by the Union men of that commonwealth, for their organic law had already abolished involuntary servitude; by the same instrument they had repudiated all debts created in the conduct of the war, thereby complying with three of the principal conditions required for restoring their State to the Union.

During the same session an act passed the Legislature disfranchising all citizens who had aided the Confederate cause after the organization, April 18, 1864, of a loyal government. By the adversaries of this measure it was claimed that the lawmaking body exceeded its powers, because the act in effect prescribed qualifications for the suffrage different from those required by the State constitution, and, so far as it attempted to deprive citizens of their privileges without judicial conviction of crime, was contrary to the law of the land. This statute awakened the indifferent, and, as the time approached for holding Congressional elections, excited considerable discussion.

In the mean time the new government silently extended its authority over those parts of the State occupied by Southern soldiers until the cessation of hostilities. Governor Flanigan on retiring suggested that Confederate county officers be continued under his successor. This proposal, however, was promptly rejected and the secession establishment in all its parts completely ignored. Governor Murphy then published a proclamation urging the people in those regions hitherto dominated by the enemy, which comprised nearly half the counties in the State, to assemble and renew their local organizations. His address was favorably received, and his administration soon acquiesced in throughout the commonwealth. Outrages ceased with the disappearance of Confederate soldiers, and by the beginning of July judicial tribunals had been revived in nearly every county. Some of the courts had been in session, and most of them were prepared to meet regularly for the transaction of business. Taxes were collected as quietly as before the war, and civil process could be executed in every part of the State. Hundreds had returned from the South to their former homes and resumed the pursuits of peace. Discontent, so far as any existed in the State, was confined to some ex-Confederate officers and to a few non-combatants who had sympathized with the rebellion. Both classes advised disregard of the disfranchising law, but as a rule the returned soldiers on both sides were quiet and orderly. All accounts concur in representing the pacification of Arkansas as complete toward the end of summer, and by October 13, 1865, the Secretary of State was able to report officially that the new government was in successful operation, the civil organization of every county having been effected. Governor Murphy in approving a circular published near the close of the same month by Brigadier General Sprague, an assistant commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau, enjoined both civil officers and citizens to give all possible encouragement to the officers and appointees of the bureau.[437]

The President on receiving intelligence of this satisfactory condition of affairs sent to Governor Murphy the following dispatch:

There will be no interference with your present organization of
State government. I have learned from E. W. Gantt, Esq., and other
sources, that all is working well, and you will proceed and resume
the former relations with the Federal Government, and all the aid in
the power of the Government will be given in restoring the State to
its former relations.[438]

As the time approached for an election of national Representatives, the Governor issued another address in which he advised the choice of persons who could take the oath required by Congress. Three members were elected, namely: William Ryers, G. H. Kyle and James M. Johnson, who subsequently appeared at Washington and presented their credentials.[439]

The foregoing account of the situation in Arkansas is confirmed by the testimony of General Reynolds, military commander of the department, who had sent officers into all the counties. These reported civil government as everywhere reëstablished. The State, they asserted, had never enjoyed greater tranquillity. There was not a shadow of conflict between the civil and the military authority, for the latter in sustaining the former was careful not to encroach on any of its functions. In short, the restoration of civil law in that State was universally admitted.

In two thirds of the counties, however, great destitution prevailed. Early in the summer the General Government felt compelled to distribute among indigent freedmen and refugees vast quantities of food, and Northern generosity alone, the Governor declared, could prevent great distress during the ensuing winter. Nor was his expectation disappointed. It is a splendid tribute to the character of Americans that one of the most destructive conflicts in history, with all the animosities which protracted civil wars engender, did not perceptibly impair in them the feelings of humanity.

The organization of a Union government in Tennessee has elsewhere been described. The Assembly chosen under its authority met at Nashville on the 2d of April, 1865, and three days later ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. On the 21st the President was requested to proclaim the insurrection at an end in that commonwealth, though a few weeks later he was called upon for troops to guarantee a republican form of government and to protect the State against invasion and domestic violence. Besides appointing executive officers the Legislature elected to the United States Senate David T. Patterson and Joseph S. Fowler.

The most important measure of the session, however, was the enactment on June 5 of a severe law affecting the elective franchise. By it the right to vote was restricted, as formerly, to white males who had attained their twenty-first year. To the classes excepted by the Proclamation of December 8, 1863, were added all those who had left seats in the General Assembly, all who were absentees from the United States for the purpose of aiding the rebellion and all who had fled within the Confederate lines with the same intention. These were disfranchised for the period of fifteen years from the passage of the act.[440]

During this session there was presented by the freedmen of the State a petition for the elective franchise. The “colored citizens of Tennessee,” as they styled themselves, received no response to their prayer beyond the approval of an order for printing 500 copies of their memorial. The motion for this trifling concession was carried by a vote of 41 to 10.

On June 12 the Legislature adjourned until the first Monday in October. On the same day Governor Brownlow ordered an election to be held on August 2 for Representatives to Congress in each of the eight districts into which the State had just been divided. Vacancies in the General Assembly were directed to be filled at the same time.

The disfranchising act, with the oath required thereunder, had the effect of excluding a large number, probably three fourths, of the citizens from voting. Its adversaries declared the law unconstitutional, and it encountered much opposition, especially in Middle and West Tennessee. Its constitutionality, however, was sustained by one of the State courts in a decision rendered June 29, and the Governor, in a proclamation of July 10 succeeding, argued in favor of the statute. Those who should unite to defeat its execution would be “declared in rebellion against the State of Tennessee, and dealt with as rebels.” It was further signified that votes cast in violation of the law would not be taken into account by the Secretary of State.

Nor were these idle threats, for the civil officers were instructed “to arrest and bring to justice all persons who, under pretence of being candidates for Congress or other office, are traveling over the State denouncing and nullifying the Constitution and laws of the land, and spreading sedition and a spirit of rebellion.”[441]

It was relative to these measures that President Johnson on July 20, 1865, sent the following despatch to Governor Brownlow:

I hope and have no doubt you will see that the recent amendments to
the constitution of the State as adopted by the people, and all the
laws passed by the last Legislature in pursuance thereof, are fairly
executed, and that all illegal votes in the approaching election be
excluded from the polls, and the election for members of Congress be
legally and fairly conducted. When and wherever it becomes necessary
to employ force for the execution of the laws and the protection of
the ballot-box from violence and fraud, you are authorized to call
upon Maj.-Gen. Thomas for sufficient military force to sustain the
civil authorities of the State. I have received your recent address
to the people, and think it well timed, and hope it will do much
good in reconciling the opposition to the amendment to the
constitution and the laws passed by the last Legislature. The law
must be executed and the civil authority sustained. In your efforts
to do this, if necessary, Gen. Thomas will afford a sufficient
military force. You are at liberty to make what use you think proper
of this despatch.[442]

Though no violence marked the election, considerable irregularities, notwithstanding the Governor’s precautions, appear to have crept into modes of registration, and he felt compelled in consequence to reject the ballots of twenty-nine counties. In this contest 61,783 citizens participated, but when those illegally enrolled were disregarded the number was reduced to 39,509. The defective vote, which applied to all the candidates, was thrown out in every county, though it changed the result in only one district. Of the eight Representatives chosen all were Union men; four, however, were conservatives, opposed both to test oaths and measures of disfranchisement.[443] Governor Brownlow because of his action was severely censured, but was supported by a majority of the General Assembly.

In October, when the Legislature reassembled, a bill to render persons of African and of Indian descent competent witnesses in the State courts passed the Senate by the close vote of 10 to 9, but failed altogether to receive the approval of the House. The Representatives of his State declined at that time, by a vote of 35 to 25, to pass a simple resolution endorsing the Administration of President Johnson, but almost unanimously adopted in place of that proposition the following:

_Resolved_, That we endorse the administration of his Excellency the
President of the United States, and especially his declaration that
treason shall be made odious, and traitors punished.[444]

A colored convention representing the freedmen of the State was held at the capital during the week succeeding the election. If the Legislature did not grant before December 1, 1865, their petition for the elective franchise, this body resolved to protest against the admission of the Tennessee delegation to Congress. On the question of negro suffrage the Governor in his October message said:

I think it would be bad policy, as well as wrong in principle, to
open the ballot-box to the uninformed and exceedingly stupid slaves
of the Southern cotton, rice, and sugar fields. If allowed to vote,
the great majority of them would be influenced by leading
secessionists to vote against the Government, as they would be
largely under the influence o£ this class of men for years to come,
having to reside on and cultivate their lands. When the people of
Tennessee become satisfied that the negro is worthy of suffrage,
they will extend it, and not before; and I repeat that this question
must be regulated by the State authorities and by the loyal voters
of the State, not by the General Government.[445]

Apprehending trouble from the antagonism of races Mr. Brownlow advocated the old idea of colonization for the black man. He believed, however, that negroes should be admitted to testify in the courts and argued in favor of conferring such a privilege. Repugnance to their testimony, he declared, was due principally to education and habit.

If the following account from _The Knoxville Whig_ of September 27 is trustworthy the freedmen of Tennessee had but a slender claim to the right to vote. That journal said:

Thousands of free colored persons are congregating in and around the
large towns in Tennessee, and thousands are coming in from other
States, one third of whom cannot get employment. Indeed, less than
one third of them want employment, or feel willing to stoop to work.
They entertain the erroneous idea that the Government is bound to
supply all their wants, and even to furnish them with houses, if, in
order to do that, the white occupants must be turned out. There is a
large demand for labor in every section of the State, but the
colored people, with here and there a noble exception, scorn the
idea of work. They fiddle and dance at night, and lie around the
stores and street corners in the day time.[446]

The Governor’s message, sent in at this session, was hopeful in tone. He favored some amendment but not a repeal of the franchise law. He advised also a “full pardon to the masses—the young and the deluded, who followed blindly the standard of revolt, provided they act as becomes their circumstances.” The unrepentant, however, should suffer the period of disfranchisement; while the active leaders, he believed, were entitled “neither to mercy nor forbearance.” To some negroes he would give the right of suffrage, but, believing it unsafe, he was opposed to conferring it on them all.

Tennessee, over which advancing and retreating armies had repeatedly passed, suffered even more severely than Arkansas, for besides having been the principal theatre of operations for the contending hosts in the West, her territory had also been in the early rule of Governor Johnson the scene of local strife. Old family feuds that for various reasons had been allowed to slumber were in many instances revived, and the most lawless outrages perpetrated in the face of day. These disorders, however, had practically ceased toward the conclusion of his governorship, and peace reigned once more within the borders of that community. The existence there of a considerable demand for labor assisted greatly in diminishing the burden of the authorities.

The closing months of the war found the loyal government of Louisiana endeavoring with the influence of the Union army to extend its jurisdiction over all the territory that had been brought under Federal control. Notwithstanding its contracted area this commonwealth for certain purposes was treated as a restored member of the Union. Like the Northern States it was affected by the draft which, on February 15, took place in some districts included in the Department of the Gulf. But the great struggle that for four years had employed the attention and tested the resources of the Government soon reached its close, thus rendering unnecessary any field service from the recruits then obtained.

Though the attitude of Congress toward the Banks government has been described in the preceding pages, that was not believed the proper place to examine the nature of the election which was held on September 5, or the _personnel_ of the Legislature chosen on that occasion. In connection with the appointment by that assembly of Messrs. Smith and Cutler as United States Senators the subject was noticed incidentally. The action of Congress on the question of admitting members from Louisiana was, however, fully entered into in that relation.

Some additional information affecting the validity of that election is afforded by a proclamation published May 13, 1865, by the acting Governor, J. Madison Wells.[447] This document asserts that the Register of Voters for the city of New Orleans declared officially that there had been enrolled 5,000 persons who did not possess the legal qualifications for electors. To ascertain the political people, therefore, a new registration was thought desirable. Mr. Wells accordingly declared the old records closed from the date of his proclamation. The certificates granted thereon, as well as the enrollment, were pronounced null and void. He then authorized the opening on June 1, 1865, of a new set of books, the enrollment to be made in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by the constitution and laws of Louisiana. The old registration having been made under an order of General Banks this announcement led at once to a difference between the Department Commander and the acting Governor. Many names recorded on the old books were alleged to have been those of colored men, and a circumstance presently to be related tends to support the assertion.

About that time the Confederate Governor, Allen, transferred to Federal officials all the important military records in his possession, and from his capital at Shreveport published a communication in which he announced his administration closed on that day. He said in part: “The war is over, the contest is ended, the soldiers are disbanded and gone home, and now there is in Louisiana no opposition whatever to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”[448]

On June 10 an address to the people of thirty-five parishes was issued by the new Governor, who congratulated them on their return to the protection of the national flag. It was not with the past, he reminded them, but with the present and the future that their welfare was bound up. They were exhorted to go manfully to work and reëstablish civil government. The submission to law and the prompt acquiescence of those recently hostile to the United States he regarded as a hopeful sign. Even the soldiers, he said, returned to their homes better and wiser men, promising by a cheerful obedience to law to atone for past errors. All citizens were urged to imitate their example. Provisional appointments to county offices would be made until they could be filled by election. In naming persons for such places the Governor promised to be guided by the recommendation of the people if they selected men of good reputation who had taken the amnesty oath, which would be a prerequisite in every case. If the people did not act promptly he would feel compelled to make appointments upon the best information obtainable. If errors were made, then citizens would be themselves to blame for neglecting promptly to suggest the proper persons. A provisional judiciary would also be constituted.

Important elections, he announced, would take place in the autumn, when Representatives to Congress and members of a Legislature would be chosen. If each parish was provided with the proper officers to open the polls an election for governor and other State officers would take place at the same time. The people addressed were informed that in making the new constitution its framers did not intend to deprive them of their rights. The response to this appeal was a local reorganization in nearly all the parishes affected.

Governor Wells, on September 21, in a second order appointed the 6th of November succeeding as the day for holding the election, and also defined the qualifications of voters. White male citizens of the United States who had attained the age of twenty-one years and had resided twelve months in the commonwealth were declared entitled to exercise the suffrage. Evidence was also required of every elector that he had taken the oath of amnesty contained in the proclamation of December 8, 1863, or that prescribed, May 29, 1865, by Mr. Johnson. The excepted classes could vote only upon receiving a special pardon from the President. In other respects the election would be conducted in accordance with the constitution of 1852.

By a Democratic convention, held October 2 in New Orleans, at which twenty-one parishes were unrepresented, Mr. Wells was unanimously nominated for Governor. The preamble to a body of resolutions adopted on that occasion asserts that the issue which for four years had tried the strength of the Government had been made openly and manfully; that the decision having been adverse they now came forward in the same spirit of frankness and honor to support the Federal Government under the Constitution.

The “National Democratic” party they believed to be the only agency by which radicalism, to which they imputed a tendency toward consolidation, could be successfully encountered, and through which the General Government could be restored to its pristine purity. On the subject of reorganization they endorsed President Johnson’s policy, which, it was alleged, preserved unimpaired the rights of the States and maintained their equality in the Union.

Noticing a question already assuming importance, they declared that, in accordance with the constant adjudication of the Federal Supreme Court, persons of African descent could not be regarded as citizens of the United States; that under no circumstances could there exist any equality between the white and other races; that as the national Government was instituted by, so it was designed to be perpetuated for the exclusive benefit of, white men. For the time they were content with this oblique reference to the subject of negro suffrage. Another resolution advised the calling of a convention to frame a constitution for the State, that of 1864 being characterized as the creation of fraud, violence and corruption.

This convention, which admitted the effectual abolition of slavery in the South, assumed that those who had sustained loss by the policy of emancipation could rightfully petition Congress for compensation. The repeal was also advocated of those statutes and ordinances not in harmony with the Federal Constitution. Believing it consonant with “the chivalrous magnanimity” of President Johnson the convention earnestly appealed for an early general amnesty and a prompt restitution of property.

Almost a month preceding the meeting of this convention an address was circulated by the “National Conservative Union” party, whose representatives assembled one week later than the Democratic delegates. Its members opposed both an extension of suffrage to negroes and the calling of a new constitutional convention. Like the Democratic delegates they endorsed the reconstruction policy of the President. They approved the attitude of their conservative Northern friends who opposed radicalism and an elevation of the freedmen to political equality with whites. The doctrine of secession was repudiated, and to the payment of all obligations created in carrying on the war they declared themselves inflexibly opposed. They, too, favored the speedy passage of an act of general amnesty as well as a repeal of the confiscation law.

Governor Wells was also the choice of this convention. He accepted both nominations and perceived no inconsistency in doing so, never, he asserted, having been a strict party man. Mr. Wells, who had formerly been a Red River planter, proved his loyalty to the Federal Government by coming within the Union lines as soon as they were established, and bringing with him his slaves, thereby endangering somewhat his ownership.

Though he had not yet returned to his home, the friends of Henry Watkins Allen, the late Confederate executive, named him as their candidate for governor.

In the election, which was held at the appointed time, the entire vote polled was 27,808, of which Governor Wells received 23,312, and ex-Governor Allen, 5,497. In every county except one the Democratic ticket for members of the Legislature was successful.

Perhaps the most instructive incident of this contest was the part played by those known as “Radical” Republicans. These held a mass-meeting in the city of New Orleans on November 13 at which were adopted resolutions claiming the election to Congress of Henry C. Warmoth as territorial Delegate. When he subsequently appeared in Washington his case was brought to the attention of the House by Thaddeus Stevens, who offered, December 20, 1865, what purported to be a certificate of Warmoth’s election as Delegate from the “Territory of Louisiana.” On request of the Pennsylvania leader this document was referred to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.[449]

This extreme element, which assumed to regard Louisiana as a Territory, polled 19,000 votes, most of which were alleged to have been cast by colored men. It declared the State organization repugnant to the Federal Constitution both in law and effect. The President, it was asserted, could not restore Louisiana by proclamation, for reinstatement could be accomplished in a constitutional manner only by petitioning Congress for admission whenever a majority of the people deemed such a course expedient, and the temper of the whites, nine tenths of whom were disloyal, rendered it inadvisable at that time to take such a step. The meeting rejoiced that the Republican party in the North had triumphed in the recent elections, for these victories pointed to ultimate success. The premature admission of Louisiana Congressmen, by placing the Union people under rebel rule, would be disastrous. However, as loyal citizens they would confine themselves to peaceable means of redress.

Warmoth appears shortly before the end of the war to have gone into Louisiana with the Union army, in which he is said by one authority to have acquired the reputation of a brave soldier and by another to have merited dismissal from its ranks.[450] By organizing the freedmen and insisting upon their political rights he won their confidence; his shrewdness and engaging address retained their gratitude. In this election his adherents not only sought to determine the Federal relations of Louisiana, but also conferred upon negroes the privilege of voting, for there was then no law of either the General or State government investing them with any such right.

The Legislature, which was convoked in special session, assembled at New Orleans on the 23d of November. The Governor’s message on that occasion related chiefly to such local objects as required the attention of the lawmaking body. By recommending an election of United States Senators Mr. Wells repudiated the action of the General Assembly, which, at the preceding session, had appointed Messrs. Smith and Cutler to represent the State. Acting upon the Governor’s suggestion, the latter was again chosen, with Hahn for his colleague. These appointments were intended to fill vacancies caused by the withdrawal, February 5, 1861, of John Slidell and Judah P. Benjamin.

One of the first acts of the lower House was the selection of a committee to consider a resolution which provided for assembling a convention to draft a State constitution. For reasons already assigned the majority report of this committee recommended the calling of a convention and counselled the Governor to order an election in which the question could be voted on by the people. The minority recognized the constitution of 1864 as binding, and on the ground of public economy preferred its amendment, especially as it had already acted favorably on the abolition of slavery. The adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and the repeal of the ordinance of secession were mentioned by them as conditions essential to the recognition of Louisiana as a State and as indispensable to a restoration of all the privileges which that condition implied.

As early as February 17 preceding the Legislature established under the constitution of 1864 had ratified the Thirteenth Article amending the Constitution. By a vote of two to one the Assembly again approved that action. The session came to an end on the 22d of December.

This commonwealth, a veritable Eden when the strife began, had been sadly changed in its progress. A generous Government, indeed, by repairing the levees protected her fairest parishes from inundation. The same beneficent authority maintained many public institutions of charity that must else have ceased their noble work. Distress and want had already invaded that once prosperous community, and in the city of New Orleans alone 16,000 persons were dependent upon and maintained by Federal bounty. Silence reigned in the great cotton market of the world. The wreck of her public finances has elsewhere been described. Her opulent commerce had been destroyed, agriculture everywhere languished. Plantations that but lately teemed with rich harvests showed the effects of interrupted cultivation, and the mighty river that had annually poured into her metropolis the productions of a dozen States now flowed untroubled to the Gulf.

To show the attitude of Congress toward the Alexandria government events in Virginia have in part been anticipated. The Legislature of the loyal portion of that Commonwealth was composed of members from only ten counties and parts of other counties. It was by delegates from this restricted area that the constitution of 1864 was framed and adopted.

By this instrument the elective franchise was confined to male whites that had attained the age of twenty-one years, who had resided twelve months in the State and were willing to swear support of the Federal Constitution and the restored government; but officials and voters were required in addition to make oath, or affirmation, that they had not, since January 1, 1864, voluntarily given aid or assistance to those in rebellion against the General Government. The Assembly, however, was empowered, when it was deemed safe to do so, to restore to citizenship all who would be disfranchised by this provision of the organic law.

Involuntary servitude was also abolished. While great numbers of negroes were thus set at liberty, nothing was then done to elevate them to the dignity of citizens. The question of making them voters was, of course, still more remote.