Chapter XXII: Section 13: provided that “if any person declared free by this or any law (5)

“These, sir, are the facts. The Committee on the Judiciary—and in the conclusion to which they came I concurred—were of opinion that under the circumstances in which the State was at the period when these proceedings were had, she could not be recognized as a State of the United States under that constitution adopted in 1864, except by an act of Congress. The committee were of opinion that it was not in the power of the Executive under the circumstances to bring the State back under that constitution. They were of opinion, however, that it was competent for Congress to do so, and the only question before the Committee was, whether, under the circumstances under which the State was at the time, it was not the duty of Congress to bring the State back so as to have her represented in the Union.”

His objection to the conclusion of the committee was that the proceedings which led to the adoption of the constitution were instituted at the instance and under the power of the Federal military authorities. The precedent, he admitted, was really a bad one, and the proposition upon which the committee were called to decide was whether, if they were satisfied that the number of votes said to have been cast were in fact cast, and the persons voting were loyal citizens, they should be denied the privilege of being represented in the councils of the nation and subjected to a continuance of military power. Mr. Johnson added: “My impression is that, no matter how the proceedings were instituted, whether it was by the military authority, or by the coming together of the people of the State, if in point of fact the people of the State did act voluntarily and were competent to act under the original constitution, and were authorized to act by being loyal at the time they did act, it is the duty of the government of the United States to receive them back.

“Another objection was that, however true it might be that it would be in the power of all the voters of the State to adopt a constitution for themselves, or to claim the right of coming back to the Union under the constitution existing at the time of the rebellion, it was not true that it was in the power of fourteen [eleven] thousand, four hundred and fourteen voters, when the entire voting population of the State was fifty-one thousand, to take that course. As it seemed to me then, and seems now, there is no evidence to show that a single citizen of Louisiana was excluded from the right of voting.”

It was not so certain, he argued further, that the eleven thousand voters who participated were not a large majority of the actual electors in Louisiana, for the war engaged the greater part of the voting population, and nine tenths of those who entered the Confederate service had forfeited their lives upon the battlefield; of those above or below the military age many had gone elsewhere, or if they remained in the State it was as disloyal citizens.

It was not pretended, he said, in discussing the relation of the loyal minority to the General Government, that by the act of secession they ceased to be citizens of the United States. Their fidelity to the Union entitled them to Federal protection. If loyal, they had forfeited no rights belonging to them before the commencement of the rebellion. No Federal law had been violated, no constitutional obligation evaded by them. They could not ask admission into the Union, because to speak such a desire was to subject themselves to punishment; when the protection of the United States was afforded them and they could once more declare their sentiments without hazard they met at their several election polls, organized their government under existing law, and then, wishing to change it, met in convention and adopted the constitution which had been submitted to the Senate. “Why,” inquired Mr. Johnson, “should we not receive it?” The right of eleven thousand citizens to change their constitution was not denied, but their action was questioned because there were others, then in arms against the Government of the United States, who did not join them in asserting it. In examining the question who were to exercise the authority of the State, he argued: “Now, if it be true that the secession ordinance had no operation to carry the State out, and that I understand even the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner] admitted last night; if it be true that the State is in the Union notwithstanding the ordinance, then the only question to be considered is, who are the people of Louisiana that are to exercise the sovereign authority belonging to the State of Louisiana? Are they the loyal or the disloyal? There can be but one answer to that inquiry. It must only be the loyal.”

Senator Howard admitted, continued Mr. Johnson, that it is not in the power of the United States to change the territorial limits of the States that had gone out, because the Constitution prohibits it. If he had thought for a moment he would have seen that the Constitution equally prohibits any interference on the part of the General Government with the exercise of the right of suffrage in a State. He then combated at some length the intimation of Senators Howard and Sumner that any power without a State had a right to prescribe qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage.

Mr. Powell, too, concurred in this view and asked by what authority General Banks and the President undertook to prescribe the qualifications of voters in Louisiana. The Maryland Senator replied that this question had been anticipated. The eleven thousand four hundred and fourteen voters, according to the proof before the Senate, were all loyal men and entitled to vote by the original constitution of Louisiana, no matter how they were brought together. If, coming together, they did an act which they would have been authorized to do if they had come together voluntarily they ought to be received.

Powell then inquired, what right had the Senate to presume that there may not have been twelve thousand loyal voters in Louisiana who were deprived of the right of suffrage because of this order of General Banks? As the Kentucky Senator understood it, no man could vote “unless he would go forward and take the oath prescribed by the President and swear to support and sustain all proclamations in regard to African slavery already issued and all that might afterward be issued.” Mr. Johnson acknowledged this difficulty and admitted that he had always felt it; but they had the same difficulty, he asserted, in his own State, and a much greater one; he would be sorry to think Maryland was not in the Union. “Maryland is in the Union,” said Senator Powell. “The constitution,” observed Johnson in reply, “which now makes her a State in the Union was adopted the other day. I mean the one which governs her. She has manumitted her slaves by force of that constitution. No man in Maryland seriously contests the obligation of that constitution in that particular or in any other. But it was adopted, in fact, by the exclusion of a good many men who were entitled to vote.”

Mr. Johnson at this point became engaged in an argument, not wholly relevant, with Sumner in which he gained some advantage over the Massachusetts Senator. As a specimen of the latter’s parliamentary tactics at this time it may not be irrelevant to reproduce a passage from the _Congressional Globe_.

=Mr. Sumner.= Allow me to ask the Senator [Johnson] whether, in his
opinion, the Ordinance governing the Northwest Territory,
prohibiting slavery everywhere throughout that Territory, and which
was declared to be a perpetual compact, could be set aside by any
one of the States in the Territory now.

=Mr. Johnson.= I certainly think they can, except so far as rights
are vested.

=Mr. Sumner.= The Senator, then, thinks Ohio can enslave a
fellow-man?

=Mr. Johnson.= Just as much as Massachusetts can.

=Mr. Sumner.= Massachusetts cannot.

=Mr. Johnson.= Why not?

=Mr. Sumner.= Massachusetts cannot do an act of injustice.

=Mr. Johnson.= Oh, indeed! I did not know that. [Laughter.][411]

Notwithstanding this claim for his native State Sumner admitted a moment later that Massachusetts had united in the Convention of 1787 with South Carolina to deny to Congress authority to prohibit the slave trade for twenty years, and he confessed that such action was unjust. His inconsistency was still further exposed by Senator Henderson, who called attention to the fact that the educational qualification imposed by the Massachusetts constitution would exclude from the franchise almost every negro in Louisiana if the provisions were applicable in the latter State.[412]

After this colloquy, not uninteresting to the student of constitutional history, the Maryland Senator resumed his remarks:

“One word more, sir, and I have done. If Congress passes this resolution, and the State is admitted, no court will hereafter be able to decide that she is not a State in the Union, and no court therefore can call in question the validity or effect of any provision to be found in her constitution. One of the provisions of this constitution is that all the slaves of Louisiana are emancipated. Pass this resolution, admit the State, and that provision is effectual at once.”[413]

Mr. Sumner, having in mind the fundamental condition imposed by Congress upon the admission of Missouri, offered the following amendment of the resolution from the Committee on the Judiciary:

_Provided_, That this shall not take effect except upon the
fundamental condition that within the State there shall be no denial
of the electoral franchise, or of any other rights on account of
color or race, but all persons shall be equal before the law. And
the Legislature of the State, by a solemn public act, shall declare
the assent of the State to this fundamental condition, and shall
transmit to the President of the United States an authentic copy of
such assent whenever the same shall be adopted, upon the receipt
whereof he shall, by proclamation, announce the fact; whereupon,
without any further proceedings on the part of Congress, this joint
resolution shall take effect.[414]

Though Senator Clark favored the principle of Sumner’s amendment, he opposed it, as it stood, because it affected a resolution which proposed “to recognize the government in the State of Louisiana,” which in his judgment was still a State in the Union, “having its constitution overthrown, but desiring and attempting to establish a new” one; and he added, “I hold that we have no power to amend that constitution; and that is the reason why I shall be obliged to vote against it here.”

He spoke for the adoption of Trumbull’s resolution and, in doing so, traveled some of the ground gone over by Henderson. The government of Louisiana, Mr. Clark believed, belonged to the Union people. He was not aware that any definite number of persons was required to constitute a State, nor did he understand how the majority by going into rebellion could take away the rights of the loyal minority.

The guaranty of a republican form of government was made, he asserted, to meet precisely such a case as had arisen in Louisiana. In this view it became the duty of Congress to protect the government established by the minority.[415]

Mr. Pomeroy, speaking to the principle of Sumner’s amendment, declared that he would vote against all measures that looked like Congressional interference with the right to vote in the States. Saulsbury interrupted him to inquire what he would have done had the President, or his Secretary of War, sent armed soldiers to the polls and imposed a test upon voters as was done in Delaware, where Democrats were chased into swamps and compelled in the night time to lie out in the snow. Pomeroy’s only reply to this was to relate his own experience under Democratic supremacy in the early days of Kansas. He resumed his remarks on Louisiana, but these had been anticipated by the speakers who preceded him. In conclusion he asserted that there were two reasons for recognizing Arkansas where there was but one in favor of Louisiana.[416]

The Delaware Senator did not fail to call attention to Pomeroy’s evasion, and said he was glad to observe a change in the spirit of some of his Republican friends. “I think,” he said, “they begin to scent the danger in the distance; that they begin to see that if a Government of law is to be destroyed, and power is to be concentrated in Executive hands, or in the hands of Executive agents, there is an end of liberty in this country. I hail the dawn, therefore, of a better day.”[417]

Mr. Henderson again entered into the discussion, and in the course of his remarks drew from Senator Sumner this remarkable statement concerning Louisiana: “It is in and it is not. [Laughter.] The territory is in; but as yet there is no State government that is in.” In this discussion Sumner asserted also that when the bill of his friend Senator Wade was before Congress no one questioned its constitutionality though it proposed to interfere in the suffrage and to impose a condition upon States at the time of their reconstruction. Pomeroy dissented from the doctrine that Congress could reconstruct the insurgent States, and maintained that the only question then was whether they would recognize what the people of Louisiana had done.

Reverdy Johnson pointed out to Sumner the great increase of representation in Congress which the South would acquire by an extension of the suffrage to negroes. The three fifths provision, he said, would be done away with, and he made the further observation that for years to come the entire colored vote of that section would be in the hands of a few white men. He urged recognition of both Louisiana and Arkansas, so that the constitutional amendment would become binding, for unless ratified by three fourths of all the States it would be open to doubt.

The session was drawing rapidly toward its close; it was late in the evening of February 25, and the resolution under discussion was too important to be passed without due consideration. These circumstances offered Mr. Wade, who vehemently opposed the measure, a decent pretext for demanding the “yeas” and “nays” on his motion to postpone the subject till the first Monday of December following, 1865.

Before a vote was reached on this motion, however, Powell spoke again at considerable length. In addition to his former arguments, many of which were repeated, he said that “all the loyal Union men in the State of Louisiana who refused, like supple menials and slaves, to crouch beneath the iron military power of General Banks, and take that oath were excluded from voting,” and he added, “I believe to-day there are more men of that description in Louisiana than voted to ratify this constitution.”

When asked by Mr. Henderson whether he had heard of any objection to it on the part of the loyal men of Louisiana, Powell answered that Thomas J. Durant and thirty-one others, distinguished, leading, loyal men of that State, had made earnest and powerful protest against it, and remonstrated against the admission to Congress of Senators and Representatives from Louisiana. They were also opposed to counting her electoral vote. Mr. Durant, he believed, was the first district-attorney appointed in Louisiana by the present Executive. Henderson insinuated by an inquiry that Durant was himself a candidate for office at that election and took the oath prescribed. Powell not being informed on these points, the matter was left in doubt.

The Kentucky Senator took this opportunity to characterize the manner of General Banks in his statement before the Judiciary Committee as that of a “swift witness, to make a case that he thought would cause Louisiana to be admitted.” He also called upon some advocate of the resolution to explain a support of the present measure after voting a few days before for the resolution declaring that the electoral vote of Louisiana should not be counted. If Louisiana was then a legitimate government, why, he asked, was she not entitled to cast her electoral vote? He did not then believe it a legitimate government and so opposed the counting of her electoral vote; but the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Johnson] and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Henderson], who then voted with him, now supported the resolution.[418]

Wade’s motion to postpone further consideration of the joint resolution till the first Monday of December was defeated by a vote of 17 to 12.[419]

In the course of the discussions to postpone Sumner said that he would regard its passage as a national calamity. It would be the political Bull Run of that Administration, sacrificing, as it would, a great cause and the great destinies of this Republic. When Trumbull taxed him with intent to postpone discussion by dilatory motions the Massachusetts Senator admitted his opposition and declared that to defeat the measure he would employ any weapon in the arsenal of parliamentary warfare.

The friends of the Administration endeavored to press their adversaries to take final action on the resolution. The earnestness of the two factions provoked rather sharp censure of Sumner and the few Republicans who acted with him and were attempting by dilatory motions to fatigue the Senate into a postponement. Doolittle was especially severe on them, and particularly on Sumner, who replied with much asperity. He was supported by Howard and Chandler, while Trumbull, Foster and Doolittle undertook a defence of the resolution and its advocates. This wrangling appears to have delighted the Democratic members. Mr. Hendricks, indeed, made no attempt to conceal his satisfaction.

“The discordant elements of the Republican party are exhibiting themselves here,” said the Indiana Senator, “and I venture the prophecy that a like exhibition will be witnessed over the country within a very few years. But four years ago, at the Chicago Convention, when Mr. Lincoln was nominated for the Presidency a solemn pledge was made to the people of this country that that party, when it came into power, would not undertake to interfere with the institutions of the States. As soon as the disturbed condition of the country gave the pretext for it, the undertaking was commenced; and now, when, in the judgment of some, it has been accomplished, there comes up the grave question, what is to be done, and what is to be the political condition of the four million negroes when they are set free? And upon that question the real strife of to-night has been witnessed. That is the subject and it need not be disguised. It is growing out of the discordant elements of the party that now governs the country.”[420]

Trumbull, in reply to an inquiry of Senator Wade, said that he had voted against receiving the electoral vote of Louisiana because it had not been recognized. Now he proposed to put it in a condition where it could cast electoral votes, and do all other acts belonging to a State.

To this Wade replied that “If the President of the United States, operating through his major-generals, can initiate a State government, and can bring it here and force us, compel us, to receive as associates on this floor these mere mockeries, these men of straw who represent nobody, your Republic is at an end.

“Sir, I have heard a great deal about this pretended election in Louisiana that did not come from Major-General Banks, and I pronounce the proceeding a mockery. It is not pretended that there could be drummed up from the riffraff of New Orleans and sent into the vicinity under the mandate of a Major-General more than about six thousand votes, where over fifty thousand were formerly polled.

* * * * *

“Talk not to me of your ten per cent. principle. A more absurd, monarchical, and anti-American principle was never announced on God’s earth——“[421]

At this point Senator Sherman, of Ohio, interposed to obtain consideration for a revenue measure which he had in charge, whereupon his colleague changed somewhat the declamation against the resolution to a denunciation of its advocates, especially Trumbull, upon whom he retorted the charge of retarding legitimate business. Howard resented the charge of radical factiousness and denounced Trumbull with considerable warmth. Sherman suggested that enough had been said on both sides, and in the lighter skirmishing of the breathing-spell which followed, Mr. Sprague, of Rhode Island, hitherto a silent spectator of these exciting scenes, declared that he held in his possession a paper indicating the names of the members of the Louisiana Legislature, and it showed that twenty-five, or twenty-seven or thirty of those gentlemen who constituted that assembly were officeholders of the Federal Government, or the government of the State, which, he said, was the same thing.[422]

While Sherman’s measure and Trumbull’s resolution were competing for priority of consideration Sumner remarked that during the preceding summer, 1864, he had met a distinguished gentleman just returned from Louisiana; he had been present at some of the sittings of the convention, having been in New Orleans in discharge of important public duties. This gentleman, added Sumner, said compendiously that the convention was “nothing but a stupendous hoax.”

When Reverdy Johnson inquired the name of Sumner’s informant, Senator Grimes replied that he could furnish a large number of names of persons present in New Orleans when the convention was held, and added: “If the Senate will give a committee I will undertake to prove and I will prove that the voters whose votes were polled in the outlying parishes at Thibodeaux and Placquemines, and other places, were carried in army transports to those places where they polled the votes, being discharged soldiers and persons belonging in New Orleans, and were brought back to New Orleans, and were not residents of the places where they purported to vote.”[423]

Sumner, immediately after the uncontroverted statement of Mr. Grimes, added, with more energy than elegance: “The pretended State government in Louisiana is utterly indefensible whether you look at its origin or its character. To describe it, I must use plain language. It is a mere seven-months’ abortion, begotten by the bayonet in criminal conjunction with the spirit of caste, and born before its time, rickety, unformed, unfinished—whose continued existence will be a burden, a reproach, and a wrong. That is the whole case; and yet the Senator from Illinois now presses it upon the Senate at this moment to the exclusion of the important public business of the country.”[424]

The urgency of the army and navy appropriation bills prevented for the time further consideration of the Louisiana question. The subject, however, was again brought before the Senate on March 2, 1865, by Mr. Doolittle, who had received and had been requested to file with the secretary of the Senate a certificate, under seal of the State of Louisiana, of the election of Michael Hahn as a Senator of the United States from the State of Louisiana for six years from March 4, 1865. Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, opposed its reception. Doolittle’s motion to have it laid on the table and filed was, however, agreed to.

Only two days of the session remained; in the temper of the Senate it was impossible that the resolution could pass at that time, and the House had not yet taken it up for discussion. In these circumstances the measure was abandoned, though very reluctantly, by its champions.

-----

Footnote 399:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1395.

Footnote 400:

Globe, Part I., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., pp. 971–974.

Footnote 401:

Ibid., p. 903.

Footnote 402:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1011.

Footnote 403:

Ibid.

Footnote 404:

Ibid.

Footnote 405:

Globe, Part I., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., pp. 1061–1064.

Footnote 406:

While this chapter was in press an interesting letter from Senator
Henderson informed the author that the Hon. Samuel Treat, of St.
Louis, formerly Judge of the United States Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, is the distinguished jurist referred to in the
text.

Footnote 407:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., pp. 1065–1070.

Footnote 408:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1091.

Footnote 409:

In support of this view the Senator cited Penhallow’s Case, 3 Dallas,
p. 94.

Footnote 410:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., pp. 1091–1095.

Footnote 411:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1097.

Footnote 412:

Ibid.

Footnote 413:

Ibid., pp. 1095–1098.

Footnote 414:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1099.

Footnote 415:

Ibid., pp. 1101–1102.

Footnote 416:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., pp. 1101–1102.

Footnote 417:

Ibid., p. 1102.

Footnote 418:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., pp. 1106–1107.

Footnote 419:

Ibid., p. 1107.

Footnote 420:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1111.

Footnote 421:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1128.

Footnote 422:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1129.

Footnote 423:

Ibid.

Footnote 424:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 1129.

XI
INCIDENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION

The Emancipation Proclamation did not affect, as is well known, the status of slaves in the loyal border States or in the excepted parts of Virginia and Louisiana. The State of Tennessee, too, as we have seen, was not named in the edict of freedom; that was published by the President simply as a measure of military necessity, and was not regarded by him or by others as operative to prevent, when war had ceased, a revival of servitude in the insurgent States, for negroes could easily be imported from those loyal commonwealths still tolerating that institution. It was uncertain, too, how the proclamation would affect the status of slaves in those districts not yet overrun by the Union armies. In the border States, in Tennessee and in the excepted parts of Louisiana and Virginia there were probably 2,000,000 men in bondage. In order, then, to abolish universally as well as permanently to prohibit involuntary servitude an amendment of the Constitution was proposed in the familiar language of the sixth section of the ordinance of 1787. Though it passed the Senate, April 8, 1864, it failed at that time to receive in the House the requisite two thirds vote. It has been seen how upon the recommendation of Mr. Lincoln it was reconsidered and passed by the Representatives at a succeeding session, January 31, 1865, and submitted to the States for their action. It was adopted by his own State, Illinois, on the following day. By the close of February sixteen others had followed its example, and before the President’s death twenty in all had ratified the Amendment. To Mr. Lincoln, who had long held anti-slavery opinions, this expression of public sentiment was extremely grateful; indeed, less than two months before his assassination he declared his satisfaction at the popular verdict, and his confidence that the States would consummate what Congress had so nobly begun. The Thirteenth Amendment, however, was not announced as part of the organic law until after the Presidential plan of reconstruction had been ignored by the Thirty-ninth Congress. This subject, therefore, need not be further discussed in these pages.

The extraordinary amount of work actually completed by the national Legislature can be comprehended only by considering the degree of perfection to which the committee system has been carried under congressional government. Measures that conduct the reader over vast stretches of the records of Congress occupy but a day or two in the calendar. The discussions described in the two preceding chapters did not, as might be supposed, engage the entire attention of Federal legislators. It was desirable, if, indeed, it was not essential, that the sentiments of the lawmaking body of the nation be authoritatively declared on the question of admitting members to Congress from those States reconstituted under the Executive plan; definitive action in the matter of the electoral votes which they presented was also awaited with not a little interest. Scarcely inferior in importance and more instructive than these measures was the passage of an act, approved March 3, 1865, which created in the War Department a “Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands.” As the system of relief then inaugurated was destined to become an important agency in the work of reconstruction a brief account of its origin and institution may not be deemed superfluous.

A former chapter has related how great numbers of “contrabands,” by assembling early in the war at Fortress Monroe and Newport News, taxed the ingenuity of even General Butler to provide for their maintenance; it also noticed an attempt under Mr. E. L. Pierce to improve the condition of abandoned slaves in South Carolina, and the friendly interest of Secretary Chase in that experiment. But the hundreds of fugitives within Federal lines in May, 1861, had grown to be millions by the beginning of 1865. Of this army of homeless freedmen the policy of enlisting colored troops provided directly for nearly 200,000 able-bodied males. The women, the children and the large class unsuitable for military service left a multitude still unprovided for. Some relief, it is true, was afforded by the Treasury Department, which undertook to establish on abandoned and confiscated lands colonies of self-supporting negroes, but the ignorance and rapacity of many persons entrusted with the supervision of this work led to its general failure. Here and there, indeed, more satisfactory results were obtained, though these isolated successes seldom reached the point of actual encouragement. The South Carolina experiment may, therefore, be properly regarded as the germ of the Freedmen’s Bureau.

The progress of these communities had been watched anxiously by the abolition and the kindred associations which sprang up to continue the work that anti-slavery men had begun. On this subject a committee representing the Freedmen’s Aid Societies of Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Cincinnati addressed, December 1, 1863, an able memorial to the President. Without expressing a favorable opinion of the plan suggested by the petitioners, Mr. Lincoln referred the question, as one of great magnitude and importance, to the consideration of Congress. The Freedmen’s Aid Societies, however, had been anticipated by Representative Eliot, of Massachusetts, who had offered, January 12, 1863, a bill to establish a Bureau of Emancipation, which was referred to a select committee; but other business, regarded as more urgent, prevented them from reporting at that time a measure which had been prepared. At the succeeding session the proposition was offered again. After numerous efforts to secure favorable action, efforts extending over a period of two years, Congress took the subject into consideration. The House proposed one, the Senate a different measure; a committee of conference suggested something unlike either, though embodying important features of both. This, like every proposition affecting the negro, encountered considerable opposition. The creation of such a bureau, said its adversaries, conceded the very point that pro-slavery men had always maintained; namely, that the negro was incapable of taking care of himself. The extent of its powers, its duration and the cost of its maintenance were successively made grounds of opposition by those hostile to its establishment. Nor did its enemies fail to point out the great temptation to abuse which was offered by the system.

The act established in the War Department, to continue during the rebellion and for one year thereafter, a bureau to which should be committed the management of all confiscated or abandoned lands, and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from any district within the territory embraced in the operations of the army, under such regulations as might be adopted by the head of the bureau and approved by the President.

The conduct of the bureau was entrusted to a commissioner appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Senate. In the exercise of his functions he was to be assisted by such clerks as the Secretary of War might assign him; their number, of course, was limited by law. For his compensation the head of the new bureau was to receive a sum fixed at $3,000 per annum. To aid in executing the provisions of the act the President was authorized to select, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, one assistant commissioner for each of the States declared to be in insurrection, not, however, to exceed ten in number, each to receive an annual salary of $2,500.

The Secretary of War, besides assigning clerks of the several grades mentioned in the law, was authorized to issue, under regulations which he might himself prescribe, such provisions, clothing and fuel as might be deemed needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen as well as their wives and children. Any military officer could be detailed to duty under the act, but without increase of pay or allowances.

It was further provided that the commissioner, “under the direction of the President, shall have authority to set apart, for the use of loyal refugees and freedmen, such tracts of land within the insurrectionary States as shall have been abandoned, or to which the United States shall have acquired title by confiscation or sale, or otherwise, and to every male citizen, whether refugee or freedman, as aforesaid, there shall be assigned not more than forty acres of such land, and the person to whom it was so assigned shall be protected in the use and enjoyment of the land for the term of three years at an annual rent not exceeding six per centum upon the value of said land, as it was appraised by the State authorities in the year 1860, for the purpose of taxation, and in case no such appraisal can be found, then the rental shall be based upon the estimated value of the land in said year, to be ascertained in such manner as the commissioner may by regulation prescribe. At the end of said term, or at any time during said term, the occupants of any parcels so assigned may purchase the land, and receive such title thereto as the United States can convey, upon paying therefor the value of the land, as ascertained and fixed for the purpose of determining the annual rent aforesaid.”[425]

It was made the duty of the assistant commissioners to submit a quarterly report of their proceedings to the commissioner, who in turn was required to report annually to the President before the commencement of each regular session of Congress. Special reports might from time to time be requested of either the head of the bureau or his subordinates.

The bureau thus established was organized principally by officers of the regular army under direction of General Oliver O. Howard, who had been selected by President Johnson as commissioner. It soon grew to vast proportions. At first it was economically managed and beneficent in its influence; subsequently, however, it degenerated into an abuse. Interesting and instructive as would be an inquiry into its operations, the history of this politico-philanthropic experiment does not fall within the limits of this work.

Since the adjournment, February 27, 1861, of the Peace Convention, which had been in session at Washington endeavoring to discover, if possible, a means of avoiding the irrepressible conflict, there was a large class who believed that if only they had been directing the policy of Government the outbreak could have been averted; even when war was flagrant and passions were highest this class, though diminished greatly in numbers, did not altogether despair of effecting a settlement between the sections. Besides these well-meaning patriots there were not a few who were ambitious of notoriety or possessed of an undue opinion of their own importance. Persons of both classes attempted from time to time to bring about an armistice which would facilitate negotiations between the two governments. The efforts of these men have no further bearing on the subject of reconstruction than as they serve to show Mr. Lincoln’s views in successive stages of the conflict.

Prominent among these attempts was the Jacquess-Gilmore mission, which has been described in an interesting volume of Rebellion reminiscences by one of the participants.[426] Horace Greeley’s career as a diplomat is also a familiar story, which at once illustrates the guilelessness of the editor and the sagacity of the President. Mr. Greeley’s failure at Niagara Falls, however, did not discourage a similar undertaking by Hon. Jeremiah S. Black, who, with no greater success, had an interview in Canada with his former friend Jacob Thompson.[427]

More important, because of its consequences, than the work of any of these volunteer commissioners was the visit of Francis P. Blair, Sr., to Richmond. This distinguished politician and editor had in the days of Nullification assisted in shaping the policy of the Government. The bosom friend and confidential adviser of Andrew Jackson, Mr. Blair thoroughly understood Southern feeling, and from long residence in Washington was intimately acquainted with Southern leaders. His political victories in the past encouraged, no doubt, the hope of some notable achievement to crown his maturer years. For some time he had been meditating a plan of reunion which would not only end the strife but contribute to heal the wounds of war. Though anxious to communicate his project to the President, he received no encouragement to do so. By requesting Blair to call upon him after the fall of Savannah Mr. Lincoln evaded a discussion of the subject. That contingency, however, was not remote, and late in December the veteran political leader received from the President a card bearing these words:

Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go South, and
return.

=A. Lincoln.=

_December 28, 1864._

With this credential Mr. Blair went at once to the camp of General Grant, whence under flags of truce he sent two communications to Jefferson Davis requesting, among other things, permission for an interview. This, after some delay, was granted, and on the 12th of January, 1865, he found himself in Richmond face to face with the Confederate President. What transpired is accurately known from accounts of the meeting by both Blair and Davis. The former admitted frankly that Mr. Lincoln afforded him no opportunity to explain the object of his mission, and, indeed, appeared anxious to avoid an interview on that subject. When he had been assured that the Confederate authorities were under no engagements to European powers that would prevent their entering into arrangements with the Government of the United States Mr. Blair unfolded his plan by reading to Mr. Davis a carefully prepared paper embodying the following suggestions:

Slavery, he said, was doomed, for even the South itself had proposed to employ the slave in winning its independence. That institution, therefore, no longer remained as an obstacle to peace. Louis Napoleon, he continued, had declared publicly that his object was to make the Latin race supreme in the southern part of North America. This, indeed, had been an idea of the Emperor’s uncle, who desired at one time to make conquests of territory in the States bordering the Gulf, and the foothold already effected in Mexico was one step in the accomplishment of this grand design. After developing these points Mr. Blair added, “Jefferson Davis is the fortunate man who now holds the commanding position to encounter this formidable scheme of conquest, and whose fiat can at the same time deliver his country from the bloody agony now covering it in mourning. He can drive Maximilian from his American throne, and baffle the designs of Napoleon to subject our Southern people to the ‘Latin race.’”

How this was to be accomplished Mr. Blair’s paper outlined. President Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation looked to an armistice, which could be enlarged to embrace all engaged in the war; then by secret preliminaries to a cessation of hostilities Mr. Davis could transfer to Texas such a portion of the Confederate army as was deemed adequate to his purpose. With a Southern force on the Rio Grande and Juarez conciliated it could enter Mexico and expel her invaders. If these combined forces were insufficient, multitudes from the Federal army, officers and men, would be found ready to engage in the enterprise. Both Republicans and Democrats of the North had declared their adherence to the Monroe Doctrine.

After thus indicating for Mr. Davis a means of escape from his dilemma the adroit politician next appealed powerfully to his desire of fame. “He who expels the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty from our Southern flank,” proceeded Mr. Blair, “which General Jackson in one of his letters warned me was the vulnerable point through which foreign invasion would come, will ally his name with those of Washington and Jackson as a defender of the liberty of the country. If in delivering Mexico he should model its States in form and principle to adapt them to our Union and add a new Southern constellation to its benignant sky while rounding off our possessions on the continent at the Isthmus, and opening the way to blending the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific, thus embracing our Republic in the arms of the ocean, he would complete the work of Jefferson, who first set one foot of our colossal Government on the Pacific by a stride from the Gulf of Mexico.”[428]

Blair remarked in conclusion, “There is my problem, Mr. Davis; do you think it possible to be solved?” After a little consideration came the reply, “I think so.” Touching the question of bringing the sections together again Mr. Davis observed that though a spirit of vindictiveness had been engendered by the war, time and events would do something toward its removal. The circumstance of Northern and Southern armies united in a common cause would, he believed, assist greatly in restoring the old feeling. He also acknowledged to his visitor that European powers were pleased to see the sections exhausting their resources in mutual war.

Thus was the Confederate leader persuaded to entertain the bold project of conquering Mexico under pretence of relieving the Monroe Doctrine from its peril. The explanation of this easy conversion, however, lies mainly in the fact that Mr. Davis, however he might endeavor to conceal his convictions, was convinced that the resources of the South were scarcely equal to another campaign. Like other leaders of the Confederacy he was anxious to seize any means of escape from an embarrassing situation. He proposed to Mr. Blair, therefore, the appointment of commissioners, and mentioned Judge Campbell, formerly of the United States Supreme Court, as one qualified by his talents and integrity to undertake such a mission.

During his short sojourn in Richmond Mr. Blair learned from other prominent secessionists the hopelessness of the rebellion, and this, perhaps, was the only tangible result of his celebrated intrigue. To initiate the project Mr. Davis handed him a letter to be shown President Lincoln. That interesting communication was as follows:

=Richmond, Virginia=, _12 Jany., ’65_.

=F. P. Blair=, Esq.:

=Sir=: I have deemed it proper, and probably desirable to you, to
give you, in this form, the substance of remarks made by me, to be
repeated by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc. I have no
disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as
heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace;
and am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose
it will be received, or to receive a commission, if the United
States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding
the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise
that a commissioner, minister, or other agent, would be received,
appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into
conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries.

Yours, etc.,
=Jefferson Davis=.[429]

Mr. Lincoln’s only response to the communication thus brought to his attention was to open a little wider the door for negotiation by sending to Mr. Blair the following letter:

=Washington=, _January 18, 1865_.

=F. P. Blair=, Esq.:

=Sir=: You having shown me Mr. Davis’s letter to you of the 12th
instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and
shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other
influential person now resisting the National authority, may
informally send to me, with the view of securing peace to the people
of our one common country.

Yours, etc.,
=A. Lincoln=.

With this note Mr. Blair returned to Richmond framing as best he could excuses why President Lincoln rejected the overtures of Jefferson Davis for a joint invasion of Mexico. With the nature of these explanations this essay is not concerned. To cover his retreat from an unsuccessful intrigue the disappointed commissioner then suggested that, perhaps, Grant and Lee could enter into negotiations for peace with more assurance of success than politicians could hope to do. Though Mr. Davis offered no objection to this proposal, Blair was forced soon after to report that military negotiations were out of the question.

The Confederate leader was then compelled to choose between obstinate perseverance in his policy of a war for Southern independence or to accept frankly Mr. Lincoln’s offer of reunion. Blair’s first visit to Richmond did not escape observation, and, when his second conference was known, interest in the purpose of his mission became intense. Without some effort at negotiation Mr. Davis could not afterward satisfy the peace party in the South without subjecting himself to the injurious imputation of preferring war. In these circumstances, and after consultation with his cabinet, he authorized Alexander H. Stephens, John A. Campbell and R. M. T. Hunter to proceed to Washington as a commission for the purpose of informally conferring with Mr. Lincoln “upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries.” They were burdened with no instructions, and only one condition was insisted upon, that is, an acknowledgment of Southern independence.

Toward the end of January they presented themselves at the Federal military lines near Richmond, and, after an exchange of telegrams with the authorities in Washington, were permitted to pass on to Fortress Monroe. It was the original intention of President Lincoln to intrust the work of the conference wholly to Secretary Seward, and for this purpose he gave him the following written instructions:

=Executive Mansion,
Washington=, _January 31, 1865_.

Hon. =William H. Seward=, _Secretary of State_:

You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and
informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on
the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a
copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three
things are indispensable, to wit: _First_. The restoration of the
national authority throughout all the States. _Second._ No receding
by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from
the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress,
and in preceding documents. _Third._ No cessation of hostilities
short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile
to the Government. You will inform them that all propositions of
theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and
passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all
they may choose to say and report it to me. You will not assume to
definitely consummate anything.

Yours, etc.,
=Abraham Lincoln=.[430]

The different if not conflicting statements as to the object of their mission nearly led to a return of the Confederate representatives without any interview whatever. General Grant, fearing the unfavorable influence on the Union cause of such a result, sent to Secretary Stanton a confidential dispatch in which he referred to the evident sincerity of Stephens and Hunter. He also expressed his regret that they were about to return without an expression on the subject of their mission from any person in authority. President Lincoln, who was about to recall Mr. Seward by telegraph, decided, on reading Grant’s message, to join his Secretary at Fortress Monroe, for which place he set out at once.

The famous conference, which took place February 3, 1865, on board a steamer at Hampton Roads, has been treated in detail by nearly every historian of the Rebellion, and, therefore, need only be briefly noticed in these pages. An informal discussion of four hours occurred on the _River Queen_. By a previous agreement no writings or memoranda were made; hence our principal knowledge of what transpired at that celebrated interview is derived from accounts subsequently written out from memory by the Confederate commissioners, and from Secretary Seward’s letter to Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister to England.

Mr. Stephens, who began the discussion, asked whether there was no way of restoring former relations; to this Mr. Lincoln replied, “There was but one way that he knew of, and that was, for those who were resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance.” Stephens observed that they had been led to believe that both sections might for a time cease their present strife and unite on some continental question until passion had somewhat subsided and accommodation become possible.

To this suggestion Mr. Lincoln replied promptly: “I suppose you refer to something that Mr. Blair has said. Now it is proper to state at the beginning that whatever he said was of his own accord, and without the least authority from me.” The President then stated that before the visit to Richmond he had flatly refused to hear Mr. Blair’s propositions; he was willing, however, to hear proposals for peace on the conditions expressed in his reply to the letter of Mr. Davis. The restoration of the Union was a _sine qua non_ with him, therefore his instructions that no conference be held except on that basis.

Though the Confederate statesmen had resolved not to enter into any agreement that would require their forces to unite in an invasion of Mexico, Mr. Stephens continued to press the subject, and this after Mr. Lincoln had refused even to discuss the question. The President then brought the conversation back to the original object of the meeting, and declared that he could not entertain a proposition looking to an armistice until the paramount question of reunion was first determined.

The terms of reunion were then discussed. On this subject Mr. Lincoln is reported by the commissioners to have said that the shortest way to effect this was to disband the insurgent armies and permit “the National authorities to resume their functions.” As to the admission of members to Congress from the seceding States the President believed they ought to be received, and also that they would be; however, he could enter into no stipulations on that subject. By the cessation of resistance, he is alleged to have declared, the States would be immediately restored to their practical relations to the Union. This sentiment was probably ascribed to him for party purposes.

As the enforcement of the confiscation and other penal laws was left entirely with him he assured them that the Executive power would be exercised with the utmost liberality. The courts could determine all questions involving rights of property, and Congress, after passion had been somewhat composed, would, no doubt, be liberal in making restitution of forfeited property, or would indemnify those who had suffered.

The President refused to promise any modification whatever of the terms of his Emancipation Proclamation. He regarded it as a judicial question. How the courts would decide it he did not know. His own opinion was that as the proclamation was only a war measure, as soon as the war ceased it would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation while it was in active exercise. The courts, however, might hold that it effectually emancipated all the slaves in the States to which it applied at the time. He is reported further to have said that he interfered with slavery to maintain the Union, and then only with hesitation and under pressure of a public necessity. He had always favored emancipation, but not immediate emancipation.

On the same occasion he is said to have stated as his belief that the people of the North were not less responsible for slavery than those of the South; if the war should then cease, with the voluntary abolition of slavery by the States, he would favor, individually, payment by the Government of a fair indemnity for the loss to owners. That feeling, he believed, had an extensive existence in the loyal States. He knew some who were in favor of an appropriation as high as $400,000,000 for that purpose. However, he could enter into no stipulation. He merely expressed his own views and what he believed to be the views of others upon the subject.

Relative to the division of Virginia Mr. Lincoln said he could give only “an individual opinion, which was, that Western Virginia would continue to be recognized as a separate State in the Union.”

Seward brought to the notice of the commissioners one topic which to them was new, that is, the passage by Congress three days earlier of the proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution. He is reported to have said that it was passed in deference to the war spirit, and that if the South would agree to immediate restoration its ratification might be defeated. This, however, is doubtful, for the Cabinet as well as the President approved the action of Congress in submitting the Thirteenth Amendment to the consideration of the States; besides, it is not in harmony with Mr. Seward’s anti-slavery record.